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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other Government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
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d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
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Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Fredrick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume. John P. Glennon supervised the process of review, declassification, and final editing.

The section on Korea was compiled by Mr. Glennon, the section on policy with regard to China by Harriet D. Schwar, and that on trade restrictions and economic sanctions against China and North Korea by Paul Claussen. Technical editing was performed by Margie R. Wilber and by Joann G. Alba, under Mrs. Wilber's supervision, in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). Anne K. Pond prepared the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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NOTE ON SOURCES USED IN THE COMPILATION ON KOREA

A listing of published and unpublished sources used in the 1950 volume on Korea is contained in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII, page vii. Most of the sources there listed were used in the 1951 compilation.

In addition to the Department of State decimal files, the most important of which for Korea is file 795.00, the largest collection of material here printed was taken from Lot File 55D128, a retired office file of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, which contains the so-called "Black Book on Cease-Fire", in which were kept the telegraphic exchanges between General Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Black Book, actually a series of loose-leaf binders with each document given a tab number, was kept at the time in the office of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk and, following his departure in November 1951, in the office of U. Alexis Johnson, who had been Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Messrs. Rusk and Johnson, along with Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, were the officers in the Department primarily responsible for handling Korea on a day-to-day basis, although on U.N. matters and matters relating to the group of nations which contributed to the U.N. military effort in Korea, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson shared responsibility.

With regard to published sources, again those listed in the volume for the preceding year were helpful, particularly the official histories compiled by the Office of the Chief of Military History in the series *United States Army in the Korean War;* Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966); and James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972). Mr. Hermes' volume (p. 540) has an excellent bibliographical note concerning the location of primary sources on the cease-fire talks, which are covered in *Foreign Relations*—primarily for purposes of saving space—in the form of the daily telegraphic reports from General Ridgway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (This volume also contains a fine collection of detailed maps depicting the progress of the fighting during the year 1951.) Unofficial accounts by participants in the cease-fire talks are given in C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York, The

Macmillan Company, 1955) and William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958). See also Allan E. Goodman, ed., *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978). No responsibility is taken by the Department of State for the truth or accuracy of events set forth in unofficial sources.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Editor's Note.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AA, anti-aircraft
AC of S, Acting Chief of Staff
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
AFP, *Agence France Presse*
ALUSNA, United States Naval Attaché
AMC, Additional Measures Committee (United Nations); *see* CAM
AP, Associated Press
ASAP, as soon as possible
BJSM, British Joint Services Mission
bn, battalion
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
C of S, Chief of Staff
CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CAF, Chinese Air Force
Caltex, California Texas Oil Company, Limited
CAM, Committee on Additional Measures (or Additional Measures Committee), *ad hoc* Committee of the United Nations Collective Measures Committee, established to consider sanctions against the People's Republic of China
CC, Central Committee
CC, Chinese Communist
CCAF, Chinese Communist Air Force
CCF, Chinese Communist Forces
CCP, Chinese Communist Party
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CG, Commanding General
CG 13 AF, Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force
CGEUSAK, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea
CGUNCACK, Commanding General, United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea
Chicom, Chinese Communist
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CMC, Collective Measures Committee, United Nations
CNA, Chinese Nationalist Army
CO, Commanding Officer
COB, close of business
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries
COM 7TH FLT, Commander, Seventh Fleet
COMNAVFE, Commander, United States Naval Forces in the Far East
COMNAVPHIL, Commander, United States Naval Forces in the Philippines
CP, counterpart
CPG, Central People's Government (People's Republic of China); Chinese People's Government
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CRIK, Civil Relief in Korea
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (British)
CSA (CSUSA), Chief of Staff, United States Army
CV, aircraft carrier
DA, Department of the Army

Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

Deptel, Department of State telegram

DL, Dalai Lama

E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

E/VFA, Adviser on Voluntary Foreign Aid, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration

ECA/W, headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington

Ecato, series indicator for telegrams from the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington to its missions abroad

ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Embdes, Embassy despatch

EmbOff, Embassy officer

Embtel, Embassy telegram

en, enemy

ESB, Economic Stabilization Board (Republic of China)

ESC, Joint Korean-American Economic Stabilization Committee

ETD, estimated time of departure

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUSAK, Eighth United States Army in Korea

Excon, designation for telegrams dealing with the export control program; export control

FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

FEAF, Far East Air Forces

FEC (FECOM), Far East Command

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FP, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

G, Deputy Under Secretary of State

G–2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional or higher level

G–3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level

G–4, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the divisional or higher level

GA, General Assembly of the United Nations

Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

GADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

GARIOA, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas

GHQ, General Headquarters

GOC, Good Offices Committee (United Nations)

GOC, Government of Ceylon

GOI, Government of India

HICOM, High Commissioner

HMG, His Majesty's Government

I, interior, i.e., local, time

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee

IC, Indochina

ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross

IntSum, Intelligence Summary

IRC, International Red Cross

IRO, International Refugee Organization

ISAC, International Security Affairs Committee

JA, Judge Advocate

JAS, Joint Administrative Services

JCRR, Joint (United States-Chinese) Commission on Rural Rehabilitation (Taiwan)

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSPOG, Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group

J.S.S.C., Joint Strategic Survey Committee

JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Advisory Group

K, Korean time

KIA, killed in action

KMAG, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), Republic of China
KPDR, Korean People's Democratic Republic
LA, Latin America
ln, liaison
LST, landing ship, tank
LVT, landing vehicle tracked
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Military Armistice Commission
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEA, Ministry of External Affairs
MIA, missing in action
MND, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China
MSA, Mutual Security Agency
NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
NAS, Naval Air Station
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFE, Naval Forces, Far East
NCNA, New China News Agency, People's Republic of China
NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NGRC, National Government of the Republic of China
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NK, North Korea
NKA, North Korean Army
NKAF, North Korean Air Force
NKPA, North Korean People's Army
NKVD, Soviet secret police
NSC, National Security Council
NSRB, National Security Resources Board
NT, New Taiwan (Republic of China currency)
OFLC, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
OIT, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
OOA, Office of Occupied Areas, Department of the Army
OPC, Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency
OPI, Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea
OPLR, Outpost Line of Resistance
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
PA, procurement authorization
PI, Philippine Islands
P.L., Public Law
POC, Peace Observation Commission
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PolAd, Political Adviser
POW, prisoner of war
PRC, People's Republic of China
PriMin, Prime Minister
PTI, Press Trust of India (Reuters)
PW, prisoner of war
R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
reftel, reference telegram
ROK, Republic of Korea
S/A, Ambassador at Large, Department of State
S/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCAP, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan
SE, Special Estimate
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEAC, Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee
SGS, Secretary of the General Staff
SigO, Signal Officer
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Stanvac, Standard Vacuum Oil Company
STEM, United States Special Technical and Economic Mission

SYG, Secretary-General
T/O and E, Table of Organization and Equipment
TCC, Temporary Council Committee, NATO
telecon, telecommunication conference
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
Toeca, series indicator for telegrams to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington from its missions abroad
Toisa, designation for telegrams dealing with matters within the responsibility of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State
Topad, designation for telegraphic correspondence in either direction between the United States Political Adviser to SCAP and the Department of State
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his Delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers
TS, top secret
TT, *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, Swedish Central News Agency
UC, Unified Command
UKG, United Kingdom Government
UKHC, United Kingdom High Commissioner
UKUN, United Kingdom Mission at the United Nations
UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNAMC, United Nations Additional Measures Committee
UNC, United Nations Command
UNCACK, United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea
UNCOK, United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNE, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
Unmis, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Mission at the United Nations
UNO, United Nations Organization
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
urtel, your telegram
USARMA, United States Army Attaché
USDel, United States Delegation
USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program
USPolAd, United States Political Adviser
UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*
Usun, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations
USUNNY, United States Mission at the United Nations, New York
WAC, Women's Army Corps
WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
Z, Greenwich Mean Time
ZI, Zone of the Interior

KOREA[1]

I. JANUARY 1-FEBRUARY 1. ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS; REJECTION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH BY THE U.N. CEASE-FIRE GROUP; PASSAGE OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION FINDING THAT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA COMMITTED AGGRESSION IN KOREA

795.00/1-151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 1, 1951—noon.
PRIORITY

1590. 1. On December 31 eve his and Nehru's[2] departure Commonwealth Conference London,[3] Bajpai[4] told me Nehru intends discussing ways means at conference effect cessation hostilities Korea. Krishna Menon, Indian High Commissioner London, had suggested Nehru fly Peiping for direct talks Chinese Communists before going London. Nehru turned this down but is prepared go from London to Washington, Peiping or any other place if convinced trip might promote peace.

2. Bajpai again expressed opinion chances for cessation hostilities greater if efforts directed thru diplomatic channels rather than UN. Panikkar[5] recent reports hostility Chinese Communists towards US has developed into emotional fury. Chief irritant seems to be US support China.[6] Chinese Communists insist and Panikkar apparently thinks they really believe US has replaced Japan as aggressor against China. Like Japan aims use Formosa as base against China and proceed overland against China through Korea and Manchuria.

3. GOI considered Communist China's suggestion conveyed week ago through Panikkar that talks for settlement Far East problems might proceed without cease-fire even though hostilities were continuing as unrealistic. Nevertheless, sent suggestion Rau[7] discourag-

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII. Considerable mention of the situation in Korea may also be found in the compilations on China, pp. 1474 ff. and 1874 ff.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

[3] Reference is to the Conference of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of Nations held in London from January 4 to January 12, 1951.

[4] Sir Girja S. Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Mr. Nehru was India's Foreign Minister as well as its Prime Minister.

[5] K. M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China.

[6] For documentation on United States relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, see pp. 1474 ff.

[7] Sir Benegal N. Rau, Indian Representative at the United Nations.

ing suggestion made by several delegations that second resolution providing for discussions be pressed without waiting cease-fire.[3]

4. Maintained Panikkar reports in great confidence increasing isolation self and staff. Feeling lonely and isolated and hopes he will be relieved after conclusion year his assignment.

Department pass London; sent Department 1590, repeated London 78.

HENDERSON

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[3] Reference is to a draft resolution (U.N. document A/C.1/642) introduced in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on December 12, 1950 by Sir Benegal Rau and sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. It did not mention a cease-fire in Korea but called for a conference of involved nations, presumably the United States, Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and India, to make recommendations looking toward a peaceful settlement of the issues in the Far East in accordance with U.N. purposes and principles. This resolution was not voted upon during 1950. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1524–1634, *passim.*

795.00/1–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, January 1, 1951.

637. Deptel 496, December 27.[1] Precise figures refugee movements impossible obtain; those following are estimates.

UNCURK figure half million on move southwards following fall Pyongyang[2] considered probable, but civil assistance teams successfully diverted large portion westward direction Haeju. Since majority blocked battle lines, number actually crossing into ROK possibly only 200,000 in west, plus about 130,000 from Hungnam-Wonsan area in east. Noteworthy, neither ROK officials nor public opinion differentiates between acceptance refugees from north 38th Parallel and those from ROK territory proper.

Large percentage military age males believed due determination most such persons not serve in Communist Army, as well as their greater mobility. Also ROK agencies encouraged young men to come south. Undoubtedly there are enemy agents among them, for whom security agencies searching, but is believed vast majority are sincerely seeking escape from Communist regime even if such escape includes induction into ROK Army.

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[1] The substantive portion of this telegram read as follows: ". . . Dept. interested in details on nr, character, and motives of refugees from north. Extremely high estimates carried in press citing UNCURK figures appear excessive in light of gen tendency farmers to remain on land. Reports of great preponderance males suggest possibility many may be camouflaged soldiers, infiltrators, stragglers from ROK forces, or entrants into north since Oct. Of interest re motives are relative strength of fear of advancing army, antipathy toward northern regime, hostility toward Chi, and forcible ejection by CCF. Is antipathy toward CCF fear of excesses of conquering army, historical or social animosity toward Chi, polit opposition to Commie Chi, or opposition to control by alien forces. Realize present conditions Seoul may render acquisition this info difficult, but Dept wld appreciate any info along foregoing which mission may be able supply since propaganda potential this type info great." (795.00/12–850)

[2] Pyongyang had been evacuated by U.N. forces on December 5, 1950.

Related subject is heavy departures from Seoul and environs, which now estimated number between 800,000 and one million. Motivation appears be combination determination not live again under Communist regime with its terror and oppression, fear of being caught in midst battle, and fear of Chinese Communist soldiers. Which is predominant in given individual is open speculation. Refugees from north appear to have same motivations.

While majority refugees from north probably middle class persons from cities and towns, substantial numbers of farmers have come down with families and in some cases whole villages have come down. Bullock, Australian UNCURK alternate, interrogated about 60 refugee farmers from North Korea who were being cared for in Seoul. Concensus was that under Communists they did not own land, hence no property to defend, and that Communist rents and taxes were so high they actually had been paying higher percentage farm returns than under Japanese. Seems possible farmers in ROK would stand by farms more determinedly than those in Communist territory because of individual proprietorship.

Undoubtedly is great fear of CCF, which does not come solely from historical Korean attitude towards Chinese. Traditionally, especially under Li Dynasty, there were good relations between two nations, but Korean tends be contemptuous of individual Chinese since his sole contact likely be with poorer class Chinese residing in Korea. There are widespread rumors of devilish nature CCF troops, such as their pleasure in killing with knife as opposed to rifle, looting, murder and the like. Perhaps general knowledge success CCF in defeating Chinese Nationalist Army adds to this fear. Additionally, is abstract fear of alien invader, but in this case directly connected with widespread horror stories.

MUCCIO

795.00/1-251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1951.

Subject: Korean Cease-Fire Attempts

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman—Swedish Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

The Swedish Ambassador informed me that he had just had a message from Ambassador Hammerstrom in Peiping stating that Mr.

Hammerstrom considered the situation with respect to a cease-fire "hopeless". Apparently, this conclusion was not based upon any further communication from the Peiping Government. Mr. Hammerstrom stated that he could see only two possibilities of changing the situation: (1) a military demonstration that the Chinese Communists cannot have their own way in Korea, or (2) an acceptance by the UN of Red Chinese conditions. Mr. Hammerstrom added that he and Mr. Panikkar were in agreement on the unfavorable prospects.

I thanked the Swedish Ambassador and asked him to express our appreciation to his Government for their helpfulness.[1]

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[1] A manuscript notation by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, indicated that Mr. Acheson was informed of this conversation by Assistant Secretary Rusk.

320/1–251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 2, 1951—7:35 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 475. Re Korea—cease-fire. Confirming telecon report to Hickerson,[1] following is account of Gross[2] and Ross[3] conversations with Rau and Fawzi[4] and later with Chauvel[5] on Sunday, December 31.

Conversation with Rau and Fawzi, representing Asian group, was most harmonious, the clear theme being necessity of maintaining both integrity of UN and unity of its free world membership in face of clear and present danger.

Gross outlined three alternative factual situations which might confront us: (*a*) most unlikely possibility that ChiComs would accept cease-fire, in which case we would, of course, move forward on road of peaceful settlement; (*b*) probable situation of massive assault across 38th Parallel by ChiComs; or (*c*) standstill which would be neither cease-fire in formal sense nor continuation of large-scale hostilities.

With regard to possibility of mass attack Gross made clear and reiterated throughout conversation assumption that every loyal free-world member of UN would find it necessary to take action which in terms of a resolution would condemn aggression, call on members to give every assistance to cope with aggression and provide, probably through CMC, machinery for determining what collective measures should be taken.

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[1] John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
[2] Ernest A. Gross, U.S. Deputy Representative at the United Nations.
[3] John C. Ross, U.S. Deputy Representative in the U.N. Security Council.
[4] Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations.
[5] Jean Chauvel, French Representative at the United Nations.

Fawzi quite readily assented to this assumption. Rau did not dissent; although he gave no explicit assent, Rau seemed rather forlornly to acquiesce in inevitability of such UN action in circumstances of mass attack south of 38th Parallel.

We discussed at very considerable length possible action in Assembly in event standstill or stalemate situation continued. Rau indicated that most important considerations in his mind were necessity of maintaining clear historical record that UN had made every possible and conceivable effort to bring about peaceful solution of Korean affair. He also indicated that second primary consideration in his mind was very great responsibility UN bore in terms of human life. With such thoughts in mind Rau proceeded to indicate that Asian group was anxious to know whether we would associate ourselves with objective of giving precedence to twelve-power Asian resolution. Fawzi concurred, adding point that Asians would be prepared to accept amendment of twelve-power resolution[6] which would make clear that cease-fire is prerequisite to any discussions. Gross made very clear inadequacy of twelve-power resolution as we saw it in light of circumstances as they have developed. Rau and Fawzi pressed their view of the matter.

Ross explained USUN view which had developed during Gross' absence in Washington; namely, that six-power resolution[7] seemed to us much better vehicle for Committee One proceedings on assumption, of course, that stalemate situation continued. This did not mean, however, that we had closed mind and would be unwilling to consider modifications of six-power resolution which would preserve essential unity of free world in UN provided at same time integrity of UN could be preserved. Rau, and in particular Fawzi, expressed objection to six-power resolution as a vehicle.

After some discussion back and forth of two resolutions it became apparent that some new approach in thinking on both sides might be necessary. We then discussed fundamental principles on which there seemed to be agreement, namely, that there should be (*a*) cessation of hostilities; (*b*) that ChiCom forces should be withdrawn and that UN forces should not remain longer than necessary; and (*c*) that there should be negotiations.

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[6] Concerning the 12-power draft resolution, see footnote 8, p. 2.

[7] Reference is to a draft resolution (U.N. document A/C.1/638) introduced in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on December 6, 1950 by the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, calling for a cessation of Chinese Communist aid to North Korea. It was not voted upon during 1950, although a similar draft resolution had been vetoed in the Security Council on November 30 by the Soviet Union. For the texts of these resolutions and related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1268–1634, *passim*.

Gross suggested wholly personally and on clearly understood *ad referendum* basis, possibility of cease-fire group adding to their report[8] recommendations incorporating these principles. Fawzi objected largely on technical grounds. Gross then altered his suggestion to possibility of cease-fire group including statement of these principles in their report. It was thought that such action by cease-fire group would provide basis for adjournment of committee for few days to provide opportunity for consultation as result of which it should be possible to formulate resolution that would be generally acceptable. Such statement of principles by cease-fire group would also provide basis substance of resolution which in sense might be considered composite of six-power and twelve-power resolutions.

Both Rau and Fawzi seemed to be intrigued with this possibility and gave us to understand they would consult their respective colleagues on cease-fire and Asian groups.

We ran over foregoing conversation with Chauvel in afternoon. Chauvel very much liked idea of statement of principles by cease-fire group on assumption, of course, that there was not mass attack by ChiComs. Chauvel wondered whether, if it were possible to work out resolution based on such statement of principles, a formulation such as set forth in his own draft resolution[9] might not be considered as adequate as second step in event mass attack occurred. We told Chauvel we felt that in circumstances of mass attack his resolution, with particular reference to paragraph identifying ChiComs as aggressors, would not be adequate to the situation.

AUSTIN

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[8] The Cease-Fire Group, composed of Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, President of the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Lester B. Pearson of Canada, and Sir Benegal Rau of India, had been established by General Assembly Resolution 384 (V), approved on December 14, 1950, to make recommendations on the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1542 ff. The report of the Cease-Fire Group was submitted to the General Assembly's First Committee on January 3; see the editorial note, *infra*.

[9] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1627.

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 3 from 11 a. m. to 1 p. m.; for the record of the meeting, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.419. The Committee received and discussed the report of the Cease-Fire Group, dated January 2, 1951 (A/C.1/643), wherein the Group expressed regret at its inability to pursue discussion of a cease-fire arrangement and indicated its feeling that no recommendation on a cease-fire could be made at the present time. The report published material on the Group's unsuccessful efforts to contact and achieve a dialogue with the People's Republic of China during December 1950, documentation on which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII, pages 1542 ff.

795.00/1-351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET THE HAGUE, January 3, 1951—6 p. m.

968. As we have received no information re reports from Netherlands Chargé Peking for nearly a month, I asked Boon [1] today if there were any later developments of which he could tell me. He said only information which had come out of their Chargé in Peking and had duly been passed on through their Embassy in Washington to the Department was that, in his opinion, Chinese Communist Government was taking stronger and more intransigent line with regard "liberating" all Korea as has been shown by recent Chinese offensive.

On other hand, Boon said he could assure me all sections Netherlands official opinion which had been seriously divided in their doubts as to US policy in Korea were now tending unite in entire backing our policy of standing firm Korea although avoiding unnecessary irritation to Chinese. This, he said, was quite new development and one which he very glad pass on to me.[2]

CHAPIN

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[1] H. N. Boon, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.

[2] A manuscript note on the source text indicated that this telegram was called to the attention of Assistant Secretary Rusk and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Livingston T. Merchant on January 4 by the Office of Chinese Affairs.

795.00/1-351 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 3, 1951—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

334. Intransigence of Chi Commie UN Del, summary rejection by Peking regime of earnest efforts of Entezam group obtain cease-fire,

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[1] This message was sent for information to the Embassy in Moscow and for action to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in addition to the Embassies in the following cities: London, Havana, Quito, Paris, Oslo, Cairo, New Delhi, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Belgrade, Taipei, Seoul, The Hague, Canberra, Wellington, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Bangkok, Pretoria, Manila, Ankara, Stockholm, Athens, Brussels, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá, Santiago, and Karachi.

and now massive offensive across 38th parallel against UN forces, which for some time have been deployed south of that line, can only be interpreted as determined effort by Commies to implement their oft-repeated threat to drive UN forces from all of Kor. Chi are apparently willing to compound their illegal intervention in Kor by renewing, with NK regime, ruthless aggression against the territory of ROK in definance UN. This confronts UN with problems even more serious than original intervention by Peking regime which might have had only limited objectives and which led to development six-power resolution.

Free world, if it is to maintain its solidarity and retain and fortify its determination to remain free, cannot afford to accept this situation without demonstration of united will to withstand aggression. Therefore, it wld be incomprehensible for UN as cohesive force in free world to ignore this aggression. Such course will prove as fatal to long-term peace as helpless inaction of League of Nations at time of Jap invasion of Manchuria. To ignore this Chi aggression wld mean in effect that "big" aggressions can succeed with impunity and that world order for which UN has been striving wld be in direct peril leaving every member country to stand alone against aggression.

On other hand, we must realistically face hard fact that it wld be foolhardy for free peoples to embark on course that wld require full-scale hostilities against great land armies controlled by Peking regime, while heart of aggressive Commie power remained untouched.

Our course must therefore be directed toward, first, unmistakably demonstrating to Peking regime and Chi people unity of opinion of free world re their actions. While this may not markedly change course upon which they have embarked in Kor, it should influence initiation of adventures which they may have in mind elsewhere, depending on the degree to which free world stands together and demonstrates its determination to offer maximum resistance in Kor.

Secondly, our efforts shld be directed toward limiting and reducing mil potential of Peking regime for hostilities in Kor. While Chi is probably not critically dependent upon imports from free world, it appears to us self-evident that countries supporting UN in Kor wld desire deny Chi access to any supplies and material assistance, however indirect. As you know, US, for its part, has already taken action to this end.

Thirdly, our action shld be directed toward strengthening and uniting spirit and will of all free peoples, thereby contributing to strengthening of defenses against Commie aggression elsewhere.

Fourthly, action shld make it clear that neither US nor UN have imperialist designs in Asia, that we continue to desire peaceful settlement of Kor situation, and that door to negotiation is not closed.

It is opinion of US Govt that these ends can only be served by UN's declaring Peking regime to be aggressor which it is in fact and continuing its efforts to repel aggression against ROK. In addition, UN shld immed consider what measures can be taken individually and collectively by its members to assist in weakening Chi Commie's will to continue its aggression and to make it clear to them that Kor adventure will be a long-term detriment to the interests of the Chi people.

US fully recognizes varying problems this course of action will pose for various members UN and is not, therefore, proposing a resolution spelling out sanctions in first instance. We are thinking along lines of simple GA resolution taking note of this compounded aggression, declaring Peking regime an aggressor, calling on all states and authorities to apply collective measures in furtherance of purposes of resolution, providing for advice by Collective Measures Comite established by Uniting for Peace Resolution of Nov 3, 1950,[2] on collective action to be taken by all Govts and Auths in furtherance of purposes of resolution, and keeping Entezam group or some other agency available for good offices and mediation. It wld seem to us that, among other possible measures, Comite might consider breaking off diplomatic relations with Peking regime, embargo on exports and shipping, freezing of assets, etc. CMC wld be advising members on measures which wld be effective to carry out general GA recommendation of action against aggressor. If it appeared advisable we cld, of course, seek further GA resolution specifically recommending particular measures.

It is our opinion that events have overtaken six power resolution and stronger resolution is required. If, however, there is strong sentiment for proceeding in two steps, that is, to adopt first six power resolution with suitable amendments, US will not oppose such procedures.

Request you urgently discuss foregoing with FonMin and report reactions.

ACHESON

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[2] For documentation pertaining to the adoption of this resolution by the U.N. General Assembly, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

357.AD/1-351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 3, 1951—8:38 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 477. Korea—six-power meeting. Sponsors of the six-power resolution met in our offices this evening to consult on future steps.

I explained that it was important for us to agree on procedures which we would follow in the forthcoming days, particularly with a view to maintaining the united front of the free world. The US had hoped that the Committee of Three [1] would open a channel for a cease-fire and negotiations. We sincerely worked for and wished for their success. Events, however, have moved very fast. The six-power resolution was not as useful today as it had been when introduced. The Committee of Three could not arrange a cease-fire. The attack across the 38th parallel ended any hope that had existed. It was clearly their intent to drive the UN forces into the sea and they were flouting the charter and UN resolutions. They had forced our hand and basic decision was now required.

I suggested we ought to work on a new and stronger resolution which should condemn the aggressors; should find some substantial method of discouraging their further aggressions; should expose the fact that they cannot win and that in the long run persistence in their present course would result in serious damage to them.

Chauvel suggested that we might start with the six-power resolution and add to it elements contained in the second Asian resolution,[2] and possibly the principles which the Committee of Three was prepared to put forward. Jebb [3] read out the principles which he understood the Committee of Three were themselves prepared to put forward. He said that Rau favored these but could not put them forward without Nehru's approval.

Jebb suggested that these principles might be put forward by the three in a supplemental report. Committee 1 might approve the report and instruct that it be telegraphed to Peiping; that if there is no response from Peiping in a reasonable time, the decks would be cleared for the withdrawal of the six-power resolution, as well as the second Asian resolution, and the introduction of a new and stronger resolution. He thought we would be more able to get support for a stronger resolution if this step were taken. The six points were roughly as follows:

> 1. Cease-fire was necessary to prevent needless destruction while efforts for peaceful settlement were being made, and the cease-fire should not be used by either party to prepare the mounting of a new offensive against the other party.
> 2. If a cease-fire is achieved and hostilities cease, advantage should be taken of it to consider further measures to consolidate the peace.

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[1] I.e., the Cease-Fire Group.
[2] Reference is to the 12-power draft resolution; see footnote 8, p. 2.
[3] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations.

3. The UN has as its objective a unified, independent and democratic Korea in which the Korean people would, by elections, determine their own future.

4. It would be necessary to withdraw all armed forces from Korea by stages and to set up machinery by which Koreans could express their free will.

5. It would be necessary to make interim arrangements for governing Korea in the meantime.

6. The US and UK had already made it clear on December 8 that they were prepared to seek peaceful settlement of existing issues through whatever channels were open to them.[4] UN should set up appropriate machinery so that this principle could be carried into effect by the UN.

Ambassador Sunde[5] said that his impression from recent talk with Fawzi was that Asians would not support an aggression resolution at this time but that if a step of this nature were attempted and failed they might, with the exception of Indonesia and possibly India, be prepared to support a strong resolution.

Chauvel stated he thought it might be difficult for a great many delegates to support now a strong resolution. He favored the course outlined by Jebb. (We were informed privately by Lacoste[6] that present French instructions would not allow them to support a finding of aggression; that they would be required to abstain).

I stated that whatever action we took should uphold the three objectives which we all had in mind: Save as many lives as possible in Korea; carry out UN purposes of stopping aggression; support UN objectives of unified, independent and democratic government without domination by any of its neighbors and with the backing of the UN. We could not abandon these objectives without abandoning the UN itself. We did not insist on immediate strong action. We were prepared to work for unity and to make concessions to it. I thought it was absolutely essential that we should not place the Chinese Communist armed forces in the same position as the forces of the UN. To do this would be a fundamental moral failure. The US and the UN are being charged with aggression; it is of great importance that these charges be given no credence whatever; that they be rejected. We were willing to consider going along with our friends on an intermediate step if it is absolutely necessary. We must nevertheless maintain our principles intact. We must not take a step backward. I considered the security of the world better protected by strong action than by weak.

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[4] For the communiqué issued on December 8, 1950 by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee following their meetings in Washington, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1476.

[5] Arne Sunde, Norwegian Representative at the United Nations.

[6] Francis Lacoste, French Alternate Representative at the United Nations.

Jebb said that it would be extremely serious for the countries bordering on Russia to name the Chinese Communists as aggressors. He mentioned Sweden and said Sweden was under instructions to vote against aggression. These states might be overrun if they supported such a resolution; we could not expect, therefore, that they would support such a move unless absolutely convinced that all avenues for peace had been fully explored.

Chauvel indicated that one of the crucial questions for him and many others was the steps we contemplate taking to implement an aggression resolution; what were our plans and what machinery did we propose to maintain control over joint actions.

Ambassador Gross made three comments with regard to Jebb's plan. He asked what was the rationale of this step and on what publicly explainable basis does it sidestep the aggression question. What program of action does it contemplate in terms of requiring a prompt reply from Peiping and in terms of subsequent action. Is it the first step of a two-step program which is agreed to at the present time? He asked whether the concept of withdrawal in Jebb's plan was not retrogressive from the six-power resolution which demanded Chinese armed forces withdraw immediately.

Ambassador Gross then outlined in very general terms a type of a resolution which we had in mind and the type of action which we contemplated that the collective measures committee might consider. We did not contemplate direct military action against the mainland.

Chauvel suggested two possible alternative steps in the interim phase: Approval of Jebb's plan with provision for a given number of days for Peiping to reply; or incorporation of the principle contained in the supplemental note and resolution, perhaps the six-power resolution, and approval by the Assembly.

Sunde supported Jebb's suggestion or some other plan which had the same purpose. He said that he thought in any case his government would be very reluctant to join in sponsoring a resolution on aggression. They might in due course be prepared to vote for such a resolution.

I summed up the meeting by saying that in the light of the positions of the other sponsors, I was prepared to given consideration to the plan which had been put forward. I felt it essential that we have the texts of these six points. I saw no reason for not discussing with the Committee of Three the ideas which had been considered at this meeting.

Jebb undertook to try to get the Committee of Three to let us have the text of their six principles tomorrow morning.

AUSTIN

320/1-451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 4, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

619. Delga 477 [1] raises question what position US rep shld take in event Asian or other Dels desire intermediate step before stronger res, of having Comite I adopt 12-Power res, or, in alternative, of having Entezam group submit "6 principles" to Peiping and await response therefrom.

In our view we shld oppose adoption 12-Power res at this time. Ourtel 615 [2] was based on assumption that attack by Chi forces had not begun. Under present circumstances adoption of 12-Power res wld be absurd and step backward in our effort to stand firm against aggression.

As to submission of "6 principles" to Peiping we recognize there may be strong demand among certain dels for this move in order satisfy themselves that all efforts have been exhausted. It is difficult for Dept to comment on this approach without seeing text "6 principles." [3] Assuming principles are satisfactory however Dept agrees with position stated by Amb Austin in Delga 477, namely, if we are willing to go along with our friends on this intermediate step before stronger res if it is necessary maintain unity of free world.

Dept believes strongly that if intermediate step is necessary to carry with us big majority on stronger res at later stage, proposal for submission "6 principles" is preferable to adoption of 12-power res. Hence, our willingness acquiesce in former intermediate step can be used as argument against 12-Power res.

ACHESON

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated December 28, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1619.

[3] The "6 principles", which had been transmitted to the Department in outline form in telegram Delga 477, *supra*, were sent forward by the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in revised form in the 5 points set forth in telegram Delga 485, January 4, from New York, p. 18.

795.00/1-451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET THE HAGUE, January 4, 1951— 7 p. m.
PRIORITY

973. I delivered substance Department's circular 334, January 4 [*3*]

to Boon this afternoon, leaving *aide-mémoire*[1] in absence Stikker.[2] In ensuing discussion he stated that views expressed were in general shared by Netherlands Government and commented specifically on paragraphs as follows:

1 and 2. Introductory, no comment.

3. Boon stated delighted at attitude expressed, which he stated followed line taken recent Dulles speech.[3]

With regard 4 and 6 Boon observed it was Netherlands' view that unanimity all-important and it therefore best to have at least at outset more limited program upon which complete unanimity to achieve rather than far-reaching one which might give rise serious division opinion within Western world. It would of course be important if some Eastern states could be won over to unanimous action.

5. Netherlands in full accord towards denying China access to supplies and material assets, however indirect. Boon remarked it true that China probably not critically dependent upon imports but nevertheless oil and rubber most important and if forced obtain them from Russia process would be slow and difficult. On other hand Boon stated it almost impossible stop leaks from other Asian countries, stating specifically that Indonesia was one country from which supplies would probably continue flow because of large smuggling trade and great coast line, even if it possible obtain cooperation Indonesian Government which extremely doubtful. Boon again expressed pleasure at US desire keep door to negotiations open for peaceful settlement.

8. Netherlands Government in full accord that Peking regime should be declared aggressor and has authorized its delegation Lake Success go along with basic six-power resolution.

9. Netherlands Government glad that no immediate resolution re sanctions contemplated and feels subject should be carefully examined as to its consequences. However, Netherlands prepared join in collective measures for sanctions if such course found feasible and Great Britain and France subscribe to it. Boon observed that Netherlands Government feels sanctions much preferable to extension of direct military forces against China. Boon said Netherlands would go along idea keeping Entezam group available for mediation but suggested this might conflict with idea of keeping UNCURK alive which for prestige reasons he supposed should be done. Netherlands Government would even be prepared break off diplomatic relations with Peking regime, particularly if this result of resolution Collective

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Dirk U. Stikker, Netherlands Foreign Minister.

[3] Presumably, the reference is to Mr. Dulles' address before the American Association for the United Nations in New York on December 29. 1950; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1951, p. 85.

Measures Committee but Boon pointed out that if limited Western representation Peking abandoned, there no apparent way communicating with that regime except through doubtful channels of other Eastern countries. Netherlands Government sees no particular objection to freezing assets but points out these largely in US where action already done.

10. Netherlands Government strongly in favor proceeding step by step and "cautiously".

Finally Boon said to me that speaking personally and not as representative Netherlands Government he somewhat surprised that view magnitude present military operations there had not been call from Lake Success for further contingents from UN members other than US. Said he realized it difficult for some states, including Netherlands, provide more troops view European situation but he thought we might wish explore such a call.

CHAPIN

320/1-451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 4, 1951—9:25 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 482. Korea: six-power meeting. Sponsors six-power resolution met again this afternoon in our offices to continue discussion. It developed that Jebb (UK) had not been in contact with Entezam group and had merely learned that Rau, still without instructions, had been unwilling to have group's six-principle supplement circulated.

I read those present the memo as cleared by Department, stressing it was secret and was intended to be used by our colleagues and ourselves with view to reaching agreement on some common position.[1]

I reported I had talked memo over with LA group, with good reactions.[2]

Quevedo (Ecuador)[3] stated it will be necessary to adopt resolution terming CPR aggressor and effort should be made to get greatest unanimity therefor. He said Ecuador will vote for such resolution but believes it better make one more try at peaceful settlement. He feared if support for a resolution not great enough UN will be further weakened. For this it is necessary to have time for consultation. He was inclined to think that best intermediate step would be to build a resolution around Entezam group principles. If group makes no report of said principles, he suggested for discussion that a resolution might be drafted by someone else along same lines. He felt it not possible to adopt resolution in tomorrow's Committee 1 meeting because of need to consult governments.

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[1] The memorandum under reference is not printed. It set forth 10 points, embodying no draft resolution, but reflecting areas of agreement within the U.S. Government centering on the idea that the United Nations would have to, within the near future, condemn the People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea. (795.00/1-451)

[2] The report of Mr. Austin's meeting with the Latin American group is contained in telegram Delga 481, January 4, not printed (320/1-451).

[3] Antonio Quevedo, Ecuadoran Representative at the United Nations.

After Ross told Jebb we had consulted with few of Asian-Arab group and had found them interested in Entezam principles and also in 12-power resolution although did not mean necessarily to put it up tomorrow, Jebb said his delegation had it on good authority Asian-Arab group most reluctant to vote for an aggression resolution before a final effort at peaceful settlement along one of four following lines: (1) Entezam group principles, approved by Assembly and sent to Peking; (2) resolution based on principles, whether or not they are put forward by Entezam group; (3) resolution along lines of Israeli draft;[4] and (4) 12-power resolution (which Jebb did not find "very recommendable" we generally agreed, only more so). So UK felt "very strongly" effort should be made along one of first three lines. Mr. Bevin would not object to "some measure of condemnation" being included in intermediate resolution but not formal designation of CPR as aggressor. Main consideration to Jebb in choice of one of above methods would be number of votes that could be obtained, with or without some clause containing measure of condemnation.

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[4] The Israeli draft resolution had been passed on to the U.S. Delegation on January 2. The substantive portion of the text, as transmitted to the Department in telegram Delga 474, read as follows:

"*The GA* . . .

"*Recommends* that the following successive steps be taken to put an end to the fighting in Korea and to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem:

"*a*) An immediate cease-fire,

"*b*) An affirmation by all governments concerned that they accept the UN objective in Korea, namely, the establishment of a unified and independent Korean state by free nationwide elections supervised by the UN,

"*c*) The participation of representatives of states bordering on Korea in the work of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which shall henceforth be charged with the supervision of the elections and the progressive withdrawal of the non-Korean forces,

"*d*) An agreement for the progressive withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea within a defined period,

"*e*) The initiation of projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea under UN auspices,

"*f*) A guarantee by the UN and the CPG of the PRC that the independence and integrity of the reconstituted state of Korea shall be respected by all states,

"*Declares* that upon acceptance by all parties concerned of the above recommendations (*a-f*) and upon agreement on their implementation, consideration should be given as a matter of urgency to all questions affecting the relations of the CPG of the PRC with the UN.

"*Calls upon* all governments to cooperate with the UN for the achievement of these objectives and emphasizes the responsibility for the peace of the world resting on those governments withholding such cooperation." (320/1-251)

Chauvel (France) pointed out various groups working with desire to achieve greatest unanimity and as yet UN had not officially announced approval of principles as contained in 12-power resolution or Israeli draft. This should be done to clear record and an agency already exists in form of Entezam group to enunciate them. It would be shame not to provide the short time necessary to have these principles enunciated.

Blanco (Cuba)[5] said his government thinks CPR has very clearly stated its conditions for negotiations and they are completely unacceptable to UN because they would mean surrender by UN. For instance, we could not accept admission CPR to UN. Since CPR holds all action illegal if taken in its absence, new effort to negotiate for cease-fire useless. He thought best course for Committee 1 would be to adopt 6-power resolution amended to condemn CPR aggression and set up CMC to study sanctions. However, if governments bearing brunt of effort acceded to delay, Cuba would go along.

Ross wondered whether there was any point in having Committee meeting tomorrow, in view of possibility no supplementary report from Entezam group. Jebb thought it impossible cancel meeting and I said I saw no harm in having meeting. Chauvel concurred saying it would not be advisable to come to a decision on 6-power resolution tomorrow and that sponsors could use Committee's full time commenting on developments affecting it, thus paving way to action on Entezam principles.

Jebb indicated opposition to ultimate use of sanctions, saying he thought they would not affect CPR but merely those applying them. I countered saying it is necessary to react to USSR charge that US is aggressor. I pointed out US public opinion is wondering, in absence of official UN pronouncement, whether other members are admitting charges may be true. Quevedo deprecated this possibility, saying number of members have contradicted charge and people are listening to them as well as to USSR.

Chauvel wondered what Committee should do about Soviet proposal to show atrocities film.[6] Jebb and I agreed it should not be shown in Committee room, but we could not vote against its being shown elsewhere if anyone cared to see it.

Sunde (Norway) stressed that it is of "paramount importance" that any resolution have greatest possible unanimity. His investigations showed that aggression resolution, if voted on now, would not obtain more than 30 votes, but would probably gain many more if intermediate step was tried first and failed. He felt we should act on assumption Rau would get authorization to present principles and he thought it would be good thing to vote on principles tomorrow and reach aggression resolution several days later. He said Fawzi (Egypt) this morning had told him Asian-Arab group animated by common desire for unanimity and will not press 12-power resolution unless others agree.

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[5] Carlos Blanco, Cuban Alternate Representative at the United Nations.

[6] At the First Committee meeting on January 3, the Soviet Representative, Yakov Malik, had suggested the Committee devote 15 or 20 minutes to seeing a documentary film "exposing the actions in Korea of the American interventionists". (U.N. document A/C.1/SR.419)

There was general disagreement with Sunde regarding reaching vote tomorrow.

Gross spoke briefly of impressions gained from meeting with several Asians earlier this afternoon (reported in separate telegram). He drew conclusion Asian desire to be conciliatory posed real problem of how to get any resolution, hard or soft, which would command high majority in GA. He thought steps of intermediate nature with which Asians were toying were only so many formulae for delay. Jebb admitted UK wants delay but [only?] until Commonwealth Conference finishes.

I summed up saying obviously no resolution can be voted tomorrow and hoping Committee might be recessed at call of President in order give time for consultations among members. Chauvel and Jebb concurred, latter urging we use recess to try to build up votes for one of first three alternatives he had mentioned earlier.

Jebb pressed for decision on whether SC should meet to dis-seize itself of whole Korean item. Chauvel thought this was logical. I said I would be able discuss this probably tomorrow.

AUSTIN

320/1–451: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET   New York, January 4, 1951—11:14 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 485. Korea. Ross and Noyes called on L. B. Pearson (Canada). The cease-fire group had met for two hours and revised the text of its principles. The revised text which was given to us confidentially is as follows.

"The following stages should be progressively achieved from cease-fire in Korea to a peaceful settlement by discussion and negotiation of Far Eastern problems.

"1. Cease-fire in Korea. The object of such a cease-fire is to prevent needless destruction of life and property while other steps are being taken to restore peace. No cease-fire arrangement can be called satisfactory unless it contains adequate safeguards, under United Nations' auspices, for securing that it will not be used for mounting a new offensive.

"2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of the further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

"3. The General Assembly has already decided, unanimously, that Korea is to be a unified, independent, democratic sovereign state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections. This will necessitate the withdrawal, by appropriate stages, of all non-Korean armed forces from Korea and the creation by the United Nations of machinery whereby the Korean people can express their own free will in respect of their future government.

"4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, interim arrangements will be made by the United Nations for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

"5. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have already announced (on December 8, 1950) that they would seek, with the Soviet and Peking Governments, through whatever channels that may be open to them, a peaceful settlement of existing issues. The General Assembly should, therefore, set up an appropriate body, which would include the representatives of these four governments, with a view to achieving such a settlement for issues affecting the Far East."

Pearson indicated that Rau had not yet received instructions permitting him to join in putting forward these principles. He was pessimistic that Rau would have received such instructions by tomorrow afternoon. He thought it was just possible that Rau would feel able to join in putting forward these principles in the form of a working paper, indicating that the committee took no responsibility but simply was giving the Assembly the benefit of its tentative thinking. If this were done, it would be up to the committee to use this material in any way it saw fit, presumably by working it into a resolution.

Pearson thought of this tactic as primarily designed to give the Chinese the feeling that every conceivable effort had been made to find a peaceful solution. If the Chinese Communists rejected such a plausible and fair proposal, he thought the Asians would be much more ready to take a strong step. He was quite clear that the Chinese Communists would reject these principles out of hand.

Ross took strong exception to paragraph 3 on the ground that no distinction was made between the moral and legal basis for the presence of UN forces in Korea, as opposed to Chinese forces. The language was open to the construction that both forces should be withdrawn gradually by proportionate reductions on both sides of the line. This was unacceptable to US. He pointed out that it is being charged that the UN forces and the US forces are the aggressors in the situation and it is essential that this claim not be given any credence whatever. He pointed out that the October 7 resolution [1] indicated UN policy as to when and under what circumstances its forces should be withdrawn from Korea. The six-power resolution which received nine votes in the SC called for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops. He thought it highly unwise for the UN to give up a point of principle of this importance in the way suggested.

Pearson refused to admit that the paragraph as drafted would have these results. He pointed out that under the language the UN could continue to insist that Chinese troops withdraw first. He thought the Chinese would see the text in this way and would therefore refuse it. He did not want to put forward a text which would have the results we had pictured. He suggested that we attempt to rewrite paragraph 3 to see if we can find language which would be satisfactory. He was not optimistic that the committee could accept such new language. He said he thought he should inform Sir Benegal Rau immediately that the US took very serious objection to paragraph 3 as written. Ross agreed.

Pearson was given a copy of our memorandum and read it hurriedly. He accepted this as an important new element in the situation and expressed the view that he might not wish to take any further steps along the lines of the five principles after he had given it careful consideration.

Ross explained our general position and our anxiety to maintain the unity of the free world and therefore to negotiate more fully and carefully with our friends to find a common program of action. He made it clear that although we might be reluctant to go along with the Cease-fire Committee's principles, if it were necessary to maintain unity and to obtain support for the type of stronger program which we felt was essential, we might be prepared to do it. He emphasized that it was of importance to us to consider these matters as part of a two-stage program both parts of which should be discussed and agreed to at the same time. Pearson thought this was sensible but seemed to be doubtful that we would obtain such commitments from some of the Asian states.

Ross mentioned that the Israeli were still interested in their own resolution and that he had tried to dissuade them from putting it forward. He indicated that of the alternative suggestions for an intermediate step we felt that the least difficult was the type of procedure envisaged in the Cease-fire Committee's putting forward a supplemental report which would be approved by the committee.

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[1] For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 904.

Pearson indicated he and Sir Benegal were hoping to go to London on Saturday[2] for a few days. He said he would not want to leave if he thought that the committee would take up a resolution such as the one we had proposed. We indicated we hoped we could get to this in the committee by early next week.

We agreed to meet with Pearson again in the morning.

AUSTIN

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[2] January 6.

795.00/1-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, January 5, 1951—1 p. m.

NIACT

3813. Depcirtel 334[1] and Deptel 3526.[2] Talked to Schuman this morning regarding question of branding Chinese Communists as aggressors. He will issue instructions today to Chauvel which he thinks will be satisfactory to us provided that the area of American military authority under any resolution proposed will not be extended beyond the frontiers of Korea at this time.

BRUCE

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[1] Dated January 3, p. 7.

[2] The text of this telegram, sent to Paris on January 4 at noon, read as follows:

"Gross has just telephoned from NY that in conv with Chauvel he ascertained that latter has just recd instrs on question of branding Chi Commies as aggressors. Gen theme of instrs is that Chi shld not be so branded since this might give added provocation. FonOff apparently feels that if Chi not so provoked 'they will perhaps behave'.

"FYI only Chauvel is very much disturbed by these instrs and is presumably requesting reconsideration. He expressed personal opinion that it wld be desirable for you to see Pleven as well as Schuman on this question." (795.00/1-451)

René Pleven and Robert Schuman were French Premier and Foreign Minister, respectively.

320/1-551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 5, 1951—2:25 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 487. Re Korea. Re Gadel 157, December 5,[1] we have given careful consideration to question of applicability of Article 12 of

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1413.

Charter to proposed General Assembly action on Chinese intervention in Korea.[2] A number of delegates, including the British and the Commonwealth and some Latin Americans, feel that it would be legally unsound and generally undesirable to proceed with Assembly action while the Security Council remains seized of the Korean question. Since Quevedo is President of Security Council during this month, we no longer face the parliamentary difficulties in taking this procedural step which we faced last month with Tsiang in the chair.[3] Furthermore, it seems fairly clear that under present conditions it would be thoroughly unrealistic to attempt to separate the question of Chinese intervention from the question of North Korean aggression. If the Security Council should want to resume control of this whole question this could be done by putting the matter back on the Council's agenda at any time. We consider it would be unwise to proceed in the Assembly without taking any action in the SC since this would simply give the Russians a handy argument that the whole proceedings were illegal and might also result in losing us the votes of some delegates who were seeking a pretext for abstention.

We therefore recommend that the US take the position that while it may not be necessary, we are prepared to go along with our friends in dropping the entire Korean question from the Security Council agenda. We would make the point in statements in the Council that this action of course had no effect on the validity of the Security Council decisions heretofore taken.

We believe the US should continue to file regular reports with the Security Council in accordance with the Security Council's request.

We also recommend that no action along these lines should be taken until a stronger resolution has been introduced into the committee so as to make clear to the public that the Council action was simply to clear the way for the Assembly.

Quevedo has called informal meeting of the members of the Security Council at his apartment at 5 o'clock on Monday.[4] This matter will almost certainly be discussed at that time.[5]

AUSTIN

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[2] Article 12 of the U.N. Charter read in part as follows: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

[3] T. F. Tsiang of the Republic of China was President of the U.N. Security Council during the month of December 1950.

[4] January 8.

[5] The Department of State transmitted the following reply to this message in telegram Gadel 192, January 5, 7 p.m., to New York: "We agree with Delga 487 Jan 5 on understanding US will not take initiative but will go along with majority." (320/1-551)

320/1–551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 5, 1951—2:25 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 488. On basis of telecons this morning with Hickerson and Bancroft,[1] Ross informed Riddell[2] that as cease-fire group knew, we have consistently wanted in every way to facilitate their effort. At the same time it appeared clear that a good many members of the UN wanted some intermediate step taken before proceeding with the program which we consider essential in condemning the aggression in Korea. In these circumstances we felt that if it were considered essential to take an intermediate step, we felt that the preferable step might be a simple resolution based on principles such as cease-fire group had in mind which could be forwarded to the Chinese Communists. If there were going to be an intermediate step, we felt very strongly that in order to avoid delay in proceeding with our preferred program, such an intermediate step should be taken as early as possible; we had in mind that if it were not possible to get a vote today, it would be desirable to get a vote tomorrow.

In the light of these considerations we did not wish to complicate matters or make Pearson's talks in the cease-fire group any more difficult than it is by suggesting changes in the draft statement of principles which they gave us last night.

I said that it was possible that Ambassador Austin might make a statement if cease-fire group should decide to present a statement of principles. I said that if he should make a statement, it seemed clear to me that he would have to indicate our strong feeling that the UN must face the facts of life. I said, on the other hand, I thought we would not oppose but would probably abstain on a resolution incorporating the principles such as the cease-fire group was considering; I did not say whether we would be prepared to vote for such a resolution.

Riddell subsequently telephoned to say that Pearson was pleased with our attitude. Meanwhile, Rau had requested that a meeting of the cease-fire group be held at noon today. Rau did not indicate whether he had received instructions from Nehru; Pearson assumed, however, that he must have received something. It was not at all clear to Pearson whether Rau would be able to join in informal sponsorship of a statement of principles. If Rau could not so join, Pearson was very actively considering trying to get the principles before the committee today in some way.

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[1] Harding F. Bancroft, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

[2] R. G. Riddell, Canadian Representative at the United Nations.

Riddell asked our views about timing in introducing a condemnatory resolution; he having in mind presumably Pearson's desire (as well as Rau's) to go to London Saturday night.[3]

Ross replied that we wanted to move ahead as rapidly as we could with the program we consider essential. If it were possible for the Assembly to take immediate action on Saturday, presumably the committee would wish an adjournment for a few days in order to give the Chinese Communists an opportunity to respond. This might take us to the middle of next week. In any event, we felt very strongly, assuming a negative response from the Chinese Communists that we should move ahead with our preferred program next week.

AUSTIN

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[3] January 6.

320/1-551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 5, 1951—2:25 p. m.

Delga 489. Rafael[1] and Lourie[2] (Israeli delegation) called on Ross late yesterday afternoon. They had been in touch with Eban[3] who wanted to raise the question of tabling the draft Israeli resolution (Delga 472 [*474*]).[4] Ross dissuaded them from this action on ground (*a*) it would confuse an already confused situation and (*b*) taken by itself the Israeli resolution did not in our view meet requirements of present situation. Ross then gave them copy of our memorandum[5] which they read. They were not particularly surprised. They questioned whether our present views represented hard and fast decision to table willy-nilly a condemnatory resolution or whether our minds were still open to possibility some intermediate step. Ross emphasized our primary objective maintaining unity of free world in UN and indicated that for this reason our minds were by no means closed on possibility of further intermediate step. On the other hand, the course of action which should be taken by the UN in the light of the current situation seemed to us very clear and that we could not with any equanimity contemplate taking an intermediate step if there were not, as a minimum, a very clear understanding that delegations would be committed in the event of failure of such intermediate step to proceed with course we considered essential. Israelis found no particular difficulty with this approach but did not commit themselves.

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[1] Gideon Rafael, Alternate Representative of Israel at the United Nations.

[2] Arthur Lourie, Deputy Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations.

[3] Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador in the United States and Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations.

[4] See footnote 4, p. 16.

[5] See footnote 1, p. 15.

They reported that following call on Gross and Ross the other day, they had called on Jacob Malik and had shown him copy of their draft resolution. They reported they felt Malik's attitude was by no means a closed-door attitude. He emphasized very strongly the necessity of withdrawal of forces as being the first step in peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.

Aside from comments on the immediate situation in the UN, Israelis reported that Malik was talking very tough. He said that if the US and others were proceeding to mobilize and build up strength, others could do the same and this might inevitably lead to a clash. Re Korea, Israelis reported Malik observed that US had chosen method of force to settle Korean problem and that perhaps we should leave it to force to decide this issue.

Austin

320/1-551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1951—3 p. m.

621. Dept believes US rep shld take fol attitude toward 5 principles set forth Delga 485.[2]

Although we might not have written principles ourselves in way they are written, particularly para 3, we believe this is question primarily for Entezam group.

US believes UN shld face facts of Kor situation squarely at this time but will not stand in way of any further effort that Entezam group or other dels think desirable to make with Peiping regime. Nor will we attempt to dictate manner in which such approach shld be made.

We do think it important, however, that UN live up to its responsibilities under Charter and that it must act promptly. If this intermediate step is to be made before UN takes whatever action is necessary to stand firm against intervention of Chi Commies, this step shld be gotten underway at once so that UN can find out whether or not this approach will succeed or be as fruitless as the previous efforts of Entezam group.

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[1] Repeated to the Embassies in Cairo as 618, New Delhi as 1032, Ankara as 335, Athens as 2114, and Karachi as 364.

[2] Dated January 4, p. 18.

As matter of tactics US rep might make these points both in private conversations and in Comite I and might suggest in Comite that Entezam group transmit these principles to Peiping without further action by GA as such step comes within authority of Entezam group under res of Dec 15 [*14*].

By adopting this attitude of acquiescing in every effort that Asian or other dels may wish make in order satisfy themselves that all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted, Dept hopes to be able to carry along those dels at later stage. Dept feels strongly that US must not by insisting on different language than that contained in present text 5 principles lay itself open to charge that it prevented effort from being successful.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 5 from 3 to 7:30 p. m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.420. The Representative of Israel set forth a plan for peaceful settlement of the Korean question along the lines of the Israeli draft resolution contained in footnote 4, page 16.

The Committee also rejected by a vote of 36 to 5, with 13 abstentions, a Soviet proposal that the First Committee officially view the film of the Soviet Delegation relating to Korea.

693.95/1–551: Telegram

The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TAIPEI, January 5, 1951—6 p. m.

887. Contents Depcirtel 334, January 3, discussed Foreign Minister [1] whose initial reactions as follows:

1. Chinese Government naturally favors strongest practicable stand against Chinese Communists and will go along with US in this sense.
2. Foreign Minister agrees events have overtaken Six Power Resolution and considers highly important to UNO prestige and US leadership that events not be allowed overtake next move decided on.
3. Chinese Government would support either adoption Six Power Resolution suitably amended, or new GA resolution branding Chinese Communists as aggressors and calling for collective action, whichever seems likely prove more appropriate.

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[1] George Yeh.

4. Foreign Minister feels questions of breaking diplomatic relations with Peking and imposing embargoes, et cetera, depend almost entirely on position taken by UK, although effective control of exports and reexports from all North and South American sources would also be important factor.

Foreign Minister will discuss these matters with his colleagues in government and let me have any further significant ideas that may develop.

RANKIN

795.00/1–551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

3283. Pls deliver fol personal message from me to Mr. Bevin [1] in explanation of course of action proposed in Depcirtel 334:

"Sir Oliver [2] came in yesterday afternoon and outlined the thinking you had been doing on the situation in the Far East preparatory to the Commonwealth Meeting. From this I gained the impression, perhaps wrongly, that you were fearful that the naming of the Peiping Govt as aggressors would be followed by hostilities against China itself. I am not clear as to whether if you felt this it was because you concluded that that would be the attitude of the US or whether you concluded it was an inevitable sequence of events.

I want to assure you first that we here intend to do everything we can to prevent hostilities spreading from Korea to wider areas in the Far East. What the Peiping Govt will do we, of course, do not know. But we do not believe for a moment that Communists either in Peiping or elsewhere would extend the theatre of war by reason of their being named as aggressors. Therefore, it seems to us that whether or not hostilities can be prevented from spreading depends upon the deliberate choice of Peiping or those who inspire that regime.

We are deeply concerned that failure of the UN to recognize the present Chinese communist action in Korea as aggression and to name it as such will be the beginning of the end of the UN just as the end of the League of Nations started with their failure to take any action against Japan and Italy in similar circumstances. We believe that this is of utmost importance to the UN and the free world and to the establishment of an orderly international society. The UN, having resolutely met a small aggression cannot afford to close its eyes to large-scale aggression.

I would be less than frank if I did not also say that, important as the UN is, there is another aspect of the question which troubles me as much, perhaps more. As I read the barometer of our public opinion,

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[1] Ernest Bevin, United Kingdom Foreign Minister.
[2] Sir Oliver Franks, United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington.

I am deeply apprehensive that a failure of the UN to recognize this aggression would create a wave of isolationism in this country which would jeopardize all that we are trying to do with and for the Atlantic Pact countries. I believe, therefore, that the UK and the countries of Western Europe have this additional and vital interest in supporting UN action of the strength I have indicated.

The nature and extent of any action that should follow the naming of the Peiping Govt as aggressor is another matter. We believe only practical steps should be taken and great care exercised to avoid steps which would lead to broadening the conflict. The concept is inherent in the UN Charter that no aid should be given to aggressors. We believed this was a sound policy when it was put in the Charter and continue to believe so and, as you know, we have already taken action in the US to prevent any aid from going to Communist China. However, what is to be done, both to deny aid to the aggressors and to assist the UN meet the aggression is not for us to decide alone and it is our position that the question of what action should be taken should be referred to the Collective Measures Committee for consideration.

I am sending this message to you personally to stress the very great importance which we attach to the matter. I understand, of course, your desire to discuss this question at the Commonwealth meeting. I earnestly hope this discussion will be given an early place on the agenda, since events in Korea require prompt UN action. I am confident you will take fully into account these views. It is of the utmost importance for the free world to stand together on this serious question. To make this possible it is essential that the US and the UK and the Commonwealth and Western Europe do so."

ACHESON

Editorial Note

For records of conversations, of which the first took place on January 6, dealing with proposed contacts through intermediaries between officials of the Governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China, and sometimes relating to the situation in Korea, see pages 1476 ff.

320/1-651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, January 6, 1951—12 : 57 p. m.

Delga 490. Re Korea. Following reports Ross conversations Jamali, Charles Malik, Padilla Nervo,[1] Fawzi Bey yesterday afternoon.

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[1] Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, Charles Malik, and Luis Padilla Nervo were Representatives at the United Nations of Iraq, Lebanon, and Mexico, respectively.

Jamali was given copy of our memo. He expressed very strong discontent with delay occasioned by Rau, cease-fire group, British Commonwealth meeting. He said they were supposed to have a 12-power Asian group. This in turn was tried through Rau to cease-fire group which was not getting anything done because of Rau. The Asian group was also tried through Rau and Nehru to the Commonwealth group. The Commonwealth, after all, represented only 8 members of UN and in effect, Jamali summarized, he was getting fed up with the paralysis which for these reasons had overtaken the Asian group and the UN. He said he had expressed the foregoing views at an Asian group meeting Friday morning [2] and had been supported by Pakistan and Iranian representatives and by most of the Arabs. He said he thought we should not delay beyond Monday filing of some intermediate step. He thought, however, that agreement between US and UK on a program of action was very important.

The speech made by Eban in the First Committee outlining points as basis for GA action [3] seemed mildly to have gotten under Jamali's skin. He said there is nothing new in these points; that they had all been encompassed in the thinking of Asian group. He did not say so, but he seemed to feel that the Israelis were stealing a march by moving into vacuum left by Asian group inactivity.

Jamali said that in Asian group meeting Friday morning, he had asked Rau whether India would be able to go along with a resolution condemning the aggression in Korea if a further intermediate step proved a failure. He said Rau had replied that India would not even in those circumstances be able to go along with a condemnatory resolution.

Charles Malik, with whom Ross had brief conversation after Committee One meeting giving him copy of our memo, is full of beans and more and more irritated over delay on the one hand and viciousness Malik's [4] and Soviet satellites speeches on the other.

Fawzi Bey was given copy of our memo. He is maintaining a rug-dealer attitude not being nearly as forthright in his comments as Charles Malik or Jamali.

Padilla Nervo said that he understood Pearson to say at Canadian luncheon yesterday that Nehru was holding up authority to Rau to go along with cease-fire statement of principles until Indian Government had found out from Chinese Communists whether such statement would be acceptable. As Padilla understood it Nehru would not authorize Rau to associate himself with such principles if Chinese

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[2] January 5.

[3] See the editorial note, p. 26.

[4] Reference here is to Yakov Malik, Soviet Representative at the United Nations.

Communists would not go along. Asked concerning this, Riddell said he did not think situation was that Nehru was waiting for Chinese Communists concurrence, although he said he knew statement of principles had been sent to Pannikar.

Padilla observed that he thought that in present situation the votes of the LA delegates, which were pretty well assured for a condemnatory resolution, were not nearly as important as getting the votes of India in particular, as well as other countries which recognize Peiping regime. If we did not get these votes, he said a condemnatory resolution would lack political force. He expressed himself very strongly in favor of an intermediate step.

AUSTIN

795B.00/1–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, January 6, 1951—2 p. m.[1]
PRIORITY

640. Embtels 530 December 6[2] and 637 January 1 and Embdes 96 December 30.[2] Evacuation of Seoul and environs continues apace, it being estimated that close to 1,000,000 people have left for south during past month. Initiation 31st of CCF drive south of parallel has brought renewed surge of refugees from areas between 38th Parallel and Seoul and further out movement of Seoul residents.

President Rhee[3] accompanied by wife, secretaries and bodyguards plans to fly to Pusan 3rd to take up residence. Cabinet meeting is being held late this afternoon at which decision probably will be taken to remove remaining elements of Government, except 5 Ministers making up war Cabinet to Pusan. UN military command will facilitate movement of remaining ROK officials which estimated to number about 4,000.

Embassy and affiliated agencies have gradually been paring down staff (Embtel 522 December 5).[2] Van Putten, USIE director, has moved to Pusan, accompanied by radio and motion picture units. Drew has moved with publication unit to Taegu. Consular section of Embassy here being closed C.O.B. today with consul Stone proceeding Pusan tomorrow. Third secretary MacDonald is proceeding Taegu tomorrow where he will maintain contact with Eighth Army headquarters. With completion these movements Embassy personnel will dwindle total of 41 broken down as follows: Chancery 6, ECA 5, JAS 18, USIE 2 (Jacoby and Lasher) and Marine guards, 10. In light existing conditions it contemplated main Embassy office will be moved to Pusan by end of present week, leaving small staff of 4 or 5 to maintain contact with Eighth Army advance headquarters here. It is expected other diplomatic missions will also remove to Pusan by week-end. UNCURK with total of 15 persons still in Seoul will probably evacuate all but 1 delegate and 4 secretariat personnel by week-end. All but handful of non-Korean civilians have left town and those remaining can be provided for without difficulty.

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[1] Seoul had been abandoned by U.N. forces on January 3 to the advancing Chinese and North Korean armies. The wording of this telegram indicates that it was probably drafted several days prior to the date of transmission.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

Sent Department 640; repeated Manila 11.

MUCCIO

320/1–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 6, 1951—7:52 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 492. Re Korea. Gross and Ross on their initiative called on Rau this afternoon. Opened conversation by giving Rau copy of our memo [1] indicating that it incorporated points made in Circtel [2] which had been sent to a number of capitals including Delhi, that Ambassador Austin had covered most of the points in his statement in Committee One yesteday,[3] as we had in previous conversation with Rau.

Gross asked whether Rau had any views on the question of timing, and with reference to Monday's Committee One meeting asked in particular whether the Indians had heard anything from Peking. Rau replied that they had heard nothing from Peking and said he had had this morning definite indication from Nehru that a week's delay would be considered desirable pending the result of a new approach to Washington. Later in conversation Rau indicated that the only word that had been received from Peking, if it could be regarded as any comfort, was that Wu [4] had expressed to his government high appreciation for Indian efforts here to achieve peaceful settlement.

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 15.

[2] Circular telegram 334, January 3, p. 7.

[3] See U.N. document A/C.1/SR.420.

[4] Wu Hsiu-chuan led the delegation of the People's Republic of China which appeared before the U.N. Security Council in November 1950 during the discussion on Korea and intervention by China; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 731 ff.

Gross read points for a possible condemnatory resolution[5] indicating that he wanted to keep Rau fully informed of our thinking. Rau took careful notes but at that point in conversation had no observations to make.

Gross then pursuant to telecon with McGhee[6] Friday morning spoke to Rau about our policy and attitude re assistance programs, expressing the hope that if Rau were to see Nehru he might help assure that our point of view was fully understood by the latter. Gross made clear that our policy with regard to assistance programs was strictly to avoid interference in the internal policies of other governments, citing as example our assistance to UK despite latter's nationalization programs. However, necessity for Congressional action on programs made it essential that other governments understand that full and frank public discussion in US of policies other governments was normal attribute of democracy and not to be confused with designs of intervention. Gross indicated that all these matters had been fully discussed with Madame Pandit[7] by the Secretary and McGhee.

Rau inquired concerning real effect on Congressional and public opinion of what is going on in the UN. Gross made clear that failure of the UN to act firmly in resistance to aggression might stimulate very greatly the growth of isolationism in the US. In particular, if UN did not grapple with aggressors, fewer advocates would be found to answer isolationists.

Rau, indicating that he had received very little from Nehru, gave following account, as best he could judge on basis of what he had received of Nehru's current thinking. He said that Nehru was probably more convinced than ever as to validity of GOI position which they had consistently held concerning Chinese representation and Formosa. He seemed to be more than ever convinced that nationalism and fear were at the root of the Chinese aggression, and that the Chinese Communists genuinely feared that an effort was being made to strangle their infant regime at birth. It was felt therefore that if the Chinese Communists could be seated in the UN, they might come to realize that it is not an organization dominated by the US or a cabal of hostile imperialist powers. Referring to the Irish rebellion and the Indian and Burmese struggles for independence, Mr. Rau said that understanding and cooperation followed great bitterness against the British. Rau observed that the British were very experienced in these matters and sensitive to their implications. He could not speak for them, but Rau thought the British felt about seating the

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[5] See telegram Delga 493, *infra*.

[6] George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[7] Indian Ambassador in Washington.

Chinese Communists as Nehru did. He said sometimes in human history a great act of faith was required in order to break out of a vicious circle. Such an act of faith might be seating the Chinese Communists and to do so might pay untold dividends.

Referring to the Israeli statement in Committee One yesterday, Gross developed the theme that both as regards Formosa and Chinese representation, everything the Chinese Communists had done at every step of the way was self-defeating. Persistence by them in their aggression could only harden still more resistance to their objectives, particularly so far as American opinion is concerned. Gross hoped that understanding of these factors might be brought home to the Chinese Communists. Rau said that of course they were continuing their efforts in Peiping to do this as they were continuing their efforts here.

Foregoing conversation was very frank and harmonious.

AUSTIN

320/1–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 6, 1951—8 : 50 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 493. Re Korea. Jebb and Coulsen (UK),[1] Chauvel (France), Riddell (Canada), Stabell (Norway)[2] called this afternoon at our request to hear eight points proposed condemnatory resolution on Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.[3] Gross presented eight points, emphasizing they were not textual, pointing out that five and six must be read in connection with seven, and that actions taken under five and six would be in accordance with recommendations of Collective Measures Committee.

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[1] John E. Coulsen, Adviser to the U.K. Delegation to the United Nations.

[2] Bredo Stabell, Counselor to the Norwegian Delegation to the United Nations.

[3] Reference is to a draft outline for a proposed United States resolution under consideration for submission to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. A copy of this document, bearing the caption "8 Points being used USUN", with the date January 8, 1951 and the notation that the text was telephoned to the Department of State from New York, is presumably identical with or similar to the document under reference. Points 5 through 8 follow:

"5. The General Assembly should call upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any encouragement or assistance to the CPG of the PRC in its aggression in Korea.

"6. The General Assembly should call upon all states and authorities to give the UN every assistance in meeting this aggression.

"7. The General Assembly should request the Collective Measures Committee

"(*a*) to consider as a matter of urgency what measures should be employed to carry out the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs;

"(*b*) To advise all states and authorities on a continuing basis on such measures; and

"(*c*) to make such recommendations to the GA as it deems appropriate.

"8. The General Assembly should affirm that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement and the achievement of UN objectives in Korea, by peaceful means and requests [———] at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end." (795.00/1–851)

In two-hour discussion which followed, chief objections and questions related to use of CMC, kind of sanctions contemplated especially whether military, and prospect of extending military operations to China. Detailed questions and our comments follow.

Jebb asked whether there would be an obligation on states which voted for resolution to heed recommendations of CMC. Riddell commented that resolution extended competence of CMC. Chauvel asked whether military measures were contemplated, recalling we did not suggest military measures in our earlier talks. We replied CMC might recommend military acts, resolution neither including nor excluding them. Chauvel said we had better tell committee what kind of sanctions we wanted, otherwise members would not support resolution for fear of becoming obligated to military measures. He thought it would be difficult to get votes if members felt they were committing themselves to decisions of a body not yet even established, and suggested opposition would arise to giving so much power to body in which Soviets were not represented. This also would give Soviets good excuse to march out of UN. Jebb remarked we seemed to be establishing new SC without veto and with Soviet Union and China not represented.

Chauvel and Stabell raised question of extending military operations beyond the Yalu. Gross said proposal tried to avoid prejudgment of sanctions and was not aimed at giving added military authority to Unified Command. Stabell suggested separating possible military sanctions from diplomatic and economic sanctions.

Jebb and Chauvel both thought CMC should not have relations direct with members, but should make suggestions as technical or advisory body to GA. Gross repeated purpose of CMC provision was to reassure members against possibility of unilateral action under points five and six. Others kept returning to this point, clearly not understanding our intentions, despite our efforts to show that choice lay between unilateral action under general authorization or collective action after consideration by CMC. Jebb indicated strong preference for Assembly asking CMC to submit report on how best to give effect to general recommendations. Chauvel suggested possible variation, with GA calling on CMC to consider specific means of carrying out measures outlined generally in series of GA resolutions. Stabell saw advantage in this course in that UN would approach final conclusion, namely war, slowly in hope of bringing Peking to senses.

Chauvel emphasized stronger moral effect of recommendations from GA than from what he called technical committee giving technical advice. We pointed out this might involve GA's sitting for six months or permanently, to which Jebb and Chauvel saw no objection.

In attempt to make others see benefits of present points, Gross asked whether it was desirable to exclude factor of CMC giving advice to members, pointed out difficulties of trying to wrestle out details of sanctions in first condemnatory resolution with debates taking place publicly in 60-member body, and reiterated dilemma of abandoning CMC thus losing reassurance against unilateral actions.

In brief discussion of point 8 (good offices group) Jebb suggested continuing Cease Fire Group. Riddell thought if Cease Fire Group not desirable, [President] of GA would be likely alternative. Coulson (UK) thought Indian Government would be reluctant to have Rau serving in group appointed at tail end of condemnatory resolution.

In passing, Jebb commented that sanctions so far undertaken or proposed seemed to be directed against UK, since as far as he could see, they did not hurt China. He thought under his formula (CMC to submit report to GA) individual sanctions could continue or be added, but seemed to feel there was considerable importance in fact that no agreed collective sanctions would be taken without report and further GA action.

Before discussion of eight points, Jebb announced he had just received instructions saying Commonwealth Prime Ministers were unanimous that further GA action should be postponed for a week. He saw two ways of doing this: first, spin out debate on original report; second, approve report and adjourn until end of week. He pointed out that Rau and Pearson as members of Commonwealth governments would obviously be unable to produce Cease Fire Group's principles under these instructions. He said he would favor spinning out debate, discussing Israeli proposal and whatever else could be thought of. If this was impossible and if Rau did not move adjournment, Jebb would feel obliged to do so himself. He assumed request for delay meant Commonwealth was not of one mind and wanted time to make it up.

We pointed out delay in introduction of Cease Fire Group's principles might affect our attitude towards intermediate step. We repeated our position that if principles had been presented Friday or could be presented Monday, we would consider them and probably acquiesce in intermediate step for sake of unity. Jebb asked if debate maundered would we feel obliged to table condemnatory resolution. Gross replied we would have to make a general reservation on that, but impact of GA inaction on military situation must be considered.

Passage of condemnatory resolution might conceivably have some effect on Chinese Communists, whereas military situation might be damaged by inaction. Others were sympathetic to possible unpleasant consequences of inaction but gave no appearance of doing anything about it.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held a relatively brief meeting on Monday, January 8, from 10:45 a. m. to 12:35 p. m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.421. The Committee debated the Korean situation but took no substantive action other than voting to adjourn until January 11 to consider the same question. The vote was taken at the suggestion of the United Kingdom Representative over the objection of the Soviet Delegate who wished the Committee to terminate debate on Korea and move on to another agenda item.

795.00/1-851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

BELGRADE, January 8, 1951—3 p. m.

859. Deptel 334 circular January 3. On January 5 I presented our view on Korean situation to FonMin[1] and requested reply. He has now informed me that while Yugoslav Government understands and appreciates our point of view, Bebler[2] will nevertheless be instructed to abstain on question of declaring Peking regime aggressor. Yugoslav Government recognizes Peking's claim that Chinese soldiers in Korea are volunteers is ridiculous, but Yugoslav Government believes UN resolution branding China as aggressor would be unwise as long as there is any chance of avoiding deeper involvement of UN in hostilities against China. Yugoslav Government continues to believe our policy towards Peking is forcing Mao[3] into closer alliance with Moscow, but chief reason for Yugoslav attitude towards Far East situation is their concern, as Europeans, lest

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[1] Edvard Kardelj.

[2] Ales Bebler, Yugoslav Representative at the United Nations.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government Council, People's Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

disproportionate amount US and UN military effort be directed towards Far East at expense of Europe.

ALLEN

795.00/1-951

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 8, 1951.

I am attaching a copy of a message which Prime Minister Attlee has sent to you via the British Embassy. This is the message which I discussed with you over the telephone this evening. I am also attaching a copy of my message to Mr. Bevin [1] which is referred to in the message Mr. Attlee has sent you.

We will endeavor to have a reply prepared for your consideration tomorrow morning and will coordinate our efforts with the Department of National Defense.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

[Annex]

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am greatly disturbed by present developments in the Far East, and feel that I should open my mind to you in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding between our two Governments.

My colleagues and I have been basing their policy on the assumptions that we should fight it out in Korea and try to localise the conflict. This was my understanding of the common position which we reached together in Washington in December. It is on these assumptions, and on the assumption that if we could hold a line and build up a position of strength in Korea the Chinese might then be in a mood to respond to a suggestion for a negotiated settlement, that His Majesty's Government have been pressing that the possibility for a negotiation with China should be kept open. This accounts for our attitude on future action in the United Nations. It now appears from the information we are receiving that the intention of the United Nations Command is to evacuate rather than fight it out. I feel compelled to ask you to give me an authoritative indication of the intentions of the United States Government in this respect. I am left with the impression, particularly from Secretary Acheson's message to

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[1] See telegram 3283, January 5, to London, p. 27.

Mr. Bevin of the 5th January, that the United States Government may wish to substitute for a policy of localising the conflict in Korea, a policy aimed at developing limited action against China.

It may be that it is militarily impossible to hold on in Korea. This possibility was recognised between us in Washington last month. Moreover, we are not blind to that possibility that China may intend to spread hostilities in the Far East. But looking at the world situation as a whole, and bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the principal enemy, we think it unwise to provoke China unnecessarily to further aggression. The wiser course, it seems to us, is to harbour our forces and build them up in order to meet Communist attacks where ever they may come. It is true that Mr. Acheson, in his message of January 5th, states that the United States intend to do everything they can to prevent hostilities spreading from Korea to wider areas in the Far East. But the kind of action against China for which the United States Government appear to be pressing at the United Nations will, in our view, almost certainly provoke China to extend hostilities. There can be little doubt that, for example, a campaign of subversion or guerrilla warfare against China involving the use of Chiang Kai-Shek's men would certainly have that effect. I do not know whether such a project is intended by the United States Government, and I should like to know whether they would intend to recommend such action by the United Nations after China had been declared an aggressor.

It was for all these reasons, which I have felt bound to explain to you frankly, that we have been opposing the introduction at this stage of a resolution in the United Nations condemning China as an aggressor and calling on the Collective Measures Committee to consider what measures should be taken.

In any case we consider it desirable, in order to consolidate opinion in the United Nations which is at present disarrayed, and ensure the greatest measure of support on the part of the free world, that an immediate step should be taken at the United Nations which, while recognising the facts of the situation in Korea, would show that all concerned were prepared to go to the utmost limit in giving the Chinese a chance to reach a peaceful settlement. Such an immediate step might take the form of a resolution based perhaps on the latest set of principles drawn up by the Cease-Fire Committee. This might include a clause condemning Chinese intervention in Korea and might lay more stress on the 5th point of the principles. There was a good deal of support among our Commonwealth friends here for the notion that the Big Powers have a special responsibility in this crisis.

It would be of the greatest assistance to me if you could possibly let me have a reply in time for tomorrow's meeting.

With all good wishes C. R. Attlee

8th January, 1951.

795.00/1-851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET Washington, January 9, 1951—noon.

NIACT

3316. For the Ambassador. Please deliver fol message to the PriMin from the Pres at once:

"My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I hasten to answer your message of January 8. In response to your questions:

First, there has not been any change in the position on which you and I agreed, that resistance to aggression in Korea should continue in Korea unless and until superior force requires the evacuation of our troops. Any other information you have received regarding the intentions and determination of this Government is wholly incorrect. The present tactical situation does not reflect any change in this position, but rather the essential adjustments to cover the increased jeopardy to UN troops resulting from a recent marked decrease in the effectiveness of the sorely tried South Korean divisions.

Second, the desire and intention of this Government to confine hostilities to Korea was correctly and, I think, plainly stated by the Secretary of State in his message to Mr. Bevin. Should the Chinese Communists extend hostilities as, for example by an attack on Hong Kong or Indochina or Japan or by massive air attacks from Chinese territory on UN forces, I should assume that you would agree that our desire and intention might be impossible of fulfillment.

Third, we do not intend to recommend to the United Nations a campaign of subversion or guerrilla warfare against the mainland of China by Chinese National forces.

Fourth, regarding action by the UN appropriate to the present situation in Korea, my chief concern is that it should be honest and honorable and directed to preserve the very essence of the great principle for which the United Nations was created—the principle of collective security. In my message to the Congress yesterday[1] I said, 'If the democracies had stood up against the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, or the attack on Ethiopia in 1935, or the seizure of Austria in 1938, if they had stood together against aggression on those occasions as the United Nations has done, the whole history of our time would have been different'.

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[1] President Truman delivered his annual State of the Union message to Congress on January 8; for the text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 6–13.

By all means let us keep all doors open for peaceful settlement. That is our duty under the Charter of the United Nations. But, if the truth be that aggression has occurred, let us not shrink from stating that truth, because of the fact that the power which launches it is formidable. If we take that attitude the great common problems which you and we have are insoluble."

ACHESON

795B.00/1-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PUSAN, January 9, 1951—3 p. m.

659. For Dean Rusk. Following message sent MacArthur and Ridgway [1] as eyes only.

I am increasingly concerned over the progressive weakening of Korean morale and spirit, both civilian and military, during the past month.

Prime factors in both fields are awe of Chinese Communist intervention and concurrent fear of abandonment by the US/UN. Loss of Seoul has jarred all Koreans to a new low. Lurid pessimism in free world press has ever undermined Koreans.

As regards the military, I might mention:

(*a*) The Korean Army has been fighting continuously since June 25 and has suffered tremendous losses. Replacements—especially quality of non-com and junior officers—have not kept pace with losses;

(*b*) US Army ever probing for the most effective way of directing and using the tremendous Korean manpower potential have used following systems: (1) the "buddy" system, incorporating Korean individuals with US units and allying Korean units to American units; (2) firming-up Korean army units with additional KMAG personnel; (3) placing Korean divisions within UN Corps; (4) better coordination of Korean army, national police and Youth Corps. Ridgway now having reviews made. I have hopes and there are indications that Korean army will again show resiliency and power of recuperation.

As regards civilian morale, I am not as hopeful:

(*a*) President under strain not holding up his hitherto effective leadership—see my letter January 1.[2] President yesterday informed me had asked Chang Myun [3] twice to return but has had no reply. Chang, by spearheading war Cabinet could be most helpful. Other official leadership is not promising.[4]

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[1] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (Japan); Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

[2] Not printed.

[3] John M. Chang (Chang Myun) was Korean Ambassador in the United States.

(*b*) Removal by Communists of large numbers has accentuated the lack of non-official leaders in all fields of national life.

(*c*) Disintegration of Korean national life by three successive military onslaughts—south, north, now south again makes effective leadership that much more difficult.

(*d*) I should again like to call attention to the fact that hundreds of Korean leaders sent to US for specialized training under the GARIOA, ECA and State leadership programs have not returned to Korea to help in this period of crises. Many have been able to just stay on in the US: Others have been able to get their grants extended: Some were taken in by the military in Tokyo for special tasks there. The fact is, very few have returned. I feel very strongly that should it become necessary to leave the peninsula all possible consideration must be given to care for as many Koreans as practicable. Up to that time, however, we must urge all Koreans to do their parts courageously and patriotically, especially those that the US has assisted.

General Ridgway and I have been doing everything possible to pep up Koreans. I still hope that their surprising resiliency will again bring them forward.

MUCCIO

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[4] Ambassador Muccio made the following further observations in telegram 669, January 11, from Seoul, which was directed to Mr. Rusk:

"I feel presence Chang Myun here more material value than presence in US at this time. (Embtel 659, January 9) He is respected by all Koreans and would be in position to (1) advise Rhee, (2) improve relations Executive with National Assembly, (3) help in dealings with UNCURK, (4) give direction and cohesion to War Cabinet—this most essential in view President's condition and War Cabinet would have to maintain order should anything happen to Princetonian [i.e. President Rhee], and (5) his mere return Korea this time would boost morale and help pull Koreans out of doldrums." (795B.00/1-1151)

795.00/1-951: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951—6:38 p.m.[1]

JCS 80680. From JCS personal for MacArthur. A. Reur C 52391[2] and C 52712[3] retaliatory measures you suggest have been and continue to be given careful consideration here. There is also full appreciation of contribution to the general situation made by current absorption of Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

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[1] The time of dispatch of military telegrams outgoing from Washington is indicated in the source text in terms of Greenwich Mean Time. In this compilation, unless otherwise indicated, the hour is given in Eastern Standard Time.

[2] For the text of this message from General MacArthur, dated December 30, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1630.

[3] Not printed.

B. Based on over-all considerations, however, the following must be accepted:

(1) There is little possibility of policy change or other external eventuality justifying strengthening of our effort in Korea.

(2) Blockade of China Coast, if undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hongkong. It is considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.

(3) Naval and Air attacks on objectives in Communist China probably can be authorized only if the Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventually [*eventuality*?].

(4) Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal (see also your C 50021 and JCS 97594)[4] to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist Garrison in Formosa, in view of improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.

(5) If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces now committed, 2 partly-trained National Guard Divisions could be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security of Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this purpose must be served by part of the troops evacuated from Korea. This is final reply to your C 51559.[5]

(6) The program for the arming of Japanese Security Forces will be expedited.

(7) Effort is being made to intensify the economic blockade of trade with China.

C. In light of the foregoing and after full consideration of all pertinent factors, you are directed as follows:

(1) Defend in successive positions as required by JCS 99935,[6] inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan.

(2) Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and materials you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.

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[4] See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1253.

[5] General MacArthur, in his telegram C-51559 dated December 18, 1950, not printed, had requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy at once to Japan the four National Guard divisions on active service in the United States in order to reassure the Japanese and safeguard against a sudden Soviet thrust at Japan while U.S. forces were committed in Korea. (JCS Files)

[6] Dated December 29, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1625.

(3) Make every effort to restrict knowledge of this message to those who need to know.

D. Questions such as disposition of prisoners and ROK personnel will be handled separately.

E. All directives and instructions in conflict with the foregoing are revoked.

795.00/1-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951—7 p. m.

3614. For Ambassador from Hickerson. Re urtel con Jessup,[1] USUN has checked with Chauvel and we believe his instrs generally satis. They appear to be about as stated your 3815 [*3813*] Jan. 5, 1 p.m. with considerable discretion as to timing. Chauvel personally favors an intermediary step; that is some further appeal to Chi Commies before action on Res along lines outlined our Depcirtel 334. We will not oppose intermediary step if it is taken promptly and if, as appears to be fact, it is widely desired among our friends.

I think it wld be useful for you give Fr generally line set forth in Sec's message to Bevin Jan. 5, which I understand repeated to you. [Hickerson.]

ACHESON

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[1] Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.

795.00/1-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951—7 p. m.

697. FYI fol are excerpts pertinent parts conversation Jan 4 at NY on possible steps to be taken in handling Korean case in UN between Amb Gross and Palar.[1]

Amb Palar stated although there was no question his Govt's mind who was right in Korea nonetheless we are now confronted with risk involvement 3rd world war. His Govt wanted play and continue play mediatory role and hoped Asia group wld continue play such role. Amb Gross expatiated on theme Sov and Commie objectives were to split up free world in UN and isolate US from rest free world, thus depriving weaker nations protection collective security. Palar stated (1) his Govt wld not agree vote for res condemning Chi Commies aggressors; (2) UN action June 25 having failed "we shld not get into a second failure"; (3) while Indo deeply sided with US nevertheless "they were facing China", were subj Commie attacks within Indo and above all else wish avoid gen war. Palar stated his Govt therefore felt bound adhere "course of mediation" and admitted that even if new conciliatory attempt failed his Govt wld continue adhere to "course of mediation".

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[1] Lambertus Palar, Indonesian Representative at the United Nations.

Gross took strong exception Palar thesis commenting history might well record UN action of June 25 had brought about fundamental change in aggressive designs internatl communism, that it might well have affected their basic timetable and forced internatl communism face much greater risks and heavier commitments in order achieve their aggressive designs in Korea, and that if UN had fallen apart in June by reason inaction, communism wld probably even now be on march in other areas notably SEA. He commented that reference "mediation" seemed almost to set high watermark in success Commie propaganda designed isolate free world from US and that US did not accept thesis there were "3 forces in the world", i.e. USSR, US and UN. In response Palar limited himself repetition sympathy and friendship which his Govt felt for US.

ACHESON

795.00/1-951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, January 9, 1951—8 : 56 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 498. For Hickerson from Gross. Korea. I called on Pearson at his request. In accordance with telecon with Hickerson, I outlined to him the President's reply to Attlee. Pearson was particularly interested in assurances re our withdrawal and he thought rumors with regard to this question had been causing some concern.

Pearson indicated they had been in close touch with the Prime Ministers in London who had been giving serious consideration to the Korean question. He said they had formed themselves into a drafting committee over the weekend with dubious results. The British had come forward with an alternative to the Entezam group's proposals based upon the idea of a return to the *status quo* as of June 25. Basic idea was that the North Koreans would control North Korea with Chinese Communist backing and the ROK would control South Korea with UN backing. Negotiations could then proceed from this basis. Pearson indicated he did not believe this proposal was practical and implied that it did not have Indian support. This alternative suggestion had now been dropped in favor of the Entezam group's statement of principles. They were now in process of attempting to revise this statement to meet points which had been raised in the Prime Minister's meeting. He felt that Nehru had probably heard the Chinese Communists reactions to the earlier text. Nehru had indicated that with certain changes, there might be some possibility that the Chinese would go along. Pearson was careful to say that Nehru had made no commitment of any kind that he would support a revised statement.

The points which Nehru had made were that the Chinese Communists would lack confidence that arrangements made by the UN or under the UN as set forth in paragraph 3 and 4 of the earlier text would be fair to them. He also apparently indicated that it would be important to give the Chinese Communists an indication that the questions which they were most anxious to deal with, namely, Formosa and representation of China in the UN, would be included among the subjects for negotiation if a cease-fire were effected. He also apparently suggested that it would be important to refer to the Cairo Declaration [1] in some way.

On the basis of these and other suggestions, Pearson had redrafted the proposed text. He had revised the preamble of this text as follows: (cf. Delga 485, January 4).

> "The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the program outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems, taking account of the Cairo Declaration, the Charter of the UN and the resolutions of the GA affecting these problems, including such questions as the independence and unity of Korea, the disposition of Formosa (Taiwan), the representation of China in the UN."

I commented that I wanted to make it clear that we were endeavoring to give free hand to the Entezam group; that we did not want to in any way mould their proposals or take any responsibility for them. We had, therefore, on previous occasion, limited ourselves to stating that we would not oppose their proposal if they put it forward. I did not wish to do more than that at this time. I wanted to advise Pearson, frankly, however, that in my personal opinion, we would have to oppose any proposal which dealt with the substance of the Formosa question by taking account of the Cairo Declaration.

Pearson indicated that he was quite ready to drop this from the preamble. He indicated that they had recognized this as a difficulty and had attempted to cover it over by reference to the charter and the resolutions of the Assembly. He thought that the deletion of the phrase taking account of these three points would not substantially affect the acceptability of the text. In the light of this decision and fact that following phrases were a duplication of the phrases in the final paragraph of the text, he also decided to drop the clause beginning "including such questions".

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448. The Declaration, issued by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill promised restoration of Formosa along with other territories taken from China by Japan to the Republic of China.

Pearson had the text revised and handed us the following revised text (quoted at end of this message) for transmission to the Department with request that we advise him whether we would have to oppose this text if it were submitted on Thursday.[2] He took the initiative in saying that he knew it would make a difference to us whether or not the Indians would support this. He wished to inform his Prime Minister [3] if possible that if the Indians did agree to this and would support it in the committee, the US would not oppose it. I undertook to obtain this information, again emphasizing that we did not wish to take any responsibility for this proposal or for the form in which it is drafted.

In answer to a question, Pearson indicated that if the proposal were put forward with Indian approval on Thursday, he hoped that the committee by Friday could approve a resolution noting the committee's formulation of these principles, approving them, and requesting the President of the Assembly on behalf of the committee to transmit them to the Chinese Communist regime with the request that they give them serious consideration as the basis for peaceful solution. He thought such a short resolution might be approved by Friday and that if this were the case it would be necessary to allow delay at least until following Tuesday before the committee took any further action. Pearson still thought it was important for many states that an intermediate step along these lines be taken. He did not expect the Chinese Communists to accept the proposed statement of principles.

Question arose as to whether it was wise for the Assembly to approve the principles as its own statement of policy before knowing whether the Chinese Communists considered them acceptable. Pearson seemed to be quite open-minded as to the possibility of a short resolution of the committee which would not approve the principles. Riddell argued that this would not give the Chinese Communists the assurances they wished and would not meet the desires of the Asian group to make it perfectly clear that this program represented UN policy. Pearson seemed to accept this argument.

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[2] January 11.

[3] Louis St. Laurent.

Full text referred to above follows.

"The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the program outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.

1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.

2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

3. To permit the carrying out of the GA resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with UN principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with UN principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

5. As soon as a cease-fire has been arranged, the GA shall set up an appropriate body, which shall include representatives of the Governments of the UK, the US, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China, with a view to the achievement of a settlement of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa and the representation of China in the UN."

[Gross]
AUSTIN

790.00/1-1051

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Christopher E. Steel, British Minister
Mr. Matthews–G

I telephoned Mr. Steel at midnight last night and referred to our discussion earlier in the evening when he informed us of the message transmitted by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Mr. Bevin's personal message to Ambassador Franks. I said that I had just come from the Secretary's home where he had gone over the two messages.[1] I said that the Secretary had been considerably surprised at the substance of the messages and had found it very difficult to believe that they had been sent after the President's reply to Prime Minister Attlee had been received and considered. I said that he had requested me to ask Mr. Steel to ascertain from London whether in fact the messages he had conveyed to us had not been sent prior to consideration of the President's reply and were not, therefore, out of date.

Mr. Steel expressed the personal opinion that the messages had been sent prior to receipt of the President's reply, but did not know this to be the fact. He said he would telephone London early this morning and let me know the results of his inquiry. (He did not seem surprised at the Secretary's reaction.)

H. F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

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[1] Bevin's message to Franks is apparently the one covered in the note *infra*. In addition, according to telegram 3827, January 10, from London, not printed, the Foreign Office sent a further message to Washington to the effect that the United States must recognize that in suggesting a new approach the United Kingdom was acting from the friendliest motives. (741.022/1-1051)

Telegram 3827 summarized the discussions of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers concerning Korea and China which culminated in the Comonwealth Prime Ministers' message urging that the United States sit down to negotiate with the People's Republic of China in the context of a conference of the great powers. U.S. objections to this proposal on the grounds that a cease-fire should be a precondition to such talks are contained in telegrams 3337 and 3338, January 10, to London, pp. 50 and 51.

795.00/1-1051

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SUBSTANCE OF A TELEGRAM NOW ON THE WAY FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS

(Parts thereof telephoned by Mr. Parrott at 11:30 a.m.
10th January 1951)

1. (*a*) You should inform Mr. Acheson that the President's message to the Prime Minister had not been received until after the despatch of my telegram of 9th January.[2]

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[1] A manuscript note in the source text indicated that this note was handed to Mr. Rusk by the British Ambassador at 6:45 p.m. on January 10.

[2] See the memorandum of conversation by Matthews, January 10, *supra*.

(*b*) The Prime Minister sent his message to the President (my telegram of 8th January) in order to have an authoritative interpretation of the American view on certain matters. The Prime Minister regards the exchange of messages with the President as private and copies have not been circulated to Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

(*c*) We are therefore still anxious to receive as soon as possible a considered reply to my telegram of 9th January, which was agreed by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in order that we may inform them of the American reaction to the proposals contained therein.

2. You should explain the situation to Mr. Acheson and, as necessary, continue the representations on the lines of my telegrams of 9th January.

3. The Prime Ministers did *not* intend that a cease fire should be made a pre-condition of the negotiations. This, after all, is a proposal which, by implication, has already been made to, and rejected by, Peking. The proposed resolution might however be so worded as to suggest a cease fire simultaneously with the beginning of the talk.

WASHINGTON.

320/1-1051

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Christopher E. Steel, British Minister
Mr. Matthews–G

Mr. Steel telephoned me at noon today to give me the results of his telephone call to London. He said that London had not in fact received the President's message to Prime Minister Attlee when the messages were sent (see my Memorandum of Conversation of today's date). He said London does wish an answer to the proposal from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers irrespective of the message from the President to Prime Minister Attlee. They had not circulated the President's message among the Commonwealth Prime Ministers as they regarded it as a personal exchange between the President and Mr. Attlee. Mr. Steel said the British had not discussed any next step with the other Prime Ministers, that is, what would happen if we do not accept the proposal. He said he could understand the difficulties for us in the London suggestions.

Mr. Steel thought an answer should be sent as quickly as possible. He said if we turn down the proposal the quicker it is done the better for any decision may well influence the Commonwealth position in the General Assembly Thursday.[1]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[1] The reference is to the meeting of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly scheduled to take place on Thursday, January 11; concerning the meeting, see p. 64.

795.00/1-1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET THE HAGUE, January 10, 1951—4 p. m.

998. At lunch today, Canadian Ambassador informed me that, as result information received from Dutch Foreign Office, he was informing his government that Dutch Chargé Peking recently reported that CPG and Peking public opinion so carried away with Chinese "volunteer" successes in Korea that, in Chargé's opinion, no concessions other than complete capitulation existing Chinese demands would be acceptable, and China now in so exalted state of mind they think almost anything possible for them achieve.

CHAPIN

741.022/1-1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1951—6 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

3337. We assume that the proposals of the Commonwealth PriMins are related to a cease-fire, along the lines of the discussions we have had with the Cease-fire Comite in NY. We have told the Cease-fire Comite, other UN Dels, and indeed, Peiping, that we are prepared to use processes of peaceful settlement of outstanding issues in the Far East and that we wld be willing to include reps of the Peiping regime in those processes. Specifically, we have told the Cease-fire Comite that we wld not oppose the five principles which they are considering putting foward.

If the omission of any ref to a cease-fire in the Commonwealth msg reflects the view that fighting in Korea wld continue during the proposed negots (which wld require several weeks to organize and carry out), then we are deeply disturbed and wld like to know what the Commonwealth PriMins envisage as the outcome. If the negots which are proposed are to be carried on with an expanding area of Korea under Commie occupation, there is no chance that the Commies wld allow themselves to be negotiated out of Korea. . . .

ACHESON

741.022/1-1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1951—6 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

3338. Deptel 3337 contains US comments on Commonwealth PriMins informal proposals furnished to Dept by Steel Tues night.[1] These comments should be furnished immediately to FonOff. We have been informed UK and other Commonwealth members are now working along lines new draft Cease-fire Committee five principles. We have informed Pearson that we would not oppose action along this line.

ACHESON

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[1] January 9; see the first of the two memoranda of conversation by Matthews dated January 10, p. 47.

693.95/1-1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, January 10, 1951—6 : 34 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 502. Korea. Re paragraphs 5 and 6 of last revisions of draft resolution telephoned to USUN,[1] we are not entirely clear as to their purpose and have some doubts that they reflect correctly our policy.

We fear that as to paragraph 5–*a*, our friends will be concerned that we are placing upon them a new moral responsibility to lend new assistance to the UC in meeting Chinese aggression. Furthermore, by the words "achievement of its objectives" they may fear that we are attempting to imply that the UN should seek its political objectives by the use of force, which was clearly not intended by the October 7 resolution of the Assembly.

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[1] At this time, the Department of State had under consideration two draft U.S. resolutions for presentation to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. The drafts were quite similar except that one stated specifically that the People's Republic of China had committed aggression in Korea, while the other avoided use of the word "aggression" and said that the PRC had committed "armed attack" against the U.N. forces in Korea. The language of telegram Delga 502 indicates that the former draft was the one under reference, and paragraphs 5 and 6 are here printed:

"*The General Assembly* . . .

"*Calls upon* all states and authorities to continue

"(*a*) *to lend* every assistance to the UN in the achievement of its objectives in Korea, and

"(*b*) *to refrain* from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

"*Requests* the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider what additional measures should now be employed to meet this aggression, and to make recommendations to the GA thereon; . . ." (795.00/1-1051)

As to paragraph 5–*b*, the facts are that few if any nations other than the US have refrained from giving any assistance to China; in other words, they have not cut off normal commercial and other contacts. Our friends may ask whether we wish them to continue their present policies or to change them.

We think resolution should reaffirm authority to continue collective measures in Korea and should embody principle that additional measures are contemplated but that their nature remains for subsequent GA recommendation. We understand that it is not Department's intention to seek new authority in the resolution for the UC or the member nations to take action against the Chinese outside Korea. We assume that the present military actions against the Chinese in Korea are fully authorized by implication by the SC resolution of June 27. It would be politically useful of course for the Assembly to reaffirm explicitly the existing authority for present type of actions if this can be done without creating new difficulties for our friends. We suggest that paragraph 5 might be revised along the following lines.

> "Affirms the intention of the UN to continue its action to meet the aggression in Korea and recommends that all states and authorities continue to assist such action in Korea under the UC pending further GA recommendations regarding action against the aggressors."

A paragraph of this nature would give us explicit authority and backing to continue the fight in Korea while at the same time making it clear that any decision to extend the area of the military conflict would be reserved for a future decision of the Assembly. It would also embody in the resolution a decision in principle that additional appropriate collective measures will be studied.

In the light of the above comments, we suggest the following changes in the draft resolution: the first four paragraphs the same; the remainder of resolution to read as follows:

> "5. Affirms the intention of the UN to continue its action to meet the aggression in Korea and recommends that all states and authorities continue to assist such action in Korea under the UC pending further GA recommendations regarding action against the aggressors.
>
> 6. Requests the CMC as a matter of urgency to consider what additional measures should be taken in furtherance of the purposes of this resolution and to make recommendations to the GA thereon.

7. Calls upon all states and authorizes to refrain from giving any encouragement or assistance to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in its aggression in Korea.

8. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the UN to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement and the achievement of UN objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests [———] at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end."

AUSTIN

795.00/1-1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 10, 1951—7:37 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 503. From Gross. Re Korea. At 3:45 p. m., January 10, Jebb called to say there was considerable excitement last night when he received word that London had instructed UK Embassy Washington to make new approach along lines of paragraph 5 of statement of principles. Jebb said the instruction from London to British Embassy crossed Pearson's message transmitting revised set of principles. Jebb has now received telegram from London saying that they were extremely interested in this revised statement of principles. (Delga 498)[1] Jebb was instructed to get our official reaction and report it as soon as possible. He was also instructed to get in touch with Franks and concert with him.

I told Jebb that the Department had considered the paper, as revised by Pearson, and that we would not oppose it. However, our position was subject to two factors: (1) Timing—to which we attached considerable importance. This meant timing both with respect to promptness of presentation, and a short reasonable interval after adoption to give Peiping opportunity to reply; (2) We would attach importance to what would follow. We ourselves would assume that if this step failed, we would then be in a position to go ahead on the next step. Furthermore, that we attached importance to GOI agreement to this intermediate step as apparently Pearson also does.

I told Jebb that our military people were concerned about the wording in paragraph 2 relating to "lull in hostilities." I said we would interpret this to mean a lull in hostilities pending the working-out of the details of a cease-fire arrangement. Jebb agreed to this interpretation.

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[1] Dated January 9, p. 44.

Jebb said he understood from London that Pearson was going to send Hume Wrong[2] to the Department to say they thought it would be easier for GOI to accept statement of principles if at the end of paragraph 5 the following words were added: "In conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the UN Charter". That, Jebb said, was an indirect way of writing in the reference to the Cairo Declaration.

I told Jebb that this implied reference to Cairo Declaration and since this was outside the scope of my present instruction, I would at once transmit information to Department.

At 5:30 p. m. following a second telecon with Hickerson, Jebb called to say Franks was unable to see Secretary because latter had left Department, but was planning to see Matthews in order to obtain Department's official reply to last night's *démarche* from London. I took the opportunity to advise Jebb of Department's reaction to language quoted above as a suggested ending of paragraph 5. I told Jebb Department's position was that we did not like the language, but that if it was necessary to put it in in order to get GOI agreement to statement of principles, we would not oppose it, pointing out also that statement of principles was not our draft. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

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[2] Canadian Ambassador in Washington.

320/1–1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, January 10, 1951—7:37 p. m.

Delga 504. From Gross. Re Korea. I advised Pearson that we would not oppose revised statement of principles (Delga 498)[1] subject to important factor of promptness presentation and allowance of short reasonable period after adoption to enable Peiping to transmit reactions. Furthermore, that we assumed that next step would be promptly taken if negative reply received from Peiping or in event of undue delay of reply from Peiping.

Re paragraph 2 statement of principles (Delga 498), I told Pearson we would interpret language relating to "lull in activities" as if it read "lull in activities pending completion of details of some such formal arrangement". I explained difficulty which might arise from misconstruction of present language; for example, if Communist forces took short breathing spell. Pearson agreed and said that although it would be difficult to send revised language back to London, he would support in committee our interpretation.

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[1] Dated January 9, p. 44.

Pearson commented that they had a "bad time" last night when they heard of London's *démarche* suggesting an intermediate step limited to paragraph 5 of statement of principles. Pearson said London appears now to have abandoned this in favor of serious consideration of the statement of principles transmitted by Pearson. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/1–1051 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army[1]

TOP SECRET Tokyo, January 10, 1951—9 : 15 p. m.[2]
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–53167. Personal for JCS. Re JCS 80680.[3] Request clarification of your directive in the light of its qualified requirements that I (1) continue to defend in successive positions subject to primary consideration of the safety of my troops and my basic mission of protecting Japan; and (2) that I withdraw from Korea to Japan if in my judgment it becomes evident that evacuation is essential to avoid severe loss of men and matériel.

In view of the self-evident fact that my command as presently constituted is of insufficient strength to hold a position in Korea and simultaneously protect Japan against external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests in the Far East. There is no doubt but that a beachhead line can be held by our existing forces for a limited time in Korea, but this could not be accomplished without losses. Whether such losses were regarded as "severe" or not would to a certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term. The command was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the North Korean invasion Army which in due course was effectively destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies of the Chinese Nation and doubtless it would not have been committed at all had there been foreseeable prospect that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense. The troops are tired from a long and difficult campaign, embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their courage and fighting qualities in misunderstood retrograde maneuver, and their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are cheerfully accepted.

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[1] In this compilation, the title supplied for General MacArthur, and subsequently for General Ridgway, follows the designation given in the source text. The military telegrams indicate either CINCFE or CINCUNC, the commands held by both men.

[2] The time of dispatch of military telegrams incoming to Washington from Tokyo is indicated in the source text in terms of Greenwich Mean Time. In this compilation, unless otherwise indicated, the hour is given in local (Tokyo) Standard Time, which is 9 hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time.

[3] Dated January 9, p. 41.

As I stated in my C 52391[4] in reply to urmsg JCS 99935,[5] I am in full agreement with your estimate that the limitations and conditions, viz: No reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action, no measures permissible against China's continental military potential, and the concentration of China's military force in the Korean-Manchurian sector, eventually will render the military position of the command in Korea untenable. Under these conditions in the absence of overriding political considerations the command should be withdrawn from the Peninsula just as rapidly as it is tactically feasible to do so. On the other hand, if the primary political interest of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept whatever casualties result and any attendant hazard to Japan's security.

The issue really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea and involves a decision of highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a Theater Commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action. Nor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of enemy action which in effect would be the determining criteria under a reasonable interpretation of your message. My query therefore amounts to this: Is it the present objective of United States political policy to maintain a military position in Korea—indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?

As I have before pointed out, under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction, if overriding political considerations so dictate. Request your clarification.

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[4] Dated December 30, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1630.
[5] Dated December 29, 1950; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 1625.

741.022/1-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET London, January 11, 1951—1 p. m.

3842. Deptels 3337 and 3338, January 10. US comments on Commonwealth Prime Ministers proposals passed Scott Foreign Office this morning in time for 11 o'clock Prime Ministers meeting. Scott said UK would concur in US view it would be absurd to even consider negotiations without cease-fire.

Gifford

795.00/1-1151

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [Washington,] January 11, 1951.

Participants: General Marshall [2]
Mr. Acheson

The Secretary telephoned General Marshall to inquire whether the General thought that the meeting which was now scheduled for Saturday noon [3] on the reply to General MacArthur should take place sooner in view of what Mr. Acheson understood was General Marshall's purpose to send someone to Tokyo.

The General replied that he did not think that the two matters were closely connected. He added that he thought that a meeting on the draft which had been considered this morning (at ten o'clock meeting at Pentagon?) [4] might obviate the need for a meeting on Saturday. But in any case, since he thought the purpose of sending someone out was to get rather than give information, it did not matter whether the proposed Saturday meeting took place before or after his departure.

Secretary Acheson said he thought the purpose of sending someone was both to take out some kind of instruction and to get some information. Secretary Marshall said his main idea in thinking of sending someone, while their going was ostensibly to send instructions along, was to get information. This was the crucial point which we cannot obtain at all here. The only way he could see to get the information needed was to send someone to get it.

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[1] The source text contains no indication of authorship but presumably this memorandum was drawn up by Mr. Battle who drafted the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Acheson and General Bradley, *infra*.

[2] George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.

[3] January 13. The meeting actually was moved ahead to January 12; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup, January 12, p. 68.

[4] No record of the meeting or the draft referred to have been found in the Department of State files.

The Secretary said he would like to outline his views. After he started to do this, the General asked whether he could call back as he was not free to talk at that time.

About 15 minutes later the General called back and resumed the conversation.

The General said that the point in his mind, which he had been struggling with and on which he did not think he was in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff, was the actual status of morale in Korea, and he wanted to have someone go out and take a look. He mentioned that General Smith[5] was going out tomorrow to Tokyo in General Marshall's plane. Later in the conversation the Secretary and General Marshall discussed the possibility of sending someone along with General Smith to accomplish Secretary Marshall's mission of investigating morale and status and any further mission that might come of the ideas which Mr. Acheson put forth, as outlined below. They agreed that this would probably be a good idea and that having someone go for General Marshall with General Smith might desirably camouflage the mission.

The General then asked why the President had in mind postponing discussion of the matter until Saturday, and Mr. Acheson said that he had learned from the President that this time had been set by the White House staff without being referred to the President, who had told Mr. Acheson he was quite willing to have the meeting earlier if Secretaries Marshall and Acheson thought it should be earlier.

General Marshall then said that he had two or three specific points that he had objected to in his talk with General Bradley[6] on the draft which had been put to him. In the first place, he did not like the first sentence, because we seem to make the decision that there is evidence that we cannot continue to hold. The General's reaction was that it would be more to the point to say that it appears from the evidence in General MacArthur's messages that it is not feasible to make a continuing defense. He wanted to make it plain that this indication came from General MacArthur, rather than that we made that decision here.

The next thing to which he objected was the word "indefinitely". He thought it should be more clearly defined. In view of what (MacArthur) has already said about his need for more reinforcements, the word "indefinitely" stretched it out to a point without limitation. General Marshall thought that some phrase such as "considerable period" should be substituted.

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[5] Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence.

[6] General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that on the matter of the timing of our action here, he was most anxious to get somebody's actual assessment and not just guessing and posterity messages. He was, therefore, concerned over delaying until Saturday noon.

The Secretary then outlined what in his view should be the procedure. He thought a memorandum should be prepared which could be carried out. He did not think a "directive" was necessary, since the existing directives are adequate for the present. Whatever happens, General MacArthur will be doing the same thing for the next two or three weeks—that is, falling back to a position which can either be held or held long enough to evacuate. If the decision to evacuate is made, General MacArthur would be doing the same thing. Therefore, it seemed important to Secretary Acheson that whoever went out should take a memorandum, approved by the President, General Marshall, Joint Chiefs and NSC. The Secretary stressed later that what he had in mind was a "memorandum" and not an "order", and felt that unless such a memorandum were taken out and the person who went had clearly in mind exactly what the President had in mind, that person might become involved in a good deal of inconclusive talk and argument as to what the purpose of the campaign is, etc. and the result would be further inconclusive cables, but not the facts, which the memorandum would be designed to bring out. He then outlined his ideas as to what the memorandum should say.

In the first place, it should say that from General MacArthur's reports, it appears that if the Chinese choose to exercise all their capabilities they have the ability to drive us out (although this can only be gathered; General MacArthur has not said that it is possible to stay). If the Chinese decide to use all their capabilities, without regard to destruction of life, the first concern of General MacArthur should be to protect his troops against annihilation, and to protect them against engagements which would cause such losses that they could not serve to protect Japan and provide a nucleus for the expansion of the army. The Secretary pointed out that that is what is meant by "severe losses". In other words, what is desired is a functioning military organization when you get through. His mission, therefore, is to continue resistance in Korea until it appears that the foregoing things mentioned as to be avoided are likely to happen.

There should be a statement of the national purposes, which are behind the fighting and sacrifice in Korea, as follows:

1. We want, if possible, to force the Chinese to take such losses that they may decide to stop. If that is possible, it will have tre-

mendous importance in Asia in showing that the Chinese troops are not invincible, as the Asians now believe.

2. It will give us the necessary time to demonstrate to everyone the determination of American military leadership and that we don't pull out just because the going is tough. It will convince our friends in Europe that we are not likely to leave them under similar circumstances. It will be helpful in the firming up of Germany and the free people to stand against aggression of the Soviet Union.

3. We are making the greatest possible effort to line people up against Communist China in case they continue the expansionist movement. This will be a great help in giving us time to do that and to show people that we are not withdrawing and asking people to take risks we are not willing to take; that we are not asking them to blockade or bomb unless forced into this action.

These are the things we would like to accomplish, subject always to the preservation of these troops and to the prevention of losses which would prevent them from accomplishing the basic objectives (of protecting Japan and providing nucleus for army expansion).

We could say that we are sending so and so out to go over the memorandum and come back with General MacArthur's ideas as to what extent these objectives can be achieved and what the time chances involved amount to, the state of morale, and the point at which further continuation of the campaign would gravely prejudice possibility of withdrawal.

The General thought the idea should be considered, although he again said he thought the primary purpose of the trip should be to have someone look into the condition of the troops. He suggested that Mr. Acheson should complete the draft, and he, General Marshall, would talk to General Bradley, and try to clarify the thinking on the time of the departure, who should go, and what should be taken out.

795.00/12-2750

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1951.

General Bradley called Mr. Acheson this afternoon and said that the Joints Chiefs were waiting for the memorandum which Mr. Acheson was having prepared.[1] This led to a discussion of the memorandum.

The Secretary outlined the reasons we thought such a memorandum was a good idea. He mentioned briefly and rather generally what would be contained in the proposed memorandum. He said that he felt it would help if General MacArthur understood all of the reasons that we felt a stand in Korea was so important and the importance to the world of this stand.

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[1] Reference is to the memorandum outlined by Mr. Acheson in his talk with General Marshall, *supra*. No copy has been found in the Department of State files.

General Bradley agreed that this was important, and mentioned conversations he had had with representatives of the press. He said that some of the press seemed to feel that there was lack of cooperation between the General and Washington and that the General was inclined to "free wheel". General Bradley said that he felt it would be helpful to all if such a memorandum as Mr. Acheson suggested could go to the General and give him all the reasons we had for the positions we had taken.

General Bradley said that he did not agree that the military men who were scheduled to go to Korea should take the memorandum with them. He thought it best to have it sent by regular channels since it was primarily a political message. He said that if military men took it out, they would be put in an awkward position because they would be asked to explain it, and it is not primarily within their competence to do so. The General said he would discuss this point with the Joint Chiefs and repeated that the above was the current thinking, although they might think differently about it later.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

INR–SE Files[1]

National Intelligence Special Estimate

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1951.

SE–1

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MAINTAINING A BEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA[2]

Problem

To estimate and enumerate the advantages and disadvantages of holding a UN beachhead in South Korea.*

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[1] Files of National Intelligence Special Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet: "The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 8 January 1951."

*In the event of full-scale Soviet intervention in Korea, it is estimated that it would be impossible for UN forces to maintain the beachhead. [Footnote in the source text.]

Estimate

1. The maintenance of a United Nations beachhead in South Korea would have the following major strategic and military implications for the United Nations and the United States:

a. Maintenance of a beachhead would have the following military advantages:

(1) Full attainment of the stated Communist objective in Korea would be denied.

(2) The loss of US military prestige which would result from a withdrawal would be avoided.

(3) The continued commitment of major Chinese Communist forces in Korea and Manchuria would restrict the Chinese Communist capability for rapid consolidation of China, for large scale expansion in mainland Southeast Asia, and for resisting invasion elsewhere on the mainland of China.

(4) The Soviet Union would be obliged to continue the supply of material in support of Communist forces in Korea.

(5) The Communist forces would be denied an additional operational base against Japan.

(6) In the event that large scale operations against China become necessary, Korea would be favorable for joint UN–US ground operations because:

> (*a*) The superior air and sea power of the UN forces could be brought to bear effectively against the numerically superior ground forces;
>
> (*b*) Chinese Communist attrition would be relatively high in the confined battle area in Korea;
>
> (*c*) The beachhead would provide an operational base that would tie down large numbers of Communist forces, could be used to mount subsequent operations in Korea, and could be used to support operations elsewhere in the Far East in the event of a general war with China.

b. The maintenance of a beachhead would have the following military disadvantages:

(1) A critical proportion of the US Army and substantial proportion of US naval and air resources would be committed in the area, thereby reducing immediate US capabilities for building up forces elsewhere.

(2) A considerable drain on US military resources would be imposed not only in the support of US forces in Korea, but also in the complete logistic support for Republic of Korea forces and the major part of the logistic support for all other United Nations forces in Korea.

(3) UN forces within the beachhead would be subjected to constant attrition (and in the event of overt Soviet intervention, danger of annihilation).

(4) The continued deployment of the Army forces of the Far East

command in Korea would leave Japan more vulnerable to hostile invasion.

(5) The US would be required to continue its support of several million Korean refugees.

2. A UN beachhead would have the following short-term international political and psychological effects:

a. There would be an avoidance of the great loss of prestige to the UN and the diminution of confidence in the US that would follow a withdrawal.

b. The maintenance of a beachhead would place stresses on the UN coalition stemming from increased fear of general war, provide continued Communist propaganda opportunities arising from a conflict between the West and Asiatics, and continue European concern over the diversion of major US military strength to the Far East.

c. The Chinese Communists would be prevented from achieving complete success in Korea and the beachhead would provide a continued symbol of UN determination to resist aggression.

d. Most Far Eastern countries would react favorably to the maintenance of a UN beachhead. In Japan, maintenance of a beachhead would be particularly advantageous with respect to negotiations leading toward a Japanese peace treaty. Those countries in Southeast Asia vulnerable to an early Chinese Communist attack, however, would be apprehensive about the possibility of a general war with China while UN forces were involved in Korea, and Indonesia and Burma particularly would favor a withdrawal.

e. In South Asia, India would react unfavorably to the maintenance of a UN beachhead because of Indian hopes of reducing the possibility of a major war and because of a general inclination to sympathize with Asiatics as against Westerners; Pakistan would react favorably to any evidence of US military strength. In the Near and Middle East, the maintenance of a beachhead might salvage to some degree US military prestige among Iran and the Arab states; Greece and Turkey would oppose UN withdrawal unless it were part of a broader plan to attack Communism at its source, or unless they were convinced that Western Europe or the Near East were immediately threatened.

f. The reaction in Western Europe would be influenced on the one hand, by an intensification of the fear that prolonged and inconclusive fighting in Korea would result in the extension of hostilities elsewhere and on the other, by concern lest the UN fail in a major effort to contain Communist aggression.

g. Latin American reaction would be favorable.

h. It is unlikely that Soviet policy will be significantly modified by a UN decision to maintain a beachhead in Korea.

Editorial Note

On January 11, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met from 3 to 6:30 p.m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.422. The Cease-Fire Group presented its Supplementary Report, dealing with the principles to be laid down as a basis for possible negotiations subsequent to the establishment of a cease-fire (A/C.1/645). Secretary Acheson had already, on the same day, secured President Truman's approval of United States acceptance of the principles (795.00/1-1151), and at the First Committee meeting Ambassador Austin stated that the United States would vote in favor of them and for their transmission to Peking for possible acceptance by the People's Republic of China. No vote was taken, however, by the First Committee at this meeting.

The text of United Nations document A/C.1/645 read as follows:

"The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the programme outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.

"1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.

"2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

"3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

"4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

"5. As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations."

741.022/1-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 11, 1951—6 p. m.
NIACT

3858. Embtel 3842, January 11.

1. At Prime Ministers' meeting this morning there was general agreement negotiations could not go on until cease-fire had been arranged. In so informing UK UN delegation, Foreign Office suggested possible compromise might be for a committee (on which CPG as well as US would participate) to be set up and held in readiness for negotiations immediately cease-fire effective.

2. Meeting also considered two points raised by Gross, USUN: (*a*) feasibility of placing time limit on reply by CPG to Entezam Committee and (*b*) if committee's efforts fail, will CPG be named an aggressor?

3. With regard to (*a*) general agreement this would not be feasible as it would be interpreted by CPG as amounting to an ultimatum.

4. With regard to (*b*) all Prime Ministers doubtful and some definitely opposed. Those who could be induced to acquiesce would only do so from desire meet US wishes.

GIFFORD

741.022/1-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 11, 1951—9 p. m.
NIACT

3864. Embtel 3858, January 11. Further on Prime Ministers' conference on Korea.

1. UKUN and other Commonwealth delegates instructed work for securing consideration principles of Cease Fire Committee revised on following lines:

a. Begin with point one (cease-fire).

b. Revise point five to set up appropriate body including US, UK, USSR, CPG with view to achieving settlement in Far East in conformity with UN Charter and existing international obligations (including reference to Cairo declaration), considering *inter alia* Formosa and Chinese representation in UN. This body to be as small as possible. Word "body" substituted for "committee" to make it easier procedurally for UN to set up group including CPG.

c. Delegates in New York to do drafting. Left to Jebb's discretion arrange whether UN should (1) table principles, contact CPG, pass resolution or (2) table principles, pass resolution and then contact CPG.

d. Re cease-fire, no one contemplates talks proceeding while fighting in progress. If cease-fire and appointment of body both included in principles tabled at UN, not necessary cease-fire should precede appointment of body. In other words, securing agreement of all powers concerned to sit down at table and cease-fire can take place simultaneously.

2. Background these decisions follows. Since original cease-fire principles known to be unacceptable to CPG on basis Panikkar's conversation of January 4 it was believed necessary revise principles lest CPG consider them a trap. Also felt necessary get US support, not merely acquiescence, these new proposals in order get CPG agree to discussions. All Prime Ministers feel no strong condemnatory resolution vs. CPG should be passed until all are morally certain every effort possible made to get CPG around conference table. All Prime Ministers felt no condemnatory resolutions should be passed until full consequences of such action explored with US.

GIFFORD

795.00/1-1251

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1951.

Subject: Continued Resistance in Korea.

The importance to our national interests of continued resistance to Communist aggression in Korea is such that we should not abandon such resistance if there is any feasible or practical way to continue it.

The President should direct the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use maximum ingenuity and imagination to discover ways and means for continuing the resistance in Korea without unacceptable losses to the U.S. forces engaged. For example, apart from Cheju-do Island, there are many peninsulas along the south coast with narrow approaches to mainland Korea and countless islands around the south and west coast which might be held indefinitely by South Korean and a portion of the present UN forces. This would permit us to establish a vast laboratory for unconventional operations against Asiatic communism, for developing the techniques of organizing Asian manpower, and for developing commando and guerrilla operations against and within Korea itself. It is also assumed that, under these conditions, a maximum air effort would be continued against Chinese and North Korean forces in Korea. The use of these peninsulas and islands will also solve the problem of the disposition of ROK government, armed forces and friendly civilian refugees.

I feel certain that if the President should make it very clear that he wants the maximum effort from our military within the limitations of available resources, that much more can be developed than we now have in mind. It would be very convenient to liquidate the Korean involvement, but we must not let this convenience trap us into missing opportunities for action which would have the most far-reaching political and national interest benefits.

If we decide upon this course of action, we could then say: "We are going to stay in Korea. We are going to to continue to fight alongside our Korean allies. We shall not abandon them. The UN will continue its resistance to aggression." A statement like that from the President would have the greatest possible benefits not only in Korea but in Southeast Asia and other vital areas.

795.00/1-1251

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mildred Asbjornson of the Office of the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1951.

Mr. Lovett[1] telephoned the Secretary this morning and said that General Vandenberg[2] had been talking with certain people in the State Department regarding the destructibility of certain dams (in the Korean area). Mr. Lovett said General Vandenberg was leaving on a short trip[3] and that he wished to take General Curtis Le May of the Strategic Command[4] with him. However, General Le May did not want to do this without first checking with Mr. Acheson to see if the Secretary thought it might have any bad effects, although Le May had in mind it might also have good effects.

The Secretary said he was calling a meeting of State Department people at the very moment, he would discuss the matter and would call right back. Mr. Lovett asked if the Secretary would call General Vandenberg direct.

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[1] Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

[2] Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

[3] See footnote 11, p. 70.

[4] Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay was Commanding General of the U.S. Strategic Air Command.

795.00/1-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [Washington,] January 12, 1951.

Participants: General Vandenberg
Mr. Acheson

After the meeting in regard to the question of whether General LeMay should go out to Korea, the Secretary called General Vandenberg and told him that the people with whom he had talked (Mr. Harriman, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Rusk) were unanimous in the feeling that General LeMay not go on this trip. He said that General LeMay had come to be something of a "Mr. Atom Bomb", and that we felt it would excite people unduly and probably have bad effects if General LeMay were taken on this trip.

General Vandenberg agreed that he would not take General LeMay with him.

L[ucius] D. B[attle]

795.00/1-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [Washington,] January 12, 1951.

Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 10:30 A. M. with the following present:

The President
Secretary Acheson
Secretary Marshall
The four Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]
The three Service Secretaries[2]
Mr. Symington[3]
Admiral Souers[4]
Mr. Wilson[5]
Secretary Snyder[6]
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Lay[7]

General Marshall read aloud the incoming telegram from General MacArthur.[8] He then said that the Joint Chiefs particularly wanted to ascertain at first hand the state of the morale of our forces and proposed that General Collins and General Vandenberg leave for Tokyo this afternoon at 2:00 o'clock. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs wish to send a message to MacArthur which General Marshall read aloud.[9]

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[1] General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

[2] Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews; and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter.

[3] W. Stuart Symington, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

[4] Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to President Truman and formerly Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

[5] Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization.

[6] John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury.

[7] James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

[8] Telegram C-53167, January 10, from Tokyo, p. 55.

Secretary Acheson pointed out that the message did not seem wholly clear in some respects and General Bradley and General Collins undertook to explain the meaning of the message. General Collins said that the question was not on a decision to evacuate or not to evacuate but of the timing of the issuance of orders to begin the evacuation.

Secretary Acheson said he understood from these explanations that it was the intention of the message to conform to the views expressed by the President in his talks with Mr. Attlee. He suggested that it might be desirable to give General MacArthur more information on the political bases of American policy.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman argued for the separation of military and political questions.

The President referred to an estimate which had just been given him by the CIA which he thought was very helpful.[10] He repeated the view which he had expressed to Mr. Attlee that he was unwilling to abandon the South Koreans to be murdered.

General Collins and General Bradley summarized the proposals they had in mind for the evacuation of the ROK forces and the prisoners of war, including the use of Cheju-do Island.

Secretary Snyder wondered whether a representative of the State Department should be sent to Tokyo with Collins and Vandenberg to explain political aspects to General MacArthur.

Secretary Acheson thought it would be unnecessary to do this. He then referred to the possibility of leaving some ROK forces on other islands and peninsulas along the Korean coasts in order to develop opportunities for learning effective methods of counter guerrilla and other unconventional types of warfare which would harass the Chinese Communists.

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[9] The message referred to in the text was dispatched to General MacArthur on January 12 as telegram JCS 80902; for a paraphrased text with deletion, see *Hearings*, p. 907. The deleted sentences read as follows:

"However, we are concerned about effect on troops, particularly ROK forces, if it should become known to them that a decision to initiate troop evacuation were made at this stage in operations. Instructions to evacuate are almost certain to become known soon after issue. Judging from your C–52964 [January 8, 1951, not printed] this might well result in partial collapse of ROK troops, thus seriously jeopardizing the ability of Eighth Army to reach a relatively secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it during period required for actual evacuation."

The telegram informed General MacArthur that, based on all factors known to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been forced to the conclusion that it was infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold a position in Korea for a protracted period. Suggesting factors to consider, the telegram requested General MacArthur to estimate the timing and conditions under which he would have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea. It also informed him that, meanwhile, the directives contained in paragraph C of JCS 80680, printed on p. 41, would remain in effect. (JCS Files)

[10] Reference is to the Special Estimate entitled "International Implications of Maintaining a Beachhead in South Korea" (SE–1), dated January 11, p. 61.

General Collins thought that Cheju-do Island would suffice for this purpose.

The President indicated general approval of the idea of arranging for appropriate evacuation of these forces but said that he did not want to pass on the operational details.

There was then discussion of General Bedell Smith's proposal to go to Japan and the President approved his plan to go at once. General Smith said they had facilities for doing the kind of thing which Secretary Acheson had suggested. The President also approved the trip of General Collins and General Vandenberg and initialed the message to General MacArthur.[11]

PHILIP C. JESSUP

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[11] Generals Collins and Vandenberg left for Tokyo on the evening of January 12, taking with them the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense printed in NSC 101, *infra*. They conferred with General MacArthur in Tokyo on January 15 and again on January 18 (Tokyo time) after returning from a visit to Korea. President Truman sent a personal message to General MacArthur on January 13, the text of which was transmitted in JCS 81050, p. 77.

S/S Files: NSC 101

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 12, 1951.

NSC 101

COURSES OF ACTION RELATIVE TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA

The enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is transmitted herewith, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, for the information of the National Security Council.

The enclosure is also being referred to the Senior NSC Staff for use in connection with the report on "Possible U.S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression"[1] currently under preparation by the Senior NSC Staff at the direction of the President for consideration at the next Council meeting on January 17, 1951.[2]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] See NSC 101/1, January 15, p. 79.

[2] See the memorandum by Bishop, p. 93.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[8]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 12, 1951.

Subject: Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively agreed upon the following objectives relative to Communist China and Korea together with the actions to be taken to attain them with some indication as to the timing.

2. *Objectives:*

a. Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan—Ryukyus—Philippines.
b. Deny Formosa to the Communists.
c. Delay a general war with Russia until we have achieved the requisite degree of military and industrial mobilization.
d. Prevent, by all appropriate means, the further spread by force of Communism on the mainland of Asia: particularly into Indochina, Siam and Malaya.
e. Support the South Koreans as much and as long as practicable; keeping alive an exile government of Korea, if forced to evacuate Korean territory.
f. Support establishment in China of a government friendly to the United States.

3. *Actions to be taken:*

a. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate to Japan if forced out of Korea.
b. Limit major U.S. ground forces in the Far East to those now committed, unless:

> (1) The outcome of the present Chinese offensive should indicate that we can profitably remain in Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now committed, in which event, if the Army could provide them and at the same time meet our commitments in Europe, not to exceed two partly trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to increase its security.

c. Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense forces.
d. Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend Japan.
e. Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.
f. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

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[8] See footnote 11, *supra*.

g. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

h. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

i. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.

j. Press now for UN action branding Communist China as an aggressor.

k. Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

l. Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.

m. Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea.

n. Increase MDAP to Indochina and assist training of Viet Nam forces if requested by French authorities.

o. Consult with Siamese authorities and, if requested, furnish a military mission and increase MDAP aid to Siam.

p. Strengthen the Philippines primarily by exerting pressure on the Philippine Government to establish internal security.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 12 from 3 to 5:50 p. m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.423. At the meeting, the Israeli Delegate introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/647) under the terms of which the First Committee would approve the principles set forth in the Supplementary Report of the Cease-Fire Group (A/C.1/645) and request the Secretary-General to submit them to Peking for the observations of the People's Republic of China as soon as possible. No vote was taken on the draft resolution at this meeting.

795.00/1-1351

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] January 13, 1951.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am grateful to you for your reply to my message of the 8th January with its reassurance as to the intentions of your Government on Korea. This came in very opportunely during our meeting of Prime Ministers, though I did not reveal these exchanges to them. We gave a great deal of our time to discussions of Far Eastern problems and we all feel the deepest anxiety about the intentions of the Chinese Government. There was unanimous agreement that in order to probe Chinese intentions it was wise to make this offer of a meeting to include the big powers through the United Nations, at the same time fully recognising, of course, that talks could not take place whilst fighting was in progress.

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[1] This message was transmitted via the British Ambassador in Washington who forwarded it to Mr. Acheson for passage to the President.

I would like to say how deeply impressed I am by the careful attention you have given to the viewpoints of the other nations, and the great effort made to reconcile the views so as to get in the end a common agreement.

We ought even now, perhaps, to be considering the situation that will arise in the near future. It may be that the Chinese will respond to this very fair offer. If that happens no doubt our two Governments will maintain the closest possible touch as to the next steps. But I have no illusions, and fear that we may be faced by a negative attitude on the part of the Chinese. I think that we shall have to consider very carefully what our aims should then be and what steps we should take to achieve them. With Mr. Bevin I have given careful thought to the memorandum transmitted to us by the United States Embassy on the 4th January,[2] but I feel that the issues and consequences affect not only our interests but the interests of so many countries so vitally that we should not embark precipitately on a policy which might not sway the Chinese Government, but which would certainly impose serious new strains on us.

The dominating factor is, of course, the military situation in Korea. It is of the greatest importance that we should maintain a stand there if it is militarily possible, and I think that our best means of bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese to abstain from further adventures is to show that their present adventure in Korea does not pay and is on the contrary a constant drain on their resources. It was for this reason that I was so glad to have your reassurances on this point which helped to dispel the doubt in my mind caused by some of the press communiqués issued in Tokyo and by our analysis of the course of the campaign.

With all good wishes,

C. R. ATTLEE

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[2] The memorandum referred to was based on the contents of circular telegram 334, January 3, p. 7.

320/1-1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1951—2 p. m.

632. There are set forth below two alternate draft Res approved in Dept for use as "second stage" Res in Korean case. Only distinction between two is that first alternative contains an express finding by GA that Chi Commies have committed aggression whereas the second alternative contains a finding of illegal acts which Chi Commies have committed without using word aggression.

You are authorized to consult with other Dels on basis of either or both drafts. Depts views fol.

1. It is our position that the action of the Chi Commies does in fact constitute aggression and we do not think that GA need shrink from making an express finding of aggression.

2. At same time one of our principal objectives is to maintain maximum unity of free world and to get as large a vote as possible for the Res. We do not believe the label of aggression is paramount, what is important is that the UN face squarely the facts of what the Chi Commies have done. If therefore there would be a larger vote for the second alternative it wld be acceptable to us. The largest possible majority is important not only for the record but also in terms of the action which UN members will be willing to take in furtherance of the recommendations of the CMC.

3. As matter of tactics Dept believes that US shld not press first alternative so strongly in consultations that if it is later determined that a larger vote would result from second alternative it becomes a "defeat" for the US position. Realistically one alternative is as "strong" as the other, and we think it would be unfortunate if the word aggression became a shibboleth which determined the willingness or unwillingness of the free world to accept US leadership.

A. *First Alternative*

The General Assembly

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has committed aggression in Korea:

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action to meet the aggression in Korea;

Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations in such action;

Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

Requests the Collective Measures Committee, as a matter of urgency, to consider what additional measures should now be employed to meet this aggression, and to make recommendations to the General Assembly thereon;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means and requests (the cease-fire group appointed in the resolution of the General Assembly of December 15 [*14*], 1950, or, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council or another group) at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end.

B. *Second Alternative*

The General Assembly

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, (1) has given assistance to the North Korean Authorities against the United Nations is [*in?*] taking action in pursuance of the Security Council's finding of a breach of the peace; (2) has used force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Korea; and (3) has sent its armies into Korea and attacked the forces of the United Nations there;

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea;

Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations in such action;

Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in its intervention in Korea;

Requests the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider what additional measures should now be employed to carry out the purposes of this resolution and to make recommendations to the General Assembly thereon;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests (the cease-fire group appointed in the resolution of the General Assembly of December 15 [*14*], 1950, or, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council or another group) at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held 2 meetings on Saturday, January 13, from 10:45 a. m. to 1:10 p. m. and from 3 p. m. to 6:15 p. m.; for the records, see United Nations documents A/C.1/SR.424 and 425.

At the afternoon meeting, the First Committee approved by a vote of 50 (including the United States) to 7, with 1 abstention, the principles embodied in the Supplementary Report of the Cease-Fire Group (A/C.1/645), and then approved by a vote of 45 (including the United States) to 5, with 8 abstentions, a Norwegian draft resolution (A/C.1/651) which read as follows:

"*The First Committee*

"*Invites* the Chairman of the First Committee, through the Secretary-General, to transmit the principles approved by it on 13 January 1951 to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and invite that Government to inform him as soon as possible whether it accepts those principles as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems. Upon the receipt of the reply from the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chairman of the First Committee will convene the Committee to consider that reply."

For the text of a statement by Mr. Acheson on January 17 explaining the United States vote in favor of the cease-fire proposal, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 29, 1951, page 164.

795.00/1-1351 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 13, 1951—6:28 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 81050. From JCS personal for MacArthur, Secty[1] sends. The following message from the President to General MacArthur is transmitted:

"I want you to know that the situation in Korea is receiving the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the gravest importance to the future of America and to the survival of free peoples everywhere.

I wish in this telegram to let you have my views as to our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to the maximum effort which could reasonably be expected from the United Nations Forces under your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.

1. A successful resistance in Korea would serve the following important purposes:

(*a*) To demonstrate that aggression will not be accepted by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying point around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet Union now poses.

(*b*) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself.

(*c*) To afford more time for and to give direct assistance to the organization of non-communist resistance in Asia, both outside and inside China.

(*d*) To carry out our commitments of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of adversity.

(*e*) To make possible a far more satisfactory peace settlement for Japan and to contribute greatly to the post-treaty security position of Japan in relation to the continent.

(*f*) To lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of communist power and to let them know that they need not now rush to come to terms with Communism on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.

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[1] Reference is to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall. A copy of this message was brought to the attention of Mr. Acheson on January 15 (795.00/1-1551).

(*g*) To inspire those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China.

(*h*) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up of the defenses of the Western World.

(*i*) To bring the United Nations through its first great effort in collective security and to produce a free-world coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests of the United States.

(*j*) To alert the peoples behind the iron curtain that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression and that this crime will be resisted by the free world.

2. Our course of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

3. We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies. Further, in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes mentioned above might be supported, if you should think it practicable, and advisable, by continued resistance from off-shore islands of Korea, particularly from Che ju-Do, if it becomes impracticable to hold an important portion of Korea itself. In the worst case, it would be important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified.

4. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our Armed Forces to meet this great danger.

5. I am encouraged to believe that the free world is getting a much clearer and realistic picture of the dangers before us and that the necessary courage and energy will be forthcoming. Recent proceedings in the United Nations have disclosed a certain amount of confusion and wishful thinking, but I believe that most members have

been actuated by a desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great majority is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will be an encouraging and formidable combination in defense of freedom.

6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances."

Request visiting Chiefs be informed.[3]

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[3] See footnote 11, p. 70.

General MacArthur's reply to this message from the President was transmitted in telegram C-53400, January 14, from Tokyo which read as follows: "We shall do our best." (795.00/1-1451)

S/S Files: NSC 101/1

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1951.

NSC 101/1

U.S. ACTION TO COUNTER CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Reference: NSC 101[1]

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff at the direction of the President and in the light of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in NSC 101, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on January 17.[2]

It is recommended that, in the form adopted by the Council, the enclosure be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Dated January 12, p. 70.

[2] At the NSC meeting on January 17, the Council, with the President presiding, discussed NSC 101/1 with particular reference to paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 in light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in their January 12 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, which had been circulated as NSC 101, p. 71. For Mr. Bishop's report on the discussion, see p. 93. The Council then referred NSC 101/1 to the NSC Staff for revision and agreed that the revised study should concern itself with U.S. objectives as well as with U.S. courses of action.

The Council also requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a detailed study of the military effectiveness of the possible use of the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa against the mainland of China, including consideration of the effect of such use upon the defense of Formosa, and requested the Department of State to prepare a study on the effect upon China and other Asian countries of continued U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek. (NSC Action No. 420)

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. ACTION TO COUNTER CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The United States should:

1. Limit major U.S. ground forces in the Far East to those now committed, unless the outcome of the present Chinese offensive should indicate that we can profitably remain in Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now committed. In that event, not to exceed two partly trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to increase its security if the Army could provide them and at the same time meet our commitments in Europe.

2. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate them to Japan if forced out of Korea.

3. Perfect plans for the evacuation of ROK and other UN forces.

[4. Expedite the build-up of internal security and police forces in Japan pending the early conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty.][3] (Proposed by the Senior Members from State, Defense, NSRB and Mr. Harriman's office.)

[4. Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense forces.] (Proposed by the Senior JCS Member.)

5. Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend Japan.

6. Continue our political and economic sanctions against Communist China and press other members of the UN to adopt similar sanctions.[4]

[7. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.] (Proposed by Senior Members from JCS, NSRB and Mr. Harriman's office.)

[7. Prepare plans for a naval blockade of China for possible use only in cooperation with other friendly nations.] (Proposed by Senior Members from State, Defense, Treasury, and Office of Defense Mobilization.)

8. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria. (The Senior State Member reserves his position on this paragraph.)

[9. Remove now the restrictions on operations of anti-communist Chinese forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists, concurrently endeavoring to secure the agreement of our principal allies to this course of action.] (Proposed by the Senior JCS and NSRB Members.)

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[3] Brackets throughout in the source text. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

[4] For related documentation, see pp. 1874 ff.

[9. Press its principal allies to agree that (*a*) present restrictions should be removed on operations of the anti-communist Chinese forces, under Chiang [5] or some other leader who might emerge, and (*b*) such logistic support should be given to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists. If unable to obtain such agreement, consider taking these actions unilaterally.] (Proposed by Senior Members from State, Defense and Mr. Harriman's office.)

10. Continue air and naval action against appropriate military targets in Korea.

11. Press for immediate UN action branding Communist China as an aggressor, following the rejection of a cease-fire.

12. Send a military training mission and increased MDAP to the Chinese on Formosa.

13. Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective anti-communist guerrilla forces in China.

[14. Prepare plans for initiating damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea, including troops in transit to or from Korea.] (Proposed by all Senior Members except NSRB.)

[14. Launch an open and sustained attack upon lines of communications in China and Korea; and also upon aggression-supporting industries in Manchuria as considered militarily advisable.] (Proposed by Senior NSRB Member.)

15. In the event of a serious air attack on UN forces in Korea or in transit to or from Korea, authorize [illegible] and naval action against the sources of such attack.

16. Increase existing MDAP to Indochina and assist training of the forces of the Associated States if requested by French and local authorities.[6]

17. Consult with Siamese authorities and, if requested, furnish a military mission and increase MDAP aid to Siam.[7]

18. Expedite the program relating to the Philippines set forth in NSC 84/2.[8]

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[5] Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.

[6] For related documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.

[7] For related documentation, see *ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 1594 ff.

[8] For text of NSC 84/2, November 9, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VI, p. 1514.

320/1-1551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 15, 1951—1:38 p. m.
NIACT

Delga 515. Personal for the Secretary from Austin. Instructions re Korea. Re Delga 506, January 12[1] and oral response thereto by Assistant Secretary Hickerson on telephone this morning, my understanding is as follows:

(1) Deptel 632[2] does not specifically refer to or answer Delga 506.
(2) In consultations with diplomatic representatives in Washington and delegations of other member states in UN, only the first alternative of Deptel 632 will be discussed or referred to until Department decides, after consultation with Mission, that it is necessary to obtain the largest possible majority to take up the second alternative. I understand that if any indication is given by Department or by Mission that we may weaken on the first alternative, we would be deprived of important trading position already established with Latin delegations and some European and Asiatic delegations. The mission will commence liaison with other delegations at once and ought to soon ascertain whether it is wise to continue to press vigorously in consultations for use of the substance of the finding of aggression according to the first alternative. I understand need to handle matter in a manner to protect US leadership, and, in fact, to increase it.

AUSTIN

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[1] Not printed. In it, Ambassador Austin strongly set forth his conviction that U.S. policy should be to press in the United Nations for a finding that Communist China was guilty of aggression in Korea (795.00/1-1251).

[2] Dated January 13, p. 74.

795.00/1-1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 15, 1951—3 p. m.
PRIORITY

1706. 1. Menon, Foreign Secretary, tells me Panikkar had talk several days ago with Chou En-lai[1] re UN proposal cease-fire. Chou En-lai somewhat noncommittal. Suggested proposal would be more palatable Peking if it could provide for cease-fire and conversations to take place simultaneously. He would nevertheless discuss matter with government.

2. I asked Menon if Panikkar explained what Chou En-lai had in mind and whether Menon understood precisely what was meant. I

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[1] Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

wondered whether Chou En-lai meant that there would be temporary cease-fire while brief conversations were held with understanding that hostilities would resume if conversations did not lead to immediate agreement. Menon said Panikkar did not try interpret meaning of Chou En-lai's remark and Menon could not understand it himself. Perhaps Chou En-lai merely meant that conversations were to take place immediately following issuance orders for cease-fire.

HENDERSON

795.00/1-1551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1951—7 p. m.

387. While Chi Commies considering cease-fire principles transmitted by GA (reported wireless bulletin, Jan 11), Dept desires continue consultations re next step to be taken by UN provided this intermediate effort does not succeed. In that event US continues believe strongly UN shld face squarely facts of situation by taking prompt action along lines Depcirtel 334,[2] and it is our hope that majority Members will be prepared such action since failure current effort shld make clear that all reasonable possibilities for pacific settlement will have been exhausted.

We have therefore authorized USUN Del consult other Dels re text possible res embodying fol specific substantive points, which you authorized discuss FonMin:

1) (Alternative one) A finding that CPG of PRC has committed aggression;

1) (Alternative two) A finding that CPG of PRC, in violation of UN Charter (*a*) has given assistance to NK Authorities against which UN is taking action in pursuance of SC finding of breach of peace; (*b*) has used force against territorial integrity and political independence of Korea, and (*c*) has sent its armies into Korea and attacked UN forces there;

2) A call upon CPG to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against UN forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3) A reaffirmation of UN's determination to continue its action in Korea;

4) A call upon all states and authorities to give every assistance to

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[1] This telegram was sent for information to Moscow and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. It was sent for action to the Embassies in Belgrade, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, and Stockholm. A similar but shorter message was sent for action to the Embassies in Canberra, Pretoria, and Wellington in circular telegram 386, not printed (795.00/1-1551).

[2] Dated January 8, p. 7.

UN in such action and to refrain from giving any assistance to CPG in its intervention in Korea;

5) A request that Collective Measures Committee as matter urgency consider what additional measures should now be employed to carry out purposes this res and make recommendations to GA thereon;

6) An affirmation that it continues to be UN policy to bring about cessation of hostilities in Korea by peaceful means, and a request to some appropriate designated body at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end.

Re alternative form first paragraph it is Dept's position that GA need not shrink from making express finding of aggression and prelim consultations by USUN will be on basis first alternative only. If initial soundings indicate reluctance other Dels employ word "aggression", second alternative will be put forward. You shld not, therefore, for present mention second alternative until further word from Dept. FYI it is Dept's basic view that label of "aggression" is not paramount and either alternative acceptable. What is important is that UN face squarely facts of what Chi Commies have done. One of our principal objectives is to maintain maximum unity of free world and get as large vote as possible for res, both for record and in terms action which UN Members wld be willing take in furtherance of recommendations of CMC. Realistically both alternatives are equally strong and it wld be unfortunate if word "aggression" became a shibboleth which determined willingness or unwillingness of free world to condemn Chi Commie action in Korea. Dept wld appreciate ur comments re these alternatives.

Fol are additional aspects of foregoing outline of res some of which represent adjustments in points outlined reftel and which shld lessen some of previous apprehensions re this approach:

1) Language wld make clear that res wld not automatically call on Members to take additional measures at present time;

2) While res wld envisage some additional measures in future, any recommendations of CMC to this end wld be made to GA and not directly to Members. Thus opportunity wld be given all Members debate such measures before approval.

3) In genl above points shld help quiet fears other countries that condemnation of Chi Commies wld necessarily result in spread of hostilities or inevitably involve chain reaction series of events leading to war.

In discussing this matter you may also assure FonMin that US intends to do everything it can to prevent hostilities spreading from Korea to wider areas in FE. What Peiping Govt will do we, of course, do not know. But we do not believe for a moment that Commies either in Peiping or elsewhere wld extend theatre of war by reason their being named as aggressors or of UN recognizing facts of their conduct in Korea. Therefore, it seems to us that whether or not hostilities can be prevented from spreading depends essentially upon deliberate choice of Peiping or those who inspire that regime. Nevertheless, we believe that in CMC's recommendations re nature and extent of any action that shld follow this res only practical steps shld be proposed and great care exercised avoid steps which wld lead to broadening conflict.

Some initial reactions previously reported to reftel indicate in our view insufficient weight being given to fact that all alternatives facing UN in Korea entail some disadvantages. They also indicate insufficient realization of consequences of failure to act. In further discussions with FonMin this matter, suggest fol additional points be made: While we recognize other Govts also have problems meeting public opinion, Dept deeply apprehensive that failure UN recognize present Chi Commie action in Korea for what it is and to face it squarely wld create wave of isolationism in this country which wld seriously jeopardize all we are trying to do with and for Atlantic Pact countries. Thus Eur countries have this additional and vital interest in supporting UN action along lines indicated.

We believe that prompt and continued UN resistance to original aggression in Korea has gained valuable time for free world. We believe that continued resistance, approval of res along above lines and taking of such additional practical measures under it as may be agreed upon are all necessary to help prevent early and decisive Communist victory in Korea and consequent consolidation of their position which wld facilitate further aggression. Since countries West Eur understandably preoccuped with desire gain time build their own defenses, we believe our suggested course of action is in their own direct interest and shld, therefore, be appealing.

ACHESON

795B.00/1-1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1951.

Subject: UK Views on Machinery for Further UN Action in Korea

Participants: Mr. Gerald Meade, British Embassy
Mr. David Popper, UNP
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR

Mr. Meade reported that the UK Foreign Office does not believe it would be wise to use the Collective Measures Committee for the consideration of any measures to be taken by the UN against the Chinese Communists following failure of the current cease-fire effort for the following reasons:

1) The CMC was set up for the specific purpose of general planning under the Uniting for Peace Resolution and to seize upon it now for a different purpose would distort and extend its terms of reference.

2) So to use the CMC would make it much more difficult for the Committee later to carry out with effective support the functions for which it was set up; it would be discredited and attacked by the Soviets and others as biased.

3) The CMC has a number of "irresponsible" members and it would be difficult to guide.

4) Consideration of what if any further action should be taken against the Chinese Communists if the cease-fire effort fails should take the form of private consultations between the UK and with other Commonwealth and friendly Governments and no resolution should be submitted to Committee I without such consideration.

5) Once these steps are worked out the question of what body needs to be created to consider or coordinate them should then be considered and it might well be that the CMC would prove to be the best body although the UK inclines to some *ad hoc* group.

6) In any event, careful consideration must be given to the agenda of the CMC under the Uniting for Peace program when it does meet; there should be no early meeting and none until the US and UK agree on what it should do.

In setting forth these views the Foreign Office desired to make clear that this was without prejudice to their views on the nature of the action to be taken.

We indicated the general thinking of the Department to be as follows: We feel that if the cease-fire effort fails no alternative remains but for the UN to take a strong position against Chinese Communist intervention. In addition to condemning the action for what it is, the GA will be faced with the alternative either of recommending specific consequential steps or of providing some mechanism for the consideration of possible future action. We are by no means completely wedded to the use of this Committee but have been unable to think of a more practically useful body for this purpose.

With regard to the specific points raised by the Foreign Office,

1) We agree that this task would be an extension of the terms of reference of the CMC but there is nothing to prevent the GA by such a resolution from conferring on its subsidiary body this specific *ad hoc* temporary task.

2) We do not feel on balance that the fact that the CMC should discharge such a task would seriously jeopardize its ability to carry

out the more general type of planning envisaged in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, except perhaps to "discredit" it in the eyes of such countries as the USSR who opposed its creation anyway. There is, moreover, some connection between this specific type of planning and the general measures which the Committee is charged with studying.

3) We feel the CMC is on the whole well balanced and responsible. With one or two exceptions it should be responsive to proper leadership.* We feel that to seek to set up a new *ad hoc* group would run the risk of obtaining a body with much less desirable composition. However, our thinking on this matter is flexible and we would appreciate any alternative suggestions which the UK might have.

4) We expressed complete agreement with the necessity of prior consultation with the UK and Commonwealth and other friendly Governments on the specific steps to be taken whatever the formal mechanism used.

5) It seems undesirable, however, from the point of view of public reaction and reaction in Peiping and Moscow to wait until those specific measures are agreed upon in detail in order to consider the UN body that should study them. We look upon the CMC more as a forum to give consideration to the nature of the measures than as one to coordinate their implementation.

6) We agree that careful consideration, US–UK consultation and planning should precede any CMC meeting to begin its original assigned task under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, although there may be some advantage in an early formal organizational meeting.

Mr. Meade indicated that he would transmit these observations to his Foreign Office.

Comments

The emphasis placed by the UK on prior consultation before introducing proposals for specific steps underscores the importance of accelerating more specific thinking on the exact proposals to be placed before the CMC and on discussing these with the UK as a prerequisite to their full cooperation in this next step. At the same time underlying the views of the Foreign Office as reported was an assumption that some such resolution as the US has in mind would be passed and it may be that this shift of emphasis from objections to the taking of such a step to detailed criticisms of the machinery to be used indicates a greater resignation by the UK to the necessity that some such step be taken.

W[ARD] P. A[LLEN]

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*The Committee consists of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. [Footnote in the source text.]

693.95/1-1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, January 16, 1951—noon.

3926. 1. In a telegram from Peiping received in Foreign Office, Hutchison[1] reports Panikkar's views on cease-fire proposals about as follows: China might be prepared agree to proposals but only provided cease-fire were implemented at same time other outstanding issues implemented. In other words, Chinese would not agree to cease-fire as prelude to negotiations on other issues, but they might agree that as part of overall agreement there should be cease-fire in Korea which, however, would not take place until agreement reached on other points at issue. There is general understanding among Chinese leaders cease-fire is probably last opportunity reach peaceful settlement outstanding issues before sanctions applied and Chinese reconstruction started, but there is general feeling there should be no compromise and no terms acceptable other than those indicated.

2. In discussing above message, Scott said Chinese reaction to cease-fire proposals as described by Panikkar was about what might have been anticipated. He made it quite clear any settlement along lines suggested by Panikkar as being acceptable to Chinese would not for a moment be considered by UK. Even India he thought could not support it. Chinese rejection of cease-fire proposals would likely be followed by UN action branding China as aggressor and assumably attempt apply sanctions. What concerned UK was consequences of such an attempt. Did US contemplate there should be limited war against China and, if so, had sufficient thought been given to what this might entail? Scott mentioned study just completed by British Chiefs of Staff pointing up relative invulnerability of China to air attack, blockade or invasion (see Embtel 3927, January 16).[2] He said British Embassy would shortly hope discuss problem with Department.

GIFFORD

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[1] Sir John Hutchison, British Chargé in Peking.

[2] Not printed (795.00/1-1651).

320/1-1651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, January 16, 1951—5:45 p. m.

Delga 520. From Gross. Re Korea—conversation with Tsiang. In conversation with Tsiang, held at his request, he told me he had been in touch with his Government which had instructed him to clarify certain points giving them great concern. He said his government guessed that Peiping might respond to the cease-fire group statement of principles in either of following ways:

(1) By proposing that body contemplated in paragraph 5 be established at once and meet as soon as possible to take up issues with cease-fire arrangements as the first item on the agenda. If this step were agreed to, Taipei feared that Peiping would suggest cease-fire problem be referred to committee of military experts and would propose that body turn at once to substantive questions. Tsiang requested our views if Peiping attempted this gambit.

I replied that it was our fixed position that we would not get into negotiations of substantive questions while hostilities continued and would therefore oppose any effort on the part of the Peiping Government or anyone else to take us into this room through the back door. At the same time I expressed the personal view that we did not have fixed views re the form or body in which cease-fire arrangements might be discussed. We had supported the Asian suggestion for the establishment of the three-man cease-fire group, but this did not necessarily mean that we considered the group the only appropriate mechanism or forum for exploring the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire. Hence, if Peiping suggested the substitution for the cease-fire group of some appropriately composed body for the purpose of exploring a cease-fire arrangement, I did not think we would reject such a suggestion out of hand. However, this flexibility did not impair or modify our set view that a cessation of hostilities in Korea must precede discussion of substantive issues.

(2) Peiping might request UN views concerning the "principles" upon which it was proposed that discussions re Formosa and other issues might take place. In other words, Peiping might ask whether the discussion of the Formosa question would be based upon the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. What would our attitude be in the face of such a reply?

I said that this would seem to be a clear attempt upon the part of the Peiping Government to draw up into a preliminary discussion of the substance or merits of the question at issue and we would reject such an effort since it would merely be a disguised way of attempting to precipitate a substantive discussion while hostilities continued.

Tsiang expressed complete satisfaction with these observations. He then turned to the report of the cease-fire group itself. He said he was completely unable to understand why the statement of principles did not specifically call for the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea and he asked how it was we had agreed to the statement of principles in its present form. I replied that our position remained precisely what it was when we outlined to the cease-fire group our analysis of points which we felt might be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. I called Tsiang's attention particularly to the first 3 points which were embodied in the first report of the cease-fire group (A/C.1/643) as to which the group had commented that in the circumstances they "felt constituted a reasonable basis for discussion". I pointed out that the supplementary report in no way superseded the first report of the cease-fire group, and it was our position that the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire which had been summarized by the group in its first report still remained in our view a valid basis. The supplementary report referred only to withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea and therefore did not in any way prejudice the principle that North Korean forces must be withdrawn from south of the 38th parallel.

Tsiang said that he had not understood this point and was certain that many of the other delegates which had discussed the matter with him did not realize that the second report of the cease-fire group was merely "supplementary" to the first report and did not affect the basis for a cease-fire which had been envisaged in the first report. He expressed gratification for my explanation and added that he had strong doubt that the Chinese Communists would accept the statement of principles if they realized that the conditions for a cease-fire remained as set forth in the first report of the cease-fire group.

Tsiang then turned to the question of the composition of the body contemplated in paragraph 5. He wanted to know what our position was re the participation of his government in discussions relating to Formosa and representation. I replied that the paragraph as drawn contemplated that governments directly interested in problems which were under discussion should be invited to participate in discussion of such problems and that we assumed the GA would accordingly invite the Nationalist Government of China to participate in discusssions relating to Formosa and Chinese representation. Tsiang said he could not conceive that the Chinese Communists would participate in discussions which included his government and he asked whether the cease-fire group agreed with my interpretation. I replied that I could not speak for the cease-fire group and did not know what their interpretations were. I added that we had not formulated or participated in the formulation of the statement of principles and took no responsibility for them. However, our interpretation was as I had stated it and I assumed the GA would interpret it in the same sense.

The conversation concluded by Tsiang commenting that our talk had been "extremely useful and comforting" and would allay much concern felt by his government.

I left with Tsiang an outline of points for a resolution of condemnation of aggression. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

On January 17, the People's Republic of China responded to the proposals put forth by the Cease-Fire Group and forwarded to Peking on January 13 by the First Committee. The response came in the following telegram sent from Chou En-lai to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, David Owen:

"Peking, 17 January 1951.

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the cablegram dated 13 January 1951, transmitted by Mr. Owen at the request of the First Committee of the General Assembly, on the principles concerning the Korean and other Far Eastern problems. In the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China I wish to reply as follows:

"1. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has always maintained and still maintains that a rapid termination of the hostilities in Korea should be sought by negotiations among the various countries concerned with a view to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Koreans themselves; that United States armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan (Formosa); and that the representatives of the People's Republic of China must assume their rightful place in the United Nations. These principles were also mentioned in my statement of 22 December 1950; transmitted by cable to Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, on the same day, and are now well known to the whole world.

"2. On 13 January 1951, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted, without the participation of the representative of the People's Republic of China, various principles concerning the Korean and other Far Eastern problems, the basic points of which are still the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea first, and the conducting of negotiations among the various countries concerned, afterwards. The purpose of arranging a cease-fire first is merely to give the United States troops a breathing space. Therefore, regardless of what the agenda and subject-matter of the negotiations may be, if a cease-fire comes into effect without first conducting negotiations to fix the conditions therefor, negotiations after the cease-fire may entail endless discussions without solving any problems. Besides this fundamental point, the other principles are also not clearly defined. It is not clearly stated whether the so-called existing international obligations refer to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and this may easily be utilized to defend the position of aggression maintained by the United States in Korea, Taiwan and other parts of the Far East. We understand that many countries in the First Committee agreed to the principles adopted on 13 January 1951 because of their desire for peace. It must be pointed out, however, that the principle of a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards would only help the United States to maintain and extend its aggression, and could never lead to genuine peace. Therefore, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot agree to this principle.

"3. With a view to a genuine and peaceful solution of the Korean problem and other important Asian problems, I hereby submit, in the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the following proposals to the United Nations:

> "(*a*) Negotiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves, in order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.
>
> "(*b*) The subject-matter of the negotiations must include the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and Far Eastern related problems;
>
> "(*c*) The countries to participate in the negotiations should be the following seven countries: the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, India and Egypt, and the rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the seven-nation conference;
>
> "(*d*) The seven-nation conference should be held in China, at a place to be selected.

"4. If the above-mentioned proposals are agreed to by the countries concerned and by the United Nations, we believe that it will be conducive to the prompt termination of the hostilities in Korea and to the peaceful settlement of Asian problems to hold negotiations as soon as possible.

Chou En-lai
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China"

(U.N. document A/C.1/653)

Following receipt of the Chinese message, Mr. Acheson released the following statement:

"The reply of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations cease-fire proposal is still further evidence of their contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace. Their so-called 'counterproposal' is nothing less than an outright rejection.

"Once again, the Peiping regime has shown a total lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

"There can no longer be any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now, we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations.

"I am confident that the United Nations will do that. The strength of the United Nations will lie in the firmness and unity with which we now move ahead." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 29, 1950, page 164)

S/S Files : NSC 101 Series

Memorandum by Max W. Bishop, Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Staff, of a Meeting Held on January 17

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1951.

REPORT OF NSC MEETING—WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1951

ITEM 1—NSC 101/1 "U.S. ACTION TO COUNTER CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION"[1]

The Secretary said that he had handed the Department's draft of a new paper on this subject to Jimmy Lay with the request that it be circulated to the members for their information.[2] (It was not circulated at the meeting but was reproduced and distributed later by the Executive Secretariat). The Secretary stated to the Council that NSC 101/1 was quite inadequate and that the Department, in preparing its draft, had gone back to the JCS paper[3] and taken some of their "objectives" and had added others. The Secretary went on to point out that there were three matters—the questions of a naval blockade, of removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance and of removal of restrictions on military operations against the mainland by Nationalist Chinese, which need a complete and careful study.

General Bradley remarked that so far as reconnaissance was concerned, the military merely wanted to "look around" Formosa and the neighboring mainland. He added that so far as Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, the Joint Chiefs had in mind that we should merely tell Chiang Kai-shek that he could now do whatever he wants to do and that we would do nothing, either to prevent or to assist Chiang Kai-shek in any ventures he might undertake.

The Secretary asked for an expression from the Joint Chiefs regarding what they think, from a military standpoint, the Nationalist forces on Formosa could accomplish on the mainland.

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[1] Dated January 15, p. 79.

[2] For the document under reference, see the attachment to the memorandum by Rusk, January 17, p. 1515.

[3] Reference is to NSC 101, January 12, p. 70.

Mr. Harriman suggested that perhaps the Department of State could prepare a memorandum giving its advice as to what the United States should now do about Chiang Kai-shek. The Secretary replied that we would undertake to prepare a memorandum on this subject.[4] General Marshall remarked that he wondered when we would do something to Communist China. He added that someone may ask whether we are not paying "too big a price for Hong Kong". General Bradley said that he gathered from his conversations with the British military that they hold pretty much the same view as we do regarding Communist China. Mr. Smith of NSRB made a long statement to the effect that we should do something now.

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[4] Most of the subsequent material in the NSC 101 series related to China rather than Korea and is printed on pp. 1474 ff.

795.00/1-1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1951.

Subject: Various Problems Relating to Korea

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

The Korean Ambassador called upon Mr. Rusk by prior appointment at 4:30 p. m. on January 17. In reply to Mr. Rusk's question as to the Ambassador's plans, the Ambasssador replied that he was leaving for Korea at the end of this week and that his orders read "on consultation". In view of this he did not know how long he would remain in Korea or whether he might not be returning to the United States.

The Ambassador stated that in view of his imminent return to Korea, there were a number of points upon which he felt he should have some clarification since he would undoubtedly be asked many questions on various phases of American policy upon his return to Korea. He wondered, for instance, what steps the United States now contemplated in relation to Communist China in view of the fact that Peiping had rejected the latest cease-fire proposals.

Mr. Rusk replied that now that the Chinese Communists had rejected the cease-fire, he thought the next step would be the immediate introduction into the UN of a resolution condemning Chinese aggression in Korea and demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops, calling upon the members of the UN to refrain from assisting the Chinese Communists, and recommending that the Collective Measures Committee study the question of what sanctions might be applied against the Chinese Communist regime. Dr. Chang expressed the hope that the sanctions would be severe and that they would include military as well as political and economic steps against China, suggesting the bombing of Chinese bases in this latter connection.

Mr. Rusk said that he did not know what sanctions the Collective Measures Committee might come up with, but he assumed that a break of relations with Peiping and economic measures against the Chinese Communists might be among the steps recommended for adoption. The Ambassador was insistent that some stronger steps should be taken, and Mr. Rusk pointed out that certain military disadvantages would result from our bombing of Chinese bases, which might cause retaliation in Korea by the Communist air force, and further prejudice the safety of UN troops, pointing out that our refraining from bombing China had strong military as well as possible political justification. Dr. Chang wondered whether the British would go along with political and economic sanctions in view of the danger to Hong Kong, and Mr. Rusk thought that the British would now support such sanctions even if it meant increased peril to Hong Kong.

The Ambassador stated that his Government and the Korean people had been very upset by certain of the terms contained in the cease-fire proposal which had been sent to Peiping. In this connection, he mentioned specifically that the proposal would have envisaged the participation of the Chinese Communists on an equal basis in an around-the-table conference on Far Eastern problems, presumably as one of the "Big Four", which the Ambassador said would violate all morale principles since the Chinese Communists were clearly bandits and aggressors with no right to be heard on such a basis. He added that his Government was also very much disturbed at the terms of the cease-fire proposal whereby some form of interim administration would be established for Korea following a cease-fire. He said that this provision would clearly have infringed upon the sovereignty of the ROK Government and that his Government could not accept such a condition. The Ambassador added that in general the acceptance by the majority of the UN of the proposed procedure for a cease-fire had seriously damaged the general morale of the Koreans and that the only desire of the Korean population was to continue the fight; for this they desperately needed the additional arms for the Youth Corps for which his Government had repeatedly asked.

Mr. Rusk emphasized the extent to which United States military resources were already being taxed in the fight to defend Korea and that we had stripped ourselves of badly-needed equipment in order to do it. He pointed out, however, that General Collins, who has been in Tokyo conferring with General MacArthur, would probably bring back with him General MacArthur's views on this question. Mr. Emmons asked the Ambassador if he knew whether recruiting for the ROK Army had fallen off or was presenting a problem, and that in essence it appeared to boil down to a question of not so much actual manpower as of obtaining the requisite arms. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the question of leadership was also of vital importance in the effective use of manpower and that much might depend upon the availability of sufficient, trained Korean leaders to take over command of newly formed units.

The Ambassador said that the Koreans were still very much worried about the UN pulling out of Korea and leaving them to their fate. He felt that he should carry back with him to Korea some reassurance on this point. Mr. Rusk referred to the statements by General Ridgeway and General Collins that we were going to stay in Korea and fight the thing through and that there was no disposition to give up.

Mr. Rusk suggested that the Ambassador might assist in strengthening Korean morale if, upon his return, he were to emphasize that the Koreans themselves must demonstrate to the world, in every way, their will and determination to their fight for their lives and their liberty, and thus, by example, to spur the other nations to the maximum help which they could render. He suggested that emphasis should be not on what foreign aid was or was not being given to the Koreans but upon the extent to which the Koreans themselves were fully dedicating themselves to the fight.

Dr. Chang then brought up the question of relief supplies to the Korean civilian population and said that such supplies did not seem to be coming through very fast. He felt that he might be criticized by his Government for not having pressed hard enough to have these supplies expedited. The Ambassador explained that he had talked recently with Mr. Ringland of E/VFA, who had explained to him the general procedure for handling voluntary aid for Korea and the machinery through which contributions from various private agencies were sent forward. Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador if he knew of any specific bottlenecks in the supply line and said that we would be glad to know of them and that we would look into this question. Mr. Emmons mentioned that he had just talked with a representative of General MacArthur's G-4 Section, who had been engaged in relief matters for Korea and that this officer had given him the impression that civilian relief supplies were coming through in very substantial quantities. Mr. Rusk suggested that if the Ambassador felt any embarrassment upon this point, he might make a statement to the press pointing out that while in this country he had consistently emphasized the importance of Korean relief and had pressed for the expediting of relief supplies.

The Ambassador then referred to his *note verbale* of January 4 containing a request for the participation of the Korean Government in peace treaty negotiations with Japan.[1] He explained that the phraseology of his note might not have conveyed the right impression and that his Government was not "requesting" such participation but that it desired to emphasize its "right" to have a voice in the negotiation of such a treaty. He added that if this "right" were not recognized, then his Government wished to conclude a separate treaty with Japan. Mr. Emmons asked him whether, in this connection, he meant a treaty of commerce and friendship or a treaty of peace. The Ambassador replied that he meant a treaty of peace, since it was the position of the ROK that the Korean Provisional Government existing at the time of Japan's occupation had certain legitimate residual claims for reparations against Japan as a result of the Japanese occupation of Korea which the present government would wish to press. Mr. Rusk remarked that it would be hard to sell the United States Government on such an idea since we had for some time been supporting a minimum standard of living for the Japanese at great cost to ourselves and that any reparations which might be paid to the Koreans by the Japanese would in fact come from the United States taxpayers.

The Ambassador again referred to the question of Korean morale and stated that the Koreans were very much preoccupied over reports of Japanese rearmament; he felt that any American arms which were being devoted to such a program should more properly be given to the Koreans since they were the ones who were actively combatting Communism at the present time. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States was not in fact "rearming" Japan but merely supplying sufficient weapons to strengthen a Japanese police force for internal security and to provide at least a minimum of protection to Japan, in view of the fact that virtually all American occupation troops were now fighting the war in Korea. He emphasized the necessity of giving Japan at least minimum protection at this stage, among other things, in order to protect the rear of our operations in Korea.

Dr. Chang then asked whether the Department had any further thoughts which he could take back to his Government on the question of a Korean Government-in-exile if events should make this necessary, and suggested the possibility of using the Hawaii Islands, where he stated that there were already some 7,000 Koreans who could assist in the assimilation of a new group of Koreans into the population. Mr. Rusk replied that we were going to fight it out in Korea every inch of the way and even from the southern Korean islands if necessary. He added that while he did not believe that the Department had developed any new ideas on the question of a government-in-exile beyond those which had been previously discussed with the Ambassador, he felt that there was going to be plenty of time to examine the problem.

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[1] The Korean *note verbale* is not printed, but, for documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

As the Ambassador was leaving, Mr. Rusk expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity to see him again before his departure for Korea.

795.00/1-1851

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1951.

The Secretary telephoned the British Ambassador and said that Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bancroft had told him of their conversation with the British Ambassador.[1] The Secretary was afraid that they could not do what Mr. Bevin requested. What he would suggest is that Mr. Austin in his speech today,[2] after saying that the Chinese people were aggressors, would not go into the machinery, but would call for future measures to be considered. He could not promise to go further to meet Mr. Bevin for two reasons: The first was that we had talked with 45 Delegations along the general lines of the paper we had sent to Mr. Bevin about ten days ago.[3] These Delegations understand that this is our general attitude, and if we don't go through with it, we will add to the general confusion. The second reason is that in order to do everything possible to keep everyone together and in going along on the five principles, we brought ourselves to the verge of destruction domestically. The Secretary felt he could not take any further chances unless it made a great deal of sense to do so, and he did not think that Mr. Bevin's suggestion made that kind of sense.

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[1] No record has been found in the Department of State files of the conversation held by Messrs. Rusk and Bancroft with Ambassador Franks, but Mr. Battle's memorandum indicated that the Ambassador set forth Mr. Bevin's opinion that the United Nations should now identify Communist China as an aggressor in Korea but should not take any further action.

[2] See the editorial note on the First Committee meeting held on January 18, *infra*.

[3] See telegram 3283, January 5, to London, p. 27.

It is foolish just to say the Chinese are aggressors and not do anything further about it.

That again gets us into the very difficult position which we were in from Saturday through nearly all of Wednesday.[4] The Secretary said he thought the most sensible thing to do to keep the situation cool is to have some UN body which reports to the General Assembly and will keep the matter in the field of discussion. The Secretary pointed out that we could have all the preliminary talks with the British which were necessary. But he did not think we could back off from the matter now. The Secretary said he thought someone must have gotten Mr. Bevin stirred up on this question, because he could not see that Mr. Bevin's attitude was a sensible one.

Mr. Acheson then read to the British Ambassador a suggested revision of what Mr. Austin would say today, which would leave out the portion about what the Committee should be asked to establish, and stating that "the measures to be taken should be designed to restrain Communist authorities from undertaking the initiation of any adventures which they have in mind." He read the suggested speech as follows:

> "We believe the General Assembly should reaffirm the determination of the United Nations to continue its efforts to meet the aggression in Korea. We believe the General Assembly should call upon all states and authorities to render assistance to the United Nations and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors.
>
> "By doing these things the GA would say in principle that collective measures should be taken to meet the aggression in Korea. In our view it would be well for the Assembly to call upon some such body as the Collective Measures Committee to consider what future collective measures should be taken.
>
> "We believe that this body should undertake the study immediately and should report back to the GA as soon as possible with its recommendations on the basis of which the GA would make recommendations to the Members."

He thought this would make our attitude perfectly clear and would embarrass no one. But he thought that it was not sensible to refer to the Chinese as aggressors and leave it there.

Sir Oliver said "All right, yes," and then paused. He said he thought we must do what we thought right; that he could not believe that it was a matter of first importance from the British point of view, but he was speaking for himself on this. He said he had told Mr. Rusk he would get off a telegram and do what he could to straighten Mr. Bevin out on this. He said, taking into account the conversation which took place a half hour before, he did not see how any damage could come of it. Secretary Acheson interjected that he did not see how anything but good could come from the proposed US action, and to this Sir Oliver replied that he was not certain about this, although he agreed that good would come from the public opinion point of view. The Secretary said he did not see how we could avoid recommending something, for if the UN does not recommend something positive, there are plenty of volunteers around to fill the vacuum. If the UN can fill the gap efficiently, calmly, and wisely, that was the way the situation should be handled, rather than being handled on the basis of cries that nobody was doing anything and "we" must do something. He said if the proposed action were one that we were springing on Mr. Bevin, he would be justified in objecting, but it was just what we had proposed ten days ago.

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[4] January 13–17.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 18 from 3 to 5 : 50 p. m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.426. Mr. Austin, speaking at the opening of the session, outlined for the United Nations a course of action along the lines of the passage quoted by Mr. Acheson to Ambassador Franks in the memorandum of conversation, *supra;* he did not, however, introduce a draft resolution.

795.00/1–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 18, 1951—5 p. m.
NIACT

3985. Embtel 3975, January 18;[1] repeated USUN 69.

Foreign Office has just telegraphed instructions to UKUN stating UK finds terms Chinese reply to cease-fire resolution unacceptable and authorizing Jebb "have good smack at it". UKUN informed UK hopes US will not insist on introducing new resolution today. If US does insist, and resolution introduced by USUN is along lines described London [*Department*] circular 387,[2] UK would wish have it amended. UK would prefer have condemnatory resolution handled separately from any resolution calling for further UN action and not combined in one document.

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[1] Not printed. It reported British reaction that the response of the Chinese Communists to the cease-fire proposals was "most discouraging", but went on to say that there was general agreement in British Government circles that the United Nations should not be rushed into further action without time for thorough consideration of the consequences. (795.00/1–1851)

Sent Department 3985, repeated info niact USUN 61.

GIFFORD

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[2] Dated January 15, p. 83.

795.00/1–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET OTTAWA, January 18, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

203. I have today discussed with External Minister Pearson Depcirtel 387 and the outline of resolution to be submitted to the UN. Pearson is familiar with our position and said that so far as Canada concerned action should be taken immediately by UN to condemn Chinese Communist aggression. He made following 2 points: 1. Chinese Communists should be condemned for helping North Koreans as aggressors in Korea, this to prevent spread of war to China and to get degree of unanimity in UN. 2. Keep open the cease-fire offer for acceptance at later date if CPG of PRC wants to do so, possibly with establishment of another committee by UN, not Pearson hopes, continuation of cease-fire committee which he said had not only leaned over backwards but had practically fallen over backwards in offering cease-fire terms.

Pearson again made the point as at press conference this morning full text of Chinese reply possibly open to more than one interpretation although declared publicly by Canadian Government as unacceptable. Pearson returning UN New York tonight. He had just talked with PriMin[1] when I called on him.

In reply Department's request my comments regarding alternatives point one Depcirtel 387, I believe Canadian Government would be willing to brand CPG of PRC "aggressor" were it not for a fear that this might lead to "the bombing of Shanghai" as Pearson expressed to me today. In my opinion they might endorse "guilty of aggression in Korea" or condemn the CPG of PRC's actions in Korea.

WOODWARD

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[1] Louis St. Laurent.

795.00/1-1951

Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1951.

After his return from Cabinet meeting today, the Secretary told Mr. Jessup, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Merchant and me about the report which General Collins and General Vandenberg had made on their recent trip to the Far East.[1]

He said that General Collins visited all Corps Headquarters. He saw and talked to the Commanders of most divisions, including the Turks and the British. One of the General's primary missions was to get an idea of the morale of the forces and of General Ridgway's plan for action.

General Collins reported that the morale of the troops was pretty good. He said there was considerable fight in the Eighth Army and the concern felt back here for them was unjustified. The General reported that the morale of all the troops except the South Koreans was pretty good. He said the French were doing an excellent job and the British and others were in fine shape. He said that the South Koreans were in better shape than anticipated. He said they were not very reliable fighting people, however, and were terrified of the Chinese. He said that they simply broke and ran when the Chinese Communists attacked and were in absolute terror of them. The General said that they were all right in engagements with the North Koreans but had a great psychological fear of the Chinese.

The General said that the South Koreans were beginning to wonder and question what would happen to them if the UN withdrew. He said that they had a dread of being left behind if the UN troops withdrew. The General said that if there were moves to evacuate, we must make a very clear statement that we intend to take South Koreans out also. He stressed that a mere statement was not sufficient but that we must also do something and do it immediately. We must evacuate some ROK troops first and not leave any until the last, which might give them the impression of being abandoned by their allies.

The General said that the morale of our troops was satisfactory and the trend was toward improvement rather than a worsening of morale. While this applied largely to the US forces, it was true to some extent of the others.

The General reported that General Ridgway has taken over with great confidence and energy. He said that General Ridgway was doing a magnificient job and was seen at the Front by his men in difficult times, etc. General Collins felt this had contributed to the morale of our forces.

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[1] For an account by General Collins of the trip, see J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 253–255.

With regard to the military situation, General Collins said that our position on the west end of the line was very strong. He said that a reconnaissance in force had been made to find out who was where, and how determined they were. No resistance was encountered until they reached the crossroad between Suwon and Wonju. There were brushes there but no indication that the enemy wanted to fight it out there. Apparently the enemy is massing in the center of the line. So far only North Koreans have come at us.

The General reported that the west end of the line was the best tank country in Korea. This contributes to our strength in that position.

The General said they did not look for much trouble at the extreme eastern end of the line. The only roadway on the coast is subject to air attack. It was not believed that this area would be a major source of trouble.

General Ridgway thinks that the Chinese Communists could not force us on the West, and could only flank us in the center which he is doing his best to prevent. He has selected several successive points to which our forces could be withdrawn. In General Ridgway's opinion there will be no need for an evacuation for three months. General MacArthur has pointed out that if General Ridgway is right, it will require all of our forces to hold and that we cannot ask him to hold subject to his responsibility for defending Japan. In order to do [so?] it is necessary that he be reenforced in Japan. It was indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on this.

The General said that the lines to which it was proposed we retreat were not in the valley where originally planned. General Ridgway thought this a more disadvantageous place for us to operate than for the Chinese Communists to operate. He prefers coming further back and setting a series of points which he would hold with North [*non-*] Korean troops. The South Korean troops would then be used as fillers between these points. The General favors keeping the forces in these command positions at specific points rather than stringing them along a line. If there is a break-through between the points, we would then try to consolidate around the break-through.

Mr. Acheson asked, in the present situation of the Eighth Army, to what extent we were handicapping the army in not letting them attack beyond Korean borders. Mr. Acheson asked that both General Collins and General Vandenberg reply to this question.

General Collins said that this was not a limitation of any importance.

General Vandenberg agreed and said that the line of communications was long enough for us to "work over" and that we were causing serious logistic trouble to the Chinese Communists, as evidenced by the present lull. General Vandenberg said that it would be good to go to the source of the supplies but that going to Manchuria alone would not be sufficient. He said we would have to go to Russian territory and mentioned Vladivostok particularly. He said he was not in any sense urging that we do this.

General Vandenberg said he wanted to talk about reconnaissance in the north. He said that Dean Rusk had asked whether the dams in the north could be knocked out. He said he had flown over the dam in the extreme north and had seen it from fairly close range. He said it was an enormous solid concrete structure. It was approximately 200 feet in width at the top and much wider at the base. He said the Air Force had dropped one bomb on the dam (Mr. Acheson thought the bomb was a 10,000 [lb.] type) and that it had had practically no effect. The General said that any operation against these dams would be very difficult.

He said that he had flown over the area from Wonju north. It had snowed three days before his trip but had not snowed since that time; nevertheless, there was no sign of any life, any footprints, any wheelprints, or any sign of movement. The roads which he saw were secondary roads and there was no traffic of any kind on them. The General thought this meant that the troops had taken to the hills, although he saw no signs of smoke from chimneys or any signs of life anywhere in the area, which is the central part of Korea going north.

With regard to possible evacuation, General Ridgway stressed the importance of having absolutely no talk about it. He said it would be very embarrassing to have any effort to move out or prepare to move out prior to the time that any such decision was made.

The Secretary said either General Ridgway or General MacArthur (he could not remember which) had talked about the Republic of Korea forces. The General had pointed out that if you want to maintain the morale of the ROK forces, it was essential that their dependents be moved if the forces were evacuated. It was estimated that if you move the forces, the Government, the police, and some civilians, you had over 300,000 people. You might get up as high as 800,000 to one million by evacuating dependents. General MacArthur feels that this should be a UN job. However, since it is impossible to talk about any evacuation, it is difficult to see how it can be lined up at this time.

With regard to the island south of Korea which has been the subject of some consideration as a possible evacuation point, it was pointed out that there was a serious problem with the water supply on the island. There are already 250,000 people on the island and it would be impossible to take anything like 800,000 more. It was also pointed out that in any evacuation of this size, there would have to be a staging operation, due to the shipping shortage, and that the evacuees probably would have to be taken to Japan for onward movement.

With regard to prisoners of war, General MacArthur considers it a sign of weakness not to return them to the US. The Secretary said this was a sign of weakness which, if it got to the point of evacuation, we would have to show. He said the thought now was to take the prisoners of war to an island near the shore and then, if we withdrew, simply leave them there and notify the Koreans of the action. They could then move back into Korea but not soon enough to be a threat to our security there.

In their report General Collins and General Vandenberg said the roads were crowded with refugees to an almost unbelievable extent. They said that we may have as many as two million in our bridgehead if we should withdraw. They said that the refugees were coming down into our area at an ever-increasing rate. Some effort was being made to direct them to the southwest, but without much luck. The refugees feared the Chinese Communists and were equally afraid of the bombing which they expected the US to do as retreat came near. Some of the refugees are probably dependents of the troops and would be included in the estimate of 800,000. Many others are not, and it is difficult to separate them.

The Secretary suggested that a meeting be arranged with General Collins and General Vandenberg to go into all these matters in more detail.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

795B.5/1-1951

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the attached memorandum of 17 January 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted their views regarding the request of the Korean Government that the Korean Youth Corps be armed, and regarding the general question of increasing Korean forces to resist Communist aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that there is not, at present, any desirable, feasible and timely method of appreciably increasing the Korean forces to resist Communist aggression.

Accordingly, I am forwarding this memorandum to you, for your information, with the request that, whenever appropriate, the Department of State inform representatives of the Korean Government that, from the military point of view, the most effective utilization of members of the Korean Youth Corps and other qualified males at present is to replace losses in existing ROK units.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[Enclosure]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 17, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Arming of the Korean Youth Corps.

1. In accordance with your memorandum of 14 December 1950,[1] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the request of the Korean Government that the Korean Youth Corps be armed, and the general question of increasing Korean forces to resist Communist aggression.[2]

2. Initial study indicated that, although no machine guns, mortars, anti-tank weapons or artillery can be made available for additional Korean forces, there are sufficient small arms and ammunition available in Zone of Interior stocks to increase Korean forces by from 200,000 to 300,000 men, armed with rifles, automatic rifles, carbines and sub-machine guns. Further, it seemed probable that on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 of these men might profitably be utilized to:

a. Augment the rifle strength of Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions and U.N. forces;

b. Form special units for guarding lines of communication and for operations against Communist guerrillas; and

c. Conduct guerrilla operations in Communist-held territory.

3. However, it is General MacArthur's opinion that such utilization of additional Koreans would be of questionable value. His comments with respect to the subparagraphs above are substantially as follows:

a. In the combat areas, withdrawal of U.N. forces, including the current retrograde movement from the Seoul vicinity, has been due in most instances to the inability of ROK units to maintain the integrity of their assigned sectors. This failure has been repeated in situations involving either North Korean or Chinese forces and, whenever determined enemy pressure is encountered, appears to have equal application to ROK divisions closely integrated in U.S. corps zones as well as those operating directly under ROK Army control. In consequence, it now appears that any possibility of checking the enemy may be dependent upon the establishment of a defensive position of such proportions that U.S. divisions can be deployed in depth in mutually supporting locations.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] This request had been pursued by President Rhee in letters dated January 6, 1951 to General MacArthur and President Truman. (795B.56/1-651)

b. Continued effort has been made since 25 June 1950 to effect the most practicable utilization of Korean personnel. In addition to materially augmenting the ROK Army, members of the Youth Corps and other qualified males have been supplied with significant quantities of small arms for the purpose of strengthening police units and anti-guerrilla security elements. Despite the relatively large number of non-army personnel now under arms, enemy guerrilla units continue to operate effectively in many widely scattered regions of South Korea.

c. Furthermore, members of the Youth Corps and other qualified males have been supplied with arms for the creation of special organizations to operate in Communist held territory. Such guerrilla forces, however, have accomplished little in Communist rear areas, primarily due to lack of strong-willed leadership.

d. On the basis of past accomplishments of ROK armed forces, the probable restricted size of the battlefield in which U.N. forces may soon be operating and the high priority of requirements for the National Police Reserve of Japan, the most effective utilization of available Korean manpower in the near future would be to replace losses in existing ROK units. Any long-range requirement for, or desirability of, arming additional ROK personnel appears to be dependent primarily upon determination of the future U.S. military position with respect to both the Korean campaign and the generally critical situation in the Far East.

4. In view of the above the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that there is not at present any desirable, feasible and timely method of appreciably increasing Korean forces to resist Communist aggression.

5. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform representatives of the Korean Government and the Secretary of State that, from the military point of view, experience indicates that the most effective utilization of members of the Korean Youth Corps and other qualified Korean males is to replace losses in existing ROK units.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

795.00/1-1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 19, 1951—1 p. m.
NIACT

4173. Following is free translation of *aide-mémoire* dated today just received from Foreign Office:

The French Government is disposed to support proposals presented by the American Government with a view to the condemnation of

Chinese intervention in Korea. It appears to the French Government that the terms of this condemnation could be patterned on those of the resolution of 25 June last condemning the action undertaken by the North Koreans as "an act constituting a breach of the peace" which act the Peking authorities have supported politically, diplomatically and militarily, thus making themselves accomplices therein.

It should be understood:

1. That the voting by the Assembly of a resolution of condemnation does not involve any implicit authorization to the unified command to take military measures against Chinese territory;
2. That measures of any nature whatever to be taken as a result of this resolution would be the subject of debate and of a decision by the Assembly;
3. That in this spirit the Collective Measures Committee would be responsible not for drawing up recommendations but for making a report to the First Committee, whose task it would be to make recommendations to the Assembly;
4. That this statement of position implies in no way that the French Government agrees to the principle of sanctions to be applied to Communist China.

BRUCE

320/1–1951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1951—7 p. m.

640. Confirming telcon. Set forth below is draft res which wld be acceptable to Dept taking into account views of other dels transmitted by telephone today. Either alternative last para wld be acceptable.

You shld make clear in your consultations with other dels that we see no reason for changing draft further. You shld also point out that present res is directed against ChiComs and shld be so formulated. Dept found particularly objectionable some of the suggestions made by other dels which seemed designed to make concessions to ChiComs or to reflect on US. Dept feels that stage of cease-fire efforts was entirely adequate and is now over unless ChiComs have change of heart and agree to cease their defiance of UN.

Dept does not believe that it is essential that there be other sponsors of proposed res and US wld be perfectly willing introduce it alone. If that is done and other dels put in amendments, we will support or vote against them in accordance with their merits. We are not disposed however at this time to make further concessions in order to obtain sponsors.

"*The General Assembly*

Noting that the SC, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of internatl peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Noting that the CPG of the PRC has rejected all UN proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon UN forces there;

Finds that the CPG of the PRC by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against UN forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the CPG of the PRC to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the UN forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the UN to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the UN action in Korea;

Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee, as a matter of urgency, to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression, and to report thereon to the GA;

[Alternative 1] *Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the UN to bring about a peaceful settlement of the KOR situation and requests the Pres of the GA to designate forthwith two persons who wld meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

[Alternative 2] *Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the UN to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement and the achievement of UN objectives in Korea by peaceful means and requests the Pres of the GA to designate forthwith two persons who wld meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end."

ACHESON

320/1-2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 20, 1951—11 a. m.

642. Re proposed Res Korea, if asked, you may reply that US does not consider passage this Res wld constitute authorization for extension gen hostilities against Chi mainland by Unified Command, nor wld Res constitute UN permission bomb Chi within meaning Pres

statement, press conference Jan 4.[1] However, US Govt as Unified Command, has always maintained that it must reserve right to take action essential to protect UN forces under its command; e.g., in event of large-scale air attacks against UN troops from Manchurian bases, it must be free to bomb airfields from which such air attacks originated, or if Chi Commie forces, in support of their action in Korea, attack UN forces outside Korea, the Unified Command must be free to counteract.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] On that occasion, President Truman had stated that the United States did not have under consideration the question of asking for United Nations permission to bomb Communist China. He also said that the United States would not bomb Communist China without checking it with the United Nations. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 2, 3)

[2] In the draft telegram sent by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews to Major General Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, on January 15 for comment, the words "must be free to bomb airfields" had read "has the authority to bomb airfields" and the sentence had ended with the word "originated." The last sentence in the draft had read: "In such circumstances United States would inform other nations participating in military action in Korea as far in advance of proposed action as possible so that they may have the opportunity to express their views."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum dated January 19 to the Secretary of Defense, who forwarded it the same day to the Secretary of State, recommended that the words "has authority to bomb airfields" be changed to read "would bomb airfields." They also recommended that the last sentence of the draft be deleted and the following language be added to the preceding sentence: "or if Chinese Communist forces, in support of their action in Korea, attack United Nations forces outside Korea, the Unified Command must be free to counteract." The Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that, since U.N. forces would deliver air attacks against Manchurian airfields only if such attacks were essential for the protection of the U.N. forces, the exigencies of the situation under such circumstances in all probability would not permit the United States to give advance notice to nations participating in military action in Korea. In addition, the security of proposed air attacks might be jeopardized if the several nations were informed in advance of specific plans for air attacks. In any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the draft as revised clearly defined the Unified Command's position, and, if the nations concerned so desired, they would have ample opportunity to express their views.

The Department of State sent the following message to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in telegram 645, January 20, 5 p.m.:

> "Assurances Deptel 642 shld be treated as top secret and communicated other dels only as essential and on entirely top secret basis. You will understand importance not having information US intentions this subject reach Peiping. Publicity on US assurances wld be highly embarrassing." (795B.5/1-2051)

795.00/1-1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1951—noon.

3837. You are requested to reply along fol lines to FonOff *aide-mémoire*, urtel 4173, Jan 19.

1. US believes it important to face squarely up to present situation in Korea and that GA need not shrink from use of word "aggression" in regard to action Chi Commies. While Dept wld prefer simple language contained in res set forth in Depcirtel 387,[1] US prepared to agree to text suggested by other dels which we understand acceptable to Fr Del. Such para reads:

"Finds that the CPG of the PRC by giving direct aid and assistance to those already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against UN forces there has itself been engaged in aggression in Korea".

2. In re four specific points French *aide-mémoire*, you shld indicate as follows:

a) re point 1, for confidential info FonOff, US does not consider passage proposed res wld constitute authorization for extension of general hostilities against Chi mainland by UC, nor wld it constitute UN permission to bomb Chi within the meaning of the statement Pres. Press Conference Jan 4. However, US Govt as UC has always maintained that it must reserve right to take action essential to protect UN forces under its command; e.g. in event large scale air attack against UN troops from Manchurian bases, UC must be free to bomb airfields from which such air attacks originate, of if Chi Commie forces, in support of their action in Korea, attack UN forces outside Korea UC must be free to counteract.

b) Dept shares understanding point 2.

c) Re point 3, Dept agrees that CMC shld make report which would be subject debate and decision of Assembly. It seems unusual procedure, however, report go directly First Comite. Upon receiving CMC report, GA cld decide whether to discuss it in plenary or send it to First Comite.

d) Dept recognizes French Govt wishes to reserve position on principle of sanctions. Inevitably, of course, sanctions of some kind will be considered by CMC among additional measures which might be employed. In CMC or in GA debates following CMC report, Dept recognizes French not committed on position in regard to any particular measures or sanctions to be taken. Dept's views re measures which CMC shld consider being transmitted separate tel.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Dated January 15, p. 83.

[2] See telegram 643 to New York, January 20, p. 1885. In a subsequent circular airgram, dated January 23, based upon telegram 643, the Department indicated that in the military sphere the United States would continue to try to prevent extension of the conflict beyond Korea and in the present circumstances would not contemplate asking the CMC to recommend military operations against Chinese territory (795.00/1-2351).

795.00/1-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

London, January 20, 1951—2 p. m.

4021. Embassy Officer has seen series of telegrams from Hutchison (British diplomatic representative Peiping) in which he reported that Panikkar (Indian Ambassador), Hutchison and Swedish Ambassador had all been called to Foreign Office night of 17th receive for transmission their respective governments text of CPG reply UN cease-fire proposals. Panikkar received by Chou (CPG Foreign Minister); Hutchison by Chang (Vice Foreign Minister); and Swedish Ambassador, to his mortification, by head European Department. Reception of Swedish Ambassador perfunctory. Hutchison given time for extended, but fruitless discussion CPG reply. He was informed text given him personally for transmission, rather than sent by messenger as had been CPG's usual practice whenever it had sent communication to UN (e.g. CPG note re alleged US bombing of Manchuria), because of CPG appreciation of sincere UK interest in reaching peaceful solution and because CPG aware Commonwealth Prime Ministers had devoted considerable time to subject during recent London meeting. In reply to direct question whether reference to withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was meant to imply CPG readiness withdraw Chinese forces, Chang merely stated "text was explicit." Other attempts draw Chang out were even less successful.

According Hutchison's report, Panikkar sent to Nehru in Paris long report his interview with Chou. Chou gave Panikkar to infer CPG reply was not meant to close door on negotiations and that question of (*a*) cease-fire first and then negotiate, or (*b*) negotiate first and cease-fire afterward was merely one of timing. Chou emphasized, however, this point was of primary importance. Re milieu for conference, Chou agreed Peiping might prove unacceptable to US, and said: "why not Cairo or New Delhi?" Panikkar came away with impression CPG still prepared consider possibilities of settlement on basis UN proposal with appropriate modifications, an impression which Hutchison shared.

London Embassy comment: it would appear CPG Foreign Office, in discussing reply with Panikkar and Hutchison, has in mind desire aggravate rift in UN attitude toward Korean problem and especially supply India (and to lesser extent UK) with further excuse for forestalling or at least delaying positive UN action. If so, and if one can rely on objectivity of Hutchison's reporting, CPG Foreign Office was successful to a certain extent. There is evidence, however, UK Foreign Office realizes Hutchison too long isolated in Peiping, he is without adequate background information, and in attempting fulfill his mission establish diplomatic relations with CPG he has been leaning over backward present CPG action in favorable light and avoid giving it offense.

GIFFORD

795.00/1-2051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 20, 1951—3:45 p. m.
PRIORITY

1038. Korea. At meeting in Jebb's office this morning with the French, Canadian and Australian delegates, the following positions were stated with respect to co-sponsoring the resolution contained urtel 640.[1] French delegation has no instructions; it may receive instructions later today but understand they will not receive definite instructions with regard to sponsorship until Chauvel's return on Monday.[2] French delegation does not expect to be in position to co-sponsor the present text since they place great emphasis on the proposed changes in the last paragraph which were rejected by the Department. If the USDel must introduce text today, French cannot co-sponsor.

Canadian delegation does not have instructions authorizing it to co-sponsor present text. They believe their Prime Minister will be less ready to act as sponsor in view of Department's rejection of changes in last paragraph. If the US must go ahead today, they cannot join us.

UKDel does not agree with present text of resolution and cannot sponsor it. British Government remains of the view that the first step of finding of aggression should be taken now and that no decision should be made re other matters until opportunity for full consultation. They prefer present text to original US text. UKDel indicated it might not be able to support original version.

Australian delegation indicated it had instructions authorizing it to co-sponsor latest draft.

We indicated we felt we must go ahead today and are prepared to go ahead with those delegations who are willing to join us; opportunity remains open for other delegations to join later if they so desire. If necessary, we would table a resolution alone.

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[1] Dated January 19, p. 108.
[2] January 22.

We discussed question of possible amendments. UK and French delegates reserve their right to introduce or support amendments to this text. Canadian delegation indicated that the amendments which they had proposed to us earlier were considered by them matters of policy and were not put forward in any way for the purpose of obtaining votes. They would probably not desire to put forward any amendments but this was not perfectly clear. Riddell thought Pearson might be satisfied to explain his policy in a statement.

AUSTIN

795.00/1-2051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY — NEW YORK, January 20, 1951—3:45 p. m.

1039. Korea. We invited to our office this noon all those delegates who were interested in joining in sponsoring a resolution, to consider what course should be taken at this afternoon's meeting. We explained the results of the meeting with the British, French, Canadians and Australians this morning as reported in mytel 1038, and indicated our government felt it was of urgent importance that a resolution be tabled today.

We went over the revisions in the resolution and explained the changes. Kyrou (Greece) agreed that it was vital that a resolution be tabled today and indicated he was prepared to join in co-sponsoring.

Uruguay, Cuba, Colombia and Peru stated that they were prepared to join in sponsoring this resolution.

Kural (Turkey) indicated his delegation was prepared to join in co-sponsoring.

South African delegate said he did not have instructions re sponsoring and could not join if it were put forward today.

Netherlands delegate said his government had been willing to join in co-sponsoring if either French or British had done so; as he understood they were not now able to co-sponsor, his instructions did not permit him to do so. They were of course prepared to support the resolution.

Belgium delegate indicated that his position was the same.

Prince Wan (Thailand) said he would support the resolution but did not have instructions authorizing him to co-sponsor. Senator Austin came in from his talk with Department and joined the group.

Senator Austin said that we were in a difficult situation at the present moment. We felt it was absolutely essential that a resolution be tabled today. Our greatest allies, the British and French, were not able to join with us today on the text which was before the group. We were extremely anxious to do whatever we could to avoid giving appearance that Russians had succeeded in splitting the US away from its major allies and from Europeans. We did not wish either to split the Commonwealth. He thought that if those delegates who had indicated their willingness to join us in sponsoring this resolution went ahead together, it would be clear that the Western Powers had not been able to reach agreement. He had just received further instructions, therefore, to meet this situation by tabling a resolution alone—in behalf of the US only. He hoped that all those delegates who either now or at some later date wished to join in co-sponsoring this resolution would do so.

Senator Austin indicated he hoped this plan would meet with the approval of the group and would not be too unpleasant to them. Delegates of Belgium, Netherlands and South Africa immediately indicated they thought this decision was a wise one; the others acquiesced with good grace.

Austin

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 20 from 3 to 5:50 p.m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.429. Ambassador Austin introduced the following draft resolution (A/C.1/654):

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Noting* that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese communist intervention in Korea,

"*Noting* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

"*Finds* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

"*Calls upon* the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

"*Affirms* the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

"*Calls upon* all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations actions in Korea;

"*Calls upon* all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

"*Requests* a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee, as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;

"*Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end."

691.93/1-2251: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET London, January 22, 1951—5 p. m.

4039. UKHC New Delhi has reported to Foreign Office he has learned from entirely reliable sources outside External Affairs tone of Panikkar's reporting has undergone change in recent weeks. Whereas previously, Panikkar had been optimistic about future Chinese developments and inclined put best possible gloss on Chinese behavior, he has reluctantly reached conclusion Chinese drunk with success and becoming quite impossible to deal with. Panikkar unhappy over prospect for future good relations not only between China and rest of world, but especially between China and India. As indicative Panikkar's changed thinking, he was quoted as stating in telegram on cease-fire proposals received New Delhi week ago he did not think Peiping would "make disastrous mistake of turning down UN Offer".

Informal Foreign Office comment is External Affairs may be losing patience with CPG and there may be showdown on Nehru's return New Delhi.

Sent Department 4039, repeated info New Delhi 126.

Gifford

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[1] A notation on the source text indicated that this message was referred to the Office of Chinese Affairs which called it to the attention of Messrs. Merchant and Rusk.

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 22 from 3 to 6:25 p. m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.429. Over the objections of the United States, the Committee voted (27 to 23, with 6 abstentions) to adjourn for 48 hours in order to consider a new communication from Peking transmitted via the Indian Government whose Ambassador had asked for an elaboration of certain points in the Chinese reply (A/C.1/653) to the principles set forth by the Cease-Fire Group. The nature of the Chinese reply, as given to the First Committee by the Indian Representative (Rau), is here printed from the summary record of the meeting of January 22:

"I. If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea were accepted and put into practice, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would assume the responsibility of advising the Chinese volunteers to return to China.

"II. Measures for the conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful solution of the Korean problem could be carried out in two stages:

> "First: A cease-fire for a limited period could be agreed upon at the first meeting of the Seven-Nation Conference and put into effect so that negotiations could proceed further.
>
> "Second: In order that the war in Korea might be brought to an end completely and peace in the Far East assured, all conditions for the conclusion of hostilities would have to be discussed in connexion with the political problems, in order to reach agreement on the following points: Steps and measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; proposals to the Korean people on the steps and measures to effect the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves; withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations; other Far Eastern problems.

"III. The definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations had to be ensured."

320/1-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 22, 1951—6 p. m.
PRIORITY

4043. Embtel 4042.[1] British press reaction to US proposals on China now before UN would appear to reflect feeling British public and officials on this question. British concern centers on these substantive points.

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[1] Not printed.

1. Real fear UN will break itself in attempting measures beyond its strength to enforce. Until clearer idea of what measures are contemplated British naturally think in terms of diplomatic, economic or political action short of war. They sincerely believe that such measures have slight hope of bringing Chinese Communists to terms and would therefore not uphold authority of UN. Furthermore, they regard them as "limited warfare" which they greatly fear would unavoidably lead to full-scale conflict.
2. Real fear of possible cleavage among Western Powers as result of UN actions put through without full cooperation of all nations with stake in FE. To British a UN resolution passed without leading nations of Western Europe and Commonwealth does not appear to have wide enough range of support.
3. Deep conviction that avoidance of hopeless war with China does not represent "appeasement," "realism" given fact Communists control all China and primary importance of Europe to Western defense. Since British believe strong UN action might possibly lead to such a war with China, their inclination is to hold back on any UN action until all factors in situation given full consideration.

British overriding preoccupation is with dangers of major conflagration as result UN attempts to curb Chinese Communists and their criticism of US is based to considerable degree on belief US course of action underestimates UN's limitations.

Above analysis is confirmed by cabinet's attitude at meeting this morning on British position re US resolution. Although there was general agreement that UK should support condemnation Chinese Communists there was not agreement on additional steps. Bevin was to telephone Jebb to avoid taking position January 22 if possible, although it was realized he might be obliged to speak. Cabinet will again consider matter tomorrow morning and instruct Jebb for tomorrow's meeting.

Sent Department 4043, repeated information Paris 1335; USUN 62; Department pass USUN New York.

GIFFORD

795.00/1-2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 23, 1951—11:04 a.m.
PRIORITY

1047. Re Korea—Peiping note. Sharma (India) told mission officer Monday afternoon that questions put to Chou En-lai were raised by

St. Laurent, Canadian Prime Minister, in correspondence with Nehru.

Reply as given by Rau was text handed to Panikkar by Chou En-lai.

Responding to question, Sharma said Indian delegation here did not have text of questions put to Chou En-lai.

Sharma urged view that reply showed Peiping had moved sufficiently from original position to demonstrate it desired cease-fire and was coming to negotiable frame of mind. Sharma thought agreement on cease-fire first met our principal difficulty. Point three in reply (Chinese Communists status in UN) was to him big retreat from previous insistence on seating before negotiations. He thought it meant Peiping would agree to cease-fire and negotiations so long as discussion of UN seat was assured at conference.

He argued strongly that new reply meant we were much closer to peace, and that we (not specifying whether "we" meant UN or US) should seize opportunity to press for further clarification from Peiping in effort to get their agreement on cease-fire principles.

AUSTIN

795.00/1-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 23, 1951—6 p. m.

4071. Embtel 4065.[1] Dixon[2] called Embassy officer to FonOff this afternoon to explain this morning's cabinet decision on UN Korea case, substance of which is contained in Attlee statement in Commons this afternoon. Dixon emphasized two substantive reasons for decision: (1) Reluctance to drive wedge between West and Asians, who oppose US draft resolution and feel this is Asian question in which they have strong legitimate interest, and (2) Feeling that there is still slight chance of negotiated settlement and consequent desire to keep door open. He said fundamental reason for decision, however, was that cabinet felt it could not carry country with it in supporting present US resolution.

Dixon said Jebb being instructed to endeavor obtain further postponement debate and Franks being instructed again to review UK position to Secretary and, we gather, plead for no action until there is further chance to "test Peking sincerity". At same time Dixon said cabinet decision permitted UK vote for resolution condemning Chinese for "intervening in support of aggression" but delay was being sought in order avoid Jebb voting against objectionable parts US draft.

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[1] The telegram, not printed, summarized Prime Minister Attlee's statement in the House of Commons wherein he said that the United Kingdom was ready to condemn Communist China's intervention in Korea in support of an aggressor but did not feel that the time had come to consider further measures in the United Nations (795.00/1-2351). For the text of Mr. Attlee's statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 483, col. 41.

[2] Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

Embassy officer again reviewed at length US views and speaking personally stated he was sure Department would be extremely disappointed at completely negative nature Franks' approach. Dixon did not deny unrealism of expecting any "sincere" or constructive results from further approaches to Peking and indicated he would send further instructions to Franks authorizing him attempt work out mutually acceptable amendments to US draft resolution which might bring it within limits cabinet decision and thus save UN from maintaining completely pusillanimous posture vis-à-vis Chinese.

Gifford

795.00/1-2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET New York, January 23, 1951—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

1050. Korea. Jebb (UK) called to say that Sir B. N. Rau asked him to find out our views about a proposed Asian draft resolution in roughly the following form:

> "Notes the reply of the CPR of January 17;
> Recommends that the representatives of the US, UK, USSR, France, India, Egypt and the CPR meet as soon as possible for the purpose of obtaining elucidations and amplifications of that reply."

He said that the Asians were discussing this with other delegations and obtaining reactions. He asked specifically whether the US would vote against this and canvass against it. He said he understood if this were passed no action would be taken on the US resolution until after the group had reported back.

After telephone communication with Department, we advised Jebb that the US would vote against such a resolution and would canvass against it. We did not believe it would be approved by the Assembly. We did not like to see the UN lean in the direction of taking the reply of the CPR as a basis for elucidation or negotiation. We did not think the group was properly composed for the purpose stated. We did not believe that the reply of the CPR or the elucidation thereof justified any delay in consideration and approval of the US resolution.

Austin

320.2 AC/1-2451

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1951.

Subject: General MacArthur's 11th Report—December 1-15, 1950, Inclusive [1]

1. The Department on January 2nd suggested a number of changes in the above described report. General MacArthur concurred in all except three of the changes, one of the three being unimportant. The important changes by the Department in which General MacArthur did not acquiesce are all concentrated in one paragraph—the first paragraph of General MacArthur's Conclusions—which read as follows:

> "Objective appraisal of events bearing upon the United Nations military effort in Korea is essential if future plans and operations are to be in consonance with reality. The full import of the changed situation became evident during the period covered by this report, wherein interrogation of newly captured Chinese Communist prisoners of war has revealed both the extent of the participation of this new enemy and his basic intentions. There is thus left no doubt that it has long been the plan of the Chinese Communist authorities to commit so much of their war resources in manpower and matériel as necessary to *insure destruction of the United Nations Command and* prevent the United Nations from bringing order and unification to all of Korea. *Our general attack of 24 November threw the surreptitious Chinese Communist buildup operations off balance and prematurely exposed the decision of the Chinese Communist authorities to intervene—a decision not openly announced nor previously brought to light through political intelligence.*"

The Department had suggested the deletion of the underlined portions of the above paragraph.[2] General MacArthur declined to accept this amendment on the following grounds, as expressed in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense:

> "He has non-concurred with some of the proposed changes on the grounds that they would result in factual, historical distortion. To present to the UN a report of General MacArthur's, bearing his signature but altered in a manner in which he has non-concurred, would be to render what would no longer be his report and would be contrary to the basic directive noted above which informed General MacArthur

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[1] The report under reference was one of a regular series from the United Nations Command in Korea in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950. At this time, lacking approval by the Department of State, the 11th Report had not been sent by the United States to the United Nations for publication.

[2] Set here as italics.

that any proposed changes in his reports would be cleared with him prior to publication."

The chief objection of the Department to this paragraph was that the Chinese Communist forces had not yet crossed the 38th parallel and had therefore not definitely disclosed an intention "to insure destruction of the United Nations Command and prevent the United Nations from bringing order and unification to all of Korea." In the light of developments since that time this objection is no longer relevant.

While the paragraph in its present form is not entirely satisfactory, it is suggested that it would be preferable to transmit the report to the United Nations and file it in its existing form rather than to seek material alterations.

UNP will attempt to seek Defense consent to the deletion of the word "political"—the next to the last word of the paragraph—if this can be accomplished without delay.[3]

2. The memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense notes that the "delays in the submission of the report to the United Nations have resulted from clearances and subsequent transmission of the reports within the jurisdiction of the Department of State rather than of the Department of Defense"; and recommends that the Secretary bring the seriousness of the results of these delays to the attention of the Secretary of State. This statement is unquestionably correct, although it should be pointed out that the delays in the Department of State have been largely caused by General MacArthur's repeated inclusion within the reports of controversial political issues, and the necessity of going back to the Department of Defense and Defense in turn to General MacArthur to have these controversial political issues eliminated.

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[3] In a marginal note, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) indicated his belief that the proposed deletion was not worth the trouble and effort involved. In the report as submitted to the United Nations on January 31, the paragraph remained as submitted by General MacArthur, including the use of the word "political"; see U.N. document S/1996.

795.00/1-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, January 24, 1951—4 p. m.

4083. Foreign Office has drafted for despatch to UKUN instructions (now in process final clearance) authorizing Jebb lead general debate on Korea during which he would explain at length UK position along lines Attlee statement in House of Commons yesterday. Without referring specifically to US resolution, he should review various paragraphs thereof in light UK thinking; e.g. UK likes idea of good offices committee, UK condemns Chinese aggression (Jebb not limited to weasel phrase "intervention in support of an aggressor" used by Prime Minister), but UK urges exercise of caution before proceeding further. In so doing, it is hoped atmosphere can be clarified and opportunity gained assess thinking other nations. UK hopes lead UN activity away from lobbying for this or that resolution and create forum for free exchange of views. In meanwhile, opportunity would be given for further exploration whether there is in fact any possibility for peaceful settlement on basis CPG's clarification its note of January 17, and if not what can reasonably be done within limits UN capacity.

Department pass priority USUN NY; sent Department priority 4083, repeated information priority USUN NY 63.

GIFFORD

795.00/1-2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

3511. Dept concerned by Brit attitude reported urtels 4042 and 4043 Jan 22.[1] Deptcirtel 334, Jan 3, gives general background our position and Deptcirtel 424, Jan 24 [2] outlines US proposals re minimum action which should follow UN Res condemning China as aggressor. Relative mildness these proposals, in face great provocation Chi Commies, shld reassure Brit our intentions and provide basis on which large majority UN powers cld reach agreement.

In spite heavy US losses Korea, and resulting public pressure for quick and effective action, US has acquiesced in desire other Powers defer sterner measures during attempts negotiate cease-fire arrangements. This forbearance has evidenced our desire explore all reasonable possibilities for peaceful settlement. It is now clear that failure condemn Commie aggression wld seriously damage UN prestige and influence and jeopardize US public and congressional support for UN.[3]

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[1] *Ante*, p. 117. Telegram 4042 is not printed.

[2] Not printed. Circular telegram 424 was based upon telegram 643, January 20, to New York; see footnote 2, p. 111.

Latest Peiping "peace proposal" as read in UN by Rau on Jan 22, while more conciliatory than previous Peiping replies is clearly not acceptance of UN cease-fire proposal Jan 13 which US considered minimum basis on which settlement cld be achieved. Nor is it to be expected that further efforts will bring full Peiping agreement to an acceptable cease-fire proposal. In US view Peiping does not wish peaceful settlement; its latest manoeuver is only designed confuse issues and divide free world so as prevent or postpone UN action and weaken collective security efforts generally. We hope Brit will recognize true character this proposal and will support passage US Res.

Re Para 2 urtel 4043, Dept believes Brit attitude cld be decisive factor in greatly minimizing danger cleavage among Western Powers re this limited program for UN action. Brit leadership cld also help in large measure give any UN Res the effective force it wld require.

Believe further efforts shld be made present true picture US policy re this matter to Govt officials, press, and public, using these points and such arguments from reftels as may be appropriate in each case.

ACHESON

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[3] The House of Representatives on January 19 and the Senate on January 23 had passed resolutions urging the United Nations immediately to declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea (H. Res. 77 and S. Res. 35, 82d Cong., 1st sess.).

795.00/1-2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

3512. For the Ambassador. Franks met last night with Secy and other Dept officers for discussion Korea–UN problem. Discussion centered about Brit reluctance support provision Korean res calling for study by CMC further steps to be taken meet aggression. Secy stressed point it shld be to Brit interest support this proposal as that wld for an indeterminate period remove question from public and heated arena of Assembly itself. This Comite which, in US view, shld meet in private wld provide forum for exhaustive examination all possibilities in which UK wld have full opportunity put forward and argue its point of view. There will be ample opportunity bilateral consultation with view reaching, if possible, common position in CMC. Dept believes program US intends propose in CMC, set forth Depcirtel 424 Jan 24,[2] extremely modest and as such shld appeal to Brit.

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[1] Repeated to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as 656.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

You requested discuss this matter at highest possible level FonOff explaining US position as indicated above in effort persuade Brit go along with this provision US res. You may also wish to use material Deptel 3511.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] In his telegram 4126, January 25, from London, Ambassador Gifford reported having set forth the argument contained in telegram 3512 to Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, during the afternoon of January 25. The Ambassador indicated that Strang expressed understanding of the U.S. position but said the British Cabinet was considering the question daily and had not yet sent forward final instructions on voting on the U.S. draft resolution in the United Nations. (795.00/1-2551)

693.95/1-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, January 24, 1951—8 p. m.
NIACT

1813. 1. Bajpai this evening read me excerpts from telegram received evening January 23 from Panikkar containing certain clarifications made by Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to Panikkar re Chinese conditions for cease-fire. Bajpai gave me excerpts from this telegram which reads as follows: "Following points seem to me extremely significant.

"First Peking undertake to assume responsibility for return of Chinese volunteers when agreement regarding withdrawal of foreign troops reached and being implemented.

"Second China agree to a cease-fire with an immediate action limit to be fixed at open session conference.

"Third and this is a completely new important and satisfactory point that conference should fix the principles under which Korea's internal political problems will be solved. Till now they have been insisting that Korean problem should be left to Koreans to decide and I have been emphasizing that Cairo and Potsdam declarations cannot legitimately be appealed to in case of Taiwan and rejected in case of Korea since those declarations place responsibility on four powers regarding the freedom and independence of Korea. For first time Chinese Government has accepted it.

"Regarding settlement of Taiwan the issue now narrowed to withdrawal of American forces including fleets which Truman had publically stated will be withdrawn when Korean issue settled.

"Regarding China's legitimate status the statement merely says that its affirmation should be ensured. In reply to my question whether they insist on its being affirmed as from time of conference, Chang Han-fu said that if powers agree to legitimate status of People's Republic, it can be affirmed by conference."

2. Referring to first point Bajpai said it seemed clear to him Peiping was in effect agreeing to begin withdrawal of Chinese volun-

teers just as soon as UN had agreed to withdrawal of UN troops and had actually begin to withdraw them. In response my further question Bajpai said he thought Peiping's idea was that conference could probably coordinate withdrawal both sides as soon as it once began.

3. I asked Bajpai if in his opinion Peiping intended that time limit on cease-fire would be for a few hours until it had delivered some kind of ultimatum and obtained reply to it. He said he did not believe Peiping had any such intentions. He thought limit for cease-fire might be for weeks or even months.

4. Bajpai emphasized particularly third point. He seemed believe Peiping agreement that future of Korea should be decided by conference rather than by Koreans was important concession.

5. I told Bajpai I personally was somewhat confused by series of proposals and interpretations thereof. Was I to understand that before China would agree to cease-fire conference should be called, UN should agree to withdraw foreign troops, to admit Peiping into UN, and to effect withdrawal American forces including fleets from Formosa? Bajpai said "No". It was his understanding there would be no conditions for cease-fire other than holding of conference. He pointed to last paragraph of excerpt in which it was stated that Peiping would insist on legitimate status of China as from time of conference. He interpreted this statement to mean that UN would not be compelled prior to conference to promise to admit Peiping into UN. He stressed however that his interpretations represented only his personal opinions. He could not enlarge on statements made by Peiping to Panikkar.

6. Bajpai read another excerpt from Panikkar's telegram to effect that Polish Ambassador[1] to Peiping was insisting that US would prefer forced withdrawal from Korea to cease-fire since if UN forces were pushed out of Korea, US could avoid discussion of FE political problems such as Formosa and admittance Peiping into UN and US would always be in a position at opportune time again to invade Korea. Panikkar quoted these statements in order show that apparently Soviet bloc was endeavoring persuade China to agree to cease-fire.

7. Bajpai asked me if I saw much hope in situation. I replied difficult to formulate opinion at this distance from US. Scenes were shifting rapidly and American public opinion which played great role in conduct our foreign affairs was factor difficult to assess in Delhi. Nevertheless I thought it would be extremely difficult to persuade American public opinion to accept solution Korean problem which might seem to them as rewarding Peiping with admittance into UN and acquisition of Formosa after Peiping had helped to promote North Korean aggression and had itself committed aggression by at-

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[1] Juliusz Burgin.

tacking UN forces. US people were slow to anger but anger when once aroused could be deep and not easily appeased. Bajpai said he realized that it would be extremely difficult for US to agree to proposals; nevertheless, he agreed with Nehru that acceptance would be preferable to prolonged war between US and China in which role whole world might become involved. He then read to me excerpts from telegram sent by Nehru to Peiping on January 22 appealing in lofty language for Peiping to lead way to peace in Asia and not to take action which would "humiliate" any great power.

HENDERSON

320.2/1–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 25, 1951—2 p. m.
PRIORITY

658. Urtel 1052.[1] Dept believes Asian-Arab res will appeal to large number dels and effort to give this res priority of consideration and vote over US res might receive substantial support.

In Dept's view US must oppose this res and make effort to discourage having it brought to a vote. At same time, US shld not make opposition of such character as to stake its influence and prestige, so that passage of res or even substantial vote for it wld be further blow to US leadership and jeopardize passage US res.

You shld indicate to other dels including Asian-Arab dels, and in short sober statement in Pol Comite, that US does not agree to any conference so long as Chi Commies continuing hostilities. Holding Far Eastern conference while Chi Commies continue hostilities wld be blow to UN authority and constitutes basic deviation from 5 principles which were adopted as minimum basis for honorable peaceful settlement in Korea which UN cld accept.

If purpose res is to obtain further elucidation Peiping position, that can be achieved without deviation 5 principles. As Ambassador Austin indicated in yesterday's speech,[2] US has no objection to any individual member seeking amplification Peiping views or making further appeal to Chi Commies. Furthermore, cease-fire group still technically in existence and if it sees any purpose it can again approach Peiping for further elaboration its attitude. If Peiping indicates it is prepared to discontinue hostilities, steps to arrange satisfactory cease-fire cld be taken immediately, but it seems clear to us that proposed 7 power conference not proper agency to make arrangements for cease-fire. If cease-fire agreed to in principle, detailed arrangements, therefore, shld be made by military commanders along lines accepted by Entezam group in its report. Thereafter, conference wld be appropriate.

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[1] Not printed. It transmitted the text of the draft Arab-Asian resolution which was tabled on January 24 as document A/C.1/642 Rev. 1. The text of this draft resolution is printed in the editorial note on the First Committee meeting of January 25, p. 130.

[2] Reference is to Mr. Austin's statement in the First Committee on January 24; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.430. At his news conference on January 25, President Truman specifically endorsed Ambassador Austin's statement on behalf of the U.S. draft resolution. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 122)

US statement could also indicate that passage US res wld not close door to honorable peaceful settlement. Good offices group provided final para US res wld be available to make further approach Peiping for amplification or reconsideration its position. Appropriate negotiations on Far Eastern question cld take place any time Peiping indicates its desire for honorable settlement on basis UN principles.

In consultations with Pearson (urtel 1057)[3] you shld take strong position that 7 nations proposed in Asian res are not in our view a satisfactory group. Principal question for negotiation is after all the future of Korea and logical states to represent UN on that question wld be the reps on UNCURK plus the big 4 and Peiping, to which because of their prior participation the members of the cease-fire group cld be added. We also agree with Pearson's principle that on particular subjects other interested governments should be represented.

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[3] This telegram, not printed, forwarded the following draft outline for a settlement in Korea and the Far East which Mr. Pearson expected to present to the First Committee:

"(*a*) A conference of the following 7 powers should be convened at an appropriate place and at an early date, and attended by the following 7 states: the USA, UK, France, The Peoples Republic of China, USSR, India, and Egypt.

"(*b*) There should be agreement in advance that immediately upon the convocation of this conference, there should be a cease-fire and standstill in Korea.

"(*c*) The first order of business of the conference should be the immediate negotiation of a more permanent cease-fire arranged on the basis of the plan submitted in the report of the cease-fire group of January 11, this part of the work of the conference to be completed before other items on its agenda are considered.

"(*d*) Once arrangements for a cease-fire had been completed, the conference should consider a peaceful solution of Korean problems in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the statement of principles of January 11, and it should then consider arrangements for the withdrawal from Korea of all non-Korean armed forces.

"(*e*) The conference should then proceed to a discussion of Far Eastern problems in accordance with paragraph 5 of the statement of principles of January 11, and as the first item of such discussions the request of the Central Peoples Government for a definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the Peoples Republic of China in the UN should be considered. It would of course be understood that the conference could not decide the question of Chinese representation in the UN, which can only be decided by the UN itself. The most the conference could do would be to express a view on this subject. It might in effect be considered that the 7-power conference would perform the function which has now been assigned to the Assembly's committee on Chinese representation which was set up at the beginning of the Assembly and which was instructed to report to the Assembly.

"(*f*) In the discussions at the conference of Far Eastern problems any government especially concerned with a particular problem should be invited to participate during that part of the discussion.

"(*g*) This recommendation should be transmitted by the political committee to the Central Peoples Government at once, with an indication that a reply was required within a brief period, perhaps 48 hours after its receipt in Peking, in order that the committee might know whether it would be possible to proceed with arrangements for convening the conference on the date proposed." (795.00/1-2451)

For Mr. Pearson's plan as given to the First Committee on January 26, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.432. It was similar to, but not identical with, the above draft.

ACHESON

693.95/1-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, January 25, 1951—3 p. m.
NIACT

1817. 1. During my conversation with Bajpai yesterday he seemed reserved about letting me have whole story re recent communications exchanged between Delhi and Peking. I therefore did [not?] undertake press him. He did not indicate that GOI had received any messages from Panikkar setting forth Chinese conditions for cease-fire other than that referred to in paragraph one Embtel 1813, January 24. I had assumed therefore that message represented Peking reply to questions put to it by GOI.

2. From Canadian HICOM I obtained following information this morning:

> On January 18, Canadian Prime Minister sent message direct to Nehru in Europe[1] asking him endeavor obtain clarification from Peking re three points. Simultaneously Attlee asked UK Chargé in Peking obtain clarification of two of these points. Nehru sent message through MEA New Delhi to Panikkar requesting replies to Canadian questions. Apparently Panikkar and UK Chargé received similar letters from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs answering all three questions. Panikkar instead of replying New Delhi sent reply to London and Rau in Lake Success without sending copy to New Delhi. UK Chargé sent copy reply to Attlee with request message be repeated to Canadian Prime Minister. GOI in Delhi in meantime at loss understand why no reply from Panikkar and how Rau should be in receipt reply to questions. Additional telegrams were sent Panikkar and telegram from him referred to in Embtel 1813 was his reply thereto. In meantime GOI had received copy original reply either from London or Lake Success.

3. It would seem from above that Chinese reply was addressed in writing both to Panikkar and UK Chargé (Deptel 1143, January 23).[2]

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[1] Following the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference on January 12, Prime Minister Nehru remained in London for further talks and then visited France, January 17–20, on his return trip to India.

[2] Not printed.

4. Canadian HICOM read to me text Chinese reply. It opened with statement of appreciation, interest displayed by Prime Ministers of India and Canada in promoting peace. Replies to questions seemed to be identical with those quoted by Rau before Political Committee. If Department unable obtain from Canada who have full text reply, please inform me and I shall endeavor obtain copy from Canadian HICOM.

5. Interesting feature from Delhi point view this exchange is that although we have had several conversations during recent days with UK and Canada re FE situation neither mentioned exchange was in process at time both HICOMs were in constant touch with GOI with regard to exchange.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on January 25 from 3 to 6:10 p.m.; for the record, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.431. Sir Gladwyn Jebb made a lengthy statement setting forth the British position, indicating that his delegation was broadly in agreement with the first 5 paragraphs of the United States draft resolution of January 20 (A/C.1/654), but entertained the gravest doubts about considering further measures before the intentions of the People's Republic of China had been fully and exhaustively explored.

The remainder of the discussion dealt chiefly with the draft joint resolution (A/C.1/642 Rev. 1) introduced on January 24 by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen; the text read as follows:

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Viewing* with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

"*Considering* that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,

"*Noting* the reply [A/C.1/653] of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the resolution of the First Committee dated 13 January 1951,

"*Desiring* to continue its efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations,

"*Recommends* that representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt and India and of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidations and amplifications of the above-mentioned reply and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems;

"The first meeting of the above representatives will be held on a date and at a place to be fixed by the President of the General Assembly; the date and place of each subsequent meeting will be fixed by the representatives themselves. They will hold their meetings in private and will frame their own rules of procedure. They will advise the General Assembly of the result of their consultations as early as possible."

795.00/1-2551 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 25, 1951—8 p. m.

4367. FonOff today showed us telegram January 19 from French Consul General Shanghai, relayed through Peiping, substance of which as follows:

According to "Chinese liberal" close to local Communist leaders, Chinese Communists have just completed plan for intervention in IC through "volunteers" but have given up idea carrying out such plan at present because of financial and economic difficulties created by Chinese Communists intervention in Korea. According several Chinese sources, strong pressure has very recently been brought to bear on Peiping regime by "liberal circles and moderate Communist elements" to moderate Chinese Communist attitude re Korea. These sources state this pressure having an effect which should be reflected in Chinese Communist reply to UN proposals for settlement Korean problem. Considerable financial burden on economy as result Chinese Communist intervention Korea has played major part in strengthening this pressure.

BONSAL

793.00/1-2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1951.

Subject: U.S. Resolution Concerning Chinese Aggression

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves–British Embassy
Dean Rusk–Assistant Secretary of State
George Perkins–Assistant Secretary of State
Philip Jessup–Ambassador-at-Large

Mr. Graves called at Mr. Perkin's house tonight to tell us about Jebb's latest instructions on the U.S. resolution concerning Chinese aggression. He said these instructions reached Jebb following his latest speech this afternoon.

Mr. Graves said that the Cabinet has fully considered the position in the Political Committee and has taken most seriously into account the considerations put to the Cabinet by Ambassador Franks. Graves interpolated that Franks had sent a "fine telegram" in which the American point of view had been most ably set forth.

The British Cabinet's conclusion was that Jebb should vote against the U.S. resolution unless paragraph 2 is suitably amended and paragraph 8 is deleted.

Paragraph 2 of the U.S. resolution now states, in effect, that Communist China has rejected *all* UN efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. The British Cabinet believes that amendments must be made based on the latest Chinese proposals which appear in fact to accept *some* of the UN proposals. The British Cabinet would accept an amendment along the lines that "the CPG have not yet accepted *all* UN proposals" or "noting the disappointing response of the CPG, etc.". If such an amendment were made, Jebb could then vote for paragraph 2.

The British Cabinet is most strongly opposed to paragraph 8, which calls for the Collective Measures Committee. Jebb cannot vote for the U.S. resolution if this paragraph remains in it.

Mr. Graves concluded that the latest instruction was in his judgment London's final word on the matter and represents the very great difficulty in which the United Kingdom finds itself. He felt certain, and the Ambassador wanted him to emphasize, that the Cabinet had the full benefit of Mr. Acheson's views and that the present position was not based upon any difference in understanding as between London and Washington.

Jebb had assumed that he must vote against the Asian-Arab resolution and the new instruction did not change that assumption although it did not specifically mention it.

There was nothing in the message from London containing any reaction to the split within the Commonwealth which the United Kingdom position would produce.

I told Mr. Graves that we were greatly disappointed by this position, that we would consider what might be done with respect to some change in paragraph 2, but that there was no hope that we could agree to a deletion of paragraph 8. I said that if this present instruction referred to the position in the Political Committee, we hoped that the instruction could be amended for the situation in the plenary session. I said that we would hope that if the plenary session sustained paragraph 8 by a two-thirds vote, the United Kingdom would then be able to vote for the resolution as a whole. That would be in accordance with the normal processes of parliamentary democracy. I also said that we would very much hope that the United Kingdom would not find itself more or less alone with the Soviet bloc in opposition to our resolution since that would create a most difficult situation indeed. It was my impression that those who were not in favor of our resolution might readily abstain rather than join the Soviets in voting against.

. . . .

I took the opportunity of Mr. Graves' visit to say that we seriously differed with the view expressed by Mr. Attlee in his speech to the House of Commons [1] that Korea is an Asian problem of special interest to Asian countries. I said we could not accept the proposition that merely because the Koreans were not white that Mr. Nehru thereby could assert some special interest in the matter. Korea was of very great interest to the United States, vitally affects the position in the Pacific, and the aggression there is a world-wide problem. Mr. Graves said that he would pass my comment along to London in a separate telegram.

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 119.

320/1-2651

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1951.

Subject: Possible Modification of US Resolution in UN on Chinese Communist Aggression

In accordance with your request that we investigate the possibility of modifying the US draft resolution in such a way as to overcome British objections, a telegram (copy attached)[1] went to New York this morning suggesting that paragraph 8 might be amended to read as follows:

"*The General Assembly* . . .

"*Requests* a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, *taking into account in its report the results*

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[1] Telegram 662, January 26, to New York, not printed.

of the efforts of the good offices committee provided for in the following paragraph." [2]

I understand that this wording has already been discussed with the British delegation and that unfortunately they have replied that it does not go far enough to meet their position. Our Delegation may nevertheless propose the Amendment in the hope that it will win some additional support for our resolution.[3]

G. H[AYDEN] R[AYNOR]

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[2] As drafted, telegram 662 also contained the following suggested addition to the final paragraph of the draft resolution: "The Committee should as a first step determine the possibilities of arranging a cease-fire in accordance with the report of the cease-fire group of Jan 2, 1951", but this sentence was deleted from the telegram by Mr. Acheson. (320.2/1-2551)

[3] At the First Committee meeting held on January 27 from 10:45 a. m. to 2:50 p. m., Mr. Austin did not propose the above amendment but pointed out to the Committee that the intent of the U.S. draft resolution was to allow the proposed Good Offices Committee to work toward producing a peaceful solution while the committee of the CMC was still considering further measures. He also stated that the United States could not support and would oppose the Arab-Asian draft resolution. (U.N. document A/C.1/SR.433)

795.00/1-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1951.

Subject: Korean-U.N. Problem

Participants: Ambassador Franks, British Embassy
Mr. H. A. Graves, British Embassy
Mr. Rusk—FE
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Raynor—BNA
Mr. Bancroft—UNP

Ambassador Franks, accompanied by Mr. Graves, called on Mr. Rusk late Friday afternoon at his request. The Ambassador presented revised language with respect to the U.S. resolution on Korea on paragraphs 2, 3, and 8.

He was informed that we felt it would be possible to revise paragraph 2, and our Mission in New York would be instructed to work this out in New York with Sir Gladwyn Jebb. We indicated that we could not entertain a further revision on Paragraph 3 as we had already made a concession on that last week and did not feel we should be asked to bargain twice on the same point. The Ambassador said he was not making a request that we meet them on this point.

On paragraph 8 the British memorandum contained the same language which Jebb had given to our Mission in New York early in the day.[1] We explained why this was not acceptable and handed to the Ambassador and Mr. Graves copies of a suggestion providing for an addition to paragraph 8 reading substantially as follows: "it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts". We explained that this was a draft which had no official status and had not been seen by the Secretary. Mr. Hickerson indicated, however, that if it would resolve the difficulty of the U.K. on the U.S. resolution, he would recommend to the Secretary the acceptance of such language. Ambassador Franks promised to communicate the language to London in an effort to obtain its acceptance but said he must tell us frankly that his instinct was that he would not be successful.

During the course of the conversation, the Ambassador said he wanted to give us his personal views as to the fundamental causes of the British hesitation on this matter. He said what he was going to say might be oversimplified and we should realize it was his own opinion. He cited three main points:

(1) Mistrust of the command in Korea and over U.S. intentions, and, above all, of U.S. impulsiveness.

(2) The influence of Nehru at the recent Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting. He said he knew that in London, and he thought in other parts of the Commonwealth, all aspects of this question were

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[1] The proposed British changes were covered in the following memorandum by Mr. Bancroft of a telephone conversation which he had held with Mr. Gross who called from New York:

"Mr. Gross called to say that he had talked to Jebb about our proposed addition to paragraph 8 and that he had been present when Jebb talked to London about it. Apparently London thought it was unsatisfactory. Jebb said that his Foreign Office favored a modification of a proposal which the Israelis were talking about which would reverse the order of our paragraphs 8 and 9 and amend the paragraph on collective measures to provide as follows:

> " 'Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee to consider, in case the efforts to be made by the committee referred to in the aforesaid paragraph shall have failed, additional measures to be employed, etc.'

"London wanted to modify the Israeli suggestion by providing that the Committee would consider additional measures 'whenever the General Assembly should find that the efforts made by the good offices committee have failed.'

"Mr. Gross said that if there were a suitable amendment to paragraph 2 of the resolution and this change to the Collective Measures Committee paragraph, the United Kingdom would vote for our resolution as a whole.

"Gross said that he told Jebb that our suggested change in the collective measures paragraph was as far as we could go and that we were definitely opposed to a change in the resolution which had the effect of creating a barrier to consideration by the committee of sanctions until after a finding that all efforts of settlement had failed.

"I told Mr. Gross that I thought that this was clearly the right line to follow and that we should sit tight on our own suggestion." (357.AD/1-2651) now viewed in the light of what Nehru had said at the Commonwealth Conference.

(3) Although admitting that it was nothing very solid, there was a feeling in London that the latest message from Peiping contained more hope than we seemed willing to credit it with.

It was of interest during the meeting that the Ambassador did not seem overly impressed by our argument that a failure in the U.N. to act promptly and firmly might have an adverse effect, in view of the sensitive state of U.S. public opinion, on the efforts now being made to strengthen N.A.T.O. countries.

320.2 AC/1–2951

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1951.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Acheson

The Secretary called Sir Oliver Franks on Saturday, January 27, shortly before 11 a. m. He thanked Sir Oliver for his efforts to help clarify the rather confused situation at the UN. Mr. Acheson said that he had been talking with Mr. Rusk and Mr. Hickerson and others, and also with the President. He said with regard to paragraph 8 of the US resolution, he was authorizing them to add language at the end to the effect that the Collective Measures Committee is authorized to withhold its report if the other Committee is getting along well with its work. Mr. Acheson said that he felt we could go no further than that. He also mentioned that Mr. Jebb's proposals were not acceptable to us and we were not able to go along with them. Sir Oliver asked if there was anything we wanted him to say personally to Mr. Attlee. The Secretary said that he would not suggest that a lot of special messages fly back and forth between the President and Mr. Attlee. Sir Oliver agreed with that point of view.

Mr. Acheson said that he had raised this whole matter with the President and the full Cabinet on Friday and that the President and the Cabinet were unanimous in their agreement on our position on the resolution. Mr. Acheson said he thought the whole thing too serious for him to be taking positions without complete Cabinet backing, which we now had. He said that he felt he had reached the end of his elasticity and said that our position was not one taken by just a few people in the State Department but represented an entire government position. The Secretary also mentioned his appearances before the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees the preceding day and said that these committees were in support of the position he has taken. He said that some of the Committee members wanted to be more "rambunctious" than the US was being.

Sir Oliver said that he would do the best he could on this problem.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

320/1-2751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 27, 1951—11 a. m.
PRIORITY

665. Confirming telecon. After conversation with UK Amb. here, Dept is willing accept a further change in para 8 of US res if it would be helpful in bringing UK along on our res. Dept also believes that it might induce the French and other western Europeans to vote for para 8 US res rather than abstain (urtel 1075).[2] US Rep should as a matter of urgency discuss proposed change with UK and Fr dels and other dels in your discretion. Proposed change is to add at end of present text of para 8 in lieu of clause set forth Deptel 662 [3] the following: "it being understood that the committee is authorized to defer its report if the good offices committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts."

As to second para US res, Dept told UK Amb yesterday that it saw no difficulty in working out language that would be acceptable. US Rep is therefore authorized to discuss with UK and reach agreement on satisfactory language.

Dept leaves in your discretion what methods should be used in introducing amendments to US res and whether they should be introduced by US or some other del.

ACHESON

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[1] A manuscript note on the source text by Mr. Hickerson indicated that Secretary Acheson cleared this telegram with President Truman by telephone at 9:45 a. m. on January 27.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted a tabulation of probable voting on the U.S. draft resolution as of January 26, 8 p. m. (795.00/1-2651).

[3] See footnotes 1 and 2 to Raynor's memorandum, January 26, p. 133.

795.00/1-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 27, 1951—noon.
NIACT

1837. 1. Am seeing Bajpai noon today and leaving document with him in form memorandum containing summary of statements made by me to him. This summary contains substance of Depcirtel 395, January 17[1] and Deptel 1131, January 23[2] without, however, referring to the alternative contained in Depcirtel 395 to point 1 of proposed resolution of UN. In the latter part of the memorandum, however, I have elaborated on the possible effect of American opinion upon failure of UN to pass resolution condemning the action of Communist China in Korea. Latter part of this memorandum reads as follows:

"Ambassador added his government realized other governments also had problem meeting their public opinion. It hoped other governments would have in mind failure UN recognize present action Communist China in Korea for what it was and face squarely might create wave isolationism in US so powerful it might affect some of basic foreign policies of US. American public would fail understand why UN should hesitate condemn forces which had attacked those of UN and had killed thousands of UN soldiers, including those of US, which were in Korea in response to call from UN. Regardless of any explanations might be made, large section of American people would interpret such failure on part of UN as placing of soldiers of US, and of other countries who entered Korea halt aggression at request of UN, on same level as those forces which entered Korea in order support aggressor and attack UN forces opposing aggressor.

"Feelings of injustice which such failure on part of UN would create would not be assauged by arguments Peiping regime had had grievances against US because various policies of US in FE were not to its liking. American people had come believe aggression gave rise war; failure collectively condemn aggression, and if necessary take other steps oppose it, would encourage aggressive tendencies and eventually lead to future world wars. Many of them might take view if aggression against forces of UN were to be overlooked by UN merely because aggressor might feel itself to have a grievance against one or other members of UN attempts discourage aggression in future by collective action would indeed be futile, with consequent increased danger world peace.

"Ambassador concluded by stating although he had endeavored faithfully set forth what he understood be his government's views, and describe some problems facing his government, nevertheless he would like make clear his government did not pretend it had found any panacea for situation in FE. His government was anxious consult with other members of UN and loyally work with them in finding ways and means for preventing spread hostilities and for bringing to an end Korean conflict, without at same time weakening UN to such extent as to endanger its efficacy in maintenance world peace."

2. I hope Department will approve this section my statement. Any suggestions for supplementary conversation would be appreciated.

HENDERSON

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[1] Not printed. Circular telegram 395 was virtually identical with circular telegram 387, January 15, p. 83; it was sent principally to the Embassies in the Arab and Asian countries (795.00/1-1751).

[2] Not printed. It urged the Ambassador to take up with Bajpai, in the absence of Nehru, the points set forth in circular telegram 395 (795.00/1-2151).

795.00/1–2751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 27, 1951—2 p. m.

1171. Ind Amb[2] called on Secy at her request Jan 27. Said she brought warm greetings from PM and SYG[3] who had told her Secy very much in their thoughts as he worked at arduous tasks. Ind Amb said things had happened since PM gave her msg in Paris[4] for Secy but PM wanted Secy know whatever he had done was inspired by complete sincerity and he and his Govt had as their objective the friendship of US; no intention to thwart US but genuine belief in possibility of peace in Korea through negots. Ind Amb said PM sent personal msg to Chou En-Lai and she had brought pertinent extracts along with "clarification" of certain points included in counter proposals made by Chi Commies to UN Pol Comite.

Excerpts from msg to Chou En Lai indicate Nehru said he had found among all classes of people overwhelming desire for peace, widespread fear of war, thoughts of rearmament—vicious circle from which all classes people wanted to escape thru negotiated settlement FE and other internatl problems. Said he addressing Chou En Lai frankly because he knew he wld understand; said he desired friendly Indo-Chi relations and cooperation for peace; possible avert horrors of war; world awaiting a lead and will respond to generous gesture; no risk involved and only good can result. Nehru suggested Chi Commies announce firm desire peace and hold immed negots for settlement. Details already discussed sufficiently to form adequate basis such negots. Remaining differences need not be stressed. Gesture at this time wld redound Chi Commies credit and he earnestly trusted Mao Tse Tung and Chou wld appreciate spirit in which suggestions made.

"Clarification" certain points in Chi counter proposals conveyed to Ind Amb Peking for transmission to GOI appear identical with those conveyed to Henderson by Bajpai (Embtel 1813, Jan 24).

Ind Amb told Secy because of these points GOI felt Res naming Chi aggressors shld be withheld. Secy said he had heard report Nehru had sent personal msg to Chou. Ind Amb said copies had been given to Attlee and Schuman. Said GOI felt it had had some success in curbing Chi during last few weeks; that negots should be held; that risk involved but risk connected negots not as great as that in naming Chi aggressors.

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[1] Repeated to the Embassies in London as 3552, and Paris as 3951.

[2] Madame Pandit, sister of Prime Minister Nehru.

[3] G. S. Bajpai, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

[4] See footnote 1, p. 129.

Secy said we wld study documents although it was pretty late do anything about our Res which might be voted on in afternoon.[5] Ind Amb said regardless of vote on Res Nehru wld continue efforts bring about negots and wld not sit back. Secy remarked that of course our Res left way open for negots. Ind Amb said if US Res passed it did not mean Nehru wld do anything to increase area of conflict. Secy said he knew Nehru motivated by sincere desires; it was not his objectives so much as way in which he said and did things which had caused us lots of trouble. Ind Amb said if war comes Communism bound to spread. If war averted Communism may spread in some areas but not as much as it wld after war. US might not be as convinced as India of extent to which Communism wld spread after a war.

Secy said he thought US and GOI wld probably not differ on this point but main problem was how to meet attack in Korea; it was of greatest importance to repel this attack and US believes Chi know what they are doing. Secy reiterated that Nehru said things in ways that created difficulties. Ind Amb smiling said she thought Nehru did this deliberately and was aware of effect of his statements but she hoped US and GOI cld find common ground on which to obtain a foothold.

ACHESON

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[5] Mr. Acheson met with Madame Pandit at 10 a. m. The First Committee meeting on January 27 lasted from 10:45 a. m. to 2:50 p. m., but no voting took place.

357.AD/1-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, January 27, 1951—4 p. m.
NIACT

1842. 1. I arrived for appointment with Bajpai noon today few minutes early and learned he was in conference with Nehru. He seemed depressed when he received me. I handed him memo containing summary my remarks (Embtel 1837, January 27) which he read carefully. He thanked me; said he would give copy to Nehru; remarked not much new in it; in any event GA would probably vote today on resolution supported by US branding Commie China as aggressor. GOI opposed this resolution and had hoped resolution by twelve power bloc would serve as bridge to peace. He himself had thought latter resolution might lead to peace and had supported Prime Minister in latter's backing it. It had been his idea that if representatives powers could have sat together around table there was chance differences could have been eliminated to an extent to create basis for peace in Far East. He now saw US public would not stand for admission Peiping UN or giving over Formosa to Peiping. I said I inclined agree public reaction in US would be strong against any such action prior to fair settlement Korean problem.

2. Bajpai sat silent in obviously unhappy frame mind. I asked him what he thought of Pearson's proposals[1] as published in this morning's press. He replied GOI not interested in them; it desired passage its own resolution. GOI had not been consulted re Pearson's proposals. As published they would obviously be unacceptable to China. Provision in fifth point that any government especially concerned should be invited to conference would certainly be interpreted by Peiping as wedge permit attendance Chinese Nationalist Government. Furthermore Formosa not even mentioned. From various his remarks I gained impression Nehru considered Pearson's proposals unexpected break in hoped-for British–Canadian–Indian front.

3. He remarked Nehru leaving Delhi tomorrow and would not return until February 1. Would be difficult GOI do much pending Nehru's return. He referred to PTI-Reuter's story today's press indicating GOI foreign policies were having adverse effect on India's request for food grain and stating Senator Connally had hinted Congress "would take its time in acting on India's request for wheat."[2] Such stories did not help matters.

4. I replied story clearly intended stir up Indian feeling against US. It was distorting situation in US in manner calculated create Indian resentment. Stated Department had not as yet had time collect all data and make decision as to advisability presenting matter to Congress. Congress was not likely act before it had views of State Department. Nevertheless I would be lacking in frankness if I should attempt deny recent pronouncement and actions GOI had added to difficulties of obtaining quick passage legislation providing furnishing US food grains to India in pursuance India's request. Nehru and he must have known recent statements certain to arouse strong feelings in US which would be automatically reflected in Congress. Impression in US that India was defending Peiping attack on UN Forces resulting in death and injury to thousands US and UN nationals was likely cause many Americans ask why when so many victims of aggression were in need they should be handing over food grains to country endeavoring rally other powers to prevent condemnation of aggressors. Bajpai replied he appreciated situation in US and regretted rift between India and US was widening. He had foreseen this possibility five months ago. I replied I recalled he had told me in July or August

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 128.

[2] Sen. Tom Connally was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For documentation on U.S.-Indian relations, see vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 2085 ff.

of his worries this respect. I was personally deeply depressed I had been unable prevail on Prime Minister not to pursue his present policies. I had done my best but seemed to have been lacking in ability convince him sincerity US in its pursuit peace or of US inability follow other course without mortally weakening whole system collective security on maintenance of which world peace depended. Bajpai replied no one could have swayed Nehru; his mind had been fixed and he was not to be deterred by any persuasion or obstacles. Nehru convinced he was right and his character was such he would go straight ahead regardless consequences. Nehru had returned from US not very happy over failure obtain wheat; difference with US over recognition Peiping had not seemed so serious at first; US hurry to make decisions re North Korean invasion and to make its own policies re Formosa had nettled; turn down his peace proposals in July had made matters worse; and crossing 38th Parallel had made differences really serious. Branding Chinese Commies by UN as aggressors against his advice would further widen breach.

5. I said I was still confident breach would not be permanent. Prime Minister was too great a man to allow differences with regard tactics make him forgetful of objectives. So long as US and India possessed common objectives—and I was convinced they did—they would eventually find themselves again on same or parallel paths. Bajpai said he hoped I was right.

HENDERSON

795.00/1-2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 27, 1951—5 p. m.
NIACT

3557. Reurtel 4135 Jan 26 [1] and previous tels. Another full discussion UN problem between Franks and Dept officers last night. Brit informed some revision Para 2 possible which USUN authorized work out with Jebb.[2]

Re Para 8, yesterday morning USUN authorized submit to UKUN fol addition Para 8: "taking into account in its report the results of the efforts of the good offices committee provided for in the fol

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[1] Not printed; the content of this telegram is covered in the memorandum of conversation by Raynor, January 26, p. 134.

[2] According to telegram 1082, January 29, from New York, not printed, the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations suggested to Jebb on January 27 a change in Paragraph 2 substituting the words "has not accepted" for "has rejected all". This proved acceptable to the U.K. Delegation and to the British Government. (795.00/1-2951)

Para". Jebb turned this down and submitted following counter-language which Franks also gave us last night: "Sets up a committee composed of members of the CMC to consider, whenever the GA shld find that the efforts made by the good offices committee referred to in the aforesaid Para have failed, additional measures to be employed to meet the situation resulting from the armed intervention in Korea by the CPG of the PRC".

Franks and Jebb informed above language completely unacceptable US as we feel strongly we must stand on principle that CMC at least begin study of further steps. We have indicated to Brit that we wld be willing to put some brake on the time of the CMC reporting to the GA and last night submitted to Franks unofficially indicating draft not approved by Sec fol language as addition present wording para 8 US Res: ". . . , it being understood the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the good offices committee, referred to in the fol Para, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts". Pres has this morning approved our accepting above language if by so doing UK can vote favorably on Para 8 or if it will mean that French and other West Europeans will vote for Para 8 rather than abstaining.

Major issue between us is whether or not CMC begin study of question. US cannot yield on this point. If UK cannot accept language such as above, probably better proceed even though UK forced to vote against US Res. Emb instructed inform Brit that language such as that handed Franks last night is our irreducible minimum beyond which we cannot make further concessions. One trouble with Brit approach is that it is almost impossible to determine when a conciliation effort "has failed". Argument could always be advanced by those who wish to do so that there is still hope. Our approach along the line of "satisfactory progress" is more practical.

A further general argument you are authorized to use in your discretion is as follows: The US wld greatly regret to see an open split in UN on voting on US Res as this is exactly what Soviets want. Furthermore we believe it important to avoid such split because of probable repercussions on US efforts to strengthen the NATO countries in view of current sensitive state of US public opinion. In particular, it wld be most unfortunate for this split to occur on eve of Eisenhower's report to American people on his European tour. You cld express hope Brit have given adequate consideration to these factors. You cld add that for our part, we have made one concession after another on Res such as revision agreed last week wording Para 3 and two suggestions referred to above re Para 8 but that point has been reached where we can concede no more.

ACHESON

795.00/1-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 28, 1951—1 p. m.

NIACT

4162. Although he has not cleared with Cabinet Attlee has now agreed to voting in favor of paragraph 8 of US resolution with the additional language quoted in paragraph 3 Deptel 3557, January 27 on understanding (*a*) that US will not put obstacles in way of those nations which feel that negotiations are still possible or useful and (*b*) that if Asian-Arab resolution is introduced with Pierson [*Pearson*] amendment [1] embodied in it US will not oppose.[2]

Department pass USUN niact as London 67.

GIFFORD

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[1] The reference here is to the plan outlined to the First Committee on January 26 by Lester Pearson of Canada; see footnote 3, p. 128.

[2] Telegram 4167, January 29, from London, reported Cabinet endorsement for Attlee's approval of Paragraph 8 of the U.S. draft resolution with the additional language (795.00/1-2951).

Editorial Note

For the record of a conversation held January 29, and developments subsequent thereto, relating to an alleged approach to the United States from the People's Republic of China concerning a proposed accommodation in Korea, see pages 1530 ff.

320.2/1-2951

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1951.

Yesterday Mr. Rusk and I received Messrs. Steel and Graves of the British Embassy who informed us that the British Government were prepared to vote for the pending U.S. Resolution on Chinese aggression but that they wanted from us an assurance that we would not vote against or lobby against and thus defeat a resolution embodying Mr. Pearson's proposals or one substantially like it. The reference to Mr. Pearson's proposals was to his six-point program in his speech in the Political Committee last Friday or Saturday.[1]

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[1] Mr. Pearson's speech was made on Friday, January 26; see footnote 3, p. 128.

I inquired whether the British visualized a resolution *after* the adoption of the U.S. Resolution. Mr. Steel said that he understood this was the case although the telegram was not completely definite on the subject. Mr. Rusk and I agreed to consider this matter and see Messrs. Steel and Graves later in the day.

After their departure Mr. Rusk and I worked out the following statement to give them in reply which I cleared by telephone with the Secretary:

> "We are ready to discuss with Canada and the UK the matter of making Mr. Pearson's proposals more precise and to put them in such a form as to be agreeable to the three of us. We are ready, as always, to discuss a cease-fire, in accordance with our proposals to the Cease-Fire Committee, with Peiping participation; subsequent to a cease-fire, to discuss a Korean settlement with Peiping participation and to discuss other Far Eastern questions with Peiping participation. We could not agree to the seven-power conference, as named by Mr. Pearson, to attempt to dispose of Far Eastern questions. Since a number of governments are interested in the various items which might arise for discussion, our present view is that the most practical procedure would be for Peiping to have a representative return to Lake Success in order that convenient groupings of interested governments could be arranged as the various items required. Further, in the event of disagreement as to the parties to participate, the matter could be referred to the Political Committee for decision. Foregoing on assumption that U.S. resolution will be adopted prior to above efforts."

At 5 p.m. yesterday, Mr. Rusk, and I saw Steel and Graves again and we gave them this oral message. Mr. Steel said that he would telegraph this at once to London. He indicated his belief that this would be regarded as a satisfactory response although not an acceptance of the British proposal which he had presented to us earlier in the day.

This morning I had this oral message read over the telephone to USUN and taken down there for their information.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

Editorial Note

The First Committee held two meetings on January 29; for the records, see United Nations documents A/C.1/SR.433 and 434. At the afternoon session, the Lebanese Representative (Malik) introduced two amendments to the United States draft resolution covering the points already agreed upon in United States–United Kingdom discussions over the past several days. The first amendment called for changing Paragraph 2 by replacing the words "rejected all" with "not accepted"; the second amendment proposed adding at the end of paragraph 8 the words "it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts". (United Nations document A/C.1/656)

795.00/1-3051

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1951.

Subject: Statement made by General MacArthur

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Graves told me that the Embassy had received a telegram from London indicating considerable disturbance over General MacArthur's remarks reported yesterday from Tokyo, to the effect that the battle would continue for free Asia.[1] The Embassy was instructed to ascertain from the Department what significance should be attached to this statement. I told Mr. Graves that he could assure London that the policy of the U.S. Government with respect to Korea, with which he was intimately familiar, had not changed one iota and that the particular phrase which he quoted should be regarded as a mere form of words. Quite obviously this was just the answer which Mr. Graves sought and I suspect he had already dictated his response to London. He did, however, go on to remark on the general feeling in London that broad statements with political overtones seemed somewhat improper for emanation from the UN Commander, which remark I allowed to drop.

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[1] On January 29, the American Embassy in London had transmitted the following message to the Department of State in telegram 4174:

"This morning's *London Telegraph* carries story by correspondent in Korea in which SCAP, on arrival at Suwon, is quoted as stating to General Ridgway: 'This is exactly where I came in 7 months ago to start this crusade. The stake we fight for now, however is more than Korea—it is a free Asia'.

"During Cabinet meeting this morning considerable time was devoted to discussion of implications SCAP statement. Deliberations understood to be based on possibility SCAP had in mind utilization Chiang's forces in attempted invasion mainland. Government under some pressure make official approach to US in hope of curbing SCAP's activities." (795.00/1-2951)

795B.5/1-3051

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 30, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to your letter of 5 December 1950,[1] in which you raised the question of obtaining additional ground force contingents for service in Korea, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that increased active participation in Korea by other Member States has the advantages of adding to the United Nations character of the action in Korea, and of welding the Member States more closely together in opposition to Communism wherever it may occur.

It is the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that renewed pressure be exerted on Member States to furnish ground forces for Korea in accordance with the following general policy:

a. The criteria previously laid down, to permit ready integration of forces into the over-all military effort in Korea, should govern.

b. Great Britain and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional forces. However, effort should be made to obtain additional forces from British Commonwealth countries, other than Great Britain.

c. Except as indicated in paragraph 2 *b* [*b*] above, determined efforts should be made to obtain increased commitments from those countries already having forces in Korea.

d. Except as indicated in paragraph 2 *b* [*b*] above, determined efforts should be made to obtain commitments from non-Communist UN members which have not yet offered acceptable forces, and are considered capable of so doing.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1411.

Editorial Note

On January 30, at the conclusion of two days of meetings in Washington, President Truman and French Prime Minister René Pleven issued a joint statement, the text of which is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, page 128. Their discussions dealt with problems relating to the Far East, principally Indochina, Europe, Atlantic defense, and economic matters. Concerning Korea, the joint statement expressed agreement on the need for continued resistance to aggression until an honorable solution could be found, as well as the need for preventing hostilities from spreading beyond Korea. For full documentation on the Franco-American talks of January 29–30, see the compilation on France in volume IV.

795.00/1–3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 30, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

1190. Sir Benegal Rau in UNGA yesterday, referring to concept that door to negots for settlement Korean affair wld still be open after US Res had been adopted, said "I feel bound to mention that my Govt has been informed on the highest auth that once there is a condemnatory Res, there is no hope of a peaceful settlement". He gave it as view his Govt that condemnatory Res wld finally extinguish all hope of settlement and urged acceptance Asian proposal "as the best way of avoiding the prospect of a war which no one desires".[1]

Pls approach Bajpai earliest, bring Rau's observations his attention and inquire who the cited "highest auth" might be, the exact nature of that highest auth's warning and circumstances under which warning was given. You may at your discretion point out to Bajpai that US is endeavoring sincerely to understand nature of Indian foreign policy and policy aims, but is experiencing difficulty in determining what means India wld propose use to check aggression in Asia if not by present UN procedures.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Rau's statement was made during the afternoon session of the First Committee on January 29; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.435, pars. 37–38.

[2] The Department of State transmitted the following additional message on this subject to the Embassy in India in telegram 1200, January 31, 6 p. m.:

"Deptel 1190 Swedish Amb told Rusk yesterday afternoon that some days ago Chou En-lai told Panikkar that any Govt voting for US res branding Chi as an aggressor wld thereby commit a 'hostile act against Chi'. Further, that Panikkar had immed passed this on to other dipl Reps in Peiping and that this might have accounted for Rau's statement to UN." (795.00/1–3151)

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held three meetings during the morning, afternoon, and evening of Tuesday, January 30; for the records, see United Nations documents A/C.1./SR.436, 437, and 438. At the evening session (8:30–10:25

p. m.), the Committee approved the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654), as altered by the Lebanese amendments (A/C.1/656), by a vote of 45 in favor to 7 opposed (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Burma, Czechoslovakia, India, and Poland), with 8 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia). Saudi Arabia did not participate in the voting. The First Committee had previously rejected the 12-power Arab–Asian draft resolution, as amended (A/C.1/642/Rev.2), along with several Soviet proposed draft amendments to it. A concise record of the votes is also contained in the Report of the First Committee to the General Assembly, dated January 31, 1951 (A/1770). The resolution forwarded by the First Committee (A/C.1/659) was taken up and approved by the General Assembly without change on February 1; for the text, see page 150.

320/1–3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 31, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

1888. 1. Bajpai told me today GOI had received no message from Peiping stating latter would not discuss cease-fire in case resolution should pass GA condemning Communist China as aggressor. Message had been received, however, January 28 from Chou-En-lai in reply Nehru's appeal to him follow policy of peace in Asia and to issue statement of China's pacific intentions. Chou-En-lai had replied that as long as resolution was pending in UN condemning his Government as aggressor he could not issue such statement since it might look as though Peiping weakening in face charges made against it.

2. While Bajpai and I were talking, message came to him of vote last evening in Political Committee on US resolution. Bajpai showed me figures without comment. He apparently prepared for vote favoring resolution, but not for such overwhelming vote. I said I was sure that when GA matter Peiping's guilt could be clarified decks would be cleared for further action in direction cease-fire on basis which would not weaken UN. I sincerely hoped passage this resolution would not terminate India's efforts in direction of peace. India was in better position than almost any country to exert ameliorating influence on Communist China. I knew there would be certain amount of pique in

Indian press at outcome vote. I sincerely hoped, however, Indian leaders would not allow fact their advice not being taken to prevent them from helping rest of free world in attaining common objective. Bajpai said he could assure me so far as he concerned he would continue his efforts. He convinced that GOI would also carry on despite defeat for its policies which vote meant.

3. Few minutes later Bajpai stated B. N. Rau had asked that special official be sent Lake Success to assist in discussions Kashmir[1] since Rau's time taken up largely with Far East matters. Bajpai said now that Political Committee had cast its vote and since plenary session would probably follow advice Political Committee he thought B. N. Rau would be freed from Far East work and could devote time to Kashmir. I stated I hoped his remark did not indicate India did not plan continue play role in Far East situation. It seemed to me passage US resolution would mean much more work for GA re Far East than in past. B. N. Rau's assistance in this work could be extremely valuable. Bajpai said he was sure India had no intention withdrawing from UN activity re Far East but now that great debate finished Rau should have more time at his disposal.

HENDERSON

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[1] For documentation on Kashmir, see vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.

Resolution 498 (V), Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, February 1, 1951[1]

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,[2]

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[1] This resolution was adopted at the 327th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a vote of 44 in favor, to 7 opposed, with 9 abstentions. The countries opposing were the same as those who had opposed during the vote in the First Committee on January 30; those abstaining were also the same with the addition of Saudi Arabia, whose delegate entered for the record a statement that his abstention indicated non-participation in the voting. (U.N. document A/PV.327)

[2] On the preceding day, the Security Council had unanimously adopted a resolution (S/1995) proposed by the British Delegate calling for removal from its agenda of the item "Complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea". The Soviet Delegate voted in favor on the grounds that this item had originally been included on the agenda illegally during the absence of the Soviet and Chinese (Communist) Representatives. (U.N. document S/PV.531)

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. *Finds* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

2. *Calls upon* the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3. *Affirms* the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

4. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

5. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

6. *Requests* a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly,[3] it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;[4]

7. *Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

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[3] For documentation relating to the work and conclusions of the Additional Measures Committee, see pp. 1874 ff. On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 500 (V) calling for a strategic embargo against the two countries; for text, see p. 1988.

[4] Prior to the vote on the resolution as a whole, a separate vote was taken on this paragraph at the request of the Representative of Israel. The paragraph was approved by a vote of 43 to 7, with 8 abstentions. (A/PV.327)

II. FEBRUARY 2-APRIL 11. CONSIDERATION OF A CEASE-FIRE; THE QUESTION OF THE 38TH PARALLEL; THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON KOREA; THE DECISION TO DISMISS GENERAL MACARTHUR

795.00/2–251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Barbour and Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea[1]

Participants:
Australia —Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Graves, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
India —(absent)
Luxembourg —(absent)
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
New Zealand —Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, First Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE–Mr. Rusk
UNA–Mr. Hickerson
EUR–Mr. Allen
FE–Mr. Hackler
FE–Mr. Barbour
Captain Maertens–Army
Captain Fischgrund–Army

Captain Fischgrund opened the briefing with a description of enemy centers of resistance as they had appeared during the past week. He pointed out that in the western sectors resistance had been light to non-existent as on the Seoul-Suwon highway and only moderately heavy in the east. He closed the G–2 portion of the briefing by reviewing enemy activities in rear areas and stating that there had been continued improvement in the situation.

Captain Maertens, G–3, reported that there had been a general UN advance of up to two miles in all front areas during the past twenty-four hours. In response to a question by Ambassador Wrong, Captain Maertens stated that in spite of the general advance, the action remained a "reconnaissance in force" or at least one with "limited objective".

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[1] This was one of a regular series of briefings for representatives of countries cooperating with the U.N. effort in Korea.

After the military briefing, Mr. Rusk reminded the group that during the next week, meetings would be held on Tuesday and Friday,[2] as previously agreed.

Mr. Rusk said that he would have prepared a memorandum on the UN prisoner of war situation and that he hoped to discuss this problem with the group shortly. He added that the International Red Cross had been completely unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain permission from the Chinese Communit and North Korean Government to perform the usual Red Cross services for UN POW's but that the International Red Cross desired that no action be taken by members of the UN since to do so might jeopardize and complicate any future concessions on the part of these two governments. The Red Cross was, however, working with the UN forces on behalf of Communist prisoners of war. He stated that reports had been received that American prisoners are being held at various places in Manchuria and North Korea.

Mr. Rusk then brought up the press speculations about UN forces crossing the 38th parallel. He said there was no immediate problem since substantial enemy forces stood between us and the parallel, and our military commanders anticipated slow progress toward the parallel. While there were no indications that the enemy had given up his original intention to drive the UN forces into the sea, the fact remained that he was believed to be unable to do so. At the same time UN forces were not strong enough to reliberate all of North Korea, and it was not likely that there would be any serious ground action north of the 38th parallel. In December, the United States had favored a proposal for a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel, and we still hold that view with no change in our original position.

A basic difficulty with a *de facto* cease-fire, Mr. Rusk pointed out, was the disparity in size and type of opposing forces: the enemy's large ground forces could be easily reinforced while our relatively small ground forces could not, and our superior air and naval forces would be ineffective during a cease-fire. Thus anything other than a negotiated cease-fire during which there would be no reinforcement on either side would, at its close, undoubtedly find the enemy in a much better position than the UN forces.

Mr. Hickerson emphasized that the cease-fire proposal outlined by Ambassador Gross on December 15, 1950, provided that there should be no reinforcement or resupplying on either side.[3]

In response to a question by Ambassador Elizalde, Mr. Rusk stated that we must assume that supplies, equipment and reinforcements or replacements are continuing to flow from Manchuria and cited intelligence reports to this effect. In reply to Mr. de Beus he added that it was his belief that some of the Chinese Communist units formerly in action had been replaced by fresh troops from Manchuria.

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[2] February 6 and 9.

[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1549 ff.

When Ambasador Makin inquired as to the effect of a cease-fire accepted by the enemy which would deny the UN access to the 38th parallel, Mr. Rusk stated that such conditions would be unacceptable to the South Koreans and, he believed, to the UN. Mr. Rusk agreed with Ambassador Politis that a stalemate had in fact been reached and stated his belief that Communist failure to take the offensive was due to military reverses and was not connected with any political maneuvers.

Mr. Rusk identified the present problem, which was not one for public or press discussion, as that of breaking off the military action during the present stalemate and avoiding permanent military commitments in Korea.

795.00/2-251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, February 2, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

1928. Deptel 1190, January 30.

1. I talked again with Bajpai this afternoon re basis of Rau's statement in UNGA to effect his government had been informed on highest authority that once there is condemnatory resolution no hope of peaceful settlement. I outlined what I had reported to Department (Embtel 1888, January 31) and asked if I was correct in assuming Rau's statement had probably been based on this message from Chou En Lai. Bajpai replied in affirmative, then asked that Panikkar's telegram containing Chou En Lai's message in question be brought to him. He read aloud excerpts of message and found near end sentence which he had not reported to me in previous conversation which we both agreed must have motivated Rau's statement. According to Panikkar Chou En Lai had informed him that "if any attempt is made to combine condemnation of Chinese with proposal for conference, China could not accept it." [1]

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[1] After the passage of General Assembly Resolution 498(V), Chou En-lai issued a statement on February 2 denouncing it as "illegal, slanderous, null and void", and added that the People's Republic of China would have nothing to do with the proposed Good Offices Committee. The text of Chou's statement is printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1951* (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; London, Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 548; and also in U.N. document A/1782.

2. In accordance with Department's suggestions I told Bajpai again that US was endeavoring sincerely understand nature of Indian foreign policy and policy aims but had some difficulty in determining what means India would propose to use to check aggression in Asia if not by present UN procedures. Bajpai replied difficult for India make general statement. Means which India would favor for checking aggression would depend upon form and character of aggression and upon effect which such means might have upon world peace. GOI's proposals for dealing with Communist China's intervention in Korea had been set forth in twelve power draft resolution.

HENDERSON

795.00/2-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Burton Kitain of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1951.

Subject: The Korean Situation

Participants:
- Prime Minister S. G. Holland [1]
- Mr. A. D. McIntosh, Permanent Secretary of External Affairs
- Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador
- Mr. George Laking, Counselor
- FE–Mr. Dean Rusk
- FE–Mr. John Emmerson [2]
- NA–Mr. U. A. Johnson [3]
- BNA–Mr. L. Satterthwaite [4]
- BNA–Mr. B. Kitain
- G-2–Major G. L. Converse
- G-3–Lt. Col. C. R. Wright

After a short military briefing on the Korean situation by Major G. L. Converse and Lt. Col. Charles R. Wright, Mr. Rusk outlined for the Prime Minister five alternatives open to the United Nations in Korea. The first would be to inject all the possible force of the United Nations in an attempt to finally defeat the Communist forces. The disadvantages of this course were: *a*) the Communists had an almost unlimited supply of manpower to counter our moves, and, *b*) we did not wish to commit the greater part of our forces in Korea.

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[1] Mr. Holland visited Washington from February 5 to 10 in the middle of a two-week stay in the United States en route to New Zealand following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings in London during the previous month.

[2] Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

[3] Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[4] Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

The second alternative would be to withdraw completely from Korea. This was objectionable because it would be disastrous for the United Nations and would serve as a warning for other small nations lying on the periphery of the Iron Curtain to make an immediate settlement with the Communists.

The third alternative, that of maintaining an indefinite military stalemate, could not be considered because the United States had no desire to have its forces whittled away by continuous attrition or to lose the bulk of the professional cadre of its forces on this remote battlefront. In addition, public opinion would not accept an indefinite "half-war, half-peace" in which the United States was prevented from using its air power against China itself.

The fourth alternative was to attack the Chinese mainland by air and sea and to support a mainland attack by Chiang Kai-Shek's forces in an attempt to bring down the Peiping regime, a course which even if acceptable to our friends would be inadvisable because of the great probability of direct Soviet intervention.

The fifth and most viable course of action was that of stabilizing the military lines so as to convince the enemy that victory would demand a prohibitive price. It might then be possible to arrange a cease-fire during which a Korean settlement might be brought about on a minimum basis of a return to the *status quo ante* June 1950. We would strive for a withdrawal of all foreign troops and attempt to leave the ROK forces as strong as possible. The risk that the entire aggression might be repeated, however great, was unavoidable. Once these preliminary steps had been taken, it would then be possible to discuss other Far East questions with the Peiping regime.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Rusk for his frank exposition of our thinking and stated that before the discussion was carried any further he wanted to assure us that we had his wholehearted support. There had been too much criticism of the United States and not enough support, he asserted. Any questions he might ask, therefore, were in no way intended to be critical but were posed solely to clarify his thinking. Before asking these questions, however, he wanted to explain the position of the British Commonwealth and the situation faced during the recent Prime Ministers Conference. The Prime Ministers had gone to London with a basic desire to present a united Commonwealth front to the world—a task rendered most difficult by the hostile attitude of India and Pakistan. The Prime Ministers had searched desperately for some possible solution of the Korean crisis which would not involve the world in a general war. The Prime Minister stated that there was a strong feeling at the Conference that there must be no appearance of a break between the Commonwealth and the United States. The situation was resolved when word was received that the United States acquiesced to the five principles presented to the General Assembly. When, however, the Chinese refused this proffered solution, Mr. Holland was convinced that the Commonwealth must follow the lead of the United States.

The Prime Minister then asked us several questions concerning the results of the military campaign, which were answered by Mr. Rusk.

The Prime Minister stated that when the United Kingdom recognized Communist China, New Zealand opposed and refused to follow suit.

Mr. Rusk indicated that the first gap in US-UK relations appeared when the UK recognized the Communist regime in China but that the US had been convinced that this gap would inevitably close. The Chinese Communists would either become less intemperate, in which case the US would be willing to move toward the UK position, or they would become even more provocative, in which case the UK would move toward the US position. The Prime Minister then asked if the fifth alternative as stated at the outset of the conversation were to be adopted and the US were to agree to discuss the general Far East situation after the cease-fire had been arranged, would this not imply US agreement to Communist control of Formosa and to Peiping's entrance into the UN? Mr. Rusk indicated that as long an anyone wished to discuss a question the US could not avoid replying. The US, however, would not agree to Chinese recognition in the UN, but, for the sake of general US policy in the UN, it would not consider such a question as subject to a veto. Similarly the US would not agree to Communist control of Formosa until the Peiping regime had given some indication that it intended to "settle down" and cease disturbing the peace in the Far East. Mr. Holland asked for how long Peiping had to "be good" before the US would be willing to consider altering its position on these two questions; did the US consider the door still open to a settlement with the Chinese Communists? Mr. Rusk indicated that with respect to the former the US position was flexible; as for the latter the US considered that the Chinese had "closed the door" but that "the key had not been thrown away." The US, however, has had contact with the Peiping regime during the past few months and there have been several opportunities for *rapprochement*, but the Peiping regime has reacted only by intensifying its efforts to stir up trouble in the Far East.

The Prime Minister again thanked Mr. Rusk for his frank discussion and indicated his wholehearted support. He asked if there were anything he could do. Mr. Rusk stated that he would discuss with the Secretary the question of further troop contingents from

New Zealand for Korea. Mr. Rusk thanked the Prime Minister for his enthusiastic support.

Mr. Holland then asked Mr. Rusk if he might call again before leaving Washington to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact. An appointment was arranged for 10:30 Thursday morning.[5]

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[5] February 8; see the memorandum on p. 1570. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

793.00/2–651: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, February 6, 1951—6 p. m.

4303. 1. Following information passed EmbOff in strict confidence by China Desk FonOff.

According to message from British mission Peiping Panikkar, Indian Ambassador Peiping, was summoned to Chinese FonOff on February 3 by Chou, Chinese Communist FonMin, for discussion of Peiping's broadcast of day before[1] commenting on adoption by UN of US resolution condemning Chinese Communists as aggressors. Main points made by Chou were (*a*) US did not realize seriousness of what it had done (*b*) conflict now likely to spread and (*c*) as long as it is branded aggressor Peiping will have nothing to do with GOC.

2. General FonOff reaction seems to be Chou merely engaging in more propaganda in hope of widening rift between India and US. There is however underlying uneasiness that in this instance also (Embtel 1934 October 3 repeated Paris 559, New Delhi 46)[2] Chou may really mean what he says, especially re (*b*): apparent failure Viet Minh offensive, concentration Communist troops along southern frontier, and relaxation of Chinese military pressure in Korea may point to more active Chinese participation in hostilities in Indochina.

Sent Department 4303, repeated info Paris 1439, New Delhi 137.

PENFIELD

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 154.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. vii, p. 839; telegram 1934 had conveyed a warning from Chou En-lai that Chinese troops would enter North Korea if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel.

795.00/2–751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 7, 1951—7 p. m.

652. Eyes only for Muccio from Rusk. Fol for ur strictly conf back-

ground and such discreet use as you may consider desirable with ROK officials.

Neither US nor UN has ever committed itself to unification of Kor by unlimited commitment of whatever force required. UN mil objective has been repel armed attack on ROK and restore peace and security in area. In absence of intervention by Chi or USSR unification by polit means might have followed destruction of NK forces. However, in view of demonstrated Chi Commie willingness and ability commit large forces to prevent UN achieving that objective without unacceptable commitment force in Kor and increasing possibility spread of hostilities into gen war that course of action is no longer feasible. Apart from mil feasibility, attempt to reoccupy NK by force wld undoubtedly arouse determined opposition friendly UN members prejudicing US position and adversely affecting further UN effectiveness collective action.

On other hand Chi Commies may not have or may not exert ability to achieve their announced objective of expelling UN forces from all Kor.

Therefore, we are considering here some solution which will deny success to Commie aggressor without continuing subj Kor to ravages war and UN and ROK forces to indefinite and indecisive combat against numerically superior foe.

It appears certain that Commies will not accept and have ability deny any polit solution which wld permit unification except on terms which wld assure eventual, if not immediate, Commie domination of all Kor.

Therefore, it is our tentative view that solution must be sought along lines which while maintaining US post-war polit attitude toward unified Kor, will restore and maintain authority ROK south of 38th parallel under conditions which will permit eventual withdrawal of UN forces. It appears to us that, if UN forces are able stabilize mil position vicinity 38th parallel, such solution cld best be achieved by seeking cease-fire and, if possible, a demilitarized border zone and such other measures as will give maximum possible assurance against renewal of aggression. This shld be accompanied by thorough program for strengthening of ROK forces to point they cld replace UN ground forces and cld, with assistance of UN naval and air power, offer maximum deterrent to renewal of aggression, and reasonable possibility of success in repelling any but an all-out attack by USSR. Some rep UN force might remain in Kor for considerable time.

To obtain such solution, it will probably be necessary for US agree to principle of negot with Chi Commies on other FE matters with all difficulties inherent therein.

Such solution is obviously not ideal from standpoint of ROK, US or UN, but is probably maximum obtainable within present capabilities. It wld achieve objective of repelling attack against ROK, denying a success to Commie aggression and restore peace to area. There wld, of course, be risk of renewed aggression, but that risk is permanent and we cannot undertake major permanent US mil commitment Kor on that account.

I wld welcome any observations or suggestion you may desire transmit re these preliminary views. Best regards. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

320/2–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, February 8, 1951—6 : 49 p. m.
PRIORITY

1136. From Ross—Conversation with Entezam re Korea and Chinese Communists. I called on Entezam this noon at his request. He initiated conversation by a very gloomy reference to fact he had been on leave at Lake Placid when David Owen, Acting Secretary General, telephoned him on Saturday and read to him resolution we had introduced that day condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.[1] His first reaction to 9th paragraph of resolution, he said, had been strong opposition to participating in his capacity as President of Assembly as provided in that paragraph of our resolution. He said he had finally yielded, however, to political necessity of accepting indicated role, although he realized it would mean very great loss of prestige in view of virtual certainty that no peaceful settlement could be worked out with Chinese Communists.

At later stage in conversation I took occasion to point out that inclusion of 9th paragraph in our resolution was not merely political gesture but that we were very sincerely devoted to objective of achieving peaceful settlement of Korean issue. I said we did not accept defeatist view which had been expressed, for example, by Indian delegate, that passage our resolution would destroy prospect of peaceful settlement. I said we wanted to cooperate fully with efforts of GOC, although we fully realized difficulties they would be up against vis-à-vis Chinese Communists. I said in our conception work of *ad hoc* CMC and GOC should be closely coordinated and proceed along parallel lines.

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[1] Reference is to the introduction into the First Committee of the U.S. draft resolution (A/C.1/654) on Saturday, January 20, by Mr. Austin.

After his initial gloomy statement Entezam went on to say that his first hope had been that both Pearson and Rau would be able to continue to serve with him in order to be able to maintain continuity of cease-fire group. He regretted decision of Indian Government against permitting Rau to serve but said that Rau had assured him of continuing support of Indian Government in peaceful settlement effort. He said that as substitute for Rau he felt Swedes, because of their contact at Peiping, would be desirable.[2] Now that Pearson was also definitely out he had asked Cordier to telephone me last night to inquire whether Padilla Nervo [3] would be acceptable to us.

I told Entezam as I told Cordier last night that I did not feel it was appropriate for us to comment on his choice of colleagues for GOC. I said that out of consideration for his position in matter it hardly seemed fair to him to expose him to charge that his appointments had resulted in any way from our influence. Similarly I thought it was much better from our own point of view not to be open in any way to charge that we have sought to influence his appointments. Entezam said he understood these points entirely and thought they were correct. While I was in his office Entezam indicated on the telephone to one of Padilla Nervo's associates his hope that Padilla Nervo would be able to serve on GOC.

Entezam outlined as follows his thinking concerning alternative approaches to work of GOC.

In general way he said first mission of GOC was to study work of cease-fire group and to consider approaches that might be made to Chinese Communists on basis of principles approved by First Committee. He said his concept of work of GOC was that it should not attempt to solve problems (such as question of Chinese representation) but rather facilitate the procedures necessary to achieve solution of outstanding issues.

With this general thought in mind first alternative mentioned by Entezam was sending of inquiry as to views of Peiping Government. Entezam discounted this alternative since it was apparent Peiping Government is illegal, etc. group. Such communication Entezam indicated might be sent by him on authority of group either officially through secretariat or through intermediary of Swedes or Indians.

In reference to this approach, Entezam said Pearson had urged him to approach Peiping authorities individually in his capacity as President of Assembly before appointing other members of GOC. Entezam said he had disapproved of this procedure since he was not authorized to follow it by Assembly.

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[2] Mr. Austin had informed the Department of State on February 6 that, in view of India's unwillingness to let Rau serve on the Good Offices Committee, Entezam had asked Sven Grafström of Sweden to accept the post, and the Swedish Government was willing to have him do so. (Telegram 1113, February 6, from New York; 310.5/2–651)

[3] Luís Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative at the United Nations.

The second alternative mentioned by Entezam was that Peiping might be asked to appoint a representative to come to New York to discuss peaceful settlement. He doubted whether Peiping would accept this.

Third, Entezam conceived that Peiping might be asked if they would accept an emissary who would go to Peiping. Such emissary might be one of other two members of group or third person. It should not be Entezam himself, he felt, since this would too deeply involve prestige of UN. He did not altogether rule out his going personally to Peiping, however, as last resort.

Fourth, if it were thought that Peiping regime would not give its formal acceptance of emissary they might be asked if they would be willing, without formality of acceptance, receive an emissary. Entezam thought this alternative was one most likely be accepted by Peiping, but he did not feel it was very dignified procedure from UN viewpoint.

Fifth, Entezam raised question of direct contact between USG and Peiping Government. He said that this approach he firmly expected would not be well received by either USSR or UK. He said USSR would obviously not wish to see US in position of driving wedge between them and Chinese Communists and he said that he did not imagine UK would be very happy about our discussing matters with Chinese Communists without their participation in some way.

It seemed fairly clear to me that Entezam had primarily on his mind question of developing contact between US and Chinese Communists. He developed his thinking on this point a little further along following lines. He said, of course, he realized that we might tell him we thought this approach was very bad or, on other hand, we might at this time not wish to make any comment. He recalled that we had repeatedly said we were willing to seek to achieve peaceful settlement through UN. One possible approach, he said, was that if Chinese Communists were not willing to send representative to New York they might be willing send representative to meet with GOC perhaps in Europe. In this case it should not be too difficult for us to arrange to have whomever we might wish to designate for the purpose available in Europe if a possibility of direct contact might be developed.

Entezam said that he did not expect any comment from me at this time on foregoing alternatives and I did not offer any.

As reported by telephone to Sandifer, Entezam indicated as Cordier had on telephone last night at Entezam's request, that he would like to be in Washington on Monday[4] and that it would be very helpful to him if he could see the principal people in Department involved in these matters, including the Secretary. I said we would, of course, be very glad to facilitate his contacts in any way we could. I reminded him that while I was sure the Secretary would always want to see him his schedule was very full and the notice was rather short. Entezam indicated that if Secretary's schedule were full on Monday it might be possible to work something out for Tuesday morning. I told him I would let him know soon as possible what arrangements could be worked out.

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[4] February 12.

Entezam said he had been discussing with Lie question of adjournment or recessing of Fifth Session GA. He said Lie had taken view Assembly should be subject to recall by Secretary General rather than by President. Entezam said he had demurred. It was his view that since there remained work to be done by first committee, with particular reference to reports from *ad hoc* CMC and GOC, that Assembly should be recessed on understanding that Committee 1 would be called into session whenever in judgment of chairman of that committee it appeared appropriate to do so. I made clear to Entezam that in our view Assembly session should be recessed and definitely not adjourned. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/2-1051

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1951.

TENTATIVE PLAN FOR OBTAINING CEASE-FIRE

1. General MacArthur issues attached statement.

2. The U.S. should make no direct approach to Peking but on its issuance should simultaneously report the action to the UN so that other governments in a position to do so can bring maximum pressure on Peking to permit North Korea to accept.

3. The statement should be given the maximum circulation throughout North Korea—consideration might be given to a spectacular leaflet drop by formations of combat planes.

4. The interval between the issuance of the statement and date set for first meeting of these emissaries should be approximately a week to permit ample time for consultation by North Korea, Peking and Moscow.

5. If accepted, first meeting would arrange a temporary truce of

not over five or six days during which conditions for a permanent cease-fire could be discussed.

6. Representatives of UNCURK should be invited to observe negotiations for permanent cease-fire, but negotiations should be kept at military commander level.

7. Negotiations for permanent cease-fire should be based upon the principles contained in the Jan. 3, 1951 report of the Cease-Fire Committee of the U.N.

8. If there is any disposition to accept a cease-fire the question of supervision is likely to be the most difficult. A decision should be reached as to whether an unsupervised cease-fire with a supervised demilitarized zone could be accepted as the minimum U.S. position.

9. Prior preparations should be made for maximum psychological warfare exploitation in event truce is not accepted.

[Annex]

SECRET

Draft Message for Issuance by General MacArthur Prior to Crossing of 38th Parallel by UN Forces

To the civil authorities, armed forces and people of North Korea:

The ever increasing forces of the United Nations continue to demonstrate their ability to repel the attacks against the Republic of Korea.

The armed might of the United Nations is continuing its irresistable advance resolute in its determination to fulfill the mission of restoring peace and security in Korea.

As always, the United Nations command stands ready to discuss honorable methods for the termination of hostilities so that the United Nations purpose of assisting the Korean people in establishing a unified, independent and democratic country may be accomplished by peaceful means.

The fulfillment of this mission and the accomplishment of this purpose will enable the Korean people to realize their rightful ambitions.

The intervention of your Chinese neighbors has only resulted in a senseless prolongation of hostilities and untold misery and loss of life for all Koreans. On the other hand the great resources of the United Nations are available to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

Only you can determined whether peace can be restored and the ravages of war repaired.

As an earnest of our intent, all UN forces will cease military activity from dawn to sunset February ——, or any earlier date you suggest, subject to the same action on your part, and will be prepared to despatch emissaries to a point ————, to conclude a truce during which discussions of the conditions under which hostilities might be terminated could be held.

795.00/2–1151

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1951.

OUTLINE OF ACTION REGARDING KOREA

1. THE PRINCIPAL ALTERNATIVES

A. *To reinforce U.S. and U.N. forces sufficiently to unify all of Korea by force*

This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) the U.S. and the U.N. do not have the necessary additional force (2) even if adequate force were available, it should not be deployed to Korea, (3) the Moscow–Peiping axis can always reinforce enemy effort sufficiently to prevent a full UN success in Korea.

B. *To withdraw promptly, either with or without a pretext*

This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) the world-wide political effect of a demonstration of U.S. irresolution would be disastrous; (2) a major aggression by communism would result in a clear communist victory; (3) the position of the West in Japan would be badly undermined; (4) the sacrifices made thus far to meet the Korean aggression would have come to naught; (5) an abandonment of our Korean allies would be unacceptable as a matter of national honor and morality; (6) great confusion, anger and disillusionment would result in the United States; (7) withdrawal from Korea would require additional action against China, the nature, extent and results of which can not be clearly seen.

C. *To resolve the Korean affair by bringing down the Peiping regime through action against China*

This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) a general war against China must be avoided in the face of the world threat posed by the Soviet Union; (2) there is no assurance of bringing down the Peiping regime without a major commitment of U.S.

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[1] See footnote 6, p. 570.

forces to the China mainland; (3) if we make a major commitment of U.S. forces to the China mainland, there is no assurance that we can avoid general war at a time and under conditions of great disadvantage to us; (4) the U.S. would be politically isolated in any such effort.

. . . .

D. *To maintain indefinitely a military stalemate in Korea*

This alternative must be avoided, if possible, because (1) it would require an indefinite commitment of U.S. forces now in Korea, forces which are urgently required for other missions, (2) it would involve further human and material sacrifice without a clearly defined purpose, (3) it would produce a constantly increasing tension which could explode into general war, (4) it would be difficult to keep the support of the American people for the effort required.

E. *To accept a cease-fire along the lines of the December, 1950 proposals and a modus vivendi in Korea providing for a phased withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea*

Of the several alternatives, this course is best suited to the U.S. and U.N. interest under present circumstance. The following factors should be kept in mind:

(1) *The cease-fire.* We could not accept a cease-fire which permits the military position to be shifted to our disadvantage under the cover of a truce. The JCS requirements set forth in December, 1950 should be maintained. We could not accept a *de facto* cease-fire by ground forces and a suspension of U.N. air action against the enemy; the enemy could build up an overwhelming superiority with impunity. Although there is no indication that the enemy would accept such a cease-fire, the idea should be pursued further by diplomacy and through the U.N. Good Offices Committee.

(2) *Settlement in Korea.* If a satisfactory cease-fire is obtained, negotiations on the future of Korea would doubtless ensue. Although the U.S. and the U.N. should maintain the policy of unifying an independent and democratic Korea, it must be recognized that, realistically, the lines established by the cease-fire would be frozen and would produce in fact a return to the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950. An agreed *modus vivendi* for Korea inevitably involves the risk of future violation by the communists. This risk is world-wide and will exist so long as there is a non-communist Korea. We can not commit large U.S. forces permanently to Korea because of this risk, nor, on the other hand, surrender Korea to communism because of it. Any such *modus vivendi* will require a strong economic and military assistance program for the Republic of Korea if it is to have a chance to survive.

(3) *Talks on other Far Eastern questions.* If there is a cease-fire and *modus vivendi* regarding Korea, further discussions of Far

Eastern questions, with Peiping included, will be unavoidable. We must be very clear that we do not continue the fighting in Korea merely to avoid difficult or embarrassing negotiations. Obviously, in any such negotiations, we should support U.S. interests vigorously and insist upon the inclusion of those governments having a legitimate interest in the subjects to be discussed.

2. MILITARY ACTION

a. In the event of an agreed cease-fire U.N. military action should conform to the agreed course of action.

b. If there is no agreed cease-fire, (1) U.N. forces should concentrate upon inflicting maximum punishment upon the enemy with minimum loss to ourselves, (2) there would be advantage in securing the territory of the ROK, but serious risks or costs should not be undertaken merely to secure terrain, (3) air and naval action against enemy forces and military targets in North Korea should be maximized, (4) ROK forces should be built into the best possible fighting force as rapidly as possible, with adequate training and replacement features to insure ROK army effectiveness over a prolonged period.

c. The 38th parallel.

In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the 38th parallel will provide acute political problems. The enemy should not be afforded a sanctuary behind the 38th parallel similar to that behind the Yalu River. On the other hand, UN forces should not embark upon an effort to drive enemy forces out of all Korea.

Upon reaching the 38th parallel, UN forces should pause for a period of rest, should strengthen the defensive positions occupied by ROK forces prior to June 25, 1950, and should clean up guerillas south of the parallel. During this period, diplomatic and intelligence facilities should be employed to determine enemy intentions regarding a cease-fire and settement of the Korean problem.

If the enemy appears to be reinforcing his forward elements at the 38th parallel or redisposing his forces for renewed attacks on UN forces, the UN commander should be free to take such action as is required for the security of his forces, without regard to the 38th parallel.

The contents of this paper should be discussed immediately with the other principal governments involved in Korea and their agreement obtained. Further, a public statement should be prepared for prompt use by the President to explain the military necessity requiring ground operations across the 38th parallel, if that situation in fact arises.

795.00/2-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, February 12, 1951—10 a. m.

741. Eyes only Rusk. Re Deptel 652, February 7. Concur wholeheartedly we must do all possible avert spreading hostilities. At various times have stressed this with Rhee, Chough [1] and, since his return, with Chang. These three key officials appreciate worst thing for Korea would be to have hostilities spread at this time. However, any attempt to reestablish 38th Parallel would bring a violent explosion from all Koreans and we would have greatest difficulty keeping them within bounds and controlling ROK forces.

Present indications point to imminent decisive defeat and well nigh extermination of all Chinese and North Koreans massed in present areas. Military leaders consider that with present UN potential we can annihilate any number of Chinese coming south of Han. If further Chinese forces are not committed we will have in effect a lull soon. If further CCF brought in we shall have to exterminate them before achieving a lull.

I agree it would be preferable to revert to *status quo* as of June 25 for a period than spread hostilities or lose support of any substantial number of backers of our stand in the UN. However, I strongly urge we refrain from initiating any commitment at this time which would reestablish 38th Parallel. We should not lead from weakness. Chinese Communists are in precarious position now and it would be manifestly desirable for them to make first move toward peaceful settlement. I feel best possible aim would be to allow forces to move to best defensive terrain somewhere between Seoul and Pyongyang keeping enemy supply lines as extended as possible. It should be possible to hold such a line with a considerably reduced UN force. I recommend program for strengthening ROK forces be undertaken at once. ROK's have abundant manpower and would soon be in position to hold such a line and replace a good portion of UN ground forces now here.

World developments may force US into tentative solution expressed in your message but from here I feel we could afford a more positive approach towards Korean unity and independence. We should take into account that Chinese now realize how determined we are and Far East will soon know decisive blow Chinese Communists are suffering. This favorable development should be most beneficial in any discussions regarding a solution in Korea as well as in other matters of contention in Far East and even in Europe.

MUCCIO

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[1] Chough Pyung Ok, Minister of Home Affairs, Republic of Korea.

795.00/2–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1951.

Subject: Korean Situation

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves–British Embassy
Dean Rusk–Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Graves brought in a copy of the attached message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks[1] and said that there was a Cabinet meeting today in London for which he would like to pass along any points which might be of interest on the 38th parallel problem.

I made the following preliminary comments to Mr. Graves:

1. The present penetration of the 38th parallel consists of the reconnaissance copy [*company*] of the ROK Capital Division, which has advanced to a point four to five miles north of the 38th parallel along the east coast road, where there has been little or no opposition for several days.

2. We do not contemplate a "major crossing of the parallel by our land forces"; in fact, it is not possible militarily in view of enemy dispositions and heavy enemy pressure in the central sector. The Unified Command has informed us that they have no such operations in mind.

3. The present operation in Korea is an active defense; the aggressive reconnaissance and thrusts recently made by General Ridgway have been designed to punish the enemy, to keep him off balance, and to prevent his build-up for a renewal of his own offensive in strength.

4. The Secretary will be meeting with his advisers in the Department at noon today on this subject and we expected to consult with the British Embassy within 48 hours on the broad range of problems concerned with the 38th parallel.[2]

5. As a preliminary view, we would see great difficulty in establishing a sanctuary north of the 38th parallel similar to the one which the enemy enjoys north of the Yalu River. This is not a current operational problem because of the large enemy forces south of the parallel, but it would bear upon the attitude of the UN forces in the absence of an agreed cease-fire.

6. We believe it most important not to give the enemy a firm indication of our intentions, since by doing so we might seriously jeopardize the position of our forces and the ability of the ground commander to punish the enemy.

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[1] Not printed. It conveyed Bevin's preliminary views on the political aspects of the question of recrossing the 38th parallel. Essentially, he felt that the political decision lay not solely with the United States but with the United Nations, particularly those countries contributing forces in Korea. He also believed that any benefit attaching to a major crossing of the parallel might be outweighed by the political and military disadvantages resulting therefrom.

[2] No record has been found of a meeting between Department of State and British Embassy officials on February 13 or 14, but see the memorandum of conversation by Rusk, dated February 15, p. 177.

7. The Good Offices Committee is proceeding with its work; Mr. Entezam is calling at the Department today and will see Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Rusk.

8. Although the United States does not accept their view, ROK authorities and people are violently opposed to any freezing of the 38th parallel in such a way as to give up the prospect of the unification of the country.

I stated that these were, of course, preliminary comments, pending our consultation with the Secretary today.

320/2–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1951.

Participants: Ambassador Nasrollah Entezam (Iran)–President of Fifth General Assembly
S/A–Ambassador Jessup
UNA–Mr. Sandifer
FE–Mr. Rusk
UNP–Mr. Bancroft

Mr. Entezam opened the conversation by saying that Padilla Nervo of Mexico had accepted membership on the Cease-Fire Group under the Assembly resolution but would not be able to start work until after February 17 because of eye trouble. He commented that he didn't think there was any rush about putting the Good Offices Committee to work.

Entezam outlined at some length his thinking on alternative methods which the Good Offices Committee might follow. These were in general the same as those he mentioned in his conversation with Ross reported in telegram #1136 from New York.[1]

Entezam then talked about the relationship between the *Ad Hoc* Measures Committee and the Good Offices Committee and suggested the possibility that after the organizational meeting this week, the *Ad Hoc* Committee might decide to request the preparation of studies to be completed by a definite date in the future. He said that this would be helpful to the Good Offices Committee for the Chinese would know that after that date the *Ad Hoc* Collective Measures Committee would be considering the actual additional measures which might be applied. Thus the date might be in the nature of an indirect ultimatum.

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[1] Dated February 8, p. 160.

We pointed out to Mr. Entezam that it was our plan to have the bureau of the *Ad Hoc* Committee first work out a plan of work for consideration by the whole Committee and thereafter to have the Secretariat or some appropriate subcommittee prepare the studies for later consideration. As far as the United States was concerned, we were not going to press the *Ad Hoc* Committee for quick action or in any way to proceed with undue haste. We wanted to give full scope to the possibilities of the Good Offices Committee. If the Good Offices Committee thought that providing for a terminal date when the studies had to be ready would be helpful, we would certainly acquiesce, although there was a possibility that the fixing of a date might later be troublesome in so far as the Chinese were concerned.

In respect to the various alternative methods of approach by the Good Offices Committee, Messrs. Rusk and Jessup suggested that the more indirect the approach was to Peiping, the more chance of success there would be. Mr. Entezam suggested that now that Sweden was on the Good Offices Committee and India off, it might be well to use the Indian Ambassador in Peiping to arrange contact with the Communist authorities. Mr. Jessup suggested that the Indian Ambassador might be used to arrange for contact between the Swedish Ambassador and the Peiping Government or perhaps contact between a Swedish ambassador elsewhere than Peiping and some Chinese Communist representative.

In so far as the question of developing contact between the United States and the Peiping Government was concerned, which Mr. Entezam mentioned in the same way as reported in New York telegram #1136, Mr. Rusk pointed out that we had made efforts for contact which had not been successful or fruitful in the past.

Mr. Sandifer made the point that it was important not to create the impression in the work of the Good Offices Committee that the United States and the Chinese Communists were the two principal parties in interest, but rather it was the Chinese Communists vs. the United Nations. Mr. Entezam agreed but suggested that although this was so in respect to Korea, the United States was a principal party in interest on the question of Formosa and, to a lesser extent, on the question of Chinese representation. Mr. Entezam went on to say that he did not want to get from us an affirmative reply that we would be willing to develop contact with Peiping but merely wanted to find out if the United States was violently opposed to it and that as far as he was concerned our silence on this point was sufficient. Mr. Rusk said that our position had been made clear in the past that we were willing to discuss Far Eastern problems in a forum at which the

Chinese Communists would be represented, but that as he said earlier our prior contacts with the Peiping Government had not been fruitful.

Mr. Entezam made the point early in the conversation that the success of his Group depended a good deal on the military situation. Mr. Rusk said that that was probably true, that the situation was very fluid and that the new offensive by the Chinese Communists would probably mean that they would not make any decision until after there had been an opportunity to find out whether or not it was successful. Mr. Rusk said that in general he did not think that the military situation would move as fast in the future as it had in the last several weeks.

795.00/2–1351

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1951.

Attached are four copies of an informal staff paper prepared in the Department of State on the subject of the 38th parallel. We hope to have a chance to discuss this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon.[1] The attached paper does not represent a firm Department of State position because we do not wish to reach one without full consultation with you.

[H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS]

[Annex]

THE 38TH PARALLEL

In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the 38th parallel will provide acute political and military problems. UN forces entered Korea to repel the aggression and to restore peace. The restoration of peace required an effort to destroy the North Korean forces. UN forces crossed the 38th parallel in October 1950 to pursue and destroy North Korean forces who had refused to surrender and were giving every indication of continuing the fight.

With the large-scale intervention by the Chinese, it must be concluded that we cannot now pursue and destroy enemy forces in North Korea. Our inability to embark upon this effort may even impose some limitations upon our ability to punish the enemy as severely as we should like.

There would be considerable advantage in forcing the enemy north of the 38th parallel and in securing the territory of the ROK, but serious risks or costs should not be undertaken merely to secure terrain. A second purpose is to bring the fighting in Korea to a close. If the enemy stops fighting, we are better off without a continuation of the fight than with it. A cease-fire on a reasonable and acceptable basis would be in our national interest. We are fully aware that a cease-fire may not last if the Chinese wish to break it.

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[1] See *infra*.

From the political point of view, what military action would be indicated? It would be for the military to consider whether such military action is feasible or desirable. The following outlines the military action which would best support our present political objectives:

a. If there is an agreed cease-fire, of course, UN forces would comply with the terms of the cease-fire. It is assumed that the cease-fire principles of December 1950 set forth our views on the conditions of the cease-fire.

b. If the enemy continues his offensive operations against UN forces, UN forces should attempt to punish him as severely as possible.

c. If the enemy retains considerable forces in any substantial part of Korea south of the 38th parallel, UN forces should punish him if an opportunity arises to do so without incurring severe losses on our own side.

d. If the enemy pulls back north of the 38th parallel, we believe that the main body of the UN forces should remain south of the 38th parallel, with freedom to patrol or thrust into a zone, say 20 miles north of the 38th parallel. The purpose of this latter point would be to give the UN Commander, in the absence of an agreed cease-fire, an opportunity to keep a degree of control over the situation to his front and to allow him to take such action as might be required to keep the enemy off balance.

e. In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, air and naval action against enemy forces and military targets in enemy hands should be maximized.

f. ROK forces should, as soon as possible, be built into the best possible fighting force with adequate training and replacement features to ensure ROK effectiveness over a prolonged period.

g. If the main body of UN forces reaches the 38th parallel, the ROK defensive positions along the 38th parallel should be strengthened and a special effort should be made to clean up guerrillas south of the parallel.

h. In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the enemy should not be afforded a sanctuary behind the 38th parallel similar to that which he enjoys behind the Yalu River.

The primary means by which our Korean commitment can be substantially reduced is an agreed cease-fire. If the enemy now refuses a cease-fire, the above suggested action will permit a continuation of punishment which might bring the enemy to accept a cease-fire. If there is no agreed cease-fire, an effort should be made to increase the capability of ROK forces in order, if possible, to permit the relief of at least a portion of the UN forces now in Korea. To the extent that air and naval forces can take over the mission of punishing the enemy, that should be done.

What is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of the above suggestions?

795.00/2-1351

Memorandum for the Record of a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1951—3 p. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (23). In addition to the Joint Chiefs, 9 military officials attended; Messrs. Jessup, Matthews, and Rusk were accompanied by 5 other State Department representatives; and also present were Executive Secretary of the NSC Lay and his Deputy Gleason.]

GENERAL

1. Before proceeding to the major topics scheduled for consideration, two items were discussed as follows:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their position relative to a withdrawal from Korea in order that there be no misunderstanding on this matter. Their position is that while they would prefer to have U.S. forces out of Korea before next winter because of other United States military commitments, the military situation in Korea does not make such a withdrawal mandatory.

b. It was noted that the purpose of these conferences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State is to exchange views rather than to reach agreements on current politico-military problems. It was decided to keep a record of the subjects discussed and the gist of the views presented, and to prepare such records of the first three meetings.[2]

KOREA

2. Views were presented on a draft NSC paper relative to the Korean situation submitted informally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by State representatives.[3] General Bradley expressed the opinion that the situation in Korea requires a determination of our political ob-

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[1] The source text represents an agreed State–JCS memorandum of this meeting, which was the fourth in what became a regular series. A complete set of these meetings is in the files of the Policy Planning Staff: Lot File 64D563.

[2] The previous meetings were held on January 24 and 30, and February 6.

[3] *Supra.*

jectives. Then the military requirements to achieve these objectives can be determined. The military is capable of any action which might be required as a result of a political decision, except that a major offensive north of the 38th parallel in the face of resistance by major Chinese Communist forces would require U.N. forces in addition to those now deployed. A U.S. commitment of such proportions should be considered with caution. The 38th parallel is considered of no military significance. A decision to cross it in force should be based on political considerations. Mr. Matthews indicated that State did not want to consider a political decision except in light of our military capabilities. Mr. Rusk thought that—if we exclude the two extremes of driving the Chinese Communists from Korea and a unilateral U.N. withdrawal—the problem is to achieve a stabilization by which we could make progress toward our political objectives. The draft paper was intended to indicate what military action would, if it were feasible, best serve our political objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a cease-fire should not be regarded as an objective in itself but as one factor in an over-all agreement.

3. Mr. Rusk thought that the political and military problems are closely related. For example, it is a political objective to withdraw our forces from Korea in order to make them available for our build-up at home, for the defense of Japan and Western Europe, and so forth. However, this presupposes some modification of the enemy's plan to take all of Korea. The Communists show no interest in reaching an agreement. For the time being, our objective is to punish the enemy severely with the idea of getting, first, a cease-fire and, second, an arrangement which would, in effect, re-establish the *status quo ante* June 25. We must accept the continuing risk of a renewed attack in view of dangers elsewhere that must be met. Our public position would still be support for the unification of an independent Korea but we would recognize that the Iron Curtain would come down on the 38th parallel.

4. Ambassador Jessup inquired whether the ROK could develop the strength to hold at the 38th parallel except against a major Chinese Communist assault. General Collins thought that ROK forces cannot be expected to have this capability for at least two or three years and agreed with General Vandenberg that if the Iron Curtain was dropped at the 38th parallel, thus permitting a Communist build-up to the north, the ROK probably never would attain the capability of holding. Ambassador Jessup and Mr. Nitze[4] concluded that there are four possibilities: (1) to withdraw unilaterally; (2) to hold on

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[4] Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

indefinitely; (3) to liquidate the situation in the event of general war; and (4) to make a political arrangement by which we could withdraw.

a. It was generally recognized that the first would mean a serious blow to U.S. and U.N. prestige and would leave the Communists free to take South Korea and to use their forces for other adventures in Asia.

b. To hold on indefinitely would require more ground troops, not only to continue combat action in Korea but to insure protection for Japan, raising our total in CINCFE [*Far East Command*] perhaps to ten or twelve divisions with an additional requirement of 30,000 troops in the pipeline to provide for rotation. Raising Chinese Nationalist forces or additional Korean forces to replace U.S. troops is a doubtful possibility.

c. The fourth possibility depends in part on whether we can step up the punishment being inflicted on the enemy. General Vandenberg indicated that we have reached the point where there are not enough targets left in North Korea to keep the air force busy. He also pointed out that while we are punishing the Chinese on the ground, we are trading irreplaceable Americans for expendable Chinese. The question is not only how long will the Chinese be willing to take punishment but also how long will the U.S. public be willing to take American losses, even at the ratio of 20 Chinese to one American. Admiral Sherman thought that we must also consider the reaction of the United Kingdom and other nations which have contributed troops to the Korean operation. General Bradley agreed since it is important to keep our allies. He felt that a "cease-fire" in itself would not be advantageous at this time and that we would probably have to defeat the present attack and probably one more attack before the Chinese Communists would be ready to consider an acceptable agreement.

5. General Collins asked where, from the political point of view, we should attempt to stabilize. Mr. Matthews replied that no agreement short of the 38th parallel would be politically acceptable. Although the more territory we hold at the time of a "cease-fire" the better, it is not politically necessary to regain Seoul or to mount an offensive to seize ground along the 38th parallel. If it is militarily advantageous to hold about where we are now, as General Collins indicated, that is politically satisfactory. There was some discussion of military action north of the 38th parallel. In general, there are no military advantages in ground action in force north of the 38th parallel and there are psychological and political advantages in restricting our ground action to the area south of the parallel. It is important to use air strikes and naval action to make North Korea an example of what happens to an aggressor. Mr. Matthews thought that U.N. forces should not move north of the parallel in force except after consultation with Washington, but it was generally recognized that we should not commit ourselves not to cross the 38th parallel.

6. It was observed that a possible additional alternative is retaliatory action against China as an effort to reach a political settlement. This would involve the risk that the Soviet Union would enter the conflict, but the Soviet Union would have difficulty in supporting an operation in the Far East. General Collins and General Bradley thought that this course would involve excessive risks at this time. Mr. Nitze indicated that our capability for taking retaliatory action might be helpful in achieving a political settlement and then in enforcing it. With this sanction we might be able to get the Chinese Communists to guarantee that the North Koreans would not move against South Korea. It was suggested that CIA, State, and Defense should evaluate what action we can take without serious risk of Soviet intervention.

7. In the course of the preceding discussion General Collins summarized the present military situation in Korea as follows. Generally speaking, military operations in Korea are now stabilized, although there will be a certain amount of give and take. Considering terrain, there would be little military advantage to be gained by crossing the parallel. Any limited advance north of the Han would put the Eighth Army in a position with an unfordable river at its back. We might even do better to fall back a bit from our present position and could do so without relinquishing our hold on the rice-growing areas. We are now close to the limit of our capabilities with present forces as long as there is no appreciable change in enemy strength, and positions are likely to remain approximately as they are now.

[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia and the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meetings.]

795.00/2-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1951.

Subject: The 38th Parallel

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves–British Embassy
Dean Rusk–Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Graves handed me the attached message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks.[1]

In addition to the written message, Mr. Graves said that he wished to pass along the following point orally on which he would appreciate a reply: "The Cabinet agreed also that the U.S. Government should be asked formally to confirm that UN forces would not advance beyond the 38th parallel without a fresh political decision taken not by the U.S. Government alone but by the United Nations." [2]

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[1] Dated February 14; not printed. In it, Bevin said that the British Cabinet had now endorsed the view that the U.N. forces should not cross the 38th parallel on a major scale, although the restriction could not be absolute, and room must be allowed for tactical land and air strikes north of the line.

I told Mr. Graves that I supposed London would like a brief reply in writing and he replied in the affirmative. It was tentatively agreed that the reply might take the form of a letter from the Secretary to Sir Oliver Franks.[3]

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[2] On February 14, at a news conference, Mr. Acheson had declined to comment on U.S. policy toward crossing the 38th parallel, saying that he would not speak on questions which might embarrass the U.N. military operation or in any way contribute to the success of the enemy (Department of State Memorandum of the Secretary's Press and Radio Conference). On the following day, President Truman likewise indicated that the 38th parallel was a military matter in which he would not interfere, adding that crossing the line was a point of strategy for the Commander in Chief in the Far East to decide (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 154–155).

[3] A reply for Mr. Acheson to send to Ambassador Franks was drafted on February 28, but was not sent, presumably in view of the fact that U.S. views on the 38th parallel, as set forth in telegram 719, *infra*, had been already adequately conveyed to the British Embassy (Lot File 56D424: U. Alexis Johnson Files).

357.AD/2–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 17, 1951—2 p. m.
PRIORITY

719. Regular briefing of Ambassadors of countries with military forces in Korea took place Fri afternoon (Feb. 16). After brief exposition of military situation by Defense Reps, Rusk addressed group on general Korea situation with specific reference to question of crossing 38th parallel. Rusk made fol points:

1. UN faces 5 possible courses of action in Korea:

a. It might re-enforce UN effort and attempt to achieve unification of Kor by force. Re-enforcements by US and other UN members for this purpose not in fact available and even if they were available, there wld be serious question as to whether to commit them. Furthermore, even if UN members were prepared to undertake such an effort, the enemy has sufficient power and apparently the intention to use it to prevent UN forces from achieving such goal.

b. The UN could withdraw from Kor, with or without a pretext such as giving Chinese mass intervention as reason. In US view, this wld leave the aggressor victorious and mean failure for the UN in its mission of suppressing aggression. It wld jeopardize security of

Japan. It wld mean abandonment of South Kor people and of South Kor forces who have fought valiantly. Such retreat and show of weakness by UN members would have serious repercussions on position of freedom-loving peoples throughout the world.

c. It might be possible to liquidate situation in Kor by extending hostilities to China. US, however, and we are sure other peoples, wish to localize the fighting to Kor if at all possible. Despite extreme provocation, Unified Command has acted with great restraint to conform to this policy.

d. A fourth possibility is a military stalemate, indefinitely protracted, in approximately present positions. This possibility has serious disadvantages. It would constitute a continued and expensive drain on material and manpower. We need our own forces elsewhere. Also, in order to maintain stalemate and prevent enemy from massing forces to drive us into sea, UN large-scale air attacks would have to continue. In face of continued massive air attacks, enemy would probably be forced to try to wind up the Korean situation, perhaps by an all-out attempt to drive UN forces out. Nevertheless, a stalemate for a time is not improbable.

e. Another possibility based on the recognition by both sides that neither will drive the other out of Kor involves expectation that at some point a possibility of negotiation and peaceful settlement might open up. There is no indication at present that enemy has such a peaceful settlement in mind, but a *modus vivendi* with a supervised cease-fire might be a way for terminating Korean war. Presumably, GOC has such a possibility in mind.

2. UN and its Members are obligated to aid Republic of Kor in resisting aggression. Neither UN nor its Members are obligated to seek to bring about by force unification of Kor along lines GA resolutions. At one time, it appeared possible that in the process of defeating aggressor and ensuring that there will be no recurrence of the aggression, UN force might also achieve UN political objectives of unification of Kor. Chinese Communist intervention has now rendered that impossible. The question of crossing the 38th parallel must, therefore, be considered in the light of the UN mission of defending the ROK against aggression, and of the alternative courses open to us as set forth above.

3. Present disposition of UN forces is basically defensive. It is, however, an aggressive defense. Aggressive character of defense has saved and will save UN forces by not leaving the enemy full initiative and by upsetting any planned attacks. The war should be viewed as a war of maneuver by opposing forces, not as a matter of positions on terrain.

4. Enemy must not be given any information about our intentions if we can help it. It would be extremely serious for the safety of our forces if the enemy felt assured of an inviolable sanctuary in North Kor like that which he enjoys in Manchuria. The Unified Command,

therefore, must continue to have authority for air action in Kor wherever the situation calls for it; our sea forces also must be able to operate as needed. The Unified Command must also be free on the ground to conduct raids, make thrusts, and take patrol actions, as our aggressive defense might require. Thus, the thrust to Wonsan or ROK patrols across the 38th parallel are only incidental to our aggressive defense operations. We can see no possible political objections to such operations.

5. The military question of necessary operations across 38th parallel must not be confused with political decision whether UN forces should seek to gain control of all of Kor and unify it by force. We do not anticipate major moves by UN forces for the purpose of seizing territory. At present a major movement by the mass of UN forces into North Kor is not probable. When question of whether to cross the 38th parallel in mass force becomes a more immediate problem, there will be time to consider that question, and we will of course consult with other Nations participating in Korean fighting. At present, it is premature to discuss that question. We do not know what the enemy's attitude will be at that time, or what his military situation will be, and other factors which will have to be considered by us and by the other countries.

In reply to a question by Ambassador Makin (Australia) about MacArthur's authority, Rusk read from transcript of President's press conference,[1] and indicated his interpretation of the President's statement to be that President did not wish to give enemy information as to our intentions, nor give the enemy or the UN Commander the impression that the President considers the 38th parallel an inviolable frontier. On the political question of efforts to conquer North Korea by force, the President did not intend to comment and so indicated.

Ambassador Bonnet [2] summed up his understanding of Rusk's statement, indicating agreement. He stated his understanding as a conclusion that there would be no mass crossing of the 38th parallel without agreement of the other countries. Later, however, Rusk dissipated this impression, making it clear that US could not agree that each Member represented could have a veto over UC action. He said UC has a responsibility and it is not always possible to get unanimous agreement of a large number of States, especially when you are in the middle of a war and must act. He did promise, however, that there would be opportunity for consultations and that efforts would be made to achieve as much agreement as possible. We have already received views of some members represented and hope that if any others desire to do so they will make their views known.

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[1] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[2] French Ambassador Henri Bonnet.

Ambassador Berendsen (New Zealand) approved Rusk's statement. He noted that there was no question that there was authority under the UN Resolutions to cross 38th parallel, and that in October there had not been a dissenting voice on this subject. It is not, therefore, a question of what the resolutions provide, but a change in the military situation; i.e., Chinese Communist intervention. He was completely satisfied with Rusk's exposition.

When asked about the place of consultations, Rusk indicated that while we have no fixed views, it would seem preferable that for the present at least, consultations should be in Washington either bilaterally or, if it is desired, at briefing meetings. He indicated that he would prepare a brief informal memorandum summarizing what he had said at this meeting, and would try and have it available by next Tuesday's briefing session so that the Ambassadors could transmit it to their Governments.

Above summary is for your information only. Department will send you copy of Rusk memorandum for use in consultation with Dels of participating countries.[3] Department will also send briefer statement for use with other Dels.

ACHESON

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[3] A copy of the memorandum was transmitted with a circular airgram of February 21, not printed (795.00/2-2151).

357.AK/2-1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, February 17, 1951—2:35 p. m.
PRIORITY

1173. Re Korea—GOC. Grafstrom advised me at noon today on confidential basis that message summarized in our telegram No. 1155, February 14, had been handed to Chinese Communist Ambassador at Stockholm by Swedish Foreign Office on February 14.[1] Chinese Am-

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[1] Telegram 1155 is not printed. The message referred to was from Entezam to the Chinese authorities in Peiping. Its substance was summarized in telegram 1155 as follows:

"Entezam will state his awareness of fact that CPG, like UN, is anxious to settle conflict in Korea by peaceful means. Exchange of telegrams does not hold prospect of fruitful results. Prior efforts looking toward peaceful solution have failed primarily because of lack of personal contact. Personal contact is essential for exchange of views re preliminary matters, for example, re the personnel who conduct negotiations, the fixing of agenda for discussions, and the like. As Peiping Government is undoubtedly aware, Entezam has appointed Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo, and the three members of the GOC are working as a team. However, it is

Footnote continued on following page.

bassador commented that he did not see very much hope, but would of course transmit message to his government. Message was also transmitted by Stockholm to Swedish Ambassador at Peiping for transmission to Chinese Foreign Office there. Only material changes are that in alternative methods of procedure suggested, there is no reference in (*a*) to "a person designated by Entezam", it being assumed that if CPG sends a representative to New York, he would deal with Entezam. In addition, (*b*) was revised to state that representative of CPG might meet with Entezam or his representative at some agreed place outside China or US.

Grafstrom told me that upon his suggestion Entezam had informed Rau about step taken by GOC, and had requested Rau to attempt to persuade GOI to "encourage Peiping Government to accept the proposals". Grafstrom stressed that apart from the members of GOC, we and GOI were the only governments who know about transmission of message to Peiping, which GOC is most anxious be kept private for time being.

Because of GOC desire to keep this matter secret, I do not contemplate advising the British here, and assume Department will likewise not advise British. If, however, Department decides it necessary to do so, I would appreciate advance information this fact.

Grafstrom also told me that the Bureau of *Ad Hoc* China Committee has requested meeting with GOC on Monday, February 19. GOC intends to say nothing concerning its approach to Peiping unless there is a reply by Monday,[2] in which case GOC will notify bureau of the exchange of messages.

With regard to information in our telegram No. 1155 concerning message sent by GOI to Stockholm reflecting suggestions by Panikkar, Grafstrom had following additional information which he gave me in confidence.

Swedish Ambassador, New Delhi, upon instructions from Stockholm, requested clarification from GOI. Bajpai told Swedish Ambassa-

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

not essential in connection with efforts by the GOC that Peiping recognize or acknowledge the GOC as a group or a team. It is not necessary to become involved in question of legality of GA resolutions. Entezam would appreciate an expression of views by CPG as to the best method of establishing contact, and to that end would welcome reactions of CPG to following possible alternative methods of procedure:

"(*a*) CPG might send a representative to New York to contact Entezam or a person designated by Entezam; (*b*) representative of CPG might meet with a representative of Entezam at some mutually agreed place outside China and outside US; (*c*) a representative designated by Entezam might be received by CPG in Peiping for preliminary discussions. In connection with the last alternative, Entezam perceives no need for CPG to issue invitation so long as it made clear that Entezam's representative would be received." (357.AK/2-1451)

[2] February 19.

dor that several days ago Panikkar had reported Chinese willingness to take part in seven-power conference, to be held independently of UN. Bajpai said that GOI is not willing to take initiative in attempts to arrange such a conference. GOI considers it hopeless to attempt to induce US and UK to agree to such a conference outside the UN. Bajpai believed US and UK would consider a conference held in such a manner to be "disloyal" to the UN and would also be swayed by fact that Peiping refused to have anything to do with the cease-fire group. However, GOI thought such a conference "would be useful" inasmuch as it would facilitate "confidential negotiations", and would avoid the "openness of UN debates."

Bajpai thereupon told the Swedish Ambassador that if Sweden would take the initiative in arranging such a conference, GOI would support Sweden.

Grafstrom read me his instruction from Stockholm, which said that his government did not want to take part in any effort which would set aside GOC. Any further moves are left to Grafstrom's discretion.

Grafstrom said he would want to consult closely with me as to future steps because he realized that our position would undoubtedly become the UN position.

I expressed gratitude my government for Grafstrom's unfailing cooperative attitude and gave him assurance of our desire to respect his confidence and to be as helpful as possible.

GROSS

795.00/2–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, February 17, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

2158. 1. During conversation with Bajpai today he asked how my government was thinking regarding Korea. I outlined substance several Department's recent telegrams this subject. Bajpai said it seemed tragic that useless fighting should continue Korea resulting loss of lives not only of combatants but civilians and in gradual total destruction Korean economy. He had been wondering whether time might not arrive near future again approach Peiping with cease-fire proposals similar those contained resolution accepted by US and passed by UN some weeks ago. Although Peiping had insisted changes these original proposals, situation had since altered. Apparently Communists had discovered not so easy drive UN forces out of Korea as they had thought early in January. Did I think US might again be willing accept original resolution embodying principles to which it had agreed previously.

2. Told Bajpai could not answer his question. US public opinion had hardened considerably last six weeks. There was growing conviction UN could not afford, after losses incurred to maintain its principles, to consent cease-fire which in any way might weaken its authority. It was not necessary for me tell him that no country was more anxious for termination hostilities than US and that US would certainly agree to cease-fire which would give promise to establishment unified Korea without commitments likely encourage future aggression. I would look over such telegrams received lately from Washington and within next few days might talk with him again.

3. Bajpai said his remarks were entirely personal and made without prior discussion with Nehru. They were for me not my government; nevertheless, if I should have additional ideas we might have further talk. Meantime, he would have chat with Prime Minister who is returning Delhi tomorrow.

4. During conversation Bajpai told me confidence that some time ago Pearson had asked Rau if Government of India could ascertain whether Peiping would be willing receive emissary from Entezam's Committee. Peiping's reply had been of somewhat negative character. Nevertheless, Bajpai not convinced Peiping entirely "unapproachable".

HENDERSON

795.00/2–2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1951.

Subject: 1. Thirty-eighth Parallel
2. Relations of Good Offices Committee and *Ad Hoc* Collective Measures Committee

Participants: Mr. Dean Rusk, FE
Mr. John C. Ross, USUN
Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, UNA

Thirty-Eighth Parallel

In the course of an hour's discussion of the above subjects this morning, the following points were made in particular with reference to the 38th parallel.

Mr. Rusk, after a conversation covering the ground of his statement to the briefing meeting of Ambassadors on Friday, February 16, emphasized the following points:

1. We have made no commitment not to cross the 38th parallel if political and military circumstances and objectives make such action desirable.
2. We have made no collateral commitments to other countries making action with reference to the 38th parallel dependent upon their agreement to or acquiescence in such action. Mr. Rusk made the point in the Friday meeting that while we agreed to consult, we could not agree that any particular country had a veto on action since the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has imposed a special responsibility on the United States in designating it as the Unified Command.
3. It is our position that no additional formal United Nations action is necessary to authorize action north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Ross said that they had found two main areas of concern among Delegations in New York. The first is a general uneasiness and distrust concerning the actions of General MacArthur, particularly the feeling that he may take individual action without governmental authority or instructions. Mr. Rusk made the observation that all General MacArthur's actions up to the present time had been within his instructions but that this does not apply of course to speeches and public statements he has made. The second concern, Mr. Ross said, was that decisions might be taken by the United States and the Unified Command without adequate consultation with other governments.

Mr. Ross raised particularly the problem that they would have in New York in answering the questions raised by the Norwegian Representative as reported by telegram to the Department[1] and the problem of relations with the Good Offices Committee. After some discussion, it was agreed that USUN should discuss frankly with the Norwegian Representative the situation as to consultation, pointing out that with the present fluid situation USUN could not keep fully up to date on day-by-day development. The United States would be glad to receive the views of the Norwegian Government or any other government and if there were special problems for the Norwegian Government in consulting in Washington, we would be glad to arrange for consultation in New York.

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[1] Reference is to telegram 1162, February 15, from New York, which read in part as follows:

"This afternoon Sunde called upon me at his request to make what he described as an 'official presentation upon instructions his government' of their views re 38th parallel. Norwegian Government, although aware that question of UN forces crossing 38th parallel might be regarded as 'academic' at present time, nevertheless wishes to advise US Government that it considers that it would not be wise for UN forces to cross north of 38th parallel even if situation might in future make such crossing practical from military point of view. Norwegian Government hopes that it might be possible to 'stabilize a front' on or near 38th parallel, and then to seek a cease-fire along lines of UC proposals previously made to cease-fire group." (795B.5/2-1551)

As to the Good Offices Committee, Mr. Rusk thought that no initiative should be taken by USUN in discussing the question of the 38th parallel with the Committee. If approached, the Mission might take the following general line:

1. We could make no firm commitments in the present developing situation in Korea.
2. It is important that no information be given to the enemy as to our real intentions.
3. We could not agree to any policy which would result in giving a safe haven in North Korea to the Chinese and North Korean forces similar to the one they enjoy north of the Yalu River.
4. A cease-fire would only be productive as related to promise or prospect of a general settlement.
5. If there are any particular views or questions on a cease-fire, they should be referred to the Department for consideration.

Relations of the Good Offices Committee

Mr. Ross commented that at the first meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Collective Measures Committee the Egyptian Representative had opened up afresh the whole question of the relationship of these two Committees. He had taken the line that in order not to impair the prospect of successful action by the Good Offices Committee, no action should be taken at present towards carrying on the program of the *Ad Hoc* Collective Measures Committee. This question would come up in mutual discussion between the bureaus of the two Committees and probably at the next meeting of the Collective Measures Committee.

Mr. Rusk stressed that it was important to remember in this connection that the *Ad Hoc* Collective Measures Committee had been established as a device to put and keep the question of sanctions for Chinese aggression in a manageable status. It is essential not to let the operations of the Committee develop or deteriorate in such a way as to stultify this purpose. While we are quite willing to go along with a careful and deliberate temper for the Committee, we cannot by any means agree that it be kept in suspense. Mr. Sandifer emphasized the importance of not allowing the work and relationship of the two Committees to develop in such a way as to paralyze the operations of the Collective Measures Committtee. There was a clear understanding during the debates on the Chinese Aggression Resolution that the two Committees should work parallel and not in tandem and this concept must be maintained. Mr. Sandifer said he had expressed these views to Mr. Shann,[2] newly elected *Rapporteur* of the Committee, at a cocktail party at the home of Mr. Moodie, Counselor of the

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[2] K.C.O. Shann, First Secretary, Australian Mission at the United Nations.

Australian Embassy, on Friday evening. Mr. Shann seemed to be fully aware of the importance of the question and said that it would be taken up in the Bureau of the Committee and that he would discuss it further with our Mission in New York.

795.00/2-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, February 21, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

2203. 1. Bajpai told me today in utmost confidence for my own information and not for my government or for discussion with British with whom he had not discussed matter that he had recently despatched telegram Panikkar asking him explore whether Commie Chinese might not be willing at this juncture when lines at 38th parallel are almost restored to agree to unconditional cease-fire which could perhaps be followed by conference with agenda similar to that contained in GA resolution of January 13. He had asked Panikkar remind Chinese that this agenda had provided for consideration Formosa question in light international commitments which had been interpreted by GOI to mean in accordance with Cairo and Potsdam declarations. He did not know whether Peiping would be disposed agree cease-fire under such conditions. Recent telegram from Panikkar had indicated that Commie Chinese much encouraged by recent Stalin pronouncements which Chinese Commies were interpreting as promise Stalin to give more support to them in Korean campaign.[1] Peiping may not be disposed make any concessions in view its belief it will receive additional aid from Russia. Bajpai added he assumed that this must be what Russians wanted.

2. Bajpai said that it was possible in any event Peiping would not wish to have dealings just now with UN or any agency UN. If it would be willing have any discussions at all it might insist they be carried on through diplomatic channels. There was faint possibility that during early stages groundwork for cease-fire could be arranged through diplomatic channels although of course UN would eventually come into picture.

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[1] On February 16, Soviet Premier Stalin, responding to a series of questions from a *Pravda* correspondent, criticized the United Nations for declaring the People's Republic of China an aggressor in Korea and warned that body against rejection of the PRC's peace proposals for Korea and the Far East. He particularly ridiculed the assertion that the United States had ". . . the right to defend its security on the territory of Korea and at the borders of China, while China and Korea have no right to defend their security on their own territory or at the borders of their states." The texts of the questions and answers are printed in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952*, p. 11303.

3. I regret necessity sending this Department despite Bajpai's enjoinder. Am doing so because feelers to Panikkar may lead to developments which may embarrass US and Department may wish give guidance to Steere[2] in my absence in case Bajpai mentions matter him. I told Bajpai I would tell Steere of our conversation.

HENDERSON

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[2] Loyd V. Steere, Counselor of Embassy in New Delhi.

795B.00/2–2151 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, February 21, 1951—5 p. m.

1214. Swiss officials and local diplomats having occasion for contact with the new Chinese Communist Minister and staff have informed me that the Chinese are obdurate in their refusal to be brought into any kind of political discussion. However, the Papal Nuncio today informed me that recently Zehnder (Swiss Under Secretary of State) in conversation with Chinese Minister raised question of Korea. The Minister surprisingly explained that Chinese Communist objectives in Korea were political; that Communists never expected to achieve military victory; and that they hope by prolonged engagement of American troops in Korea situation will develop conducive to mutual compromise. This smacks of *ex post facto* rationalizing, or "sour grapes" reasoning, but I report it for what it may be worth.

VINCENT

795.00/2–2251

Memorandum by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1951.

DRAFT STATEMENT ON KOREA BY THE PRESIDENT

1. The occasion for the statement might be the military stabilization which now appears to have been achieved in Korea.

2. The form of the statement might be a letter by the President in reply to a letter from Senator Connally inquiring whether military stabilization of the situation in Korea might serve as the basis for a political arrangement conforming to the U.N. objectives in Korea and relating this problem to other urgent questions under consideration by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

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[1] A notation on the source text indicated that this memorandum was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Acheson on February 22, with Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, also being present. The notation was presumably made by Mr. Tufts. No record of the meeting has been found.

3. The points which the President might make in his letter are:

a. The U.S. hopes that military stabilization of the situation in Korea might serve as the basis for a satisfactory settlement of the Korean problem. The U.N. action in Korea was undertaken to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and the U.N. has consistently sought and still seeks to conclude the fighting in Korea on terms which would restore peace to the area, in order to lay a basis for the continuation of its efforts since 1947 to secure the peaceful unification of an independent Korea.

b. The intervention of the Chinese Communists created a wholly new situation and made it impossible to conclude the fighting and restore peace by the military operations which were undertaken in October to destroy the North Korean aggressor forces. The U.N. has sought and still seeks to prevent the widening of hostilities in this new and inflammable situation and to conclude an arrangement with the Chinese Communists which would assure a cessation of hostilities in Korea, the independence of the Republic of Korea, the phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, and the prevention of the use of North Korea as a base for aggression against the Republic of Korea while the U.N. is working out arrangements for the unification of Korea.

c. Clearly, the question whether military stabilization of the situation in Korea can serve as the basis for such a political arrangement depends in large measure on whether the Chinese Communists are free to seek peaceful settlement. The U.S. will continue to support the efforts of the U.N. to conclude such an arrangement. The U.S. believes that the Chinese people will recognize that failure to conclude such an arrangement can only further the schemes of Russian imperialism which seeks to create a new colonialism in Asia and to involve the Chinese people in war as a means of furthering its aim of dominating China and of furthering its expansionist designs in other areas.

d. This Government therefore advocates that the primary objective of the U.N. forces in Korea should be the restoration of the situation existing prior to the North Korean attack on June 25 under conditions which will protect the Republic of Korea against renewed attacks south of the 38th parallel and will lay the foundations for a peaceful unification of Korea by political means.

e. Obviously, so long as North Korea continues to be used as a base for aggression against the Republic of Korea military action against North Korea required by this situation must be continued.

795.00/2–2351

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 23, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There are attached five copies of a draft memorandum for the President on the subject of the 38th parallel. I should appreciate the views of the Department of Defense before the memorandum is forwarded to the White House. You will notice that the first recommendation is that the memorandum itself be furnished by the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a policy basis for a military directive to General MacArthur.

The Department of Defense may wish to suggest changes in those sections of the memorandum relating to military matters or it may wish to suggest that a military annex be appended to the memorandum itself.

Assistant Secretary Rusk will be available at any time to discuss the memorandum with representatives of the Department of Defense. I believe that the matter is of some urgency and would greatly appreciate your views as soon as practicable.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure]

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: THE 38TH PARALLEL

1. There is urgent need for a preliminary determination of the action to be taken by United Nations forces with respect to the 38th parallel. General MacArthur needs more precise instructions on the matter than he now has. Other governments with troops in Korea are insisting upon full consultation before any decision is made to move substantial forces across the parallel.

United Nations and United States Objectives

2. It is the political objective of the United Nations and of the United States to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. This has been a United States objective since the Cairo Declaration and has been accepted repeatedly by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. The October 7, 1950 resolution of the General Assembly (Tab A)[1] is the latest statement of this objective.

3. The essential objective of United Nations military action in Korea is to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. This is set forth in the June 27, 1950 resolution of the Security Council (Tab B).[2] The United Nations could not accept a result which leaves the aggressor in possession of his loot; hence, it could not accept anything less than a restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950, except as a matter of

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 904.

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, p. 211.

military necessity. On the other hand, success in repelling the aggression across the 38th parallel would constitute a major victory for United Nations forces since it would involve the denial to the massed hordes of the enemy their main objective.

4. Neither the United Nations nor the United States has undertaken an obligation to use whatever force is necessary to achieve the unity of all Korea by military means. The October 7, 1950 resolution of the General Assembly is permissive but not mandatory on this point. Our principal allies and the great majority of governments having troops in Korea would not support the unification of Korea as a *war aim*, although they continue to support it as a *political objective.* A decision to press for the unification of Korea by military action would constitute a vast increase in our present military commitments, would almost certainly require the extension of hostilities against China, would greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet participation, and would require a major political effort to obtain the agreement of other directly interested governments.

Enemy Intentions

5. There is no evidence that the Moscow–Peiping axis has changed its publicly announced intention to drive United Nations forces from all of Korea. There continues to be substantial evidence of a reinforcement and supply effort on the part of the enemy to support major military operations in Korea. In his recent *Pravda* interview, Stalin said, "If Britain and the United States reject finally the proposals made by the People's Government of China, the war in Korea can only end in a defeat of the interventionists."

6. If the enemy persists in his effort to drive United Nations forces from Korea, no early end of the fighting is in sight. The enemy must now decide, however, between a major reinforcement of his effort in Korea or a suspension or abandonment of his purpose to seize all of Korea. If enemy losses and the prospect of even heavier costs in personnel and matériel cause a reconsideration of the situation in Moscow and Peiping, they may reach the conclusion that a restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950 should be accepted. This would not mean that their purpose of producing an all-Communist Korea would be abandoned, but it might be pursued by other means. Further, it can be expected that the Moscow–Peiping axis would attempt to extort a price for the restoration of the *status quo*, such as concessions on Formosa and admission to the United Nations. These we could not accept, since to do so would reward aggression and vitiate the sacrifice already made to repel it.

The Military Situation

7. United Nations forces would require heavy reinforcement to undertake large-scale operations into North Korea. These reinforcements are not readily available from the United States or elsewhere and, even if they were available, there would be grave problems involved in committing them to Korea in face of the present worldwide threat posed by the Soviet Union. If this additional United Nations effort were attempted, the Moscow–Peiping axis has comparatively unlimited reserves which could be committed to Korea to prevent a complete United Nations success. The enemy's ability to maintain larger forces and to oppose United Nations advances would sharply increase as the battle moved northward. If the United Nations problem is to force a change in the enemy's policy by inflicting maximum punishment upon him with minimum cost to United Nations forces, a battle of maneuver in the general vicinity of the present positions would seem to be more advantageous to the United Nations than would operations substantially to the north.

International Opinion

8. Virtually all members of the United Nations, including the great majority of those actively participating in the military operations in Korea, are strongly opposed to any general advance across the 38th parallel. This opinion is largely based upon (*a*) the view that by driving the enemy back across the 38th parallel the primary objective of repelling the aggression would have been accomplished, and (*b*) the view that an advance into North Korea would (1) make an early settlement of the Korean issue impossible because the enemy would not accept anything less than the 38th parallel, (2) greatly increase the pressure to extend the hostilities to China, (3) involve United States military resources on an increasing scale to an indecisive operation in Asia, and (4) greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement in Korea and the consequent risk of general war. A major advance across the 38th parallel would require full consultation with our principal allies, and their agreement would under present circumstances, be extremely difficult to obtain. Unilateral action by the United States as the Unified Command would create a severe crisis within the free world and could lead to the withdrawal of certain allied forces from the Korean campaign.

Summary of Factors Operating Against a General Advance Across the 38th Parallel

9. The principal factors militating against a general advance across the 38th parallel are: (*a*) the capability of the Moscow–Peiping axis to inflict a decisive defeat upon United Nations forces if they

make the decision to do so, (*b*) the risk of extending the Korean conflict to other areas and even into general war at a time when we are not ready to risk general war, (*c*) the heavy additional drain on American manpower and resources without a clearly seen outcome of the effort, (*d*) loss of unity among our allies and in the United Nations in support of the Korean effort, and (*e*) the diversion of additional United States effort from other vital requirements.

The 38th Parallel as a Safe Haven

10. It would be disastrous for United Nations forces if Korea north of the 38th parallel should become a safe haven for enemy forces. The Unified Command must be free to continue maximum air and naval action against North Korea and to take such action on the ground as is required to keep the enemy off balance, interrupt or prevent enemy offensives against United Nations forces and, if opportunity offers, to inflict punishment on the enemy without serious loss to our own forces. The 38th parallel should not become a barrier to the conduct of aggressive defensive operations which have characterized United Nations action in recent weeks.

Factors Favoring a General Advance Across the 38th Parallel

11. If a general advance across the 38th parallel were within our military capabilities and could be accomplished without heavy loss to United Nations forces, such an advance would (*a*) greatly increase the cost of aggression to the Moscow–Peiping axis, (*b*) explode the myth of Chinese military power, (*c*) render less likely Chinese adventures in other areas, and (*d*) produce strains within the Peiping regime and between Peiping and Moscow.

An Agreed Settlement

12. This memorandum is based upon the absence of an agreed settlement of the Korean affair as a result of negotiation or the work of the United Nations Good Offices Committee. It is considered important that our military action be consistent with the steps we should take in the absence of agreement but, to the extent possible, be such as to (*a*) produce a desire for settlement on the part of the enemy and (*b*) create a situation in which a settlement could in fact be reached. The Department of State is preparing a separate memorandum on the question of a possible agreed settlement of the Korean situation and related problems.[3]

Conclusion

13. On balance, it would be undesirable for United Nations forces to attempt a general advance north of the general vicinity of the 38th parallel.

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[3] See the memorandum by Robert W. Tufts, *supra*.

Recommendation

14. It is recommended:

a. that this memorandum be furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a policy basis for the preparation of a draft directive to General MacArthur for the consideration of the President;

b. that the Department of State, upon the approval by the President of a directive to General MacArthur, discuss the matter with other governments having troops in Korea;

c. that the Departments of State and Defense keep the situation under constant review and advise the President in the event of any significant change in the political or military considerations affecting this position.

795.5/2-2351

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 23, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department has considered the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the possibility of additional ground forces from United Nations member states for service in Korea, as transmitted in your letter of January 30, 1951. Informal discussions between officers of our two Departments have been held on this subject and I am writing you now to apprise you of the prospects.

The United States is approaching the governments of Australia and New Zealand with a view to securing the dispatch to Korea of an additional battalion by each country. Similarly, the Department will approach the government of Canada with a view to its increasing its ground contingent in Korea to the size originally contemplated.

Discussions will be held in the near future with the governments of Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Chile and Peru for the purpose of attempting to persuade those governments to provide units of a size to conform with the criteria laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department believes that it would be unwise at this time to press either the Turks or the Greeks for additional forces, but advantage will be taken of any opportunity to encourage a voluntary offer on their part. In connection with the Greeks, who originally offered a brigade, the Department has sent a telegram to the Embassy in Athens with a view to ascertaining the feasibility of raising the Greek contribution from the present battalion to a full brigade.

It is intended that current talks at the technical military level with the Uruguayans, Ethiopians and Cubans will proceed, with a view to placing these units in the field in accordance with the offers made by those governments and already accepted by the Unified Command.

A review has been made of all other possible contributors, exclusive of those specifically eliminated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the conclusion has been reached that for the foreseeable future there are no worthwhile prospects except those discussed above.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

795.00/2-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, February 23, 1951—7 p. m.

4595. Australian High Commissioner has informed Foreign Office of receipt of message from Australian Ambassador Washington reporting conversation with Secretary Rusk in which latter was quoted as stating he foresees two alternatives for Korea: (*a*) Unification by agreement which would probably lead to eventual seizure of power by Commies throughout Korea or (*b*) Reversion to *status quo ante* June 25. Of these two alternatives, Rusk said to have indicated preference for (*b*).

In Foreign Office thinking alternative (*a*) would be preferable as honorable settlement if it could be acccomplished without military defeat. In long term, UK feels effect in Korea would be the same, as reversion to *status quo* would merely reopen ROK to Communist penetration. Foreign Office inquires informally whether views expressed by Rusk, as reported by Australian Ambassador, represent official US views or, as more likely, Rusk's informal thinking.

GIFFORD

795.00/2-2451

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET PUSAN, February 24, 1951.

DEAR ARTHUR: Although the subject may be "academic", I thought you might be interested in an indication as to how the delegates to the United Nations Commission feel about the 38th Parallel.

The Netherlands and Pakistani delegates have never raised this question with me. I understand, however, that both feel we should not carry the offensive across the parallel.

The Turkish delegate and Filipino alternate have taken no position.

In fact, Bueno is so devoted to his extra-curricular activities he has probably given the matter no thought whatsoever.

The Australian, Thai and Chilean delegates take the stand that the 38th Parallel should be ignored. This does not mean that they think UN forces must plow through to the Yalu and Tuman Rivers. It means, however, that for psychological, political and international purposes it would be better to have any temporary lull or arrangement not based on the 38th Parallel. The Koreans have developed a real national psychosis on the question of the 38th. A line of demarcation even partly this side and partly the other side of the parallel would be not quite so difficult to sell to the Koreans.

The Principal Secretary has told me he considers it would be a real diplomatic and political blunder to reestablish in any way, shape or form the 38th Parallel.

I feel now as I did early in February [1] in my reply to Dean Rusk that the best we can hope for at this time is to move militarily to the most favorable defensive terrain somewhere between Seoul and Pyongyang which at the same time would give us the most extended enemy supply line possible. We should be able to hold such a line with a considerably reduced UN force by bolstering Korean force.

The Koreans, as must be expected, will all hold out for complete unification. The more rabid—including President Rhee—would never publicly acquiesce to drawing a line anywhere except on the old border at the Yalu. They would undoubtedly scream and joust against any limiting arrangement, even though it were clearly evident that the settlement had been forced by the international situation. With this irreconcilable group, it would be difficult enough to maintain internal order and stability should any line of demarcation be forced. It would be impossible to keep them under control were that line set at the 38th.

Sincerely yours, JOHN

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[1] See telegram 741, February 12, from Pusan, p. 168.

795.00/2-2351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1951—8 p. m.

3955. Reurtel 4595 Feb 23 conversation Rusk and Austral Amb followed lines Depcirtel 487 Feb 18 [1] and statement alternatives attributed Rusk distortion conversation. Amb inquired whether US wld prefer attempt at polit solution for all Korea which wld run risk ending in ultimate Communization entire country or whether we wld prefer restoration *status quo* which might insure at least South Korea remaining non-Commie. Rusk replied risk always present Korea but we wld not wish abandon our basic objectives for unification Korea and estab democratic Govt. When Amb in pursuing hypothetical point narrowed choice to non-Commie South Korea or a Communized unified Korea, Rusk agreed we wld certainly prefer former.

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[1] Not printed; it was based upon and transmitted the information contained in telegram 719, February 17, to New York, p. 178.

WEBB

357.AK/2–2851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, February 28, 1951—7 : 05 p. m.

1211. Re GOC and CAM—From Ross. I lunched with Padilla Nervo today on his invitation. He discussed relations GOC with CAM along following lines:

1. He said at first meeting of two groups last week he had taken line with Sarper[1] that CAM should not meet again until GOC had given either positive or negative report to CAM Bureau. He said at meeting with Sarper yesterday discussion on this point had continued. Arguments presented by him, and he said agreed to by Entezam and Grafstrom, are outlined below. He said at yesterday's meeting Sarper had insisted on necessity CAM meeting without reasonable delay, but that at present he would be willing postpone calling of meeting if he could explain to press that he was doing so at express request for delay by GOC. Padilla said he had expressed view this was quite agreeable to him but he objected to statements to press which would merely agitate press and in turn possibly develop Congressional opinion adverse to orderly conduct of business. He said he expressed view that press agitation and Congressional opinion might in effect unduly influence US decisions. In any event Padilla said he had indicated that he felt two groups might follow US lead since USG in best position to judge what should be done and when. Arguments Padilla said he had advanced in discussion with Sarper along following lines:

2. With regard to further military sanctions Padilla said he felt there was no occasion for consideration by CAM since under existing

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[1] Selim Sarper, Turkish Representative on the Additional Measures Committee.

authority unified command quite free to solicit additional forces, et cetera.

3. With regard to diplomatic and political sanctions Padilla cited, for example, possibility of recommendation that governments which had not yet recognized Chinese Communist regime should continue to refrain from doing so. He expressed two objections to such consideration as follows:

(*a*) With regard to general run of Latinos in particular he said Latino governments would become involved in difficulties flowing from principle that recognition was matter involving national sovereignty; they would inevitably, he felt, link question of recognition Chinese Communists in principle with problems presented by UN action during past three or four years re Franco.

(*b*) Such recommendation by GA would have adverse effect on Chinese Communist desire for peaceful settlement since in light of fact UN dealing with Franco question had taken three or four years Chinese Communists would estimate their own problem would take as long and there would be no incentive in this field for them to seek peaceful settlement.

4. With regard to economic sanctions Padilla felt we would have considerable difficulty again on grounds of national prestige and sovereignty. In this connection, he referred to statement he said had been made by USG few days ago against export of raw materials, et cetera, to countries engaged in military action against UN forces. In reaction to this statement he said President Videla of Chile had issued statement February 26 indicating that this was matter for individual governments to decide for themselves and that so far as copper, for example, is concerned, Chile would export copper to highest bidder. Padilla attached great significance to this statement since he said Chile in matters concerning Communist aggression was, of course, more Papist than the Pope. In same connection Padilla referred to an item on agenda for March 26 meeting of American Republics' FonMins concerning production and consumption of primary materials which he said would cause US considerable difficulty.

5. Interspersed with foregoing were number comments concerning necessity proceeding in any further measures against Chinese Communists with maximum degree of unity and harmony in UN. He alluded in this connection and in context of remarks concerning military measures to necessity of UN approval for further measures such as bombing against China mainland. He referred also to great disadvantage confronting us if in voting on further measures in GA there were large number of abstentions. In this connection he said that we might, of course, get number of Dels vote with us but we should consider importance of getting support from the hearts of the peoples

of the countries voting with us. In same general context he indicated that if GOC failed in its efforts, way would be cleared for work of CAM.

I told Padilla that I thought I detected in his comments certain amount of defeatism re work of GOC and effort to achieve peaceful settlement of Korean affairs. At same time, I said I thought I detected certain amount of misconception concerning our own objectives and motives. I said that we were eager to achieve peaceful settlement of Korean affair and wanted to assist GOC in its efforts in every reasonable way. At same time, UN could not be sure that Chinese Communists wanted peaceful settlement. Therefore, it seemed essential as a minimum to maintain momentum of CAM. I said in our conception the two committees were not antithetical, but that their work should proceed along parallel, if not converging, lines. I said I thought the problem was delicate one of maintaining political balance between the two committees. I said that we did not want to force unduly the pace of CAM either as to substance or as to timing. On other hand there was considerable body of public opinion in US which wanted to see quite extreme measures taken against Chinese Communists. In face of this opinion, I expressed view that CAM would not remain idle for indefinite period. In any event I made clear my view that decision as to timing was not for us to make but to be arrived at on basis consultation with principally interested Dels.

So far as question of diplomatic sanctions was concerned, I said I thought analogy he drew between Chinese Communists and Franco was not a valid one, since Franco had not been engaged in aggression against UN while Chinese Communists clearly were as GA had found.

With regard to economic sanctions, I said at present we did not contemplate that CAM should necessarily get involved in specifications and details, particularly with regard to specific commodities.

On other hand, I said I saw no reason why if CAM should meet on Monday or Tuesday of next week [2] to consider plan of work presented by Bureau this would cut across bows of GOC.

Padilla said that he thought it was significant that no reply had yet been received from Chinese Communists to Entezam's overture of more than week ago. Assuming that Chinese Communists were concerting their policy with Russians Padilla said he thought there were only three alternative explanations for this delay as follows:

(*a*) Mao had been consulting with the Soviets but they had been unable to reach agreement on reply that should be made.

(*b*) Russians were following line with Chinese Communists that

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[2] March 5–6. For documentation on the work of the Committee on Additional Measures, see pp. 1874 ff.

GOC was a blind for the work of the CAM which was aggressive in its intentions against Chinese Communists; on this theory Chinese Communists were waiting to see what CAM would do.

(*c*) Russians had persuaded Chinese Communists to hold off pending further estimate of prospects of alleviating tensions by means of CFM meeting.

I said we wanted to hold door wide open to possibility of peaceful settlement. I said if Chinese Communists wanted to walk through this door that was one thing and we could proceed from that point. On other hand, I expressed view Chinese Communists must realize that if they did not choose path of peaceful settlement additional measures to combat their aggression were inevitable. I repeated view that while keeping work of two committees in balance and without attempting to force pace of either committee I saw no reason why CAM should not meet by Monday or Tuesday next week for initial consideration of plan of work drawn up by Bureau.

Padilla expressed view that GOC must necessarily be hearing something from Chinese Communists by middle next week. He therefore felt that CAM should not meet before middle or end next week.

Padilla said that he and his colleagues (Entezam and Grafstrom) had met this morning and had considered whether it would be desirable to review with us points which we would consider important in event Chinese Communists should respond favorably to Entezam's overture for discussion looking toward peaceful settlement. He said he and his colleagues agreed that such consultation with us would be desirable. If Chinese Communists' response unfavorable, nothing would be lost. On other hand, conceivably Entezam might receive favorable response from Chinese Communists at any time. It would be better, therefore, to have had consultations with us previously rather than to attempt such consultations under time pressure. I told Padilla I did not want to make any personal comment on advisability of procedure he raised, but would have to seek advice from Department. I asked him what sort of points he and his colleagues had in mind. He said they had in mind such points as (*a*) conditions we would now consider essential re cease-fire arrangements; (*b*) steps following a cease-fire; and (*c*) meeting for discussion of outstanding issues.

I told Padilla I would, of course, endeavor to let him know our views on procedure he raised soon as possible.

Padilla raised question his own situation and that of his Del and government in view fact Mexico is member CAM. He felt that he personally should not participate in work CAM since he was member GOC but should send an alternate to represent him on CAM. His

FonMin has been inclined to view that Padilla himself might appropriately represent Mexico on CAM. I questioned whether as matter of formality he might not be named as Mexico's representative on CAM together with alternate and determine in light circumstances from one meeting of CAM to another whether he would represent Mexico or send someone (probably Noriega). Padilla felt this might be reasonable compromise; on other hand he seems to have some leaning towards absenting himself from participation in CAM work in view of his membership on GOC. He asked that we let him know any views we might have on this question. [Ross.]

GROSS

895A.2614/3-151

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: Bombing of Power Plants at the Yalu River Reservoir

Participants: General Omar Bradley—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

I called General Bradley with regard to General MacArthur's request for permission to bomb the power plants at the Yalu River Reservoir.[1] I told him that the political questions which formerly applied to this problem were no longer the same since we did not consider these plants of any importance as a bargaining factor. There remained the political problem applicable to such targets as Yalu River bridges with respect to crossing the Manchurian frontier. I said that we had no particular feelings with respect to the power plants but that we wished to preserve a common front with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Bradley said that they were unenthusiastic about any change in the directive and that they were contemplating telling

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[1] The text of telegram CX-56453, February 26, from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff read as follows:

"Ref JCS msg 95949 DTG 070457Z Nov 50.

"1. CGFEAF has made an urgent rqst for permission to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex to include those plants on the Yalu River.

"2. CGFEAF considers that the destruction of these fac will hinder Communist support of the war effort, adversely affect gen morale, and reduce the surplus power aval to Manchuria.

"3. In view of the possibility that political considerations which influenced prev decisions may have changed, rqst instructions." (JCS Files)

General MacArthur that the earlier directives continue in effect. I said that we would concur with such a directive.[2]

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[2] The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 84577, March 1, read as follows:

"Reur CX 56453. In light of info contained in your C 52125 Dec 50 and continued validity of comments in JCS 95949 Nov 50, JCS do not approve request initiated by CGFEAF." (JCS Files)

Previous to this, on February 21, General MacArthur had been told that the restrictions on bombing Rashin, which had been in effect since September 1950, would not be lifted (see *Hearings*, p. 3193). The Department of State had opposed removal of these restrictions (Memorandum of the Secretary of State's Daily Staff Meeting; 795.00/2-2051).

795.00/3-151

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 1, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: After careful consideration of the State Department's draft memorandum of 23 February for the President on the 38th parallel, the Department of Defense believes that, from the military point of view, it should not be submitted to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their attached memorandum of 27 February 1951, have presented several military grounds for not favoring this approach at this time. I concur with them that there is a risk in disclosure to the enemy of a United States military decision, that freedom of action and freedom of maneuver must be maintained for U.N. ground forces, and that it is now premature, from a military point of view, to determine the action to be taken by U.N. forces with respect to the 38th parallel.

The Department of Defense agrees with the Department of State that the United States should abide by the United Nations decisions with respect to Korea. Since the U.S. position constitutes one of the major elements in U.N. decisions, the Department of Defense strongly believes that it is now urgently necessary to formulate U.S. political objectives in Korea and China, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested in paragraph 11 of their memorandum. On the basis of these objectives, the Department of Defense will recommend proper military courses of action. Therefore, it appears to me that the political and the military factors should be worked out in the forum of the National Security Council and presented to the President. From the military standpoint, such a policy should include consideration of the effective means for the psychological handling of the problem of the 38th parallel.

I am advised that U.S. policy with respect to Korea and China is now receiving consideration in the NSC Senior Staff.[1] Recommendations on this policy should be forthcoming as soon as possible. The State Department's draft memorandum for the President and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both presented a number of the political and military aspects of the Korean problem, which should be useful as a basis for developing national policy for the President's approval.

In the meantime, it might be advisable, if you agree, to inform the President, before his departure to Key West, that the Departments of State and Defense have carefully studied the problem of the 38th parallel from both the political and military points of view; that the National Security Council is urgently preparing recommendations for his approval on an integrated political and military position with respect to Korea and China; and that, from the military point of view, it appears to be premature for even a preliminary determination to be made at this time as to the action to be taken by the U.N. forces with respect to the 38th parallel. In this connection, I would particularly suggest informing the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported that—"The Commander in Chief, Far East, has indicated his intention to continue his advance to develop the enemy's main line of resistance; and, if no major enemy strength is disposed south of the 38th parallel, to make a report to this effect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting instructions before proceeding further."

If it is your decision to forward the draft memorandum to the President, I would appreciate it if you would accompany it with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2]

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

Washington, February 27, 1951.

Subject: Action to be Taken by United Nations Forces with Respect to the 38th Parallel.

1. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the draft memorandum prepared by the Department of State for the President on the subject of the 38th parallel is, from the military point of view, an un-

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[1] Reference is to the work which culminated in NSC 48/5, approved by President Truman on May 17, dealing with U.S. policy toward Asia. An extract from NSC 48/5 is printed on p. 439, but for the complete text of this paper as well as related documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 33 ff.

[2] Mr. Acheson did not forward the State Department draft memorandum of February 23 to President Truman.

sound approach to the problem of determining future *military* courses of action for United Nations forces in Korea inasmuch as this approach:

a. Would, based solely upon interim political factors, predetermine future military courses of action without consideration or determination of concurrent political courses of action in the premises;
b. Proposes future military courses of action without a review having first been made of present political objectives and of the political courses of action which the United States should adopt as a result of that review; and
c. Would, in all probability, result in disclosure to the enemy of a United States military decision.

2. It should be obvious that the current situation in Korea is such as to require an immediate review of United States political objectives for that area. Such a review should result in either reaffirmation or modification of these objectives. Thereafter it should be practicable to develop the short-range political courses of action to be adopted in furtherance of these political objectives. Once these political courses of action have been developed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff can analyze military capabilities and can recommend military courses of action to be taken in conjunction with and in furtherance of those political courses of action.

3. Two possible military problems are discussed in the draft memorandum prepared by the Department of State:

a. Unification of Korea by military means; and
b. Restoration of the *status quo ante* 25 June 1950.

In addition, the paper develops at least by implication, a third possible military problem; namely, halting the advance of the United Nations ground forces south of the general vicinity of the 38th parallel. The paper fails to indicate a political solution to any of the above military problems. In this connection, it must be recognized that to attempt to solve the political problem of Korea by military measures alone is unsound.

4. With respect to unification of Korea by military means, the statement appears in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum for the President that "It is the political objective of the United Nations and of the United States to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea." However, in paragraph 4 thereof it is stated that "Our principal allies and the great majority of governments having troops in Korea would not support the unification of Korea as a *war aim*, although they continue to support it as a *political objective*." Thereafter in the subject paper it is indicated that the risks involved in attaining our objective are grave. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff agree that there would be grave military risks in attempting the attainment of this political objective by military means alone.

5. As long as the present political objective of the United Nations and of the United States for Korea is retained, the military forces of the United Nations and of the United States should not be forbidden, for political reasons, to advance north of the 38th parallel since such a prohibition is wholly inconsistent with that objective.

6. With respect to restoration of the *status quo ante* 25 June 1950, paragraph 6 of the draft memorandum indicates that such a restoration is unacceptable politically because of the concessions which the Moscow-Peiping axis would attempt to extort. The 38th parallel is of no military significance whatsoever insofar as military operations are concerned. Restoration of the above *status quo*, however, would permit the Communists to build up north of the 38th parallel, either overtly, or covertly, such a concentration of military forces as to jeopardize the safety of present or contemplated United States and United Nations forces in South Korea. Accordingly, in addition to the fact that restoration of the *status quo ante* 25 June 1950 may be considered unacceptable from the political point of view, it is wholly unacceptable militarily in view of the military risk involved.

7. A United Nations prohibition against a general advance north of the general vicinity of the 38th parallel would not impose a comparable restriction on the Communist forces. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that, based on their military experience, it would be impracticable to undertake aggressive defensive operations which would keep a numerically superior enemy off balance and to interrupt or prevent enemy offensives against United Nations forces unless the 38th parallel as such is disregarded as a *military* feature by the ground as well as the air and naval elements of the United Nations command. In any event, such a prohibition would definitely limit and restrict the freedom of action and the freedom of maneuver which the United Nations ground forces *must* have if for no other reason than for their own security.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with the view of the Department of State that the United States should strive for a settlement of the Korean question by political action rather than by placing dependence primarily on military action. If, however, the Korean question cannot be settled by political action, then the political measures adopted should advance rather than jeopardize the security of the United Nations military forces in Korea.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it premature for even a preliminary determination to be made at this time as to the action to be

taken by the United Nations forces with respect to the 38th parallel. The Commander in Chief, Far East, has indicated his intention to continue his advance to develop the enemy's main line of resistance; and, if no major enemy strength is disposed south of the 38th parallel, to make a report to this effect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting instructions before proceeding further. Until this determination has been made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a decision to cross the 38th parallel or one to halt south of that line would be unsound, from the military point of view.

10. Any decision not to cross the 38th parallel, which is taken on the political level in consultation with other United Nations members, would inevitably result in disclosure to the enemy of this decision. Such a disclosure would permit the enemy to select his course of action based upon the known intentions of the United Nations ground forces and thus could jeopardize the military position of the United Nations in Korea.

11. In view of all of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the present military courses of action in Korea be continued at least until:

a. The Department of State, after due consideration of public opinion both national and international, has formulated and transmitted to the Department of Defense the political courses of action the Department of State recommends for furthering the United States political objectives in Korea and China;

b. Based upon these political courses of action, the Department of Defense has formulated, in the light of the global situation and United States military commitments, future military courses of action with respect to Korea; and

c. These political and military courses of action have been integrated into a governmental decision as to our future politico-military policy toward Korea.

12. Until this governmental decision is reached there should be no change in that part of the directive to General MacArthur which now permits him so to dispose his forces either north or south of the 38th parallel as best to provide for their security.

13. In light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the Draft Memorandum on the subject of the 38th parallel, prepared by the Department of State, not be submitted to the President; but instead that the Department of State be urged to initiate action in accordance with paragraph 11 above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

357.AK/3-251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 2, 1951—7 p. m.

753. Urtel 1211 Feb 28. Dept agrees with position you took with Padilla re relationship GOC and CAM. As you suggested, there is no reason why CAM shld not meet Monday or Tues. to deal with plan of work. US anxious however to cooperate in every way and if GOC wld prefer CAM postpone mtg until Wed., US will go along if other Dels willing. It shld be understood however that mtg shld be held Wed. even if GOC has not had reply from Peiping by then, since in our view holding CAM mtg cld in no way interfere with GOC operations.

Whether Padilla shld represent Mex in CAM is of course a matter for him or his Govt to decide. Dept sees no impropriety in Padilla serving both GOC and CAM particularly since he serves in personal capacity on GOC, and as Mex Rep on CAM. However, if Padilla believes his effectiveness on GOC might be compromised, he cld send an alternate to CAM.

Dept of course interested in Padilla's views re additional measures against Chi and concurs your comments in response.

Dept's view re consultations with GOC follow in separate tel.[1]

WEBB

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[1] See telegram 762, March 5, to New York, p. 209.

357.AK/3-551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 5, 1951—12 : 37 p. m.

1226. Re GOC; POC; 38th parallel crossing in Korea. I called upon Grafstrom, at my suggestion, to explore present attitude of GOC. I told him of the conversation between Ross and Padilla Nervo (re ourtel No. 1211, February 28). Grafstrom said that although Padilla Nervo had not discussed with him the matter of a meeting with US, Grafstrom felt it might be helpful. Grafstrom made it clear that he himself would be glad to have such a talk, but he did not wish Padilla Nervo to be regarded as an intermediary for GOC. On the contrary, Grafstrom left me with the distinct impression that inasmuch as Entezam was dealing with Peiping through the Swedish Government, Grafstrom himself would be the most appropriate person for discussions with US. He repeated what he had said, several times before that the attitude of the US was decisive so far as the UN was concerned. He said that when he made this comment to Jebb several days ago, the latter had concurred. Grafstrom, therefore, considered it essential for GOC to be apprised at all times of our thinking. According to Grafstrom, GOC thinking is that if Chinese Communists indicate willingness to meet, GOC might fix a preliminary agenda, first item of which would be a "provisional cease-fire". When pressed on this, Grafstrom commented that GOC hoped that if Chinese Communists came to a conference, attended by US and "other states to be determined", the first order of business would be an agreement to cease hostilities and to enter into discussions at once looking toward agreement as to conditions on which a permanent cease-fire would be arranged.

Subsequently on March 5, a.m., Grafstrom advised me that GOC members had concluded it would be desirable to meet with US (Entezam would not take part) and I agreed to meet with Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom on Tuesday, March 6 at 10:30 a.m. Urgent instructions or guidance from Department concerning approach to GOC and points to be made would be greatly appreciated, particularly concerning GOC ideas re "tentative agenda" and provisional cease-fire.

With regard to general efforts of GOC to make contact with Peiping, Grafstrom found some significance in failure of Chinese Communists to reply to Entezam note delivered through Swedish Ambassador at Peiping. He recounted chronology of GOC efforts as follows: Entezam note was handed by Swedish Foreign Office to Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm on February 14. On February 15, Swedish Ambassador at Peiping handed identical message to Chinese Foreign Office. On February 21, Grafstrom suggested to his government that Peiping might be jogged through approach to Peiping Foreign Office by Swedish Ambassador at Peiping. On February 26, Swedish Ambassador reported he had conveyed message to Peiping Foreign Office, and received a non-commital reply which led to report to his government that matter did not seem to be "hopeless". On February 27, Grafstrom again wired Stockholm suggesting another approach, this time to the Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm. Latter was requested for information as to when an answer to Entezam's message might be expected. Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm agreed to request advice from Peiping but made no other comment.

Grafstrom is of opinion that Peiping's delay in answering should be regarded as indicating a division of opinion within Chinese Communist Government. In answer to a question, Grafstrom admitted this was purely personal conjecture on his part.

POC.

[Here follows the portion of the telegram dealing with the Peace Observation Commission; for documentation on this body, see volume I, pages 616 ff.]

Korea.

Grafstrom said he had been kept informed concerning Department's thinking re 38th parallel as discussed in Washington with Swedish Ambassador. Grafstrom expressed personal view that question of crossing 38th parallel was now a "military rather than a political question". He himself felt if UC believed it militarily advantageous to pursue enemy forces across 38th parallel, it should be free to do so. His reasoning was that earlier fear that carrying offensive to North Korea might bring Chinese Communists into action, was no longer applicable in view of Peiping intervention in Korea. At the same time, as member of GOC, he felt bound to point out that current efforts to establish contact with Peiping might be effected [*affected?*] by a mass ground offensive across 38th parallel. He understood question was premature at present time.

GROSS

320.2/3-551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 5, 1951—7 p. m.

762. Urtel 1226, March 5. Re ur conversation with Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom you may convey to him fol as representing present US views re peaceful settlement in Korea while making clear this does not necessarily represent formal US Govt position.

(1) US of course desires an end to hostilities in Korea in accordance with UN principles. For its part, US believes any cease-fire must be based on technical conditions outlined original Cease-Fire Comite and set forth its report Jan 3. US sees grave dangers in a provisional suspension of hostilities which does not comply with these conditions and which might not lead to permanent cease-fire on such conditions. If any indication is given GOC that Chi Commie authorities are interested in a permanent cease-fire, US Govt wld be glad to take matter under consideration.

(2) If cease-fire along above lines is put into effect there shld be discussion in appropriate forum of arrangements for settlement of

Korean question in accordance with UN principles. US wld not oppose participation by Peiping.

(3) If asked about discussion of other FE questions, you shld indicate US always prepared discuss any outstanding questions with interested parties. US prepared, therefore, participate in discussions FE questions after cease-fire in effect. We may indeed wish ourselves suggest number of items for discussion. In agreeing such discussions, US in no way commits itself as to substance of any item to be discussed. US will not oppose participation by Peiping and Sov Union on questions in which they have an interest, but US cannot agree to any artificial formula for determining who is to participate in mtg, and will consider that any govt with legitimate interest in a question shld be allowed participate in discussion that question.

You shld also point out to GOC that US position as outlined above has in past been misinterpreted to mean US prepared make concessions re certain questions, notably Formosa and Chi representation, in exchange for peaceful settlement in Korea. This is false picture of US position which shld not be perpetuated or relied upon. US has stated in past that it considers that settlement of Korea question must be on its own merits and in accordance with UN principles and is in no way related to or dependent upon particular solution any other FE question. We have also stated clearly that US opposes any concession which amounts to submitting to blackmail or rewarding aggressor. In any discussions of other FE problems, US will take a position on intrinsic merits of particular question in light of all circumstances, but in no sense can there be any "deal" in exchange for a Korean settlement.

(4) If questioned as to US attitude re "Five Principles" approved Political Comite Jan 13 you shld indicate that you have no instructions and will have to refer matter to Dept.

(5) We see no reason to view delay in Peiping reply GOC other than as stalling or delaying tactic while preparations pushed for new major military offensive which may be launched at any time and see no political significance in Peiping failure to reply.

(6) FYI Dept does not object occasional informal and off-record talks with members of GOC but does not wish to have mtgs between USUN and GOC.

Public comment and speculation re such mtgs wld be disadvantageous both to GOC and to US.

WEBB

795.00/3-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Barbour and Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Taymans, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands —Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Ambassador Jooste
United States —FE—Mr. Rusk
UNA—Mr. Sandifer
BNA—Mr. Raynor
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Henkin
FE—Mr. Hackler
FE—Mr. Barbour
Major Converse—Army
Captain Maertens—Army

Major Converse stated that there had been recent confirmation from a number of sources of the movement of large bodies of Chinese and North Korean troops from the Manchurian border southwards. In the center of the peninsula north of the 38th parallel the build-up of reserves and the concentration of supplies was being continued, which led to the conclusion that the enemy had freedom of action to reinforce his defense or to launch a counteroffensive. New figures available on enemy strength showed that there were an estimated 73,000 North Korean and 160,000 Chinese Communist troops in action, with an additional 201,000 North Korean and 146,000 Chinese Communist forces capable of intervention. These figures represented a total increase of 73,000 over the figures given last week. The number of guerrillas south of UN forces was estimated to be 28,000. The North Korean VI Corps was now reported south of the Yalu River for the first time. There was no indication whether the reconstituted North Korean army units were equipped with Russian weapons.

Captain Maertens, reviewing UN operations, reported that the past four days had been relatively quiet. In the western sectors there had been patrol actions with few enemy contacts; heavy enemy opposition in the center of the peninsula had slowed friendly advances; and in the east coast area there were continuing slight gains, although one strong enemy attack had forced a South Korean unit to withdraw and regroup. He pointed out that although there had been instances of considerable advances against light opposition, UN units were not following through in any sort of breakthrough since they were trying to maintain a strong line across the peninsula, and great advances by any one unit would weaken this position. It was reported that the Philippine, Greek, and French battalions had been in action during this period as well as had the British Commonwealth Brigade. Air activity was at a maximum during the period with airdrops continuing to supplement the curtailed ground transportation facilities.

Mr. Rusk, reviewing political aspects of the present situation, stated that, on the basis of information available to us, we accepted the fact of a large enemy build-up in the battle area and just north of the 38th parallel, and we believed that the enemy was in a position to launch a counteroffensive if he so desired. On the political side we expected an additional enemy offensive, and we should not be unduly optimistic as to the outcome of such action even though the enemy has been hurt and General Ridgway's forces are now in good position. Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Ridgway's lines are relatively thin, and he did not have massive reserves such as were available to the enemy. Although we were not overly anxious about the situation, which General Ridgway had under control at the moment, Mr. Rusk said we did not consider that events of the past five or six weeks could be considered to set a pattern of anticipated results should the Communists launch another full offensive.

Mr. Rusk said that the United States had received no information that there had been any change in the attitude of those in power in Peking regarding the Korean military situation, the possibility of a cease-fire, or their original intent to drive UN forces into the sea. He said that he would be very glad to receive from any of the representatives present additional information on these points which they might have received. On the basis of our present understanding, it appeared to us that the build-up of very large enemy forces, our own relatively unfavorable military position, and the absence of any changes of attitude on the other side added up to sufficient reason for expecting the enemy to attempt another large offensive before being willing to consider a change of policy.

Mr. Rusk added that the United States was getting replacements in to our units to build them up to full strength. He reminded the members of the group that it was very important that their forces in Korea be kept up to strength and that replacement plans be formulated, if this had not already been done.

In response to a question by Ambassador Politis, Mr. Rusk indicated that the United States was not involved in the operations of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations which, in our opinion, should have complete freedom of action and that we had not, therefore, received information of any recent activity. Although we had heard that the Committee had communicated with the Chinese Communist authorities, we had had no word of the results, if any.

357.AK/3-651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, March 6, 1951—7 : 30 p. m.

1236. Review of activity of GOC. Ross and I called on Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo this morning at Swedish Del headquarters and arranged yesterday (mytel 1226, March 5).

Grafstrom opened discussion by reviewing activity of GOC to date as follows:

On February 14 Entezam in his capacity as President of GA sent telegram through Swedish channels as follows to Chinese Communists:

(1) Message assumed Chinese Communists desire find peaceful settlement Korean issue.
(2) Stated view that peaceful settlement could not be achieved through exchange telegrams and public discussion in committees.
(3) Personal contact was necessary.
(4) Reference was made to GOC as a team, but it was stated that Chinese Communists were not being asked to recognize legitimacy of GOC or deal with GOC as such.
(5) Message questioned which of following methods would be acceptable to Chinese Communists:

(*a*) Designate representative to meet with Entezam in NY.
(*b*) Designate representative to meet Entezam at some place outside of China or US.
(*c*) Receive someone designated by Entezam in Peiping.

This message was communicated to Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm on February 15. He indicated not much chance favorable response in view of well known views expressed by Chou En Lai, etc.

On February 17 message was delivered by Swedish Ambassador Peiping to Vice Commissar Foreign Affairs.

Latter had no comment, but questioned in what capacity Entezam had sent communication; Swedish Ambassador replied as President of GA.

On February 21 Entezam sent reminder in form of suggestion that Peiping answer be sent through same channel. Dispatch of this message from Stockholm was crossed by receipt on February 22 of telegram from Swedish Ambassador Peiping to effect merely that no reply had been received. On February 26 Stockholm received reply from Swedish Ambassador Peiping to message of 21st indicating that he had delivered new message to Vice Commissar on 23rd. He was unable to find out whether any reply could be expected. He got nothing except impression that question was under consideration.

On 26th Swedish FO was requested inform Chinese Communist Ambassador Stockholm that President of GA would like to know when a reply could be expected; this action was taken in Stockholm on 27th.

Yesterday (March 5) GOC received in NY message transmitted through Stockholm from Swedish Ambassador Peiping reporting conversation on 3rd with head Political Department. Swedish Ambassador had strong impression that no answer was to be expected. GOC decided yesterday to request Swedish FO to ask Chinese Communist Ambassador Stockholm if a reply was to be expected.

On conclusion this review of GOC activity I indicated that as matter purely of speculation Department saw no political significance in delay of Chinese Communist reply; delay might be associated with purely dilatory tactics to gain time in preparation for new offensive which conceivably might take place any time.

Grafstrom said that prospects seemed to be gloomy. He went on to say that government viewed its task as being limited to preparatory work necessary to pave way for conference on Korea and other FE problems. They had in mind preparing agenda. He likened their task to that of FonMin Deputies now meeting in Paris. He then said GOC had certain questions they wanted to put to US as follows:

(1) GOC wanted to know if we considered conditions for cease-fire were same as set forth in report of cease-fire group of January 2 (A/C.1/643). GOC assumed they were.

I confirmed this was the case. I stressed that conditions set forth were military and basic in character although points required filling in. I stressed that they were not a basis for compromise or negotiation.

(2) Grafstrom, assuming that as far as they went eight points were "water tight", asked what compromise would be acceptable to the UN (he consistently avoided confusing US and UN) between alternatives, (*a*) cease-fire first with negotiations afterwards, or (*b*) negotiations followed by cease-fire. I replied that USG had always attached greatest

importance to establishment of cease-fire prior to discussion of Korea or, thereafter, other FE questions since we felt strongly that security of UN forces could not otherwise be assured.

We then had lengthy discussion cease-fire question along following lines.

Grafstrom said GOC had in mind possibility getting together with Chinese Communists to discuss agenda for possible conference. At end of such discussion GOC had in mind possibility of proposing provisional cease-fire. If Chinese Communists agreed process of peaceful settlement could get under way.

I pointed out and reiterated that USG saw gravest dangers in any provisional cease-fire in nature of mere lull in hostilities without adequate safeguards for security of UN forces such as, for example, provision of supervisory machinery as provided for in fourth cease-fire point. An arrangement which required, for example, suspension of US air activity behind Chinese Communist lines only to permit them to develop supplies and bring up forces could not be considered satisfactory. I pointed out with reference to phrase "lull in hostilities" in point two of the five principles contained in supplementary report of cease-fire group (A/C.1/645) that we had repeatedly made clear to Pearson that we did not interpret this phrase as meaning a provisional cease-fire except on basis of acceptance of conditions Crittenberger and I had previously given cease-fire group.[1]

Grafstrom asked whether my compromise on principle that cease-fire must come first before negotiations.[2] I replied in affirmative.

Grafstrom then shifting from term provisional wondered whether preliminary (or temporary) cease-fire would not necessarily be first step leading to discussion of real or permanent cease-fire! He wondered whether if Chinese Communists accepted preliminary cease-fire in this sense it would not be very difficult for them to resume fighting. I replied that in a sense eight conditions contained in January 2 report of cease-fire group were themselves temporary in that they required implementation.

Grafstrom asked what our view would be if it were possible to clarify with Chinese Communist point that there must be permanent cease-fire before discussions re Korea or other FE matters could take place. I reserved our position but said we would consider any Chinese Communist proposal.

Grafstrom said that it might be bad to work with concept of temporary cease-fire based on eight conditions, since they were quite elaborate, but he thought this was nevertheless a negotiating point.

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[1] See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1549 ff. Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger was U.S. Army Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Security Council's Military Staff Committee.

[2] A question mark penciled in the margin of the source text indicated that presumably something is missing or garbled in this sentence.

I reminded Grafstrom that the eighth of these points established permanent character of cease-fire since it required approval of cease-fire arrangements by GA, which arrangements would continue in effect until superseded by UN.

Grafstrom then moved on to question that if permanent cease-fire were achieved and followed by negotiations on other matters, what would be the position if such negotiations failed. I indicated view that onus would then be on the party, if any, reopening hostilities. I pointed out this was basic to our concern about Chinese Communist talk of temporary cease-fire which inevitably, it seemed to us, tied the cease-fire to their political objectives. I questioned whether Chinese Communists did not have in mind in their concept of temporary cease-fire one that could be repudiated by them with impunity. Grafstrom indicated acceptance in principle of view that it was essential before any negotiations could start that cease-fire be effectuated. I referred in this connection to point one of five principles of January 11. Grafstrom wondered whether it was possible to think of any modification of approach in event Chinese Communists would not accept cease-fire first.

Padilla intervened at this point to assume, first, establishment of permanent cease-fire followed then by discussions on Korea, such discussions resulting in failure in sense that UN objectives concerning unification, etc., could not be achieved. He questioned in this event how permanent would cease-fire be. He explained his question as follows. If objective of unified Korea could not be achieved by negotiation following cease-fire and assuming Chinese Communists wanted cease-fire to continue, Chinese Communists would remain in North Korea and Korea would remain divided. What then, he asked, would be position of UN? He said it never had been a UN position that its objectives in Korea should be achieved by force of arms. In circumstances he envisaged would UN then feel it necessary to attempt to unify Korea by force? I replied that Padilla's questions imposed a dilemma but expressed view that UN forces would not be free under a permanent cease-fire to attempt to unify Korea by force. I said I felt there was no commitment or duty requiring such an attempt by UN. I said I felt neither side would be free to breach a permanent cease-fire.

Padilla pursued this line somewhat further in following sense. He said that permanent cease-fire having been achieved GA would have no choice but to approve conditions for cease-fire. Would there, however, remain in light of UN political objectives the possibility of GA attacking cease-fire if cease-fire were thwarting achievement of

UN political objectives? Conversely by accepting permanent cease-fire would UN morally and legally be tieing its hands against effort to achieve UN objectives in Korea by force? If this were case, would we not be in same position as we were before? I agreed we would be in same position politically, but said meanwhile we would have achieved objective of halting aggression in Korea, but without prejudice to achievement of UN objectives by appropriate political means.

Padilla then raised question of possibility of temporary cease-fire as first step in process of putting into effect basic conditions of permanent cease-fire as set forth in January 2 report. Conceiving these eight points as an integrated plan each of steps within this plan would require working out in detail. Grafstrom commented that in his thinking he contemplated a gap of perhaps only three or four days between a temporary cease-fire and implementation of remaining conditions for permanent cease-fire. He said he was trying to work out a political-psychological approach which would get Chinese Communists started on cease-fire path. I indicated there might conceivably be some room for such an approach; I reiterated on other hand that questions involved seemed to me primarily of military character involving security of UN forces and protection against risk of Chinese Communists building up supplies, reinforcements and like. I said assuming that agreement on all of conditions set forth for cease-fire could be achieved in principle, each step in implementation of various points would have to be taken on basis of military judgment, bearing in mind necessity of guarantees necessary to protect UN forces. I added that I thought process might be considered as one of stages rather than of differentiation between temporary and permanent cease-fire.

Padilla observed he felt all details and implementation of conditions should be worked out before an order for cessation of hostilities was given. If UN were required to order cessation of hostilities prematurely, onus would be put on UN if hostilities broke out again. Padilla felt eight conditions might be divided into categories. Certain of them must be decided once and for all before any cease-fire order were given; more time might be allowed to work others out. He referred to point seven (*c*)[3] as an example of a point that might take more time.

Padilla then went on to indicate that in his view fourth point of cease-fire conditions (supervision of cease-fire by UN commission) would be one of most difficult for Chinese Communists to accept since UN commission would be able to [go] anywhere technically in North

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[3] As set forth in U.N. document A/C.1/643, the eight conditions for the cease-fire were lettered from *a* to *h*; presumably, the word "seven" is incorrect here and reference is actually to point *c*, the third of the eight conditions.

Korea. Grafstrom observed that if it be considered the UN was one party in fighting some provision should be made for participation of other party in supervision of cease-fire. I explained that we had pointed out to cease-fire group our view that commission should be UN body, but that observer groups might well include Chinese Communist members. I agreed with Padilla that this would mean that representatives of both parties could observe implementation cease-fire on both sides cease-fire line.

Moving on from cease-fire question Grafstrom opened new subject as follows. He said chances of getting Chinese Communists accept cease-fire depended upon prospects of discussion thereafter. This involved two questions: (*a*) agenda for conference, and (*b*) conference itself. Taking last question first, the question of composition arose. He queried concerning seven-power group. I responded that it seemed to us forum and participants should be related to problems and not considered on artificial basis. We considered seven powers an artificial setup. I indicated that merely by way of example we would expect Indian participation if Tibet were discussed, French participation if Indochina were discussed, ROK certainly in case of Korea, nationalist China in case of Formosa; conceivably UN might be best forum for discussion Formosan question. I agreed with comment by Grafstrom to effect that if there were to be any discussions we felt arrangements should be flexible.

I took advantage of this line of questioning to clarify any misunderstanding there might be, paraphrasing in effect last part of numbered paragraph 3 of Deptel 762, March 5. I made very clear that we considered Korean question as quite separate from other FE questions.

Padilla then raised question of our attitude toward five principles of January 11. I said we were without instructions and would have to refer this question to Department. I indicated our willingness to discuss outstanding questions along lines first part of numbered paragraph 3 Deptel 762. I emphasized that question of cease-fire arrangements should not be related in our view with question of conference on political questions.

Grafstrom said he felt it would be mistake not to take five principles as basis for settlement. He said he felt that if there were a reply indicating Chinese Communists willing to establish contact GOC should in first instance deal with Chinese Communists on question of cease-fire and only thereafter on question of agenda for possible conference. He observed he felt position was very sound that cease-fire arrangements must be completed before conference.

Padilla, who seemed to share this view, raised question of situation in UN with regard to five principles. There were two possible approaches. Either five principles represented standing offer by UN as statement of UN position or alternatively they no longer had any standing since they had been rejected by Chinese Communists. He also raised question in this connection of status of GOC in relation to point five of five principles which provides that as soon as agreement is reached on cease-fire GA should set up "an appropriate body", with view to achievement of settlement of FE problems, while Feb. 1 resolution talked about achievement of UN objectives in Korea.

I reiterated that we were attached to general principle of discussion of outstanding issues (as provided indeed by charter); however, achievement of permanent cease-fire without political conditions attached was prior consideration. In other words Chinese Communists had key to their own jail in their pocket.

Our discussion terminated at this point. Grafstrom and Padilla indicated that they wished to have further discussion with us on two points: (*a*) assumption that five principles remained as basis for settlement, and (*b*) what should be done if no reply is received from Chinese Communists or if reply is a rebuff. I said we would of course report their desire for further discussion of these points to Department. I added that we were, of course, at their disposal, but we felt for obvious reasons it was most desirable to avoid any publicity or speculation. We felt, therefore, that our discussion today as well as any further discussions we might have should be considered as informal and off-the-record and of such nature that we all might readily deny there had been any consultation with GOC as such. To this Grafstrom and Padilla readily agreed.

GROSS

795.00/3-951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1951.

Subject: Limitations on counteroffensive action by UN forces in Korea

Participants: Ambassador van Roijen, the Netherlands
Mr. Rusk, Assistant Secretary—FE
Mr. Scott—WE [1]

Ambassador van Roijen called at his request to inquire about General MacArthur's recent statement regarding limitations on counteroffensive action by UN forces in Korea.[2] He said that this statement had occasioned some worry in The Hague that General MacArthur might seek the removal of the restrictions under which he currently has to operate in Korea.

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[1] Joseph W. Scott, Officer in Charge of Swiss and Benelux Affairs.

I told the Ambassador, very confidentially, that the problem was more of a public than a private one. I said that General MacArthur had not in fact requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend any changes regarding the restrictions under which he was operating. For reasons which the Ambassador would readily understand, the restrictions nevertheless did present General MacArthur with a uniquely difficult military problem and thus with a considerable public relations problem. Unlike situations with which commanders in the field are ordinarily faced, such as the attainment of specific objectives with the entire resources available to a government behind them and with access to enemy targets limited only by military exigencies, General MacArthur was faced with a situation where the precise objectives of his mission had not yet been finally determined; where he knew he could not expect further significant reinforcements, and where he was required to respect the "sanctuary" of the enemy in Manchuria. Under such circumstances it would be next to impossible in a democracy such as ours to attempt to censor General MacArthur in his quite natural determination to remind the public from time to time of the unique character of the restrictions under which he was having to operate in Korea.

On the policy side, I assured the Ambassador that our very firm policy to localize operations to Korea would not change through any action on our part. It was clearly desirable, not only from an ideal policy viewpoint but because of hard, military facts, to conduct the campaign in Korea so as to avoid the extremes either of precipitating an all-out war with China or withdrawing from the peninsula. While this was not an easy course to steer, I observed that no one would have thought it possible a year ago that as many American soldiers could be fighting Chinese soldiers as are engaged in Korea today without the US being at war with China. Possibilities existed, of course, that the Chinese Communists might themselves take some new action such as a decision to engage in air warfare on a major scale in Korea or to attack American troops in Japan, or possibly to launch an offensive against Indochina. If any of these things happened, we would of course be faced with a new situation and we would have to reconsider our present policy in the light of such a new situation.

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[2] On March 7, General MacArthur issued a statement wherein he said: "Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and matériel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves." The statement concluded with the observation that "vital decisions have yet to be made—decisions far beyond the scope of the authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor solely military, but which must provide on the highest international levels an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea." (*Hearings*, pp. 3540-3541)

In response to a question, I told the Ambassador that we did not have any direct evidence that the Chinese Communists were in fact planning any such adventures in the immediate future, but that they could not be ruled out as possibilities.

Regarding the crossing of the 38th parallel, I told the Ambassador that, for the while at any rate, this was still an academic question except for aerial and naval attacks and perhaps feints and thrusts by the ground forces. We were not in a position to launch a major offensive across the parallel at this time.

Referring to the portion of General MacArthur's statement involving decisions yet to be made on the highest international levels, I said that the GOC, according to our information, had come up with a complete blank insofar as any reaction by the Chinese Communists was concerned. Our best guess was that the Peiping authorities were waiting to see the results of their next major offensive before deciding whether to commit a heavily increased number of their forces or to have a go at negotiations for a cease-fire.

Although recognizing that the present see-saw operations in Korea present a difficult public relations problem in this country, the Ambassador appeared to be reassured regarding our basic policy toward the situation. I asked him to request The Hague to limit the dissemination of the information I had given him, emphasizing its extremely confidential character.

795.00/3-951

Memorandum by Bernard G. Bechhoefer of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1951.

Subject: 16th Report of United Nations Command [1]

In accordance with our discussions, I telephoned Colonel Hutton [2] this morning concerning the above matter and stated the Department position that the last three sentences of the draft 16th Report should be deleted. These sentences read as follows:

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[1] The draft of General MacArthur's 16th report covering the period Feb. 16–28 had been submitted but not yet cleared within the U.S. Government for publication by the United Nations.

[2] Col. Carl I. Hutton of the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

> "The question of the recrossing of the 38th parallel continues to arouse public discussion. While President Truman has indicated that the crossing of that parallel is a military matter to be resolved in accordance with my best judgment as theater commander, I want to make it quite clear that if and when the issue actually rises I shall not arbitrarily exercise that authority if cogent political reasons against crossing are then advanced and there is any reasonable possibility that a limitation is to be placed thereon. Meanwhile I repeat that at this time the question is academic."

I stated that the chief reason why the Department wished the deletion of these sentences was that the entire subject of the crossing of the 38th parallel has explosive possibilities. I pointed out that at the last meeting in the Department of State of the representatives of countries with military forces in Korea the foreign representatives spent most of their time dealing with this matter. I referred Colonel Hutton to Depcirtel 487 of February 18[3] which had been distributed in Defense and with which he was familiar.

I pointed out that the sentence in question could be construed to indicate that General MacArthur had the ultimate authority to make the political as well as the military decision. Even if General MacArthur had such authority, which has not yet been decided, it would be politically unwise to make such a suggestion at this time, especially when, as General MacArthur states, the question is academic.

Colonel Hutton pointed out that General MacArthur was voluntarily restricting his authority beyond that indicated in the Presidential statement. I agreed with Colonel Hutton that General MacArthur undoubtedly was making this statement with the best motives, but that I nevertheless felt that the General did not appreciate what the impact of his words would be.

I further suggested that this statement seemed to be in conflict at least with the spirit of the 9th and 10th paragraphs of the JCS letter on this subject[4] which stressed the necessity of giving no indication to the enemy of our plans after the 38th parallel was reached. This statement indicates that we might hesitate before we plunge. I specifically stated of course that is a military and not a political consideration and I merely wanted to bring it to Colonel Hutton's attention.

In past conversations, Colonel Hutton had indicated that it might not be too difficult to secure the deletion of these sentences. He was less reassuring in our discussion this morning. I therefore suggest that it would be advantageous for Mr. Rusk, or if he is not available, for Mr. Johnson to reinforce my suggestion at a higher level at the Pentagon. Since the suggested deletion will go out to General MacArthur on the "Telecon" this evening, it might be advantageous to telephone this afternoon.[5]

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[3] Not printed; it was based upon and transmitted the information contained in telegram 719, February 17, to New York, p. 178.

[4] See the enclosure to the letter dated March 1 from Marshall to Acheson, p. 203.

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[5] According to a memorandum of March 12 by Mr. Bechhoefer, no telephone call was felt to be necessary since the Defense Department's outgoing message to General MacArthur set forth the Department of State's position very forcefully. General MacArthur acquiesced in the requested deletions (795.00/3–1251) and the 16th report, as published on March 26, did not contain the sentences in question; the text of the report (U.N. document S/2053) is printed in *Hearings*, p. 3460.

795.00/3–1051

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, March 10, 1951.

DEAR JACK: Welcome back. Sandy,[1] if I may say so, did a magnificent job and we deeply appreciate his helpfulness and patience with us.

The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you the enclosed draft of a letter to Phil Jessup which was prepared by Trygve Lie, who handed it to me yesterday afternoon. He has not (repeat not) sent the letter and does not intend to do so, although that was his original idea. He gave the draft to me, and asked me to send it to you for a consideration of its contents rather than a request for comment as to whether he should send it to Phil, which he definitely does not intend to do.

In discussing the substance of the draft letter with me, Lie made the following additional points.

He says he has been advised by "his people" in Hong Kong and Shanghai that the Chinese Reds have made repeated unsuccessful appeals to the Soviet Government for heavy artillery and planes. He thinks there may be sufficient stress and strain between at least some elements of the Peiping regime and Moscow to justify consideration of an approach to the North Korean authorities, which is of course the central suggestion in his draft letter. Moreover, he thinks that if by any chance the Soviet Union should be looking for a way to liquidate the Korean war, which is causing a drain upon them, they might seize upon the dodge of using the North Koreans as a means for achieving a peaceful solution. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists are looking for a way out, they might seize upon this device, placing reliance upon the fiction of the Chinese "volunteers" which they could agree to withdraw on the basis that they had been advised by the North Korean authorities that their assistance was no longer required.

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[1] During Mr. Hickerson's absence, Durward V. Sandifer had been Acting Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

In fairness to Lie, I should point out that he does not place much reliance upon his suggestion. He says he realizes that it would only be a useful device in any event if the situation were ripe, that is if the Chinese Communists and/or Russia wanted to cut their losses and liquidate the affair.

He told me in confidence that on Thursday, March 8, he spent two-and-a-half hours with Entezam and Padilla Nervo. A great deal of their discussion apparently centered upon Lie's suggestion of a possible approach to the North Koreans. He said Padilla "was very interested." Entezam took the position that the resolution of February 1 did not authorize the Good Offices Committee to deal with anyone but the Peiping regime. Both Entezam and Padilla Nervo, however, suggested to Lie that he take the matter up with me.

In connection with the four points listed by Lie as a "basis of discussion", I said that it was important for Lie to remember that the Unified Command had formulated minimum conditions for a satisfactory cease-fire, and that these conditions had been reported to the Cease-Fire Group. I emphasized the dangers from the standpoint of military security in tampering with these points.

With regard to his basic suggestion of an approach to the North Koreans, I was completely non-committal, merely undertaking to transmit his draft letter to you and agreeing to discuss it further with Lie on the basis of such instructions or guidance as you saw fit to give me.

Sincerely yours, ERNIE

[Enclosure]

Draft Letter by the United Nations Secretary-General (*Lie*) *to the Ambassador at Large* (*Jessup*)

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] March 9, 1951.

DEAR PHIL: I am writing you quite informally in order to suggest to you some of my thoughts regarding the Korean war.

In December and January the United Nations forces in Korea were in retreat and the Chinese definitely had the initiative. At this time the question of the settlement in Korea became involved with the larger demands of the Chinese Communist regime regarding Formosa and representation in the United Nations. The initiative has now passed to the United Nations forces and we seem to have reached a situation of stalemate in the neighborhood of the 38th parallel. In the meantime, President Entezam and his Good Offices Committee have been unable to get any reaction from Peiping for a reopening of negotiations to end the conflict.

I have come to feel that the time is perhaps right for a new approach which would bypass Peiping and seek to bring an end to the fighting in Korea, leaving all other Far-Eastern questions for a later time. What I am now thinking about is an approach by the United Nations, either through the Good Offices Committee or otherwise, to the North Korean authorities.

If negotiations with these authorities could be started, the basis of discussion might be these four points:

(*a*) a ceasefire with a possible demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel;
(*b*) a supervised withdrawal of all non-Korean troops;
(*c*) elections for all of Korea to be held within a stipulated time period under United Nations supervision;
(*d*) access for United Nations relief personnel and supplies throughout all of Korea.[2]

I have had two experiences during December which led me to believe that there may be some chance that a direct approach to the North Koreans might hold some possibilities of success. On 14 December I spoke to Ambassador Wu and the other members of the delegation of Peiping about a United Kingdom request regarding prisoners of war held in North Korea. Ambassador Wu took the position that his Government had no responsibility for prisoners of war in North Korea and that Chinese prisoners of war in the hands of the Unified Command were the concern of the North Korean Government and not of his. He also said that he could offer no help to me in contacting the authorities of North Korea. In short, his position was that the war was the affair of the North Korean authorities and that his Government had nothing to do with it.

On 4 December I had a conversation with Mr. Siroky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia. He said that the Korea conflict could be solved by re-establishing the *status quo* of last June. More specifically he referred to the establishment of the line of demarcation at the 38th parallel, the removal of foreign troops and leaving the future of Korea to be decided by the Korean people themselves.

If these two conversations correctly reflect the attitude of the Soviet bloc, they would point in the direction of a direct approach to the North Koreans.

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[2] A typewritten marginal note on the Department of State file copy read thus: "(Following notation in ink on original) It is unlikely that all these four points will be accepted, but they are issues which have to be discussed in any negotiation".

I realize that the one disadvantage of this approach is that it would tend to confirm the *de facto* position of the North Koreans. On the other hand, it would have the advantage of removing from the Korean question the idea of a horse-trade with the Chinese over their own demands.

It can be assumed that the success of any such approach would depend very largely on whether the Peiping regime has had enough of the Korean war. I consider this a distinct possibility, if not at the moment, at any rate within the next couple of months.

The reason why I have set out these thoughts of mine at some length to you is because I think that some consideration should be given to an informal approach by you to Gromyko during your meetings in Paris.[3] He might be asked whether the Soviet Government would have any views on a settlement of the Korean conflict through negotiation between the United Nations and the North Korean authorities, and that if they did not care for this idea, what other approach they might have in mind.

I have sent copy of this letter to Jack Hickerson through Ernie Gross. I should be much interested in hearing your reaction.

Sincerely,

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[3] Ambassador Jessup was in Paris as head of the U.S. Delegation to the meetings of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union working on the preparation of an agenda for a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. The Deputies meetings lasted from March 5 to June 21. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko led the Soviet Delegation.

357.AK/3–1251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 12, 1951—7 p. m.

776. Urtel 1236, Mar 6. In further informal discussions Grafstrom and Padilla, you shld indicate Dept's views as follows:

1. 5 principles were approved by First Comite on Jan 13 as basis for peaceful settlement of Korea problem and other Far Eastern problems. In view of rejection of these principles by Peiping and of intervening circumstances, status these principles uncertain and Pol Comite may wish to re-examine them. So far as US concerned, question appears academic at present. If Peiping gave any clear indication that it is interested in settlement, US wld wish to consult other UN mem-

bers, in light of any forthcoming Peiping communications and of circumstances at that time.

2. Feb 1 res established GOC to meet "at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices" to help bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and achievement of UN objectives by peaceful means. In light of these terms of reference, GOC must itself determine whether rebuff by Peiping or other circumstances shld terminate or suspend its activities. In Dept's view, res created GOC as a continuing body to be available so long as hostilities continued, to exercise its functions at any opportunity which GOC considers "suitable". Rebuff by Peiping or failure of Comies reply to its communications might lead GOC to suspend activities for present, but GOC wld continue be available to try again at some new "suitable opportunity". At an appropriate time GOC might decide to submit a progress report to Assembly through SYG.

WEBB

795.00/3-1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, March 13, 1951—noon.

2413. Bajpai Secretary General MEA told me yesterday GOI received as yet no reply its message some weeks ago to Commie Chinese suggesting time had come to reconsider question cease-fire. He added telegram received from Radhakrishnan Indian Ambassador to USSR that during latter's recent visit London Soviet Ambassador had said that in his opinion time had come again to take up question cease-fire and calling of seven-power conference. GOI again requesting Panikkar sound out Peking and if reply seemed not too unfavorable it might through diplomatic channels again endeavor bring about cease-fire.

HENDERSON

795.00/3-1351

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 13, 1951.

DEAR ERNIE: The way you handled the conversation with Trygve Lie, as described in your letter of March 10, seems to me entirely right. I agree particularly that it would be very dangerous to tamper with the minimum conditions for a satisfactory cease-fire which you and General Crittenberger submitted to the previous cease-fire group. While these points are several months old, we would probably stick to them. That question is now being checked over at the Pentagon.

Trygve Lie's suggestion for an approach to the North Koreans is an interesting one, though I personally don't have much faith in its effectiveness to bring about peace. Of course, if Peiping wishes to act out of the war and the Soviet Union is also willing to liquidate the Korean affair, the North Korean authorities could serve as the dummy for bringing this about. I do not see much evidence, however, of a disposition by Peiping and Moscow to settle the Korean question. The two experiences in December to which Lie refers in his draft letter to Phil, took place too long ago, and, particularly in view of the intervening fighting, would not encourage me very much in the hope that Russia and Communist China are ready for peace.

Unless both Peiping and Moscow really want peace, the approach to North Korea could not result in peace. I doubt also that it would result in creating friction between Peiping and Moscow. On the other hand, it might be construed as an effort to drive a wedge between the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists and might make the work of the Good Offices Committee more difficult.

These are my own views for your information. In any conversations with Trygve Lie or the Good Offices Committee, you should indicate that if the Good Offices Committee believes it would serve a useful purpose to approach the North Korean authorities, the United States certainly would not wish to make any objection. The mandate of the Good Offices Committee, under the February 1 resolution, would seem broad enough to authorize them to approach anyone at all in the hope of bringing about a cessation of hostilities in Korea. We have repeatedly made it clear that we do not wish in any way to interfere with or inject ourselves into any efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

795.00/3–1451

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson), to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 14, 1951.

Subject: Statement on Korea by the President or Secretary.

Out of two days of attempting to defend our Far Eastern policy before a variety of groups in Providence, Rhode Island, I have gained a strong impression that the frustration with regard to the Far East is more intense now than ever. This feeling is by no means restricted to people who have been in opposition to the State Department or its Far Eastern policies. Those who approved our resistance in Korea now find the present situation completely confusing and baffling. Even when the idea of obtaining the most favorable conditions for a peaceful settlement is presented they still appear to feel that we are remiss in not taking some decisive action which would end the slaughter in Korea.

The term "Operation Killer" has had a most unfortunate effect. This slogan has stuck in the public mind as representing the objectives, nature, and meaning of the whole action in Korea. I fear that to many people Korea now means only killing, a process of killing Americans, Chinese and Koreans.

In a discussion at the "Providence Journal" which is probably one of the best newspapers on the east coast and which has supported the Department, the editor-in-chief asked bluntly: "Why hasn't the President or the Secretary made a statement on how we end the war in Korea? Why haven't the Chinese been appealed to?"

It seems to me that the time is now opportune for a brief statement by the President or the Secretary, preferably by radio, repeating once again the basic reasons for the action in Korea and expressing clearly and forcefully our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. The statement should be directed primarily to the American people but should also be designed for the Chinese. It should point out that the enormous losses which the Chinese leaders are forcing the people to suffer are deeply deplored by us and that there is an opportunity for a peaceful and honorable settlement of a war which is bringing nothing but disaster to the Chinese and is preventing them from the useful and constructive tasks in which they should be engaged.

Following and enforcing General Ridgway's statement,[1] such a pronouncement by the President or Secretary would do a great deal to dispel the misgivings and profound uneasiness which I believe are rather general in the American public. At the same time it could serve a psychological warfare purpose with regard to the Chinese and would again demonstrate to our UN allies that we earnestly desire and energetically seek a peaceful settlement.

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[1] Reference is to statement made by General Ridgway on March 12 to news correspondents to the effect that it would be a tremendous victory if the war ended with the U.N. side in control up to the 38th parallel, having thus shown its ability to defeat the Chinese Communist effort to drive the U.N. forces into the sea. (See *Hearings*, p. 454)

795.00/3-1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1951.

Subject: United States Policy Toward a Crossing of the 38th Parallel in Korea.

Participants: Mr. Pyo Wook Han—First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson—Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd—Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Han called on Mr. Rusk at his request at ten o'clock this morning. He explained the purpose of his visit was to inquire what United States policy now is toward a crossing of the 38th parallel, remarking that newspaper speculation as to the possibility that United Nations forces would be halted at the 38th parallel had greatly disturbed his Government. He explained that should the United Nations decide to halt at the parallel, a situation similar to that on June 25 would be recreated, that no future security would be possible for Korea under the circumstances, and that the Korean people would suffer a great loss in morale and might become disillusioned with the United Nations. He said that his Government held very strong views that the United Nations should continue its military operations toward the Yalu River until peace and security, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, had been established throughout Korea. Mr. Han mentioned that the ROK was also very worried over the attitude of the various members of the United Nations toward a crossing of the parallel which seemed to it to represent a change in the original interpretation placed upon the June 27 and October 7 resolutions.

Mr. Rusk replied that we did not know specifically upon what considerations such a change in attitude might be based. He pointed out that there were two basic questions which could not be determined in advance of our reaching the parallel. One of these involved the actual military situation as it would exist at that time and the other, the political conditions, specifically the Communist attitude, which might then obtain. Mr. Rusk explained that for this reason it is now not possible for the United States to reach a decision upon whether or not the parallel should be crossed. In connection with Mr. Han's reference to the United Nations resolutions on Korea establishing the objectives of restoring peace and security and unifying the country, Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States had never abandoned such objectives and was not now going to do so. However, while the June 27 and October 7 resolutions of the United Nations provided authority for the United Nations to cross the Parallel into North Korea, and were thus permissive in character, they would in no sense make it mandatory for us to do so.

Mr. Rusk stressed that the United States very clearly understood the natural attitude of the Korean Government and people in their desire that everything should be done in Korea to make it unified and free, and that this had been our consistent policy since 1943. He pointed out, however, that the single-minded pursuance of this course of action was for the Koreans a much simpler matter than it was for the United States, since the Koreans, in all frankness, were naturally concerned principally with the future of their own country, whereas the United States and the other UN nations had to take into consideration the much broader factors of their own national interest and the maintenance of general world security. Mr. Rusk wished to urge upon Mr. Han that Korea could never be entirely separated from a continued threat to its security as long as the Soviet Union and a Communist China were on its northern frontier and that in the last analysis the only way in which this danger could be finally eliminated would be by the destruction of those two governments. To attempt this obviously would involve us in a third World War during which the continued existence of Korea would be very doubtful. Therefore, he believed that the ROK should be very disturbed if at any time there were indications that the United States or the United Nations were taking a course of action which would lead to a World War. The survival of the Korean nation depended upon a solution to the present problem being found within the boundaries of Korea itself. The accomplishment of the ultimate political objectives in Korea was not necessarily dependent upon military operations throughout all of Korea.

Mr. Han then brought up the question of additional arms for the Koreans and stated that if Korea were to continue to be menaced by Communism, it was vital that it be in a position to defend itself adequately. Mr. Rusk said that we were fully aware of this problem, that undoubtedly the Korean armed forces would in the future have to be strengthened by additional equipment, training, and manpower, but that the building up and supplying of such additional forces would require time and that one of the principal problems involved was the effective strengthening of a corps of trained officers and NCO's. Mr. Han wondered whether the non-United States members of the United Nations could not contribute more forces to Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that while the Communists continue to have tremendous resources in manpower, the United States, together with the other members of the United Nations, had sent to Korea virtually all of the manpower which they could provide. There then followed a brief discussion of the general military situation.[1]

Mr. Han, in concluding the conversation, asked whether, in the light of what had been said, it would be appropriate for him to inform his Government that the United States had reached no decision as to a crossing of the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk replied that he might indeed do so, but he added that the Korean Government and people should realize that neither the United States nor the United Nations had, in any sense, abandoned their basic objectives for a unified and independent Korea.

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[1] For a summary of recent military developments, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Barbour, March 16, p. 235.

795.00/3-1551

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 15, 1951—11 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (16). In addition to the Joint Chiefs, 5 military officials attended; Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, and Perkins were accompanied by 3 other Department of State representatives; also present was Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay.]

KOREA

. . . .

GENERAL COLLINS: I think that we should take another look at an early meeting at the problem of Korea. If the Chinese Communists have smartened up, they may be falling back of the 38th parallel. In that event, what do we do? They have been dumb enough to fight us with their best troops and to take a terrible beating. It will be very hard for them to replace their losses. They have filled up their hospitals.

GENERAL BRADLEY: That is a political decision not a military decision.

GENERAL COLLINS: The political decision might be to ask the military how far we can go in Korea.

MR. NITZE: If our political decision was to seek the reestablishment of the *status quo ante* June 25 by an arrangement which would permit us to withdraw our forces—if that is the political objective relevant to the military course of action—we might still have a serious problem if we did not obtain the arrangement soon. In this event, a combined political-military decision concerning our attitude towards the 38th parallel during the time until the arrangement is obtained would be necessary.

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[1] The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the other participants. A complete set of these meetings is in the files of the Policy Planning Staff: Lot File 64D563.

General Collins: This is a field of inquiry into which we need to get.

Mr. Nitze: We have hoped that we could have some discussion of this prior to our next meeting. I believe that the Secretary wishes to discuss this problem with General Marshall and General Bradley. If the problem is not straightened out by next Wednesday,[2] perhaps we could discuss it then.

General Collins: We may be faced with the necessity of a decision before Wednesday. There is no place for the Chinese to hold if we take Chunchon. We have our momentum up and we may be able to go a considerable distance without much fighting. We will have to decide what we are to tell General Ridgway.

Admiral Sherman: We should explore the strategic merits of various positions north of the 38th parallel. I have personally favored the taking of Pyongyang. I think that we could talk better if we held Pyongyang and that we would be ready to do business.

General Collins: If we are going that far, perhaps we should go on to the waist. That is a good defensive position. We would pick up the rest of the rice-producing area. A line anchored on Wonsan on the east and following the most desirable terrain to the west coast would be a good one. It would also include about 90% of the Korean population.

General Vandenberg: We would have twice as much difficulty because the Air Force could not operate effectively against the shortened Chinese lines of communication.

Mr. Nitze: It had been my understanding that a line south of the Han offered the best defensive potentialities largely because of the long Chinese lines of communication. Of course we cannot deny the Chinese the capability of breaking contact with our forces. They can withdraw beyond any line on which we choose to hold—unless of course we go all the way to Peiping.

General Collins: We never had an opportunity to organize our position on a line anchored on Wonsan as we were able to organize a position in the west south of the Han River. A properly organized position would be a very difficult one for the Chinese to break through even though the Air Force would be handicapped. With good fields of fire, we could raise hell with this particular bunch of people if they tried to storm our positions.

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[2] March 21.

Admiral Sherman: I would urge that if we do consider a line north of the 38th parallel, we take into account other relevant considerations such as its relationship to Dairen.

[Here follows discussion dealing with Greece and Turkey.]

Editorial Note

On March 15, General MacArthur made a public statement on the 38th parallel issue in a telegraphic interview with Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press. In response to a question on how many troops would be needed to hold the 38th parallel inviolate, the General gave the following response:

"As I have on several occasions pointed out, the conditions under which we are conducting military operations in Korea do not favor engaging in positional warfare on any line across the peninsula. Specifically with reference to the 38th Parallel, there are no natural defense features anywhere near its immediate proximity. The terrain is such that to establish a conventional defense system in reasonable depth would require such a sizable force that if we had it, and could logistically maintain it, we would be able to drive the Chinese Communists back across the Yalu, hold that river as our future main line of defense, and proceed to the accomplishment of our mission in the unification of Korea. Under the realities existing, however, we can and will, unless the situation is radically altered, continue our campaign of maneuver as the best means to neutralize the military disadvantage under which we fight and keep the enemy engaged where it best serves our own military purposes. Such a point of engagement will of necessity be a fluctuating variable, dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of the forces committed and will constantly move up or down. The problem involved requires much more fundamental decisions than are within my authority or responsibility to make as the military commander—decisions which must not ignore the heavy cost in Allied blood which a protracted and decisive campaign would entail." (The *New York Times*, March 16, 1951)

At his own news conference on the afternoon of March 15, President Truman declined to comment on General MacArthur's statement since he had not yet seen it, but he reiterated his previous assertion that the decision to cross the parallel was a tactical one to be handled by the field commander. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pages 188, 190)

Also on March 15, President Rhee in a radio interview expressed his belief that United Nations forces should drive north of the 38th parallel and proceed all the way to the Yalu River where 500,000 well-armed forces could keep the Communists in check in the future. He added that, if necessary, U.N. bombing should be extended to China. (A summary of the interview, released by the Korean Office of Public Information, was transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 121, March 15, from Pusan; 795.11/3–1151.)

For further comments on Korean statements concerning the 38th parallel at this time, see despatch 124, March 17, from Pusan, page 244.

795.00/3–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Luxembourg —Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands —Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
New Zealand —Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Benler, First Secretary
Union of South Africa —Ambassador Jooste
United States —FE—Mr. Rusk
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
R—Mr. Armstrong[1]
BNA—Mr. Raynor
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Henkin
FE—Mr. Hackler
FE—Mr. Barbour
Major Converse—Army
Captain Maertens—Army

Major Converse stated that the recent northward movement of enemy units may have been due to the casualties inflicted by the UN offensive or might indicate that the Communists are withdrawing to a main line of resistance farther north. He said that there had been no contact with the enemy from the west coast to the center of the peninsula but that the resistance being met by advancing UN forces farther east was either a delaying action or an operation to screen the outposts of a main line of defense.

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[1] W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence.

Captain Maertens read a summary of an Eighth Army directive outlining the mission of this latest campaign as follows:

> 1. In the First Corps area, to attack north of the Han River and at the same time to retain sufficient forces south of the Han to provide security for First and Ninth Corps flanks;
> 2. In the Ninth Corps area to seize Hongchon and Chunchon and to trap as many of the enemy as possible south of Hongchon;
> 3. In the Tenth Corps and ROK sectors to attack and destroy the enemy.
>
> Units were instructed primarily to destroy the enemy and to maintain lateral coordination at all times.

Captain Maertens said that the highlights of activities during the past three days had been the entering of Seoul and the securing of a lateral road line north of the Han River. UN troops had continued their steady advances of from three to five miles with increasing enemy opposition in the center sectors and virtually no resistance on the east and west coasts. He reported that the Greek battalion, while under heavy fire, had forced a crossing of the Hongchon River.

In reply to two questions from Ambassador Wrong it was stated that, first, the enemy's intentions now seemed to be to defend a line running from the Han estuary laterally north and east to the old North Korean fortifications near the 38th parallel and, second, the enemy's retreat from Hongchon, formerly considered as a line of resistance, did not indicate that he was not capable of mounting an offensive. As the enemy suffered defeats and casualties his immediate capability for mounting such an offensive decreased but was by no means destroyed.

Mr. Rusk, referring to press speculations on the subject of the 38th parallel, stated that the problem was constantly under study here and that we would be glad to have the views of the representatives present in addition to those already received from their governments. He said that basically the situation had not changed in spite of the Communist withdrawal from Hongchon. Powerful enemy forces still confronted us, and there had been no indication that the enemy had altered his political and military objectives. In this connection Mr. Rusk referred to an article by Mr. Stewart Alsop in the *Washington Post* of March 11. In this article Mr. Alsop, quoting a reliable Iron Curtain source, reached the following conclusions:

> 1. The Chinese Communists lack heavy equipment and technical training for using such equipment, but the Soviet Union is now pro-

viding technical assistance and within one year the Chinese Communists will be able to drive UN forces out of Korea;

2. There is no chance that the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists would agree to any settlement in Korea which would leave UN forces near the 38th parallel or anywhere else in Korea;

3. If UN forces should again reach the Manchurian border or should there be an American attack against the mainland of China, the Soviet Union would openly and militarily intervene.

Mr. Rusk referred to this article as "interesting" since the information came from a Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and might give an indication of enemy intentions to fight on and drive UN forces out of Korea.

Mr. Rusk said that we would like to have the informal views of the governments represented on the question of whether the Unified Command, after consultation with the governments with armed forces in Korea, should in the near future make a public statement outlining UN policies with respect to Korea. There would be nothing new or different in this statement; it would clarify the objectives in understandable terms and make distinctions between military and political objectives of the United Nations as they relate to the present situation.

In response to Ambassador Wrong's question about General Ridgway's statement on the 38th parallel,[2] Mr. Rusk said that there had been no political instruction or directive behind the statement and assessed it as a statement of troop leadership to assure the troops that they had done a magnificent job and had won victory even if, for example, a stalemate should develop.

Mr. Rusk replied to Mr. Millet's question on General MacArthur's most recent interview [3] by pointing out that General MacArthur had repeatedly said that there were decisions to be taken with respect to Korea which were quite beyond his competence as a field commander which was usually the case in wartime. The General had pointed out certain restrictions as bearing on the nature of the UN operation in Korea, but he had not publicly asked for their removal. Mr. Rusk said that there were two aspects of the problem of the 38th parallel—the first was the achievement of the parallel as a military objective but the second, a political objective, concerned the northern frontier.

Ambassador Wrong said that General MacArthur's statement implied that some very important decisions were being expected. Mr. Rusk replied that the President had repeatedly said that General MacArthur had adequate directives for the conduct of the campaign. So far as Mr. Rusk was aware, there had been no request for clarification or modification of these directives.

In answer to Mr. de Beus' question, Mr. Rusk stated that it was correct to say that there had been no change in the attitudes expressed previously to the group (on February 16).[4] We did not see any quick or immediate change in the problem unless there should be a spectacular UN breakthrough which was highly unlikely, but we were thinking very hard about the question and if other countries had any views, we would like to have them. He said that although the enemy had been severely punished, he had by no means been defeated.

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[2] See footnote 1, p. 229.
[3] See editorial note, *supra*.

In response to a question by Mr. Tomlinson, Mr. Rusk said that he thought the Unified Command would be the appropriate issuing authority for the previously discussed statement on Korea. Before such a statement would be issued, it would be circulated to each of the governments concerned for its comments and concurrence. We would be happy to have the views of the members of the group on this subject. Possible criticism from the UN as a whole would have to be considered by the group as would the effect of such a statement on the work of the Good Offices Committee.

It was agreed that the meetings on Tuesday and Friday would be continued during the forthcoming week.

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[4] See telegram 719, February 17, to New York, p. 178.

357.AK/3-1651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 16, 1951—2: 03 p. m.

1287. Re GOC—approach to Chinese Communists. Grafstrom advised me that at GOC mtg afternoon March 15 is decided to transmit through Stockholm request to Swedish Ambassador Peiping to see Chinese FonMin with message from Entezam in following sense.

Entezam, as GA president, would like to ascertain whether Peiping intends to reply now to Entezam's previous communication or whether it considers it more appropriate to withhold reply for present. GOC felt that formulation of approach to Peiping in the above sense would make it easier for Peiping to indicate its attitude toward Entezam's communication without necessity for blunt rejection at the present time.[1]

GROSS

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[1] Prior to any action taken in connection with the proposed approach to the People's Republic of China, the Department received the following message in telegram 4973, March 16, 7 p. m., from London:

"According to msg received in FonOff from Peiping, Swedish Min called at Min Fon Affairs on 14 to inquire whether Chi Commies were now ready to reply to Entezam's msg of Feb 18 in his capacity as Pres of GA. Min informed [British Chargé Lionel] Lamb he 'got a blank negative'." (320/3-1651)

357.AK/3-1651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 16, 1951—7 : 02 p. m.

1293. Re peaceful settlement Korean affair. Following are reports conversations concerning peaceful settlement Korean affair which Ross and I had with Grafstrom, Padilla Nervo and Trygve Lie yesterday on their initiative.

We met jointly with Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo. At their request and pursuant to questions raised by them in conversation on March 6 (Usun 1236) I outlined what I described as "general" reactions of Dept as set forth in Deptel 776, Mar 12. Padilla and Grafstrom expressed general agreement; latter in particular expressed view no other attitude could be taken pending development such factors as military situation in Korea and FonMin deputies talks in Paris.

Padilla then raised question Trygve Lie idea of approach to North Koreans as reported my letter Mar 10 to Hickerson. At some length Padilla indicated idea intrigued him. Said much same idea had grown out of consultations he had had with number LA's dating back to period before passage Feb 1 resolution. He said there had been considerable feeling that dealing directly with North Koreans would sidestep necessity political concessions to Chinese Communists.

I indicated tentative views expressed by Hickerson in his letter to me of March 13 without referring to Hickerson by name, and emphasizing that these views were not necessarily definitive views of Dept. I elaborated following points:

(*a*) We did not think approach to Gromyko at Paris was likely to be fruitful.

(*b*) We did not think idea of driving wedge between Chinese Communists and Russians seemed very realistic.

(*c*) Approach to North Koreans might get UN drawn into series of commitments while Chinese Communists would be left free of commitment. Result of this process might be very seriously disadvantageous from both political and military viewpoints.

(*d*) In response to query by Padilla concerning possible Chinese Communist necessity save face I commented that this was a question of negotiating tactics and should not be allowed to put UN at a political and military disadvantage; on other hand, if Chinese Communists chose to put North Koreans forward as authorized intermediaries, or to use any other agents, that was up to Chinese Communists.

(*e*) I said we did not want to appear wholly negative to action which GOC in its judgment might find it desirable to take, and I expressed view GOC had competence to approach North Koreans.

Foregoing analysis appeared to convince Padilla and Grafstrom that approach to North Koreans by GOC was not likely to be fruitful or safe.

In response to request for estimate present situation I said was difficult to judge at such distance. However, in personal way I mentioned following alternatives: First, Chinese Communist withdrawal might be prelude to new major offensive by them; we must assume this a likely development. Second, Russians might move in. Third, Chinese Communist withdrawal might be part of policy to cut losses and withdraw from Korean engagement. In this case we would be confronted with necessity decisions, both political and military in character, involving problems of control and supervision of northern area in order to prevent new military build-up and otherwise assure security UN forces, while providing basis for peaceful achievement UN objectives in Korea.

Padilla said GOC was not required to report. If GOC reported "progress" this would have effect stalling work of AMC, pending clarification peace-making efforts. This GOC did not think appropriate now. He saw no need for GOC to make any negative report unless developing circumstances should indicate desirability for good political reasons. Parenthetically he said with regard to AMC that UC already had authority to ask for any additional assistance it might want in Korea, but for AMC, First Committee, and Assembly to go through process of recommending anything less would seem destined to have bad public reaction.

After leaving Padilla, Grafstrom told us GOC had met earlier and was meeting later Thursday afternoon[1] to consider desirability of "consciously naive" approach to Malik[2] to inquire whether any information had been received from Soviet Ambassador, Peiping, concerning reasons why no reply yet received from Chinese Communists to Entezam's communication. In response to Grafstrom's request for opinion I did not venture any but asked if they had considered alternative possibility of Swedish Ambassador Peiping more casually sounding Soviet Ambassador.

In conversation with Lie late in the day I outlined to him, in same manner as I had to Grafstrom and Padilla, views concerning his idea of approach to North Koreans.

Lie said he thought with UN forces doing well at moment we had good opportunity to take strong initiative and press for peace. If we did not do so alternative he saw was deterioration to stalemate situation involving continued losses UN and particularly US troops. He queried how long US public opinion would stand for such situation.

He said he felt Dept's attention was concentrated too much on China as factor in situation. He said he felt we should turn our concentration to Russia. He interpreted Stalin's recent statement[3] as indication that Russians were prepared to write off Korean venture, adding that if Chinese and Russian interests were not parallel Russians would not hesitate to use North Koreans as means achieving peaceful settlement.

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[1] March 15.

[2] Yakov Malik, Soviet Representative at the United Nations.

He said he thought there were four alternative approaches, looking towards cease-fire and peaceful settlement. First, a military approach in the field (through MacArthur, he said). He did not know anything about this. Second, an approach to Chinese Communists which had been made and he expected no result whatever from this course. Third and fourth, an approach through Malik or alternatively Gromyko. An approach through Malik he thought would be useless. He had taken soundings with Zinchenko[4] who told Lie that best approach would be through Gromyko for two reasons: (*a*) Gromyko was now very close to highest Soviet authorities; (*b*) Gromyko was no longer closely associated with UN and UN affairs.

Lie queried possibility of a *de facto* cease-fire leading now or later on to negotiated settlement. He said we should not be too proud to accept something less than 100% of UN objectives in Korea and expressed view return to *status quo* before June 25 would be best way out of situation.

I pointed out to Lie dangers we saw in any provisional cease-fire, whatever it might be called, and in any *status quo* situation which would leave Communists free hand in North Korea, without any UN control or supervision, to prepare new aggression. In general I took same line with Lie as we had with Padilla and Grafstrom earlier in day.

GROSS

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[3] See footnote 1, p. 187.

[4] Constantin E. Zinchenko was an Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, in charge of the Department of Security Council Affairs.

795.00/3-1751

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1951.

Subject: Cease Fire Agreement for Korea

The following are the thoughts George Kennan[2] asked be put before you:

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[1] A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this document. In addition to the Secretary, it was addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Assistant Secretaries of State for European and Far Eastern Affairs (Perkins and Rusk), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze).

[2] Mr. Kennan, Counselor of the Department, had been on leave since the previous September. On March 12, 1951, Charles Bohlen received Senate confirmation as Mr. Kennan's successor, but Mr. Bohlen did not return from Paris to assume his new position until July 1951.

1. The time has come when, if one wishes to obtain any cease fire in Korea or any improvement from our standpoint in the situation there, it is necessary to deal with the Russians. It would be dangerous to count on any understanding or arrangement regarding the North Korean area to which the Russians were not a party. They are the great land power in that part of the world and have an obvious and legitimate interest in what goes on in Northern Korea. By leaving them out and dealing only with their puppets, one would leave them without obligation and free to do whatever they pleased, which is in many ways just what they wish. To build on an arrangement which does not include them would be building on sand.

2. By "dealing" with the Russians is meant treating with them through informal channels and with the obligation of complete secrecy. Any leaks or intimations to the public would convince the Russians that this was only a propaganda venture designed to embarrass them publicly and they would play it accordingly. This means that it would be necessary either (*a*) to be prepared to ride it out and assert the propriety of secret diplomacy in the event of an inadvertent or malicious leak, or (*b*) the job would have to be done through some intermediary who could be denied in case of necessity.

3. Whoever talks with the Russians must begin by stating bluntly and in terms they will understand our reasons for intervening in South Korea and our objectives in that country. This should be expressed in terms of simple national interests as involved in our position in Japan and in the Philippines. They should be told that our long-term policy still looks to a unified and independent and democratic Korea, that we do not want a world war to be precipitated because of the Korean problem, but that on the other hand we have no intention of getting out and turning the whole country over to them. That they must understand that their violation of the strategic frontiers established at the end of the war could not go unanswered.

4. If we again push north of the 38th Parallel we will again invoke trouble. If the Chinese Communists are not able to obstruct our northward advance we invite the possibility of Soviet intervention.

5. There seem to be two primary choices of action at this time: (1) to choose the best line in the middle of Korea and sit on it by military means. This is perhaps not too bad a solution but the weakness of our intelligence with respect to Communist capabilities and intentions make it potentially dangerous; (2) some sort of an agreement with somebody. Since the UN does not seem to offer the possibility of pro-

ducing such an agreement and since the Chinese Communists are not the real bosses of the area, that leaves the Soviet Government as the only possible party with whom to work out an agreement.

6. Two alternative agreements appear possible in the circumstances. (1) Return to the *status quo ante* the North Korean aggression. This would put the Russians back in North Korea which would have the advantage of precluding them from getting fancy with us in that area unless they were in fact ready for World War III. In such an event their presence would make little difference since, if and when they decide to kick off World War III, it will not be for local Korean reasons. (2) The alternative would be a proposal to the Soviet Union for UN forces from non-NATO countries to take over the bulk of Korea with Soviet and US forces restricted to small areas in the northern and southern extremities of the country respectively. The Russians would not like this and would probably not accept it. The North Koreans have been knocked out for some time and such an arrangement would be definitely to the disadvantage of the Communists. If it were possible to agree on the first alternative, we would of course have to make it clear that our reconstruction efforts in Korea would be limited to the ROK. These proposals, which would involve the complete withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Korea, should put a real strain on Soviet-Chinese Communist relations.

7. The Russians will of course reply to any such proposal that they want the Chinese Communists to be in on the conversations. This will have to be resisted. We might well play the role of the offended party, insisting that the Chinese Communists were hysterical and childlike and that it was impossible to do business with them, whereas the Russians were responsible, businesslike and, after all, the real power to deal with.

8. We would have to insist that any arrangement arrived at must be worked out and presented through the UN and that we could not agree to any other manner of revealing it to the public.

9. Whereas there is not the slightest possibility of extracting a capitulation in Korea from the Chinese Communists or the Russians, the possibility of a deal as suggested above does exist since the present situation in Korea is unsatisfactory to both the Soviet Union and the United States. There would appear to be a mutuality of interest sufficient to make possible such an arrangement.

F. REINHARDT

795.00/3-1751

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, March 17, 1951.

No. 124

Subject: ROK Views Concerning 38th Parallel

Ref: Embtel 797, March 12, 1951[1]

As indicated in the Embassy's telegram under reference, the expected Korean reaction to General MacArthur's statement concerning the likelihood of a "theoretical stalemate" was slow in materializing. Now, however, there are positive indications that General MacArthur's statement did not go unheeded and that its possible implications have been cause for considerable alarm among the Koreans. Needless to say, General Ridgway's press conference of March 12, in which he declared that it would be a "tremendous victory for the United Nations" even if the Korean war should end at the 38th Parallel, has done nothing to allay Korean fears concerning the intentions of the United States.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a press release[2] issued in English on March 15, 1951, by the Korean Office of Public Information, quoting at length the views of the Defense Minister on the necessity of disregarding the 38th Parallel and pushing the enemy beyond the Yalu River. The statement is known to have been prepared in the President's office as a result of General MacArthur's "theoretical stalemate" comments. From the known sequence of events it appears likely that the prepared statement was being discussed in a meeting of the State Council at President Rhee's residence on the morning of March 13 when news of General Ridgway's press conference remarks reached the Koreans, and that the President became so perturbed that he immediately sent Clarence Ryee, Director of the Office of Public Information, to call on me.

Clarence Ryee arrived at my desk while the Council meeting was still in session, bringing with him both the draft of the prepared statement and the text of the UP Peter Kalischer release concerning General Ridgway's press conference. I emphatically pointed out to him that it was time for all Koreans to stop getting agitated every time anyone mentioned the 38th Parallel and that this would be a good time for all of them to re-read the United Nations' resolutions passed since June 25. In this connection I mentioned that the all-important issue and the United Nations' commitment is to stop aggression. The United Nations policy is still aimed at a united, independent, democratic Korea, but there is no commitment anywhere that I know of requiring the United Nations or the United States to bring in any amount of force that may be needed to unify Korea. I went on to state that the Koreans simply must bear in mind that world developments will govern what can be done in Korea, and that the worst possible development, both for Korea and for the world, would be for hostilities to spread. I particularly stressed this latter point in connection with the draft of the prepared statement which he had brought with him.

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[1] Not printed. It reported that Korean reaction up to that time had been unexpectedly light in response to General MacArthur's statement of March 7 on the possibility of a stalemate in Korea. (795.00/3-1251)

[2] Not printed here.

Probably as a result of my remarks to Mr. Ryee, authorship of the statement was attributed in the press release to the Defense Minister, rather than to President Rhee as in the draft which was shown me. It is also noted that the English-language release was considerably toned down. The Korean-language release, however, appears to have been left substantially in the same form as that of the original draft. This release is summarized in the enclosed translation of a news item from the Tong-A of March 16.[3] It will be noted that the wording of the release in Korean was considerable stronger than that in English.

On March 15 General Ridgway and I called on President Rhee during the course of which the President again brought up the matter of the 38th Parallel, speaking in a rambling fashion of vague plans to telegraph President Truman and General MacArthur concerning the necessity of bombing Manchuria. At this time I again took the occasion to repeat the remarks I had previously made to Clarence Ryee, particularly emphasizing the fact that the worst possible development for Korea would be a spread of hostilities. It is doubtful, however, that any words or logic could sway the President from his insistence that Korea must be unified at whatever risk or cost.[4]

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[3] Not printed here.

[4] Under cover of his despatch 125, March 20, from Pusan, Ambassador Muccio transmitted to the Department a copy of a memorandum for the record by General Ridgway concerning their meeting with President Rhee. General Ridgway's memorandum read in part as follows:

"1. I first had a half hour with Ambassador Muccio and General Coulter. I took up with the Ambassador the three principal points I had planned to take up with the President, subject to the Ambassador's concurrence. These were:

"*a.* To point out that Seoul had not been captured; that I was not ready to work on Seoul; that we were playing a dangerous game, with a numerically vastly superior enemy in a terrain which stretched our logistics capabilities to the limit; and that, therefore, the tide of battle might well go back and forth repeatedly.

"*b.* For these reasons I hoped that only the minimum number of farmers essential to plant the coming crop be permitted to return to the northern area.

"*c.* That this was war we were in, and not peace time maneuvers or training. Therefore, I expected that senior commanders whose troops disintegrated under attack, and above all those whose troops abandoned equipment, would be sternly and summarily dealt with. I said it was one thing for a senior officer who felt he could not hold his ground to withdraw his units intact, either on his own initiative or with proper superior authority, but it was quite another, and very serious matter, for him to give up the equipment which we had such difficulty in supplying, and which was so vital to the enemy in waging war against us.

"The Ambassador having concurred, I took up these points substantially as outlined with the President, who seemed to receive them all well." (795.00/3-2051)

Given these well-known views of President Rhee and the Korean Government, increasingly strong reactions can be expected from the slightest intimation that the United Nations action might stop anywhere short of the Yalu. The enclosures may well indicate the course which the Korean Government will follow in combatting any possible suggestions in favor of more limited objectives. The press release states categorically that to drive the Chinese Communists back into Manchuria is "the clear mission and duty of the United Nations forces." Such a view could logically lead to violent charges of betrayal in the event of any compromise of the Korean conflict.

For the Ambassador:
MEREDITH WEATHERBY
Second Secretary

795.00/3-1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Secretary Acheson, Dean Rusk, Paul H. Nitze
Secretary Marshall, Robert A. Lovett, General Bradley, General Collins, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg

Secretary Acheson made an initial presentation based upon the outline prepared the night before by Mr. Rusk and as amended in the Secretary's office the next morning.[1]

General Collins presented the views of the JCS as to the line to which the U.N. forces should attempt to advance and then hold in north Korea. This line was roughly diagonal, running northeast from the Imjin River to Wonsan. He described the relationship of this line to the problem of maintaining sufficient air space between it and the Yalu River, and its desirability from the point of view of dominating the major lines of lateral communication.

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[1] Mr. Acheson's presentation dealt with the proposed statement defining the Unified Command's policy aims in Korea, which Mr. Rusk had mentioned at the briefing of Ambassadors on March 16 (p. 235). No record has been found of the meetings alluded to involving Mr. Acheson and Mr. Rusk.

A more detailed account of this discussion on the proposed statement is given in *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to the United Nations Operations in Korea From 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951 Prepared by Them for the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees*, dated April 30, 1951, p. 100. It read as follows:

"On 19 March 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held another informal discussion with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on the subject of 'Future Courses of Action in Korea.' The draft of a proposed Presidential declaration on the Korean situation, which had been prepared by the Department of State, was discussed. It was agreed that a message would be sent to General MacArthur to the effect that the Department of State was working on a Presidential announcement and CINCFE was to be queried as to the authority he would need for the next two weeks or so. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Secretary of State agreed to incorporate the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those of the Secretary of Defense in a redraft by the Department of State of the proposed Presidential directive."

For the comments of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Marshall on the Department of State draft, see the memorandum from Marshall to Acheson, March 21, p. 252.

General Marshall questioned the security of such a line, particularly the northeastern flank, if it were contemplated that that flank was to be held with south Korean troops. The JCS indicated that they would give further consideration to the problem.

795.00/3–1951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 19, 1951—11:35 a. m.

1296. Re Korea. Rafael (Israel)[1] inquired as to our present estimate of peaceful settlement in Korea, our position re troop movements across 38th parallel and whether we were taking any diplomatic initiatives with the Soviets or Chinese Communists. Saying his government is awaiting report from the Israel delegate on these matters, he remarked that recent statements by MacArthur and Ridgway were creating speculation that UC had virtually given up any thought of large scale military operations in North Korea. He asked whether we still adhered to the conditions for a cease-fire published by the cease-fire group.

I suggested Eban take these matters up with Department, adding however that we had in no sense withdrawn or modified the conditions for a cease-fire previously presented by us to cease-fire group. As to the other questions, I commented merely that we were loyally supporting the GOC and that to avoid confusion we felt that discussion of more general questions he raised should more properly take place in Washington. He replied that Eban intended to call upon Rusk shortly.

Rafael reported that at Israel reception 14 March, Malik twice took the initiative in raising Korean question with Eban. Malik apparently asked Eban for his views as to possibility of settlement, and appeared to be cordial and interested in the ensuing conversation. No specific suggestions were made by either participant. At one point Entezam entered the discussion and, according to Rafael, "courageously" urged upon Malik the importance of the Soviet Government using its influence with the CPG to persuade the latter to take steps toward peace in Korea.

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[1] Gideon Rafael, Israeli Alternate Representative at the United Nations.

Rafael said he and his colleagues were struck by the fact that Malik referred repeatedly to the current Paris meeting of the Deputies. Rafael thought Malik showed "great awareness" of the connection between the Korean problem and the Paris conference. This is a point Department may wish to explore further with Eban.

GROSS

396.1–PA/3–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, March 19, 1951—3 p. m.

5517. From Jessup. Re Embtel 5383 [1] and Deptel [4831] Mar. 16.[2] Davies told Parodi and me Jebb had again raised possibility our approaching Gromyko here concerning possible Korean settlement. We three agreed saw no advantage acting on this suggestion. [Jessup.]

BRUCE

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[1] The text of this message, dated March 14, read as follows:

"From Jessup. Parodi told Davies and me yesterday Trygve Lie had approached Lacoste at Lake Success urging we three discuss with Gromyko possible settlement Korea. Davies indicated same approach their UN representative. Both Parodi and Davies disapproved idea. I said had no official information but personally shared their view." (396.1–PA/3–1451)

Alexander Parodi, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, and Ernest Davies, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, headed their countries' delegations at the Deputies meetings in Paris (see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.). Francis Lacoste was French Deputy Representative on the U.N. Security Council.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Embassy of the impending transmission of the Gross–Hickerson exchange of letters, March 10 and 13, pp. 223 and 227. (396.1–PA/3–1451)

795.00/3–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1951.

Subject: Problems Relating to the 38th Parallel in Korea.

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Albert Fequant, Second Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Daridan called on Mr. Rusk at 5:15 this afternoon at the former's request. Mr. Rusk opened the conversation by asking Mr.

Daridan if he had yet received a reaction from his Government on the Department's proposal that a Presidential statement should be made concerning our objectives in Korea at the time when United Nations forces reached the 38th Parallel. Mr. Daridan replied that Paris liked the idea and thought that such a declaration should set forth a reasonable solution to the Korean problem which the Chinese Communists could accept, and should include a reiteration of the general objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Mr. Daridan also indicated that his Government believed that the Good Offices Committee should be kept informed and consulted on further moves.

Mr. Daridan stated that the question of the 38th Parallel was a very complex one indeed, since the Parallel, as a formal dividing line in Korea, really had no standing, and the only time that the Parallel had represented any real significance was when Ambassador Panikkar of India had received a warning last fall from the Chinese Communists that United Nations forces should not cross it into North Korea. Mr. Rusk agreed the Parallel had really no basic validity in the formal sense and pointed out that ever since 1945, the United States and later the United Nations had bent their efforts toward doing away with it. Mr. Rusk also stressed that the Parallel involved two questions which should be carefully distinguished: One involved the principle of close-in military operations at or near the Parallel itself and the mere setting foot across it, the other being the much larger and more significant question of how far north between the Parallel and the Yalu River frontier operations should be continued. He pointed out that in the former case, the crossing of the Parallel was largely a matter of tactical maneuver to keep contact with the enemy, while the second question had much broader and more serious implications for all concerned.

Mr. Rusk discussed the difficulties inherent in any stalemate which might develop, referring to the serious problem involved in disengaging large and powerful forces locked in battle and pointing out that in World War II the solution to this problem was found only in the unconditional surrender of the enemy; in his opinion it would be difficult to find a satisfactory formula for terminating hostilities and withdrawing forces in a situation where neither side could gain a clear victory, and he noted that thus far there was no indication that the Good Offices Committee had made any headway with the Chinese Communists in finding such a formula.

From the military point of view, Mr. Rusk stated that it was important that United Nations forces not lose physical contact with the enemy and that were the Communists in a position to break all such contact, either because of the Parallel or for other reasons, our forces in Korea might be subjected to counter-attacks of unforeseeable size and scope which would endanger them. He believed, therefore, that we must be in a position to continue probing action against the enemy.

Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Daridan what, in his opinion would happen if the Chinese Communists were to reject or refuse to respond to the proposed declaration by the President. Mr. Daridan replied that he could see no clear solution in that case but that perhaps a stalemate near the 38th Parallel would result. He said that this would not necessarily lead to a termination of hostilities and that a stalemate might be disastrous to the morale of the United Nations troops.

Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Daridan whether he believed that French opinion, taking into account all of the factors represented in the present situation, would favor halting the fighting in Korea and a general disengagement at this point. Both Mr. Daridan and Mr. Fequant agreed that in their opinion the French people would like to see such a termination of hostilities, and the sooner the better. Mr. Rusk then read excerpts from a draft declaration for the President, indicating that it was a tentative draft upon which more work had still to be done. He hoped that he might have a final version available by sometime tomorrow. In commenting upon this draft, Mr. Daridan seemed to agree that it was generally in accord with French ideas as to what such a declaration should contain.

There then followed a general discussion of certain military aspects of the present situation in Korea. Mr. Rusk thought it possible that the present apparent withdrawal of the Communists with only light contact with United Nations forces might be designed to cover up plans for a new offensive and that it also might represent an effort to render the situation for the United Nations more complex and to introduce a further political element into the 38th Parallel question. Mr. Daridan agreed that this might be a deliberate move on the part of the Communists and wondered what the situation would be if the Communists were to break contact, pull back, and demand a cessation of United Nations sea and air attacks but without a definite agreement to terminate hostilities. Mr. Rusk stated that this would create a perplexing situation which would be even more complex if, at that point, the Communists were to demand that the United Nations stop all hostilities but without offering to negotiate a settlement. He believed that such a situation would place additional strain upon United Nations relationships and might be very difficult to handle.

Mr. Daridan wondered if, after all, the United Nations should continue its insistence upon a unification of Korea under the ultimate jurisdiction of the ROK, since the ROK was evidently even less popular with the Koreans than was the North Korean Communist regime. He based this statement on the premise that the ROK soldiers had shown a lack of will to fight as distinguished from the performance of the North Koreans. Mr. Rusk took strong exception to this analysis, saying that the ROK clearly had the strong support of the majority of the Koreans, many of whom had fled from the North to escape the Communist authorities, and that the ROK had fought equally well or better than the North Koreans and had surrendered in markedly fewer numbers. He pointed out that the United Nations could not abandon the Korean people nor renounce their great ambition for a unification of their country and remarked that the Liberal West was frequently too impatient with the shortcomings of oriental leaders such as President Rhee and Bao Dai.[1]

In concluding the conversation, Mr. Daridan said that he would inform Paris that we were proceeding with the idea of a Presidential declaration and added that the French felt that some solution to the Korean question was needed to bring hostilities to an end in Korea as soon as possible. He hoped that there would not have to be a general crossing of the Parallel.

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[1] Chief of State of Viet-Nam.

795.00/3-2051 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1951—1:34 p.m.

JCS 86276. State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

795B.5/3-2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 20, 1951—8:49 p. m.

1305. Re Korea. Col. Limb[1] today showed USUN copy of tel he has just recd from Pres Rhee instructing him to make formal request to

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[1] Ben C. Limb, Korean Foreign Minister.

UN that Unified Command be authorized to bomb strategic targets and troop centers in Manchuria for purpose of eventually bringing war in Korea to conclusion. Tel continued to instruct Col. Limb to address notes along this line to SecState as well as to appropriate UN official, who Col. Limb assumes to be UN SYG.

USUN suggested that this is very important step, that Korean policy shld dovetail with US policy on this matter, and recommended that before sending these notes Col. Limb discuss their substance with Asst SecState Dean Rusk. Col. Limb recognized validity these points and promised to consult Rusk, probably Mar 22, before sending notes. In meanwhile Col. Limb intends to reply to Pres Rhee's instruction by cabling him tomorrow that Unified Command may already have some authority for bombing Manchuria under existing SC and GA resolutions and that under circumstances it wld seem more appropriate for Pres Rhee to discuss question of bombing Manchuria directly with SCAP.

A second instruction which Col Limb has just recd from Pres Rhee instructs him to "press for time limit on Good Offices Comite" so that Additional Measures Comite can proceed with its work. Col Limb proposes tomorrow to address ltr to Entezam in his capacity as Pres of both GA and Good Offices Comite urging that time limit be placed on Good Offices Comite and to send copies of ltr to other dels as well as releases to newspapers. USUN wondered whether this communication wld have much value other than as propaganda and whether it might not have some kickback as respects world public opinion but did not see fit to urge him not to submit ltr. Col. Limb intends, however, to send ltr to Entezam tomorrow afternoon, thus still allowing time for USUN to discuss matter further with him if Dept wishes to send USUN instructions in time tomorrow morning.

Suggest Dept repeat this tel urgently to Pusan for Amb Muccio's info.[2]

GROSS

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[2] The Department did so on the following day. (Telegram 729 to Pusan; 795.00/3-2151)

795.00/3-2151

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 21, 1951.

DEAR ACHESON: I am returning in a very informal manner, in order to save time, the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding a proposed presidential statement on Korea and my own suggestions.[1]

Those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are indicated on Page 2 in blue ink.[2] My suggestions are indicated in red ink—in the second line by striking out the word "the" and by the letter "X" opposite certain paragraphs which I think might well be omitted in order to make the statement shorter and more incisive. However, that is a mere suggestion of mine.[3]

G. C. MARSHALL

[Annex]

Draft Text of a Proposed Presidential Statement on Korea[4]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, March 21, 1951.]

I make the following statement as Chief Executive of the Government requested by the United Nations to exercise the Unified Command in Korea, and after full consultation with United Nations Governments contributing combat forces in support of the United Nations in Korea.

United Nations forces in Korea are engaged in repelling the aggression committed first on June 25, 1950, by North Korean forces against the Republic of Korea and subsequently by Chinese Communist forces against the United Nations.

The aggressors have been driven back with heavy losses to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched last June.

There remains the problem of restoring international peace and security in the area in accordance with the terms of the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950. The spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter require that every effort be made to prevent the spread of hostilities and to avoid the prolongation of the misery and the loss of life for which the aggressors are responsible.

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[1] The text of the draft statement is printed as an annex to this memorandum, below, with the suggestions of Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated in subsequent footnotes.

[2] See footnotes 5 and 6, below.

[3] None of Secretary Marshall's suggestions were incorporated in the proposed statement. The paragraphs marked by him with an "x" for possible omission were the third, fifth, and tenth.

[4] The source text is that which was submitted on March 21 to the representatives of countries participating in the U.N. effort in Korea, with the request for comments by Friday, March 23, or the weekend at the latest; see the memorandum by Mr. Allen, p. 256.

There is a basis for restoring peace and security in the area which should be acceptable to all unless the aggressors are determined to continue their aggression at whatever cost.

The Unified Command is prepared to enter into arrangements which would assure the ending of the aggression, would conclude the fighting and ensure against its resumption. Such arrangements would open the way for a broader settlement for Korea, including the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

The United Nations has declared the policy of the world community that the people of Korea be permitted to establish a unified, independent and democratic state. The latest expression of this international policy is contained in the resolution of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950.

The Korean people are entitled to peace. They are entitled to determine their political and other institutions by their own choice and in response to their own needs.

The Korean people are entitled to the assistance of the world community in repairing the ravages of war—assistance which the United Nations is ready to give and for which it has established the necessary machinery. Its member nations have already made generous offers of help. What is needed is peace, in which the United Nations can use its resources in the creative tasks of reconstruction.[5]

It is regrettable that those who are opposing the United Nations in Korea have made so little response to the many opportunities which have been and continue to be afforded for a settlement in Korea.

A prompt settlement of the Korean problem would greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and would open the way for the consideration of other problems in that area by the processes of peaceful settlement envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

Until satisfactory arrangements for ending the aggression and for concluding the fighting have been reached, United Nations military action against the aggressor must be continued.[6]

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[5] The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, without success, that this paragraph be amended to read:

"The Korean people are entitled to the assistance of the world community in repairing the ravages of war—assistance which the world should be ready to give. The United Nations has established the necessary machinery to assist in this essential task. Its member nations have already made generous offers of help. What is needed is peace."

[6] The text of this paragraph represented acceptance by the Department of State of a JCS proposed change, in that the original State Department draft had read:

"In the absence of satisfactory arrangements for ending the aggression and for concluding the fighting, United Nations military action against the aggressors must be continued."

795.00/3-2151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 21, 1951—1:24 p. m.

1309. Re Korea: In compliance with draft Deptel telephoned by Henkin this morning,[1] USUN informed Colonel Limb that Dept believes proposed ROK letter to Entezam urging time limit on GOC is both inappropriate and undesirable, giving reasons set forth in second para of reftel.

Colonel Limb agreed to postpone sending letter to Entezam and to discuss both it and proposed formal request re UN bombing in Manchuria with Rusk March 21. He will this afternoon request Korean Emb to obtain appointment for him with Rusk tomorrow. He remains worried about his failure to comply promptly with Pres Rhee's instructions.

Limb feels obliged to take some action in connection with Pres Rhee's tel re UN bombing of Manchuria and, therefore, this afternoon will send tel to Rhee pointing out that existing SC and GA resolutions may already contain some authority for bombing Manchuria and that discussion this subject logically should first be held with SCAP.

GROSS

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[1] The draft telegram under reference was transmitted to New York at 2 p. m. on March 21 as telegram 800, which read as follows:

"Dept concerned over probable effects if Limb shld act on Rhee's instructions, urtel 1305, Mar 20. If Limb comes, Rusk will seek to persuade him that formal request to UN re bombing Manchuria wld seriously damage cause for which ROK and US both striving.

"In Dept's view, proposed ROK letter to Entezam urging time limit on GOC is both inappropriate and undesirable. Under Feb 1 Res, functioning of GOC does not prevent AMC from proceeding with its work and US has been urging their view in AMC. Time limit on GOC wld give impression that UN gives up policy of seeking peaceful settlement in Korea which UN and US have repeatedly expressed. Publicity and propaganda effect cld only harm UN effort and do great damage to ROK position. Also, Feb 1 Res provided that GOC shld be available to exercise good offices at any 'suitable opportunity', implying continuing efforts by GOC, and only GA has authority to limit or change these terms of reference. US cld not support any proposal to limit GOC and other nations wld certainly oppose it.

"Dept believes it desirable that proposed ROK communication to Entezam shld not be made and requests you to express these views to Limb." (795.00/3-2151)

795.00/3-2151 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, March 21, 1951—2:53 p. m.

C-58203. Reurmsg JCS 86276.[1] Recommend that no further military restrictions be imposed upon the United Nations Command in Korea.

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[1] Dated March 20, p. 251.

The inhibitions which already exist should not be increased. The military disadvantages arising from restrictions upon the scope of our Air and Naval operations coupled with the disparity between the size of our command and the enemy ground potential renders it completely impracticable to attempt to clear North Korea or to make any appreciable effort to that end. My present directives, establishing the security of the command as the paramount consideration, are adequate to cover the 2 points raised by the State Department.

795.00/3-2151

Memorandum of Conversations, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement by Unified Command on Korea

Participants: Mr. David W. McNichol, Australian Embassy
Mr. Frank Corner, New Zealand Embassy
Mr. B. J. Jarvie, Un. of S. African Embassy
Mr. Raynor—BNA [1]
Mr. Johnson—NA
Ward P. Allen—EUR

(*Separate Conversation*)
Mr. Roger Taymans, Belgium Embassy
Mr. Edmund P. Callebaut, Belgium Embassy
Dr. J. G. de Beus, Minister, Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Raynor—BNA
Mr. Winfree—WE
Ward P. Allen—EUR

Mr. Raynor gave each of the above representatives, who had called at our request, a copy of the draft statement prepared for possible issuance by the President as the Unified Command on behalf of the countries participating militarily in the Korean action.[2] Mr. Raynor emphasized that it was tentative and informal and that the President had not seen it. He stated that we desire the observations and comments of their governments preferably by Friday [3] and certainly by this week-end if at all possible in order that, if agreed upon, the statement might be issued on short notice.

He explained the purpose of the statement was merely to restate our basic objectives and to reaffirm both the willingness of the Unified Command and the participating nations to terminate hostilities on reasonable grounds and their determination to continue to resist the aggression if the other side should make cessation of hostilities impossible. He pointed out that although the statement designedly omits specific reference to the 38th parallel it is not intended to change our present policy in that regard. We still plan no major crossing for the purpose of capturing extensive territory without full consultation with other participating nations, and that therefore their concurrence in this statement is without prejudice to such consultations.

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[1] G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

[2] See the annex to the memorandum from Marshall to Acheson, p. 253.

[3] March 23.

He indicated that the statement was also being given to the representatives of the other countries with military forces in Korea and that in addition the Members of the Good Offices Committee would be consulted. In response to questions we indicated that the US did not intend to issue the present statement as on behalf of the fourteen participating countries until we received their reaction, and we would hope that no statement at all would have to be made by the US alone.

After reading the statement Mr. Callebaut's initial response was that it seemed to foreclose any possibility of a cease fire on or near the parallel because of the emphasis on unification. We stated that this was not the intention and pointed out that the reference to unification is merely a restatement of the UN political objective which it has steadfastly maintained for the last four years, but that the previous paragraphs referring to cessation of hostilities contained conditions which conceivably could be satisfied by a cease fire in the general proximity of the parallel.

The only other representative who indicated any significant reaction was Dr. de Beus (Netherlands) who pointed out that the statement contains some seven references to "aggressors" or "aggression" and he thought his government might feel that if the statement were intended to open the way for negotiations it might be unwise to make such extensive use of the label. We expressed doubt as to whether any reaction of the Peiping Government would be in fact dependent upon the number of times the word was used. Dr. de Beus stated that he had just received some general views of the Netherlands Government as to the possibility of a public statement which he summarized as follows: (1) it might be useful to restate the aim of the UN of repelling the aggression and its determination to do so; (2) the statement should stress the political aim of the unification of Korea; (3) without committing the UN for any specific future period, the Unified Command should state that in order to open up the possibility for peaceful settlement UN land forces would temporarily make a halt on the 38th parallel but action by sea and air forces north of the parallel would continue. He recognized that the first two points were contained in the draft statement and therefore the question remained as to whether it would be desirable to include the third point. We replied that it seemed to us undesirable to do so. Mr. Allen mentioned the military considerations brought out at previous meetings of the Ambassadors which showed how undesirable it would be to lose contact with the enemy or disclose our intentions to him. Contact would probably be lost should we be required, pursuant to any public declaration to halt at the parallel. He also suggested that any such public statement would create difficulties if and when it subsequently became necessary to resume military operations. Such action would then either be regarded as a breach of our promise or be misinterpreted as an indication that the final door was closed to any settlement and it was a fight to the finish for the military unification of all Korea. So long as we make no declaration if there should be no substantial advance beyond the proximity of the parallel, this could be interpreted as being dictated by military necessity only.

All representatives indicated they would communicate the statement as soon as possible to their governments and Mr. Raynor again stressed the urgency of obtaining reactions since the sooner comments were received the greater the consideration it would be possible to give them.[4]

WARD P. ALLEN

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[4] Within the next several days, responses were received from most of the countries consulted on the draft statement. Belgium, Greece, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Turkey registered approval. Australia, Canada, France, and South Africa put forth changes, principally relating to less frequent use of the terms "aggressor" and "aggression" in regard to Communist China. France and South Africa proposed deleting the reference to the October 7, 1950 General Assembly resolution, with Canada making the additional suggestion that the Peking Government be given advance notice concerning the issuance of the statement. (Memoranda on talks with the various foreign officials may be found in files 795.00/3–2151 *et seq.*)

For the text of the proposed Presidential statement as forwarded to President Truman on March 23, see p. 263.

Editorial Note

At his news conference on March 21, Secretary of State Acheson stated that no new authority was needed for crossing the 38th parallel, but that the United Nations should have a common point of view on the question.

On the following day, British Minister of State Kenneth Younger indicated that there would be no general United Nations advance across the parallel barring full consultation of the governments involved; for the text of Mr. Younger's remarks, see *Parliamentary*

Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, volume 485, columns 2677, 2679. The substance of Mr. Younger's statement had been cleared in advance with the Department of State (795.00/3-2051).

795.00/3-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

Subject: Various Aspects of Current Policy in Relation to Korea.

Participants: Colonel Ben C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea
Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor of Korean Embassy
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

The Foreign Minister called on Mr. Rusk at 4:00 this afternoon upon instructions from his Government to discuss with the Department certain aspects of current policy in relation to the Korean situation. He opened the conversation by saying that President Rhee had instructed him to discuss with United Nations officials the possibility of having a time limit put on the present activities of the Good Offices Committee in order to free the Additional Measures Committee from any inhibitions towards more aggressive action in the field of obtaining sanctions against Communist China. He stated that the President had instructed him to discuss this matter with the United States Government before proceeding further with it. He explained that the views of the ROK were that if a time limit were placed upon the GOC, and no concrete results were produced within that time, the way would be cleared for the Additional Measures Committee to proceed with its own program.

Mr. Rusk replied that if the present terms of reference of the GOC were to be changed, this would involve a parliamentary procedure which would have to be taken up in the General Assembly. Furthermore, he wished to point out that the Additional Measures Committee was not, in fact, being held back by the activities of the GOC to the extent which the Minister may have intended to indicate, since the two Committees were working concurrently and without mutual interference, and since the fact of the matter was that many members of the United Nations were not basically enthusiastic about implementing the program for sanctions upon which the Additional Measures Committee was working and were using the GOC as a pretext. These states, he believed, were holding back not so much through any lack of sympathy with the general objective of curtailing Communist aggressive power as they were influenced by a fear of any spread of the present conflict and a desire to avoid it at all costs. Mr. Rusk pointed out that many of the nations involved have individual relationships with Communist China which undoubtedly influence their views toward the question of sanctions. He also recalled that the United States has consistently pressed for action by the Additional Measures Committee concurrently, and without reference to, the work of the GOC.

Mr. Rusk suggested to the Foreign Minister that an appropriate means of bringing the views of the ROK on this point to the attention of the UN would be in a personal and informal manner with the members of the GOC itself, and that any publicity concerning this approach, in his opinion, should be carefully avoided in order that the ROK should not, in any sense, be made to appear as opposed to a peaceful settlement in Korea. The Minister agreed and said that he would confine his approach to the line suggested by Mr. Rusk. In further explanation of what was meant by a time limit on the GOC, the Minister later stated that his Government contemplated merely that the GOC should be asked, by a specific date, to submit a report to the United Nations on the status of its efforts to find a peaceful solution in Korea and that of course the ROK was in agreement that the GOC should continue such efforts into the future. The Minister added that he was sending the Department a letter concerning the position of the ROK on this question, merely for the sake of the record.

The Minister next took up the question of a crossing of the 38th Parallel by UN forces. He stated that it was the opinion of the ROK on this delicate question that UN forces should tactically cross the Parallel and that they had the full authority of the United Nations to do. He understood that we were consulting with the other participating nations on this question. Mr. Rusk said that we were consulting and he agreed that the U.S. Government also considered that the UN Resolutions provided authority to cross the Parallel but that the question was principally one of military expediency to the extent that the factors inherent in the present military situation would have great influence upon our course of action. He pointed out that General Ridgway was extremely short of reserves in manpower and that, having crossed the Han and with this river at his back and with his troops spread out thinly across Korea, his present position was not necessarily very secure.

At this point the Foreign Minister interjected that the ROK was anxious for the United States to give full consideration to the possibility of effectively utilizing the Korean manpower reserves, stating that there were approximately 1,000,000 men which potentially could be used effectively to form such a reserve, if given proper shelter, clothing, and arms, and that of these, approximately 500,000 had had some training and that over 200,000 of this number, in turn, had been given intensive training.

Mr. Rusk replied that we had given very careful consideration to this whole question, that our military authorities were making the maximum use of these potential reserves in expanding and strengthening Korean military units already in being and that one of the problems which still had to be solved in connection with any major overall increase in the use of Korean military manpower was the lack of trained officers, particularly at the battalion command level. He pointed out that the training of such personnel would require many months to accomplish. Mr. Rusk mentioned that we were now working on a statement of general principles, which the President would make shortly.

The Foreign Minister then took up the question of the bombing of Chinese bases, which he stated was a course favored by the ROK. Mr. Rusk emphasized that there were of course very serious considerations involved in any such step. Among these considerations, he pointed out that whereas UN forces now enjoyed virtual domination on the air space in Korea south of the Yalu River, the Soviet Union had very powerful reserves of air strength in the Far East and that we had received indications that this air force might be thrown in against us if we were to attack China. Should this occur, we would lose the very important advantage we now enjoy in the air and that an outright attack on China would very probably involve the spread of warfare to the point where a general war might ensue. If this were to happen, Mr. Rusk stressed that the Korean people would by no means benefit because the UN forces in Korea might well have to be withdrawn to other areas; this consideration was one of the utmost of importance to the Korean nation. Mr. Rusk further explained that a kind of tacit equilibrium with the Communists had been reached in relation to the use of airpower whereby neither side apparently wished to change the present state of affairs.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that in the view of his Government it was not necessarily a foregone conclusion that if Chinese bases were attacked the USSR would intervene, since it considered that the USSR would precipitate a general war only under conditions which were essentially favorable to its prospects for victory and only at such time as these prospects were considered sufficiently bright.

Mr. Rusk replied that, while this might be essentially true, a spread of the Korean conflict into China would certainly materially increase the danger of overt Soviet intervention and that one could not be sure at what point the balance might be tipped in favor of a decision by the Kremlin to go to war. As an example he cited the instance of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea which had occurred at the last moment, despite our estimate that conditions favoring such intervention had passed by that time. He pointed out that in the Chinese case our estimates had been badly off base and that it was therefore dangerous to make broad assumptions as to the intentions of the potential foe.

Mr. Rusk asked the Minister, on a purely personal and off the record basis, whether in his opinion the Korean people might not be tiring of the war and losing determination to continue. At the same time he described our great admiration for the magnificent courage and fortitude of the people of Korea and of their armed forces in the splendid performance which they had thus far rendered, even under the most adverse of circumstances. The Minister replied that he had been in Korea up through September 1950 during the difficult days of the retreat southward toward Pusan, that the Korean people had suffered tremendously under the Communists and were so sure that their only salvation lay in fighting for their independence and democracy that they would never relent or weaken in their determination. He pointed out that the Koreans, as a nation, when once persuaded were very tenacious of their ideas and that they were thoroughly opposed to Communist domination. He had, therefore, no fear whatsoever as to the weakening of their resolve and stated that all they ask for are the weapons with which to fight. He hoped that the United States would ensure that these weapons would be forthcoming and that the Korean Army would be so strengthened that it could assume an increasing role in the defense of the country, thus relieving to an increasing extent the necessity for the indefinite presence in Korea of large United Nations forces. He added, however, that his Government hoped that the United States and the United Nations would continue to keep some forces in Korea even after the termination of hostilities in order to preserve order and to strengthen the defenses of the country.

The Minister indicated that the desire of Korea for a strengthened Korean military establishment also stemmed from a basic distrust of the Japanese. He emphasized that while Japan was at the moment peacefully inclined, with the coming of a treaty the Japanese would necessarily have to be rearmed and, that while the Koreans desired to live in peace with Japan, they feared the inherent tendencies of the Japanese toward a militaristic imperialism which had been a demonstrated Japanese characteristic throughout history. He therefore hoped that the Koreans could at least keep pace with the arming of Japan, so that the two countries would, in a sense, be neutralized with respect to each other with the advantage that, if necessary, they could combine their resources in the face of Communist expansionism. Beyond that, however, the Minister emphasized that Korea must be prepared for a possible resurgence of Japanese expansionist tendencies toward the mainland of Asia across the bridgehead of Korea, and that the Koreans wanted a basic defense for their independence in order to live at peace with all of their neighbors.

The Minister also asked Mr. Rusk what progress was being made on a Pacific Pact, upon which he stated that his Government placed great importance for the future stability of Asia and he hoped that such a Pact could soon be developed. Mr. Rusk replied that while we were definitely interested in such a Pact, progress toward it at the moment was slow because of the disparity of interests among the Pacific nations and that the Pact might not become a reality until these various nations had drawn more closely together.

The Foreign Minister thanked Mr. Rusk for the frank exchange of views on these important subjects and stated that he would be coming to Washington from time to time in the future and hoped to have further conversations. He said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions and point of view expressed by Mr. Rusk and would so inform his Government.

795.00/3-2351

Draft Text of a Proposed Presidential Statement on Korea[1]

SECRET [Washington, March 23, 1951.]

I make the following statement as Chief Executive of the Government requested by the United Nations to exercise the Unified Command in Korea, and after full consultation with United Nations Governments contributing combat forces in support of the United Nations in Korea.

United Nations forces in Korea are engaged in repelling the aggressions committed against the Republic of Korea and against the United Nations.

The aggressors have been driven back with heavy losses to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched last June.

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[1] The text was given to the President by Mr. Acheson who reported on the discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the nations involved in the U.N. effort in Korea. The Secretary indicated that a definitive recommendation would be made once consultations with the foreign governments had been completed and suggested that the statement might be made in the following week. The President said that he would study the matter. (795.00/3-2351)

There remains the problem of restoring international peace and security in the area in accordance with the terms of the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950. The spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter require that every effort be made to prevent the spread of hostilities and to avoid the prolongation of the misery and the loss of life.

There is a basis for restoring peace and security in the area which should be acceptable to all nations which sincerely desire peace.

The Unified Command is prepared to enter into arrangements which would conclude the fighting and ensure against its resumption. Such arrangements would open the way for a broader settlement for Korea, including the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

The United Nations has declared the policy of the world community [is] that the people of Korea be permitted to establish a unified, independent and democratic state.

The Korean people are entitled to peace. They are entitled to determine their political and other institutions by their own choice and in response to their own needs.

The Korean people are entitled to the assistance of the world community in repairing the ravages of war—assistance which the United Nations is ready to give and for which it has established the necessary machinery. Its Member nations have already made generous offers of help. What is needed is peace, in which the United Nations can use its resources in the creative tasks of reconstruction.

It is regrettable that those who are opposing the United Nations in Korea have made so little response to the many opportunities which have been and continue to be afforded for a settlement in Korea.

A prompt settlement of the Korean problem would greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and would open the way for the consideration of other problems in that area by the processes of peaceful settlement envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

Until satisfactory arrangements for concluding the fighting have been reached, United Nations military action must be continued.

795.00/3–2351 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 23, 1951—midnight.

567. There is being sent by immediately following tel text of statement made by Gen MacArthur today.[2]

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[1] Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Manila, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, and Wellington.

[2] See circular telegram 568, March 24, *infra*.

This statement was not authorized, expected or representative of the views of this Govt. However under no circumstances must this be disclosed or intimated in any manner. All inquiries should be referred to Wash.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Mr. Acheson has indicated that the text of General MacArthur's statement was brought to him at 11 p. m. on March 23 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett and Messrs. Rusk, Johnson, and Battle of the State Department and that the MacArthur statement was discussed by them until 1 a. m. on March 24 (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 518–519). No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

795.00/3–2451 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1951.

568. Following is text statement released by Gen MacArthur today. See related tel.[2]

"Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

"This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain and battle.

"Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

"He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

"Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

"When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground fire power, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference of human loss.

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[1] Sent to the same posts as circular telegram 567, *supra*.

[2] *Supra*.

"These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

"The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

"These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

"The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.

"Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed."

ACHESON

Editorial Note

Following receipt of General MacArthur's statement in Washington, Mr. Rusk on March 24 drew up an outline of proposed actions which read as follows:

"1. Acheson, Lovett and Collins should meet with President at about 11:30 *off-the-record*.

"2. About noon, State Department spokesman should make attached statement. [Text printed below.]

"3. The State Department should insist that our foreign policy interests be fully protected by such action by the President and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff as will insure that no further statements be made by MacArthur beyond operational military communiqués without full clearance with the U.S. Government.

"4. The disciplinary problem created by MacArthur's statement should be left to the Commander-in-Chief, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"5. Rusk should tell the Ambassadors of the 13 nations that MacArthur's statement was unauthorized and unexpected and give them assurances that steps have been taken by the U.S. Government to prevent a repetition." (795.00/3-2451)

Subsequent developments on March 24 were summarized by Mr. Rusk in a memorandum dated March 30 to Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews (795.00/3-3051), which read in part as follows:

"On the evening of March 23 (Washington time) just prior to his departure on a trip to Korea, General MacArthur issued a statement to the press, a copy of which is attached [*supra*]. The first information on the statement was obtained from the radio and the full text was obtained by the Department and the Pentagon from the press ticker. On March 24 following a meeting with the President attended by the Secretary, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Lovett and General Collins, the Department issued the attached statement. The Departmental spokesman also indicated to the press, not for attribution, that General MacArthur's statement was unexpected and not cleared with Washington.

"At the same time the JCS transmitted a message to General MacArthur to the effect that the President had directed that his attention be called to the President's order of December 6, 1950, concerning statements by military officers on matters relating to foreign policy and that in view of the information given him in the JCS message of March 20, 'any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December'. The message also stated that the President directed that if the Communist[s] requested an armistice in the field, the fact was to be reported immediately to the JCS for instructions."

The statement issued to the press by the State Department on March 24 read: "General MacArthur is conducting UN military operations in Korea under military directives issued through the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff which, as the President stated in a recent press conference, are fully adequate to cover the present military situation in Korea. The political issues which General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibilities as a field commander are being dealt with in the United Nations and by inter-governmental consultations." The text of the message transmitted by the Joint Chiefs to General MacArthur, also on March 24, is printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, page 443.

In addition to the above quoted accounts by Mr. Rusk, other versions of the day's events by participants are contained in Truman, *ibid.*, pages 440–444; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 518–519; and Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pages 269–271.

General Collins in his account referred to two meetings on March 24, one involving Acheson and members of his staff, Lovett, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by one involving the same group and President Truman. The other versions made no mention of a meeting preceding that with the President. No records of the meeting with the President have been found, presumably in view of Mr. Rusk's suggestion that the talks be kept off the record.

Also on March 24, the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) transmitted to the Department of State a statement issued on that day by President Rhee calling once again for the unification of Korea by having United Nations forces advance to the Yalu River (telegram 823, March 24, from Pusan; 795.00/3-2451).

795.00/3-2651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 26, 1951—4:05 p. m.

1327. Re March 25 MacArthur statement.[1] Sunde (Norway) accompanied by Stabell called on me this morning to inquire concerning the significance of what Sunde referred to as "MacArthur's pronunciamento". I said I had received no special word about this but looking at it personally it seemed to me General MacArthur merely intended to indicate that as commander of UN forces he was prepared to discuss a cease-fire. His statement, I thought, strengthened the moral position of the UN. I expressed the view that MacArthur did not intend to go beyond his authority as military commander nor to assume a prerogative to deal on political issues. Sunde inquired concerning our policy regarding the crossing of the 38th parallel. Again expressing a personal opinion, I said it seemed to me the 38th parallel had lost political significance when it was violated by the Communist forces and that as a military matter it would be illogical to view the 38th parallel as a "taboo line" if the lives of UN troops were at stake.

Stabell asked whether MacArthur's statement implied that we were now thinking of raising a question in the UN, either in the GA or in the AMC, regarding attacks upon the Chinese mainland. Gross replied in the negative.

Stabell also asked for information concerning a story by Reston in the *New York Times* of March 25 which indicated that the 14 countries with military forces in Korea were formulating a new statement of policy regarding Korea. Gross replied that some discussion was going on regarding a possible statement designed to reaffirm existing UN policy in the light of the present situation in Korea, but that so far as we were aware there is no thought of a statement involving new policy. Sunde and Stabell expressed strong hope that the Norwegian Government be kept closely advised and I assured them of our desire to maintain a strong feeling of mutual confidence between our two governments. Sunde expressed gratification, adding that the Norwegian Government was vitally interested in this matter and would appreciate being kept informed.[2]

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[1] Reference is to the statement of March 24, the text of which is printed in circular telegram 568, p. 265. The statement generally appeared in the American press on March 25, accounting for occasional references to it as the March 25 statement.

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[2] On the following day, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins recorded the following memorandum of a conversation with the Norwegian Ambassador, Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne:

"The Norwegian Ambassador called today at his request to ask whether General MacArthur's recent truce statement foreshadowed any change of our policy on aerial bombing or other form of attacks on Chinese territory. I told the Ambassador that our policy in this respect had not changed and assured him that no such change would be made unilaterally by us. We would certainly consult with the fourteen countries having armed forces under the Unified Command and I had no doubt that his government would also be informed in advance." (795.00/3-2751)

795.00/3-2651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, March 26, 1951—10:10 p. m.

1330. Re Korea—38th parallel. Rau called at his request to discuss tactical crossing of 38th parallel. The suggestion has been made to him by an unnamed Asian del that now was appropriate time for an Asian appeal to UN that its forces should not cross the 38th parallel. Rau presented this idea to Gross, not as a suggestion of his govt, but to get a US reaction before communicating it to GOI. He thought that the concept of his unnamed Asian colleague was based partly on the fact that 38th parallel question is no longer academic and partly on Gen. MacArthur's recent statement on crossing it.[1] He recalled that similar appeal had been made to PRC and while it had had no effect, one might naturally expect some result from appeal to UN on which cld base cease fire. He added that in view of Indian Ambassador in Peiping no representation to PRC would be of much use earlier than two weeks from Mar 17, date of last communication from Pannikar. Rau added that perhaps these developments made some such move important before that time.

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[1] On March 24, upon returning to Tokyo from his one day trip to Korea prior to which he had released the statement printed in circular telegram 568, p. 265, General MacArthur commented that the parallel had never had any real military significance and that for tactical purposes the U.N. forces were free to cross it. The text of his statement is in Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 388.

In answer to question by Gross, Rau expressed personal view that appeal if observed by UN forces would remove one ground of PRC basis for intervention in that claim cld not again be made that UN has invaded NK. He had not considered whether appeal wld cover air and sea forces as well as land activities. He thought that probably it shld not cover air activities until there is cease fire because otherwise build-up by PRC and NK wld be possible.

He felt that UN forces might halt some 10 miles behind 38th parallel allowing remaining area to parallel to be buffer zone for land patrol action and this might be stronger political position than zone previously suggested north of parallel.

Realizing serious nature of objections raised by Gross' questions, he wondered whether appeal might not be both to UN and PRC. Here again he realized tactical problem of starting move in UN by its members to appeal to themselves or to put UN on basis of equality with PRC.

In substance he was tentatively thinking of whether this is a time when an appeal wld be useful as a device leading toward a cease fire. Gross stressed that as members contributing troops had been advised, any crossing of the parallel is a tactical military measure and that UN is not committed to unification of Korea by the invasion on a strategic scale of NK. He thought it likely that any decision for such a strategic crossing would be the basis of wide consultation, certainly among the group contributing armed forces. He stressed the fact that UN troops shld not be put into position of having additional inhibitions on their power to maneuver. More forces wld be necessary to hold any fixed line such as Rau suggested. Gross indicated we still consider possible PRC offensive against UN forces. Gross stated strongly that such an appeal is a sort of one way valve against the interest and security of UN forces and the PRC would probably pay no more attention to it than to the earlier appeal. It wld also be contrary to UN unity to have some members appeal to others. Personally he strongly indicated the undesirability of such an appeal.

Gross agreed to pass on to Dept Rau's inquiry, to indicate clearly it was personal inquiry and not GOI view and to have US position for him soonest. Gross added that personally he felt big GOI contribution cld be made by close contacts with Peiping.[2]

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[2] The Department made the following response in telegram 819, March 27, to New York:

"Dept concurs in comments made by Gross to Rau re proposed Asian appeal to UN forces not to cross 38th Parallel (urtel 1330, March 26). In our opinion, such an appeal wld increase difficulties of UN forces and of UN Members who are supplying such forces; adversely affect UN unity in resisting aggression; complicate efforts to achieve peaceful settlement for Korea; and give encouragement to aggressors." (795B.5/3-2751)

795.00/3-2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Taymans, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands —Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
New Zealand —Ambassador Berendsen and Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Ambassador Wan and Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE—Mr. Rusk
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Popper
FE—Mr. Ogburn
FE—Mr. Heidemann
BNA—Mr. Raynor
FE—Mr. Hackler
FE—Mr. Barbour
Colonel Thompson—Army
Lt. Colonel Hutton—Army
Lt. Colonel Wright—Army
Major Converse—Army

New estimates on Communist strength were listed as follows:

North Korean troops in action	28,000
Chinese Communist troops in action	122,000
North Korean troops in the rear	159,000
Chinese Communist troops in the rear	152,000
Guerrillas	14,000
Total	475,000

Major Converse stated that interrogation of enemy prisoners of war had revealed that the reconstituted North Korean Sixth Corps was in fact, equipped with Soviet weapons but not to the same extent as formerly. It had also been ascertained that the unit was a much less efficient fighting force than it had been on June 25, 1950. Major Converse summarized a report on enemy logistic capabilities, concluding that the Communists could maintain from forty to sixty combat divisions along the 38th parallel and that while his logistic facilities might enable him to stockpile sufficient supplies to launch a large offensive, it was doubtful that such an offensive could be maintained indefinitely without air and artillery superiority.

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[1] The source text indicated that Mr. Rusk was a codrafter of the memorandum, presumably for authoring the last paragraph.

Lt. Colonel Wright reported on UN ground activities of the past three days, during which time there had been continued general, slow advances with limited patrol actions. On March 23, the 187th airborne regimental combat team had been dropped very successfully in the vicinity of Munsan. Casualties had been very light, and good results had been obtained with drops of artillery and vehicles. From the center of the peninsula to the east coast advances of two to three miles had been registered against generally light opposition.

In reply to a question by Mr. Rusk, Lt. Colonel Wright stated that with the exception of South Korean units in the Tenth Corps area, all forces had reached the phase line objective, "Line Cairo". Major Converse added that on the extreme east coast elements of the South Korean Capital Division had reached a point two miles north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Rusk stated that although we did not have a great deal of information on the subject, there were indications of major troop movements in enemy rear areas and that the Chinese Communist First Field Army may become involved in Korea. He pointed out that such movements would indicate that the enemy intended to continue the conflict in Korea.

At this point Mr. Rusk requested that everyone except Mr. Hickerson and the chief foreign representatives leave the room. Mr. Rusk then informed the Ambassadors that General MacArthur's recent statement was unauthorized and unexpected and that steps had been taken to prevent further uncoordinated statements; further, that if the opposing Commander should by any chance seek discussions with MacArthur, the latter would refer to Washington for instructions.

795.00/3–2951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 29, 1951—12 : 52 p. m.

1342. Re Proposed Statement on Korea. Pursuant to telecons with Hickerson, Gross and Ross called on Entezam and Grafstrom late

Wednesday afternoon, Mar 28. Gross said that consistent with our desire to support GOC we wanted to keep them informed as fully as possible concerning our activities and thinking. He said consideration was being given to the issuance of a statement, probably President as Chief Executive of Govt designated by UN as UC. We were consulting govts with combat forces in Korea and indications received thus far from most of these govts were favorable. It was not yet certain but probable that statement would be issued. Idea of statement had been conceived before issuance MacArthur statement end of last week and there was no relation between two. Indicating that statement was not yet crystallized as document beyond working-level paper, Gross then summarized our thinking as to content of proposed statement.

Most significant aspect of ensuing discussion was that both Entezam and Graftstrom revealed substantial doubt concerning (*a*) desirability of issuing any statement; (*b*) if statement were to be issued whether issuance by President (UC) was most desirable form or method; and (*c*) if statement were to be issued whether now is appropriate time.

First question asked by both Entezam and Grafstrom was purpose or objective in issuing statement. Gross summarized purpose as follows: (*a*) To make clear beyond shadow of doubt that UC (and govts with combat forces) desired peaceful settlement Korean affair; (*b*) to reaffirm UN objectives in Korea; (*c*) to make clear there was no obligation (commitment) to take over (liberate) NK by force.

Analyzing pros and cons, Entezam then said on side of advantage he could see that it might be desirable (*a*) to clarify situation in a sense that might even be interpreted as directive to UC in field, and (*b*) to indicate that in victorious position UC (UN) was still desirous of peaceful settlement. On disadvantageous side Entezam wondered (*a*) about propriety of issuing statement in manner indicated and in this connection speculated about role of SC and GA in matter of this kind, and (*b*) while understanding that such statement might be desirable for our public opinion, whether Chi Communists would consider it as appeasement or as a threat.

Gross interposed that no threat was intended, referring in this connection to references to prevention spread of hostilities and specific reference to interests of neighboring states. Gross said Dept would, of course, be interested in knowing what Entezam and Grafstrom felt about possible effect of issuance of statement on work of GOC.

Entezam said that without any contact with Chi Communists it was difficult say what effect would be on GOC work. He said they were not in position at moment to tell Chinese Communists to hurry up with their reply. He assumed if statement were issued GOC would have duty of trying to interpret statement as an overture, that is, a new *démarche* or step in direction of peaceful settlement.

(Re contact with Chinese Communists, Grafstrom reported that Swedish Minister Peiping, inquiring of acting FonMin when Pres of GA might expect reply to communication, was promised by Acting FonMin he would take matter up his govt. This interview, which was apparently very recent, was not interpreted, however, as promise there would be reply).

Grafstrom, raising anew question of what is object of issuing statement, said there was nothing new in it, that it was not really a declaration of peace aims, that in one respect it was more rigid than five principles, and that with regard to Formosa and FE it seemed very vague. He concluded tentatively that statement would not improve chance of favorable reply from Chinese Communists re first steps toward peaceful settlement. Elaborating this thought Graftstrom at later point said that from what was known this would not be statement that would encourage Chinese Communists to "bite" if they have not already through other channels, e.g. Indians or GOC. He was frankly puzzled, therefore, as to why we felt it necessary to issue statement.

Entezam said he was quite sure that if any contact had been established with Chinese or were likely to be within short period, it would be better not to issue statement. Since there was no contact it was very difficult to know whether Communists would or would not respond favorably. As he understood it there was no intention of laying down any new policy or indicating any new direction of policy.

Gross expressed view that statement would in effect codify existing policy. He stressed psychological-political advantages to be gained by issuance of statement. Referring to Grafstrom's remarks, Gross indicated that statement, if issued, would carry general implication that without renouncing UN political objectives, political and not military methods should be used to achieve those objectives. While making clear that military task did not end at 38th Parallel statement would imply in effect that NK future settlement would be sought by political rather than by military means.

Entezam, agreeing with concept that 38th Parallel is not a military line, queried what would be next line from military view point. He thought it would be better to wait until that line is reached before issuing statement. Statement issued at that time in nature of "peace offer" and carrying implication that if peace offer were not accepted at that time military operations would continue, even if Chinese territory were involved, would be clearer and more convincing and generally understood as generous offer in victorious situation.

Gross indicated that we were engaged in Korea essentially in war of maneuver, not of lines. There was no evidence that Chinese communists had given up idea of new offensive or of their determination to drive UN forces into sea. It was difficult to imagine practical line which would ensure against Chinese Communist break through.

Grafstrom, conceding that statement might reassure Chinese Communists on point of renunciation of force to achieve political objectives, questioned whether issuance by Pres (UC) was right "form"; in other words, was this right approach from UN "constitutional viewpoint". He thought there might be better way of communicating idea to Chinese Communists. On balance he thought statement might make it more difficult to establish contact with them.

Gross observed that while we had to take Chinese Communist side of picture into account we should not, however, forget UN side and desirability of clarifying picture on that side.

Discussion concluded with suggestion by Entezam that if we really wanted statement to be known to Chinese Communists we might consider issuing it as major broadcast. Entezam was also interested in knowing whether anyone outside combat group had been consulted, to which we replied in negative. He was then quite insistent that our discussion be kept secret so that they would be in position of disclaiming any knowledge of statement before reading about it in the papers. He agreed, however, that it might be appropriate for us later to state publicly we had given to GOC members copies of statement shortly before issuance "for their information."

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795.00/3-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Korea

Participants: M. Edmund P. Callebaut, Belgian Embassy
Ward P. Allen—EUR

Calling at his request, M. Callebaut expressed a desire to be brought up to date on the issuance of the draft statement on Korea and probable developments. Claiming to be speaking only privately, M. Callebaut expressed some doubts about the present utility and timing of the statement, particularly in its relationship to General MacArthur's statement of March 24th. He felt that, while portions of the latter were very indiscreet, the subsequent "disclaimer and rebuke" by the US Government was very strong indeed. The proposed statement if immediately issued might be interpreted as further "backing away" from MacArthur's views and a weakening of our position in the face of the Chinese Communists' rejection.[1] He referred in this connection to the importance of not undercutting MacArthur's basic position in the area as the Supreme Commander. M. Callebaut suggested that the statement might contain a reference to General MacArthur's statement and explain that it was by way of clarification of the former.

As to the statement itself, I indicated that we have now received favorable comments from all countries consulted, except the UK, whose views would, I hope, be forthcoming shortly. The text was in process of revision to incorporate most of the drafting comments made by various countries but had not been changed in substance. No decision had been reached on the timing of possible issuance and the pertinent views he had put forward we, of course, were bearing in mind. As a personal view, I said that it seemed unlikely that a statement would be issued this week.

M. Callebaut expressed interest in our estimate of the possibilities of full scale Soviet intervention. He indicated some fear that the USSR was planning to soft pedal its activities in Europe, move against the US in Korea and Japan in the relatively near future, and seek to woo Europe into maintaining a neutral position. Without speculating on Soviet intentions, I expressed confidence that any such maneuver if it were attempted would not succeed, provided his government and others were determined not to be fooled by it. Since the USSR usually likes to use its satellites and stooges and prefers not to commit itself directly until it feels fairly confident of victory, this should make them pause before deciding on any full scale warfare in Korea.

When I suggested as perhaps a more imminent possibility a holding action in Korea and a strong Chinese Communist offensive in Indochina, M. Callebaut agreed that this would be tempting to Peiping. However, according to the views of the Counselor of the Belgian Embassy, who had just come from China, the Communist hold in South China is relatively weak. Since the Southern warlords are not convinced Communists, their allegiance to Peiping is not firm. He felt, therefore, that the warlords and chiefs would be very reluctant either to send the troops under their control into Indochina and thus deprive themselves of their local strength, or to acquiesce in the influx of northern Chinese armies in order for them to start an offensive in Vietnam.

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[1] On March 29, Peking radio had broadcast a statement issued on the previous day by the spokesman of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace and Against U.S. Aggression which termed MacArthur's statement an insult and an attempt to intimidate the Chinese people and called for a redoubled effort to liberate all of Korea by driving out the aggressors whose primary intention was to invade China from Korea (795.00/3-3051).

Editorial Note

At his news conference on the afternoon of March 29, President Truman was asked several questions on the MacArthur statement and the 38th parallel. He made no comment on the former matter, and on the latter simply reiterated the United States position that there had been no change in the basic policy favoring unification of Korea which did not, however, imply that United Nations forces would proceed to the Yalu. The General's instructions, he said, remained unchanged, affording him tactical authority to cross the parallel, but no one, continued the President, could anticipate the eventual military situation in Korea. The President several times referred to and expressed consonance with a statement made by Secretary of Defense Marshall on March 27 to the effect that a general advance across the parallel would be a matter for political and not military decision. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pages 203–207)

795.00/3–3051 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Hong Kong, March 30, 1951—noon.

2823. In conversation at ConGen, former Brit Chargé at Peiping Hutchison expressed belief that fear of US intentions was important factor impelling Chi Commies to intervene Korea. He felt Chi leaders convinced by US action Korea, aid to Vietnam and Siam and plans for strong Japan that they being encircled. They believe US milit leaders bent on stifling development of Chi revolution and preventing Chi from taking position of leadership in Asia which rightfully due her. Consequently, they considered UN action Korea carried out by MacArthur to be real threat, since, in their view UN controlled by US. Chi explain failure of UN so far to attack Manchuria as due to UN fear it wld bring USSR. Hutchison thinks Chi believe Russia will come their aid if Chi terr attacked.

Hutchison believes Chi will not accept cease-fire Korea unless their demands for simultaneous action on Chi Commie representation UN and Formosa question are met. However, he believes heavy losses being inflicted on them will have salutary effect and may lead to typically Chi settlement in form of undeclared cease-fire which wld in effect restore situation prevailing before June 1950. He saw no evidence of dissension within CCP over Korea war nor was there anything but rumor to indicate whether "internationalist" and "Nationalist" clique exist within party.

Hutchison considers Chi Commies primarily interested in reconstruction of country which likely take 20 to 30 years, by which time Chi leaders will have become much more Chi and less [garbled group] Commie than is case today. He minimizes Russian influence on Chi feeling that since Mao and Chi came to power with very little Russian aid they are unlikely to submit to Russian dictatorship. He sees Chi leaders as convinced Marxist-Leninists, but believes they think of themselves rather than Kremlin as leader of Asia. However, the more pressure the West exerts on Chi the more Chi will be forced to depend on USSR and the less able act independently. Russians are not much in evidence in Peiping according to Hutchison and there is no fraternization between them and Chinese.

Hutchison much impressed efficiency and integrity of Commie officials. However, he appeared to have very little concrete info about conditions Chi. He said, for example he had no way of knowing whether Korea war and Amer embargo had had any effect on Chi economy.

McConaughy

795.00/3-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [Washington,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: President's Statement on Korea

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

Mr. Tomlinson called at his request this afternoon and handed us a copy of the attached telegram from the Foreign Office to the Embassy.

Mr. Rusk commented to Mr. Tomlinson on the telegram as follows:

1. With respect to the first paragraph, we agree that every opportunity should be explored to avoid further military operations, but we doubt that such operations can be avoided or that the Chinese will be prepared to enter into any discussions whatever, at least until after they have undertaken and failed in another major offensive.

2. We agree that it is not likely that the Chinese Government will cooperate with the Good Offices Committee. We have no objection in principle to the inclusion of additional countries in a statement of policy, but must note that as the number of countries is increased the difficulty of obtaining agreement is also increased and the statement tends to assume the level of the lowest common denominator. Mr. Rusk pointed out that in addition to India, Sweden and Denmark, who have contributed medical and ambulance units, one could well include such countries as Norway who have contributed shipping facilities. Mr. Tomlinson commented that it appeared that the Foreign Office was seeking a formula under which particularly India and possibly Sweden could be included.

3. With regard to paragraph 3*a* of the telegram, in so far as it goes we agree with it as a statement of policy attitude. However, it appeared to us that one of the problems was how one maintained this policy attitude without confusing it with the war aims. In reply to Mr. Rusk's questions, Mr. Tomlinson indicated that the Embassy had no indication whatever as to how the Foreign Office thought that such a declaration might read, nor whether the declaration which the Foreign Office had in mind meant the same as the draft statement which we had submitted to them for comment.

4. With respect to paragraph 3*b* of the telegram, we could perceive some merit in separating the joint declaration from the military declaration. However, any military declaration would have to take into account the military necessities of the situation and our ideas with regard to the conditions under which hostilities could be terminated in general remained about the same as those included in the January 2, 1951, report of the Cease-Fire Committee.

5. With respect to paragraph 3*c* there seemed to us to be danger in inviting the Chinese and Soviets to express their views as to the best method of terminating hostilities as this gave them a very advantageous negotiating position and a further opportunity to exploit differences in the UN on this subject. We felt that it was much preferable to determine the principles upon which hostilities could be terminated and then submit those principles to the Communists.

6. Paragraph 4 of the telegram gave us no difficulty and we were inclined to agree. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Tomlinson whether there was any indication that the United Kingdom channel to Peking was available and that Peking would be responsive. Mr. Tomlinson replied that they had no such indications except that Peking accepted written communications from them.

7. Paragraph 5 of the telegram did not present any particular difficulty to us.

8. It is difficult for us to comment on paragraph 6 in the absence of any UK comments on our proposed statement and a clear indication of the type of declaration that the UK had in mind under paragraph 3*a* of the telegram.

9. With respect to paragraph 7, if the implication was that the Government of the Republic of Korea had to be wiped out and a fresh start made in South Korea, we were unable to accept this view. Mr. Tomlinson replied that he was certain that this was not the implication of the paragraph, but that it related to the question of

the authority of the Republic of Korea over territory north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the attached message was also being transmitted to the participating Commonwealth Governments and to France for their comments as well as to the UK Delegation at New York. Mr. Rusk raised the question as to whether there would be any objection in London to the UK's discussing with the remaining members of the 13-nation group what the UK had in mind. However, after some discussion, Mr. Tomlinson agreed that it might be preferable to obtain further clarification before undertaking any additional conversations.

Mr. Tomlinson indicated that the Embassy would immediately transmit a message to London along the lines of the foregoing discussion and Mr. Rusk indicated that as they were working on the text of the declaration mentioned in paragraph 3*a* of the telegram we would be studying the possibility of a statement in accordance with paragraph 3*b*.

[Annex]

Telegram by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)[1] *to the British Ambassador in Washington (Franks)*

SECRET [undated.]

I wish you to discuss with the State Department the possibility of a new approach to a negotiated settlement in Korea. We must not miss the chance, now that we are near the parallel, to examine whether further military operations can be avoided.

2. It is, however, now almost certain that the Chinese Government will not cooperate with the Good Offices Committee and it is for consideration whether the objectives of the Good Offices Committee might not be attained by other means. If, for example, we could secure a clear statement of policy in regard to Korea, agreed to by all the countries with forces in Korea (I should hope that India, Sweden and Denmark who have contributed medical and ambulance services might also be associated) and specifically endorsed, as regards its military implications, by the unified command, then I think that we would have a basis for an approach to Peking both direct and perhaps through Moscow in order to explore Chinese readiness to come to a negotiated settlement by some procedure other than through the Good Offices Committee.

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[1] Herbert Morrison succeeded Ernest Bevin following the latter's resignation on March 9, due to illness. Mr. Bevin died on April 14, 1951.

3. A possible programme might be

(*a*) A joint declaration by all the nations with forces in Korea, expressing their desire to see an independent unified Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign troops; and their readiness to achieve these objectives by negotiation rather than by military means

(*b*) A simultaneous additional declaration by President Truman in his capacity as Chief executive of the state providing the unified command to make it plain that the military implications of the policy outlined in the Declaration were fully accepted by the Unified Command;

(*c*) After publication of these two statements of policy, an approach to the Chinese and perhaps to the Soviet Government drawing their attention to the joint declaration, expressing desire for a peaceful settlement in Korea and inviting the Chinese and Soviet Governments to express their views as to the best means of bringing this about.

4. The approach to the Soviet Government would be on somewhat different lines from the approach to Peking and might be made by France, the United States and the United Kingdom. The approach to Peking might be by India and ourselves. The Swedish Government might also consent to transmit a message.

5. Strictly speaking, the powers providing forces etc. in Korea are not *ipso facto* entitled to speak for the United Nations. They are, however, entitled to make a collective pronouncement about the aims for which their forces, etc. are being used, and in any case these aims coincide with the expressed objectives of the United Nations. Such a pronouncement, coupled with a specific endorsement of its military implications by the unified command, should carry weight with the Chinese and Russians and may prove useful as a lever to open the way to negotiations.

6. I would like you to put these ideas to the State Department as soon as possible. In these circumstances it is not necessary for me to comment in detail on the draft statement to be issued by the unified command contained in your telegram No. 838 as amended by your telegram No. 845.[2] I note that in any case the United States Government intended to delay issuing this declaration on account of General MacArthur's latest statement. His statement is indeed an additional reason for considering some entirely new procedure as it is now unlikely that any further statement by the Unified Command alone would be taken seriously by the Chinese.

7. I am repeating this telegram to the UKDel New York for comment as it is important to avoid confusion with the efforts of the Good Offices Committee. I hope however that the Committee would welcome the procedure outlined above. If this new approach were

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[2] For the text of the draft Presidential statement of March 23, see p. 263.

generally approved by the Governments concerned and finally resulted in negotiations, it would of course be important to associate the United Nations at a later stage with whatever settlement was agreed upon. We must try to ensure, if it is humanly possible that a negotiated settlement and withdrawal of United Nations forces do not result in the spread of Communism throughout Korea. The United Nations would therefore have to be brought into the picture for the purposes of supervision of elections, rehabilitation etc. These are not immediate issues, but we must not lose sight of them.

8. It is difficult to assess Chinese readiness to talk or the chances of their responding to a new approach but at the risk of a rebuff I think that we would be well advised to make the effort.[3]

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[3] At 6 p. m. in the evening of March 30, Messrs. Acheson and Rusk met with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman who was in Washington in connection with the visit of French President Auriol, March 28–April 2. Most of their discussion on Korea dealt with the British proposal contained in Morrison's telegram to Franks. The U.S. minutes of the meeting read in part as follows:

"Mr. Schuman said that the proposal sounded interesting and deserving of consideration. It would, of course, have to be studied. Mr. Rusk said that we had asked the British for further clarification of their proposal. The Secretary added that he hoped that if Peiping and Moscow were approached they would come up with different answers. Mr. Schuman said that perhaps three different statements might be too many. Mr. Rusk stated that this might all be academic since the Chinese seemed determined to proceed with their military offensive and not take any political action before that. Mr. Schuman inquired whether London was aware of the military situation. Mr. Rusk replied that they perhaps were not completely briefed on the developments of the past three days. The Secretary added that this posed a very difficult problem for President Truman. General MacArthur's unexpected statement had added to the confusion. President Truman had withheld comment until he had time for consultation with the other powers. Once the various points of view had been coordinated a concerted effort for a peaceful settlement could be made. Mr. Rusk added that keeping in touch with 14 governments is a difficult method of forming policy and does not represent an easy technique. This brought up the question of whether all 14 countries should have to define the policy to be followed. It must be borne in mind, however, that the general policy remains unchanged as it was defined by the UN but due to the fact that the General Assembly is not in session and that the Security Council is paralyzed by the Soviet Union, the 14 governments in question appear to be the group best suited for defining any international action which may be necessitated by the circumstances of the moment. Mr. Schuman asked whether the British did not want to add to the 14 countries. Mr. Rusk replied that they did. Mr. Schuman asked whether the 14 governments should take a position on the basis of the British proposal. The Secretary clarified that in his last remarks. Mr. Rusk referred to the US proposed statement and that it was not suggested that the 14 governments should define a new policy but stated that President Truman as the Chief of State of the country designated as the Unified Command could consult with the 14 countries in order to determine how the policy laid down by the UN could be best complied with and how a specific solution could be best reached. However, in principle, the policy determined by the UN was still being followed.

"Mr. Schuman asked whether there was any indication of a disposition on the part of the Chinese to negotiate. The Secretary answered that there was none whatever. Mr. Rusk said that the basic Chinese condition had remained the same for months, namely, withdrawal from Korea and Formosa and a seat in the UN. Their policy was to force the UN troops to evacuate Korea. Mr. Schuman said that this had indeed been announced by Stalin himself." (795.00/3–3051)

Full documentation on the visits of Prime Minister Pleven and President Auriol to Washington, January 29–30, and March 28–April 2, is contained in volume IV.

357.AD/3-3051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 30, 1951—6:20 p. m.

1350. Appeal by UNCURK to NK people and political leaders. Confirming telecon with Hickerson, Cordier telephoned Ross to say cable had been received from Stavropoulos, Secy of UNCURK, indicating UNCURK was considering making appeal to NK people and political leaders to cease war and to enter into negotiations with comm with view to settlement in Korea. Comm interested in getting Lie's views, requesting that this approach be considered highly confidential. Cordier asked that we respect confidential character and asked for our views.

Ross reminded Cordier that in recent conversation with him and Lie concerning general idea of approach to NK's, Gross had indicated great risk possibly involved in any approach that would leave Chicom's free from any commitment. Ross also suggested that Lie might wish to send cable strongly recommending against hasty action pending opportunity to think through question. Cordier said this was Lie's own view and that such cable would be sent today. Ross indicated any views Dept might have would be communicated promptly as possible.

AUSTIN

357.AD/3-3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 30, 1951—8 p. m.

824. Re Ross-Hickerson telecon concerning reported intention UNCURK to issue cease-fire appeal addressed to North Koreans:

Dept has little doubt authority UNCURK to make proposed appeal, in view very broad terms of reference in Oct 7 Res GA. In Dept's view, however, it might be desirable for UNCURK, prior to issuing any such appeal, to discuss with GOC, which under subsequent GA Res has broad authority to exercise its good offices to bring about peaceful settlement in Korea. If it is decided that it wld serve useful purpose to approach or appeal to North Korean authorities, US certainly wld not wish to make objection. We have repeatedly made it clear that we do not wish in any way to interfere with efforts to bring about peaceful settlement.

You may indicate foregoing informally to Cordier or GOC. If asked for Dept's views on merits of proposal, you may add that we do not have much faith in effectiveness of approach or appeal to North Koreans to bring about peace.

ACHESON

795B.5/3-3151

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the letters which have been exchanged between our Departments on the question of obtaining additional ground force contingents for service in Korea, this Department has noted with some concern the limited prospects outlined in your letter of 23 February.

I appreciate the intricate and highly difficult problems involved. Nevertheless, in the light of the current situation in Korea, the Department of Defense considers that an opportune moment is at hand to renew the requests for fuller participation by members of the United Nations in the Korean action. The heavy commitments of United States ground troops, the casualties suffered, the long months of unrelieved combat duty and the desirability of redeploying battle-tested soldiers to form key cadres for our own mobilization, and for their further redeployment to strategic areas, make it all the more imperative that United States units be relieved for rotation. A long period will be required to strengthen the forces of the Republic of Korea to a point where they may relieve United States combat units.

The primary objective in making such a renewed approach should be to obtain real rather than token assistance. Within the general policy outlined in my letter of 30 January, I requested that our efforts be renewed in order to obtain additional assistance from those countries which seem able to provide contingents of worthwhile size and to furnish these contingents a reasonable share of the equipment and support required for service in Korea.

Specifically, we are hopeful that Australia, New Zealand and Canada might increase the size of their present forces and it would be desirable if it could be done without interference with the NATO schedules for Great Britain to bring her forces up to division strength. Mexico and Brazil appear to have the military manpower to enable contribution of effective size and we suggest other Latin American Republics might contribute contingents of acceptable strength.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

795.00/3-3151

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to our discussion regarding Korea on 19 March 1951 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[1] I am transmitting herewith, for your information and consideration, a memorandum of 27 March 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States position regarding an armistice in Korea. These views supersede those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which were submitted to the National Security Council on 13 December 1950 (NSC 95).[2]

I am in general agreement with the terms, conditions and arrangements enumerated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Joint Chiefs memorandum. However, I believe that the questions of Formosa and Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations, as well as other general political and security factors referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be fitting topics in the consideration of basic terms of settlement of the Korean situation, and might be taken up in discussions between our two Departments on the overall question of Korea.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 27 March 1951.

Subject: United States Position Regarding An Armistice in Korea.

1. In the course of the meeting on 19 March 1951 which you attended with the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question was posed by the Secretary of State as to whether or not the armistice terms, as set forth in the memorandum to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 12 December 1950, were still valid.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, have formulated the following views on the broader problem of the termination of hostilities in Korea which supersede the views furnished you in their memorandum dated 12 December 1950.

3. The Chinese Communists and the North Korean forces are now suffering especially heavy losses. Any arrangement which did not

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Nitze, March 19, p. 246.

[2] The views of the Joint Chiefs were contained in a memorandum dated December 12, 1950 from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1529.

prejudice their position in Korea but which would end the infliction of large losses on the Communists would be greatly to their advantage. Conversely, an arrangement which would require United Nations forces to remain in Korea, and which did not prejudice the position of the Communist forces there, would be greatly to our disadvantage. Such an arrangement would, in all probability, jeopardize the security of our forces, constitute an unwarranted drain on our military resources, and tie down our forces in Korea almost as effectively as if they were engaged in combat. From the military point of view, therefore, an armistice arrangement of itself would not, even temporarily, constitute an acceptable solution of the Korean situation.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the present military situation in Korea may be conducive to a satisfactory resolution of the immediate over-all problem by political action. Specifically, it may be possible to take political action to end the aggression, to conclude the fighting and insure against its resumption. Such a resolution of the situation, however, must provide for a termination of hostilities in Korea only under circumstances which would make possible the ultimate attainment of our objective without forfeiture of, or prejudice to, our general position with respect to the USSR, and with specific respect to Formosa, and to seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations.

5. In view of the foregoing, any armistice arrangement must, from the military point of view, be contingent upon the acceptance of a general agreement which protects the over-all security interests of the United States. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur in any armistice agreement which does not include the terms, conditions, and arrangements set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 below, and particularly in subparagraph 6*a*. Further, these must be agreed to by all governments and authorities concerned, including North Korea and Communist China, prior to the implementation of any armistice arrangement.

6. The armistice arrangement:

a. Must be contingent upon the acceptance by the Communists of a general agreement to end the aggression and to accept basic terms of settlement satisfactory to the United States;

b. Shall be confined to Korea;

c. Shall require all governments and authorities concerned, including North Korea and Communist China, to order a cessation of all acts of armed force; the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and all ground forces to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof;

d. Shall provide for supervision of the general arrangements, as well as specific details, by an Armistice Committee (under a Peace Commission designated by the General Assembly of the United Nations), which Committee shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. This Committee may, if necessary, be assisted by a limited number of observers designated by the Chinese Communist and/or North Korean forces;

e. Shall require all governments and authorities concerned to cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing units or personnel, including volunteers, during the armistice period. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the administrative relief of individual personnel on a man-for-man basis;

f. Shall require all governments and authorities to refrain from introducing additional war equipment and material into Korea. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Committee, and

g. Shall continue in effect until the details of a permanent settlement of the Korean situation have been arranged.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following specific details to be essential to the above armistice arrangement:

a. The Armistice Committee must be competent to inspect to insure that the terms, conditions and arrangements as agreed to will be carried out by all armed forces, including guerrillas in Korea. It shall be provided with a sufficient number of competent military observers to enable it to carry out its duties and functions;

b. Its provisions should not become effective until the Committee has been organized and is in position to exercise its functions. The Committee shall report promptly to the General Assembly of the United Nations all violations of the armistice arrangement;

c. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, centered at or north of the 38th parallel. Its exact location shall be determined by the Armistice Committee on the basis of the position of the opposing ground units in combat at the time;

d. The armistice arrangement shall apply to:

(1) All opposing ground forces in Korea, wherever located. In addition, those forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas in advance thereof;

(2) All opposing naval forces in the Korean area which shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces, to the limit of three miles offshore. Naval units designated by the Committee for sea transport, supply, evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing provision while such units are engaged in these duties and have on board a representative of the Committee; and

(3) All opposing air forces which shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas in advance thereof. Air units designated by the Committee for air transport, supply, evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing provision while such units are engaged in these duties and have on board a representative of the Committee.

e. Teams of military observers appointed by the committee together with such United Nations Armed Guards as may be available and considered appropriate by the Committee shall have freedom of movement anywhere throughout all Korea;

f. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expeditiously as possible;

g. Organized bodies of armed forces initially in advance of the demilitarized zone shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces. Guerrillas, both north and south of the demilitarized zone, shall be withdrawn and be granted safe conduct through the demilitarized area under terms and conditions to be established by the Committee;

h. Nothing in the agreement shall preclude commanders in the field from providing for the security of their forces, supplies, and installations, except that no security forces for this purpose will be permitted within the demilitarized area;[3]

i. The Committee shall be responsible for civil government, including police functions, in the demilitarized zone; and

j. Refugees shall not be allowed to migrate in either direction into or across the demilitarized area.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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[3] At the State–JCS meeting on March 28 a copy of this paper was given to Messrs. Rusk and Nitze to read. Mr. Nitze observed that it was a very helpful paper, but raised the point that paragraph 7*h* might open the way to the Chinese Communists to advance a requirement for putting additional forces into Korea to protect their security. General Collins replied that this paragraph was a holdover from an earlier draft and agreed that it was unnecessary and perhaps undesirable. Admiral Sherman expressed agreement, after which the minutes indicated that there was general concurrence. (State–JCS Meeting, March 28, 1951; Department of State Draft Minutes: Lot File 64D563, Box 728)

795.00/4–251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Korea: Conversation With the Australian Ambassador

Participants: Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin
Mr. David W. McNichol, Second Secretary of the Australian Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
BNA—Mr. Shullaw[1]

Ambassador Makin called on me today at his request to ask for our comments on the *aide-mémoire* which he had left with Mr. Johnson last week. The *aide-mémoire* dealt with the question of the 38th parallel.[2] Before discussing the *aide-mémoire*, however, the Ambassador asked whether it was still our intention to have the President issue a statement on political objectives in Korea.

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[1] J. Harold Shullaw, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.

I told the Ambassador that we had had replies from all of the countries contributing armed forces for the Korean operations to whom we had circulated copies of the proposed statement. These replies, with the exception of that from the United Kingdom, appear to be close enough together to permit agreement on a statement. The United Kingdom, however, in its reply made three points, the implications of which are not entirely clear to us. These points were: 1) The nations on whose behalf the statement was to be issued should be expanded to include those countries sending hospital units and those which intended to supply armed forces at a later date. I remarked that this obviously would make it more difficult to reach agreement on the text of the statement. 2) There should be a second statement affirming that the countries issuing the statement on political objectives accepted the military implications. I remarked that we did not know precisely what was meant by this suggestion. 3) There should be an additional appeal to Moscow and Peiping reiterating our desire for peaceful settlement and inquiring whether the Soviet Union or Communist China had any suggestions to offer. I pointed out that acceptance of this suggestion would place us in a bad tactical position.

The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his government to say that Australia considered General MacArthur's recent statement as exceeding his authority. Mr. Makin asked whether we were in a position to give any assurance that such statements would not be made in the future. I told the Ambassador that General MacArthur's statement was unauthorized and unexpected and that steps have been taken at the highest level of the United States government to insure that this does not happen again.

Ambassador Makin said that his government is of the opinion that if and when the proposed statement by the President is issued, it might be desirable to indicate that discussions had been in progress with the interested governments since March 16 thus indicating that it was not a reaction to the MacArthur statement.

The Ambassador inquired whether we had had any indication of a willingness on the part of the Peiping regime to negotiate a settlement in Korea. I told him that we had received no indication that the Chinese Communists had abandoned their announced intention of driving the United Nations forces from Korea. I remarked that on the contrary the recent heavy buildup of the Chinese forces north of the parallel appeared to indicate that another attack was contemplated within the next few weeks or possibly days.

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[2] The Australian *aide-mémoire* of March 28 expressed the view that tactical crossing of the 38th parallel should be permitted the U.N. Commander but urged that there be no general offensive north of the line other than to secure the best defensive position possible in proximity to the parallel. The long term objective of peaceful unification of Korea was not to be abandoned, but was obviously not practically achievable at the present time by military means. (795.00/3-2851)

The Ambassador asked what progress had been made with the proposed Pacific pact[3] and whether we were firmly committed to inclusion in it of the Philippines. I told him that we were still awaiting a reply from the British and hoped that we would receive it within the next few days. I said that so far as the Philippines were concerned this did constitute a problem for us, but that it might be possible to handle the matter in some other way than by including them in a pact with Australia and New Zealand. In any case, however, our minds were not closed on the subject.

In concluding the conversation I told the Ambassador that we were in general agreement with the points made in his *aide-mémoire* of March 28 on the subject of the 38th parallel and our political and military objectives in Korea.

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[3] For related documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 132 ff.

396.1-PA/4-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951—6 p. m.

5207. Eyes only for Jessup and Bohlen. Because of several indications including Lie's suggestions to Gross (relayed to Paris as Deptel 4831)[1] we suspect that Gromyko may be authorized to discuss privately possibilities of a negotiated settlement of Korean conflict.[2] In view of delicacy of subject and intervening developments we believe that exploration of Soviet attitude shld begin one level below Gromyko.

Therefore, we suggest that Bohlen[3] go on a fishing expedition with Lavrentiev.[4] If no objection perceived will he please contrive to meet alone with Lavrentiev and create an opportunity for Lavrentiev to unburden himself of Soviet reactions to Korean situation and, particularly, Soviet thinking on a settlement of the Korean conflict.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 248.

[2] At the State–JCS meeting on the next day, Mr. Nitze made the following statement:

"There are indications that the Soviet Union wants to negotiate. Zinchenko—who is one of the Soviet citizens on the U.N. Secretariat—suggested to Lie that Gromyko and Jessup should discuss this problem in Paris. It seems to us that he would not have made this suggestion unless the Soviet Union sincerely desired to negotiate." (State–JCS Meeting, April 4, 1951; Lot File 64D563, Box 728)

[3] Charles E. Bohlen, Minister at the American Embassy in Paris, was a member of the U.S. Delegation headed by Mr. Jessup to the Deputies meetings currently underway in Paris (see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.).

[4] A. I. Lavrentiev, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, was a member of the Soviet Delegation headed by Mr. Gromyko to the Deputies meetings.

These instructions are of course designed only to draw out Soviet position and in no way to commit ourselves to anything beyond already announced aims of UN in Korea.

As this would be an informal approach, simply giving the Russians an opportunity to speak their piece, you shld not inform Davies and Parodi of the projected meeting. After Bohlen has had the conversation and if there is any development of the situation we can then consider their desirability of informing British and French.

ACHESON

795.00/4–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951—7 p. m.

827. At briefing meeting reps of nations with troops in Korea, Apr 3, Rusk stated:

1. By Fri, Apr 6, we hope to have further observations to make on contemplated UC statement.[1] By then, we expect all govt comments will be in and we will see where we stand. We are not at all frozen to proposition that such statement shld in fact be issued. Observations to date indicate general agreement on content but some questions have been raised as to whether statement is worth going ahead with. It may be that if certain govts have particular problems vis-à-vis their own public, these might best be handled by separate statements designed primarily for domestic consumption. We hope to be able discuss this entire question too on Fri.

2. As we have indicated, build up of enemy forces points to possibility of strong enemy offensive, and we are anticipating such an offensive. We are increasingly concerned that in connection with such an offensive there may be heavy enemy air attack. We do not have any firm indications, but there has been increased air activity reported and intelligence sources indicate build up of air strength in Manchuria including 2-engine bombers. While we may be out of range of MIGs based in Manchuria, heavy 2-engine bombers from bases north of Yalu cld endanger our troops, our ships at sea, as well as our bases in Japan. We are vulnerable to heavy air attacks especially since our troops have gotten used to fighting without fear of enemy air opposition. Our ports are generally unprotected except for friendly aircraft. If in the opening phase of an enemy attack, there shld be heavy air offensive, enemy cld do us considerable damage.

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[1] For Mr. Rusk's comments at the April 6 briefing, see circular telegram 601, April 9, p. 317.

US has always been anxious to keep fighting localized in Korea. Even from a military point of view, it is perhaps to our advantage to fight battle in Korea without having to face attacks on our troops and ships from Chinese and Russian planes. Other side presumably was equally content not to have their bases and installations on Chinese territory attacked by our bombers. We have always made clear however, [See Deptel 642, Jan 12[*20*]] [2] our concern about security of our forces in event that enemy shld decide to launch massive air attacks. And if such attacks shld come, we wld have to meet in any way we cld.

Rusk stressed that we have no firm info but that we were concerned with matter and wanted to inform in preliminary way other nations fighting in Korea.

ACHESON

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[2] *Ante*, p. 109. Outer brackets are in the source text.

357.AD/4–451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, April 4, 1951—11:50 a. m.

1359. Re UNCURK. Re Deptel 824, March 30. During conversation April 3 in SYG's office, Trygve Lie handed Austin and Hickerson copies following "strictly confidential" cables recently exchanged between Stavropoulos and Cordier re suggested UNCURK appeal to North Korean authorities. Lie commented that he would continue to try to hold UNCURK in check if members persist in idea of sending appeal at this time.

1. "Some members commission are considering possibility of commission making appeal addressed North Korean people and political leaders to cease war and negotiate with Commission on unification of Korea. What is reaction Secretary-General and if in affirmative what would be best means for transmitting appeal. Commission may discuss matter Thursday or Friday and I would therefore appreciate early reply. Please communicate this only to Secretary-General." (Foregoing from Stavropoulos to Cordier dated March 29.)

2. "Secretary-General believes that in present state delicate negotiations with Peking Government and status relationship with North Korean authorities it would be premature commission to make separate appeal to North Koreans.

"Secretary-General is giving serious consideration to role to be played by commission in present situation and will keep you advised." (Foregoing from Cordier to Stavropoulos dated March 30.)

AUSTIN

396.1-PA/4-451 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 4, 1951—2 p. m.

5920. Eyes only for Secretary from Jessup and Bohlen. We have serious doubts as to advisability of procedure suggested in Deptel 5207, April 3 for following reasons:

1. It is almost impossible to arrange a special meeting alone with any member of the Soviet delegation in such fashion as to avoid comment.
2. In any case, Lavrentiev in our opinion would not be the proper person to approach. It is our distinct impression that Gromyko pays little attention to Lavrentiev. (For example: At luncheons although Lavrentiev understands no English, Gromyko conducts luncheon conversations entirely in English without even bothering to interpret or consult with Lavrentiev.) It is, therefore, highly doubtful even if discreet meeting could be arranged that Lavrentiev would in any sense give Soviet reaction to Korean situation.
3. Gromyko has reputation of being very sensitive as to his position and might easily resent going behind his back on matter of this character. We would have to assume it would be immediately reported to him and Gromyko's reaction might cause complications with danger of leakage if not approach to French and British.

Although he is stationed in Berlin, it is our impression that Semenov[1] has more standing than Lavrentiev and is furthermore more clear-headed and competent individual. The only opportunity of a private conversation of this nature with Semenov would be during the tea interval at conference and would of necessity be extremely brief. The most that could be done in our view is for Bohlen to mention casually to Semenov during tea interval if opportunity presented itself obvious importance that Korean question would have on the atmosphere of meeting of the four ministers and if he agreed to ask him what present Soviet thinking was as to possibility of settlement of that question. Since we believe Semenov is acute and quick to take any hint, if there is any Soviet interest, he would logically return to this subject in an equally informal manner at later time during conference. We do feel that this is extremely delicate and tricky and it would be very dangerous to attempt to be more definite or to go farther in the initial step.

Please instruct.[2] [Jessup and Bohlen.]

BOHLEN

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[1] Vladimir Semenov, Political Adviser to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, was a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Deputies meetings in Paris.

[2] The Department replied in telegram 5220, April 4, 4 p. m., to Paris, the text of which read as follows:

"Dept concurs suggestion last para urtel for approach to Semenov by Bohlen." (396.1-PA/4-451)

357.AD/4-451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 4, 1951—5:42 p. m.

1362. (1) Re Asian-Arab group mtg;
(2) Proposed action by UNCURK;

. . . .

Romulo (Philippines) called Gross re following:

(1) On April 3, Romulo, Palar (Indo) and Fawzi (Egypt) met at Lie's luncheon for President Auriol, and discussion among three led to conclusion that something useful might be done to help efforts of GOC. Accordingly, a mtg of the 13 member Asian-Arab group is planned for 10:30 a. m., April 5, at apartment of Sir B. N. Rau. Romulo said he had expressed opinion to Fawzi and Palar that no step taken by Asian-Arab group would have much chance of success unless acceptable to UC. Romulo therefore asked if we had any comments.

Gross advised Romulo of approach by Rau concerning possible appeal to UN not to cross 38th parallel (mytel No. 1330, March 26). Gross outlined US views to Romulo in accordance with Deptel No. 819, March 27,[1] and Romulo agreed to take this position if suggestion were raised at Rau meeting.

In reply to request by Romulo for affirmative suggestion, Gross expressed view that it might be useful for Asian-Arab group to suggest to CPG, either privately or publicly, that it reply to Entezam approach, which has remained unanswered for some weeks. Gross also reminded Romulo of appeal which had been made by Asian-Arab group last Dec to CPG not to cross 38th parallel.[2]

(2) Romulo said he had received word via Manila from Philippine member UNCURK that UNCURK was contemplating an appeal to "peace-loving people of Korea" and offering its services. Gross advised Romulo we had received similar information from SYG (ourtel No. 1350, Mar 30), and in response to Romulo's request for our attitude toward the suggestion. Gross outlined views contained in Deptel No. 824, Mar. 30. Gross expressed personal agreement with Romulo's view that it would be acceptable to discuss question with GOC before any overt action were taken by UNCURK.

. . . .

AUSTIN

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 270.

[2] For the text of the appeal, made on December 5, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1408.

S/S Files : NSC 101 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1951.

Subject: Military Action in Korea

1. In view of the arrival of United Nations ground forces in the vicinity of the 38th parallel in Korea and in the light of current United States policy toward Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following as the United States military position toward Korea under conditions now obtaining:

a. If the USSR precipitates a general war, United Nations forces should be withdrawn from Korea as rapidly as possible and deployed for service elsewhere; and

b. If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to be critical to the safety of the United Nations forces, United Nations forces should be withdrawn. The United States should then mobilize in readiness for general war.

2. If general war is not precipitated by the USSR prior to the resolution of the Korean problem:

a. If the immediate objectives of the strategy of the USSR are in Western Europe, it would be to the advantage of that nation for the maximum number of United Nations Forces to remain in Korea. On the other hand, if the immediate objectives of the USSR are in the Far East, it would be to the advantage of that nation for United Nations forces to leave Korea; and

b. It would be greatly to the advantage of the Communists to bring about an armistice which would leave their military forces in Korea. Such an armistice would be greatly to the disadvantage of the United Nations forces inasmuch as it would constitute an unwarranted drain on our military resources, and would keep our forces in Korea.

3. The Korean problem cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States by military action alone. Further, because the Korean problem is a symptom of world tension, a satisfactory resolution of that problem probably cannot be achieved by politico-military action which is confined to Korea; rather, a resolution of that problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States is not to be expected unless and until there is a general relaxation of world tensions.

4. In the light of all of the foregoing:

a. United States forces in Korea must pursue their current military course of action there until a political objective for that country appears attainable without jeopardizing United States positions with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, and seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations;

b. Dependable South Korean units should be generated as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength to take over the major part of the burden from the other United Nations forces;

c. Preparations should be made immediately for action by naval and air forces against the mainland of China; and

d. Action should be taken as a matter of urgency to ascertain the policies and objectives of our allies toward Korea specifically and the Far East in general, and also to discover the degree and nature of the support which we would expect from them if, while continuing our present military course of action in Korea, operations against the mainland of China are initiated.[1]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[1] At the request of the Secretary of Defense, this memorandum was circulated to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the NSC (Lay) on April 10. Mr. Lay's note of transmittal indicated that the paper would be referred to the NSC Staff for consideration in connection with the priority project on the NSC 48 series dealing with U.S. national objectives and policy in Asia; for documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 33 ff.

Secretary of Defense Marshall on April 9 furnished President Truman a copy of the JCS memorandum under cover of a transmittal letter containing this comment:

"I believe you might be interested in these recommendations which deal with the basic military factors in the Korean situation. This memorandum is also being sent to the National Security Council for consideration." (JCS Files)

795.00/4–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks—British Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

After the meeting between the British Ambassador and Ambassador Dulles on the Japanese peace treaty and Pacific security arrangements, Sir Oliver came to my office for a few minutes to talk about Korea.

The Ambassador showed me a telegram from London which he said reflected the "MacArthuritis" in London. The telegram stated that it was important that we not only not extend the hostilities in Korea to other areas but that we show no desire or intention to do so. The U. K. considers that since it has a substantial troop contribution in Korea it is entirely appropriate for the U. K. to make suggestions as to General MacArthur's directives. The telegram thereupon asked Sir Oliver to bring to our attention London's views about a directive which it would be useful to send to MacArthur at this juncture. The text of this portion of the telegram is attached.[1]

The telegram then referred to London's understanding that the 7th Fleet was intending to conduct an operation along the China coast in the general vicinity of Formosa about April 7. The U. K. referred to this operation as "dragging coat tails" (which was a World War II expression applied to operations which challenged the enemy to come out and fight—DR). The telegram stated that such an operation had, of course, nothing to do with UN purposes in Korea nor with UN operations there. It stated that the U. K. took the gravest view of this operation and must insist that the United States will take sole responsibility for any consequences which might come from it.

I reviewed for Sir Oliver very briefly our longstanding policy regarding Korea. I told him that we had been prepared to see a conclusion of the fighting in the general vicinity of the 38th parallel and that we were determined not to do anything on our side which would in fact extend the hostilities. I pointed out that, whatever General MacArthur said, his actions had been in response to directives from Washington and that UN forces had acted with great restraint. I told him that I thought there was one difference of emphasis between London and Washington which it might be useful to recognize. It was my impression that London considered that after reaching a suitable line in Korea, a position would be held on a more or less static basis in the hope that negotiations would open up. I told him that we were prepared to move toward a period of negotiation but that we saw no evidence of it whatever on the part of the other side. On the contrary, there was every indication that Communist forces were being built up in great mass for a new major offensive in the immediate future. The imminence of this offensive was a more impelling factor in our present thinking than was the prospect of any negotiation. Our estimate is the other side will not negotiate until it has tried on such an offensive. General Ridgway's problem, therefore, was related to the overhanging threat of a major offensive by a hostile force and we felt that he could not alter his tactical plan in any fundamental sense in order to create a superficial lull within which negotiations might occur. If there was interest in negotiation on the other side that might make a difference. As a preliminary comment on the content of the directive suggested by the British telegram, I said that much of its substance was already in existing directives but that in certain details a difference of emphasis could be recognized. I told him that, for example, the intention to "localize" hostilities would need the usual qualification with respect to action to be taken by UN forces in the event of, say, a massive air attack upon Manchurian bases.

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[1] Not printed.

I told Sir Oliver that we had only heard in the last day or so about the projected operation of elements of the 7th Fleet along the China coast but that it was our understanding that the purpose of such an operation being conducted was for reconnaissance purposes in relation to the mission of the 7th Fleet with respect to Formosa.[2]

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[2] The operation in the Formosa Strait area was carried out by the Seventh Fleet without incident, except that some antiaircraft fire from coastal batteries on the mainland was encountered (*Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 103). For further information, see the memorandum of discussion, April 4, p. 1616.

Editorial Note

On Thursday, April 5, Congressman Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives, in the course of a speech on the House floor (*Congressional Record*, volume 97, part 3, page 3480) read the contents of a letter, dated March 20, which he had received from General MacArthur in response to one sent him by Mr. Martin 12 days earlier. The texts of both letters with brackets, as printed in *Hearings*, page 3182, are here reprinted:

Letters exchanged by Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March 1951

(1) Letter from Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., to General MacArthur, March 8, 1951:

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938]

OFFICE OF THE MINORITY LEADER,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 8, 1951.

General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In the current discussions of foreign policy and over-all strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct.

Sincerely yours, JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.

(2) Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20, 1951:

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938. See also Daily Congressional Record, April 5, 1951, p. 3482]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951.

Hon. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARTIN: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally, these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic [*diplomats?*] there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am

Faithfully yours, DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

As a result of the disclosure of MacArthur's letter, with its implicit criticism of United States and United Nations policies, President Truman took counsel during the next several days with his diplomatic and military advisers on the question of dismissing the General. On April 9, responding to a request made by the President two days earlier, General Bradley reported to Mr. Truman the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, on purely military grounds, General MacArthur ought to be replaced. This judgment was unanimously concurred in by Acheson, Harriman, and Marshall, who were present with the President and Bradley.

During the period between April 6 and 9, a number of meetings were held on the question of General MacArthur's dismissal, but no contemporary records of them have been found. On April 6, Mr. Truman met with the Acheson–Marshall–Harriman–Bradley group apparently before and after a regular Cabinet meeting on that date. Later on the same day, the four met without the President. On the next day, the Chief Executive met with the same group and made his formal request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be polled. On April 8, the President consulted separately with Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder and Mr. Acheson, indicating his readiness to act on the following day when Bradley conveyed the JCS recommendation. Also on April 8, General Bradley and the Service Chiefs met and agreed on the need for dismissal of MacArthur, after which they conveyed their decision to Secretary Marshall. On the following day, the President received the unanimous recommendation of Acheson, Marshall, Harriman, and Bradley for dismissal and decided to proceed on this course. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway was to succeed to all of MacArthur's commands, i.e., Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (Japan); Commander in Chief, Far East; Commanding General, United States Army, Far East; and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet would take Ridgway's place as Commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea. President Truman signed the appropriate orders on April 10, with plans calling for the formal notification to MacArthur to be conveyed personally by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, then in Korea, who would proceed to MacArthur's headquarters for the purpose. This was scheduled to take place at 10 a. m. on April 12 in Tokyo (8 p. m., April 11, in Washington), but the threat of a premature news leak late on April 10 along with a delay in transmission of the message to Mr. Pace due to mechanical difficulties moved the President to make public the dismissal notice, effective immediately, at approximately 1 a. m. on April 11 in Washington to coincide with the arrival in Tokyo in mid-afternoon of a communication from the Department of Defense concerning the action.

(Testimony by Secretary Marshall in *Hearings*, pages 345 ff.; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pages 445–450; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pages 222–223, 288 ff.; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 520–524; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pages 280–287; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pages 374–377; Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency* (Baltimore, Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), pages 340–347. Notes on the discussion held in Washington during the period in question were subsequently dictated by President Truman on April 28 and by General Bradley on April 23–24, 1951. Copies of these notes from the Truman Library, the JCS Files, and the Bradley Papers have been provided to the Department of State by the Department of Defense and are in file 795.00/4–551.)

357.AK/4–551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 5, 1951—6:01 p. m.

1367. Re proposed statement on Korea. In response to initiative by Padilla Nervo, Gross and Ross called on him this noon and had long conversation concerning possibility of issuance of statement on Korea by UC. Padilla said that Entezam had informed him of our recent conversation with Entezam and Grafstrom on this subject (Usun 1342, Mar 29). He said GOC as such had not yet discussed matter, but would probably be doing so soon; Grafstrom was coming in to see him this afternoon. Padilla said it would be helpful to him if we could review with him points we made in discussion with Entezam and Grafstrom.

Gross summarized situation along lines summary he gave to Entezam and Grafstrom, adding that we had received general comment from UKG and indicating very briefly nature UK idea.[1]

Padilla Nervo said he had discussed matter with French (probably Lacoste), Jebb, Rau and Bebler. French had said matter was, of course, one under discussion in Washington. They apparently raised questions whether if statement were issued by UC it would deal only with military matters or, if it dealt also with political matters, whether it would reaffirm or modify established UN policy. French also apparently raised question concerning relationship between group of 14 govts with combat forces and UN as whole.

Jebb had apparently been rather vague and in general seemed to have questioned desirability of issuance of statement.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, March 30, p. 278. The British communication appended thereto had been transmitted to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in telegram 825, March 30, to New York. (795.00/3–3051)

Rau indicated that Indian contacts with ChiComs indicated to Indians that Mao was convinced that US did not want peaceful settlement in Korea. Padilla said he had indicated his feeling that US desire for peaceful settlement had been made very clear both privately and publicly. He asked Rau how ChiComs could be convinced if they were not already convinced. Question of desirability of issuance of public statement might be very good thing or very bad thing, depending upon interpretation put upon it by ChiComs. If statement indicated strict adherence to established UN policy by way of reaffirmation, statement might be good idea. If, on other hand, statement indicated deviation from established UN policy it might be very bad thing. Rau apparently gave some indication to Padilla that on procedural point statement might be given to GOC for proper use at proper time.

Bebler thought that Soviets were not pushing ChiComs to carry on war in Korea. Commenting that within Soviet orbit there were substantial differences in degree of pressure exerted on satellites, Bebler said that Soviet-ChiCom pressure relationships were "more difficult and more loose". Bebler also commented that if Soviets were not pressing ChiComs at moment it was because they did not want Chinese either victorious or direct agents of settlement in Korea and would prefer to have USSR in one or other role.

Going on to explain his personal views, Padilla Nervo then said he felt we should avoid issuance of statement by 14 govts with combat forces or even by US as UC if statement carried any indication it was being issued after consultation with the 14. To do so, Padilla thought, in effect would divide UN into sheep and goats and play directly into Soviet hands, giving them most useful field for propaganda and having adverse effect on attitude of ChiComs. He stressed that Commie line leaned heavily on theme that action in Korea was not really UN action, but rather an aggressive action by group of imperialist powers led by US.

Continuing his expression of personal views Padilla said that special responsibility having been given to UC in military matters, question arose whether, if proposed statement dealt with political matters it would in any way be subject to misinterpretation by ChiComs. Padilla then went on to say that if it were considered desirable for some statement to be issued as a US statement, if, in other words, some reiteration or reaffirmation of UN policy in political field were really necessary, there were number of ways in which this could be done. US statement might be handed to and issued by Entezam as Pres of GA, or statement might be issued by GOC, or statement might be presented in First Comite, perhaps proposed by US as declaration by First Comite. Later in conversation Padilla modified his suggestion as indicated below.

Leaving aside for moment question of procedure, Padilla expressed personal view that statement might have good results if it were in fact reaffirmation of existing UN policy, particularly of principles approved by UN. On other hand, he thought it would be undesirable if nature of statement were such as to provoke public debate involving, for example, US Congress, etc. He felt proposed statement would undoubtedly be related to MacArthur statement, variously interpreted in this relationship, and perhaps cast doubt on MacArthur's situation.

Summarizing Padilla's comments in order make sure we understood them, Gross said that Padilla seemed to have two points in particular in mind as follows: (1) That if statement were to be issued we should avoid giving any impression that there was political enclave in UN (the 14 govts with combat forces in Korea); (2) That we should avoid indicating any change or modification of existing policy.

Padilla agreed that these two points accurately reflected his own thinking. He went on to say, in effect stating a third point, that if first two points were covered statement might have salutary effect if issuance handled in right way, which he thought might be along following lines: US, acting in its capacity as govt designated by UN as UC, might address statement to GOC with indication it was doing so in order to clarify any misunderstanding that might have resulted from recent events. (Padilla specifically mentioned in this connection any misunderstanding that may have resulted from MacArthur statement.) Statement would be sent to GOC as body charged by the GA with responsibility for seeking pacific settlement in Korea. GOC in turn might give publicity to statement after consultation with us as to timing and method of publication. Publicity might be direct or by means of GOC report to First Comite.

During course our discussion Rau, following conclusion Arab-Asian group mtg this morning, telephoned Padilla and asked him in his personal capacity and not as member GOC to meet with Arab-Asian group this afternoon, which Padilla agreed to do. Padilla said he had no indication from Rau as to what they wanted to see him about but speculated group might wish to ask his personal views concerning statement we have under consideration. He wanted to ask us very frankly whether we thought it would be helpful or not if he were to express his views to Arab-Asian group as he had done to us. We replied with equal frankness that mtg with group as large as Arab-Asian group, any speculation which might arise from his meeting with them would not be likely to make distinctions between Padilla Nervo in his personal capacity and as member GOC. In order to protect himself and GOC it seemed to us frankly that it might be desirable for him to hold his cards very closely. Padilla said this was his own instinct and said if question of statement we have under consideration should come up he would suggest that group should consult USDel. Gross thought it might be helpful to Padilla to know about Rau's visit the other day (Usun 1330, Mar 26), when Rau indicated that one member of Arab-Asian group had suggested possibility of Arab-Asian appeal to UN forces not to cross 38th parallel. Gross pointed out disadvantages of any such appeal. Padilla agreed. Variation of idea also mentioned by Gross was possibility that someone might support appeal not to cross 38th parallel addressed equally to ChiComs and UN forces. Padilla agreed such appeal would be equally disadvantageous. Gross then mentioned the personal thought that if Arab-Asian group felt they had to do something they might as group, either privately or publicly, inquire of ChiComs why they had not replied to communication from Pres of GA.

Padilla agreed he would let us know whatever he appropriately could concerning his meeting with Arab-Asian group this afternoon.

AUSTIN

396.1-PA/4-551 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 5, 1951—8 p. m.

5960. Eyes only for Secretary from Jessup and Bohlen. Deptels 5207 [1] and 5220.[2] After lunch today, since party split up into two groups, Bohlen found opportunity to make the informal inquiry suggested by Dept.

In reply to an opening given by Semenov concerning realistic approach to the world situation, Bohlen said while discussion here on agenda was interesting and important a meeting of the four Mins wld only make sense if it had an opportunity to produce some genuine relaxation in the world sitn; that while by common agreement Far Eastern questions were excluded both from this discussion and the mtg of the four Mins, nevertheless, realistically speaking, it must be apparent to Sov Govt that as long as people were being killed in Korea, that fact by itself quite apart from governmental attitudes was a major factor in world sitn and cld not but affect the general atmosphere surrounding internatl relations. Bohlen added that although he had not been directly involved in this Korean matter, nevertheless, from authoritative statements and other info, it wld appear apparent that a purely military decision for one side or the other was difficult to foresee and that one thing was certain—that it wld not be possible for the North Koreans, even with Chinese help, to win a complete mil victory.

Semenov referring to mil sitn said that this wld undoubtedly be a long drawn-out affair since "the Chinese believed that they cld win a mil victory and push the Americans off the peninsula".

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[1] Dated April 3, p. 290.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 292.

Bohlen replied that this was an illusion and that the state of all equipment in all branches of the service now compared to what it had been in the opening months of the campaign when we had come to the aid of the South Koreans shld make it plain to any serious mil observer that the Chinese cld not achieve this aim.

Semenov indicated in oblique terms that as a professional diplomat he understood the purely informal and personal references of Bohlen so we may hear more from him on this subject.

The impression Bohlen drew from the remark quoted above, which of course shld not be taken too literally, was that Semenov felt a future Chinese offensive might well succeed where others had failed. It is interesting that Semenov made no ref to North Korean prowess, nor attempt to disguise Chinese intervention through any ref to so-called volunteers nor to argue the point as to who was the aggressor in Korea.

It is probably unnecessary to point out that these off-hand and inconclusive observations of Semenov's in the context of a deliberately casual conversation shld of course not be taken as any definite or accurate reflection of Sov Govt position and we must await any follow-up, if any, from Semenov before any conclusion on this score can be drawn. [Jessup and Bohlen.]

BOHLEN

795.00/4-651

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Subject: Attached Memorandum of April 5 from JCS, Military Action in Korea.[1]

I fail to follow the reasoning, in particular of paragraph 2, of this memorandum. Paragraph 2*a* states if the immediate objective of Soviet strategy is western Europe, it would be to the Soviet advantage for a maximum number of UN forces to remain in Korea. The memorandum goes on, however, to state that if the immediate Soviet objective is the Far East, it would be to the Soviet advantage for UN forces to leave Korea. The memorandum goes on in paragraph 2 to state without qualification that any armistice which would leave Communists and UN forces in Korea would be greatly to the disadvantage of the UN forces.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 295.

If the JCS assumption that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets for UN forces to withdraw from Korea if immediate Soviet objectives are in the Far East, I do not perceive how an armistice which would leave UN forces in Korea would necessarily be to our disadvantage.

With reference to paragraph 3, I agreed that while [*sic*] a satisfactory resolution of the Korean problem in a sense of a unified non-Communist Korea cannot be expected unless and until there is a general relaxation of world tensions. However, I do not think it necessarily follows that military action, as suggested in paragraph 4*a*, must be continued until the millennium when our political objectives for Korea can be attained without jeopardizing our position with respect to the USSR, Formosa and seating the Chinese in the UN. It seems to me that the memorandum entirely rejects the possibility of arriving at an acceptable *modus vivendi* such as we have been considering.

795.00/4-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong, Ambassador of Canada
Mr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands
Baron Silvercruys, Ambassador of Belgium
Mr. Joaquin M. Elizalde, Ambassador of the Philippines
Mr. Millet, Counselor of French Embassy
Mr. John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State

At the end of the regular briefing session today with the representatives of countries having military forces in Korea, the above mentioned gentlemen cornered me after the others had left and asked about the President's statement at his press conference yesterday in response to a question as to whether General MacArthur had been given authority to bomb bases in Manchuria in the event of an air attack on UN troops.[1]

Mr. Millet led off with the questioning and said that the French Government had understood that the countries with military forces in Korea would be consulted before any such instructions were given. I replied that during the month of January we gave a number of governments, including the French Government and I believed, practically all of the countries with military forces in Korea, assurances that the proposed Chinese aggression resolution did not confer any additional authority for military action beyond that already covered in various other resolutions; I added that we carefully pointed out that in the event of a massive air attack against UN forces, the Unified Command must reserve the right to take counter-measures including bombing of the bases from which the attacking planes came. I added that at that time we gave assurances that we would, if possible, consult in advance with the interested governments but that we could not be absolutely sure that there would be time for this for military reasons. I added that those assurances still were valid and that the situation in that regard had not changed.

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[1] Mr. Truman had replied to the question by stating that it involved a military strategy matter on which he could not comment. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 217)

The Belgian Ambassador asked if this meant that General MacArthur would have to communicate with Washington before he could bomb the bases in the event of a massive air attack. I replied that it did.

Mr. Millet asked if it wouldn't be a good idea in view of the importance of this question for us to consult with other governments now. I replied that we had thought that we were consulting in January when we gave these assurances.

Mr. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands, asked if it would not be a good idea to make sure that the enemy knew that if they made a massive air attack on the UN forces that there would be retaliation against their bases in Manchuria. Mr. Millet immediately expressed some opposition to this. I commented that my own feeling is that the enemy hasn't much doubt that their bases would be bombed if they made a massive air attack on UN troops. I added that an effort to get such a warning to them would raise all sorts of additional and complicated problems.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

795.00/4-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants:

	UK	*US*
	Sir Oliver Franks	General Bradley
	Lord Tedder[1]	Admiral Sherman
	Mr. B. A. B. Burrows[2]	Col. Carns[4]
	Capt. Coleridge, BJSM[3]	Mr. Paul H. Nitze

General Bradley opened the discussion by bringing forth a chart which showed the location of airfields and the estimated number of planes on them in North Korea, Manchuria, North China, and Siberia. The chart indicated approximately 800 planes in North Korea, Manchuria, and North China on some 90 airfields. Lord Tedder said that their intelligence roughly corresponded with ours, but might be somewhat lower as to the number of planes which would be actually operational. Sir Oliver indicated that it was important that there be agreement between London and Washington as to the facts. He gave the impression that his government was somewhat inclined to believe that our figures might be exaggerated.

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[1] Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder was Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington.

[2] Counselor of the British Embassy.

[3] Secretary to the British Joint Services Mission.

[4] Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, Deputy Secretary to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Bradley read the directive which he proposed to clear with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the President with the view to obtaining their authorization to issue it upon a determination by the JCS that the situation contemplated by the directive had in fact arisen.[5]

Sir Oliver said that he had certain preliminary comments. He felt there were far-reaching political implications to the decision involved, and that his government would feel that this was a decision which would have to be taken by the responsible Ministers. His government felt that if the state of facts occurred it would be desirable to give a preliminary warning, the warning to be endorsed by as many of the U.N. governments as possible. The state of facts might be reported to a special meeting of the U.N. He said his government attached considerable importance to the final decision being made in Washington. Admiral Sherman pointed out the importance of quick action in the event the state of facts took place and asked whether it would not be possible to give a warning before the event rather than after it. Sir Oliver said his government would give consideration to this question, but that he wanted to emphasize that his Ministers felt deeply their responsibility to Parliament and would not take lightly having a decision of this type taken by the U.S. JCS on behalf of all participants. It would be much easier for his government to go along with the consequences of such an action if they had participated in the decision.

There then followed some discussion as to the danger of an attack and as to the damage which it might cause in the event that it might be delivered. Lord Tedder felt that the important criterion was whether the attack was damaging. He said that the effects of such an attack often appeared much more serious right at the time then subsequently turned out to be the fact.

Admiral Sherman emphasized the important impact that such an attack would have upon public opinion in this country. Lord Tedder asked about the amount of anti-aircraft defense which was available in South Korea. General Bradley said that he would look into the question.

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[5] See the annex to this memorandum.

Mr. Nitze raised the question of an attack on Japan. Sir Oliver said he could not express the views of his government, but his personal feeling was "that would be it."

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain Presidential approval now for them to send the following message to General MacArthur if and when the enemy launches from outside Korea a major air attack against our forces in the Korean area:

> "You are authorized with the U.S. forces assigned to the Far East Command to attack enemy air bases and aircraft in Manchuria and the Shantung peninsula in the immediate vicinity of Weihaiwei."[6]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[6] Information in the JCS Files indicates that on April 6 or 7 the authority requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved by the President, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. Notification of this approval was not, however, sent forward to General MacArthur prior to his removal from command.

795.00/4–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 6, 1951—2:31 p. m.

1370. For Hickerson from Gross. Conversation with Malik (USSR). At Protitch[1] reception evening of Apr 5, conversation developed between Malik and myself along following lines.

Malik, as at several recent meetings, was in an amiable and conversational mood. After a bantering exchange of no significance, Malik struck a serious note re "American war preparations". We had the usual interchange in which I stressed the defensive basis of the program to strengthen ourselves and those who supported the UN Charter, and in which Malik repeated the standard Cominform line.

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[1] Dragoslav Protitch was Principal Director of the U.N. Department of Security Council Affairs.

Malik then brought Korea into the conversation as "evidence" of our "aggressiveness", referring in the same way to our "seizure of Formosa". When I reminded him that we had withdrawn our forces from Korea and had returned only under a UN mandate to repel aggression, Malik replied that the Soviet Union had also withdrawn its forces from Korea. He proceeded with some vehemence that nobody could believe the US really considered Korea essential to our security. Korea was thousands of miles from the US but only 65 miles from important Soviet area and with border on China. I commented that our objectives in Korea were perfectly clear, had been openly stated, and were identical with the objectives of the UN in Korea. I said that public opinion of the world generally understood that the North Korean Forces would not have committed aggression last June without the approval of the Soviet Govt. Open Soviet support in UN of North Korean actions confirmed this. I asked what are the Soviet objectives in Korea?

Malik replied the answer is very simple, that his govt "wants a peaceful solution". On the other hand, the US Govt "perhaps because of the influence of General MacArthur" wants to conquer the Far East even if this means world war. I said this was nonsense and honestly believed Malik knew it was nonsense.

There followed somewhat lengthy and general discussion in which Malik repeated his usual line of "monopoly", "warmongers", etc.

I said I thought conduct is the best text of intention and reminded Malik of the frequent efforts of the UN to find a peaceful solution which did not involve surrender to aggression. I referred specifically to the current efforts of Entezam to establish contact with Peiping and asked Malik whether he could explain why Chinese Communist Govt had not given a reply to Entezam. Malik became noticeably guarded and evasive, leaving me with the impression he is not well-informed on the matter, rather than that he wished to conceal what he knew. I did not consider it appropriate to pursue the matter further and let the matter drop with the remark that it was all the more puzzling to understand why the CPG should refuse to acknowledge an approach from the President of the GA, since surely the CPG did not consider the GA or the President of the Assembly "illegal". Malik replied in a half-joking manner that since the GA did not recognize the Chinese Communist Govt, perhaps the latter did not recognize the President. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/4–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY New York, April 6, 1951—3: 32 p. m.

1371. Re Asian-Arab group mtg, Apr 5—Egyptian and Swedish Del views. On evening of Apr 5, in conversation with Grafstrom (Sweden) and Gross, Fawzi Bey reported developments at Asian-Arab group mtg held at Rau residence Apr 5 (ourtel No. 1362, Apr 4). Group reached no conclusions concerning future steps, although consensus was that this appears to be "opportune time for some effort in direction of peace." According to Fawzi, group is "concerned" by press reports of intention on part of US Govt or of states with forces in Korea to issue a statement. Fawzi commented that if "any group of members issued a statement, then other groups should feel free to make statements," obviously referring to Asian-Arab group.

According to Fawzi, group had agreed that it would take no steps without prior discussion "with all interested dels;" in particular, Fawzi mentioned US, UK, France and the three members of GOC. USUN would be requested very shortly to meet with a rep of the Asian-Arab group. Fawzi indicated that at such a mtg questions would be asked us concerning proposed UC statement. (Dept guidance urgently requested.) In reply to question by Gross whether group intends to talk with Sov del, Fawzi was at first evasive, later said group would probably do so, but only following discussions with us.

Fawzi said Padilla Nervo had been invited to sit with the group at afternoon mtg Apr 5, adding that Padilla had been invited "in his personal capacity," rather than as member GOC. When Grafstrom showed visible annoyance, Fawzi made awkward excuse that group had not been able to find Grafstrom in his office. Grafstrom tactfully ignored Fawzi's statement, but later told Gross he had been at his office all morning and in fact Padilla had phoned him there re Rau invitation.

Grafstrom strongly argued to Fawzi that GOC task would be made even more difficult if Asian-Arab group, either as a whole or through the Indian rep in Peiping, should make "parallel approaches to Mao." Grafstrom felt group might usefully support efforts of Entezam to establish contact with CPG. GOC had deliberately chosen to seek contact through Entezam as Pres of GA in order to make it easier for CPG to make a response without at same time recognizing legality of GOC. Grafstrom reminded Fawzi that purpose of GOC "was not to negotiate with Peiping" but rather, to establish contact so as to make it possible for suitable negotiations to take place. Grafstrom emphasized feeling that Asian-Arab group should be careful to avoid lowering prestige of GOC, which was group of individuals entrusted by the GA with a special responsibility. Grafstrom remarked there was a great deal of difference between Panikkar supporting efforts of Entezam to obtain a reply from CPG, and Panikkar representing GOI or Asian-Arab group in an independent effort to establish contact on assumption that Entezam efforts had failed. Fawzi professed to agree, but avoided anything resembling a commitment.

Gross gave general support to line followed by Grafstrom, adding that US Govt had always been and remains receptive to constructive efforts leading to peaceful solution. To that end we give loyal support to GOC and recognize difficulties it faces. Accordingly, Gross expressed personal view there would undoubtedly be disadvantages from standpoint of UN prestige and moral unity if "competitive appeals" were made by informally constituted groups. Rather, it is more likely to lead to productive results if effort is concentrated on a single clearly understood objective. It seemed to us there are only two "parties" to this affair, the aggressors on the one side, and the UN on the other. Referring to suggestion advanced by Rau concerning possible Asian-Arab appeal to UN not to cross 38th parallel (ourtel No. 1330, Mar 26), Gross said we strongly deplore any such suggestion as damaging to unity of the UN and involving a real threat to security of UN forces.

Moreover, the same objections would apply to an appeal "to both sides" not to cross the 38th parallel. Fawzi appeared to be aware of Rau's suggestion (it is not unlikely idea originated with Fawzi) but refrained from replying to Gross comments. Grafstrom strongly expressed agreement with latter.

Fawzi repeated assurance Asian-Arab group would take no steps without prior consultation with US. Gross expressed gratitude and told Fawzi we were anxious to maintain close contact.

AUSTIN

795.00/4-651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 6, 1951—6:42 p. m.

1373. Padilla Nervo gave Gross following report concerning Asian-Arab group mtg Apr 5. (See No. 1371, Apr 6 also).

Padilla found the group concerned about three things:

(1) Speaker Rayburn's statement, which apparently caused some consternation in the group;[1]

(2) Reported intention of US Govt to issue statement on Korea; and

(3) Feeling that this was time to take some action looking toward peaceful settlement Korean question.

The group reached no agreement as to what steps, if any, might be useful. There was considerable expression of opposition to the issuance of a statement by the US Govt, or by the countries having forces in Korea. Much of the apprehension was based upon lack of knowledge as to the substance of the proposed statement, whether it was a reaffirmation of existing policy or what its implications might be. Several members of the group expressed the view that if the UC issued a statement, the Asian-Arab group might also usefully issue a statement "in order to have equilibrium in the situation".

Padilla told Gross, as the latter had anticipated, (ourtel No. 1367, April 5) there was considerable support for public appeal by the Asian-Arab group addressed both to the UN and to the Chi Coms to respect the 38th parallel. In line with prior discussion between Padilla and Gross, former told Asian-Arab group he thought it would be a useless and dangerous move. He expressed view group should coordinate its views with other dels, especially US, in order to avoid the issuance of separate statements by individual UN members or groups of members. When pressed by group for info concerning proposed UC statement, Padilla suggested that group get in touch with US del.

Speaking further in opposition to suggestion of "appeal to both sides", Padilla thought it important not to lose sight of desired result and that all steps should be avoided which might complicate the mil situation and indicate disunity in the UN. An "appeal to the UN, or an appeal to both sides" would cause a great deal of controversy and would put the UN forces at a disadvantage.

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[1] In debate on the House floor on April 4, Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn made the following remarks:

"I have never in my long service in this House said a thing or done a thing that might have a tendency to deceive the Members of the House. Since even yesterday, with 30 enemy planes coming over in Korea, with the massing of troops in Korea and Manchuria, and not all of them Communist Chinese by a great extent, I say to this House in all earnestness and in all seriousness that it is my firm belief that we are in greater danger of an expanded war today than we have been at any time since the close of the World War in 1945." (*Congressional Record*, vol. 97, pt. 3, p. 3311)

At his news conference on the following day, President Truman was asked about the Speaker's statement. He replied that he had no comment to make, but added: ". . . the Speaker is a truthful man." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 215)

Entezam told group that best way to progress was to urge Peiping to answer Entezam's approaches. Padilla thought that ball was in the hands of Peiping, that the UN has stated its policy and reiterated its principles and has set up the GOC to be available for efforts toward peace.

Padilla stressed with group importance of consulting with other dels, particularly the US, before taking any action, even the suggested action of urging Peiping to get in contact with Entezam.

A member of the group suggested to Rau that GOI might sound out Peiping to explore what moves CPG might consider useful. Padilla volunteered view that this would not be a wise step. That before the Asian-Arab group (after consultation with US and other dels) had decided upon its course, a vague approach to Peiping could not result in anything practical or positive, but would merely be taken as indicating doubt and disunity.

Zafrulla Khan expressed views that it was not necessary for group to meet with numerous UN dels but that it was of first importance to meet with US del. Zafrulla suggested that he, Rau, Fawzi and perhaps one or two other members of group should make arrangements for talk with USUN. Padilla expressed agreement with this suggestion and urged that group communicate with USUN quickly.

There was considerable discussion of arranging a "stand still" and of "maintaining the *status quo*" in order to give the Asian-Arab group time to consider its next moves. Padilla explained that this referred both to UC withholding its statement and also an attempt to do something immediately to head off a possible major offensive "by either side".

Only concrete suggestion made, however, was possible group appeal to UN and to Chi Coms not to cross 38th parallel.

Padilla recd impression majority of group was impressed by his argument against such a course.

However, after mtg had ended, Azkoul (Lebanon) and Palar (Indo) remained behind to talk further with Padilla. Both Azkoul and Palar insisted upon the importance of taking some step immediately and both favored an appeal "to both sides" to prevent deterioration of the present situation. Padilla renewed his objections to this course, stressing again the importance of attempting to persuade Peiping to acknowledge Entezam's approach.

Rau promised Padilla to keep latter informed and also agreed that Asian-Arab group would take no action without prior discussion with GOC.

Padilla appeared surprised that group had not yet sought mtg with

Gross and expressed belief they would do so promptly, possibly during week-end.

Dept's urgent comments would be greatly appreciated as to general line to be followed with Asian-Arab group, particularly re their concern about UC or similar statement. We, of course, will continue to oppose issuance of appeal by Asian-Arab group to UN or to "both sides".

AUSTIN

795.00/4-651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 6, 1951—6:57 p. m.

1374. From Gross. Korea: During course of conversation on another subject today. Gross asked Bebler (Yugo) about current Yugo estimate Korean situation.

Bebler replied that Belgrade estimate is that USSR may well be almost ready for negotiated settlement. He pointed to Stalin's self-interview of Feb 16 which, he said, offered political and moral support to North Koreans and Chi Communists but carefully avoided mention of military support. He said Belgrade thought that interview contained some promise of Soviet readiness to negotiate. He also said that Stalin statement, which was more editorial than Stalin's usual deliberate style, still seemed to him somewhat "panicky" or nervous, thus revealing worry over Korea situation in high Soviet circles. He said Belgrade thought this tied in with current rumors and reports about build-up of Soviet air and mechanized strength north of Yalu and Tumen Rivers, which, he suggested, may be encouraged by USSR not only to improve negotiating position re Korea, but also in CFM.

According to him, Belgrade also thought that USSR and Communist China must be having some very serious and complex disagreements over hegemony in Korea, glory for military successes, economic agreement in Manchuria and so forth. Belgrade did not believe USSR will be contented to leave to Communist China the leading revolutionary role in East Asia.

Bebler therefore thought time is near when some such Soviet figure as Gromyko or Malik may approach some American official with some sort of proposal for settlement. He thought that to save Soviet face it might be easier for US to approach some Soviet official first someplace. Bebler claimed that Soviets use UN for propaganda purposes, but that for matters such as this, they prefer to negotiate secretly.

He also thought Soviets and Chi Communists are rather committed not to use any UN body as channel for approach to US. He believed US approach to USSR would be better than approach to Communist China because Soviets are more desirous of settlement and more free to negotiate than are Chi Communists. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/4–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of India–Nepal–Ceylon Affairs (Weil)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1951.

Subject: Indian Minister-Counselor Kirpalani's Call on Mr. Rusk: Questions on Korean Developments.

Participants: Mr. M. K. Kirpalani, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of India
FE—Mr. Rusk
SOA—Mr. Weil

Mr. Kirpalani called at his request on Mr. Rusk at 10:30 a.m. and remained approximately 20 minutes. Before the substantive conversation began Mr. Rusk told Mr. Kirpalani he was glad to hear an old friend of his, Eric Da Costa, was planning to visit the States.

Mr. Kirpalani said he had been asked by his Prime Minister to obtain background information on press reports of two recent developments—Speaker Rayburn's announcement that troops, not all of which were Chinese, were being massed on the Manchurian border; and rumors that General MacArthur had received authorization to bomb bases in Manchuria.

Mr. Rusk said the Department understood that some 100,000 new enemy troops were now in North Korea, comprising the Chinese Communist First Field Army. There were also elements of the Third Field Army, and North Korean units which had been reconstituted in Manchuria. He said there were also reports, as yet unconfirmed, that units now in Manchuria included "volunteers" from various parts of the USSR and from Europe, as well as former Japanese POW's. Mr. Rusk said it was thus difficult to believe that the Chinese Communists were contemplating a negotiated peace at this time.

With reference to instructions to General MacArthur Mr. Rusk said the General had not been authorized to bomb Manchurian bases but that if the enemy launched a substantial air attack on UN forces he would presumably receive such authority. Mr. Rusk reminded Mr. Kirpalani that the US was doing everything possible to limit the area of hostilities but made it clear that in the event of an air campaign against the UN forces these forces would have to be protected. He emphasized the fact that a decision to bomb Manchurian bases would not be made by General MacArthur.

Note: When approached by correspondents following his talk with Mr. Rusk, Mr. Kirpalani said he had come to request information regarding Speaker Rayburn's statement concerning troops on the Manchurian border, and regarding reports that General MacArthur had been authorized to bomb Manchurian bases. When asked whether Mr. Rusk had confirmed Mr. Kirpalani's understanding of these developments, Kirpalani told the correspondents that was a question they would have to ask Mr. Rusk.

795.00/4–951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 9, 1951—2 p. m.

601. Fol is report on briefing meeting of reps of countries with troops in Korea, April 6:

In reply to inquiry on massing of non-Chinese forces in Manchuria, Rusk indicated that while he does not of course know what Rayburn had in mind,[2] Rusk supposed that he spoke about reported build-up of Soviet air power in the area. There are also some reports, of unknown reliability, that the Russians had increased their forces in Port Arthur and on the Siberian-Manchurian frontier. Also, there have been occasional reports of unknown reliability concerning European volunteers in the Chinese armies massing on the Manchurian border, including allegedly former Japanese prisoners, nationals of Soviet satellite countries, *et al.* Rayburn was apparently referring also to these rumors, about which we are trying to get some more definite information. Rusk indicated that Rayburn was undoubtedly referring to these reports to emphasize the continuing danger, in an effort to prevent the Congress from relaxing into complacency.

Rusk then reported on the status of proposed statement which had been given to the other Govts for comment. He indicated that a number of questions had been raised:

A. Some governments, and also the GOC, had queried whether the 14 nations shld speak for the UN. Alternatives were suggested—for example, that the statement might be issued by the GOC, although it was realized that if the GOC issued such a statement it might make its task of bringing about a settlement a little more difficult. Some thought that the GA or the First Comite were the only ones with authority to speak for the UN. Another suggestion made by several Govts represented was that the US alone shld issue the statement in its capacity as Unified Command.

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[1] Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Capetown, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Manila, Ottawa, Paris, Wellington, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in New York.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 313.

B. A second group of comments referred to the language. A number of Govts felt that the language might be modified so as to make it less unpalatable to the Chinese Communists and increase the chances that the statement might persuade Peiping to agree to a peaceful settlement, without any issues of "honor" or "face-saving". We thought these comments were constructive and were prepared to meet them.

C. The replies also underscored the difficulty of making any statement which wld properly differentiate between the military and long-term political objectives of the UN. The UN went into Korea to meet aggression and to restore peace in the area. The political question of unification had been troubling the UN for years before June 25, but there was never any suggestion that the UN shld seek to achieve the unification by force. In any statement, therefore we are faced with the difficult question as to how to indicate that the UN maintains the political objectives without converting them into military objectives. If we indicated only that we were prepared for peaceful settlement along the 38th parallel, the other side wld get a political advantage and it wld seem that the UN had given up its political objectives. Also we must recognize that the South Koreans are passionately devoted to the principle of unification. A statement which formally abandons unification wld create real trouble with the South Koreans. In the present situation, even from the military aspect alone, it wld be highly unfortunate to endanger the morale and the wholehearted fighting support of the ROK forces by any formal abandonment of unification.

D. Finally the comments from other Govts underscored the difficulty of writing a statement which wld both assert our readiness for a peaceful settlement, and our determination to continue fighting if the enemy does not agree to peaceful settlement. The expression of such determination is itself likely to make the acceptance of peace by the enemy that much more unlikely.

Rusk summed up by saying that since we first discussed the project a number of things had happened. We have not really decided ourselves what is the best approach in the light of these events and the comments. Tentatively we are now thinking that the US, as the Unified Command might itself put out a brief statement as to what the Unified Command considers to be its responsibilities.[3] We wld issue this statement through the SYG to all the Members of the UN. This statement wld be sort of a lowest common denominator of gen agreement, and we wld circulate this statement to the countries participating in Korea before it was issued to give them a chance to raise any questions that they might have. Later, we might for our own people, as other countries have done or might wish to do, make a further statement or speech expressing the Amer attitude, a fighting speech on why we are in Korea, etc.

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[3] See *infra*.

Rusk indicated that both at this stage and if any such statement is circulated we wld welcome suggestions both official and personal. However, at present the idea is still tentative and it may be the middle of next week before we have any definite views on it. Since, however, we had stirred up the whole matter with our original proposal we thought it only proper that we keep the other countries informed as to the developments.

The Greek Ambassador, addressing himself to some of the questions to which Rusk had referred expressed himself rather forcibly to the effect that this group is entitled to speak for the UN, that they have a mandate from the UN because they are the ones who sent troops.

The Dutch Ambassador indicated that his Govt wld welcome a statement by the UC alone. In his personal opinion it was desirable that it be a very brief statement to clear away uncertainties which had developed recently. There may be some delay involved in the plan which Rusk outlined, which is unfortunate but inevitable. Of course if the US Govt reserves the right to make future public comments to its own people, other govts will also wish to reserve this right.

Berendsen (New Zealand) stated that the hope had been to issue a statement right away, before any Chinese attack occurred, since if it had any use its chief design is to prevent such attack. Rusk stated that if this were the only approach to Peiping for peaceful settlement what Sir Carl said wld be very forceful. However, there were other approaches being made to the Peiping Govt, both through the GOC and through diplomatic channels. The proposed statement was not motivated exclusively by the hope that it might bring peaceful settlement. There are no indications whatsoever that the Chinese Communists are even considering peaceful settlement; they seem to be in a state of political suspense.

The Dutch Ambassador intervened again to state that the statement as originally contemplated had had several purposes. One of these, of course, as Sir Carl suggests, was to try to bring about peaceful settlement, and preferably to try to do that before the Chinese Communists launched another major attack. However, the statement also had the purpose of clarifying the position of the UN and of the Govts fighting in Korea and remove doubts and uncertainties, and he hoped the proposed UC statement wld achieve that.

ACHESON

795.00/4-951

Draft of a Proposed Communication by President Truman to the United Nations Secretary-General (Lie)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1951.

MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: In accordance with paragraph six of the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, I submit the following summary report on the situation in Korea, in my capacity as Chief Executive of the Government requested by the United Nations to act as the Unified Command for United Nations operations in Korea.

Since June 27, 1950 the forces of the United Nations have been engaged in repelling the aggression committed in Korea by the military forces of North Korea and, subsequently, by those of Communist China. The attacking forces have again been driven back, with heavy losses, to the general area from which the unlawful attack was first launched last June.

The spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter require that every effort be made to prevent the spread of hostilities and to avoid the prolongation of the misery and the loss of life resulting from the aggression in Korea. The United States as the Unified Command is, therefore, prepared to enter into arrangements to conclude the fighting and to insure against its resumption. Such arrangements should open the way for a prompt and general settlement for Korea, including the phased withdrawal of non-Korean forces from the peninsula. The ending of the fighting in Korea would greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and would open the way for a prompt settlement of the Korean problem itself and for the consideration of other Far Eastern questions by the process of peaceful settlement envisaged in the charter of the United Nations.

The United Nations has affirmed that the legitimate rights and interests of Korea's neighbors should be respected. It is regrettable that those who are opposing the United Nations in Korea have made so little response to the many opportunities which have been and continue to be afforded for an honorable settlement in Korea.

Information available to the Unified Command indicates continued preparations by forces opposing the United Nations for a new and major offensive in the near future. Until satisfactory arrangements for ending the fighting have been reached, there is no alternative but for United Nations military action against those forces to be continued. The Unified Command has sought in every possible way to give effect to the policy of the United Nations that the fighting in Korea be limited to that country. In following this policy, however, the Unified Command will carry out its elementary responsibility to safeguard the security of United Nations forces from major attack from other quarters.

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[1] Concerning U.S. consideration of such a communication, see *supra*. This draft was not transmitted to any of the other U.N. member states for consideration, nor was a message ultimately sent from President Truman to Secretary-General Lie.

The Unified Command has been deeply impressed by the gallantry and competence of forces made available to it by the Members of the United Nations and is encouraged with indications that these forces are to be augmented further.

The Unified Command also pays tribute to the determination of the Korean people to establish and maintain their independence. The Korean people are entitled to be relieved of the tragedy which has been forced upon them and, in accordance with long-established United Nations policy, to establish a unified, independent, democratic sovereign state. The Unified Command invites the continued attention of the Members of the United Nations to the ravages of war and to the urgent need for the assistance which the United Nations is ready to give and for which it has established necessary machinery.

The Unified Command will continue to be guided by the principles set forth in the resolutions of the United Nations which prescribe the policy governing the exercise of its responsibilities for the conduct of military operations on behalf of the United Nations in Korea.

357.AD/4-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 9, 1951—5 p. m.

837. Urtels 1371 and 1373 April 6. Dept is in full agreement with ur reaction to various proposals for new steps by Arab-Asian group re Korean problem. In ur further discussions with reps of this group, we hope you will continue to stress undesirability of separate and uncoordinated moves which might hamper GOC and UC in carrying out functions assigned them by UN and which cld give CPG opportunity to play off one UN agency or grouping against another. Specifically, any appeal by Arab-Asian group directed toward military standstill on 38th Parallel or elsewhere wld as indicated Deptel 819 March 27 [1] be disadvantageous to UN.

Present moment is particularly inopportune for action by Arab-Asian group. We appreciate desire this group to be informed re nature of any US or UC statement. While Dept is now considering various possibilities, our ideas have not yet crystallized. You may, however, assure reps of Arab-Asian group that any statement issued will not depart from policy line laid down by UN and that we will keep GOC informed re such statement.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 270.

In gen, we wld wish to discourage Arab-Asian group activity at this juncture and to ensure that if such activity is undertaken it will be in support of rather than uncoordinated with efforts of UC and GOC to reach satisfactory settlement of Korean problem.

ACHESON

795.00/4-951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, April 9, 1951—7 : 37 p. m.

1385. Re : Korea—possible Asian-Arab appeal.

Palar (Indonesia) called at his request today. He identified himself as the unnamed Asian colleague on whose behalf Rau had approached us on March 26 for an Asian appeal to the PRC and UN that no forces should cross the 38th parallel (mytel 1330, March 26).

He was speaking as the rep of his govt and not on behalf of Asian-Arab group in raising this question. He thought it likely that members of that group would present their views to USUN within a day or two. His position is based upon fear of general war and its effect on the future of his govt. General war might be expected to destroy Indonesia as a democratic state and delay indefinitely its economic development for lack of capital from US. After a third world war the US would probably not be in a position to set up a new Marshall Plan and to make capital available to Indonesia. Therefore, while opinion in the Asian-Arab group has not crystallized, he was advocating a step which admittedly would sacrifice the prestige of the UN to some extent in order to preserve peace. He sees this as primarily a great power problem with the immediate solution the bringing together of the great powers even though hostilities continue.

A forthcoming PRC offensive might well mean general war and therefore some appeal should be issued to fore-stall the offensive. He recalled the criticism of the Asian-Arab states for dividing their proposal of 12 December into two draft res, which the PRC had interpreted as indicating their siding with the west and lacking in impartiality. Recalling that Indonesia had stood against dividing the two proposals for that very reason he thought that experience dictates that an appeal be made now to lay a foundation for effective negotiation after a Chinese offensive has started and when the UN forces might be in a far less advantageous position than now.

Speaking for himself, he is considering an appeal to the PRC not to go south of the 38th parallel. Although he realizes the difficulty of UN or any group in it appealing to the UN itself, he thinks there should be a correlative appeal to the UN forces not to go north of the 38th parallel. Such an appeal might be made by some undefined group other than the Asian-Arab states. This would preserve the bilateral character of the operation and involves an admitted sacrifice of prestige. This was essence of repetitive presentation in which he stressed particularly the importance of time as indicating some sort of appeal.

Gross pointed out the similar aims and responsibilities of US and Indonesia as UN members in dealing with the matter of aggression which is something distinct from fighting. The UN theory to which the US subscribes has been from the start that firm opposition to aggression is the way to avoid general war by indicating to PRC and USSR the determination of the UN to stand on principle and operate as a collective security organization. It should not quickly be forgotten that many appeals have been made and none has been answered. He picked three examples: (*a*) the appeal of the Asian powers of Dec. 5, (*b*) the very careful formulation by the UC of the terms of a cease fire along the general line of the 38th parallel as published by the GOC and (*c*) Entezam's communication to the PRC in which he acted as GA Pres, quite distinct from his role as member of GOC. Gross reiterated that all these appeals are unanswered.

He suggested very strongly that the present focal point in the problem of communicating with the PRC is through Entezam. His efforts have properly been not to arrange a settlement but to bring the PRC into a position to negotiate with appropriate authorities. In answer to Gross' questions Palar indicated no ideas on what further he or the group could do to aid in Entezam's efforts. Gross pointed out that Entezam is singularly important to the group as being one of its members as well.

Given the UN purpose of firmness in meeting aggression, Gross warned that group appeals might well undermine the entire operation. He recalled press accounts of consideration that has been given to a statement by states contributing military units in Korea. In fact, he observed that thought is being given to a statement by the UC which would contain no new elements but drawing together a carefully formulated view of what the purpose of the UN in Korea is. Naturally this had been examined with states supplying troops and would also be considered with the GOC. The fact that there is not an intention for the group to issue a statement is indication of US view that statements by groups in UN are divisive rather than unifying. Palar expressed great satisfaction at fact that proposed statement would not contain any new elements.

Gross felt and we had communicated this to Rau after Palar's idea was originally presented on the instructions of the Department that the sort of appeal or appeals Palar is considering would be premature, unwise and possibly dangerous to the security of UN forces in Korea. This would put an additional burden on UN troops and would be a one-way valve contrary to the security of UN forces because they would probably pay no attention at all to it. He stressed very strongly this general position and urged Palar to consider how he and the Asian-Arab group might strengthen and assist Entezam's efforts. As to Palar's point that now is the time for an appeal, Gross felt that it is far more important to be sound on the substance than to act precipitously. Furthermore, if there is an offensive from the north facts may very well indicate that after the offensive has been commenced or possibly halted it is a far more effective time to get on with the negotiation looking toward the settlement we both want.

Palar intends to discuss rather generally with UN dels his views along the above lines but does not intend to see the USSR del. Gross held himself at the disposal of Palar to discuss problem further at any time. He also would be available to Asian-Arab group whenever it might wish to pursue the subject.

AUSTIN

795.00/4-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: Australian Suggestions with Respect to a Settlement in Korea

Participants: The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin
Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin, called on me today and briefly reviewed the points which he had made in his conversation with Mr. Merchant on April 9[1] concerning the possibility of a renewed effort to negotiate a settlement of the Korean question. Briefly the Ambassador said that his Government believed this might be the last opportunity for negotiating a settlement because hostilities might spread with the launching of another Chinese offensive. He mentioned two points in particular: the desirability of establishing contact with Peiping and of reaching agreement among ourselves on minimum political objectives in Korea and on other Far Eastern questions.

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[1] Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Merchant, April 9, not printed (795.00/4-951).

In replying to the Ambassador's remarks, I mentioned the fact that in attempting to arrive at an agreed position with our friends, there was a tendency to move to our minimum position. The other side might attempt to halve the difference and the pressure would be on us to accept the "compromise", even though our basic position might be undermined thereby.

With respect to other Far Eastern problems, I said that it had always been our conviction that aggressors should not be permitted to charge a price for their aggression. The issue, I pointed out, remains aggression in Korea, and the Chinese Communists should not be permitted an opportunity to distort the issue so that it would appear the war was being waged for the purpose of preventing the seating of their representatives in the UN, or over Formosa.

I told the Ambassador that it was a difficult problem to define war aims in Korea without appearing to surrender our political objectives of unification of the country. Our minimum political objective must continue to be unification of Korea, but this is not necessarily a military objective.

In discussing Formosa I reminded the Ambassador of our special responsibilities in the North Asian area which gave us a special interest in this Question not shared in the same degree by our friends. Furthermore I said that it was reasonable to ask what kind of a China we would be turning Formosa over to—a power aggressively inclined toward its neighbors, a power which might turn the island over to the Soviet Union for use in operations against the free world? I also mentioned the fact that, quite apart from the question of Chiang Kai-shek, we cannot be indifferent to the implications of turning over the large non-Communist population of Formosa to Communist rule. I told the Ambassador that while in an absolute sense we must continue to regard Europe as the priority area in the struggle with the Soviet Union, there is the possibility that the Soviet will not choose to make Europe the immediate field of contest. If instead, it were to choose the Far East as the area in which to push its aggressive schemes, then territory in the Pacific, such as Formosa, would take on added importance. I said that we had reached no conclusions on this question but we were studying its implications.

So far as establishing contact with Peiping is concerned, I pointed out to the Ambassador that there has been no lack of opportunity for the Chinese Communists to talk with us about a settlement had they been so inclined. They still have these opportunities, but it seems apparent from all the information which we have that there is no desire on their part to enter into negotiations at this time.

795.00/4–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Netherlands —Ambassador van Roijen
New Zealand —Ambassador Berendsen
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Ambassador Wan
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa—Ambassador Jooste and Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —UNA—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Henkin
FE—Mr. Heidemann
FE—Mr. Barbour
Major McBride—Army
Captain Maertens—Army

New figures on Communist strength were listed as follows:

North Korean troops in action	29,000
Chinese Communist troops in action	88,000
North Korean troops in rear areas	183,000
Chinese Communist troops in rear areas	382,000
Guerrillas	13,000
Total	695,000

Major McBride said that the increase in strength estimates reflected a belief that the Chinese Communist 18th Army Group of 100,000 men had moved into the forward areas in Korea. He reported that enemy rocket fire had been encountered for the first time in several months and that the enemy had, during the past four days, launched several small probing attacks accompanied by intense small arms and mortar fire. All of these attacks had been repulsed. He said that it was possible that the Communists were attempting to anchor their defense line on the Hwachon Reservoir, adding that the opening of the floodgates of this Reservoir had had no appreciable effect on the tactical situation in the area.

Captain Maertens reported the highlights of UN activities during the period as follows:

(1) UN forces continued to advance toward "Line Kansas": In the west advancing units crossed this line but were still eight to ten miles away from it in the east.

(2) A task force was dispatched to secure the Hwachon Reservoir Dam and at last reports was approximately two miles from its objective.

(3) Continued moderate advances put UN forces across the 38th parallel in all corps areas.

(4) The 41st Royal Marine Commandos landed at Songjin, 75 miles from the Soviet-Korean border, destroyed considerable railroad trackage and withdrew without having suffered any casualties.

In reply to a question by Ambassador Politis, Major McBride said that indications that the enemy intended to launch a counteroffensive were based upon the continued southbound movement of vehicular traffic and the build-up of his ground forces, as evidenced by the arrival of the 18th Army Group and the movement of two North Korean corps toward the front. In answer to Ambassador Jooste's question as to whether the build-up of enemy forces could not also be interpreted as a defensive measure, Major McBride replied that this might possibly be the case. He agreed with Ambassador Jooste that the Communist forces had taken no initiative recently and that they were not, at present, "heavily engaged". Major McBride stated, in answer to another question by Ambassador Jooste, that insofar as he was aware there was no line objective beyond "Line Kansas".

Mr. Hickerson said that we had nothing new to report on the statement of UN objectives in Korea as outlined by Mr. Rusk at the last briefing. We currently feel that the statement should be in the form of a report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of individual members in accordance with the resolution of July 7, 1950, which requested periodic status reports. Mr. Hickerson said that thus far all such reports had been purely military but that a report such as the one Mr. Rusk had mentioned would be signed by the President of the United States in his capacity as Chief Executive of the State providing the Unified Command and would follow the text with which they were familiar. He emphasized that we had made no definite decision on this matter as yet. We would possibly want to see the members of the group individually or collectively some time before Friday's briefing.[1]

Mr. Hickerson added that President Entezam had called recently to say that there had been absolutely no response to his approaches to the Chinese Communist Government, and there was no indication that a reply could be expected. Entezam said that he had no new appeal in mind.

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[1] At the briefing on Friday, April 13, the following remarks were attributed to Mr. Hickerson concerning the proposed statement:

"Mr. Hickerson told the group that although the events of the preceding 48 hours [see the editorial note, p. 298] had not changed our views on making some sort of a statement on the present situation in Korea, these events had affected the timing of such a statement. He explained that we had not yet taken any final decision on the matter but were still thinking of a report signed by the President to the Secretary General of the United Nations for the information of the member states. No statement would be made until next week at the earliest, he said, and we would wish to consult with the members of the group when our position had been clarified." (795.00/4–1351)

795.00/4–1051

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TEXT OF SUGGESTED DECLARATION
[CONCERNING KOREA]

We members of the United Nations who have furnished aid in the field to the Republic of Korea desire to re-affirm our objectives in Korea.

The purpose of the present campaign is to resist aggression. We covet no territorial or other advantages for ourselves and our only aim is to bring about a free and independent Korea as set out in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations.

We proclaim our continued adherence to this policy and our readiness to pursue this objective by peaceful means through negotiation. We affirm our intention to prevent, as far as it lies within our power, the spread of hostilities beyond Korea.

In our earnest desire to remove this threat to world peace, to relieve the sufferings of the war ravaged Korean people and to achieve the early withdrawal of all foreign forces in Korea so that the Korean people may work out their own destiny free from all foreign interference, we ask for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea so that a way may be found to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of that unfortunate country.

We make the following proposals:

(*a*) A conference should be held at an early date of representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, People's Republic of China, U.S.S.R., and India.

(*b*) The conference should immediately appoint a Cease-Fire Committee consisting of the President of the General Assembly and representatives of the United Nations Unified Command, including South Koreans, and of the Chinese and North Korean forces, with instructions to arrange an immediate cease-fire.

(*c*) Once arrangements for a cease-fire had been completed, the conference should consider a peaceful solution of the Korean problem leading to the creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korean state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections in which the will of the Korean people can be freely asserted.

(*d*) The conference should at the same time consider arrangements for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.

(*e*) The conference should also consider means of alleviating the sufferings and hardships of the Korean people and of restoring Korea's economy.

It is our belief that these proposals offer a way of bringing about peace in Korea and of relieving the present tension in the Far East. It is our hope that they will be considered in the same spirit of sincerity in which they are offered and that a settlement in Korea will promote world peace and lead to a settlement of other disputes in the Far East by the same peaceful process of negotiation.

WASHINGTON, 10th April, 1951.

795.00/4-1051

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: British Draft Declaration of April 10, 1951[1]

I do not see that this proposal should in any way interfere with the release of the proposed Presidential report to the UN and the President's speech. Nothing that is proposed be said by the President is inconsistent with the British proposal.

Apart from Korea itself, the proposal raises the larger question of whether a "Big 6" which includes the Chinese Communists is to be constituted. While the proposed conference would relate only to Korea it inevitably would provide a precedent for the consideration of other Far Eastern problems. It is of course obvious that we would be heavily outvoted and placed in a difficult position.

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[1] *Supra.*

With respect to the proposal itself for Korea I believe the following should be noted:

1. The fate of Korea would be decided by the "Big 6" without any Korean participation whatever. The proposal entirely ignores the legitimate status and the position of the Republic of Korea. Its exclusion would undoubtedly present us with very serious problems in Korea itself.
2. The proposal entirely ignores the UN vs Communist China aspect of the Korean situation and treats Communist China on the basis of an entire equality with the countries which have at tremendous sacrifice been opposing its criminal acts.
3. Sub-paragraph (*c*) of the British proposal apparently envisages the wiping out of the Republic of Korea and a "fresh start."
4. I question whether as a matter of tactics it is desirable to put forward a proposal as specific as this prior to any indication whatever that the Chinese Communists are willing to discuss a peaceful settlement thus prejudicing our bargaining position.

795.00/4-1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 11, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Ambassador Wrong and Mr. Herbert Norman
France —Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor
Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
India —Mr. Kirpalani, Minister
Netherlands —Ambassador van Roijen
New Zealand —Ambassador Berendsen
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Ambassador Wan
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa—Ambassador Jooste
United States —FE—Mr. Rusk
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Allen
FE—Mr. Ogburn
FE—Mr. Barbour

Mr. Rusk said that he had some very informal remarks based on first impressions of the day's events which he would like to pass on to the members of the group. He said that under the arrangements by which the President had appointed the Commanding General, Unified Forces in Korea, he had relieved General MacArthur of this command and appointed General Ridgway in his place.[1] This would mean, unfortunately, that General Ridgway would not be able to spend as much time in Korea as formerly since he would also be Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, Far East; etc., as well as the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. From our point of view, it was extremely valuable to have one military leader in the field dealing with the related problems of Japan and Korea. It had been anticipated for several months that should there have been some development preventing General Ridgway's being able to continue in command of the Eighth Army, General Van Fleet would take command. From this it would be seen that the appointment of General Van Fleet as Commander of the Eighth Army was not a decision made on the spur of the moment. Although General Van Fleet was not as well known as General Ridgway, he had had extensive military experience including the command of military operations in Greece and was known to be aggressive, hard-hitting, and capable.

Mr. Rusk said that the decision to relieve General MacArthur had been made with extreme regret. As a military leader he had served with distinction for 50 years and enjoyed great public confidence. It was therefore very regrettable that such a distinguished commander should prove unable to carry out the responsibilities imposed by both the United States and the United Nations. He said that we hoped that the personal discussion of General MacArthur would soon die down, permitting us to get down to the basic problems confronting us.

Mr. Rusk emphasized that it was very important to understand that the change in military leaders in the Far East represented no change of policy. On the contrary, the fact that General MacArthur had been relieved would indicate that the United States Government was determined to carry out its present policies. We still desire an early Japanese peace settlement. There was no change in our attitude toward the Peiping regime or in our determination to take a firm line with respect to threats to security elsewhere in the Far East. He said that he hoped that the change in command would not be misinterpreted; any speculation that there would be a change in these policies was groundless. We had requested our mission in New York to notify the Secretary-General of the UN of the change in the Unified Command, and Mr. Hickerson added that this was done in the usual routine manner.

With regard to the proposed statement on Korea, Mr. Rusk said that the question was whether a statement should be issued, whether it should be a statement of individual or joint objectives, or whether it should be held for further consultation and exploration with other groups such as the GOC. He said that it was the working level view of this government that there was no longer any particular requirement for a statement as such, but we might want to consult further on this subject. It was also possible that a talk to the American people might have to occur. If such a talk were given, the Administration would not speak as the UN and would leave the UN position in *status quo*, he stated.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 298.

Mr. Rusk said that any speculation that the relieving of General MacArthur represented a consolidation of our policies and interests in Europe rather than in the Far East was entirely unjustified. We had permanent problems in both areas, and the change in Tokyo was in no sense a shift in emphasis.

In reply to Ambassador Jooste's inquiry as to whether a domestic address for the American people would be made, Mr. Rusk said that it was becoming increasingly evident that the people desired a statement on Korean policy and that one would probably have to be made.[2] In any case we would be very careful not to jeopardize the UN policies with regard to Korea.

Ambassador Wrong believed that there existed an urgent need for a restatement of our objectives in Korea, particularly in view of the recent statements from Tokyo which seemed to contradict stated UN policies. The form in which such a statement might be issued was entirely immaterial. He also said that it was quite possible that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists had a sincere and deeply rooted distrust of United States and therefore of United Nations objectives in Korea, although the removal of General MacArthur might greatly clarify our aims. He asked whether it was not possible that in the near future some means might not be found to end the fighting through the Good Offices Committee or through some other medium. Mr. Rusk said we believed that any public or private approaches to Peiping now would probably have as little effect as other recent approaches had had. It was believed that the Communists would make at least one more military effort to achieve their goals before being willing to sit down and talk. He conceded to Ambassador Wrong that we should not fail to explore all possibilities but questioned the value of a spate of public offers. Upon Ambassador Wrong's asserting that we should not overlook the fact that some substance had been given to Chinese fears, Mr. Rusk observed that while something might be done to diminish Chinese mistrust of us, something might also be done to diminish our mistrust of them.

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[2] Concerning President Truman's radio address to the nation on April 11 at 10:30 p.m., see the editorial note, p. 337.

Ambassador van Roijen predicted that his government would feel that the issuance of a statement such as the one discussed would be useful in order to redefine our aims in Korea and to ensure that nothing had been left undone to end the fighting.

Mr. Rusk observed that it was very difficult to find a line on which a disengagement would be safe, particularly since we cannot announce the location of such a line without giving the other side a safe haven.

In reply to Mr. Kirpalani's question whether the establishment of a definite UN line across the peninsula would have an effect on future operations, Mr. Rusk replied that it would largely depend upon the enemy's capabilities, intentions and actions and upon other military factors which might exist at that time.

Ambassador Jooste inquired whether it was not true that the establishment of a unified Korea was more of a political objective than a war aim and whether it might not be that the North Koreans believed that the UN was trying to impose unification upon them by force. Mr. Rusk replied that the other side was aware that any serious attempt to settle the military situation in the vicinity of the 38th parallel would receive serious consideration. He said that we were still faced with basically irreconcilable aims. He also explained that while the political and military objectives differed, the serious effect which the formal abandonment of the principle of unification would have on the South Koreans would have a bearing on the military situation.

In answer to Ambassador Jooste's question whether a restatement of the broad aims of the United Nations in Korea would not have an improved chance of eliciting a favorable reply from the Communists, Mr. Hickerson said that as was well known this had been done in January, and the Peiping Government had flatly rejected our offer to negotiate.

357.AD/4-1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 11, 1951—3:37 p. m.

1392. Appeal by UNCURK to NK people and political leaders. Remytels 1383, 1359 and 1350 and Deptel 824,[1] and telecons April 11, Brown-Sandifer.[2]

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[1] Telegrams 1350 from New York and 824 to New York, both dated March 30, are printed on p. 283; telegram 1359, April 4, from New York, is printed on p. 292. Telegram 1383, April 11, from New York is not printed; it indicated no change in Secretary-General Lie's position that it would be premature at this time for UNCURK to make an appeal to North Korea (357.AD/4-951).

[2] Benjamin Brown, Deputy Executive Secretary of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, and Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

Following are texts two "strictly confidential" cables dated April 11 from Stavropoulos to Secretariat, given us by Malania (UN).[3] USUN comments follow in next number telegram.

First Cable.

"I communicated members of Commission SYG's suggestion for delay and strongly supported it but with exception of Plimsoll, all others favoured sending immediate message to Entezam. At today's meeting even Plimsoll,[4] although reluctant, voted text. As you will see argumentation is very weak. Their action is motivated by desire to take some part present effort. Do not believe that the communication by itself will produce any harm and if as I would expect Entezam advises appeal will conflict with other plans I believe Commission will not proceed further. However since Chile, Pakistan, Netherlands, Thailand suggested that they have agreement their govts for making appeal, I suggest that you contact their individual dels to correlate action."

Second cable.

"Please communicate following message from Commission to Entezam.

'1. The UNCURK is considering an approach by Commission at present time to people and political leaders of NK to discuss all questions relating to establishment of an independent, unified, and democratic Korea. This approach could be made by means of radio broadcasts from Tokyo and UN headquarters.

'2. Members of the Commission hold no exaggerated hopes about success of such a move, but feel that there is a possibility that present military situation, which has forced the Chinese armies into a limited withdrawal, may have produced necessary psychological reaction in the minds of the leaders of both NK and Chi forces opposing us, to make them more receptive to an approach by the representative body of UN in Korea.

'3. Such an action on part of Commission would serve to emphasize once more that the UN desire the unification of Korea, which is believed to be the common aspiration of people in this country.

'4. The offer might serve to demonstrate fact that interests of NK's and Chinese assisting them are not the same.

'5. The Commission feels, in consequence, that there is at least a possibility of taking advantage of the situation, at a time when military developments are favourable to UN.

'6. The Commission, before deciding upon such a step, would greatly appreciate your views on the subject in order to avoid any inconsistency or conflict with any actions that GOC or other competent groups or bodies may be contemplating.'

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[3] Leo Malania, Special Assistant to Andrew W. Cordier who was Executive Assistant to U.N. Secretary-General Lie.

[4] James Plimsoll, Australian Representative to UNCURK.

Commission requests that a copy above message be communicated by you to each of dels represented on Commission."

Dept may wish relay to Pusan.

AUSTIN

357.AD/4-1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 11, 1951—4:15 p. m.

1393. Re appeal by UNCURK to NK people and political leaders. Re UNCURK cables given my preceding tel (Usun 1392).

Malania gave text second cable to Entezam. He found Entezam had been thoroughly briefed by Cordier on background UNCURK consideration of appeal idea. Entezam said he would ask GOC to meet this afternoon. He personally felt GOC should advise UNCURK that such appeal would be "premature". He did not see how appeal could be approved without some prior indication by NK authorities of their readiness to receive and consider appeal. In the absence of such prior indication, Entezam was "85 per cent sure" appeal would lead to nothing.

Entezam was, however, not sure his colleagues would agree with him. Thinking out loud, he speculated regarding possible compromise in case his colleagues reacted favorably to UNCURK suggestion. One possibility, he thought, would be for GOC to counsel delay until situation further clarified, especially with respect to consequences of Gen. MacArthur's removal. Another possibility would be for GOC to state that in principle it felt the object of proposed UNCURK appeal was "worthwhile," but GOC could not take a position without first seeing a text of proposed appeal. Malania formed impression Entezam fully aware of all the implications of UNCURK suggestion and would take no precipitate action.

Grafstrom called today at USUN to discuss certain unrelated questions. We took occasion during his visit to mention that we understood UNCURK was requesting GOC's views regarding a possible appeal to North Koreans. Grafstrom reacted strongly against the idea. He thought UNCURK appeal at this time would be most ill-advised. He said he would express himself emphatically on this point to his colleagues in GOC.

Malania later told us that in accordance with UNCURK's request, he was transmitting copies of second cable to delegations of governments represented on UNCURK. He did not intend to comment to these delegations on merits of UNCURK proposal nor would he ask their opinions regarding substance. He intended to inform them that secretariat would be glad to offer its facilities and advice upon request.

In accordance with Sandifer's telephonic instruction, we took no action in this matter other than as indicated above.

Department may wish repeat Pusan.

AUSTIN

357.AD/4-1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 11, 1951—9 : 20 p. m.

1397. Suggest Dept repeat Pusan. Re appeal by UNCURK to NK people and political leaders.

Remytels 1392 and 1393 April 11. Malania (UN) gave us in strictest confidence substance of cable sent by Entezam to UNCURK following GOC meeting this afternoon. Entezam took line it would be difficult to express an opinion concerning the proposed appeal without having opportunity to examine a text. He stated that in the opinion of the GOC, a public broadcast of an appeal at this time would not be opportune. UNCURK itself in its cable had indicated that members did not believe there was a good chance of favorable reception. Rejection by NK authorities would not facilitate GOC task. Entezam suggested UNCURK might explore "ways and means" of making other types of appeal. He requested that committee take no step without consulting him further.

Malania, who attended latter part of meeting, said he sensed no real difference of opinion among GOC members. At close of meeting, they agreed to make no announcement to press concerning subject of discussion.

Malania expressed personal opinion it was unfortunate that it had been necessary to send copies of UNCURK cable to UN dels of govts represented on UNCURK. He felt this would precipitate fruitless and unnecessary discussion and might lead to press leaks.

In transmitting text UNCURK cable to Australian del, Malania learned that Canberra had rejected outright the idea of an UNCURK appeal. Australian del speculated that Plimsoll was able to acquiesce in UNCURK decision because it involved only a solicitation of Entezam's views, without committing UNCURK to principle of appeal.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

At 10:30 p. m. on April 11, President Truman delivered a radio report to the American people on Korea and United States policy in the Far East. The principal theme of his address, which he reiterated several times, was that the United States was trying to prevent the spread of hostilities in Asia into a third world war. By fighting a limited action against the Communist aggression in Korea, which, the President asserted, had been plotted and launched as part of a greater plan to conquer all of Asia, the United States believed it would blunt the Communist thrust and thwart the Kremlin's effort to take over the Far East. General MacArthur's dismissal, resulting from his disagreement with the American policy of limiting the war to Korea, presaged no change in the country's policy. Mr. Truman went on to state that a negotiated peace could be achieved, but not through appeasement of the aggressors. It must be based, he said, on a cessation of the fighting, the taking of concrete steps to see that the fighting would not break out again, and an end to aggression. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, page 223)

III. APRIL 12–JULY 7. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL MACARTHUR; CONSIDERATION OF A STATEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS AIMS IN KOREA; DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM

795.00/4–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1951.

Subject: Statement concerning the Korean Situation

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Emmons, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 2:30 this afternoon at his request. He asked Mr. Rusk whether for the moment we contemplated making a further statement on the situation in relation to Korea or whether the President's statement of last evening in our opinion would suffice, and did we consider this the statement about which we had been talking all along? Mr. Rusk replied that for the moment it seemed to us wise to allow the facts of the situation to sort themselves out and settle down for a few days before taking any further step in relation to the present situation and that, in a sense, this had been the statement, although perhaps we might consider further action along this line at a later date. He pointed out that we had not only a domestic problem in relation to Korea at the present time but the reaction to the President's statement had not yet been received either from the Communist side or in terms of other foreign opinion. He therefore felt that for the moment it was unlikely that we would want to take any further step of this kind.

Mr. Tomlinson then showed Mr. Rusk the text of a cable from the British Foreign Office in which it was indicated that Mr. Morrison felt that the time was propitious for further efforts towards peaceful negotiation, despite the fact that the Communists in Korea might be building up for an offensive. Mr. Morrison wondered whether the United States government contemplated making a further statement on the situation or would support the idea of a United Nations effort along this line, which he seemed to feel advisable. The cable indicated that Mr. Morrison believed that, if the United States government contemplated no further statement at this time, he himself should make a statement along the general lines which had been already communicated to the State Department.[1] Mr. Rusk reiterated that we did not at the moment contemplate any further statement.

Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Tomlinson whether there had been any reaction yet from England to the President's statement. Mr. Tomlinson replied that it was still too early to have received the British reaction but that he thought in general the speech had been a good one and would be received with satisfaction.

There then followed a brief discussion of certain aspects of the military situation, which Mr. Rusk mentioned he would be taking up with the British Ambassador.

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[1] See the note from the British Embassy, April 10, p. 328.

795.00/4-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants:

	UK	*US*
	Sir Oliver Franks	General Bradley
	Lord Tedder	Col. Carns
	Mr. B. A. B. Burrows	Mr. Paul H. Nitze
	Capt. Richard Coleridge	Mr. Dean Rusk

Sir Oliver said that he had received instructions from his government and that he had two points to make. Inasmuch as the first related primarily to military matters, he would ask Lord Tedder to give his views.

Lord Tedder said that even though there was close collaboration on intelligence matters between their people and ours in Washington, he found that there was more difference between London's views and Washington's than he had previously thought existed. London doubted whether the Chinese had the capability of a new offensive in the near future. He thought, perhaps, the difference arose from a difference in viewpoint as to the location of the 4th Army. General Bradley said that he thought it might arise out of more recent information which we have received as to the location of three units of the 1st Army. Lord Tedder went on to say that London felt that the Chinese would certainly not be ready for a major offensive before the end of May. General Bradley said that we had received one message, giving the date of April 16, but that he, himself, did not believe an offensive would take place prior to June, but that one could never be sure.

Lord Tedder said the difference as to combat numbers was not so important, but rather the British felt that the Chinese air capability, although not a flash in the pan, would not give them the capability of a really serious attack. He questioned, however, whether we had sufficient anti-aircraft, whether we had sufficient fields for dispersal, and whether we were not taking an unnecessary gamble. London thought that some weeks, perhaps some months, might elapse before the Chinese would have the capability of a serious air attack. This would give us time both for further conversations and to take necessary protective measures.

Sir Oliver indicated that his government would have been glad if we hadn't felt it necessary to take up this question at this time, but understood that we wished to. He said that his government felt that whatever decision was taken, it must be taken by governments, not solely by military authorities, because it might cause general war in the Far East.

General Bradley emphasized that as to the U.S. this was a governmental decision and had been approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President. The only decision that the JCS might take would be that of determining that the conditions contemplated had actually taken place.

Sir Oliver said that even if the general authorization asked for was granted, his government felt that the effective decision as to the magnitude of the attack must be passed on by his government, and they could not give their agreement in advance of the event.

General Bradley said that the time lag under these circumstances might be very great. If there was time he anticipated that the JCS would go through regular channels to the President. There was a possibility that Sir Oliver and Lord Tedder might be out of town. Our planes are now wing tip to wing tip. Repeated attacks might be disastrous.

Lord Tedder asked whether there wasn't time to build more fields to disperse planes and increase the anti-aircraft defenses. He said he thought we were taking a gamble in acting as though present conditions would continue indefinitely. General Bradley said that such action would decrease the effect of our air support by a half to a third. Lord Tedder said he thought we could operate more easily if we had more fields. General Bradley said that it was hard to build the necessary fields all over the world. Lord Tedder said that if we kept our planes as tightly packed as they are now we were inviting an initial blow which might be decisive.

General Bradley said that there was a further question of morale of our forces if the Chinese were to change their ground rules and we were not to change ours. Lord Tedder said he agreed that it might be necessary to have a decision within 24 hours. Sir Oliver said that the moment of decision might very well be it; we would be moving into an unknown expansion. Because of the inherent facts in the situation, his Ministers would feel that even if the general policies were agreed to in advance, they must ask that they be in on the final decision. General Bradley said that he agreed that a political decision was involved and if there was time it should be reaffirmed through political channels, but that if there was not time rapid action would be necessary.

Dean Rusk asked what would happen if Washington should say "yes" and London would say "no". Lord Tedder said that the initial reports might be very much exaggerated. Dean Rusk asked whether the important factor was the scale of the effort or its effect. Lord Tedder said that the U.K. did not feel that the Chinese could produce damaging effects.

General Bradley said that if the Chinese changed their ground rules then we would have to change our ground rules, or get out. Lord Tedder said we were gambling on the other fellow continuing to limit his attack; we should take the proper precautions now.

General Bradley asked whether the British advocated going to all fourteen governments. Sir Oliver said that his instructions did not take him that far. He repeated that his government was interested in the application of the policy; that is carries real risks of an enlargement of the war, starting in the Far East. His government must look at it from the point of view of a country which will suffer most of the casualties. They felt that they ought to be in on the decision. Speaking personally, he felt that if one looked at it from their viewpoint, this looked right. He agreed that if one looked at it from the point of view of its effects in Korea it might be hard to say that it was right. If the U.K. has to go along with everything that follows from the decision, then the U.K. must be in on the decision.

General Bradley said that when we know that they have changed the ground rules we know they are prepared for general war. Sir Oliver said that if such were to be their decision, it is vital that the 50 million people in the U.K. go in in good heart.

Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be advisable to give a warning in advance along the lines of the Dutch suggestion.[1] Sir Oliver said that if one could define the conditions then this might be possible. The British always hate deciding on general propositions and committing themselves to act on particular instances which fit within such a general proposition. They want to look at the general policy in the light of the specific situation. The decision in this case is so important that even with the best possible will, they must be in on the operative decision.

Mr. Rusk said that the U.K. might view the Far East differently than we do. We face on two oceans. Sir Oliver said that this is a fair point. The recent parliamentary debate showed that Churchill, Eden and the others were in agreement with the Labor Party on this point.

Mr. Rusk asked when the U.K. proposed to deal with Nehru, etc. Sir Oliver said that this might be an issue of peace or war. We will look at it from the standpoint of our geographic and political interest, but we won't need to argue the fundamentals out again. We would look at the facts—not at what we would prefer to see. Sir Oliver said he did not think the Dominion office would send out telegrams to eight countries.

Lord Tedder said that it was important that they be able to say that they had been consulted and had agreed. General Bradley said that if Russian planes come in we must get out of Korea. In order to do so we must go after their bases. Sir Oliver said that this reinforced his case.

Mr. Rusk asked about an attack by the USSR on Japan. Sir Oliver said that he understood the question but was not going to give an answer. Mr. Rusk said that we have assumed that the occupation is an allied occupation; maybe we have assumed too much. Sir Oliver said that the record of the Jessup conversations of last fall gave the answer.[2]

General Bradley said that he wanted to raise a different question. There was a strong possibility that the Chinese would use North

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[1] See circular telegram 601, April 9, p. 317.

[2] For text of the minutes of a political-military conversation, October 26, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 1689.

Korea fields as staging bases. Are we to accept this as no change in ground rules? He said that this was one we ought to think over, but should not try to answer now. What was worrying us now was the danger of a sudden attack. Lord Tedder suggested that, perhaps, we could set up some special machinery for consultation in time of emergency.

Mr. Nitze asked why the U.K. regretted that we had felt it necessary to raise this question at this time. Sir Oliver said that the U.K. Chiefs of Staff felt the danger of a Chinese air attack was not imminent. He also referred to the date of our inquiry.

795.00/3–2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1951—8 p. m.

1118. See USUN Tels No. 1330, Mar 26; 1385, Apr 9, rpt to you Apr 12.[1] Dept calls ur attention to efforts of Palar to stimulate Arab-Asian group to issue appeal to both PRG and UN not to cross 38th parallel. Dept approves Gross views as set forth in reftels.

In ur discretion suggest approach to FonOff along lines Gross talk with Palar. You may inform FonOff Dept appreciates particular concern of Indon Govt and its fear of extension of hostilities in Far East. US shares Indon desire for limiting Korean hostilities and for bringing about cessation hostilities and Korean settlement. US action and policies, both as UC in conduct of campaign and as member in UN, have been directed toward these objectives.

Like Indon, US has much to lose; it does not desire World War or Asian war. US has made and will continue to exert all its influence and power to avert such war. But just as Commies have power to bring about peace at any time they wish it, they, unfortunately, also have power to plunge world into war. We hope they will not do so. But likelihood that enemy will extend hostilities will not be diminished by any steps which wld encourage aggressors, endanger security UN forces, and shatter determination and unity of free world to present solid front against aggression. FonOff must realize that security free nations lies in unity of free world in support of UN Charter principles. Any action which wld breed disunity and reveal less than full support for UN collective measures against aggression would endanger entire framework established in UN Charter for protecting all nations large and small against armed attack.

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[1] The two earlier telegrams were repeated to Djakarta in telegram 1119, April 12 (795.00/3–2651).

Dept agrees that every effort shld continue to be made to persuade Chi Commies that peaceful settlement in accordance UN principles is in interest of world peace and in their own interest. For reasons set forth in reftels, however, separate Asian-Arab intervention, particularly intervention along lines of Palar suggestion, will not enhance possibilities of peaceful settlement and indeed might frustrate and hamper existing efforts. Proliferation of conflicting appeals tends only to confuse picture and to undercut efforts GOC which is exerting every effort and is alert for any opportunity to bring about settlement we all desire.

Issue raised by proposed Arab-Asian action is not merely question of UN prestige. By treating UN on same basis as Chi aggressors, and by giving impression Arab-Asian group stands apart from gen UN effort in Korea, proposed action wld undercut entire moral position of UN and threaten UN effectiveness as bulwark against aggression anywhere. If Arab-Asian nations wish to contribute to peace efforts, they cld best do so by supporting Entezam and GOC efforts.[2]

ACHESON

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[2] Ambassador H. Merle Cochran in Djakarta reported to the Department in his telegram 1437, April 16, that he had passed on the above views to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Roem, who received them attentively but noncommittally (795.00/4-1651).

795.00/4-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Paul H. Nitze

I told Sir Oliver that I wanted to be perfectly frank and open with him so that he would be in a position to inform his government appropriately.

I recalled that at our initial meeting General Bradley had left early to go to another meeting and that Admiral Sherman had continued in his stead.[1] At the meeting to which General Bradley had gone, the question came up for discussion of what procedure the U.S. Government, in its exercise of its responsibilities as Unified Command, should follow in the event of a major attack on U.N. forces from bases outside of Korea. I recalled that this was at a time when the newspapers were carrying stories that General MacArthur was authorized to initiate a counterattack in the event of such a contingency, and that it was essential that a clear-cut determination be made by the U.S. Government as to what procedure should be followed in the event of such a contingency. I went on to say that when the issue had first come up some days before, I had suggested that General Bradley and I sit down with him and Lord Tedder so that the U.S.-U.K. relationships in this problem could be clarified with the least possible delay. However, our desire to discuss this matter with the U.K. did not remove from us as Unified Command the responsibility for action one way or another in the event such a contingency took place. I had gathered from him that the U.K.'s position was that the contingency was unlikely in the near future and, therefore, we had considerable time for a further exploration of views between us.

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[1] Presumably the reference is to the meeting of April 6; see Mr. Nitze's memorandum of that date, p. 307.

Sir Oliver said that he was disturbed that a final decision was taken by the U.S. Government while the matter was under discussion with his government. I replied that I found difficulty with the word "final". In the event the U.K.'s estimate that the danger of the contingency was slight proved to be wrong, we would have to act one way or another. Lack of action was as much a decision as a decision to act and might be just as serious. In the absence of agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. as to the procedure to be followed, the responsibility fell upon us as Unified Command for acting in one way or another. It seemed to be perfectly clear that the decision as to the magnitude of the attack should be taken in Washington and not in the field. We would, however, feel strongly that under certain circumstances it might be far more dangerous to delay action than to take the time for widespread consultation. If the U.K.'s estimate was right, we had plenty of time for further clarification of the U.S.–U.K. relationship in the event of such a contingency.

Sir Oliver said that he now understood our viewpoint and he felt he was in a position to write his cable in a more understanding and helpful way.

357.AK/4–1351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 13, 1951—2:36 p. m.

1401. For Hickerson from Gross. Re meeting with Grafstrom and Nervo re GOC. I met Grafstrom and Padilla this morning at their request. On afternoon April 12, Rau requested meeting with GOC at which he outlined following views:

> March 17 Panikkar reported to New Delhi of his impression received from Peiping Vice Minister Foreign Affairs that Chinese Communist Govt might be interested in discussing possibilities peaceful settlement in Korea, but were deeply suspicious of motives of UN and US in Far East. At that time, according to Rau, Panikkar received indication in Peiping that there was no likelihood of change in the Peiping position or of further answer to Panikkar "for two or three weeks."
>
> Rau expressed view to GOC that developments of past few days, particularly relief of MacArthur and President's speech, formed an excellent basis for new approach to Peiping by Panikkar, either on behalf of GOI or on behalf of Asia-Arab group as a whole. Rau was therefore prepared to recommend to GOI that Panikkar be instructed to make prompt approach to Peiping Foreign Office, pointing out to latter that developments of past few days should serve to remove doubt as to UN desire to terminate conflict in Korea and to remove suspicions as to designs of US or UN in Far East. Rau thought Panikkar might urge upon Peiping desirability of responding to Entezam's unanswered communication of February 14. Rau also proposed to GOC that Panikkar might advise Peiping that Entezam was prepared to agree that a four power conference would be convened, consisting of US, UK, USSR and Chinese Communist Govt. Such a conference would seek to arrange a cease-fire in Korea. If a cease-fire were arranged and put into effect representatives of the four powers mentioned would proceed to next order of business, which would be to agree to the composition of a larger conference and to prepare the agenda for such larger conference.
>
> Before taking any action, Rau wished reaction of GOC and requested latter to communicate with USG to ascertain our views.

I undertook to transmit foregoing immediately to Department and requested GOC reaction as of interest to Department.

Grafstrom and Padilla believe that some step is desirable, provided it is not of a public nature. However, they agreed with my personal and tentative reaction that it would be most undesirable and dangerous to go as far as Rau suggested. In other words, they perceived misleading and dangerous possibilities if Panikkar were to get into discussion, even on a most tentative basis, of questions involving the convening of a conference, its composition or its agenda. On other hand, GOC believes it might be useful for Panikkar, after pointing out that developments of past few days should wholly allay unfounded suspicions of Peiping, to urge Peiping to respond to Entezam's communication. GOC feels this might be useful not only as an additional pressure upon Peiping but also because it will leave UN in stronger diplomatic position if such an approach were rejected by Peiping than if no such step were taken. I stressed and Padilla and Grafstrom agreed, that we should discourage public approach or public appeals at this time.

GOC most anxious to obtain urgent reply and I agreed to see Grafstrom at Lake Success at 5:00 p.m. today. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AK/4-1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 13, 1951—5 p.m.

847. Dept concurs in ur strong negative reaction to Rau proposal for sounding Chi Commies re Four-Power conf to arrange Korean cease-fire. We are gratified to note that Grafstrom and Padilla themselves understand danger of discussing such a conf with Peiping.

We wld not object to having Ind Amb to Peiping urge Peiping to respond to Entezam communication of Feb 14, if GOC feels this wld be useful.

In ur discussion with Grafstrom sug you point out that change in UN Command, with accompanying internal political ramifications, does not involve any change in US policies re Korea, as Pres has stated.

ACHESON

357.AK/4-1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 14, 1951—1:20 p.m.

1410. GOC. Grafstrom advised Gross Rau has recommended to GOI that latter instruct Panikkar to approach Peiping FonOff. Rau agreed with GOC as to desirability of Panikkar limiting approach, referring to recent events as serving to remove any Peiping suspicions and urging Peiping to respond to Entezam communication.

AUSTIN

795.00/4-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1951.

Subject: Australian Suggestions with Respect to Korea

Participants: The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin
Mr. Colin Moodie, Counselor, Australian Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin, called on me today at his request to inquire whether we were able to give any further reactions to Mr. Spender's suggestions concerning the question of Korea which had been brought to the attention of Mr. Merchant and myself earlier in the week. I told the Ambassador that unfortunately the press of work during the past few days had prevented me from giving the consideration I wished to give to Mr. Spender's message.[1]

The Ambassador inquired whether we still intended to have the President make a report to the United Nations for the Unified Command on objectives in Korea. I said that we planned to give the matter further consideration in the light of recent developments and that we had an open mind concerning the form and content of such a statement. Mr. Makin remarked that his government found itself in general agreement with the proposal of the United Kingdom respecting a statement to be made by the countries making contributions in Korea. He added that in the opinion of his government Arab-Asian support, and particularly the support of India, was important if it were to serve a useful purpose. The Ambassador said that Australia had a reasonable claim to participate in negotiations which might follow for a settlement of the Korean question but that it was not prepared to push the point if it were an obstacle to agreement.

I told the Ambassador that we would have difficulty in accepting a proposal which would appear to set up something comparable to a Council of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of settling Far Eastern questions. The inclusion of India would make it even more difficult for us.

I took advantage of the opportunity to tell the Ambassador that in some quarters it was being stated that the relief of General MacArthur increased the chances of a peaceful settlement in Korea. I remarked that this might indicate a misunderstanding of the situation. The relief of General MacArthur did not indicate any change in United States policy. Furthermore the Chinese Communists have given no indication of a willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement but instead are building up for another offensive, this despite the fact that it is obvious to them that they could get a negotiated settlement on the basis of a cease-fire in the vicinity of the 38th parallel.[2]

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[1] The views of Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender had been conveyed to Mr. Merchant on April 9; they are covered in the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Rusk of April 10, p. 324.

[2] On April 15, in remarks delivered on the NBC television program "Battle Report", Mr. Rusk outlined the choices facing the United Nations in Korea. He rejected both withdrawal and expansion of the hostilities and stated that the United Nations aimed at maintaining peace and security without a general war. He went on to say that peace could only come in Korea when the Communists gave up their aggressive purposes, which they showed no sign of yet doing. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 23, 1951, p. 655)

357.AD/4-1651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 16, 1951—9:16 p. m.

1413. Re UNCURK appeal to NK people and political leaders. Remytel 1397, April 11. Stavropoulos has cabled that Chilean and Pakistani members of UNCURK[1] took position that Entezam's message of April 11 was unsatisfactory and insulting. They argued that under para 2(*a*) of Oct 7 GA resolution it was duty of commission to issue appeal for discussion of questions relating to establishment of unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea. They suggested UNCURK request Entezam to clarify how an appeal by the commission would render GOC's task more difficult. Stavropoulos endeavored without success to dissuade Trucco from pressing this view in UNCURK meeting April 14. Plimsoll also took position that proposed message to Entezam would be ridiculous. By a vote of 4–3 (Chile, Pakistan and Thailand) commission decided to adjourn discussion until members received instruction from their UN dels.

Following UNCURK meeting April 14, Trucco cabled Santa Cruz[2] he had decided to leave commission, since Entezam's message proved it was impossible for UNCURK to carry out its task. He felt Chile should withdraw from commission. Stavropoulos reported that Trucco had then left for Tokyo. Stavropoulos did not believe it would be worthwhile to persuade him to return.

Malania, who gave us above info, later said he had learned that on instructions from Canberra, Australian del would press UN dels of govts represented on UNCURK to accept Entezam's point of view. Australians were sending letters to these dels stating that: (1) UNCURK appeal would be inopportune; (2) appeal would have only slight chance of acceptance; (3) public broadcast might produce public rejection, which definitely would complicate GOC's task; and (4) it would be undesirable to issue appeal to North Koreans alone, without taking into account Chi Commie participation in aggression.

At Malania's suggestion, Australian del agreed to inform Entezam of steps being taken.[3]

AUSTIN

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[1] Manuel Trucco and Mian Ziaud-din, respectively.

[2] Hernán Santa Cruz Barcelo was Chilean Representative at the United Nations.

[3] On April 25, the U.S. Mission at the United Nations informed the Department that on April 17 UNCURK had voted unanimously, with Chile and Thailand absent, to drop unconditionally the idea of an appeal to North Korea, while in New York all the delegations of nations represented on UNCURK, except Pakistan, Chile, and Thailand, had indicated agreement with the line taken by Entezam regarding this matter. This information came to the Mission from Mr. Malania. (Telegram 1443, April 25, from New York; 310.5/4-2551; see also U.N. document A/1881, pp. 10–11.)

795.00/4-1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1951.

Subject: Questions relating to Far Eastern Policy

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 10:30 this morning by prior appointment. He stated that the Embassy had received a request from the British Foreign Office to determine whether the U.S. Government had the documentary evidence alluded to in a story by Stewart Alsop in his column of March 11, 1951 to the effect that Mao Tse-tung had been planning with the USSR as early as December 1949 an invasion of South Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that he knew of no particular documentary evidence which might back up this statement, that he felt sure that the Department had not given Mr. Alsop such information, but that we would be glad to look into the matter further to see what we might have on it.

Mr. Tomlinson then referred to an exchange of cables with his Foreign Office concerning a proposed statement of policy on a negotiated settlement with the Chinese Communists which the 14 nations might find it desirable to make. He left with Mr. Rusk a summary of the latest cable received from Mr. Morrison expressing his view as to how such a statement might be handled.[1] Mr. Tomlinson remarked that Mr. Morrison felt under some considerable pressure to make a statement before Parliament on this general question. Mr. Rusk pointed out that for the moment we, ourselves, had no further immediate step in this direction in mind, but he thought the decision as to whether any such statement should be made publicly or whether the approach should be private was both delicate and of considerable importance; under certain conditions a public statement might only serve to strengthen the communist determination to reject a peaceful approach.

Mr. Rusk mentioned that he and the Secretary felt that a reply was owing to Mr. Morrison on several points which he had recently raised with us on the matter of a declaration and that today he was going to devote considerable time to working out a message from the Secretary to Mr. Morrison which would cover a great deal of ground relating to Far Eastern questions; among these would be a discussion of the subject covered by this latest message from the Foreign Office. Mr. Rusk added that in this message we might also take up such topics as the course of action to be followed in the event of a massive intervention in Korea by communist aircraft, and the problem of additional measures against Communist China.

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[1] *Infra.*

Mr. Tomlinson inquired whether the contemplated message would also include a reference to the problem of Hong Kong. Mr. Rusk replied that we did not plan to do so except perhaps in relation to its connection with the general question of the control of trade with China. Mr. Tomlinson remarked that this was a delicate and difficult problem and had been especially touchy in the recent case of the tanker, which had been kept from Chinese Communist hands only with the greatest difficulty.[2]

There then followed a general discussion of policy towards Communist China. Mr. Rusk pointed out that there were two possibilities in handling the Communist China problem; on the one hand, a building up of outside pressure against the Peking regime could take place, which would at first perhaps cause a consolidation of the regime inside the country as well as with the Communist orbit, but which ultimately might lead to its fragmentation; the other approach might be to attempt to establish an attractive force from the West which would tend to loosen the ties which China might have with the USSR. The second course he felt involved the danger that, in the process of attempting to win China away from communism, we might, in fact, end up by strengthening communist power in China. He pointed out that the first course, on the other hand, had the advantage that, if it did not succeed, we would at least ultimately be in a stronger position to continue pressure and would not have sacrificed our general strategic advantage. As an illustration he stated that Communist China was apparently beginning to feel the pressure of the Korean affair on its internal structure, a point, however, with which Mr. Tomlinson did not entirely agree.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the British point of view had generally been, in dealing with China, to counter Chinese pressure where necessary with British pressure, as for instance in Korea, and that they would undoubtedly do so if the Chinese intervened in Indochina, but where the Chinese Communists indicated an inclination to be reasonable, the British Government in its turn felt that reasonableness was the best policy.

Mr. Tomlinson wondered whether the U.S. Government had yet perfected plans for a program of increased aid to Formosa. Mr. Rusk replied that the Bureau of the Budget had not yet passed upon such a program but that it was our plan to increase this aid within the next year.

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[2] For documentation on control of trade with mainland China and economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China, see pp. 1874 ff.

In summing up the conversation Mr. Rusk reiterated that many of the points which had been discussed would be incorporated in the message which the Secretary planned to send to Mr. Morrison within the next few days.

795.00/4-1751

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Message on Korea From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the British Embassy in Washington

In suggesting a fresh approach to a negotiated settlement I had in mind not only the importance of rallying world opinion but also of seeing whether the Chinese would be more ready to respond to an initiative not coming directly from the United Nations with whom they are apparently unwilling to co-operate, at any rate at this stage. From both points of view this is the right time to try.

It has always been my intention to keep the Good Offices Committee fully in the picture and if, as suggested the Committee feels that its functions are being usurped, then it will be necessary to explain to them that this is not so but that I had on the contrary hoped that they would welcome an initiative on a basis somewhat different from that of their efforts precisely because the prospects of a response from the Chinese were perhaps a shade better under the procedure I proposed. I hope that the Asian/Arab Group would also acquiesce in my proposals. Although this Group is not directly participating, a declaration of aims by the countries with forces in Korea may offer a better prospect of Chinese response than an initiative by some other Group such as the Asian/Arab Group who can neither speak for the United Nations as a whole nor are primarily responsible for the conduct of operations in Korea.

I would like you to put these considerations to Mr. Acheson and say that I still regard a restatement of aims as urgent and that I see advantages in having it made in the way I suggested, i.e. an identic statement by Governments with forces in Korea, backed up by a message from the President on behalf of the Unified Command. If we delay too long there is the double risk that we may miss the present opportunity and that some less hopeful initiative may be taken by another Group, e.g. the Asian/Arab Group, or that extensive military operations may recur.

Timing and manner of the approach to Peking call for very careful consideration. My present idea is that we should concentrate on securing a declaration of aims and that we should thereafter decide how best to use it for the purposes of an approach to the Chinese. We must avoid giving the impression of weakness and at the same time we must if possible avoid the risk of a direct rebuff from the Chinese. I think therefore that we might regard this operation as in two stages, first a declaration of aims and secondly an approach to the Chinese.

WASHINGTON, 17th April 1951.

711.551/4–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 17, 1951—1 p. m.

4734. For Ambassador. Dept has noted last sentence ur 5406 Apr 12 to effect MacArthur's dismissal has removed important irritant to Anglo-Amer relations even though policy differences re FE remain.[1] We feel that your statement exactly sums up situation. Moreover, believe this may be critical period Anglo-Amer relations re FE.

It is important Brit do not regard MacArthur action as appeasement toward their point of view or as appeasement toward Chi Commies. If Brit react either above ways their position FE questions likely become even firmer.

On contrary, is most important Brit view MacArthur action as removal of irritant, removal cause of suspicion and apprehension and in general as clarification of atmosphere which shld result UK being in position to support or at least acquiesce in certain US FE policies which thus far Brit have adamantly opposed. Stated another way, now is time for us "cash in" on new situation arising because of removal of MacArthur from scene. In this connection most important for Brit to understand this does not mean change in our position vis-à-vis Chi Commies which if changed in any way will be in direction of increased firmness.

Dept realizes new situation probably not sufficiently powerful bring about complete change on part UK re FE policy. Dept does feel, however, that on selective basis progress shld be made and suggests for moment concentrating on obtaining Brit support our proposal UN Additional Measures Comite on econ sanctions and that Brit relax present position that Chi Commies be represented Jap Treaty negots.

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[1] Telegram 5406, not printed, reported that the news of the President's decision with respect to General MacArthur had been extremely well received in the United Kingdom, particularly by the Labor Party (711.551/4–1251).

FYI. Some adjustment UK position FE may be especially timely from their own view inasmuch we have indications that in Congressional debates over MacArthur Brit FE policy may [be] prominently brought into debate. Brit will doubtless be charged fol policy appeasement in FE.

Above furnished you for background guidance for talks key UK officials this issue. General line re significance MacArthur removal may also be used discreetly in public and press relations.

ACHESON

795.00/4-1851

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 18, 1951—11 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (15). Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, and Nitze were the principal State Department representatives, with Mr. Gleason sitting in for the NSC Staff. For the Joint Chiefs, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg attended, but Admiral Sherman was not listed as a participant.

[The first brief paragraph of the text deals with the question of Yugoslavia.]

Korea

MR. RUSK: To take up the political side first, the general feeling abroad that the negotiating situation has somehow improved is, in our opinion, incorrect. There is, as you know, a considerable sentiment abroad that the dismissal of General MacArthur has opened the way for a peaceful settlement. We have told our friends abroad to be careful in their analysis of this problem. They have tended to regard General MacArthur as a block to a peaceful settlement, whereas we do not think that we have ever blocked a peaceful settlement in any way. However, the change in command is stimulating new approaches to the Chinese Communists. The Good Offices Committee is now trying to see whether it can get an answer from Peiping to the approach it made some weeks ago. Others are in touch with the Soviet Union to see whether the Soviets have anything to say. We do not yet know how to evaluate the North Korean statement.[2] At a first reading, it does not look promising. However, there are difficulties in translating this document, and we have not yet had a chance to study it carefully. There was an interesting editorial in *Pravda* this morning. It is the first official indication of the Soviet line on the dismissal of General MacArthur. The line seems to be that we set out to attack China and that when we found that this was an impossible venture we relieved General MacArthur in order to cover ourselves. The interesting thing about the editorial is that it says, in effect, that we are not going to attack China. The implications of the editorial may be more important than what it actually says.

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[1] The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants. A complete set of these meetings is in the files of the Policy Planning Staff: Lot File 64D563.

Mr. Matthews: Of course, it is too soon to jump to conclusions.

General Bradley: Of course, the Soviets change a man when they change a policy.

Mr. Rusk: We should remember, however, that it was a little remark by Stalin which opened the way to the settlement of the Berlin blockade.[3] The ambassadors of the nations participating in the Korean war have been fairly quiet lately. However, if the situation gets more complicated—if, for example, the Chinese Communists continue to withdraw and if we continue to move north—we are likely to have political problems once again.

General Collins: We may have trouble deciding what to say to General Ridgway.

Mr. Rusk: We will have no trouble with the ambassadors if the Chinese Communists do undertake a big offensive. We will not have a political problem if our forces build a defensive line. We may, however, have a large political problem if the Chinese Communists realize that they cannot obtain their political price for a settlement and act as they did in Greece. If they let the fighting peter out, what should we do? What are the implications for our ground forces? I remember that Gromyko, Hector McNeil, and I talked about the Greek problem.[4] We did not get anywhere because the fact of our discussions became known prematurely, but it soon became evident that the Soviets were going to let the Greek campaign peter out.

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[2] Reference is to a communication, dated April 15, to the President of the U.N. Security Council from North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hen En (U.N. document S/2092/Corr. 1). This message, after a lengthy list of alleged atrocities committed "by the Americans and Syngman Rhee followers", concluded with a demand that the United Nations settle the Korean question in conformity with the wishes of the World Peace Council, which, at its meeting in Berlin in February, had called for the settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of withdrawal of all foreign troops and a conference of all concerned countries. For documentation on the World Peace Council, see the compilation on United States response to the Communist peace offensive in volume IV.

[3] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 643 ff.

[4] For documentation on these talks, see *ibid.*, vol. VI, pp. 227 ff.

We will also have a big political problem if the Chinese Communists launch a heavy air offensive. Governments of the other U.N. countries have pointed out the difficulties they will have in this eventuality. They will have to take governmental decisions. We will have to keep consulting them although we will not give an inch on our right to make a decision here if and when the attack comes and if there is no time for consultation. This raises the question whether your Air Force people in Korea could brief their colleagues from other governments on the air situation. For example, could you brief the Royal Australian Air Force on the air build-up so that the government of Australia would be kept currently informed? Or do you have to handle this problem through channels here in Washington?

In summary, there is nothing of significance to report on the negotiating situation. We have made contacts of various kinds, but there have been no responses to date. Secondly, if the Chinese Communists pull back, what course of action do we follow and what do we say about it to other governments? Thirdly, if the Chinese Communists make a big attack including air, what can we do to give the other governments advance information and what reaction do we make to the attack?

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have been considering here in the JCS whether we should give a complete new directive to General Ridgway which would cancel all his preceding directives. He is now operating under a directive to kill all the Chinese he can while taking prudent measures to protect the safety of his troops. If there is any chance of this thing petering out, it will require us to let them withdraw so that the fighting can peter out. If we kept after them they could not let the fighting come to an end. Of course, they could withdraw all the way to the Yalu. We could not follow them that far in any event because it would lengthen our line of communications too much. If the thing is to peter out, we have got to stop at some point.

GENERAL COLLINS: We have got to give General Ridgway political guidance. For example, from the political standpoint, how far north is it satisfactory for us to go? Are we going to stabilize and hold elections and create a government for Korea except for the part of Korea which we do not hold? One political factor which had been in Walker's[5] mind all the time was the course of the main railroad line. Because of the way this line is laid out, it is a very sensitive point and one which is hard to protect.

MR. RUSK: If we should say to you that the principal military mission for the indefinite future is to provide reasonable security to the Republic of Korea, would that kind of a mission be feasible? If this should be your mission, at what point could you break contact with the Chinese Communist forces?

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[5] Reference is to Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commanding General U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, who had died in an accident on December 23, 1950.

General Bradley: The present line is about the best one we could have. It is the strongest line from the defensive point of view unless we went far north—which would so increase our line of communications as to offset the advantages of the shorter defense line on the ground.

General Vandenberg: From the point of view of the air force, we would prefer the present line, or, alternatively, the present line with the right flank moved up to Wonsan. Either of these two lines would give us the depth we need to carry out our air attacks.

General Bradley: The reservoir cuts out about ten miles from the present defense line. If there is any chance of a negotiated settlement or of a petering out, we should know it now for we are at a good place to stop.

Mr. Matthews: There is considerable difference between a negotiated settlement and a petering out—there will be no negotiations if the thing is allowed to peter out.

General Collins: In Greece the outside forces withdrew. If that happened here, I feel sure that the South Koreans could handle the North Koreans, but they cannot deal with the Chinese Communists. They are still afraid of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Matthews: Do I understand you correctly that a breaking of contact, either at the present line or with the right flank extended to Wonsan, would not endanger the security of our forces?

General Collins: As now deployed, our forces can, I believe, hold whatever the Chinese Communists can throw at them. Before General Ridgway moved up his forces, there was a gap of about 90 miles on the west which worried us considerably.

General Bradley: He ran into heavy resistance in moving up in the west. Four Chinese Communist divisions and one North Korean division opposed him, and had to be driven back before he could clear up the area around Seoul.

Mr. Matthews: Do you have any idea what the purpose of the big smoke screen was?

General Bradley: Apparently it was to cover their withdrawal. We thought at first that it might signal preparations for an attack. They employed this tactic once before, but there has been no attack and so the purpose was probably to cover a further withdrawal.

General Vandenberg: We want to remember that the Russian Air Force is getting experience in tactics and technique. They are using this Korean war as they did the Spanish Civil War. They are bringing in one unit after another and then withdrawing them and bringing them back into the Russian Air Force where they can train others in what they have learned. The smoke screen might have been laid down to determine how it would affect our close support operations. In my opinion, there is still a large danger of an attack. I would like to address my remarks for a moment to Mr. Rusk's point about lining up our allies. In my view, it will not help to talk with the Australian representatives here. Their air force general in Korea attends all our briefing sessions and must be in touch with his government. The problem we have here in Washington is to persuade these governments that we believe that the air build-up is being made with serious intentions. The U.K. is ready to sacrifice the brigade it has in Korea if that is necessary to save the British Isles from attack. However, we cannot sacrifice nine divisions for that purpose. We have got to insist that these governments look at the problem from our point of view. Even though they could afford to sacrifice the small units they have in Korea, we cannot afford to make such a sacrifice. As long as they continue to build air fields and to employ Chinese Communist forces, the enemy poses a serious threat. The Russians are edging into this thing little by little. There is talk now about a volunteer air force. That could be a Russian air force. The Russians have 4,000 aircraft in the area. They could use half of that if they thought it could do the job. They could mount an offensive which could seriously upset us. We need earnest efforts to persuade our allies that an air offensive could be serious. We cannot handle this thing on a wait-and-see basis as the U.K. desires. The Russians have the capability which we have got to take account of. We hope that it will not be used, but we have got to know what we are going to do if it is used.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The British will not give you the answer you want. They are going to wait and see what develops.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: But we have got to push them to give us an answer.

GENERAL COLLINS: I agree, but I don't know how we can push them unless we are sure that they are adequately briefed. The British and the Australians are briefed, but I am not sure that the others are.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: The British are the main obstacle.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The U.K. is now asking us for our order of battle in order to discuss this problem in the Cabinet. This request scares us on security grounds. Our present decision is that we should not provide this information. However, the British say that they cannot make up their minds without all the facts which bear on the situation.

MR. NITZE: I have had a further conversation with Sir Oliver Franks. He is disturbed about how to report to his government. In our first conversation, we indicated that we had not yet decided to react in the event of an attack; and, in our second conversation, we indicated that we had decided to react. I told him that the U.S. is responsible for the unified command and that the lack of a decision is tantamount to a decision that we would not react promptly. I also told him that because of our responsibility we had to be in a position to decide what reaction to make. He then said that he thought that he could present our point of view to his government, but he was disturbed that a decision had been taken in advance of the receipt of British views.

General Collins: Has the difference between our commitment and their commitment been fully exposed?

Mr. Nitze: Yes, it has been.

General Collins: That is important because in my view General Vandenberg's point is valid. We do have a big commitment whereas the others do not.

Mr. Nitze: We are in a better position with the British now that we have informed them that we are not going to leave a gap in this matter of deciding how to react. We are prepared, of course, to discuss the best way of reacting with them if we can.

General Bradley: We told them that we were thinking about it before we took our decision, but we cannot wait if an emergency arises.

Mr. Matthews: However, if there is time, it would be very helpful if we consult. It will be helpful to the U.K. if they can say that the decision was a joint one.

General Bradley: If the attack comes during the day, we could get a decision here in 30 minutes.

Mr. Nitze: We should preserve our right to make a decision, if necessary, but we should also consult, if possible. It is very important to have the U.K. with us, particularly if we get into a general war.

General Vandenberg: If they try to get the enemy's order of battle in the air from us, there are a couple of points which ought to be clarified. I feel that the British have been looking at this from a ground point of view. There is a different perspective when the problem is looked at from the point of view of the air forces. If a concerted attack is made, it can do heavy damage in four to five days even if it peters out thereafter. Regardless of whether the order of battle shows 800 planes versus 2,500 planes, we have to remember that 800 present a real threat until we take retaliatory measures. Eight hundred planes can inflict destruction and disruption until they are knocked out. Therefore, the figures carried in the order of battle are not so important as they seem at first thought.

Mr. Nitze: I have been somewhat annoyed by the position the British have taken regarding passive defense measures. I don't know quite what to say in order to get that point off the record.

General Bradley: They have made quite a point of that.

General Vandenberg: It would take a good deal of time to disperse our forces, to build new fields, to obtain more anti-aircraft, and so forth. Probably these measures are four to five months from completion. If the attack with the forces now being built up is imminent—if it comes in two to three weeks—there is very little we can do to improve our defensive measures in that period of time.

General Collins: We should ask the U.K. for anti-aircraft. We cannot send any more.

General Bradley: There are only two anti-aircraft batteries in Korea and in addition to our own. One is a light British battery, and one is a light Turkish battery. We have about nine battalions and four extra batteries.

General Vandenberg: That is about what they have around Andung.

General Bradley: It does seem to me that we need to prepare a new directive for General Ridgway which would cancel the others. One of the main questions we have to deal with is the question whether we stop about where we are now in order to let them peter out if they so desire.

Admiral Davis: He is already under instructions not to cross the 38th parallel in force without referring the matter to Washington.

General Bradley: We can say that we are about on the 38th parallel now. Our casualties are very light in view of the fact that we are still killing quite a few Chinese Communists.

Mr. Nitze: From the political standpoint, it looks as though the present position is about as good a one as we can have. I do not know about military factors—the morale problem and so forth—but from the straight political standpoint it is a good position.

General Bradley: General Ridgway has sent us a message requesting us to grant him certain authority in the event of a Soviet attack against the Far Eastern Command.[6] We have always agreed that we should get out of Korea in that contingency. General Ridgway asks for authority including authority to withdraw and to redeploy the forces engaged in Korea for the defense of the Far East. His request includes all U.N. forces. It thus raises a new question for we have never considered what we should do with any forces other than our own.

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[6] The text of General Ridgway's telegram C-60308 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 17, read:

"Request JCS grant CINCFE the following authority in event of Soviet attack against the FEC: *a.* To initiate withdrawal at my discretion of UN Forces from Korea; *b.* To utilize redeployed UN Forces in defense of the FEC." (JCS Files)

General Vandenberg: Where are these forces going to go? The Navy will have a terrific problem in the event of a forced withdrawal. It will increase the Navy's problem if it has to take these forces to Okinawa or some other distant point.

General Bradley: We cannot commit U.N. forces to the defense of Japan without the permission of other governments.

General Collins: If I were General Ridgway, I would pull out the U.S. troops first and would use the other U.N. troops to cover the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Mr. Matthews: I would not favor an approach to other governments on this problem at this time.

General Collins: I agree.

General Bradley: We are planning to inform General Ridgway that he should inform us of conditions at the time and await instructions prior to ordering the withdrawal of his forces. We are also planning to tell him that pending further instructions we cannot plan to use U.N. forces outside of Korea.

Admiral Davis: General Ridgway is just trying to get himself lined up to meet any emergency which may arise.

Mr. Nitze: Your proposed reply sounds all right to me.[7]

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

General Bradley: Should we extend our briefing to governments other than the Australian and British governments? Would this involve a sacrifice of security? What is your view, General Vandenberg?

Mr. Nitze: I think that the whole problem will fall into place if we get the British in.

Mr. Matthews: I don't think there is much pressure from anyone else.

General Vandenberg: I think we should concentrate on trying to get the British to understand our problem.

Mr. Nitze: Shall I press Sir Oliver in further meetings with the British to consider this problem?

General Bradley: I am not sure we should press him yet. I think we ought to wait until he gets some new instructions.

General Vandenberg: Air Marshal Tedder can see the implications of this problem, but his government holds him under a tight rein.

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[7] The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway's message of April 17 was sent out on April 19. In it, in addition to the above points, he was informed that he should not plan on using other than American and ROK forces against a Russian attack pending further instructions. See James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, a volume in the series *United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 383.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The British Chiefs cannot recommend a course of action to the government until the nature of the attack is clear.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: The British Chiefs also understand the difference between their commitment and ours, and since they have important political objectives which they are trying to accomplish, they are just sitting back.

GENERAL COLLINS: We have to maintain our position that we can take whatever decision is necessary. We cannot be in the position that we have to consult with our allies for Congress would "blow its top" if we were under any such limitation. Does the U.K. understand that?

MR. NITZE: We all agree that we have to maintain our right to decide. We should try to get an understanding with them of the conditions under which we would have to react even though they will still want to consider the problem of reacting in light of the specific situation.

GENERAL BRADLEY: If this happens, we ought to be able to get in touch with them in 20 minutes, and Sir Oliver should be able to get us an answer in an hour's time if the attack comes at the right time of day. We should consult with them if we can. If we can get ahold of everyone, we should do that. What we now have is authority to act in an emergency. If the President is in the White House and if the Secretary of State is in his office, we will, of course, check again with them. We can assure the British that we will consult with them if it is at all possible, but we must make clear that we will not be able to wait 24 hours.

GENERAL COLLINS: Another problem is that even if their answer is in the negative, we are still going to have to react.

MR. NITZE: That is right. But, of course, we will have to recognize the consequences. If we decide and act unilaterally, we are going to have to face the consequences of unilateral decision and action.

GENERAL COLLINS: Those consequences aren't too bad. In the event of war, we are going to have to carry the load out there in any event.

MR. NITZE: But it does affect the use of U.K. bases in the event of general war.

GENERAL COLLINS: If general war comes, the U.K. will come into it.

GENERAL BRADLEY: We might just have a Pacific war.

MR. NITZE: Sir Oliver has expressed his personal view that an attack on Japan would mean a general war.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I suggest that the JCS consider the problem of a new directive to General Ridgway, and that you in State also think about it. Then we could get together late this week or early next. General Ridgway is edging forward rather fast. He is not going to run way up north and leave his flank exposed, but I think he is going to need a new directive soon.

795.00/4-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1951.

Subject: Strengthening of the Korean Armed Forces

Participants: Colonel Ben C. Limb, Former Foreign Minister and Korean Observer at the United Nations
Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
General Omar Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

The former Korean Foreign Minister, Colonel Ben C. Limb, called on General Bradley at noon today by prior appointment. After thanking General Bradley for the tremendous assistance which the U.S. is rendering to the Korean people at great sacrifice in the present conflict, Colonel Limb stated that his principal concern in talking with the General at this time related to the desire of President Rhee to make the maximum utilization of the resources of trained Korean manpower which is now available for employment in combat.

Colonel Limb explained that President Rhee had in mind the immediate formation of an additional ten divisions of ROK troops provided that sufficient arms could be acquired with which to equip them. He explained that there are now in training in Korea some 300,000 men of military age and that another 200,000 had recently been released from the training camps to return to civilian life, but remain subject to recall. All of these men have received basic military training in some degree, although insufficient weapons had been available for them to have experience with the use of small arms. Colonel Limb stressed the determination of the Korean people and the anxiety of Korean youth to throw their weight into the conflict and pointed out that through the increased use of Korean manpower, the heavy responsibilities now resting with non-Korean UN forces in Korea could be lessened. He also stressed the importance of building up Korean armed strength for future defense.

General Bradley referred to the reports we have received of the fine performance which the ROK forces and the Korean people have shown in the campaign in Korea. He asked Colonel Limb at what date the last ROK division had been activated. Colonel Limb replied that it had been in October of 1950, adding that there were now ten ROK divisions in the field. General Bradley then asked whether the training program to which Colonel Limb had alluded was sufficient only to provide replacements for the maintenance of the full strength of the present ROK divisions or whether that program could also provide an excess for the formation of the additional divisions. Colonel Limb answered that there was a very considerable excess of manpower available which was not immediately required in the normal replacement program.

General Bradley explained that the question of utilizing additional Korean manpower in the present conflict had been taken up some time ago by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that, in fact, a memorandum [*message*] on this subject to General MacArthur had recently been published.[1] He stated that the requirements for equipment to maintain the level of military action in Korea have been very heavy and that, shortly after the JCS memorandum [*message*] under reference had been written, a general retreat from north Korea had taken place, during the course of which the UN forces had lost a very considerable proportion of their weapons; the urgency of replacing these had overridden any other considerations at that time. The General added that inasmuch as several months had now passed, it would be necessary to make a new check of the various factors which would be involved in any program such as that suggested by Colonel Limb. He explained that it would be necessary, for instance, to obtain full details and information from the ROK as to the various aspects of their program; it would also be essential to have the opinion of Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet on the question, as well as to carry out a survey in this country of the availability of matériel which might be required.

The General pointed out that the formation of a new division requires not only the necessary small arms for the combat troops but also supporting weapons and other equipment sufficient to fill out the divisional organization. He suggested that Colonel Limb suggest to his Government that it consult with Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet as to what information might be required of it and that when such information could be made available, the ROK might wish to forward it through General Coulter, as Deputy Commander,[2] or through its diplomatic mission in Washington via the State Department. General Bradley stated that the Department of Defense would be willing to review the whole question when the necessary information had been compiled, which might require some time, but that he could give no assurance as to a final decision at this stage. He stressed that such a decision would ultimately have to be made at the top governmental level, taking all factors into consideration; and repeated that he could make no commitment at the present time.

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[1] The exchange of messages on this topic between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs during January 1951 had been made public by the White House on April 11; see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 450.

[2] Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, Deputy Commander, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

Colonel Limb then raised the question of training sufficient officers to provide cadres for the newly formed divisions if they were brought into being. He stated that of course the standards of officer training in Korea were, of necessity, much below those in the U.S. but that considerable progress had been already made in the more basic type of officer training. He wondered whether, in view of the inadequacy of such training for full command responsibilities, the Department of Defense could not assign officers from the retired list to take command positions in the new ROK divisions.

General Bradley replied that it might not be possible to assign such officers except as volunteers, but referred to the fact that the Korean Military Advisory Group was already carrying out training functions with the regular ROK army units. He said that the Department of Defense would be glad to consider any suggestions which might be put forward on this question, pointing out, however, that here again a policy decision would be required and that he could make no commitment at this stage.

In closing the conversation Colonel Limb stated that he would appreciate an opportunity to keep in touch with General Bradley on these two proposals. General Bradley agreed that this might be generally desirable but suggested that it might be well to handle such matters through the Department of State.

795.00/4-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1951.

Subject: Question of Possible Retaliatory Action Against Manchurian Airbases in Event of Large-Scale Enemy Air Attacks

Participants: The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin
Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin, called on me today at his request to reiterate the views of his government on action which would involve the United Nations in military operations outside Korea. The Ambassador recalled that Mr. Moodie in a conversation with Mr. Merchant on April 6[1] had stated that the Australian government believed no step should be taken which would have this effect without frank and full consultations and general agreement. Mr. Merchant, the Ambassador stated, had questioned the practicability of having consultation and general agreement in all circumstances, and this comment had been reported to Canberra. The Ambassador said that he had now been instructed again to put forward the view that prior consultation with governments contributing forces is imperative and that general agreement should be reached before such action is taken. He added that if the time came when this question were put to the several governments for discussion, all relevant information concerning the military situation would be required. Mr. Makin said that the Australian government does not accept the view that the scale of enemy air intervention is likely to be such as to make it impossible to consult the other governments before retaliating. He remarked that a United Press dispatch of April 5 reported that General MacArthur had been authorized to bomb Manchurian bases if the Chinese committed their air force in Korea. It had been the Australian understanding that the original directive forbidding General MacArthur to bomb bases in Manchuria would not be altered without consultation with interested governments.

The Ambassador inquired whether we had given any consideration to warning the Chinese of retaliation if they launched an air offensive against United Nations forces. He also asked about the capacity of United Nations forces to meet an enemy air attack with anti-aircraft protection and whether there is any evidence that Soviet pilots have participated in recent air battles in Korea.

I told the Ambassador that we want to consult with the other governments having forces in Korea in advance of any action by the enemy raising the question of retaliation and also when such action occurred. We recognized, however, that enemy action could be of such a character that consultation would be very difficult. Apart from the fact that the United States acts as the Unified Command, it also has a responsibility so far as the security of the 250,000 American troops in Korea is concerned. If the security of this large American force were endangered by enemy action, we might be obliged to strike back even in the absence of consultation and agreement with the other governments having forces in Korea. I said that we fully appreciated the difficulty in this situation for Australia as well as for the United States, and I expressed the hope that the Ambassador would make this point in reporting our views to his government.

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[1] Memorandum of conversation, dated April 6, by Mr. Merchant, not printed (795.00/4-651).

Mr. McNichol remarked that as he understood it we regarded consultation on this question as already taking place through such exchanges of views as these. I said that this was correct and again emphasized the fact that we had every desire to consult with the other governments on this question. I recalled that during the last war theatre commanders had been designated who were empowered to take action to meet emergencies as they arose. The purpose of this action was to avoid the possibility of a command vacuum in periods of danger. I said that so far as the United Press dispatch was concerned no directive authorizing General MacArthur to bomb Manchurian bases had been issued—that decision would have to be taken in Washington.

In discussing Mr. Makin's question about a warning to the Chinese Communists of retaliation, I pointed out that such a warning might introduce prestige considerations and actually produce the action we hope the Chinese will not take. Furthermore in issuing a warning to the Chinese Communists it would be very difficult to handle the problem presented by the fact that the Chinese are even now operating against our forces from Manchurian bases. We could not in effect condone this situation in a warning directed against large-scale as opposed to small-scale enemy air attack. I mentioned, however, that the Chinese Communists were undoubtedly aware of the possibility of retaliatory action on our part because we had told India of our thinking along these lines.

I told Mr. Makin that our forces in Korea had the ordinary anti-aircraft equipment but that additional equipment from other countries having forces in Korea would be helpful. Fighter aircraft, both land and carrier based, would be the principal weapon in resisting enemy air attacks. I said that we have not yet shot down any enemy planes behind our lines and therefore have not been able to confirm whether Soviet pilots are being used. We have, however, intercepted conversations between enemy planes and the ground which were being carried on in Russian.

357.AD/4-1851 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 18, 1951—7 p. m.

639. Dept has for some time been concerned over increasing evidence feeling of futility and resultant loss morale on part UNCURK Reps. Situation particularly acute since, as result Chi Commie intervention

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[1] Sent to the Embassies in Ankara, Bangkok, Canberra, The Hague, Karachi, Manila, and Santiago; repeated to the Embassy in Pusan and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

there is doubt among UNCURK members whether UN will be able carry out unification Korea, which was principal UNCURK assignment.

In Dept's view, political and psychological value UNCURK's role in Korea cannot be over estimated. Korea operation is UN operation and solution Korea problem basically in hands UN; it is essential, therefore, that UN be effectively represented on Korea scene. Further, great responsibility might suddenly devolve on UNCURK as a result of developments of military or political character and it is important UNCURK be present and prepared for that eventuality. In addition to symbolic and political role, UNCURK cld also be of inestimable value to UN as independent source of info and reports on current developments.

Dept believes, therefore, UNCURK potentialities of great importance and must be fully exploited. Suggest you call problem informally attention Govt to which you accredited expressing hope that FonOff will impress on its Rep on UNCURK its active interest in work Comite and suggest ideas for improvement UNCURK role including specific programs of UNCURK activity.

For ur info Dept concurrently endeavoring stimulate interest in UNCURK along foregoing lines through Dels at UN and AmEmbassy Pusan. Latter has been requested discreetly to pass on to selected UNCURK members specific suggestions for program of activity for UNCURK, Deptel 806 to Pusan, Apr 18.[2]

ACHESON

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[2] *Infra.*

357.AD/4-1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 18, 1951—7 p. m.

806. Re UNCURK role, urtel 839, Apr 5, NY's 1382, Apr 9,[2] Deptcirtel 639, Apr 18. Suggest you pass on discreetly to selected UNCURK members fol suggestions for possible UNCURK activity, based on reftels:

1. As political Rep of UN, maintain close contact with other UN operations in Korea, consulting and advising with UC on problems mutual interest;

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[1] Repeated to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as telegram 859, to Canberra as telegram 280, to Santiago as telegram 382, to The Hague as telegram 1181, to Karachi as telegram 662, to Manila as telegram 2489, to Bangkok as telegram 1529, and to Ankara as telegram 542.

[2] Neither printed. These telegrams dealt with the problem of low morale among UNCURK members and suggested various ways in which UNCURK might be encouraged to contribute to the U.N. effort in Korea (357.AD/4-551, 4-951).

2. Maintain close contact ROK Govt and discuss problems in which UN has legitimate interest, particularly those in which UN can assist ROK;

3. Initiate programs and prepare materials setting forth UN role in present situation, stressing international character of support being provided and genuine interest UN Member States in achievement UN objectives. These might be designed to strengthen popular understanding in Korea, and made available to UC for use in PW camps as well as for psychological warfare to bring truth home to peoples of North Korea and China. Similarly, UNCURK cld provide SYG materials for dissemination throughout world publicizing all aspects UN effort, as well as ROK cooperation with that effort and its contribution to its own defense;

4. Initiate studies and analyses, e.g.:

  a. Enemy observance of international conventions—specifically treatment POW's, hospital ships, etc;

  b. Commie treatment civilians in occupied areas, evidence of Commie atrocities, etc;

  c. Commie propaganda and other materials, dated before or after June 25, indicating aggressive purpose and build up for aggression; also propaganda alleging atrocities UN forces with view to disproving it;

  d. ROK Govt administration and organization, policies and reforms re land tenure, trade, education, police, refugees, public welfare activities, etc;

  e. General political developments in Korea including public attitudes.

Suggest also discussions ROK and UC to gain maximum cooperation for any UNCURK programs along above lines.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

On the evening of April 18, Mr. Acheson gave a major Far Eastern policy address before the Women's National Press Club in Washington; the text of the speech is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 30, 1951, page 683. In it, the Secretary echoed the theme of President Truman's address of a week earlier, that the United States would not appease aggression by withdrawal but would not extend the war in Asia. The willingness of the United States to settle the problem of Korea peacefully, Mr. Acheson said, was not appeasement.

In his talk, the Secretary emphasized many of the points made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the previous day in a Chicago address wherein General Bradley associated the effort in Korea with the United States attempts to build up NATO and generally to contain Communism throughout the world (text in the *New York Times*, April 18, 1951). The United States, however, said General Bradley, would do nothing to provoke a war against anyone nor would it wage a preventive war against even an arch-enemy.

Editorial Note

On April 19, General MacArthur, recently returned to the United States, presented his views before a joint session of Congress (text in *Congressional Record*, volume 97, part 3, page 4123). After surveying the world and Asian scenes, he focused on Korea and the related questions of China and Formosa. While indicating that it would be irrational to consider sending ground forces into continental China, he nevertheless urged the necessity of a drastic change in strategic planning if victory was to be achieved. In particular, he called for destruction of the sanctuary north of the Yalu, intensification of the economic blockade of China, imposition of a naval blockade along the China coast, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of the China coastal areas and Manchuria, and removal of restrictions on the Nationalist forces on Taiwan with United States logistical support to contribute to their operations against the "common enemy". The absence of such steps, he said, forbade the possibility of military victory.

357.AK/4–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1951.

Subject: Negotiations with Chinese Communists for Peaceful Settlement of Korean Dispute; Alleged U.S. Air Attacks Against China

Participants: Ambassador Entezam, President of General Assembly
John D. Hickerson, Department of State
David Popper, Department of State

Ambassador Entezam called this afternoon to bring us up to date on the status of the work of the Good Offices Committee.

He said that, following up Sir Benegal Rau's suggestion a few days ago that the relief of General MacArthur might afford a new opportunity of approaching the Chinese Communists, the Good Offices Committee agreed that a new approach would be desirable although it did not agree that any detailed proposals should be made to Peiping. Rau concurred, and subsequently Pannikar approached the Chinese

Communist Foreign Office. The Chinese Communists' response was to the effect that they did not consider that the change in the Far Eastern command improved the prospects for peace, since it did not involve any change in U.S. policy.

The Chinese Communist response also referred to alleged air action by 200 bombers against the south China coast between Canton and Shanghai as well as air attacks in Fukien Province and in Manchuria. I said that I had heard of no such actions and that I was certain they had not occurred, but that I would make a check with the Defense Department and telephone Ambassador Entezam in the morning. The Ambassador felt that we should deny the Chinese Communists' allegations, using the same channels of communication they had employed, in order that silence might not be deemed to indicate assent to the charges.

President Entezam made reference to the North Korean communication to the United Nations[1] and said that the Good Offices Committee had examined it to determine whether it should be used as a basis for any approach to the North Koreans. The GOC had decided in the negative since the North Korean communication was essentially a condemnation of the U.S. and the UN and seemed to offer no hope for an acceptable negotiation.

John D. Hickerson

Note: April 20, 1951

This morning I asked Mr. Johnson of NA to make a check with the Pentagon on the matter of the alleged air attack. The response was that the Pentagon knows nothing of any such attack and assumes that nothing of the kind has happened. At 10:30 this morning I telephoned Ambassador Entezam and gave him this information.

J. D. H.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 354.

795.00/4-1951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 19, 1951—5:33 p.m.

1425. From Gross.[1] Conversation with Rau re Korean peaceful settlement. Rau called on me at his request to discuss possible steps looking toward peaceful settlement in Korea. Stressing that he was reflecting his own personal ideas which he had not discussed with Asian-Arab group or reported to his own govt, he requested my reaction to suggestion that the Asian-Arab group might address a communication to NK FonMin, suggesting that latter send to NY a representative to meet with Asian-Arab group and outline more specifically NK proposals. Rau said he had recd word from New Delhi that Panikkar had reported from Peiping that an air attack had been made by 200 Formosa-based US bombers on the China coast near Shanghai in the past few days and that this was taken in Peiping as evidence that US was committed to course of aggression against China. I made a flat denial and expressed astonishment that Panikkar would give credence to a report so palpably absurd.

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[1] The words "From Gross", not present in the file copy of this message, were added to the source text in the light of a request for their insertion contained in telegram 1428, April 20, from New York (795.00/4-2051).

Rau expressed gratitude for receiving this assurance and said he would communicate at once to New Delhi.

In response to questioning concerning further details of Panikkar's report to New Delhi, Rau said his own info was limited to foregoing. It was not clear whether Rau was actually uninformed concerning details of Panikkar's report or whether he was being evasive. Rau professed uncertainty whether Panikkar had made an approach to Peiping FonOff (ourtel 1410 Apr 14) or whether Panikkar's report concerning alleged bombing reflected Peiping FonOff views rather than Panikkar's own reaction to rumors current in Peiping. Dept may wish to ascertain through Henderson more exact info concerning nature of Panikkar's approach to Peiping and report by Panikkar to GOI.

Re Rau's personal suggestion of possible approach by Asian-Arab group to NK FonMin I urged Rau not to take such action nor suggest it to Asian-Arab group until we had had chance to discuss it again. I pointed out following disadvantages:

(1) Such an approach by informally constituted group of UN members would undercut prestige of GOC and in particular efforts of Entezam to establish contact with Peiping.

(2) It would tend to give weight and prestige to NK doc of 15 Apr 1951, which we regarded as a nauseating propaganda doc meriting nothing but disgust.

(3) I could think of nothing more damaging to prestige of UN or more infuriating to decent public opinion than spectacle of NK rep coming to US and behaving like Gen Wu,[2] which he surely wld do if he were given chance.

(4) Speaking frankly to Rau, it seemed to me that communications or appeals to NK by unauthorized UN members or groups of mem-

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[2] Wu Hsiu-chuan headed the delegation from the People's Republic of China which appeared before the U.N. Security Council in November 1950 to discuss the questions of Korea and Taiwan; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 1237 ff.

bers could not fail to indicate disunity and weakening of UN solid front.

I added that we remained, as we always had been, anxious to support constructive efforts to reach peaceful solution in Korea. However, we felt that best hope for honorable peaceful settlement still lay in direction of maintaining firm and united polit front against aggression in UN and that as time went on this became increasingly important objective in itself.

To these comments, Rau emphasized tentative nature of his own thinking. He professed complete agreement that support should be given to efforts of GOC. However, he said he was most pessimistic concerning efficacy of their approaches to Peiping. At this point in conversation, Rau seemed to be intimating that Panikkar had actually been unsuccessful in attempt to elicit reaction from Peiping concerning Entezam's communication of Feb 14. Although this was merely an impression on my part, Rau repeated several times during our conversation his own skepticism concerning likelihood of further reaction from Peiping on subject of Entezam's communication.

Rau agreed with me that it is most difficult to attempt at this moment to formulate tactics of new approaches to Chi Commies and felt it wld be better to wait for several days in order to give Panikkar an opportunity to obtain reactions from Peiping concerning NK messages of 15 Apr to GA Pres.

Rau suggested as an alternative that Entezam might send a communication to NK FonMin requesting clarification of NK message of 15 Apr. Rau perceived difficulty that this might give status to NK authorities. I said it was my understanding that members of GOC had reached conclusion that it would not be desirable to reply to NK message.

Rau said he had also been giving thought to possibility that if a communication were sent by Asian-Arab group to NK FonMin suggesting that latter send rep to NY to talk with group, it might be suggested in same communication that NK agree to cease-fire at once. I took this occasion to remind Rau of necessity under any circumstances to avoid direct or indirect appeals for cease-fire unless they went thru appropriate channels and were carefully drawn so as to include conditions essential to security of UN forces. Rau said that he understood this and that in any event wld neither take action nor recommend to Asian-Arab group that any action be taken prior to further discussion with USUN. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/4-1951

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1951.

Subject: Alleged Bombing Attack on China Coast near Shanghai

With reference to New York's 1425, April 19, concerning Rau's report that Panikkar had reported from Peiping that an air attack had been made on the China coast by US bombers, I talked to Admiral Thach[1] in the Navy regarding the possibility of planes from the 7th Fleet on its recent sweep along the south China coast having accidentally bombed Chinese territory.[2] Admiral Thach immediately sent a radio to COMNAVFE which replied that no bombing of any kind took place and none could have as none of the planes carried any bombs whatever and not a shot was fired by any of the planes.

I informed Mr. Hickerson of the foregoing in order that a categorical denial could be made to Rau. I agreed with Admiral Thach that no public statement in this regard would be made without prior clearance with the Navy.

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[1] Rear Adm. James H. Thach, Director, International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 298.

357.AK/4-2151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 21, 1951—3:54 p. m.

1433. For Hickerson from Gross. GOC—possible approach to NK authorities. As per Telecon April 21: the GOC is seriously considering requesting the Soviet Govt to deliver to NK authorities at Pyongyang a message from Entezam as GA President similar to his message of 14 Feb to Peking. Padilla and Grafstrom in two lengthy conversations with me have emphasized anxiety lest they be accused of letting go by default any possible significance in timing of NK message of 15 April, or in its implied omission of reference to non-Korean FE issues. Although Padilla and Grafstrom agree thoroughly with us that the NK April message is a scurrilous document, they are under pressure from many UN members "to do something." Furthermore, at Austin reception April 20 Padilla, Sunde, Palar and Zinchenko had conversation at which I was also present for part of the time.

Zinchenko, in response to direct questions by Padilla and by Sunde, expressed the view that the NK message "was worth following up." When Sunde and Palar both complained of the nature of the document, Zinchenko replied that one must understand that it was necessary under the circumstances for the NK Govt to use strong language "just as the other side has used strong language." I did not participate in conversation except to tell Zinchenko at this point that I could not possibly agree with him and that we regarded the document with complete contempt. However, Padilla told Grafstrom and myself later that he was impressed by Zinchenko's repeated suggestions that the NK message should be followed up, particularly since Padilla feels that Zinchenko "does not have views of his own." I gave no reaction to Padilla and Grafstrom regarding their ideas of communicating with NK through the Soviet Govt, except to agree to discuss it again early next week. I did, however, point out the extreme importance of keeping the US Govt entirely free of the matter. I said that if the GOC should decide to take this or any other step of the same nature, it would have to do so entirely upon its own responsibility and that the US Govt would feel itself in a position to deny any knowledge of such an approach or any approval thereof. Grafstrom agreed that this was a sound position.

Comments of Dept are requested urgently in view of seriousness with which GOC apparently contemplates steps. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

693.0024/4-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, April 21, 1951—5 p. m.

887. Re Deptel 793 Apr 13.[1] Fol comments CCF morale based principally EUSAK interrogations and evaluations effectiveness psychological war efforts. Interpretation must take account fact that majority POW's are ex-KMT who believed represent 60 percent or possibly more of total CCF forces Korea.

POW's statements clearly show dissatisfaction conditions in CCF in Korea, based on heavy losses, serious hardships, shortages equipment. There is little evidence that war is understood or that ordinary soldier has any convictions regarding it. Psychological war's anti-morale leaflets, stressing good treatment, etc., receiving some response under these conditions. It appears that at least in this class CCF troops, physical restraint and strict surveillance are major factors preventing greater defections, rather than effect of 2 years or more of CCP indoctrination. Emb officers impressed by absence evidence of such effect except among those with lowest IQ. Judging from information thus obtained, there is basis for belief a major mil defeat, resulting breakdown discipline and surveillance, wld provide opportunity for mass desertions and that a majority of CCF wld take advantage of it. Continuing psychological war activities, coupled with current campaign hardships aggravated by round-the-clock air attack and intense artillery fire, will contribute appreciably to this objective. Difficult assess effect KMT or fon mil attack mainland, but believe same general factors apply, and that physical disruption CCP discipline wld be prerequisite any serious effects.

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[1] The substance of this message read as follows:

"Dept urgently required prepare immediate estimate on current public opinion in China, including morale Chi Commie forces. Dept wld appreciate current info on dissatisfaction among Chi forces and attitudes toward Mao regime ChiNats. Also interested possibilities large-scale desertions, particularly if ChiNats or western forces started mainland operations. Info needed not later than Apr 23." (793.00/4-2151)

For documentation on the situation in the People's Republic of China, see pp. 1474 ff.

Emb emphasizes that all foregoing comments are based solely upon POW attitudes, which may well be nonrepresentative sampling, and considers particularly significant fact that until now all UN forces in Korea have taken only 3,100 Chi prisoners out of the masses of Chi employed Korea.

MUCCIO

793.00/4-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, April 22, 1951—1 p. m.

2929. 1. During conversation Bajpai Apr 22 I asked what news from China; Bajpai replied nothing encouraging; Pannikar had advised against making any further peace approach Commie China just now. Commie Chinese in belligerent frame mind particularly because alleged bombing by US planes neighborhood Fukien.

2. He had been surprised that intelligent man like Rau shld have regarded recent announcement North Korean Govt of willingness consider peace on basis resolutions Berlin peace conf as offering new peace hopes. It shld have been clear this was merely propaganda move to draw world attention those resolutions. Nevertheless at Rau's request GOI had sent query to Pannikar who had agreed that NK announcement did not mean any change attitude on part NK or Peiping.

HENDERSON

396.1-PA/4-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 23, 1951—2 p. m.

6425. Eyes only for Secretary from Jessup and Bohlen. During conversation Saturday night [1] in connection with reference to Far Eastern situation in armaments discussion with Bohlen Semenov, with obvious reference to previous conversation, said that since his work lay entirely in German field any discussion of Far Eastern matters should be taken up directly with Gromyko (Embtel 5960, April 5). He did not elaborate point and Bohlen left it there. Semenov, however, again gave a clear indication that Soviets expect a victory in Korea. He said, speaking to Bohlen "not as a diplomat but as a realist" that "US must by this time understand after their experiences in China" that they could not successfully oppose the millions of Asiatics who are seeking to throw off the "colonial yoke".

If there is anything in regard to Korea that Department desires pursued here, we are in complete agreement that it should be done with Gromyko.[2] [Jessup and Bohlen.]

BRUCE

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[1] April 21.

[2] See the memorandum by Mr. Merchant dated April 25, p. 379.

357.AK/4-2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, April 23, 1951—3 : 28 p. m.

1435. Hickerson from Ross. Message from Pannikar re Chinese Communist reaction to North Korean peace feeler. Grafstrom telephoned this morning and referring to conversation with Gross last Friday (Usun 1433, April 21) said Rau had called on him this morning with message from Pannikar which Rau requested be treated as top secret, Grafstrom asking us so to consider it. Message from Pannikar, as follows, was theoretically response to request that Pannikar find out Chinese Communist reaction to so-called North Korea peace feeler.

Pannikar indicated that North Korean communication had not been made public nor commented upon in Peiping (this has been confirmed to Grafstrom from Swedish sources). Pannikar went on that full resolution of World Peace Council [1] contained, of course, specific references to other Far Eastern questions. It was not strange, therefore, that

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[1] In addition to the resolution on Korea, other resolutions of the World Peace Council relating to Asia dealt with "Japan" and "the U.N. and China"; texts in *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, pp. 304–306.

North Korean communication omitted reference to these since presumably North Koreans were concerned only with Korea. Object of move would seem to be to expose UN as unconcerned with constructive suggestions of World Peace Council, and possibly intended to get this Council to take more definite steps against UN and US. Pannikar indicated he had no reason to think North Korean communication represented serious effort to start negotiations. Pannikar's message concluded with his observation suggesting that North Korean communication be treated with great reserve.

Grafstrom said he indicated to Rau that message seemed to express Pannikar's own views rather than reflecting Chinese Communist views; Rau agreed and said he was sending further message requesting Pannikar get Chinese Communist views.

Grafstrom commented to me that he found Pannikar's message "extremely interesting." He said he had doubted whether any approach to North Koreans such as he suggested to Gross on Friday would be worthwhile but that Pannikar's message caused him to wonder whether his doubt was well-founded. Pannikar's message, Grafstrom said, might indicate that Chinese Communists had nothing to do with North Korean communication, that there might be what Grafstrom termed "a bad connection" between Chinese Communists and that approach such as he indicated to Gross might therefore be useful. Grafstrom said that Rau had agreed that Pannikar's message was very interesting but perhaps not exactly the way Pannikar intended.

I told Grafstrom that Gross' conversation with him had been reported to Department and that I would let him know any views Department might have as soon as possible. Grafstrom said he was meeting with Entezam and Padilla Nervo this afternoon. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

357.AK/4-2151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 23, 1951—7 p. m.

870. Dept agrees generally with approach urtel 1433, Apr 21. US considers document unworthy of our comment or attention. Like previous atrocity accusations by Commies, NK communication is scurrilous document which as Dept has stated is full of wild accusations, baseless vilifications and perversion of fact. It does not remotely read like a "peace offer" and we do not therefore see much basis for attributing to communication significance as "peace feeler".

You will note Bajpai views as expressed in Embtel 2929 from New Delhi Apr 22.

Re GOC attitude, Dept has consistently taken position that GOC has authority to make any effort to achieve peace, and US will not interfere with any such attempts. Whether despite character of document there is some purpose in GOC approach to NK authorities is of course for GOC to determine.

Shld GOC decide to act on NK communication, suggested approach through Soviets might lead to rebuff; Soviets might reply that GOC is using wrong post office. While this is matter for GOC to decide, GOC in any approach to NK directly cld give copy of communication to USSR Rep and thus perhaps achieve what GOC has in mind.

ACHESON

795.00/4-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Ambassador Bonnet and Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands —Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
New Zealand —Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Ambassador Wan
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —UNA—Mr. Hickerson
FE—Mr. Merchant
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse
UNP—Mr. Henkin
EUR—Mr. Allen
FE—Mr. Heidemann
FE—Mr. Barbour
Army—Lt. Col. Gilchrist
Army—Captain Fischgrund

Captain Fischgrund reported that at 1800 hours, April 23, Korean time, the enemy launched a coordinated ground offensive in strength, which was preceded by the heaviest Communist artillery fire of the war, and succeeded in making penetrations of varying depths in all UN corps areas. The greatest threats to UN security were believed to be in the western sector along the Imjin River and in the central area where enemy troops had pushed to within one mile of Kapyong. There were no significant engagements on the east coast. Lt. Colonel Gilchrist said that the main weight of the enemy attack had been directed against ROK units forcing them to withdraw to prepared defensive positions.

The Army officers summarized a report just received from General Ridgway stating that the enemy attack, which was believed to involve some 15 Chinese Communist armies, was continuing as of the time of the report in increasing strength. The two principal objectives were believed to be Seoul in the west and Chunchon in the center. At the time of the report, the full enemy strength had not yet been committed, but General Ridgway believed that the Communist offensive would involve all enemy forces presently available in Korea. He reported that the overall conduct of UN troops had been excellent except for the one ROK unit which had lost considerable equipment. General Ridgway estimated that as of 1800, April 24, approximately 25,000 casualties had been inflicted on the enemy while UN losses, minus the casualties suffered by the ROK units, totalled only 874. The attack was believed to be a further development of the enemy's plan to drive UN forces into the sea or to destroy them. It was the strongest enemy attack we had yet sustained, but we had been anticipating it for some time, and our logistic position was satisfactory.

No other questions were discussed in detail.

396.1-PA/4-2351

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 25, 1951.

We have discussed in FE Paris's 6425 of April 23 (eyes only for Secretary from Jessup and Bohlen) and as a result I am of the opinion that we should not at the present time instruct Mr. Bohlen to approach Gromyko regarding Korea. With the Chinese offensive under way and the situation militarily fluid, I see nothing to gain and something to lose by such an approach at this time. I do not see how we could expect a positive response until the fate of the offensive is clear and to make the approach would almost inevitably be interpreted by the other side as weakness on our part. I believe, however, we should keep this question under constant review and reconsider attempting to utilize this channel at such future time as we might determine.

I have discussed this with Mr. Hickerson and believe him to be in agreement. I would appreciate, however, your appending your comments or concurrences on this memorandum enroute to Mr. Matthews.[1]

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[1] This memorandum was routed to Mr. Matthews through the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt). Mr. Hickerson indicated his concurrence in a marginal note; Mr. Reinhardt appended no comment, but initialed the memorandum. No further action was taken in regard to instructing Mr. Bohlen to approach Mr. Gromyko in Paris.

795B.5/3–3151

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (*Marshall*)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 26, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Acting Secretary Lovett's letter of March 31 with further reference to the question of obtaining additional ground force contingents from other United Nations members for service in Korea has received careful attention in the Department of State.

This Department has for some time been concerned with regard to the need for obtaining substantial additional contributions of ground forces not only in the light of the military situation in Korea but also with a view to strengthening the cooperative nature of the United Nations action there. The Department has approached all other United Nations members which appear to be in position to make substantial contributions or to increase existing contributions. It has been our understanding that the Department of Defense is desirous of obtaining substantial rather than merely token contributions. As you are aware, serious practical difficulties bear upon the ability of some other Governments to give substantial help. Some United Nations members can contribute or increase contributions of ground forces for action in Korea only at the expense of depleting forces already assigned to or earmarked for regional defense purposes or for the maintenance of internal security. The extent to which the United States is prepared to make up deficiencies on the part of possible contributors in ability to train, equip, transport or supply forces constitutes an important factor in other cases.

In your letter of January 30 you informed me of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Great Britain and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional forces. It is noted that you believe that it would now be desirable for the United Kingdom to increase its ground forces up to division strength if this result can be obtained without interference with NATO schedules. As the problem of NATO schedules involves important military decisions, the Department would appreciate the views of the Department of Defense on this problem. Subject to such views, the Department desires to point out, however, that it does not see from what source these additional forces could be drawn except from the United Kingdom itself. If the situation in Malaya can be brought under effective control some troops now engaged there might at some future date become available.

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense continues to be of the opinion that we should not approach the NATO countries on the European continent for additional forces.

The Australian Government was asked on February 19 to provide an additional battalion of ground force troops for action in Korea. The Australian Government has replied that it is unable to make a decision on this question at this time in view of the dissolution of Parliament and the decision to hold a general election on April 28. The Department intends to take up the question again with the Australian Government after the election and to urge that two additional battalions rather than one be supplied. On February 20, the New Zealand Government was asked to double the number of the New Zealand ground forces in Korea. The New Zealand Government replied on March 30 that steps would be taken to increase the number of New Zealand ground forces in Korea; but that as such an increase would involve considerations affecting other Commonwealth Governments the question was being discussed with them. The New Zealand Government is being informed of this Government's hope that the consultation with other Commonwealth Governments would not delay for long the implementation of the New Zealand decision to supply additional forces. The Department will press this matter actively.

It should be pointed out that both Australia and New Zealand face the problem of reconciling the sending of additional troops to Korea with their commitments to build up their armed forces so as to be in position to furnish troops for service in the Near East which is a matter of priority under British plans.

The Canadian Government on February 19 was requested to increase its contribution to United Nations ground forces in Korea. The Department has now been informed that the major portion of the Special Force—about 6,300 men—has been scheduled to leave Fort Lewis, Washington for Korea about April 20. Of the approximately 3,000 men remaining at Fort Lewis after this date, it is understood that the Canadian Government plans to have roughly 1,500 serve as replacements for the Special Force in Korea and 1,500 serve as a nucleus for the brigade to be created to meet NATO requirements. Given the NATO and Canada's so-called "Active Force" requirements for additional strength, the Canadian Government's position against conscription and the present rate of recruitment for ground forces, there would appear to be little prospect that the Canadian Government would for some time increase materially forces available for service in Korea unless it were decided to request diversion to Korea of troops yet to be raised and which are earmarked for other purposes.

Turkey has in the field in Korea a brigade of about 5,000 men, and is currently replacing its losses, which as you know have been heavy. At the present time, we are making arrangements to assist in financing an expansion of the Turkish military establishment, in order to augment the size of the country's forces and to strengthen their fighting capabilities. In addition to these factors, certain highly important political considerations, such as the Turkish insistent demand for a full-fledged United States security commitment, suggest that it would be inadvisable at this time to solicit additional Turkish troops for Korea. The situation in Greece is somewhat similar: Assignment of more Greek troops to Korea would be embarrassing to the Greek Government in view of the tense situation in the Balkans and the absence of any security arrangement for Greece. Our financial support of the country's military and economic structure is substantial and continuing, and any request in behalf of the Unified Command would be certain to meet with a counter-request for additional United States financial aid which would be most difficult for us to provide. Iran, in a precarious position on the Soviet perimeter, cannot divert any armed strength from its own needs. Ethiopia is furnishing some 1,100 troops. Israel and the Arab States are unlikely sources, in view of the modest military establishments maintained and the existing tension in the area. Pakistan would not favor withdrawal of any of its forces from the country until the Kashmir issue is settled and relations with India enter a more cordial phase. India's policy is such that an approach on this subject would not be welcomed.

The Department has not pressed the Philippines to increase its present contribution. If additional Philippine ground troops were to be sent to Korea in the near future they would have to be withdrawn from forces now fully occupied with internal security problems. It is not believed that such a reduction in existing internal security forces would be wise at this time. The Department is likewise doubtful whether a request should now be made to the Thai Government for an increase in its present contribution. We are, however, asking the opinion of our Ambassador in Bangkok whether, considering the existing political situation there, a request for additional forces should be made in the absence of a further offer from the Thai Government.

Advantage was taken recently of the presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics to bring the pressing need for additional ground forces in Korea directly to the attention of those Latin American states most likely to be able to contribute. On April 5 the Minister of State of Brazil was asked for an infantry division for Korea. The Minister of State said that he would inform President Vargas of this request; that he knew that President Vargas was in principle in favor of close military cooperation with the United States; and that pending a decision on the question preliminary talks should commence between the military representatives of Brazil and the United States. The President on April 9 handed to the Brazilian Minister of State a personal letter to President Vargas stressing the urgent need for action on this question.

On April 6 the Peruvian Foreign Minister was asked whether Peru might not be in a position to contribute a regimental combat team (4,000 to 5,000 troops). The Peruvian Foreign Minister replied that while his Government was in agreement that the Peruvian Government should contribute to the Unified Command in Korea, public opinion in Peru had to be prepared to accept the need for sending Peruvian troops outside the country. It was agreed that the military aspects of this matter should be discussed between Peruvian and American military representatives. It is the Department's understanding that pending a decision on the question by the Brazilian and Peruvian Governments, military representatives of those Governments have been discussing equipment deficiencies with Department of Defense officials.

The Chilean and Uruguayan Foreign Ministers agreed to discuss the question urgently with their respective governments. In the case of Bolivia, it was agreed that there should be further discussions between military representatives of the two countries. The reply of the Mexican Foreign Minister was negative.

The foregoing constitutes the more important recent developments relating to this matter. The Department would be glad to receive any suggestions which the Department of Defense may have to offer with regard to further steps which might usefully be taken at this time.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

357.AK/4-2651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 26, 1951—7:47 p. m.

1453. For Hickerson from Ross. Re possible GOC approach to North Koreans. On Grafstrom's initiative I saw him yesterday afternoon at Lake Success. He asked if I had any comment from the Dept on the information and views he had expressed in conversations with Gross on April 21 (Usun 1433) and with me on April 23 (Usun 1435). I told Grafstrom (Deptel 870, April 23) that I thought there was very little, if anything, I could add to what Gross had already said to him. I said that we felt that the NK communication was a scurrilous document which we did not ourselves consider in any sense to be a "peace feeler". Grafstrom said that the GOC did not wish to proceed with any attempt to communicate with the NK's if we had strong objection to their doing so. I commented that he knew we had loyally supported UN bodies, including the GOC, which had been established with the object of achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea. I said I thought the question of whether the GOC should approach the NK authorities was one which the GOC would have to decide for itself and I would not consider it appropriate for us to be associated in any way with their decision. Grafstrom said he understood this and assured me that we would not be associated with any decision they might make.

Grafstrom still seemed to be somewhat intrigued with the possibility that the NK communication which had on it "Soviet hall mark" and indications that Chi Coms had given no publicity whatever to it might reveal divergence between NK's and Soviets, on the one hand, and Chi Coms, on the other. I made no comment.

Grafstrom also indicated Rau seemed to feel there might be something in point he had just mentioned. I thought it wise to indicate in strictest confidence that according to information received from our Embassy in New Delhi, Indian Govt appeared to feel Panikkar's estimate valid.

Grafstrom seemed also to continue to be intrigued by idea of using Soviets for channel of communications to NK's. I said I had had personal question in my mind whether this might lead to rebuff, and asked whether they have considered possibility of direct approach to NK's, giving copy to Russians. Grafstrom observed that he did not know how they would communicate directly with NK's. He said they wanted to avoid any communication which might be interpreted as formal response by GA President to NK communication. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET URGENT TOKYO, April 27, 1951.

1. I am fully cognizant of the national interest in avoiding an extension of hostilities in this theater, providing this can be done without jeopardizing the safety of my own forces, and without appeasement or sacrifice in principle.

2. With respect to this national interest, and subject to these limitations, I believe I am fully aware of my responsibilities.

3. With this in mind, I have concluded that the military situation in this theater now requires that there should be delegated to me without delay authority to attack enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula at the earliest moment. I am prepared to do so following a major enemy air attack against our forces in Korean Area.

4. The reasons supporting this conclusion are the increasing scope and rate of build-up of enemy capabilities of air attack, the increasing probability of such an attack in support of his present major ground offensive, and the fact that the effectiveness of our counter attack by air will vary directly with the rapidity of its delivery. The almost certain delay in launching the attack, incident to the necessity of first securing JCS approval, would almost certainly decrease the effectiveness of our retaliation and increase our own immediate and ultimate losses.

5. I consider enemy air attack so far delivered as sporadic, limited and primarily defensive in nature. I would define a major air attack as a concerted effort by large numbers of enemy combat aircraft against our ground forces, rear bases, or fleet, and not merely counter-air action such as recent enemy MIG operations conducted from Manchuria and in the rear of enemy front lines, even though large numbers of such aircraft were to be similarly employed.

6. I have further concluded that I should at once be authorized to conduct air reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula, as an essential preliminary to the effective attack on such bases, if this should be ordered, under the conditions as already stated. I have designated the Shantung Peninsula rather than the Weihaiwei area, as information here indicates an enemy air build-up in the former but not in the latter.

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[1] Copies of this and the immediately succeeding message have been provided by the Department of Defense; the texts are complete, but certain message indicators of a special character on the originals have been deleted.

7. I therefore recommend that JCS instruct me soonest substantially as follows: "you are hereby authorized to use United States Forces assigned to the Far East Command to conduct air reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. In the event of a major enemy air attack from outside of Korea against United Nations Forces in the Korean area, you are hereby further authorized at your discretion without further reference to the JCS or higher authority, to attack those bases. The authority here granted will not be delegated, except to your successor in command, should you become a casualty."

8. Com Gen FEAF [2] and COMNAVFE [3] have been fully consulted and concur.

RIDGWAY

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[2] Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer.
[3] Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy.

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1951.

1. You are hereby authorized to use the United States Forces assigned to the Far East Command to conduct air reconnaissance of the enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. Such reconnaissance should, if practicable, be made at high altitude and as surreptitiously as possible.

2. In the event of a major enemy air attack from outside Korea against United Nations forces in the Korean area, as outlined in Par 5 . . . [of your message], you are hereby authorized at your discretion without further reference to the JCS or higher authority, to attack enemy air bases in Manchuria and in the Shantung peninsula. The authority here granted will not be delegated, except to your successor in command should you become a casualty. However authority to attack should only be used in the event that in your judgment time and circumstances do not permit reference to the JCS.

3. The consequences of the action authorized may set in chain a course of events making it of the utmost importance to have the support of the other countries and the right to use facilities and bases controlled by them. This support may depend upon consulting or at least informing them of the action prior to its occurrence, if at all possible you should seek JCS advice before taking action and in any

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra*. Regarding Mr. Acheson's role in the approval of this message, see Merchant's memorandum, May 2, p. 399.

case you should inform the JCS immediately and withhold publicity until notification of allies has taken place.

795.00/4-2851 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 28, 1951—3 p. m.

651. At briefing mtg of reps of Govts participating in fighting in Korea, Apr 27, Merchant (FE) anticipated that group undoubtedly concerned by stories appearing in *NY Times* (Apr 26) and other papers on US policy re retaliatory bombing Manchuria. He assured group that story entirely unauthorized and that situation and policy on this question remain as we have stated before. Summarizing briefly, Merchant said UC policy remains that in event massive air attacks by enemy in Korea, US will endeavor consult with other nations participating in fighting in Korea as to steps which shld be taken to meet such attacks. UC must, however, note reservation that it is possible that enemy attacks might be of such magnitude and suddenness as to require immediate countermeasures not permitting consultation we wld like to have.

Merchant told group we always ready receive their views on this question and were prepared discuss it in group or privately at any time.

Group also informed that any decision to institute retaliatory bombing wld be made not in field but in Wash.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Sent to the Embassies in Wellington, Manila, Bangkok, Ankara, Canberra, Brussels, Ottawa, Paris, Capetown, London, Athens, The Hague, Luxembourg, and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

[2] In discussing this subject with Mr. Colin Moodie, the Australian Chargé, on April 30, Mr. Merchant made the further point that any retaliatory action would be directed only against the airfields from which the attacks were launched, since the United States was not thinking in terms of attacks on other targets in China (795.00/4-3051). See also the memorandum by Mr. Merchant, May 2, p. 399.

S/S Files : NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated

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[1] This memorandum was forwarded to the National Security Council for information on May 1 by the Executive Secretary of that body, James S. Lay, Jr.

27 April 1951,[2] in which you requested on or before 1200, 1 May 1951, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 48/3, a draft statement of policy on Asia.[3]

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined this draft statement of policy and, from the military point of view, recommend:

a. For purposes of clarification, that paragraph 9–*b*–(2)[4] be amended to read:

> "Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression."

b. To clarify the relationship between the mission assigned the Seventh Fleet and our effort being expended on strengthening forces ashore on Formosa, that paragraphs 11–*a* and 11–*c* be amended to read, respectively:[5]

> "11–*a.* Continue the mission presently assigned the Seventh Fleet until Chinese Nationalist forces are able to defend Formosa."
>
> "11–*c.* Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that paragraph 6–*e* of the subject paper,[6] which purports to set forth the current United States policy objective with respect to Korea, is, in effect, a course of action and is not sufficiently comprehensive to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate therefrom necessary military policies.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[2] Not printed.

[3] NSC 48/3, dated April 26, is not printed. The text of NSC 48/2, dated December 30, 1949, is in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol VII, Part 2, p. 1215. Another revised draft, NSC 48/4, dated May 4, is also not printed. For the complete text of NSC 48/5, approved by President Truman on May 17, 1951, see vol. VI, Part 1, p. 33. See also p. 439.

[4] The text of paragraph 9-*b*-2 in NSC 48/3 read as follows:

"[The United States should] deny to the enemy the opportunity of consolidating his position in Korea or otherwise exploiting his aggression."

[5] Paragraphs 11-*a* and 11-*c* in NSC 48/3 read as follows:

"11. With respect to Formosa the United States should:

"*a.* Continue the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet."

"*c.* Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined."

[6] Paragraph 6-*e* of NSC 48/3 read as follows:

"In view of the threat to United States security interests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should be the policy of the United States to seek a settlement acceptable to the United States of the Korean problem which would, as a minimum, terminate hostilities, end the aggression, and provide against its resumption. Until such a settlement is achieved, military action should continue in order to penalize the aggressor and deny him the exploitation of his aggression."

795.00/4-1651

The Secretary of State to the Korean Chargé (Sae Sun Kim)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951.

SIR: The receipt is acknowledged of your note of April 16, 1951,[1] in which you present certain questions relating to the policy of this Government concerning the future conduct of hostilities against aggression in Korea. In reply, I take pleasure in setting forth, for your consideration, the views of the United States Government upon the points which you have raised.

It might be well, for a moment, to review briefly the background which has led to the outstanding cooperation between the various forces operating in Korea under the Unified Command. The members of the United Nations have sent their forces to Korea pursuant to the recommendations of the Security Council of June 25 and June 27, 1950, to repel the aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. In its resolution of July 7, 1950, the Security Council recommended that those members of the United Nations providing military forces and other assistance make these forces and this assistance available to a Unified Command under the United States. It follows from this action of the Security Council that the Unified Command so established should exercise the responsibilities of that Command on behalf of all members of the United Nations who are participating in the operations in Korea or who have supported such operations. The actions of the Unified Command, furthermore, must in all respects correspond to the will of the United Nations as expressed in its several resolutions on Korea; within this framework all policies and decisions of the Command in Korea must be cast and executed.

In a splendid gesture of solidarity with the United Nations, it will be recalled that President Rhee, on July 14, 1950, turned over for the period of hostilities the operational command of the gallant forces of the Republic of Korea to the Commanding General of the forces of the United Nations. From that date forward, these Korean forces have fought shoulder to shoulder with the troops of the other allied nations in the common aim of defending freedom and justice, of repelling the aggressor and restoring peace and security. It is against this background, therefore, that the questions put forward in your letter must be viewed.

The answer to your first question[2] must inevitably depend not only upon the policies of the United Nations but also upon the military capabilities of both the United Nations forces in the field and also those of the enemy. It is the policy of this Government to support, with all available means, the military objectives of the United Nations in Korea as set forth in the Security Council resolutions. Military capabilities are not without their limits and are influenced by conditions and circumstances often beyond the control of any military commander to predetermine. The hypothetical character of any present military decision to take and hold a given geographical line in Korea, therefore, makes it impossible for me to make any specific answer to your question at this time.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The first question in the Korean note of April 16 asked whether it would be the policy of the United States to induce the U.N. forces to cease hostilities before reaching the Yalu River, the traditional boundary between Korea and China.

The second question raised in your note[3] like the first one involves hypothetical considerations and decisions which lie beyond the ability of this Government alone to determine. It should be clear, however, that only in unity is there strength and that, given a common objective and a common determination to cooperate in carrying it through to a successful conclusion, the problem which you raise would never arise.

While the answer to your third question[4] would, of course, in the last analysis rest with the United Nations, the United States has never advocated and does not contemplate advocating the use of Japanese armed forces in Korea. It might be noted that there are no Japanese armed forces in existence.

I venture to express the hope that the foregoing discussion will be of use to you, and I am confident that by singleness of purpose and an ever closer cooperation between our two nations, a victory can be won which will bring to the people of Korea the full realization of their just aspirations for unity, peace and freedom.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
L[IVINGSTON] T. MERCHANT

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[3] The second question asked whether, in the event the Republic of Korea forces should push ahead to the Manchurian border, it would be the policy of the United States to induce the U.N. forces to withdraw thereupon from Korea.

[4] The third question asked if there was any possibility that the United States might permit the United Nations to invite Japanese armed forces to land in Korea should more U.N. manpower be needed.

795B.5/4-3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951—7 p. m.

4969. Pls deliver fol personal message to Morrison from Secy soonest:

"I am writing you about some of our common problems, especially those relating to the Far East. We each ought to understand the other's position—what we think; why we think it. We start from the common ground of desiring peace and security in the Pacific and the earliest conclusion of the Korean conflict. We agree that the United Nations must fight the attack in Korea. We are doing everything possible to limit the fighting in Korea.

This country, which fronts on two oceans, has heavy responsibilities in the Pacific, as well as in the Atlantic. It is properly and deeply concerned with the problems of the Pacific and is making great sacrifices toward their solution.

The real problem is how to achieve our agreed aims in Korea. The attack must be repelled, and it must be shown that its continuance will not pay.

Short of a change in the aggressive Communist purpose, I do not see how hostilities can cease. So long as this purpose persists there will be fighting in Korea. So far there has been no indication of a change in purpose. In fact, a new and massive offensive is under way.

Under these circumstances, we must fight. And our economic and political measures and attitudes should back up our military ones. We must convince the enemy that a cessation of hostilities is in his interest.

I believe that it is essential to make plain in every sensible way that our military objective is a limited one, and that the fighting can and will stop when the aggression stops.

There are many indications that a major air attack may be launched at any time against the United Nations forces from bases on Chinese territory. If this occurs, we must assume that a decision has been made to attempt to drive the United Nations forces from Korea whatever the cost or consequences. Under these circumstances, it may be imperative to attack the bases from which the attack upon our forces comes.

Should this air blow be launched against us, the safety of the forces, land, sea, and air, will be gravely imperiled. Time will be a factor of the most vital importance in launching a counter blow against the bases from which the attack comes.

We realize fully that the Governments which have forces in Korea are deeply concerned in this decision, and for this reason we have been holding consultations to reach the widest possible agreement on the procedure to be followed.

The particular circumstances of an attack cannot be anticipated, but I think we can anticipate that the decision of how to meet the attack, if there is a major one, would have to be made at once. As a practical matter, consultation after the event between Washington and London—to say nothing of additional consultations with the other Governments—would require the passage of hours, even days, during a time of grave peril to our forces.

For these reasons, we believe that this Government, as the Unified Command, must retain the latitude to determine whether an attack requires immediate counter action in order to preserve the safety of the forces. This requires confidence on the part of our Allies that the decision will be soberly and wisely made, with full realization of all that is involved. I think that the course which the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have followed over many months has justified this confidence. I think also that the authority to take counter action to preserve a command is inherent in and essential to the very conception of command. Any other view would leave this Government with the responsibility for the forces—our own and those of other nations—engaged in Korea, but unable to take a step which may prove to be essential to preserve their very existence.

This Government profoundly hopes that the necessity for the decision which I have been discussing will never be presented to it. But it cannot rest upon that hope. The Chinese are plainly playing for a military decision. They have still large bodies of troops uncommitted. We cannot close our eyes to the possibility of a reckless and desperate play on their part at some point in the battle.

Another question which has been much discussed between our Governments is the use of economic measures to aid the military ones.

In your message which your Embassy let us see on April 27 you voiced objection to the Additional Measures Committee rushing ahead and submitting a report at once to the Political Committee of the General Assembly.[1] I do not believe that the issue is really one between precipitate action and considered and deliberate action.

The proposal for economic measures has been under discussion since last January, and the Resolution of the General Assembly providing for a committee to consider it was taken on February 1. At that time it was understood that the Committee might defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reported satisfactory progress. It was also understood that the Additional Measures Committee was not required to remain inactive until the other Committee reported failure. For almost three months now the Good Offices Committee has been at work, and yet it cannot even report progress.

Under these circumstances, I do not believe that continued inaction by the Additional Measures Committee is helping to bring about or to increase the possibility of negotiations for peaceful settlement. On the contrary, I think that it suggests timidity and indecision on the part of the United Nations.

In the past some members of the United Nations have believed that the development of economic measures would further alienate the Chinese Communists and increase their hostility. I do not see how their hostility can be increased. I do not see any possibility of any basic realignment of the Chinese Communists toward the free world unless and until they end their attack. A prerequisite of this seems to be a conclusion on their part that to end the attack is in their interest. So it seems to me that the addition of economic measures to the military ones we are already taking will move the Chinese in the direction of this decision and that failure to take them moves them away from it.

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[1] For related documentation, see the compilation on economic sanctions against Communist China, pp. 1874 ff.

Moreover, what we are actually proposing is that urgent consideration should be given to the adoption of a resolution calling for an embargo on war materials for Communist China and the establishment of review procedures which would make possible changes in the initial embargo in the light of actual developments in China and Korea and in the experience of cooperating countries in applying their respective control measures.

The United States has done much more than this and has ended all commercial and financial relations with Communist China. We would welcome similar action by all United Nations members. But we recognize the great importance of unity in action; and, therefore, in the effort to get general agreement, suggest something considerably less than what we have done.

So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, what we have proposed means little more than proclaiming publicly what is already being done.

However, public agreement upon these measures in the United Nations and their extension to other countries would, we think, be a demonstration of a united will to participate in a collective program designed to diminish the war-making power of the Chinese Communists and to bring home to the Chinese the increasing cost to them of the course upon which they are embarked.

In the political field our Governments have differed in the past regarding the wisdom and advisability of admitting the Chinese Communists to the United Nations. Whatever may have been the merits of this debate, can we not now agree to a moratorium upon it? At a time when the Chinese Communists are defying the United Nations, fighting its forces on a major scale, and denying the validity of every provision of the Charter, the discussion of their possible admission to the United Nations seems to me to have the most divisive possible effect between us and to give them the greatest encouragement in continuing their present course.

It is difficult everywhere in this country, and in all the countries which are supplying forces in Korea, to keep our peoples constantly alive to the rightness and necessity of the sacrifices which have to be made for a struggle limited in its nature and not susceptible of the conceptions of victory to which people have become accustomed. To add to these difficulties discussion of admitting the enemy to the organization which they are fighting seems to me so utterly confusing to the average man as to imperil the whole United Nations operation in Korea.

I am still giving careful thought to the possibility which we suggested last month, and which you also developed on somewhat different lines, of having a new declaration of aims, which will reemphasize our desire for peaceful settlement upon conclusion of the aggression.[2] We will have further talks with officers of your Embassy during the coming week. I am sure, however, that you are already aware of the serious objections which we have to certain elements in your counterproposal. These objections can be developed in detail during the forthcoming talks.

In any event it is my immediate suggestion that the present moment is not an opportune one for a public statement. The military issue in Korea is still being fought out. General Ridgway believes that he can meet and repulse the attack. It is clearly a great one and is not yet fully developed. In this situation any statement by us looking toward a peaceful settlement is, in my judgment, sure to be rejected with contempt as a cry for peace from nations which are sorely pressed. So I think we would retard rather than help the chances of a peaceful settlement by a statement now."

ACHESON

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[2] Two drafts (not printed) of a proposed report from President Truman to U.N. Secretary-General Lie on the Korean situation are in Department of State file 795B.00/4-2051. The drafts, dated April 21 and 27, were designed to set forth the views of the United States regarding the nature of its mission as the Unified Command in Korea and to indicate the desire of the United States for an honorable cease-fire and settlement in Korea.

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 1, 1951—6:57 p. m.

JCS 90000. From JCS.

1. Foll instructions, which are a compilation and condensation, with minor modifications, of existing directives, constitute your authority for conduct of mil operations in Korea and do not pertain to instruc-

tions regarding China, Formosa, and Japan. All previous directives or portions of directives in conflict herewith are rescinded.[1]

2. UN Security Council in its resolution of 7 Jul 50 recommended that all mbrs providing mil forces and other assistance, pursuant to Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June 50, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

3. In accordance therewith you have been designated as the cdr of those mil forces assisting ROK. Your title in this capacity will be CINCUNC.

Mission

4. In accordance with appropriate UN resolutions, over-all mission of UN is to assist ROK in repelling the aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea.

5. As CINCUNC your mil objective is to destroy the armed forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto. In pursuit of this objective two considerations are overriding:

A. Security of forces under your command; and
B. Your basic mission, as CINCFE of the defense of Japan.

Operations

6. In pursuit of your mil objective in Korea, you are authorized to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your objective. This specifically does not include authority to conduct air or naval action against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or against North Korean electrical power complex including the Yalu River power installations, and as a matter of policy no operations will be conducted within 15 miles of USSR territory.

7. With regard to ground operations, your planned operation set forth in your C 59397 Apr 51 is approved.[2] You will not undertake any general advance beyond limiting line specified therein without prior approval of JCS. You are, however, authorized to conduct such limited tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to insure safety of your command, to maintain contact, and to keep enemy off

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[1] The Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 25 had approved the draft directive and had forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense recommending that he submit it to the President. Secretary of Defense Marshall, under a covering letter dated April 30, forwarded the directive to the President, who approved it. (JCS Files)

[2] This message, dated April 5, 1951, had been sent by General MacArthur prior to his recall; for a summary of its contents, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 363. In general, it called for advance by U.N. forces, which had already entered North Korea, to the Kansas and Wyoming lines.

balance. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphibious and airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

Forces

8. As CINCUNC the fol forces are available to you:

A. All United States forces currently deployed in FECOM except 40th and 45th Inf Divs. These divs will not be employed outside Japanese Islands without authority from JCS, and the integrity of personnel and units in these divs will be preserved. For planning purposes you may assume that in event implementation of Jt Outline Emerg War Plan is directed while UN forces are in conflict with Communist forces in Far East, all SAC units operating in Far East Theater will be redeployed as required to support strategic air offensive. This does not include the 19th Bomb Wing.

B. Such ROK forces as are made available by ROK. You will not provide logistic support to any major ROK units other than those already being provided for, except on prior approval of JCS. At your discretion, attachment of ROK personnel to United States units is authorized.

C. Forces of UN mbrs accepted by Unified Command for service in the UN Campaign. Negotiations for provision of additional forces from UN mbrs will be handled at governmental level.

Operational Restrictions

9. Under no circumstances will your forces cross Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.

10. In the conduct of naval operations care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.

11. Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including coastal waters, is authorized, up to Yalu River on west coast but short of Korean-Soviet international boundary on east coast. Aerial reconnaissance over coastal area of China to determine imminence of attack on Formosa is limited to areas south of 32nd parallel and north of Hong Kong.

12. There is no restriction on your employment of United States naval and air forces as between support of Korea and def of Formosa. Only United States forces will participate in operations relating to Formosa except with prior approval of JCS.

13. You are prohibited from attacking Rashin with air and naval forces.

14. In event of Chinese Communist air or sea attacks against United States forces outside Korea, principle of immediate retaliation on Chinese mainland is approved. However, subject to right of immediate self-defense, you will inform JCS of facts concerning the Chinese Communist attack and receive approval for retaliatory action prior to attacking targets on Chinese mainland.

Soviet Intervention

15. In event of open or covert employment of major Soviet units in Korea (including "Volunteers") you will, subj to security of your forces, assume the defensive, make no move to aggravate situation, and report to JCS. This is not to be interpreted as a restriction on conduct of air and naval operations in Korea.

16. If Soviet Union announces in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea and gives warning either explicitly or implicitly that their forces should not be attacked, you will refer the matter immediately to JCS.

17. In event of an attempt to employ small Soviet units covertly in Korea you should continue your current action.

18. It is agreed in principle that, in event of Soviet attack against the FECOM, UN forces will be withdrawn from Korea and you should plan accordingly. Situation may require some immediate movements of your forces by air. Subj to this, however, and to immediate security of your forces both in Korea and in Japan you will initiate major withdrawal from Korea only upon instruction furnished you after receipt of info from you as to conditions obtaining. Pending further instructions, you should not plan for use of any UN forces other than those of United States, in defense of FECOM outside of Korea.

Psychological Warfare

19. You should make an intensive effort using all info media available to you to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive designed to support your mil mission.

Civil Affairs

20. In South Korea the provisions of WAR 85117, 6 Jul 50,[3] as currently implemented in field remain applicable.

21. In North Korea provisions of JCS 95328, 29 Oct 50, as interpreted in WAR 95715, 2 Nov 50,[4] remain applicable. The changing situation requires re-examination of this directive by Depts of State and Defense and the UN, and certain revisions may hereafter be necessary.

Logistic Support

22. You are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from sources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will report your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

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[3] Not printed.

[4] Neither printed; for a summary of their contents, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 221. For the text of the civil affairs directive for North Korea, see telegram 256, October 28, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1007.

23. With respect to logistic support of foreign forces under your command, WAR 90576, 3 Sep 50[5] will serve as your guidance.

Captured Matériel

24. You will be guided with respect to the acquisition, use, and ultimate disposal of enemy matériel captured in Korea by instructions by JCS contained in JCS 99193, 19 Dec 50, as amplified by JCS 2171/2, dated 6 April 51,[5] fwdd to you by CSA on 24 Apr 51.

Prisoners of War

25. Handling of POWs will be in accordance with pertinent United States Army Regulations and International Conventions.

26. Consistent with provisions of Geneva Convention[6] and other applicable regulations, you should initiate and maintain a comprehensive program for interrogation, indoctrination, and reorientation of POWs with a view toward their eventual utilization as avowed anti-Communists.

Censorship

27. While it is recognized that you do not have the facilities to impose complete censorship within your command, you are in a position to impose delays and news blackouts from time to time. Therefore, you are directed to impose a news blackout and impound pertinent communications immediately under your control in appropriate Korean areas whenever in your judgment necessity requires such action.

Armistice

28. In event Communist mil leaders request an Armistice in the field, you will immediately report that fact to JCS for instructions.

29. For your background info, views of JCS with respect to an Armistice are contained in a memo for Sec Def dated 27 Mar 51 (encl to JCS 1776/201) fwdd to you by CSA 4 Apr 51.[7]

Channels of Communication

30. Directive from Unified Command (United States Govt) will be transmitted to you through JCS. CSA will act as executive agent for JCS in these matters.

31. Requirement for rendering reports to the UN on operations of UN forces in Korea is contained in JCS 87422, 28 Jul 50.[5]

32. With regard to public policy statements your attention is invited to JCS 98134, 6 Dec 50.[8]

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[5] Not printed.

[6] The Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, dated August 12. 1949, entered into force for the United States on February 2, 1956; text in TIAS No. 3364; 6 UST (pt. 3) 3316.

[7] For the text of the March 27 memorandum, see the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.

[8] Text in *Hearings*, p. 3536.

795.00/5-251

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1951.

Late in the afternoon of April 27, Admiral Lalor[2] came to see Mr. Matthews with an urgent Top Secret dispatch to General Ridgway for clearance. The dispatch was in reply to one just received from General Ridgway in which he requested authority for aerial reconnaissance over Manchuria and delegation to him of authority to institute retaliatory bombing of certain bases in Chinese territory in the event of a massive air attack on his forces.[3] Mr. Matthews called in Mr. Nitze and myself, and after a few minutes' discussion with Admiral Lalor, the three of us went to the Secretary, being joined later by the Admiral. It developed that Mr. Lovett[4] had discussed this exchange with the Secretary over the telephone but the Secretary received the distinct impression that the JCS reply related exclusively to the question of aerial reconnaissance. The Secretary thereupon telephoned Mr. Lovett, and later General Vandenberg, who in the absence of General Bradley from the city had signed the dispatch for the JCS. By arrangement, the Secretary and General Vandenberg met with the President later in the evening. Mr. Matthews informed me later in the evening that the Secretary had just telephoned him to say the dispatch had been forwarded to General Ridgway with the President's approval but with the addition of a final paragraph which emphasized the vital necessity of informing Washington instantaneously if there were not opportunity for consultation with the JCS so that our allies could be informed and the risk of dissension on their part over the action would be minimized.

During the discussion in the Secretary's office it was pointed out that the 14 Ambassadors at their semi-weekly consultation and briefing that very afternoon had had confirmed to them, in a discussion of this general subject, that the final decision on retaliation would be made in Washington. It was recognized that they should be promptly apprised of the fact that under certain circumstances General Ridgway would now be authorized to react without communication to Washington. It was agreed that it would be unwise to call a special meeting and it was further agreed that this slight change in the situation should be put to them in such fashion as to avoid needlessly arousing their apprehensions.

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[1] This memorandum was directed to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins), the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), and the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] Rear Adm. William G. Lalor (ret.), Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[3] See the exchange of messages between General Ridgway and the JCS, dated April 27 and 28, pp. 385 and 386.

[4] Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

On Monday, April 30, Messrs. Nitze, Hickerson and Merchant spoke individually to the Ambassadors or Chargés of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Belgium, The Philippines, France and The Netherlands, all of whom at one time or another had raised the question with the Department individually. All of them accepted this clarification of the position without any apparent disturbance or objection.

At the regular meeting of the 14 Ambassadors on May 1, Mr. Hickerson unostentatiously clarified this point for the benefit of the entire group. Again, no objection or serious discussion was thereby provoked.

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1951.

Subject: Item 2, NSC Meeting, May 2—NSC 48/3,[1] United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia.

This paper is scheduled for preliminary discussion, but not final action. The paper as it stands is generally acceptable to us, although we have in mind proposing some drafting refinements. General Marshall and the other members of the Council may be prepared to approve the paper in principle today. Unless the President is strongly of a contrary opinion, I recommend that you take the position that the paper should be returned to the Senior Staff for further refinements. Final action can then be taken by the Council at its next meeting, if it is felt necessary for the Council to approve these changes.

The JCS has submitted its comments (Tab A).[2] With respect to the JCS revision of 9 *b* (2), you may wish to observe that their language appears to narrow the concept of our military mission in Korea and request General Bradley's clarification. You may also wish to make similar inquiries regarding the proposed changes of 11 *a* and 11 *c*.

Paragraph 3 of the JCS paper is the most important point in their comments. It raises the question of the adequacy of our political policy as a basis for their military policy in Korea. This is, in substance, one of MacArthur's principal contentions. I think you will wish to seek particular clarification on this point.

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[1] Not printed. See footnote 3, p. 388.

[2] See the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Marshall, April 30, p. 387.

These proposed revisions by the JCS are adequate reasons for returning the paper for consideration by the Senior Staff.

If necessary you can say that revisions by this Department in the wording of the current draft are being submitted directly to the Senior Staff for their consideration.[3]

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[3] In the light of discussion at its 90th meeting on May 2, 1951, the National Security Council decided to refer NSC 48/3 to the NSC Staff for revision (NSC Action No. 466–*b*).

795.00/5–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Corrigan and Thomas J. Cory of the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET — NEW YORK, May 3, 1951.

US/GEN/419

Subject: Some Soviet Views on the World Situation.

Participants: Mr. Jacob Malik, Permanent Soviet Representative to the United Nations.
Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin, Alternate Soviet Representative to the United Nations.
Dr. Frank P. Corrigan, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
Mr. Thomas J. Cory, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Tone of Conversation: A ride into Manhattan with Soviet Delegate Jacob Malik and his Deputy, Semen Tsarapkin, following yesterday's Security Council meeting afforded an opportunity for a four-way conversation on many subjects. The discussion was free and informal and, on occasions, very animated. Mostly, it was between Malik and Cory and between Tsarapkin and Corrigan, but at times it became general. Both Russians expressed themselves in a casual and unofficial way and showed little of the caution and reserve which ordinarily mark their public appearances. They did not seem to be trying to "make propaganda", but seemed rather to be enjoying a frank exchange of views with two antagonists.

American Luxury: As we were getting into the car, Malik said that his Chrysler is a fine American automobile, that it has especially large tires, and that it rides very comfortably. He compared the luxury of the automobile to the luxury of all American life, and said that he fails to understand why the United States with all its wealth, devotes so much effort to imperialist aims in Europe. He wondered why the United States should spend its resources so far afield. We answered that the United States is trying to help reconstruct Europe. Malik said he believes the real aim of the United States is to make satellites of the Western European countries and that this is a form of aggression which naturally alarms Russia.

American Bases: Malik remarked that Russia is well aware of American aggressive intentions against the USSR and that Russians follow carefully the construction of American bases in Greenland, North Africa, England, Japan, and other countries encircling the Soviet Union. He observed that there are no Soviet bases in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Canada, or other countries around the United States and wondered how Russians could avoid their conclusions about American imperialism when they looked at a map showing the location of American bases.

Foreign Invasion of Russia: Malik then went into considerable detail about the long history of foreign aggression against Russia. He began with Tamerlane and passed to Genghis Khan, Sweden, Lithuania, Poland, the Teutonic Knights, Napoleon, the Kaiser, the Allied intervention, and Hitler. He noted that these invasions had all failed and that any American invasion likewise would fail. Cory said that Malik demonstrated an unreasonable fear; that the United States has no intention to invade Russia as had Napoleon, Hitler, and others; that the United States seeks a peaceful solution to outstanding problems and avoidance of war. Malik objected to the use of the word "fear". He said Russia fears no one, that Russia has been invaded so many times that she has ceased to fear, but that she is united in her determination to resist aggression. Cory suggested that perhaps a better word would be "suspicion", and that geography and history give the Russian people good cause to be suspicious. Malik assented to the substitute word, saying that suspicion is an important characteristic of Russian psychology. We all agreed that Russian history and tradition are factors which should not be lost sight of during the present crisis.

Peaceful Coexistence: Malik asked whether the United States believes in peaceful coexistence. We replied that of course it does but that the history of the last five years has taught the American people that peaceful coexistence is something which must be purchased by preparedness, that good will on one side is not sufficient. To this Malik observed that the American press carries many reports of public speeches and statements by American officials proving that American officials are opposed to peaceful coexistence. He referred to speeches of Senators which advocate dropping atom bombs on Moscow and to what he called inflammatory war propaganda in Washington, in the American press, and in speeches made throughout the United States. Malik said that no such public statements are made in Moscow. Cory suggested behind the walls of the Government and Party offices in Moscow, perhaps inflammatory statements also are made, but that they never come to the attention of the world because of the secrecy which cloaks the activities of the Soviet State. Malik denied that this is so, saying that no Russian official ever makes such statements either privately or publicly and that in any event the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recently passed a law providing severe punishment for war mongers. He dismissed Pospelov's last speech as containing not propaganda but only the unvarnished truth.[1]

U.S. and Soviet Strength: Malik inquired what the United States hopes to achieve by its aggressive warmongering policy against the USSR. He touched on the long history of disagreement between the United States and the USSR in the United Nations, blaming the U.S. for failure to reach agreements on atomic energy or in the Military Staff Committee. He was told that American policy seeks to prepare not for aggressive war, but to develop protective strength against existing Soviet power and that disagreements such as Malik had mentioned arose not because of American aggressive policies, but because the Soviet Union was out of step with the rest of the world. Cory said that the United States is engaged in building up strength to ensure against Russian employment of the military force the Soviet Union now has under arms and mentioned current press estimates that the USSR has 275 divisions under arms. To this, Malik replied heatedly that the United States always speaks of the number of Soviet divisions, which number, he said, is nothing like 275, but that the United States never refers to its own powerful navy or its strategic air force or its stock of atom bombs. He said that the United States had never made public the number of atom bombs in its stockpile and claimed that a given number of atom bombs can certainly offset a given number of divisions, and that therefore the United States may actually be stronger than the USSR regardless of the number of divisions each country has in the field. (There was no braggadocio in Malik's analysis of the strength of the two countries.)

How to Reconcile Disagreements: Cory said the conversation shows that the disparity between his thinking and that of Malik is just as great as that between the United States and the USSR and wondered how two such differing points of view could ever be reconciled. Malik replied that the only hope is abandonment of United States aggressive policies. Cory insisted that the United States deeply desires peaceful settlement of outstanding issues, but Malik continued to insist that all facts argue to the contrary.

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[1] Presumably, the reference is to a speech given by P.N. Pospelov, former editor of *Pravda*, head of the Soviet Communist Party's Department of Agitation and Propaganda, on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of Lenin's death, January 21, 1951. The speech was bitterly critical of United States imperialism, particularly with regard to American intervention in the Russian Revolution. For the text, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 17, 1951, p. 3.

Settlement of Korean War: The conversation shifted to Korea and here, we suggested, is a limited dispute which could be settled by good will on both sides in a manner which could pave the way for settlement of other great disputes between our two countries. Malik answered that all the evidence shows the United States wants no settlement of the Korean War. Cory objected strongly to this, saying that the United States' policy in the United Nations clearly testifies to the American desire for a peaceful settlement on honorable terms and mentioned U.S. support of the Cease Fire Committee and of the Good Offices Committee. Malik said that these are merely words, that the facts of the case show that the United States definitely does not want a peaceful settlement. Malik was then asked how a peaceful settlement could ever be brought about. He initially replied that he thought it might be done through the two Foreign Ministers. Cory asked what Malik meant, whether he was referring to the Soviet and U.S. Foreign Ministers. Malik said no, that he was thinking of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers. Cory asked whether Mr. Malik was proposing that the Foreign Ministers' meeting, if it is ever held, should add settlement of the Korean War to its agenda. Malik said he was making no proposal, that he was merely thinking that the Korean dispute, as well as many other outstanding matters, could and should be settled by discussion between the United States and the Soviet Governments. He said the Soviet position on such bilateral discussions is well known. (Malik deftly avoided being pinned down more specifically on how to settle the Korean War, and he did not volunteer, and a shift in the conversation denied us a chance to discuss the position of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in such settlement.)

Facts are Facts: Cory said that Malik, and also Mr. Vishinsky last fall, often referred to the facts of the case, saying let the facts speak for themselves. Cory suggested that a useful approach in the Korean situation might be for the two governments to isolate facts from propaganda and said that he himself had been in Korea at the time of the North Korean attack and that as far as he is concerned, it is a fact that the North Koreans commenced the aggression. Malik replied that even observers on the scene sometimes fail to interpret correctly what has happened and suggested that Cory might have been mistaken. Cory heatedly denied this, saying that any man in Seoul at that time, particularly one in the Political Section of the American Embassy, could have no doubt as to the facts in this particular case. Malik continued to deny that such facts are necessarily evident to an observer on the scene. Cory mentioned that as a matter of fact that very afternoon Senator Austin had held a press conference in which he presented two captured North Korean documents which clearly confirmed that the war had been started by the North Koreans.[2] Malik said he had not seen the documents, but that it is well known that such documents can easily be forged. We answered that of course they could, but that these documents certainly had not been forged because they agreed too completely with what already is known of the North Korean aggression. Cory then referred to the North Korean White Book,[3] saying that Soviet spokesmen in the UN are on very weak ground in quoting from it because there is in that book no document attributed to U.S. sources which proves that the U.S. or the Republic of Korea began the aggression. He said that the only such "proof" in the White Book consisted of statements and broadcasts of South Koreans who had defected and who necessarily would give slanted and mendacious testimony.

Settlement of Korean War: We insisted again that the United States wants a peaceful settlement of the Korean War on honorable terms, to which Malik replied that any settlement on honorable terms must necessarily be on terms which are honorable to all interested parties (Malik obviously was referring to North Korea and Communist China). Cory admitted that this seemed reasonable but that the U.S. was striving for a settlement of the Korea situation *per se* and saw no reason to bring Formosa or recognition of the Chinese Communists or Chinese Communist membership in the UN into what the United States considers a localized question. Malik merely repeated that any Korean settlement must contain honorable terms for all interested parties.

Formosa: Malik shifted the conversation to Formosa, inquiring how the United States occupation of Formosa could do other than cause the Chinese Communists to hate the United States. He seemed to believe this is the principal reason for the Chinese Communist intervention. He was unperturbed by Cory's mention of the fact that last fall Mr. Dulles had expressly told the UN that there were only 42 American soldiers in Formosa. Malik continued to insist that the United States occupies Formosa, adducing as additional proof the recent establishment of an American Military Advisory Group for Formosa. At this point, Tsarapkin came into the conversation to observe that there were various forms of occupation and the United States could occupy Formosa without many Americans being present. (From the tenor of the conversation, it seems possible that Tsarapkin was assuming that the United States occupies Formosa with few Americans being present in much the same way that the USSR managed to control North Korea with relatively few Russians in the country.)

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[2] On May 2, 1951, Ambassador Austin transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a special report from the U.N. Command in Korea forwarding two documents captured from North Korean forces. The documents, dated June 18 and 22, 1950, were presented as evidence that the North Korean forces had planned aggression against the Republic of Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities on June 25, 1950. The text of these documents is contained in U.N. document S/2112 and in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, p. 828. For the North Korean response, May 18, see U.N. document S/2167/Rev. 1. A retort from the United States, May 31, is in U.N. document S/2179.

[3] *Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea: Documents From the Archives of the Rhee Syngman Government.* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 1950)

Capitalist War Profits: Cory said that he found this a depressing conversation and one which was doing nothing to narrow the differences between us. Malik reverted to his previous claim that the reason for this is that the United States does not want peace and added the new theme that Wall Street capitalists are making such profits from the Korean war that they never will end the fighting if they can help it. He adduced some statistics on earnings of U.S. corporations and said that he recently read in the newspapers that Charles E. Wilson, Defense Mobilization Director, had received a large bonus from his company [4] due, he assumed, to the great earnings of this company from the Korean war. We objected to this, saying that Mr. Wilson and many Americans like him may have sons or relatives in Korea and that no right-thinking American places profits above the welfare of his own kin and country. Malik seemed totally unimpressed by this argument and continued that capitalist forces in the world are the ones responsible for aggression whereas no Soviet citizen could conceivably profit from war.

Yugoslavia: Cory then inquired how, if capitalist forces cause war, had the dispute between the USSR and Yugoslavia arisen, that being a dispute between two socialist states. Malik replied by saying that American capitalists had incited Yugoslavia to her action. Cory ridiculed this, saying Malik must be aware of the status enjoyed by Americans in Yugoslavia prior to the defection. Malik answered that even though American capitalists themselves may not have been present they at least sent agents to Yugoslavia to do the job.

U.S. Foreign Service Officers: At one point during the discussion of United States' warmongers, Malik inquired what has become of George Kennan who, he said, he understands to be the number one American expert on Russia. Cory replied that Kennan is not now in the Government and is at present engaged in advanced study at Princeton University. Malik said that Kennan has had a great and unfortunate influence on United States' policy toward Russia and that he has no doubts that Kennan's voice is still heard in American policy circles. Malik inquired about Charles E. Bohlen, saying that he assumed Bohlen is now the number one American expert on Russia. Cory replied that Bohlen is still in Paris, but that presumably he will return shortly to Washington to assume his duties as Counselor of the State Department. Malik did not warm noticeably to Cory's contentions that Kennan is a great admirer of many qualities of the Russian people, that he has devoted his life to the study of Russia and that he is particularly interested in the life and works of Chekhov of whom Kennan reportedly hopes some day to write a biography. Tsarapkin inquired about Elbridge Durbrow and seemed interested to learn that Durbrow is now Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. Tsarapkin also inquired about Charles W. Thayer, mentioning that he saw him last in Korea in 1946 or 1947. We said that after leaving Korea Thayer had headed the Voice of America for several years. Tsarapkin commented that in Russia the Voice of America is known as something like the "Lying Voice". Tsarapkin asked where Thayer is now. When told that Thayer is now in Germany,[5] Tsarapkin said that he assumed Thayer must be engaged in warmongering and anti-Soviet propaganda directed at Eastern Europe and Russia. At this point, Malik remarked rather jokingly in English to Tsarapkin that it is interesting that an American officer has gone from Korea to Germany and that he thought it might be worth while to study the transfer of other American officials from Korea to Germany. To this Cory observed that there had been several such transfers of American officers but that he was not worried about any aggressive intentions being behind the transfers, although he would worry very much if such Soviet officials as Tsarapkin, who had Korean experience, were transferred to Germany. Malik sought to dismiss the worry by saying that Soviet officials had no aggressive purposes in North Korea and would have none in Germany if they were transferred to that country.

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[4] Mr. Wilson had been President of the General Electric Company.

GA Resolution of February 1: At one stage in the conversation about Korea, Malik mentioned that immediately after the passage of the GA resolution of February 1 which found the Chinese Communists to be aggressors he had heard Ambassador Austin exclaim "Thank God the UN has passed this resolution." Malik said that this resolution clearly shows the aggressive forces behind United States' policy and the fact that the U.S. desires the war to continue.

United Nations: The discussion then revolved around the U.N. and Malik made the statement, "The UN is dead". Cory asked him to say that again and Malik did, saying, "The UN is dead". Cory asked him precisely what Malik had been doing that afternoon at Lake Success and Malik replied that he was out there but that his work is not important. Malik then ticked off the United States "mechanical voting bloc", listing the 20 American Republics and 10 or 12 Western European nations. He said that all these nations are American satellites. We asked whether he included France and England in this category and Malik replied that of course he did. Cory asked Malik whether if "the UN is dead" he expects soon to be the Soviet Delegate to the World Peace Council. Malik dodged this and said only that the UN has so changed since 1945 that it no longer is the organization it started out to be. Cory asked how Malik could honestly think that the U.S. has a mechanical voting block in the UN when Malik must see from the newspapers the difficulty the U.S. has been having in obtaining support for a UN program of economic sanctions against Communist China. Malik replied that he may have read something of this in the newspapers but that not being on any of the appropriate committees he is not well acquainted with difficulties which the U.S. may be experiencing in this respect.

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[5] Mr. Thayer was Chief of the Liaison and Reporting Division, Office of Political Affairs, in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

General MacArthur: In talking about the dismissal of General MacArthur, we observed that this dismissal clearly demonstrated the United States' desire to localize the war in Korea and that, according to the press, the school of thought championed by General MacArthur involves an enlargement of hostilities to which the Administration is opposed. Malik seemed unimpressed by this argument and responded only that the entire history of recent months shows clearly that the U.S. intends to continue the war in Korea and probably, in time, to extend it.

Chinese Communists in Korea: Another subject discussed at some length and with some heat was the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Corrigan asked what did the Chinese Communists expect to gain for China by forcing the hand of the United Nations perhaps to the point of provoking all-out war against them and observed that the course they are pursuing will interfere with their plans for social and economic development and will lead to their utter destruction. The two Russians contended that wars do not always turn out as planned by the aggressors.

Chinese "Volunteers": It may be worth noting that during the discussion of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, Malik did not once refer to "volunteers", or attempt to use any terminology to disguise the fact that regular forces of the Chinese Communist regime are fighting in Korea.

Cost of War Preparations: Tsarapkin lamented that because of aggressive U.S. policies, the Soviet Government is compelled to spend so much money on defense to the detriment of great plans for grand canals, transportation, reforestation and so forth.

U.S. Democracy: Tsarapkin expressed a low opinion of US Democracy. He said that the people have no voice. His statement that an American had told him that if he had 100 million dollars to spend, he could elect a "Chinaman" President of the United States, gave Corrigan an opportunity to point out the folly of paying attention to such stupidity and to counsel a new approach to his study of the United States, pointing out the obvious fact that no one can predict who will be the next President nor even what men will be the nominees of the two great parties. Corrigan also pointed to the fact that our informed public opinion is independent of the newspapers which had often been 90% mistaken in their appraisal of it. He said our confidence is founded on the basic tenet of democracy that an informed electorate can determine what is good for them better than anyone can decide it for them and quoted Lincoln, "Give the people the light and they will find their way". This analysis seemed to make little impression on Tsarapkin. Perhaps, he said that may have been true in the time of Lincoln, but not today. He seemed interested in Corrigan's presentation but remained convinced in his own mind that somehow or other he must be right.

Nationalism: Corrigan and Tsarapkin engaged in a philosophical discussion on the importance of national sovereignty and its accompanying national feeling as a political force and reached agreement that even in Russia, as well as in Yugoslavia, it has major influence. Tsarapkin said that perhaps it has to be admitted that this is a century or age in which nationalism is still a predominant force and in which international arrangements must be obtained through an accord of *sovereign nations* ceding a share of their sovereignty to an organization like the United Nations, at least with regard to armaments and war.

American Effeteness: Tsarapkin manifested to Corrigan an amazing lack of appreciation for the American scene and a depreciation of American virility. He gave the impression of believing that all Americans are coddled and spoiled and lack the ability to withstand the hardships which are the accepted lot of the noble Russian people.

Comment: Malik was a charming and cordial host during the 45 minute ride to Manhattan, Tsarapkin somewhat less so. Most of the conversation was in English with Cory occasionally helping Malik in Russian and Corrigan assisting Tsarapkin in French. There was no serious language difficulty.

Corrigan was impressed by the manner in which the two Russians referred to their "colleagues", using the word as well as other diplomatic expressions in a way indicating a deep-rooted desire to be accepted by others as colleagues in the diplomatic sense.

Leaving aside the major question of the imperviousness of the two Russians to foreign ideas, their statements raise wonder as to (1) how well informed they really are on the secret workings of the Soviet

State and its relations with Communist China and (2) the extent to which they project into the non-Soviet world the psychology of themselves and their own country.

Editorial Note

Beginning on May 3, the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations held hearings on the military situation in the Far East and the circumstances surrounding General MacArthur's recall. These sessions continued through June 27. For the record, see *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry Into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments in That Area* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951).

In addition to the testimony taken from Secretary of Defense Marshall, Secretary of State Acheson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur, and others, the text of the *Hearings* contains considerable documentary material which was declassified and made public at the time.

795.00/5–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1951.

Subject: UK Proposal for 14-Power Declaration on Korea

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
Mr. Livingston Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

Mr. Tomlinson called at our request today to discuss the above subject. He was first given a copy of the Secretary's message of April 30, 1951, to Mr. Morrison which he read before the discussion proceeded. With respect to the latter part of that message he observed that he knew of no sentiment whatever for issuing such a statement while the Communist offensive was in progress, but that the UK felt it would be well to proceed with the discussion of the type statement which might be made at an opportune time in the future. He also asked what new indication there might be of the possibility of massive Communist air attack. Mr. Merchant stated that in addition to the information which had already been given to them Intelligence reported that in spite of the continual attack to which they were subjected the enemy were expending a great deal of effort in attempting to place airfields in North Korea in an operable condition and that there had recently been a great increase in the anti-aircraft protection of those fields.

With respect to the UK's suggestion for a 14-Power statement and the UK draft,[1] Mr. Hickerson observed as follows:

1. The United States has been and continues to be completely opposed to any proposal that a conference be convened before the fighting has stopped. The US had communicated to the Cease-Fire Committee its thoughts with regard to the essential elements of any cease-fire and if the other side desired to bring about a cease-fire this could readily be done through established UN organs without the necessity for a conference. While the principles for a cease-fire set forth in the January 3 report of the Cease-Fire Committee contained what we felt were the essential elements in any such arrangement, we recognize that circumstances might require some changes therein.
2. The composition of the conference suggested by the UK was entirely unacceptable to the US, the membership being "loaded" from the US point of view and not representative of a cross section of UN attitudes toward the Chinese regime.
3. There is also the problem of a self-constituted group, such as that suggested, handling what is essentially a UN problem. In this regard the UK draft statement gives no recognition whatever, except for the doubtful proposal that the conference appoint the President of the General Assembly to a cease-fire group to the UN aspects of the whole Korean problem and military action there. Additionally, the UK proposal disregards the position and legitimate interests of the ROK. The draft declaration makes no reference to UNCURK or UNKRA in the roles assigned to them by the UN.
4. There would be great difficulty in obtaining agreement among what is now the sixteen nations group[2] to any statement and the setting up of a group of this kind would encourage other groups, such as the Arab-Asian bloc, to go off on their own on similar proposals without reference to the UN.

Mr. Hickerson stated that we had been giving continuous consideration to the question of a statement or report of some kind since our original proposal was made, but that it had been beset by difficulties which Mr. Tomlinson was aware and it had not been possible to obtain its issuance prior to the renewal of the Chinese Communist offensive. He stated that we were now thinking in terms of a report by the President to the UN which would start off with a short account of the operations in Korea, and end with a statement along the following lines: the UN Charter requires every effort be made to prevent the spread of hostilities and to prevent the prolongation of the loss of life resulting from the aggression in Korea; the statement would go on to say that the US as the Unified Command was prepared to enter into appropriate arrangements which must include an end to the fighting, provisions to insure that fighting does not break out again, steps to bring about UN objectives of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and the phased withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from the peninsula. The report would close with a statement to the effect that such arrangements would fulfill the UN policies with regard to Korea, greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and reassure the peoples of the world that peace can and will be maintained. Mr. Hickerson emphasized that this statement was still in draft form, was under continuous revision, and had not yet been approved by the Secretary.

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[1] See the communications from the British Embassy dated April 10 and 17, pp. 328 and 351.

[2] The countries contributing troops to the U.N. effort in Korea were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, and the United States.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the only other reaction that they had thus far received to the UK proposal was a suggestion by Canada that the statement should include "Pearson's Principles".[3] He stated that he would immediately transmit to London our observation and inform us when a reply is received.

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[3] See footnote 3, p. 128.

795.00/5–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, May 3, 1951—6 p. m.

5731. Deptel 4969, Apr 30. In conversation with EmbOff this morning Scott informally outlined his reactions to personal message to Morrison which he feels have good chance being accepted by Cabinet. Fol are his views:

Agrees with first four paras.

Fifth para. There is still some doubt in Brit minds as to what extent our proposals are based on their own merits and to what extent on pressure of Amer opinion.

Seventh para. There is apparent conflict of intelligence data and evaluations, as Brit intelligence estimates still do not envisage major air attack as probable and believe it cld not be carried out without substantial direct Soviet participation. Fuller exchange of data and consultation on intelligence level might have salutary effect on Brit attitude.

Re point in ninth para that US Govt as Unified Command must determine whether attack requires immed counter-attack, Scott feels it wld be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get HMG to give any other govt authority in effect to declare world war on its behalf. Brit are also concerned over report that President has already authorized Chiefs of Staff to order counter-attack on theory that it is possible civilian officials govt might not be immed available to make decision in event emergency. HMG willing to make political decision in principle subject to confirmation immed upon receipt factual info when and if major air attack occurs. Scott emphasized such confirmation cld be obtained within an hour or so at any time of day or night. He also emphasized that Brit position on this subject has nothing to do with full confidence he insists they have in judgment Joint Chiefs, but is based on firm principle that decision of such gravity can only be made by civilian heads of govt on basis full info on immediate situation.

There is still considerable reluctance to authorize AMC take immed action but Scott feels Cabinet may agree, particularly if they cld receive some assurance that presently contemplated measures are not merely opening wedge for complete embargo which Brit feel still inadvisable. Jebb being informed instructions on this point will be forthcoming within next two or three days. There is still some difference re exact list of items to be embargoed and in this connection Scott remarked on statement in para 16 that "what we are actually proposing" is "an embargo on raw materials".[1] He points out that actual proposal is for embargo on items which wld add to war-making potential including certain raw materials.

Re proposed moratorium on debate over admission Chi Commies to UN, Scott is in hearty agrmt but somewhat pessimistic as to possibility of finding a formula for moratorium which wld not involve change of policy. He sees some possibilities in an arrangement for mutual abstention similar to parliamentary pairing but states many efforts have been made find way out of legal box imposed by Brit recognition CPG, all of which have been vetoed by FonOff legal experts.

On postponement of declaration of aims Scott agrees completely with last para but states decision will involve internal political difficulties for govt.

At lunch Wednesday[2] Morrison told me he appreciated personal message from Secy very much and that he thought it excellent statement of our position and quite convincing. However he wanted to study it carefully from their point of view. I have appointment with him tomorrow afternoon to discuss message as well as Iranian situation and will report further after this conversation.

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[1] As transmitted in telegram 4969, April 30, to London, the language used was "war materials"; see the first full paragraph on p. 393.

[2] May 2.

GIFFORD

795.00/5–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia—Mr. Moodie, Counselor and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium—Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada—Ambassador Wrong
Colombia—Dr. Mejia-Palacio
Ethiopia—absent
France—Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
Great Britain—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Luxembourg—Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands—Ambassador van Roijen
New Zealand—Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand—Ambassador Wan
Turkey—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States—UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE—Mr. Merchant
EUR—Mr. Ringwalt
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Henkin
FE—Mr. Hackler
Army—Lt. Colonel Hutton
Army—Captain Pope

Captain Pope reported that enemy activity had been light during the past 24 hours and that small groups up to company and battalion size had been engaged at a few points along the defense line.

He presented the substance of a special report from the Far Eastern Command concerning enemy capability which included the following main points: the present enemy offensive is probably designed to last for a longer period and make a deeper penetration than any previous offensive. It is apparently to be carried out in three phases with a commitment to each phase of one-third of the enemy strength available. Apparently the three major attacks are to be spread over a period of two months with Pusan as the final goal. A recent increase in supply efforts and concentration of divisions and tanks by the enemy are clear indications that further extensive operations are planned. The enemy is now making serious efforts to provide anti-aircraft defense for important points and some elements in the front line. Though he has the capability, the enemy has not yet committed his air force to active engagement but has kept North Korean airfields in operational control. During the present offensive the enemy has not been supported by guerrilla activity behind UN lines. Thus the enemy may be saving both his planes and guerrilla bands for use at a later and more critical period. In conclusion, Captain Pope quoted the F.E.C. report as stating that though the indications were inconclusive, they strongly pointed to enemy plans not only to continue the offensive but also to undertake operations on a more extensive basis than heretofore.

Lt. Colonel Hutton reported that there had been fewer UN casualties in the last few days than at any previous period. UN strength was being gradually shifted to the west, he reported.

Mr. Hickerson welcomed the Colombia Chargé d'Affaires, Dr. Mejia-Palacio, who was attending his first meeting. The Colombian frigate, *Almirante Padilla*, arrived recently in Far Eastern waters to take part in the UN action, Mr. Hickerson said, thus making Colombia the 16th member of the UN to contribute armed forces to the common effort.

Mr. Hickerson emphasized again the importance which the United States Government attached to action being taken now by the Additional Measures Committee for a limited embargo against Communist China.

795.00/5–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, May 4, 1951—6 p. m.

5765. In course of conversation with Morrison this afternoon, I discussed personal msg quoted Deptel 4969, Apr 30, and was encouraged by his generally reasonable and cooperative approach to problem. We had a rather long and thorough discussion of need for meeting of minds of UK and US on the whole range of FE policies and I believe it will prove helpful.

He had already written me that he is "very grateful" for msg to which he is giving "immed and careful study". In conversation this afternoon, he reiterated his appreciation for msg and his approval of this form of direct communication when situation warrants.

He stated that Cabinet decision had been made on bombing question and that formal reply on this question was about to be despatched. He reviewed same arguments made by Scott yesterday (Embtel 5731, May 3) and stated only problem involved is that of consultation. He emphasized confidence felt in our top mil and civ officials but elaborated upon impossibility of HMG giving carte blanche to any foreign power to make decision of this gravity without prior consultation. He also emphasized that firm political decision in principle had been made to authorize retaliatory bombing in event of "material" air attack on UN troops and fact that arrangements had been made for extremely quick decision when and if such attack occurs.

On question of Chinese recognition and membership UN, he appeared to welcome idea of moratorium although he did not use that word. He indicated in his opinion that no immed change cld be expected in HMG recognition policy, but said in effect he had no desire push UN membership and felt this question did not need to come between us at this time.

He obviously not fully aware of all details present situation in AMC, but gave me impression he thought HMG may well be willing come along with us. I emphasized and elaborated upon importance of timing to Brit from point of view American opinion, pointing out that Brit support now for our AMC proposals might do much to counteract current unfavorable atmosphere in US. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning. In conclusion, he said that in addition to replying immed to bombing question, he wld reply as soon as possible to balance of personal msg.

GIFFORD

795B.551/5–851

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)[1]

SECRET PUSAN, May 5, 1951.

Remarks of the American Ambassador to President Rhee, May 5, 1951.

Mr. President, when I visited you April 25th with General Coulter,[2] I mentioned that for two and one-half years I had been looking for indications of greater confidence of Koreans in one another and between the Government and the people and of improvement in the ability of Koreans to live and work together, and that I could not satisfy myself there had been substantial progress.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department as enclosure 5 to despatch 161, May 8, from Pusan, not printed (795B.551/5–851).

[2] Lt. Gen. John B. Coulter, Deputy Commander, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. Memoranda of the April 25 meeting by General Coulter and Ambassador Muccio were sent to the Department as enclosures 1 and 2 to despatch 161.

Last night, I read an article by George F. Kennan in which several points appear very pertinent to the situation here. He observed that: "The forms of Government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is a great deal of good in the (Korean) national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come . . . , let us not hover nervously over the people . . . applying litmus paper daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be (Koreans); let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which people advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good."

I am against foreign interference in Korean affairs. On the other hand, all Koreans must appreciate that with 17 free nations having sons fighting and dying here, world-wide interest in Korea is inevitable. Internationally, Korea is living in a "gold fish bowl." Koreans appear hyper-sensitive to living under such conditions. I see no reason why Koreans should be squeamish. You have done remarkably well since August 1948. Still, all interested in the welfare and progress of Korea feel that more could have been done in certain respects. For instance:

1. It is fundamental that in the long run no country is militarily defensible unless it is in good health socially, economically and politically. In these three fields, good health can only come from the efforts of the Koreans themselves. Outsiders can only help Koreans attain that to which they aspire. Socially, there is special concern over the tendency of treating substantial elements of the Korean society as subversives by official and semi-official agencies instead of making use of all—admittedly scarce—Korean talent and ability. Economically, there has been continuing alarm over the threat of inflation which undermines the very fibres of Korea's national structure. An integrated program to solve the inflation that will re-establish confidence in the *won* and above all confidence in the Government of Korea cries for the wholehearted cooperation of all. Inflation is a "rat-hole" that vitiates all the good that should come from outside economic assistance. The

threat of inflation cannot be completely overcome so long as public servants are not paid salaries adequate to allow them to be honest. Politically, the delicate and healthy balancing of authority essential in any representative government between the Executive and the Legislature and the Judiciary has not progressed satisfactorily and is a real impediment to good government.[3]

2. In the military field, the best brains available to the United States of America have constantly sought means and methods of more effectively using the manpower available here. On the whole, I think the Korean armed forces have done remarkably well. The critical times call for ever better coordinated effort. Two factors govern effective use of manpower—1) availability of arms and equipment, and 2) capacity to use. Today the factor not fully exploited is the capacity to use.

You may recall that on April 25th, General Coulter and I outlined to you and the Prime Minister the impediments to the expansion of the Korean military forces. In spite of that explanation, the clamor for arms continues, both directly and indirectly, prior to taking steps toward improving discipline, efficiency and leadership in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps.

3. In several fields there is not the frank, open exchange between Korean and US–UN authorities. In times of crisis, mutual confidence is essential; lack of it may be fatal. Admittedly, this is most delicate and difficult to attain between foreigners. What I am concerned about is the tendency to either not present and discuss programs, or if a program is unilaterally adopted and for some reason found not practicable, to attempt to circumvent or force acceptance. Striking examples of this tendency are:

a. The announcement in January of the formation of a national reserve of 10 divisions for a defense force of 320,000 without any prior consultation with UN authorities. Queries by me and Mr. Drumright[4] brought only evasive replies by Korean officials directly concerned.

b. Korean officials have avoided telling members of my staff what has been done in land reforms and related problems.

c. Lack of confidence is further reflected in giving weight to so-called intelligence reports brought in by para-military and private groups such as the Youth Group, "Tiger" Kim,[5] "Montana" Chang and No Duk Sul in preference to data available through official Korean or UN channels.

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[3] President Rhee had recently asked for and received the resignations of the Ministers of National Defense, Home Affairs, and Justice, as a result of their roles in reporting on the so-called Kuhchang massacre which had taken place in February in southeastern Korea and involved the execution of a considerable number of civilians, after trial by court martial by ROK military authorities, for their alleged role in aiding Communist guerrillas. The Korean Government had come in for severe criticism both foreign and domestic for the killings and the subsequent handling of the investigation. (See U.N. document A/1881, pp. 22–24, and despatch 147, May 2, from Pusan in file 795B.13/5–251)

[4] Everett F. Drumright, Counselor of the American Embassy in Korea.

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[5] Col. Kim Chong-won ("Tiger" Kim), Vice Commander of Military Police in the Civil Affairs Department of the South Kyongsang District Martial Law Command, had recently beaten with his fists two Korean newsmen for publishing remarks critical of Korean military and police personnel in his jurisdiction (despatch 163, May 12, from Pusan in file 795B.00/5-1251).

795B.5/5-651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, May 6, 1951—Noon.

929. Not for distribution outside Dept. Remytels 894, April 23[1] and 928, May 5.[2] In view possibility Dr. Pyun may take advantage presence Wash to raise with Dept question further arms for ROK, fol text of letter I addressed Pres Rhee May 4 is quoted for Dept's info and more follows by air pouch:

"Gen Van Fleet has forwarded to me copies of letters which he has written to Lt. Gen Chung Il Kwon, Chief of Staff ROK Army, and by Gen. Hoge, Comdr of the 9th US Corps to Brigadier Gen Chang Do Young, Comdr of the ROK 6th Division, dated May 2, 1951, and April 28, 1951, respectively. Both letters are on the subject of the extremely unsatisfactory conduct in battle of the ROK 6th Division and the great loss of major items of equipment. Copies of these letters are enclosed herewith for your information.[3] It is the desire of the Commanding General of the 8th US Army that I convey to you the following:

"The primary problem in the ROK is to secure competent leadership in their army. They do not have it, from the Min of Defense on down, as is clearly evidenced by repeated battle failures of major units. This is the chief and basic responsibility of the Pres of the Republic in the mil field. Until we get competent leadership, there is little reason to expect any better performance of ROK troops, or any higher degree of confidence than presently exists among their UN comrades.

"Until competent leadership is secured and it demonstrates its worth, there shld be no further talk of the US furnishing arms and equipment for additional forces. Such action wld be as criminal waste of badly needed equipment, when the forces already equipped continue to abandon major items of equipment without justification.

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted the text of a letter, dated April 21, from President Rhee asking Ambassador Muccio to forward to President Truman Rhee's request for arms, ammunition, and equipment to supply 10 additional Republic of Korea army divisions according to American standards (795.00/4-2351).

[2] Not printed; it reported on the departure of Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai for the United States to attend a ceremonial occasion (033.95b11/5-551).

[3] Neither printed. Copies of these letters were transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 161, May 8, from Pusan, also not printed. (795B.551/5-851)

"The problem today is leadership and training and a greater desire to fight for their native country and loved ones. If and when they demonstrate their competence and worth, consideration will be given to a recommendation by the 8th US Army for an increased ceiling of strength, but not until that worth is demonstrated in the battle now raging."[4]

MUCCIO

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[4] In despatch 161, May 8, from Pusan (not printed), Ambassador Muccio gave the following account of the meeting on May 4 at which the substance of the above letter was communicated to President Rhee:

"May 4—General Ridgway, General Van Fleet, and I met with the President at Taegu. In the course of a lengthy conversation both General Ridgway and General Van Fleet emphasized the points contained in General Van Fleet's letter of May 3 and suggested measures for improving discipline and the will to fight. The President agreed to take stronger measures in enforcing discipline in the ROK Army, particularly at the higher levels, to address a statement of encouragement to the troops, to spend more time visiting the troops at the front, and to insure that ROK Chief of Staff rather than various politicians be able to deal responsibly with UN Forces on military matters." (795B.551/5–851)

Editorial Note

On May 7, President Truman in an address before the Civil Defense Conference in Washington defended his policy of limiting the scope of the fighting in the Far East. He stated that expansion of military activities, for example against mainland China, would lead to a bigger and more costly war, reduce America's abilities to contribute to Europe's defense, and perhaps cause disarray and disunity in the ranks of the anticommunist allies presently opposing the Kremlin's world-wide strategy of destroying freedom. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), page 265)

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 8, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action In Asia

Reference: NSC 48/4[1]

The enclosed revision of paragraph 6–*e*, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 388.

Council in lieu of the version of that paragraph contained in NSC 48/4.[2]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

REVISION OF PARAGRAPH 6–*e*, PAGES 4 AND 5 OF NSC 48/4

6–*e*. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means a solution of the Korean problem which will provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek as a current objective a settlement, acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) deny Korea south of the 38th parallel to the Communists; (3) restore the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of the 38th parallel; (4) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; and (5) permit the build-up of sufficient Republic of Korea military power to repel a renewed North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. In the absence of at least the aforementioned minimum settlement, and, recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

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[2] Paragraph 6-*e* of NSC 48/4, dated May 4, read as follows:

"Seek a settlement, acceptable to the United States, of the Korean problem which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements, (2) deny Korea south of the 38th parallel to the Communists, (3) restore the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of the 38th parallel, (4) permit the building up of sufficient ROK military power, supplemented by the minimum possible amount of United States logistic support and combat forces, to deter or repel a renewed North Korean or Chinese Communist aggression, and (5) make possible, but not mandatory the eventual withdrawal of United States and other U.N. forces. Such a settlement should not preclude an eventual political settlement, under United Nations auspices, which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. In the absence of at least the aforementioned minimum settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor."

795.00/5-851

Memorandum by John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1951.

Davis (EE)[1] has just told me that he has been informed in a telephone conversation with Cory (USUN) that Malik's and Tsarapkin's

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[1] Richard H. Davis, Officer in Charge of Soviet Union Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs.

May 3 invitation to Cory and Corrigan to ride with them from Lake Success into New York City arose out of rather natural circumstances.[2] The two Americans were without transportation and the invitation followed.

Cory informed Davis that he (Cory) had suggested that Malik dine with him sometime and that Malik had indicated willingness to do so.

The question is whether we should follow up on Malik's evident willingness to talk about American-Soviet relations.

I think we should. I am still of the belief that we can learn far more than we can give away (if there is anything left to give away in information). There seems to me to be only two objections which can be advanced. One is that the Russians publicize these conversations as they did the Smith-Molotov talks[3] and thereby embarrass us. The other is that bilateral conversations between us and Soviet representatives would make our allies nervous and apprehensive lest we make a deal behind their backs.

I would question whether either of these objections is valid. I think that the risks of a disclosure of the conversations for propaganda purposes can be avoided if our representative is someone whom the Kremlin feels (*a*) will not seek a personal, political advantage through publicizing his role, and (*b*) although not a high American official, is in a position to speak with authority and in confidence for the Government. That person is Kennan. Kennan should be asked to do the job, be briefed and meet with Malik at a three-some dinner with Cory. If the exploration proceeds satisfactorily and we wish to transfer the talks to an official plane, we can always do so.

As for the nervousness of our allies, I suspect that nowadays it is less a fear that we will go soft and sell them out to the Kremlin than that we will be so tough that we will bring down a war around their heads. Therefore, it seems to me that there can be less objections now to bilateral feeling out than was the case several years ago. Whether we should inform the British and the French or others of such talks, I would leave to our specialists in European Affairs. Personally, I think we can save our friends much idle speculation if we go ahead without telling them, at least at the outset.

. . . .

Not to follow up on the opening provided by Malik is to continue our relations with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of blind man's bluff without even attempting to discover whether the blindfold can be lifted a bit.

JOHN DAVIES, JR.

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[2] See the memorandum of conversation, dated May 3, p. 401.

[3] Reference is to discussions concerning the Berlin Crisis during the summer of 1948; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, pp. 995 ff.

S/S Files : NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State, to Walter N. Walmsley[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1951.

Subject: NSC 48/3:[2] CIA Intelligence Memorandum

In response to your memorandum of May 7 enclosing a CIA memorandum of May 2[3] on the subject of NSC 48/3, and JCS memorandum of April 5, "Military Action in Korea," I can give you the following comments:

1. The statement in the first paragraph of the CIA memorandum that "it is an unwarranted assumption that Soviet immediate objectives are concentrated in either Europe or in Asia, to the exclusion of the other" is in complete accord with our own estimates and with joint estimates of the several government intelligence agencies. It is also in accord with the views of Embassy Moscow and with a joint . . . Intelligence study made last summer. . . .

2. The remainder of the CIA memorandum (paragraphs 2 and 3) raises question as to whether the USSR would consider it wholly to its advantage to have UN forces remain in Korea even if immediate Soviet objectives centered on Europe, or, conversely, would consider it wholly to its advantage immediately to drive UN forces from Korea if its objective centered on the Far East. We entirely agree that under either of the assumed Soviet objectives it is by no means an open and shut case as to what Soviet policy would be with regard to ending the Korean war.

If Soviet policy were concentrated on Europe, the USSR might estimate—as the CIA memorandum notes—that the Korean situation might get out of hand and force either Soviet intervention or a loss of Korea and a severe blow to China, thus importantly affecting the Soviet global position, i.e., its prospects in Europe. The USSR might in addition be concerned, even if its interests centered in Europe, over the stimulus that prolonged Korean fighting would give to US mobilization efforts, efforts that of course affect the relative power position of the two countries in Europe as well as Asia.

Similarly, if Soviet objectives centered in Asia, the Kremlin might conceivably desire continued US involvement in Korea rather than a quick ending of the conflict. Aside from the cementing effect this continued involvement could have on Sino-Soviet relations—the point stressed by the CIA memorandum—the Kremlin might consider it advantageous in that (*a*) it would insure continued diversion of US forces from the defense of Japan and from the support of anti-Communist efforts in southeast Asia, and (*b*) it would serve as a constant propaganda issue in Soviet appeals to Asiatic peoples, and, if called for by Soviet strategy, a convenient excuse for further Soviet or Chinese aggression.

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[1] Mr. Walmsley was Alternate Department of State Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council and Department of State member of the NSC Staff Assistants.

[2] See footnote 3, p. 388.

[3] Neither printed.

3. Without regard to the issue of area of Soviet concentration, the question of whether the USSR favors the expulsion of UN forces at the earliest possible moment or is willing to see the conflict drag on more or less indefinitely presents a number of intelligence puzzles.

All available evidence indicates that the Kremlin's objective is establishment of Communist control over all Korea, and that it will not abandon this objective unless subjected to far greater pressures than have so far been brought to bear. Yet the Kremlin possesses capabilities of aiding the Chinese forces in a way that would not materially increase the risks of full Soviet involvement but would substantially improve the Chinese prospects of driving the UN forces from the Peninsula. These capabilities, which include the assignment of heavy Soviet equipment, greater technical assistance, and even unacknowledged employment of select Soviet combat units, have not been brought to bear.

There are, of course, a number of indications that this situation is changing, and a great increase in Soviet support of Chinese combat operations, including unacknowledged participation of Soviet personnel, must be considered a serious possibility. However, Communist propaganda is currently in terms of a long war of attrition, offering no hint of a plan for a sudden final blow against UN forces. There is also no "holding out of a hope" that Chinese inferiority in equipment and planes will be reduced, although some prisoners of war have reported that their officers have made statements to this effect. The propaganda line has been that the "aggressors" will be defeated despite their superiority in planes and equipment.

Moreover, Peiping is increasingly stressing the long-run, in fact permanent, nature of the conflict with the US. From the internal standpoint, the Chinese Communists appear to look upon the conflict as a crucible that will serve to temper the Chinese Communist State, facilitating, as did the Civil War and Intervention for the Bolsheviks in Russia, the purification of the Communist Party and the consolidation of its control over the country. Internationally, they seem to be imbued with the key nature of their role in the Communist mission to bring about the final overthrow of imperialism. Illustrative of both of these attitudes is a statement by Chinese Politburo member Peng Chen in the April 27 issue of the Cominform journal. Peng explained that with the "high tide of anti-imperialism represented by the opposition to American aggression . . . all reactionary dregs are being quickly eradicated and all democratic reconstructions of the people are being quickly developed."

Peng then went on to discuss the connection between the present struggle and the final defeat of the US. After characterizing the US as "the last enemy in human history for the laboring people of the world," Peng asserted that

> "The present era is an era of intensity in the struggles of the peoples of the world in opposing imperialism. It is an era of fanatic aggression of imperialism and of revolution of the proletariat and the oppressed races. The carrying out of armed struggles against imperialistic aggressors is not only the main struggle pattern of the Chinese People's Revolution but also has begun to become the main struggle pattern of the peoples of the oppressed nations of Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, and Malaya. Imperialism and the oppressed peoples cannot stand side-by-side. Imperialism and all reactionaries are armed to the teeth. Any uprising to resist aggression and demand liberation to overthrow the domination of imperialism and the reactionaries by the oppressed peoples or oppressed races will immediately meet the armed suppression of these brigands and become a blood struggle. In such cases, the masses have to use revolutionary armed might to oppose counterrevolutionary armed might."

A prolonged Korean conflict could, therefore, fit into the overall Soviet strategy of keeping the US power position under constant attack. On the one hand, it would increase pressures on the US (accentuate "contradictions" both within the US and between the US and its allies), and, on the other, strengthen the resolve and increase the dependability of the Chinese as allies of the USSR, as fighters in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle. This does not mean, of course, that Moscow would prefer that the war continue rather than be brought to a successful (from the Communist standpoint) conclusion, providing this last could be achieved without a substantial increase in the commitment of Communist resources. Moscow would probably reason under this circumstance that other "struggles" could be pushed forward (particularly in southeast Asia) in case the Korean were eliminated. In fact, the way has obviously been prepared for this in Communist propaganda. It is perhaps noteworthy in this connection that Peng in the treatise referred to above did not take the position that a solution of the Korean problem, even on Chinese terms, would mark the end of, or even a pause in, the conflict with the US. Rather, the line is that the conflict—in fact "armed struggle"—is to continue until imperialism (the US) is vanquished.

Possible Soviet willingness to let the Korean conflict drag on is not indication that the USSR considers itself a bystander in the conflict.

It is our estimate that while Moscow may be somewhat reserved in the utilization of its resources if the only issue at stake is the speed with which Communist victory is to be achieved, it would utilize its resources to the maximum short of a formal resort to war if Communist defeat were threatened. In fact, OIR estimates that if the existence of the Communist regime in China were at issue, the Soviet Union would probably formally intervene with all means at its command.

4. With respect to Soviet capabilities in the Far East, on the basis of National Intelligence Estimates, it appears that against presently available opposition forces the USSR is now in a position to: (*a*) expel the US from Korea, (*b*) ensure successful defenses of the Chinese mainland against any force—Nationalist or combined Nationalist-US—that could at present be arrayed against it, (*c*) attain air superiority over Korea, the Sea of Japan, and probably Japan proper, (*d*) attack the Japanese main islands with sufficient force to overrun Hokkaido and probably also Honshu, and (*e*) maintain communications between the Asiatic mainland and the Japanese islands.

With respect to the questions raised in your memorandum about specific capabilities, the information available to us indicates:

(*a*) Against the forces presently available to the US in the Far East, the USSR could probably mount a successful amphibious attack on Japan.

(*b*) Soviet forces in the Far East are now, as before World War II, largely independent of support from European Russia. Actually, the buildup of these forces has been under way since the 1930's. This buildup reached a point where the Russians were ready for a full-scale offensive against the presumably powerful Kwantung Army in 1945. The arrangements made to fight Japan have not been scrapped. The number of divisions has been somewhat reduced, but supply depots, equipment, communications, etc. have steadily improved. These are forces in a logistic position that would enable them to make an assault on Japan or against US forces in Korea without any further buildup or even without any further warning. Stockpiles appear adequate to take care of full-scale operations of several months duration.

(*c*) For operations of prolonged duration it would be necessary for supplies and equipment to be transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Far Eastern provinces do not have sufficient industrial or food production to maintain support of forces presently stationed in the Far East.

(*d*) Maintenance of the Soviet forces in being in the Far East on the present semi-war basis has not strained the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is estimated that quite substantial additional military freight could be handled by the Trans-Siberian in case of an emergency. Moscow has given improvement of the Trans-Siberian top priority for many years.

(*e*) Soviet forces already in the Far East are adequate for a successful attack on US forces in Korea. They exceed the lifting capacity that would be available for an assault on Japan. Appreciable additional forces could be massed, but it is estimated that those already present are sufficient for any campaign that is considered militarily feasible.

W. PARK ARMSTRONG, JR.

795B.5/5-1151

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM MR. MORRISON TO MR. ACHESON DATED 10TH MAY, 1951

I have given careful thought to the frank and friendly message you conveyed to me through Mr. Gifford.[1] We start, as you say, from the common ground of desiring peace and security in the Pacific, the earliest conclusion of the Korean conflict, and the limitation of the fighting to that country. I share also your determination that the attack in Korea must be repelled. We too have heavy responsibilities in the Pacific and South East Asia area.

I agree that it is difficult to see how the campaign in Korea can be ended short of a change in the aggressive purpose of the Communists. Aggression must be opposed, and must be shown to be not worthwhile. There can be no compromise on this. So long as the Chinese continue their aggression in Korea they must be made to realise that they will meet with steady and collective resistance and that the fighting will stop only if they put an end to their aggression. It must be unmistakably shown that the responsibility for any extension of hostilities is theirs. Meeting aggression is the immediate problem in Korea. The long-term problem is the future of the country, and I do not think we should seek to impose a political settlement on North Korea by force if we can possibly solve the problem by negotiation and agreement. I believe therefore that we must lose no opportunity to reach a pacific settlement should the Chinese and North Koreans show any willingness to negotiate, or if we can lead them that way.

This brings me to the possibility of bombing Chinese bases in the event of heavy air attacks on United Nations forces. I agree with you that if such raids occur there will be no alternative but to meet this new threat by the most effective military means at our disposal, namely by bombing the bases in China from which the attacks have been launched. This will involve serious risks of an extension of the war, perhaps even into global conflict; but the consequences will have to be faced and shared by all of us.

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[1] See telegram 4969 to London, April 30, p. 390.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided that in the event of heavy (repeat heavy) air attacks from bases in China on United Nations forces in Korea, they will associate themselves with the policy of retaliatory action against these bases in order to prevent further attacks and to minimise casualties to United Nations forces in Korea.

This is a decision in principle. The consequences (which may be general war) are so grave that the decision to authorise retaliatory action must be subject to concurrence by us at the time. We have full confidence in the President and the Administration, and are sure that the decision would (as you say) be taken "soberly and wisely". It is however not a question of confidence, but of responsibility for a major act of policy, and we cannot divest ourselves of it.

May I at the same time put to you the suggestion that, just as on our side the decision will be subject to confirmation at the time by the Prime Minister, the existing authorisation by the President should on your side be confirmed by him?

It is important that no military risks should be incurred through delay, and to avoid these we have made arrangements whereby we can make our decision at very short notice. To enable us to do so it is essential that the fullest factual information should be supplied to us regarding the scale and nature of the attacks upon United Nations forces immediately they take place. Can you arrange for this to be done through the British Joint Services Mission in Washington or by any other means which will ensure that we have at our disposal the necessary data on which to confirm our present decision in principle? Meanwhile it would be useful to have the evidence which makes you expect such attacks. Our advisers, on the basis of such information as they have at present, are by no means convinced that it is in the power of the Chinese to launch heavy and repeated air attacks.

I understand that at the "Briefing Meetings" in the State Department your views on the necessity for retaliatory air action have been made known to certain Governments. In view of our special relations with the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and the military contributions which they have made to the Korean campaign we are now informing those Governments of our decision explaining that it has been raised with us by you. If you would be so good as to let us know with which Governments, apart from these Commonwealth Governments, this question has been discussed, I shall consider what we should do.

Air attacks from bases in Soviet territory would raise separate and even graver problems, and our present decision does not cover this contingency.

It would be helpful to us to have your assessment of the military and political consequences which you consider might follow any attack on Chinese bases, and in particular, your estimate of the Soviet attitude to such an attack.

You refer to sanctions against China. As you know, we are opposed to political sanctions. They would not influence the course of the campaign in Korea and indeed would have little effect on China except to strengthen the hands of the Chinese Government against those sections of Chinese opinion who still look to the west. These sections of opinion are not politically important in China today, but there is nothing to gain by allowing the Russians to point to futile political sanctions as further evidence of the implacable hostility of the west to the new China.

Economic sanctions I view differently. For a long time we have kept an eye on trade with China to ensure that no goods of direct military value reached her from British sources. The system has worked well so far as concerns most of the goods that could directly assist the Chinese war effort in Korea, except in the case of rubber, and there we had to take steps last month to check the increasing exports of rubber from Malaya and Singapore to China even though the restrictions cannot be fully effective without the co-operation of other producers and purchasers. There has been so much misunderstanding of our policy in the matter of trade with China that we have considered it necessary to make public what the policy has been. We have also been considering again the question of rubber and have come to the conclusion that Chinese civilian needs can be regarded as having been fully satisfied for 1951. We have therefore asked the Colonial Governments concerned to take steps to see that no further rubber is exported to China this year.

May I say a word about Hong Kong? With its fine harbour Hong Kong, in wrong hands, would be a menace to the South China seas. I am sure you would not wish to give it to China. It is simply not possible to cut off Hong Kong from China without giving rise to the gravest internal problems of unemployment, starvation and unrest—in other words, without creating for Communism the ideal conditions in which it can flourish. What we have been trying to do is to ensure, with as little publicity as possible (in order to minimise repercussions in Hong Kong) that exports from Hong Kong do not contribute to the Chinese war effort. To go to the extreme limit of cutting off trade between Hong Kong and the mainland in ordinary consumer goods and foodstuffs would make no difference whatsoever to the fighting in Korea, and would on the other hand risk the loss of an important centre of free speech and western ideas. Everyone (Chinese included) who goes to Hong Kong from China breathes more freely and senses the contrast. Is this of no value in the world wide war of ideas?

In considering sanctions against China I would ask you to bear these things in mind. They explain why we would oppose general economic sanctions against China. There is another important reason why we would hesitate to follow your example: we believe that there would not be general support amongst European and Asian countries for such a policy, and that pressure to adopt it would weaken the United Nations.

As regards a selective embargo against war materials, however, we are with you and indeed this has been our policy for some time. But we desired to give the Good Offices Committee ample time to exhaust the possibilities of making contact with Peking. Delay by the Additional Measures Committee meant little in practice; the principal supplying countries were already applying restrictions which in the main exceeded what is now proposed for the United Nations.

It was not on the substance of the proposals, but on the timing, that you and we have hitherto not seen eye to eye. In view however of the time which has now elapsed and in deference to your request, His Majesty's Government have now decided that there is no longer any reason to delay submission of a resolution from the Additional Measures Committee to the Assembly recommending the imposition of a selective embargo on the supply of war materials to China. I do not exclude the possibility of extending the list now under consideration at Lake Success to further specific items of strategic importance; but I would continue to oppose its extension into a general embargo.

You mentioned Chinese representation at the United Nations. Our views have been put on record. As I said to Mr. Gifford, they flowed naturally from our conception of the doctrine of recognition. To allow the effective Government of China to occupy the Chinese seat at the United Nations is in no way a measure of weakness, but is inherent in the constitution of the United Nations. I know that many people wonder why we should support a proposal which if accepted would seat a Government at the council tables of the United Nations when that Government is engaged in military operations against United Nations forces which are resisting aggression. I am interested in your suggestion of a "moratorium" but am not clear what you have in mind. Perhaps you could develop your thought on this a little further. Meanwhile, it seems to me that what matters is that we should both do what we can (the initiative in raising the issue does not of course lie with either of us, but with Russia) to prevent our known differences of view on this point from developing into a source of misunderstanding between us. The legal arguments for seating them there are in our view conclusive, though I should certainly not wish to display any enthusiasm in championing the claims of the Central People's Government of China at the United Nations so long as they are set on their present course. On the other hand, I could not act in such a way as might imply support for the fiction that Chiang Kai-shek's representative in the United Nations speaks for China.

The present is, as you say, not the moment for a public declaration of our aims in Korea. Nevertheless, I believe that it is still of great importance to clarify our policy and state our aims (including constructive proposals for a settlement) as soon as ever it is practicable. Public opinion in this country, and I imagine in many others, is groping for guidance as to where we stand in Korea and what we are hoping to achieve. The opportunity may occur if the United Nations forces succeed in blunting the Chinese offensive. Perhaps the Chinese may by then be in a more chastened mood and less unwilling to negotiate, but whether they are so or not I believe that we owe it to our peoples and to our troops to define our policy. I therefore welcome your suggestion that further talks should be held with Sir Oliver Franks about the form which this declaration should take. I should like us to make suitable preparations for operation at the psychological moment.

Mr. Gifford said to me that he thought our differences on Far Eastern policy had been narrowing in recent months. I think that this is true, and I am glad. He went on to say however that he thought we might now be at a cross roads and our paths might begin to diverge again. I hope this is not so; at any rate, if the risk exists, the best way to guard against it is for us to exchange occasional messages. That is why I especially valued the candour and friendliness of your message, and I have tried to reply in the same spirit.

WASHINGTON, 11th May, 1951.

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 11, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated 4 May 1951,[2] in which you requested on or before 1200, 8 May 1951, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 48/4, a draft statement of policy on Asia.

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[1] This document was transmitted on May 14 to the National Security Council by the Acting Executive Secretary (Gleason) for information and consideration in connection with Council action on NSC 48/4 at its meeting on May 16.

[2] Not printed.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that the policies set forth in paragraph 6 *e* of NSC 48/4 [3] are primarily a political matter and that political and diplomatic considerations must govern. However, from the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a more desirable wording, it being assumed that it would be politically inexpedient to settle for a line below the 38th parallel, would be as follows:

> "*e.* Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish a unified, independent and democratic Republic of Korea with a northern boundary so located as to facilitate both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor."

3. The basic objective of seeking to avoid a general war with the USSR, as stated in paragraph 3 of the subject paper,[4] may require a course of action designed to avoid extension of hostilities against Communist China, but such course of action does not thereby become a separate and equally important objective of United States policy. In view of the above, it is recommended that the objective stated in subparagraph 6*f* be modified to read as follows:

> "*f.* Consistent with *e* above and the protection of the security of UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of the hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union or an unlimited war between Communist China and the United States alone." [5]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[3] See footnote 2, p. 421.

[4] Paragraph 3 of NSC 48/4 read as follows:

"The United States should, without sacrificing vital security interests, seek to avoid precipitating a general war with the USSR, particularly during the current build-up of the military and supporting strength of the United States and its allies to a level of military readiness adequate to support United States foreign policy, to deter further Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should this prove unavoidable. This should not preclude undertaking calculated risks in specific areas in the over-all interest of the defense of the United States."

[5] Paragraph 6–*f* of NSC 48/4 read as follows:

"Consistent with *e* above and the protection of the security of UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of the hostilities in area into general war with Communist China or with the Soviet Union."

795.00/5–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 11, 1951—12:52 p. m.

1524. Re Korea (confirming Hickerson—Gross telecon May 11 a. m.) Padilla Nervo in strict confidence gave me following info Thursday, May 10, night. GOC members had lengthy mtg with Rau afternoon and evening of May 10. Rau made suggestion which he described as personal views not presented to or cleared by GOI. Rau proposed that after adoption by GA of selective embargo res,[1] a second res might be adopted in following sense. GA would declare as matter of policy that UN forces would not cross 38th parallel on condition that (*a*) NK and Chi Communist forces would make similar declaration, and (*b*) that agreement would be reached on conditions "acceptable to the UC" to assure security of UN forces and to assure against build-up of Chinese-NK forces.

Entezam and Grafstrom apparently agreed in principle to Rau's suggestion subject, however, to Rau obtaining approval of US Govt. Padilla informed me he withheld comment to Rau but was personally very favorable to the idea. Rau told GOC members he would call me this a. m. to discuss matter.

All three GOC members anticipate that question of further "peace moves" will inevitably arise in debate on our embargo res.

GROSS

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[1] For documentation on economic sanctions relating to the People's Republic of China, see pp. 1874 ff.

795.00/5–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 11, 1951—5:07 p. m.

1525. Re Korea (supplementing mytel No. 1524, May 11). Rau has not communicated with us re his suggestion reported in mytel No. 1524. However, during the day I have had opportunity to learn more about matter in separate conversations with Grafstrom and Padilla and find that Padilla's report concerning Rau's suggestion may not have accurately described Rau's thinking. According to Grafstrom's version of Rau conversation with GOC, Rau apparently was completely vague on the subject of conditions assuring the security of UN forces. His suggestion apparently was at first limited to the adoption of a GA resolution (after adoption of strategic embargo resolution) which would declare intention of UN forces not to cross 38th parallel if Chi-

Coms and NK authorities where to issue similar declaration. I gathered from Grafstrom that problem of methods to assure security of UN forces was brought into conversation by GOC members rather than on Rau's initiative. In response to inquiries on this aspect of the matter, Rau apparently made some vague comments to effect that UN would have to satisfy itself on this point. In response to further questioning, he expressed assumption UC would speak for UN on this problem, inasmuch as it involved military considerations primarily.

After talking with Grafstrom, I asked Padilla for further clarification on his report to me yesterday. He did not deny accuracy of Grafstrom's summary. In fact, he added that the reason he withheld comment to Rau was that he and other members of GOC stressed to Rau the importance of obtaining US reactions.

Both Grafstrom and Padilla expressed the view that Rau had no very clear ideas on the subject and probably had not communicated with me because he was "still thinking it over."

I took the occasion to stress with both Padilla and Grafstrom the importance of weighing very carefully any suggestions by Rau along this line before giving him encouragement. I reminded them that in our frequent dealings with Rau, he had often advanced on his own responsibility ideas which he had not thought through or made precise. Both Padilla and Grafstrom said they would be careful to avoid giving Rau encouragement and would continue to emphasize in their discussions with him the importance of giving us the opportunity to comment upon any suggestions before he raised them with others.

GROSS

320.2-AC/5-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1951—7 p. m.

925. Re urtel 1524, 11 May and re Hickerson–Gross telcon re Rau suggestion, Dept's preliminary reaction is as follows:

1. We feel strongly that strategic embargo presently being considered by AMC shld be put on books of GA without regard to any other questions like those raised by Rau proposal. In other words, it shld be dealt with separately and distinctly and be completed before other questions re Korean case are raised.
2. We remain willing as always to agree to arrangements which wld stop fighting, and aggression and ensure against its resumption.
3. Rau proposal seems to be effort to use a GA Res initially as a vehicle for bringing about cease-fire. We assume proposal wld not im-

pair in any sense UN political objectives with regard to unification of Korea.

4. In our view a GA Res is not suitable vehicle to achieve cease-fire. Such Res permits less flexibility than efforts through instrumentality like GOC, and wld limit freedom of negotiation. Further, a GA Res supported by US might even make more difficult getting Chi agreement to cease-fire.

5. We feel that GA Res wld be vain and futile exercise unless there is prior indication of willingness on part Chi Commies to agree to acceptable cease-fire. Best prospects for cease-fire wld be through continued informal approaches by GOC and others. If Chi Commies indicate interest, then cease-fire cld be negotiated, and subsequently a GA Res to confirm agreed arrangements might be desirable.

ACHESON

795.00/5-1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1951.

Subject: Australian Views on Retaliatory Bombing of Manchurian Air Bases

Participants: Mr. Colin Moodie, Chargé d'Affaires, Australian Embassy
Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

Mr. Moodie, Australian Chargé d'Affaires, called on me today to deliver an *aide-mémoire*, copy attached,[1] setting forth the Australian views on the subject of retaliatory bombing of Manchurian air bases. Mr. Moodie said this matter had been considered by the new Australian Cabinet in its first meeting on May 11.[2] The Australian Government accepts in principle the view that if massive air attacks from Manchurian bases occur, counter attacks upon such bases may have to be made. Furthermore, Australia recognizes that it might be impracticable for the U.S. to consult all fourteen countries concerned before taking counter action, but it nevertheless assumes that the U.S. will do its utmost to consult Australia in advance. Mr. Moodie in elaborating on the *aide-mémoire* said that his Government believed any massive air attack, in order to warrant retaliatory action, should be of such a character as to seriously endanger U.N. forces. Mr. Moodie agreed, in response to a question which I raised concerning the meaning of the phrase "seriously endanger", that an enemy attack which jeopardized the effective operation of U.N. forces would warrant retaliatory bombing.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The Australian general election of April 28 resulted in the continuation in office of the Liberal-Country Party Government of Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies. Richard Casey became Foreign Minister, succeeding Percy Spender who was appointed Australian Ambassador in Washington.

The Australian Government, Mr. Moodie said, believes that counter attacks should be limited to the bases from which the enemy aircraft came and to the aircraft themselves wherever they might be found. He added that Australian acceptance in principle of retaliatory bombing is limited to Manchurian bases and does not relate to attacks from Russian territory. I asked whether consideration had been given by the Australian Government to the possibility of attacks from bases on the Shantung peninsula as well as from Manchuria. Mr. Moodie said that he would seek a clarification of this point.

I told Mr. Moodie that we will do our utmost to consult and that the need for such consultation is fully appreciated at the highest levels of our Government here in Washington and by General Ridgway. I said that it is difficult to determine how the attack, if it comes, will be delivered. It is possible that only part of the attack may be mounted from Manchurian bases and the balance from North Korean fields thus introducing an element of deception. We are attempting to knock out North Korean air fields and have achieved good results.

Mr. Moodie then raised several questions concerning the current Congressional inquiry on Far Eastern policy. He asked whether General Marshall's testimony [3] indicated that the Department of Defense considered the veto could be used to bar the seating in U.N. of Communist China. I said that I believed this was not quite correct; that the point General Marshall was making was that every resource available to us should be used to block the admission of Communist China. I asked Mr. Moodie what Australian thinking was on the question of whether or not a veto would be possible in this case. Mr. Moodie said that he doubted that his Government believed the veto could be exercised.

In discussing the question of military and economic aid to Formosa, I made the point that our efforts are directed toward increasing the defensibility of Formosa rather than toward preparing it for attacks on the mainland. I added, however, that were the Chinese Communists to spread hostilities elsewhere in the Far East we would not wish to be bound by the present policy of neutralization of Formosa. In reply to a question from Mr. Moodie concerning consultation in such an eventuality I pointed out that this would be dependent upon developments but that presumably there would not be the same urgency attaching to this question as is the case with possible retaliatory bombing of Manchurian bases.

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[3] Secretary of Defense Marshall testified before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees daily from May 7 to 14, with the exception of Sunday, May 13; see *Hearings*, pp. 321–724.

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 15, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

References: A. NSC 48/4
B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 1,[1] 8 and 14,[2] 1951

The enclosed revisions of paragraphs 6–*e* and 6–*f* and of the introductory sentence of paragraph 8, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference memo of May 14), are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with Council action on NSC 48/4 on the subject at its meeting on May 16, 1951.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

PROPOSED REVISION OF PARAGRAPHS 6–*e* AND 6–*f* AND OF THE INTRODUCTORY SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF NSC 48/4

6–*e*. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

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[1] See footnote 1 to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 387.
[2] See footnote 1, p. 431.

6–*f*. Consistent with *e* above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.[3]

8. While continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now; . . . .[4]

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[3] At its 91st meeting on May 16, the National Security Council accepted the above language for Paragraphs 6–*e* and *f*, as prepared by the NSC Senior Staff, and recommended approval by the President (NSC Action No. 471). Mr. Truman approved NSC 48/4, as amended, on the following day, May 17, and the final document was circulated as NSC 48/5; for the text, see vol. VI, Part 1, p. 33. For extracts from NSC 48/5, May 17, dealing with Korea, see p. 439.

[4] The introductory sentence of Paragraph 8 of NSC 48/4 did not contain the prefatory clause on recognition of the Nationalist Government of China, which was approved and included in NSC 48/5.

795.00/5–1551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 15, 1951—7:07 p. m.

1540. Re Korea—GOC. Gross advised by Padilla Nervo that latter has learned from Rau that Rau has concluded for present not to make any proposal or suggestion along line reported ourtel No. 1524, May 11. Rau apparently advised Padilla that inasmuch as GOI attitude "has been misunderstood and unjustly attacked", Rau, upon careful consideration, feels that his motive in making proposal along lines he discussed with GOI "might be misinterpreted."

In event Rau takes up matter with USUN, we shall of course follow instructions Deptel No. 925, May 14.

AUSTIN

795.00/5–1751

Memorandum Containing the Sections Dealing With Korea From NSC 48/5, Dated May 17, 1951[1]

TOP SECRET

Current Objectives:

a. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

b. Consistent with *a* above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

c. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

1. Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.

2. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:

(*a*) Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.

(*b*) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.

(*c*) Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.

3. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.

4. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as

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[1] For the complete text of NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951 on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia, see vol. VI, Part 1, p. 33. The sections here printed correspond to Paragraphs 6 *e* and *f*, 9 *a* through *g*, 10 *e* and *f*, and 20 through 24 of NSC 48/5.

possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.

5. If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

6. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.

7. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

Policy Guide Lines for United States Action

a. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

b. Consistent with *a* above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

PRINCIPAL COURSES OF ACTION

Settlement of the Korean Problem

1. The United States has consistently sought as an ultimate political objective the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. Since the North Korean invasion, the military objective of the United States in the United Nations has been to repel the aggression and to establish international peace and security in the area. The intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea has so changed the situation that it appears militarily impossible now to bring about a

situation under which a unified, non-communist Korea could be achieved by political means. Therefore, while in no way renouncing the ultimate political objective which we hold for Korea, the present task should be to bring about a settlement of the Korean problem which at the minimum will deny to communist control that part of Korea south of the 38th Parallel and will provide for the phased withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces as militarily practical.

2. Because it appears likely that both the United Nations and the communist forces will be able to maintain military positions in parts of Korea, the Korean situation could develop in one of the following ways:

a. Chinese Communist agreement to cessation of hostilities and a political settlement of the Korean problem.

b. A political and military stalemate during which the Chinese Communists neither offer nor accept any suggestions for settlement.

c. A northward movement of the United Nations forces.

d. A massive communist drive, possibly supported by Soviet or satellite "volunteer" air and naval activities.

3. In view of the above possibilities the following considerations are pertinent: (*a*) the United Nations should not accept a settlement which leaves any part of South Korea in the hands of the aggressor; (*b*) United Nations forces may be able to expel the aggressor from South Korea; (*c*) United Nations forces can continue to inflict heavy losses on the Chinese; (*d*) a settlement will permit the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea for use elsewhere and will put an end to Chinese losses in Korea; (*e*) a majority of the United Nations presently opposes another major crossing of the 38th parallel; and (*f*) it is important to maintain the maximum amount of unity within the United Nations regarding Korea. Unless the USSR provides greatly increased military support to the Communist forces in Korea for a massive drive south, it is conceivable that a cessation of hostilities and a political *modus vivendi* can be achieved. Such a *modus vivendi* would permit the withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea.

4. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

a. Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.

b. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:

(1) Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.

(2) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.

(3) Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.

c. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.

d. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.

e. If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

f. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.

g. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

5. The United States should give special attention at all stages of the settlement of the Korean problem to the development of a strong ROK military establishment for continuation of the struggle against communist forces (in case of a stalemate), and for the organization of a strong barrier to defend the ROK against future aggression. Particular emphasis should be placed on training capable Korean officers. Essential parts of the program to develop military stability are the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Korea in the area south of the demarcation line, and such economic and technical assistance, consistent with the absorptive capacity of the Korean economy, as will develop stability by the time United Nations forces are withdrawn from the peninsula. It is probable that the ROK will require the provision of air and naval assistance after withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. forces.

795.00/5-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Colombia —Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Absent

France—Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece—Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg—Absent
Netherlands—Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand—Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States—UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE, Mr. Merchant
R, Mr. Howe
EUR, Mr. Allen
FE, Mr. Hackler
UNP, Mr. Stein
Army, Lt. Col. Kaufman
Army, Captain Pope

The most recent figures on enemy troop strength were listed as follows:

NKA on front— 56,000
CCF on front—289,000
NKA in rear—147,000
CCF in rear—268,000
Guerrillas— 8,000
768,000

Captain Pope reported that before May 16, four Chinese Communist Armies had moved east from their old position northeast of Seoul. On May 16, the enemy had attacked northeast of Seoul and across the front from Chunchon to the east coast.[1] Guerrilla activity had been reported in south central Korea for the first time in many weeks.

The Far Eastern Command has rearranged the order of enemy capability by placing the resumption of the offensive in first position. After 24 hours of heavy fighting there are clear indications that four or five CCF Armies plus two others are massing in the Inje-Kapyong sector and all across the US 10th Corps sector. Although the broad aspects of the hostile scheme of movement are not apparent, it is significant that this front is pierced by two important axes, Inje-Hongchon-Wonju and the Chunchon-Hongchon-Wonju, which offer attractive avenues of advance into UN positions.

Colonel Kaufman reported that on May 17 intensive thrusts by the enemy had forced curtailment of UN patrols in the 1st and 9th Corps sectors. Patrols had been withdrawn in the 10th Corps sector. Today's report, he said, indicated even more serious enemy activity. One US Company had been isolated in the 10th Corps sector and a task force was at the moment en route to rescue the company. Certain ROK units in the east had been forced to withdraw. UN air operations had been seriously hampered by bad weather.

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[1] The second phase of the Communist Spring offensive was launched on May 16; by May 21, the U.N. Command had halted the drive, inflicting heavy losses on the Communist forces (see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 389).

Mr. Hickerson stated that the US had been gratified by the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly on the strategic embargo resolution.[8]

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[8] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 500(V), adopted at the 330th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on May 18; for text, see p. 1988. The vote was 47 to 0, with 8 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, and Syria), and 5 countries not participating in the voting (Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the U.S.S.R.).

795.00/5-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys, and Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
Colombia —Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Ambassador Bonnet, and Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Ambassador van Roijen
New Zealand —Ambassador Berendsen, and Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Ambassador Jooste
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Stein
FE, Mr. Hackler
Lt. Col. Gilchrist (Army)
Lt. [Gen.] Bolte (Army)

Lieutenant Bolte reported that enemy activity had decreased recently all along the front. No reports had been received of enemy air or armor in the battle area. Although the enemy was withdrawing in the west and decreasing pressure in the east, Far Eastern Command still considered that the enemy was capable of mounting a massive offensive.

For the period May 17–20, the four principal days of the present offensive, Lieutenant Bolte listed the following enemy casualties:

36,000—killed in action
31,800—wounded in action
824—prisoners of war

Colonel Gilchrist outlined the recent action on the ROK section of the front and reported that the 3rd and 9th ROK Divisions had been seriously hit and forced to withdraw. They had lost all of their equipment and large numbers of their personnel. The 1st and Capital ROK Divisions had withdrawn on the east side of the 3rd and 9th in order to straighten the UN line at its eastern end.

To relieve the pressure on the US 10th Corps and ROK Army Corps sectors, General Ridgway had launched an attack on the western end of the line which started on May 20. The momentum of his drive north from Seoul had not slackened, Colonel Gilchrist said, and the enemy was not resisting strongly. Heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy by UN artillery and air. General Ridgway has reported that UN losses in the past few days have been fantastically light.

In response to a question by Ambassador Jooste, Lieutenant Bolte stated that the Far Eastern Command believed that the enemy offensive had been planned in three phases. The first one was the offensive which started on April 21. The second was probably the one which started on May 16; whether or not the enemy considered that the second phase had ended was not known. Mr. Rusk commented that reports have been received of prisoners of war statements that their units had not come close to reaching the goals which had been set for them. Lieutenant Bolte said that approximately ⅓ of the enemy troops available are actually in the line at the moment and that adequate reserves were therefore available for continuing the second phase or preparing for the third phase. Colonel Gilchrist agreed with Mr. Rusk that certain ROK divisions, for instance, the 1st and Capital Divisions, had shown excellent fighting quality and acquitted themselves well and that the recent failure of the 3rd and 7th ROK Divisions to hold their own ground should not lead us to generalize about the quality of ROK troops.

Mr. Rusk reported that the United States has received no indication that any new "peace feelers" have been extended by the enemy. He drew attention to the fact that *Pravda* published the full text of the resolution for cease-fire in Korea offered by Senator Edwin Johnson, which called for a cease-fire based on the 38th parallel, to be effected on June 25, the anniversary of the North Korean invasion.[1] *Pravda* had commented that the resolution indicated that the "imperialists" realized their failure and were seeking peace.

Mr. Rusk said that consideration must be given to whether or not an opportunity will shortly present itself for the initiation of new attempts at reaching a settlement. He asked all representatives present to report any indications which they might receive that the Communists had changed their objective and were receptive to a new overture. He said that if the current offensive is set back with heavy losses there might be an opportunity for a new UN peace effort. However, the United States had received no indication as yet of any change in the declared Communist objective to drive UN forces out of Korea. Some evidence of change in this objective would be needed, he said, before a further UN peace effort could be undertaken.

Ambassador Bonnet expressed his assumption that any negotiations would be limited to the future of Korea. Mr. Rusk said the United States' position remained on the one hand that the UN cannot link other questions to Korea so as to award [*reward*] aggression, but on the other hand, that all problems are subject to methods of peaceful settlement, e.g., the seating of Chinese Communists is regularly subject to discussion in UN organs. In response to Mr. McNichol's question as to whether a report by the President of the United States to the Secretary-General of the UN was still being considered as a possible approach, Mr. Rusk agreed that this was one possibility to be considered when the present offensive ended, but that the details of any approach would be discussed by representatives present, if and when the opportunity arose.

Referring to his speech of May 18,[2] Mr. Rusk said that its purpose was to convey a message of friendship to the Chinese people along the lines of Senator McMahon's resolution expressing American friendship for the Russian people.[3] This was the sole purpose of the speech, he said, and it was not intended to contain any new policy and, above all, not intended to indicate any change in the United States' attitude toward a peaceful settlement in Korea, which we continue to consider most desirable.

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[1] For the text of the resolution, see S. Res. 140, 82d Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 1951. The resolution also called for withdrawal of all non-Koreans from Korea by December 31, and a full exchange of prisoners by that date.

[2] The text of Mr. Rusk's speech before the China Institute at New York on the subject of Chinese-American friendship is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 28, 1951, p. 846.

[3] A portion of this resolution was quoted by Mr. Rusk in his May 18 speech; for the text of the McMahon–Ribicoff resolution as adopted on June 26, 1951, see S. Con. Res. 11, 82d Cong. 1st sess., in 65 Stat. B69 or the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1951, p. 381. For further documentation on the McMahon–Ribicoff resolution, see the compilation on U.S.-Soviet relations in volume IV.

795.00/5-2251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 22, 1951—11:14 a. m.

1562. Re Korea. Grafstrom told Ross last night that Rau has a new idea as follows: Everyone (particularly the US) is agreed that conflict should be limited to Korea. On other hand Chi Commies are not yet convinced this is case. Therefore, GA should pass resolution stating that UN objective is to limit the conflict and to this end First Comite should meet regularly, say every two weeks, to discuss matter.

In response to question by Grafstrom, Rau said he was not under instruction on this matter. In response to further question, Rau said that he did not want to work on this new idea with Arab-Asian group. (Grafstrom also ascertained that Rau was not instructed to mention in his GA statement last Friday possibility of settlement on 38th Parallel).[1]

Grafstrom said he would discuss Rau's idea with Padilla and Entezam and let us know any reaction they might have. Meanwhile he asked that we refrain from discussing with other delegations and let him know any reactions Dept might have.

Ross commented Chi Coms must certainly know that UN policy is to limit conflict if possible and questioned whether any useful purpose would be served by periodic debate of subject.[2]

AUSTIN

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[1] At the General Assembly meeting on Friday, May 18, Sir Benegal Rau suggested that, since the Unified Command had already indicated that it would be a great victory if the United Nations succeeded in clearing South Korea of the aggressors (see footnote 1, p. 229), the United Nations should consider this subject with a view to making an early pronouncement along the same lines in order to dispel any doubts about the military objectives of the United Nations (U.N. document A/PV.330).

[2] The Department of State responded as follows in telegram 946, May 25, to New York:

"Urtel 1562 Re Korea. Dept agrees with Ross' comment on Rau's latest idea and has no further observation thereon." (795.00/5-2251)

795.00/5-2351

Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] May 23, 1951.

Subject: Next Steps in Korea.

I. The mood of the country is angry. The testimony by Secretary

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[1] The memorandum was also addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk).

Marshall and General Bradley[2] has calmed the storm for a while, and responsible commentary in the press and on the radio is pointing out the fallacies in General MacArthur's recommendations. Nevertheless, the demand continues for a statement of how peace is to be achieved.

II. Already, under the pressure generated by General MacArthur, the Administration has "toughened" its policy: the United Nations strategic embargo, the increased aid to Formosa, the diplomatic pressure on our friends, and Secretary Marshall's flat statement that we would never agree to let Formosa fall into Chinese Communist hands or let the Chinese Communists fall into the United Nations seat. If there is no settlement in Korea, the public pressures to get peace or hit harder will increase. The Administration may then be forced to move further; we might even wind up by doing most of what General MacArthur recommends, with all the disastrous results foreseen by those who now oppose his recommendations.

III. Even now, the results of the great debate is a diplomatic stalemate. Secretary Marshall's testimony on Formosa and the United Nations seat leaves us without a bargaining position. The Chinese Communists might have accepted the January cease-fire proposal when they came to decide that they could not drive us out of Korea, with the hope of getting Formosa and the United Nations seat in return for a Korean settlement on United Nations terms. We have now said that we may be forced into discussion but will never surrender. The Communists are confident that so long as we take this position a majority of the United Nations will uphold it. There is consequently no political or diplomatic advantage to them in a cease-fire.

IV. An early Korean settlement is therefore both imperative, if we are to avoid the possibility of a larger Asian involvement with unforeseeable consequences, and more difficult than ever to achieve.

V. In looking for a possible way out, it may be useful to list the probable objectives of the chief participants, and their present degree of expectancy about attaining these objectives.

A. *Soviet Union:*

(1) To keep United States power away from its borders (both the actual Soviet border and the border with its vital Manchurian interests). This has been achieved.

(2) To keep the United States and China engaged indefinitely, thus diverting United States resources and attention away from the principal target in Western Europe. (If we should take General MacArthur's advice, the only consequence more damaging to our national interests than Soviet entry—and resulting general war—would be Soviet non-entry, resulting in an indefinite United States involvement

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[2] See *Hearings*, pp. 321–724, and pp. 729–1182. General Bradley followed Secretary Marshall in testifying before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

in Asia with Western Europe remaining naked.) The present Soviet expectancies about achieving this objective must be high. On the other hand, they must also be worried by the prospect that an indefinite continuation of the Korean war, with American tempers getting shorter, could lead to a general war for which they might not now be ready. The emphasis in the Senate hearings on the Sino-Soviet Pact would make even more glaring the perfidiousness of the Soviet Union if we should extend the war to China and they then refused to come openly to China's assistance. As part of a new "peace offensive", the Russians might be prepared to abandon this objective for the moment, hoping that a Korean settlement would lead to a slackening of the Western defense effort.

B. *China:*

(1) To keep United States power away from its borders. This has been done and probably cannot be undone by us short of victory in a general war.

(2) To get all of Korea. They may realize now that this is most unlikely; and they may be feeling the stresses and strains of a continued effort, not only on their army but on their domestic economic and political situation.

(3) To use their continued pressure in Korea as a bargaining counter for Formosa and the United Nations seat. They must now realize from Secretary Marshall's statement that they are most unlikely to attain this objective at present.

(4) If they are working with the Russians on a time-table calling for early general war and world conquest, they may be attempting also to engage United States power indefinitely in Asia so the Russians can take Europe. If this is one of their objectives, the prospects of attaining it are good under present circumstances and the aggression will continue indefinitely.

C. *United States:*

(1) To repulse aggression. This will be within reach soon if we can get a cease-fire at the 38th parallel.

(2) To end the fighting in Korea as quickly as possible. This is attainable on the same basis as above.

(3) To get our forces out of Korea and return to our priority task of strengthening the Western alliance. This is possible, at least to some extent, if we can get a cease-fire.

(4) To achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The United Nations has never undertaken to achieve this objective by military means; it remains the political objective, to be achieved through the United Nations processes of peaceful settlement.

VI. The situation therefore may offer the possibility of a settlement on the same basis as the previous post-war conflicts with the Soviet Union: the restoration of the *status quo*. This is the only type of settlement which will be possible so long as we continue to wage limited wars and engage in conflicts with the Soviet Union which do not go beyond the boundaries of the specific areas of conflict. As long as they continue to test our nerve and strength at specific points, and we continue to stand up to those tests, the most we can achieve is a restoration of the *status quo* at the specific points. They will not give us more than they have to: and, without our using (or threatening to use) our strategic air power to strike directly at their centers of power, they do not have to give up anything more in these local situations than the effort to push us out. This is basically what happened in Greece and Berlin. What this means in Korea is that we will have reestablished the independence and integrity of the Republic of Korea and they will have maintained North Korea as a Communist satellite. The military objective of the United Nations—repulsing aggression—would be achieved. This might not be a totally unacceptable solution to the Communists, since it does not involve total defeat for them: they would still have North Korea, and could announce that they had "repulsed the South Korean aggression". Of course, if Peiping is deliberately trying to engage us indefinitely without a decisive outcome, and if Moscow does not fear the consequences of allowing the war to continue, there is no prospect of a settlement at present. There is only one way to find out whether this is true: devise an action the United Nations can take, and await the aggressor's reaction.

VII. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley have both indicated in the hearings that something along these lines might be useful. Secretary Marshall said the United Nations could appropriately take the initiative for a cease-fire, asking the aggressors if they had had enough and were willing "to halt this sacrifice of lives and find a basis for adjustment". General Bradley said that "we could have an intermediate military objective without abandoning the long-range political objective" that "we would consider it a victory with something less than" the immediate establishment of a free and united Korea; and that "the military mission given to General Ridgway does not include the clearing of all Korea. It includes the inflicting of maximum casualties on the Chinese with minimum losses to ourselves and with due regard to the safety of our troops in order to get into a position whereby we may negotiate some kind of peace." He added that there was a possibility "of this war simply petering out around the 38th parallel even without negotiating a peace".

VIII. USUN is not in a position to make any hard and fast recommendations. However, the staff has discussed this situation and has suggested the following four ideas. They are not mutually exclusive. We cannot evaluate their worth, but we would like to contribute them as possibilities which the Department might explore in its thinking on this question.

A. We could stimulate the Good Offices Committee to re-state, either publicly or privately to Peiping, the eight points of the original cease-fire suggestions made public on 2 January (A/C.1/643). Presumably these still stand as the basis on which a satisfactory United Nations settlement could be built. This restatement now might lead Peiping to conclude that this is the best settlement it can get for the present.

B. The United States might make a private approach to the Russians. Malik's remark to Cory (US/GEN/419) that the Korean affair might be settled by the United States and Soviet Foreign Ministers may have been simply conversation.[3] On the other hand, there is at least a possibility that it may have been intended seriously. Such an approach would seem to suit the Russian taste for private negotiations: which they apparently regard as a more suitable method for dealing with serious matters. If such an approach led to any positive results, the agreement would of course be registered by the United Nations.

C. We could propose to the Additional Measures Committee a program of psychological measures designed to clarify and restate United Nations objectives in Korea. Such a reformulation could be used both as psychological warfare and as an indication of our approach to peaceful settlement. (See Annex for a fuller treatment of this point.)

D. Beginning in the Additional Measures Committee or the Political Committee itself, we could issue a United Nations manifesto in the form of a General Assembly resolution, perhaps along the lines of the proposed special report of the President as chief executive of the Unified Command. Such a declaration might go further than a reiteration of our willingness to enter into arrangements for a cease-fire. An arranged cease-fire, involving a conference and an inferential confession that they have had enough, may involve too much loss of face for the Chinese Communists to accept. We might be able to get a *de facto* cease-fire if we were simply to cease firing the next time we got back to the parallel, the United Nations declaring that the military objective of repulsing the aggression had been achieved and that the fighting would only be renewed if the aggressor renewed his attack. If Moscow and Peiping have had enough, they will not renew the attack. The Communists might then enter into arrangements for a permanent cease-fire. If so, the United Nations will have achieved not only a cessation of hostilities but will have received certain guarantees against the renewal of aggression. If they do not enter into more permanent arrangements, the United Nations forces could assume a defensive posture and maintain air reconnaissance of North Korea, so that ground forces could re-group against any attack that might be mounted. Meanwhile, the drain on our forces would be stopped and the destruction would be ended. Even if a permanent cease-fire were not arranged, the attack might not be renewed and the "volunteers" might slip away, as in Greece. Then the United Nations forces could be gradually withdrawn as ROK forces were trained and armed.* If, on the other hand, the attack were renewed, we would have gained the following political advantages:

(1) The United Nations would be clearly on the record for a settlement at once honorable and realistic. This would be good psychological warfare. It would also establish the

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[3] See the memorandum of conversation dated May 3, p. 401.

*This provision distinguishes the present idea from Senator Johnson's resolution, now getting such a play from the Communist press, which states flatly and without guarantees being received that all non-Korean forces should depart by the end of the year (after a cease-fire at the 38th on 25 June). [Footnote in the source text.]

basis for some future settlement, if the Chinese Communists should ever decide that they had had enough.

(2) We would strengthen our political position internationally, and especially our Western alliance, by showing that our determination to achieve a reasonable peace had not slackened despite continued rebuffs.

(3) We would help restore domestic tranquillity by showing that we were not without a plan for achieving peace in Korea.

(4) We would have inserted a potential wedge between Peiping and Moscow, which might be driven home in the future if Chinese casualties continued indefinitely, with Stalin offering no help to them except guns and cries of encouragement.

IX. These ideas, even if acceptable and tried out, may come to naught. If a cease-fire should be achieved, though, there may be a conference of the interested nations. There will certainly be problems a-plenty. Whatever the outcome, it will be important for the United States to be ready to take political leadership in the Far East.

[Annex]

Next Steps in the Additional Measures Committee

SECRET

There are three possibilities for future work in the Additional Measures Committee, apart from servicing the embargo resolution, (1) military, (2) diplomatic, (3) psychological. This paper deals with psychological measures. In its confidential paper the Bureau of the Additional Measures Committee listed possible measures for consideration by the Committee and formulated one in the following language:

> "Should further steps be taken to bring to the knowledge of the people of the world, especially the people of China and Korea, the nature of the United Nations action in Korea, and the aims and objectives of the United Nations there?"

There are great advantages in initiating promptly in the Additional Measures Committee a program of additional psychological measures. Such a program would supplement measures already being taken by the Unified Command.

It could be used (*a*) as a strategic and perhaps tactical tool developing what is already being done in active support of United Nations forces in Korea and (*b*) to tell the story of what the United Nations is trying to do beyond the iron curtain as well as to educate the free world, hold it together and at the same time have an effect on our own public opinion here.

The substance of such a program is something that would have to be worked out with the collaboration of our public information people as well as our military people. It is significant that Paul Hoffman in his pamphlet on the Marshall Plan (Peace Can Be Won) considers that one major department of the Marshall Plan conception is the publicizing of steps taken with Marshall Plan assistance.

An over-all plan would have various substantive elements. In so far as military operations are concerned, the use of pamphlets and radio would be continued and perhaps strengthened. It would be possible to use radio, perhaps from sea based United Nations transmitters, to state over and over again what the United Nations aims are in Korea with some hope that it might reach people on the Chinese mainland.

The sort of things that the United Nations would want to publicize by every medium to everyone fighting against the United Nations in Korea is a series of points or principles, including such things as the following:

1. It was the North Koreans that attacked and the United Nations which met the attack.
2. General war is avoidable; it is a decision that is up to the Russians and Chinese Communists.
3. Our military aims are to repel aggression in the area; our political aims are a unified, independent and democratic Korea.
4. The United Nations is as much a place to negotiate as it is a collective security organization and the door is open to negotiation.
5. The concept of the worth of the individual as we understand it in the free world.
6. An affirmative statement to meet the point that this is a war of the white race against the Asians.
7. A series of slogans such as the communists use over and over again to state these points in simple catch phrases.
8. Some of the Marshall Plan techniques could well be employed, such as stamping goods exported with some legend indicating they are not for ultimate destination or use by aggressors against the United Nations. Also, United Nations information offices could be used.

A program of psychological measures would have considerable immediate advantages. Among them are the following:

1. It could be used to pick up the Indian idea that there should be a statement of war aims by the General Assembly. Some of the points mentioned above could be formulated by the Additional Measures Committee and then taken into an Assembly resolution. Such a statement of war aims by the General Assembly might be preferable to a statement of war aims by the President or the Unified Command.
2. It would create a balance between the collective security activities and the peaceful settlement responsibilities in the United Nations and show that we are actively engaged in both fields.

3. It would give the sort of support to United Nations troops fighting for the United Nations that we would at once give them if they were fighting a general war solely on behalf of the United States. (We are using these techniques now, and both Generals MacArthur and Ridgway have reported large numbers of pamphlets dropped and the use of surrender passes. We might broaden and develop what is being done.)

4. We could use United Nations as well as Voice of America facilities to meet the Soviet and Chinese Communist big lies, some of which Mr. Dulles has exposed in his recent speech.

5. This will lay a good foundation for meeting the propaganda of the World Peace Congress and show that the peoples of the free world are behind the United Nations action in Korea.

6. It would provide a means for telling our story more effectively to the Asians and meeting the point of those of our friends who feel that we have not given sufficient attention to that.

Of course, there are dangers and disadvantages that we would have to watch from the beginning. For example, we should not permit the United Nations to interfere with the tactical use of pamphlets and surrender passes as our military authorities consider them appropriate. Also, the United Nations would not want to start a course of action where pressures would build up to drop pamphlets or otherwise use American facilities for flights over the Chinese mainland.

795.00/5-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary
WE—R. M. Winfree

The Belgian Ambassador called today at his request. He spoke about Korea and inquired as to whether the time was opportune for negotiations with the Chinese Communists to achieve a cease fire. I replied that as yet there had been no indication that the Chinese had departed from their original plan, namely, that UN troops would be driven out of Korea. Before any negotiations could be undertaken, they would first have to abandon this plan.

The Ambassador then wondered if it might not be well to put out some feelers to the Chinese to which I replied that if the Chinese wanted to get in touch with us, they had every opportunity to do so.

Baron Silvercruys then stated that he thought our attitude should not be one of passivity but should be one of action. I stated that if the Chinese registered any indication of desiring to talk about a cease fire, we would immediately hear of it. I did not believe that any further action should be taken until something had been heard from the Chinese regarding a cease fire.

The Ambassador then pressed his points at great length, obviously seeking information. He added several times in several different ways that we should take action to feel out the Chinese. I told the Ambassador that this was something on which I could not reply without consulting my colleagues.

DEAN RUSK

795.00/5–2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong and Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Colombia —Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Absent
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —Mr. LeGallais
Netherlands —Mr. van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
BNA, Mr. Raynor
R, Mr. Trueheart
EUR, Mr. Allen
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Lockhart
Army, Captain Fischgrund

Captain Fischgrund reported that in the past few days the "second phase" of the enemy offensive had ended in failure due to heavy casualties inflicted by UN forces. The 8th Army is continuing its advance northward and is meeting scattered light resistance. An air report that UN forces now hold the town of Inje has not been confirmed. Captain Fischgrund stated that the success of the current UN offensive lay in that it had caught the enemy off-guard while they were on the offensive, and not disposed in depth as has been the case in previous UN attacks which were blunted and absorbed by the familiar leap-frog tactics. FEC now estimates that the enemy will probably not provide strong resistance until UN forces reach the Imjin River. Enemy casualties from the beginning of hostilities to May 16 were listed as follows:

NK battle casualties	— 336,663
Non-battle casualties	— 80,561
Prisoners of war	— 144,922
	562,146
Chinese Communist battle casualties	— 311,325
Non-battle casualties	— 38,319
Prisoners of war	— 3,964
	373,608

From May 16 through May 23, unadjusted casualty figures bring the total enemy casualties to 1,025,000.

Mr. Rusk said that he had been encouraged by the ability of the 8th Army to return immediately to the offensive after having been heavily hit by the enemy during the "second phase" offensive which started on May 16. The UN forces in Korea are in good shape, he said, and are inflicting very heavy losses on the enemy at remarkably low costs to themselves. Emphasizing the secret nature of the information, Mr. Rusk revealed that the immediate objective of the present UN offensive is probably the line previously held by the UN along the Imjin River and eastward along the Hwachon Reservoir and that there did not appear to be any political difficulty at this stage. Current newspaper speculations about unlimited objectives should be disregarded, he said.

Mr. Rusk said that General Collins under questioning this morning by the Joint Congressional Committees had summarized the main points which the United States had proposed some time ago as the report to be issued by the President of the United States as Chief Executive of the Unified Command.[1] Mr. Rusk assumed that the revelation of this draft statement would not cause any difficulty, but he wished the representatives present to be aware of the situation in case their Governments would need to be informed. He suggested that in answer to any newspaper inquiries it would be appropriate to state that the summary which General Collins made was based on United States views, which did not necessarily represent or reflect the comments of the other Governments which have fighting forces in Korea. Mr. Rusk agreed with Ambassador Silvercruys that the substance of the proposed presidential report had now been made public and that the enemy would have the opportunity to study it and perhaps take this opportunity to respond.

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[1] See *Hearings*, p. 1193.

In response to a question by Ambassador Wrong, Mr. Rusk stated that the Department had been unable to find anything substantial behind the newspaper stories concerning peace feelers. He said that he was confident that if the enemy decided to give up his intention of driving UN forces out of Korea, the news of this change of intention would reach us very quickly.

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Hickerson agreed that a special report from General Ridgway to the UN might be made at any time in order to reflect the new military situation and that any special announcement would, of course, be discussed with representatives of those countries whose forces are fighting in Korea.

Mr. Rusk repeated his request of the last meeting that any indication received by anyone present concerning the attitudes or intentions in Moscow or Peking be passed on to the United States Government as quickly as possible.

Mr. Hickerson agreed with Ambassador Silvercruys that the publication of the essence of the proposed presidential report eliminated the possibility of its being used but did not preclude the possibility of making some other suitable report at a propitious moment.

357.AK/5-2551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, May 25, 1951—9:31 p. m.

1585. Eyes only Hickerson and Rusk. Re GOC proposal on Korean hostilities. Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo at their request met with Ross and Hyde to discuss a project; they were speaking with consent of Entezam. Padilla Nervo presented the idea at length and had previously gone over it carefully with Grafstrom.

The substance of their proposal, which they had not developed to the point of drafting or in detail, is that the time has come when the GOC should make a full report to the GA and as part of that report suggest and sponsor an Assembly res. The res would in its preamble state three clearly agreed UN aims in Korea; (*a*) The creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korea; (*b*) the desire of the UN that hostilities should be brought to an end and (*c*) the determination of the UN that aggression must be met in the area of the ROK and that it has been met there.

The res in its operative part would then provide that upon assurance, or some indication, on the part of the PRC and NK forces that they will not advance south of the 38th parallel, the UN forces will not themselves operate north of that parallel, subject, however, to the PRC and NK forces recognizing the need for the safeguards for UN forces contained in the Gross-Crittenberger proposals put forward in cease-fire talks during December.

As part of a full report to the GA the res would end this phase of GOC activities. This sponsorship would be preferable to allowing India or other Asian states to come forward with a proposal and it would probably be better than having the sixteen participating states put in such a res, although Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo do not rule this out. They stressed the importance of timing, indicating that the Korean operation in the UN is at the crossroads, that politically at least the 38th parallel is an important symbol and that this move might lead to a *de facto* cease-fire without using that term, which should be carefully avoided, and with regard for security of UN forces. This would not settle the Korean case. They envisaged over-all negotiations to come later. The Pres of the GA would be the channel for presenting the proposal GA res to the PRC. Padilla Nervo stressed that the UN and the US have nothing to lose by this operation which if it failed would have great propaganda advantages and would lay a basis for further actions necessary to prevent aggression. Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom elaborated the proposal after stating a series of propositions substantially as follows:

1. The GOC has been unsuccessful after weeks of work. It baited the hook and has had no bites. Now is the time for new bait and new fisherman. GOC was hampered by being considered as illegal. By this report and proposal it would move out of the center of the picture but without being regarded as a failure. However, they regarded the proposal as more important than sponsorship and in spite of their views on action by the sixteen participating powers they would be willing to see them undertake sponsorship as a possible alternative.

2. The current PRC offensive seems to have ended and responsible diplomats in the UN are troubled at what they consider the lack of a clear statement of aims beyond the military objective of repelling aggression and killing as many aggressors as possible.

3. The military testimony before the joint Senate comite suggests the UC's view that the UN is not able to defeat the aggressor forces throughout Korea, nor are the aggressors able to throw out the UN forces. Therefore some sort of settlement along the 38th parallel has been mentioned. The proposed res in the light of these facts would not now seem a strategic inhibition on UN plans but consistent with military thinking which seems not inclined to risk extending UN lines of communication.

4. The October GA res is not completely satisfactory as statement of political aims because of permissive clause allowing military operations north of the 38th parallel. For same reason this statement seems dated.

5. The five principles stated in Jan res, while widely supported and valid at the time, would present difficulties for US in light of subsequent developments. Some people doubt whether Gross-Crittenberger cease-fire conditions are still completely up to date.

6. USSR has too much initiative in current situation because they themselves might or otherwise cause a crisis to be precipitated beyond Korea, for example in Iran. Furthermore, if there were a serious air attack on US naval units off Formosa, and Padilla Nervo recalled recent hits on two naval vessels off Korea, US public opinion might quickly force the very broadening of the conflict which the administration opposed by insisting on bombing of Manchurian air bases.

Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo felt one could only speculate on current Soviet-PRC relations. PRC must be somewhat concerned at Soviet standing aside during this offensive. On the other hand, USSR would probably not want to settle along the lines of the proposed res because it does not involve returning to the *status quo* as of June 25. It would leave UN forces and bases in Korea. Hence a self-executing arrangement at which proposed res is aimed would be expected to appeal to PRC as first step toward settlement.

7. They stressed the growing feeling that events are moving swiftly and that aims need to be stated now. Grafstrom commented that he expects to sail for Sweden on June 8. Padilla Nervo feels that even friendly UN reps are not clear on how the US and UN stand and that the UN position could be effectively consolidated by this type of res which would make it no longer necessary to study a series of previous ones to arrive at present policy.

Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo stressed that they did not want to push this against the judgment of the US and other responsible members. They urged the importance of timing and the advantages of using the GOC in order to avoid a less responsible effort by the Asian group, to allow the GOC to withdraw, to create a situation making negotiation possible and to liquidate these hostilities before graver troubles are upon us.

We listened carefully and attempted to clarify various points by questioning. Ross commented that he did not feel competent to express an opinion on possible military implications or broad political impact of these ideas but assured them we would report, and most careful consideration would be given to their proposal. He recalled that the US has never taken a negative attitude toward possible peaceful settlement and has consistently tried to maintain even balance between what we feel necessary to repel aggression and effort for peaceful settlement. He noted their acceptance of the need to guarantee the security of UN forces and prevent enemy build up. He wondered whether they attached too much symbolic value to 38th parallel as such. He suggested the real problem is that certain conditions for a cease-fire are essential; if and when complied with by PRC a cease-fire might be arranged but in the framework of the then existing military situation.

He inquired whether cessation of hostilities is possible without provision for the withdrawal of PRC forces from NK since otherwise their presence would prejudice achievement of UN political objective of independent, unified, democratic Korea. Grafstrom felt question of withdrawal of forces would be first item and objective of negotiations looking toward peaceful settlement after cessation of hostilities and that such negotiations would be long and drawn out. Padilla Nervo recalled military testimony that we cannot throw PRC forces out of NK without broadening conflict which no one wishes to do.

Ross wondered whether proposed res might precipitate a broad debate on Far Eastern problems in First Comite with proposals and amendments leading to confusion rather than clarity, especially if Asian group took an active hand. Padilla Nervo felt that careful diplomatic preparation and a substantial majority would reduce the risk of this.

AUSTIN

795.00/5-2551

Memorandum by George F. Kennan Concerning Events From May 18 to May 25, 1951 [1]

PRINCETON, [undated,] 1951.

On Friday, May 18, having been called to Washington by *P*, I talked with *O* in the presence of *P* and two other persons.[2] *O* asked me whether I would be willing to undertake the project in question, and I told him that I would. It was agreed that arrangements would have to be made by *E* in New York, and that I should see him when I was up there the following week.

On Monday, May 21, I talked at length with *E* in New York. It was agreed that he would seek an opportunity to communicate again with *X* and to suggest to *X* that it might be both useful and interesting for him to talk with me. He was to give *X* an opportunity to think it over and was to offer to arrange the meeting.

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[1] At this time, Mr. Kennan, on leave of absence from the Department of State, was at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. This document and others relating to his talks with Mr. Malik on May 31 and June 5 were sent by Mr. Kennan to Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow on February 20, 1968. Copies have been indexed into the Department of State files under the decimal number 795.00/5-2551.

[2] The following manuscript note by Mr. Kennan, dated February 20, 1968, appeared in the source text:

"Insofar as I can recall, the code of letters used above was as follows:

"*P*='Doc' Matthews, then either Deputy Under Secretary or Director of EUR.

"*O*=Secretary Acheson.

"*E*=Someone attached to our UN delegation in N.Y., probably Tom Cory.

"*X*=Soviet Amb. to the U.N., Jacob Malik, or possibly Tsarapkin."

On Tuesday, May 22, I phoned *O* and told him that I had started the ball rolling. I suggested to him that he and a tiny circle of his associates sit down immediately and arrive at some clarification, to be communicated to me, of the areas which might profitably be explored and those areas which it would be better not to have explored at all. I explained that I would be speaking solely as an individual and without commitment of anyone else, but that it was nevertheless obviously desirable that I know what things it would be wise to talk about and what things had better not be discussed. He said that they were planning to do this. I said that I thought that someone, probably *F*,[3] ought to be kept in a state of readiness to come to see me in Princeton at any time, to bring me this information. I said that I would want him also to be able to brief me on everything that I should know involving things happening elsewhere, such as the Paris discussions or the Japanese peace treaty discussions, which might have a bearing on the subject at hand. I was sure that *X*, if he consented to talk to me, would be thoroughly briefed on these matters, and I thought I should be too.

On Tuesday, May 22, I had lunch with *E*, who said he had made an attempt to reach *X* by phone but had received the usual run-around and had failed to get through to him. I asked him to continue his efforts, and if he failed to reach him by phone to send him a personal note by messenger.

On Wednesday morning, May 23, *P* phoned me in Princeton and said that he thought it would be best if I were to come to Washington. I said I would try to arrange this (it meant cancelling engagements), and called him back in the evening to say that I would come the following day.

On Thursday morning I phoned *E* and told him I was going to Washington. He said he had had another phone communication Tuesday afternoon with *X*'s office, that this time they had been interested enough to inquire his office and home numbers and had indicated they might call back, but they had not done so. He had not yet sent any note. There was to be a meeting on Friday which he thought *X* might attend and where he would probably see him. I told him to hold the note, but to transmit the message orally, if an occasion presented itself, on Friday, unless he had heard from me to the contrary in the meantime.[4]

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[3] "F" is not identified in the source text.

[4] There is no further record of developments on Friday, May 25, but see the letter from Mr. Kennan to Mr. Tsarapkin, May 26, *infra*.

795.00/5-2551

George F. Kennan to the Soviet Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Tsarapkin) [1]

[PRINCETON,] May 26, 1951.

DEAR MR. TSARAPKIN: You will remember our official acquaintance in Moscow. You also know, I suppose, that I am now on leave of absence and engaged in academic activity here in Princeton.

I am writing to ask you to be good enough to tell Mr. Malik (whom I know very slightly) that I think it would be useful from the standpoint of both our governments if he and I could meet and have a quiet talk some time in the near future. I think that my diplomatic experience and long acquaintance with problems of American-Soviet relations should suffice to assure you that I would not make such a proposal unless I had serious reasons to do so.

I am leaving tonight for the west coast and will not be back before next Thursday (May 31). I would be glad to meet with Mr. Malik next Thursday evening (or afternoon) or any time on Friday, where and when it suits him. If he would care to be my guest for dinner Thursday, luncheon Friday, or dinner Friday, I would be happy to receive him that way and would arrange for a place where I would hope we would not be disturbed. If he would care to bring someone with him, that would be entirely acceptable to me, as long as it is a person who has his confidence.

I can be reached by telephone on Monday and Tuesday [2] at the residence of Mr. Paul Hoffman in Pasadena.[3] For reasons of security, however, I think it would be better if any reply could be communicated to my personal secretary, Miss Grace Marshall, at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (telephone Princeton 4400). It will be sufficient, in any reply made to her, to refer to Mr. Malik as "the gentleman Mr. Kennan has asked to see." Miss Marshall will be absent on Monday, but will be present on Tuesday and Wednesday.[4]

Very sincerely yours, GEORGE KENNAN

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[1] A typewritten note attached to the source text indicated that this letter was sent to Mr. Tsarapkin on May 26. Mr. Acheson, in his account of these events, stated that the letter was delivered by a member of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations to Mr. Malik at the latter's apartment in New York; see *Present at the Creation*, pp. 532–533.

[2] May 28 and 29.

[3] Former Head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, at this time Director of the Ford Foundation.

[4] A typewritten note attached to the source text indicated that a telephone message was received, presumably by Miss Marshall, at 11:05 a. m. on Tuesday, May 29, to the effect that the gentleman Mr. Kennan had asked to see could meet with him on Thursday, May 31, at the gentleman's villa outside New York. The site was near Glen Cove, Long Island; for a memorandum of the conversation, see p. 483.

795.00/5–2651

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 26, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: NSC 48/5, "U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,"[1] which was approved by the President on 17 May 1951, provides in substance that efforts will be made to develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the United Nations forces there. In light of this policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are accelerating their efforts to fulfill our national objective in this respect.

Any action by the United States will, however, never be entirely successful without the full cooperation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. General Ridgway, in a recent message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that President Rhee was reported to have stated to the press on 18 May that, if the United States would equip his already well-trained soldiers, American troops could be withdrawn. Since such is obviously not in consonance with fact, General Ridgway is continuing to seek, through Ambassador Muccio, to induce President Rhee to cease making such flagrant and damaging statements.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested, and I concur, that the Department of State bring strong pressure to bear on the Government of the Republic of Korea in order to correct this situation.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 438.

795B.55/5–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, May 26, 1951—4 p. m.

986. Rptd info Tokyo 171. Re Deptel 889, May 22.[1] Question of steps to strengthen and improve performance of ROK army considered

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[1] The text of this message read as follows:

"Renewed consideration is being given here to more effective and long-range measures which could be taken to strengthen and improve the performance of ROK armed forces. While it is obvious that ROK's lack trained mil leadership which can only be developed by effective long-range mil program, wld appreciate your preliminary analysis of situation, particularly with respect to such factors as (1) extent to which Polit factors in Govt and Ministry Defense interfere with or prevent most effective utilization of already available leadership and salutary disciplinary action in cases of obviously unsatisfactory conduct; (2) what additional steps can and shld be taken by US Govt to bring about correction outside purely technical military field, for example should any consideration be given to assignment of senior adviser to Ministry of Defense.

"Dept wld appreciate any suggestions you may have re this urgent and vital problem." (795B.55/5–2251) to be one of utmost urgency. Details and circumstances of rout of entire Third Corps last week are much worse than reported in press. There is no doubt individual Korean is good soldier but main weakness ROK army is leadership all officer levels. Most of trained junior officers lost last July–August and competent replacements not yet caught up with losses. Without leadership, Korean characteristic to distrust fellow Koreans enhances tendency under pressure for all to run when few start running. Also must not overlook fact Koreans including army are tired. Troops conscripted often by Shanghai methods and lack real patriotism or ideological convictions. Problem leadership all more difficult when involves using apathetic, weary, uninspired men. Solution of problem obviously primarily in technical military field. EUSAK fully alive to situation and urgently considering corrective measures for Armed Forces.

Corrective measures outside purely technical military field difficult to specify as problem involves whole range of national life, including economic and social conditions, education and govt administration. Korean national life approached complete disintegration last January (see mytel 659, Jan 9) and improvement has been slow and uncertain. Leadership needed at all levels in departments of govt as well as in army. Hence, I have continued stress that Korean leaders sent to US for specialized training should return to Korea to help country in present crisis. In order bring much needed outside help in technical assistance and rehabilitation, I have also stressed urgency of activating UNKRA without delay.

As for specific questions raised by Dept, political interference in army operations not considered of prime import. It is true former Min Defense had tendency by-pass ROK Chief of Staff in chain of command leading to certain amount of confusion to say the least. Next Min Defense [2] has not as yet really taken hold and has spent little time in ROK Army headquarters, hence too early to decide how he will conduct himself. Disgruntled, by-passed older Chinese and Japanese trained officers have also had adverse influence.

With respect to discipline, I hear we are at a low point where Amer concepts and practices have not yet quite taken hold and Japanese or Korean practices not yet abandoned. The latter, of course, are very drastic and ignore rights of individual and legal processes. Trouble is average soldier does not understand lenient treatment. He understands brutal treatment, which, therefore, gets results. Several KMAG officers feel under circumstances present American policy hinders development of effective fighting force. Foregoing pointed out merely to describe problem. Incidentally, in regard debacle sixth ROK Division last month, disciplinary steps were handled in accordance approved American standards. Board of inquiry was invoked and court martial was held resulting in sentences against regimental and battalion commanders.

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[2] Lee Kee Poong had been appointed Minister of National Defense on May 7, succeeding Sihn Sung Mo.

Regarding Department's suggestion as to advisability appointing senior adviser to Min Defense, I have already pointed out Koreans need advice and assistance throughout entire field of government. There is no greater need in Defense Ministry than elsewhere. I doubt, however, that problem under discussion would be eased by having special adviser that Ministry for matters outside purely technical military field. In fact this would only complicate matters as basic difficulties there are purely military. Another adviser would pose problem his relations with Chief of KMAG and have tendency reduce latter's influence.

As Dept is aware, Korean security forces were placed under operational control of CINCUNC, this control being effected primarily through Chief of KMAG to Korean Chief of Staff. Chief of KMAG and specialized staff officers, however, also available as advisers to Min Defense and his staff who are located in same building as ROK Chief of Staff. Effective functioning of KMAG at headquarters and in field is, of course, vital. These officers must not only be technically proficient but must have ability transmit knowledge to orientals. If they distrusted or disliked by Koreans their "advice" will be ignored. KMAG record on whole has been outstanding. EUSAK aware that recently invoked rotating policy emphasizes continuing need supply officers of high-calibre.

MUCCIO

895B.13/5-2851

The Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (White) to Mr. Emerson Bigelow, Office of the Secretary of Defense

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. BIGELOW: You are no doubt aware of a series of recent cables from the American Ambassador in Korea to the Secretary of State (Pusan 892, April 23; Pusan 910, April 27; Pusan 959, May 17; Pusan 964, May 18) [1] in which the urgent problem of *won* advances to the armed forces under the Unified Command is discussed. I need not remind you of the informal discussions held among representatives of Defense, Treasury and State on the subject of possible releases of dollar funds from the suspense account now held by the Treasury as an equivalent to the *won* advances to the Unified Command under the Financial Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea, July 28, 1950.[2]

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[1] None printed.

In view of the messages received from Korea, and for reasons explained below, I am inclined to suggest that a release from the suspense account should be made immediately to the Government of the Republic of Korea. My reasons are chiefly the following:

1) That part of the *won* advances which is paid out to individual soldiers of the United Nations Forces represents a substantial portion of the total *won* advances made to the Unified Command, about 40 per cent, according to various estimates. Pusan 964 (May 18) indicates that during the month of April alone 10.6 billion *won* were sold to individual soldiers on this account, as compared to 41.6 billion *won* of total disbursements by the Republic of Korea Government on its budgeted account. The *won* advances sold to individual soldiers result from a banking transaction, and are freely spent in the Korean economy.

I believe, therefore, that the United States Government has an obligation to reimburse the Republic of Korea Government for that portion. I am aware of the fact that such an obligation has not been conceded to the Republic of Korea Government, and that the terms of the Financial Settlement of July 28, 1950, leave settlement of all *won* advances to future negotiations between the United States and Republic of Korea Governments. However, it is not my understanding that in other areas in which United States forces were stationed, individual soldiers' expenditures of local currency have been met by local governments. In fact, it is my understanding that we have always allowed pay-as-you-go settlements of such expenditures even in former enemy countries. I, therefore, fear that the moral position of the United States in Korea would be weakened if we did not acknowledge our obligation to reimburse the Republic of Korea Government for the *won* spent by individual soldiers.

2) The American Ambassador in Korea has indicated that there is considerable political pressure being brought by the ROK Government to negotiate a reimbursement of the local currency advances. The Ambassador feels that such a release would be desirable for political as well as economic reasons.

3) We have recently urged the Republic of Korea Government to stabilize its economy and prevent further inflation by raising its revenues and reducing its own expenditures. The Republic of Korea Government has shown a substantial improvement of the balance of revenues and expenditures in April; but the large *won* disbursement of United Nations Forces, amounting to a figure equal to one quarter of total Republic of Korea expenditures will continue to contribute to the overall inflationary pressures unless it can be translated into immediately available imports of fertilizer and consumers goods which can sop up purchasing power on the local market. I do not

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[2] TIAS No. 2135; 1 UST 705.

want to suggest that the release of funds from the suspense account—about $12 million if computed as approximately equivalent to the individual soldiers' expenditure of *won*—would bring about the turning point of the inflation. For that, it is not nearly big enough. But it could certainly be used as a fund for Republic of Korea procurement of essential imports of commodities which are available now in Japan or in the Far East. It would stimulate Korean foreign trade, in itself a highly desirable objective.

I would suggest that releases from the Special Deposit Account with the Treasurer of the United States be made on the basis of a partial and interim settlement for that part of the *won* advances sold to individual soldiers; the ROK would in turn agree to relinquish any further claims against the U.S. Government arising from *won* sold to individual soldiers as of a certain cut-off date. It might also be possible, in connection with these negotiations, for the Ambassador to urge the Koreans to apply a more realistic counterpart rate on aid supplies.

An arrangement could be made by which the funds would be transferred to the Korean Government upon recommendation of the United States Ambassador from time to time. Allocations by the Korean Government should be made in accordance with Art. IV, para. 2 of the Aid Agreement.[3] Such an arrangement would give the Ambassador control over the import program which the Republic of Korea Government would wish to carry out with its foreign exchange funds, and would establish safeguards against wasteful expenditures.

The details of the release of such funds will require further study, particularly by the Legal Section; however, it will be appreciated if you will carefully consider this proposal. Interested State Department officers will be glad to meet with representatives of the Department of Defense and other interested agencies to discuss the matter further if you think it desirable.

Sincerely yours, C. THAYER WHITE

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[3] Signed at Seoul on December 10 and entered into force on December 14, 1948; text in TIAS No. 1908, 62 Stat. (pt. 3) 3780.

895B.13/5-2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, May 29, 1951—9 a. m.

995. Pass Tokyo. Re Deptel 868, May 14.[1] On May 26 after series unsuccessful conversations Emb reps with ROK officials, I addressed letter to PriMin[2] referring to previous communications from Emb to ROK concerning urgent need to revise counterpart rate. Indicated

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The letter to Prime Minister John M. Chang is not printed.

that proposal to adopt as counterpart rate weighted average of prices actually charged in *won* by Office of Supply for goods and services furnished Korea under aid agreement was not satisfactory to US. Advised aid agreement interpreted to require that counterpart rate be agreed to in explicit terms. Letter also stated: "The US Govt considers that prompt agreement on a counterpart rate for the period after Dec 1, 1950, is a matter of urgency. In accordance with the consistently expressed view of my govt, the agreement of the Govt of the Republic of Korea to a counterpart rate of *won* 4,000 to 1 dollar for the period December 1, 1950 to March 31, 1951, is earnestly requested. Having regard for the depreciation of the purchasing power of the *won* and the emphatic need to maintain a realistic counterpart rate, agreement of your govt is also requested to a counterpart rate of *won* 6,000 to 1 dollar, effective April 1, 1951".

At meeting of ESC with Pres, Vice Pres[3] and PriMin on May 26, Carwell[4] and Loren[5] presented US position that agreement on specific counterpart rate at realistic level is of utmost urgency. Indicated that failure ROK to utilize most effectively the aid furnished jeopardized future appropriations for Korea. UNKRA's rep stated position his agency that imported goods must be sold at realistic prices. UNCACK has also required CRIK goods to be sold at *won* 6,000 to 1 dollar. Despite reiteration urgency for realistic rate by all agencies concerned, Pres continually reverted to discussion of payment of "UN loan" as solution to present difficulties and stated that thereafter prices wld come down making revision of rate unnecessary. It was pointed out to him that every effort being made to increase flow of supplies for civilian economy, need for which all agencies recognize, but that rate involves question of effective utilization of supplies by ROK to combat inflation. Pres and Ministers of Commerce[6] and Communications[7] particularly insistent that "devaluation of *won*" wld cause further inflation, but again offered to raise prices of imported goods to "market levels". This was rejected as already disapproved by US Govt, and as having been found unsatisfactory in practice in the past. Director, Office of Supply admitted that cotton, a major import item, is being sold at less than market price despite previously approved policy because of price control on cotton cloth allegedly set by Min of Commerce and Industry. PriMin appeared to recognize need for revision of rate and Min of Finance[8] also seemed to favor change, but neither wld take issue with Pres who had support of other Korean members of comite. Vice Pres did not enter discussion. Recent press campaign, probably inspired, has blamed present inflation exclusively on expenditures of UN Forces, without regard to govt deficits and failure govt to take full deflationary advantage of such goods as have been delivered for civilian economy. Public and Natl Assembly view reflected in these press reports were cited as evidence of general acceptance of govt position. Mtg closed with agreement by Rhee that govt wld reply to my letter after careful consideration of views expressed at mtg, but Emb reps convinced his position is unaltered.

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[3] Kim Song-Soo.

[4] Joseph Carwell, international economist in the Department of State, temporarily assigned to the Embassy in Korea.

[5] Elbert A. Loren, formerly Deputy for Financial Affairs, ECA Mission in Korea, at this time financial adviser to the Embassy in Korea.

[6] Kim Hoon.

[7] Chang Kee Yung.

Rptd info Tokyo 174.

MUCCIO

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[8] Paik Too Chin.

795B.5/5-2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 29, 1951—noon.

6263. At Fon Off yesterday, Emb Off shown text of proposed armistice terms supplied Brit Emb Wash on May 26 by Rusk.[1] General reaction appears favorable subject following comments:

a. Armistice terms appear to be only thinly disguised ultimatum to Chi Commies and would be difficult for them to accept.

b. UK wld prefer Armistice Comite be empowered itself enforce armistice terms rather than peace comite to be designated by Armistice Comite. Existence two overlapping bodies wld appear to be unnecessary and somewhat cumbersome.

c. UK wld prefer prior issuance of Allied declaration of aims to be followed almost immediately by declaration by Pres Truman as Commander UN Armed Forces in Korea that he agrees substantially with declaration of aims. Only after lapse of reasonable period (perhaps a few days) in order give CPG opportunity reply to declaration of aims shld armistice terms be announced.

d. Fon Off believes no need for haste. There is thought Chi Commies, frustrated over inability win decisive victory in Korea and exacerbated over Korea and exacerbated over failure obtain adequate support from USSR, is probably coming to realization its alliance with Moscow is not necessarily profitable and, therefore, we shld give this trend time to mature.

Fon Off drafting msg to Dept along above lines.[2]

GIFFORD

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[1] See the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, dated March 31, p. 285.
[2] See the note from the British Embassy, p. 497.

102.201/5-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1951.

Subject: State–JCS Meeting

Participants:	General Bradley	Admiral Lalor
	General Haislip	Colonel Baer
	General Twining	Colonel Carns
	Admiral Sherman	Mr. Matthews
	General Taylor[1]	Mr. Nitze
	General White[2]	Mr. Rusk
	Admiral Duncan[3]	Mr. Harriman

[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia, documentation on which is contained in volume IV.]

Mr. Matthews then raised the question of Korea and asked whether recent developments in Korea had caused the Chiefs to amend their previous views, particularly with respect to the armistice terms suggested in their paper of March 27. Mr. Rusk said that he had assumed that the military situation would continue to be a war of maneuvers in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. If there were a possibility of destroying the Chinese forces, this would affect our assumption. There has been no reaction to the feelers which we and the U.N. have put out with respect to a settlement, but public statements on the Communist side, including *Pravda* and other Russian propaganda emphasis on the Johnson Resolution, indicate that discussions of a settlement may be a possibility. If such discussions take place, are the Chiefs still of the same mind as they were before?

General Bradley indicated that the Joint Chiefs have not changed their minds. They still would like to get a settlement along the lines previously discussed. General Haislip said that there were no signs of a Chinese collapse. They are getting out of the way of our weapons. Only on the east central front have they been hurt; on the west, they are sitting tight. General Bradley said we don't have a condition under which there are wholesale surrenders. They are now back to their depots. He said he believed the opposition would be stiff from here on and that the present position was as good as we were going to get for some time. Mr. Nitze asked whether there was any possibility of a large-scale amphibious envelopment operation. General Bradley said this was out of the question, although small landings as threats or harassments were being and would continue to be carried out.

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[1] Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, U.S. Army.

[2] Maj. Gen. Thomas D. White, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force.

[3] Vice Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations.

General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs needed guidance because they are trying to consolidate and bring up to date the directives defining CINCFE's mission. Is his mission to be the Yalu or the 38th parallel or something in between? The Joint Chiefs were considering language which would direct CINCFE to seek JCS approval before undertaking any general advance beyond the line running east and west through the Hwachon reservoir. Mr. Rusk asked what would happen if the enemy were to disengage at that line. General Bradley said there might be some advantage if such a disengagement offered the chance of developing into a *de facto* settlement. He said there were certain military handicaps in losing contact, but that these handicaps might be over-ridden by other considerations.

Admiral Sherman said that in his view a line further north, perhaps as far north as Chinnampo, Pyongyang, Wonsan might be better. This was a very strong line. One could then dictate terms in exchange for drawing back to the 38th parallel. Otherwise one would have nothing to give up in exchange for what we were demanding. General Bradley said that the moment one went north of the present position one would start processes in the Kremlin arising from their uncertainty as to how far north one proposed to go. There followed a discussion of a line running from Wonsan southwest to the Imjin River, and the point was brought out that the further north one went the more serious would become one's own logistic problems. There was no port which would help in these problems south of Wonsan. General Bradley said he would like to have guidance from the State Department as to whether the line should be the one through the Hwachon reservoir or the next line north. Mr. Rusk said that the further north one went the more difficult might become the problem of settlement, particularly with respect to the South Koreans. General Bradley emphasized the political difficulties if one were to give away in a settlement territory already occupied. The additional risks would seem to outweigh the small advantages, particularly if one took into account the probable reactions of Syngman Rhee. Admiral Sherman said that there were plenty of indications that the Chinese had taken punishment. If the opportunity comes for us to move north and we don't because of self-imposed limitations, we ought to know what the reactions of our allies would be. Mr. Matthews said that we would have no problem with our allies if we didn't move further north. Problems would be raised if we attempted to ascertain the views of all of them. General Bradley said that if there is no nibble from the other side, then perhaps the wraps ought to be taken off. Mr. Rusk said that if there are no indications of a willingness from the other side to talk, we should take another good look at the triangle Hwachon, Chorwon and Kumhwa, where the main Chinese build-up prior to the recent offensives took place. He felt that we should not be nervous about authorizing a further freedom of maneuvers in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Admiral Sherman suggested that perhaps the line 38°30′ would provide the necessary room for maneuvers.

Mr. Matthews asked Mr. Harriman's views. Mr. Harriman said that his views were colored by his feeling that negotiations were impossible. He wouldn't hesitate too long in expanding General Ridgway's authority if there was something to be gained thereby. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the suggested directive to General Ridgway merely directed him to touch base with the JCS before he went north in force. General Haislip said that no line north of the present one was any better than any other. General Bradley pointed out that the rivers did not add much to the strength of any line—in the fall they dry up and in the winter they freeze. Admiral Sherman said that the risks would definitely increase if one went north of Pyongyang. Mr. Harriman asked whether there was any intelligence about what the Chinese were doing in their rear area. General Haislip said that there was great confusion in the east central part of their front but that our 1st and 9th corps were up against solid resistance in regimental and greater strength and were running into enemy probing attacks. He said that our 10th corps was running into resistance in battalion strength. Mr. Matthews said that on one point he felt very strongly: any move by U.N. forces north of the Wonson general area would greatly increase the risks of Soviet intervention and broadening the conflict. Mr. Harriman said he fully agreed.

[Here follow portions dealing with Yugoslavia and also with the question of a blockade of mainland China; for text, see page 1990.]

357.AK/5-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 29, 1951—8 p. m.

953. Reurtel 1585, May 25, Dept has no objection and wld defer to GOC's judgment on advisability of GOC making a report to GA at this time. We have some question, however, as to wisdom of supplementing report with draft res along the lines indicated in reftel. We cannot see what such a res wld accomplish.

As we have previously indicated (Deptel 925, May 14), we do not consider a GA res the best vehicle for negotiating peaceful settlement or cease-fire. Efforts to open negotiations leading to termination of hostilities are far more likely to succeed if done discreetly through GOC or available diplomatic channels and later confirmed by GA. Open discussion in GA on such res with inevitable recriminations, propaganda and face-saving, only make achievement cease-fire more difficult. Further, GA res which wld be meaningful almost inevitably involves commitments by UC and UN Members who will pay attention to GA res and none by the Commies, thus putting the latter in a far better negotiating position.

We suggest that GOC cld report its efforts to date and let report speak for itself.

ACHESON

795.00/5-3051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, May 30, 1951—3:15 p.m.

1593. Re Korea and other matters. Following is report of conversation between Bebler (Yugo) and Cory during ride back from Flushing yesterday:

Titoism in Communist China:

Cory told Bebler he had noticed recently what appear to be divergencies between respective propagandas of Chi Com and USSR. He said that ChiComs apparently made no comment on recent Johnson res on Korean cease-fire although it was heavily emphasized in Sov press. He also mentioned that ChiCom propaganda lately has placed little stress on Sino-Soviet friendship and has been playing down Korean war in domestic press and propaganda. Cory also pointed out that ChiComs, contrary to usual practice, delayed almost a week in commenting on May 18 GA res re economic sanctions, adding that when ChiComs did, this comment placed little stress on expectations that Sov economic aid would alleviate effect of sanctions. When asked what significance, if any, he attached to this, Bebler replied with seeming elation that any development of this kind has significance in Communist countries. He said that under present circumstances he would attach to these developments very considerable importance because they tend to reveal grave and growing tensions which he is sure must now exist between ChiComs and USSR and recalled his previous views on subject (see USUN tel 1374, Apr. 6) as well as Yugo analysis of divergencies between ChiCom and Sov May Day slogans.

Peace settlement in Korea:

Bebler contended he feels time has come when USSR is ready for bilateral US–USSR talks leading toward Korean settlement along 38th parallel. He commented he has felt this to be true ever since Stalin's self-interview of Feb 16, and said he thinks bureaucratic bumbling of Sov Govt is perhaps responsible for Sovs having so far failed to express themselves more clearly on subject. He said he was struck by moderation of Malik's statements May 17 and 18 in GA first comite and plenary session [1] and said that he thought Malik could not possibly have taken less temperate attitude, whereas he obviously could have done much more to make propaganda and sabotage proceedings if his government had so instructed. Bebler tied this in with Malik's May 28 denial of US–USSR peace talks, pointing out Malik specifically did not say USSR is wrong party for US to contact for settlement Korean war and that Malik's denial was unusually quiet and non-polemical.[2]

Cory asked Bebler why he thought USSR would be interested in Korean settlement. Bebler replied this was simply because Far East situation has become too serious for Sovs, who do not want global war, and that Chi Communist military defeats have placed USSR in position where total victory in Korea can be achieved only by open Sov intervention, a stake for which USSR is afraid to play. Bebler added that he thinks Sovs fear another UN invasion of North Korea principally because of loss of prestige which that would involve for USSR all through Asia. Bebler admitted as another reason that Sovs of course also fear approximation of US power near their borders but claimed that this is secondary consideration because from strategic point of view USSR has capacity to force US units off Korean Peninsula at any time global war may come.

Influence of certain Sov officials:

Cory asked Bebler how important a figure Malik really is in Sov hierarchy, pointing out that Malik is Deputy FonMin. Bebler replied that he thinks Malik is not very prominent in Sov officialdom, that Malik certainly lacks influence Gromyko had, but that even Gromyko is not very big person. In support this statement, Bebler recalled that several years ago when Molotov was in New York, Molotov asked Bebler what Bebler thought of Gromyko's capacity as Sov rep. According to Bebler, he replied that he thought Gromyko a very intelligent and hardworking young man, to which Molotov responded that although Gromyko is young and relatively inexperienced, nevertheless Sov Govt held in high esteem his intelligence, diligence and loyalty and that his UN assignment was to groom him for higher posts. Bebler commented that if Gromyko were high personage certainly Molotov would hardly have asked opinion of small Yugo diplomat.

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[1] Reference is to the discussion attendant on passage of the resolution imposing economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China; see U.N. documents A/C.1/SR.444 and A/PV.330.

[2] See the *New York Times*, May 29, 1951.

When Cory expressed astonishment at this story, Bebler said that is not unique, that several years ago while in Belgrade, Molotov inquired of group of Yugo officials what they thought of Sov Ambassador who was in Belgrade at that time and whose name began with G.[3] According to Bebler, Yugo officials nodded their heads in deprecating manner, to which Molotov responded by saying rather apologetically that this individual was only one available at that time for Belgrade assignment and that although he was "stupid he was also honest" and Molotov therefore hoped Yugo officials would be patient with him.

Bebler also said he is convinced even Vyshinsky is not top-level Sov official and on various occasions he has noticed how Vyshinsky has abruptly altered his line in UNGA as result of what must have been sharp instructions from Moscow.

Malik presidency SC:

Bebler said he does not expect Malik to try any tricks during his SC presidency next month. He thought it unlikely Malik will energetically raise question of Chi representation[4] because Yugos still believe USSR really does not want ChiComs to attain UN membership. Bebler thought it unlikely Malik will rule against validity of Chi Nationalist credentials and force question to vote. Bebler said Malik could have done that last August at time when SC membership was more favorable to ChiCom representation than it is now and that Yugos thought it most significant at time that Malik failed to do so.

Cory told Bebler that if Malik does raise question next month US hopes Yugo will at least abstain on general question of ChiCom membership and, if necessary, support US view that substantive decision on ChiCom membership should not be made by SC as long as aggression continues in Korea. Bebler was non-committal as to position Yugo will take if Chi representation question is raised again.

Yugo vote on Kashmir:

When questioned about his vote yesterday on SC letter to GOI and GOP,[5] Bebler said he voted affirmatively despite previous Yugo record of abstention on Kashmir case because he thought letter to be reasonable act on part SC and not because he now believes in correctness of general SC policy towards Kashmir. He said he was unhappy that Malik insisted upon a vote yesterday but that as long as vote was taken, he felt obliged to vote affirmatively. (Bebler thus did not seek to get any especial credit from US for his vote.)[6]

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[3] The editors have been unable to identify the individual alluded to here.

[4] For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 209 ff.

[5] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.

GROSS

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[6] The Department of State responded to this message in telegram 956, May 31, to New York, which read: "Dept finds urtel 1593, May 30 interesting and commends Cory for excellent reporting." (795.00/5-3151)

357.AK/5-3151

Memorandum by John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] May 31, 1951.

Subject: Discussion Between Amb. Padilla Nervo and Tom Hamilton Re Peaceful Settlement in Korea

At his request Padilla Nervo called on me this morning as follows:

On the day last week of Hamilton's first *New York Times* article on rumors of a Soviet "peace feeler"[1] Hamilton called on Padilla and had a general discussion of the prospects of a peaceful settlement in Korea. Padilla discussed pretty frankly with Hamilton his current thinking about a General Assembly move, giving to Hamilton in effect the gist of the suggestions that Padilla and Grafstrom gave to Hyde and me last Friday at lunch (USUN's 1585, May 25). Padilla's interview with Hamilton was apparently before he had discussed his suggestions with Grafstrom or Entezam. At the end of the interview Hamilton asked if he could publish Padilla's views. Padilla refused to permit this.

Hamilton kept after Padilla and on last Tuesday (May 29) called Padilla and, referring to his story in that morning's *New York Times* concerning Malik's "denial" of peace feelers, asked Padilla whether the latter did not feel that in the light of Malik's "denial" it would now be appropriate to publish the material Padilla had given Hamilton last week. Hamilton seemed to have the impression that Malik's denial somehow changed the picture. Padilla again refused to assent to publication, saying that he did not see how Malik's statement altered the situation and indicating further to Hamilton that since their interview he had passed his ideas on to his GOC colleagues and to the U.S. Delegation. Hamilton, however, got Padilla to agree to look at a story Hamilton had written on his interview with Padilla.

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[1] See the *New York Times*, May 24, 1951.

Padilla received Hamilton's story yesterday evening, May 30, when Hamilton again telephoned him. Meanwhile in the course of the day yesterday someone from the *New York Times* office telephoned Padilla about Hamilton's story, indicating that Hamilton had apparently already filed it. Hamilton again tried to get Padilla to release the story and again Padilla refused. It was left that Hamilton would call Padilla again today.

Padilla was very much concerned by the foregoing situation and said in view of Hamilton's apparent determination to run his story in one way or another he thought he had better let us know right away. He wondered whether there was anything we could do to stop publication of the story. He gave me a copy of the story to read. It gave pretty well the gist of the proposal which Padilla and Grafstrom discussed with us last Friday with some variations which Padilla said were Hamilton's and not his.

I made no comment on the substance of Hamilton's story. I told Padilla that while we always wanted to be helpful I just did not know of any steps we could take to prevent publication of the story. If there were any steps available to us I doubted very much whether it would be advisable to take them. To do so, I felt sure, would simply blow the story up and create more rather than less embarrassment for all concerned.

I told Padilla I could readily understand the embarrassment he would undergo if the story were published. I also indicated that I felt publication of this kind of story was a hindrance rather than a help to the process of peaceful settlement.

Padilla said that he felt Hamilton was very sincere in feeling that publication of the story at this time would be helpful. In the light, for example, of a recent Lippmann story which made quite an impression on delegations here, Hamilton felt that it would be a good thing to reemphasize at this time the conditions Gross and Crittenberger gave last December to the Cease-Fire Group and to clarify the status of the five principles. I commented that I had not the slightest doubt of Hamilton's sincerity but it was simply unthinkable that a newspaperman could have the necessary information and background to formulate a judgment as to whether a particular procedure was a good thing or, if it were a good thing, to determine whether and at what time and in what form such a procedure should be followed.

Padilla said he had always found that Hamilton had respected background conversations. He did not seem altogether hopeful that he would be able to prevent Hamilton from publishing the story; he hoped at least that he could persuade Hamilton to leave his name out of it. (Padilla's name was very prominently used throughout Hamilton's piece.) Padilla said he would be very particularly embarrassed if it were revealed that he felt since the United States were no longer wedded to the five principles in so far as they related to Formosa and Chinese Representation that the United Nations should recognize this as a new situation.

I sympathized with Padilla and said I thought the best thing for him to do was to be entirely frank with Hamilton, telling him that he had relied on his discretion in the past and hoped he could in the future.

Since I had the impression that Padilla was, in small part at least, persuaded that Hamilton's idea of publicity for the latest GOC suggestions was a good thing, I thought it best to give Padilla a forecast of the Department's attitude towards those suggestions as expressed in the Department's 953, May 29. (Gross and I have in mind communicating the Department's views officially to Grafstrom and Padilla together.) Padilla said that he felt there were two useful purposes to be served by early Assembly action, if not exactly then somewhat along the lines of their approach last Friday. First, he said if it should become necessary in the future to take further action against the Chinese Communists (he referred in this connection to Admiral Sherman's comments concerning a naval blockade)[2] it would be well to have on record beforehand a clear statement of United Nations aims which have been repudiated by the Chinese Communists. Second, Padilla felt that we should not minimize the risk (*a*) that other Members of the UN would agitate the question of peaceful settlement on the basis of the five principles, or (*b*) that the Chinese Communists themselves may sue for peace (e.g. by responding to Entezam's communication) on the basis of the five principles.

Regarding the first of these points Padilla seemed quite convinced that we would be unable to get the Assembly to agree to further action that might be necessary in the absence of another UN try for a peaceful settlement. With regard to the second point Padilla felt that it might be very embarrassing to us and to a good many other UN Members if the Chinese Communists sued for peace on the basis of the five principles.

In anticipating the Department's probable reaction to the Padilla-Grafstrom suggestions I stressed that realistically we could probably not expect much to come of UN public action if there had not been adequate diplomatic preparation through the Good Offices Committee or other diplomatic channels. This point seemed to register with Padilla but it was quite clear to me that he feels some prompt action in the peaceful settlement field is necessary.

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[2] Reference is to Admiral Sherman's testimony before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on May 30 and 31, 1951; see *Hearings*, pp. 1508 ff.

795.00/5–3151

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1951.

Revised British Draft of Proposed Declaration.[1]

Our preliminary comments, Mr. Johnson's[2] and mine, on the British text of the revised draft of the proposed declaration which you handed to me this afternoon are as follows:

1. The revised text is a considerable improvement over the initial British text[3] in that:

a) it confines the declaration to the Korean problem itself. It does not include the other Far Eastern problems which was one of the difficulties of the original draft;

b) the United Nations is mentioned and the President of the General Assembly is included as a member of the Committee to set up and arrange details for a cease-fire.

2. One of the basic difficulties is paragraph (*b*):

a) it isn't clear what the composition of the international conference is to be. While the principal powers are included, no reference is made to others who might participate;

b) it isn't clear whether the creation of a unified and independent Korean state is to precede a government based on free popular elections by secret ballot.

3. Another basic difficulty is whether the declaration responds to United States objectives in Korea. A peaceful solution leading to a unified, independent and democratic Korea will ultimately be oriented towards the Communists or to the West. It is not conceivable that the Soviets and Chinese Communists will accept a Korea oriented toward the West. We ourselves cannot accept a Korea oriented toward Communist China and/or the Soviet Union. It seems to us, therefore, that an international conference of the nature contemplated in the revised draft is doomed to failure. The question, therefore, arises whether under the circumstances it would not be advisable at this juncture to omit any reference to an international conference, and confine the declaration to a cease-fire and a desire for a peaceful settlement with the United Nations objectives of a unified, independent and demo-

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[1] See the annex to this document.

[2] U. Alexis Johnson, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[3] See the note from the British Embassy dated April 10, p. 328.

cratic Korea to be pursued through the existing United Nations instrumentalities.

4. No details are set forth regarding a cease-fire. We could not accept a cease-fire that did not provide for a form of observation throughout all of Korea which would ensure against a recrudescence of aggression. In addition, we desire a twenty mile demilitarized belt between the North and South Koreans along the 38th parallel or further north. A cease-fire without observation machinery would be unacceptable to us and presumably not acceptable to the Chinese Communists.

5. It seems to us that we ought to tell the British quite frankly what, in our view, a declaration of this nature can accomplish within the limits of our objectives.[4]

[Annex]

British Revised Draft of a Proposed Declaration on Korea[5]

Following is text of revised draft of proposed declaration:

Begins:

"We Members of the United Nations who have furnished aid in the field to the Republic of Korea desire to reaffirm our objectives in Korea.

"The purpose of the present campaign is to resist aggression against a government recognised by the United Nations. We covet no territorial or other advantages for ourselves and our only aim is to bring about a free and independent Korea as set out in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations.

"We proclaim our continued adherence to this policy and our readiness to pursue this objective by peaceful means through negotiations. We affirm our intention to prevent, so far as it lies within our power, the spread of hostilities beyond Korea.

"In our earnest desire to remove this threat to world peace, to relieve the sufferings of the war ravaged Korean people and to achieve the early withdrawal of all foreign forces in Korea so that the Korean people may work out their own destiny free from all foreign interference, we ask for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea so that a way may be found to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of that unfortunate country.

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[4] This memorandum was transmitted first to Mr. Hickerson for his comments. On the following day, June 1, it was sent to Mr. Rusk under cover of the following note from Mr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, an assistant to Mr. Hickerson:

"We thought it might be helpful for you to have Jack Hickerson's comments on Dave Wainhouse's memorandum of May 31, addressed to both of you, on the revised British draft of the proposed declaration.

"Jack concurs generally in Dave's memo. He feels that any *public* statement will probably be self-defeating as regards the Chinese Communists, although of value to the free world. Jack feels that if we want to make progress with the Chinese Communists, Entezam should approach them secretly and ask if they are now ready for a cease-fire."

[5] The source text is an unsigned, undated copy of the original which was presumably delivered to the Department on May 31, but which has not been found in the Department of State files.

"We make the following proposals:

"(*a*) That a cease-fire in Korea should be agreed upon at once and a committee, including the President of the General Assembly and representatives of the United Nations Unified Command, the South Koreans, the Chinese and North Koreans, be set up to arrange details.

"(*b*) That, as soon as a cease-fire has been agreed upon and brought into force, an international conference should be summoned to include representatives of the principal powers concerned to consider a peaceful solution of the Korean problem leading to the creation of a unified independent and democratic Korean state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections by secret ballot in which the will of the Korean people can be freely asserted.

"(*c*) That the conference should also consider arrangements for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea and means of alleviating the sufferings and hardships of the Korean people and of restoring Korea's economy.

"(*d*) That the agreements reached at the conference should be reported immediately to the United Nations.

"It is our belief that these proposals offer a way of bringing about peace in Korea and of relieving the present tension in the Far East. It is our hope that they will be considered in the same spirit of sincerity in which they are offered and that a settlement in Korea will promote world peace and lead to a settlement of other disputes in the Far East by the same peaceful process of negotiation."

Ends.

795.00/5–3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1951.

Subject: New Effort to Bring About Cease-Fire in Korea

Participants: Dr. Ales Bebler, Ambassador, Yugoslavian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP[1]

Mr. Bebler indicated that he thought that a propitious moment had now arrived for taking new steps to stop the fighting in Korea. He proposed that a public appeal be made to the Chinese Communists, indicating that a cease-fire could be based on the five principles accepted by the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 13. This would be coupled with an announcement in advance of a willingness to have the United Nations forces cease hostilities at a given date and time, if the aggressors would announce in advance their agreement to have their forces cease-fire at the same moment.

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[1] Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Mr. Bebler said that he thought there were real prospects that such a public appeal for peace would be successful. In his view the continuation of the hostilities in Korea was now proving on balance to be harmful to both the Chinese and to the Soviets. The Chinese were clearly not getting the Soviet assistance needed to attain their announced objective of driving United Nations forces out of Korea. The Soviets were not attaining their objective of getting the United States out of Asia and were losing prestige as a result. Moreover, continuation of the conflict would increasingly strain the relations between the Chinese and the Soviets. Thus, if the other side could be allowed to save some face through inclusion of reference to the five principles in a new United Nations peace proposal, Mr. Bebler thought a new step would be worthwhile.

In the course of discussion Mr. Bebler drew upon the experience of Yugoslavia to emphasize his conviction that the Chinese Communists are not subservient to the Russians. He recalled that in the period of Yugoslav-Soviet collaboration, the Soviets made suggestions and attempted to persuade the Yugoslavs but did not issue orders to them. He noted particularly that in 1943 the Yugoslav National Movement had gone counter to strong Soviet representations in convoking their Provisional Parliament.[2] In his opinion, backed by his knowledge of Cominform operations, the Soviets would be even more restrained and cautious in their dealings with the Chinese Communists, who of course were stronger than the Yugoslavs.

Mr. Hickerson informed Mr. Bebler that we were giving constant consideration to the prospects for new efforts to make peace in Korea. As Mr. Bebler knew, the successive steps taken by the United Nations had yielded no results, and the Chinese viewpoint had remained absolutely inflexible. Now the plans we had made in March for a statement by the Unified Command had become known publicly, and the Communists if they wished could of course pick up our proposals. Meanwhile, Mr. Hickerson wondered if it was not better to take private soundings before any public appeals were issued. Mr. Bebler said he was not sure his method was the only good method but that he felt it would be useful to make a new appeal for peace.

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[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 973.

Mr. Hickerson said he would inform Mr. Bebler through Ambassador Gross of the Department's reaction to the Yugoslav proposal.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

795.00/5-2551

Memorandum by George F. Kennan to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

[PRINCETON, ?] May 31, 1951.

Confirming what I have just reported by phone, I visited this afternoon the gentleman of whom we have spoken.[1]

He received me very cordially and pleasantly in a sort of a summer pagoda adjoining his house, and we talked for some two and a half hours. His general attitude toward the visit seemed to be: "I am, as a diplomatic representative of the Soviet Union, always happy to meet with worthy Americans and to talk things over with them." He complained, incidentally, that he was isolated, that people were afraid to see him, etc. I naturally told him that I understood his position very well, having served so long in Moscow, even though I personally deplored the decline of normal and free contact between diplomatic representatives and others.

I told him that what I had come to talk about was the problem of a possible cease-fire in Korea. I explained my own status and emphasized that as an official on leave, occupying no responsible post in the Government, I obviously could not treat with him formally on behalf of our Government. I realized, I said, that this problem of a cease-fire was a very complicated one involving numbers of other countries, and that its final solution would require many things besides just such conversations; but I was convinced that if we were able to ascertain that there was some identity of view between our two governments as to how we should proceed toward it, the other difficulties could all be surmounted, whereas if no such identity of views existed I feared that any efforts to arrive at agreement elsewhere would be apt to be unsuccessful. I wanted to find out, I said, how he felt about this: whether he thought that it might be worthwhile for us to talk about these matters, bearing in mind my status, or whether he thought it would be better for us not to do so, or whether perhaps he thought there was some other forum where the matter ought to be discussed. While he refused to be drawn out on this question, he did say that unless he had thought there might be some use in our talking he would not have agreed to meet with me. In the discussion which ensued, he turned the subject time and time again to general political questions, advancing the usual Soviet propaganda theses. It is my impression that his reason for doing this was probably that our conversation was being overheard and recorded; at least I assumed that to be the case, and his words seemed fully in accord with this hypothesis. I tried generally to avoid this type of discussion by saying repeatedly that I was sure we would not agree on these wider matters, and the best we could do would be to see whether we could not get on with the practical matter at hand. What is set forth below, therefore, about our actual exchanges on the subject of a cease-fire represents not a single continuous conversation but a series of things which came out in the course of this prolonged dialectic exercize.

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[1] Reference is to the Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Yakov A. Malik; regarding Mr. Kennan's request for this meeting, see his letter, p. 462.

He wanted to know what I thought about the proposal that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea. I said I thought that was desirable as a final solution but did not believe that anything of this sort could be done immediately: the Koreans, I thought, were not in a situation where they would be able to take over the handling of their own affairs at once; I feared that the immediate departure of all foreign troops would only mean the renewal of civil war on the peninsula; nothing could be worse than to have the whole thing start all over again in this way; I thought that once hostilities ceased under some sort of cease-fire agreement we would have to face the question of the future of Korea, but I was afraid that agreement on that would not be easy for us to reach and negotiations might take a long time. What, he asked, did I think my Government's position was with regard to the future of Korea? I replied that as I understood it it was the position adopted by the United Nations, in a series of resolutions, namely that Korea should eventually be an independent and democratic state; but I did not think this goal had to be achieved to the satisfaction of everyone concerned on the day following termination of hostilities.

He asked on what basis I thought a cease-fire might usefully be discussed—what terms, that is, I thought my Government would approve. With the usual disclaimers about not binding my Government, I said I thought it might be useful if we could examine the problem on the basis of termination of hostilities approximately in the region where they are now taking place, recognizing that there would have to be some sort of control authority which could give the respective sides assurance that the armistice would not be exploited by the other side for the purpose of amassing new strength and launching a new offensive. When he pressed for further details, I said that unless I knew whether his Government was interested in seeing hostilities ended on something like this basis I did not think any useful purpose would be served by my going into greater detail. I said there would be plenty to discuss under this concept if we both felt in principle that it was a concept worth pursuing.

When he brought up, as he did repeatedly, the question of our wider differences with the Chinese Communists, I told him that I thought no useful purpose would be served by trying to couple consideration of the cease-fire question with the wider problem; I thought we could make progress only if we took the specific question of a cessation of hostilities in Korea and looked at it alone and without relation to the wider differences concerning general Far Eastern problems. He said that in this case my remarks contained "nothing new," and he was at a loss, therefore, to know what to say in reply to them. He did indicate, however, that if I could make more detailed proposals his Government would be interested to hear them. To this I replied, as indicated above, that I thought no useful purpose would be served by my trying to go into greater detail at the time, in the absence of any indication from him of the views of his Government on the general desirability of such a cease-fire. I felt that if I were to try, in these circumstances, to go into greater detail about this, I would be only airing views so personal that I did not think they would be useful to him.

When I pressed him to say whether he thought that it would or would not be useful for us to meet again, he was evasive but not negative, saying that he thought that it was a good thing in general for people to talk things over and that he would always be happy to receive me and to pass the time of day. I had the feeling that his reluctance to say anything more definite on this point stemmed from an unwillingness to indicate that he would ask for further instructions from his Government. I therefore said that I would like to give further thought to what he had said and would come back on another occasion at his convenience, if this were agreeable to him. When I suggested several different days on which I thought I could do it, he selected Tuesday June 5 as the most agreeable to him, provided his duties as Chairman of the Security Council did not interfere. We therefore left it that I would return next Tuesday afternoon at 3:00 p. m. in the absence of any further word from him.

I think I should add that during the course of the conversation he repeatedly turned the talk to the problem of the Chinese Communists and our relations with them, going into the usual propaganda line about how sensitive they were, how we had offended them, etc. I think my own replies to these charges are scarcely of sufficient interest to recount. I did say to him that I thought it would be a great mistake to underestimate the extent to which the conduct of the Chinese Communists had been offensive to the American people; I was sure, I said, that ten years of good behavior toward this country on the part of the Chinese Communist regime would not suffice to wipe out in the minds of many of our people the memories of the provocative and hostile attitude which they had exhibited toward our representatives and toward this country in general in these recent months and years, not to mention their gratuitous and uncalled for entry into the hostilities in Korea. The frequency with which he introduced this subject and the emphasis which he laid upon it seemed to me a strong indication that it was in this area, namely of its relationship with the Chinese Communist Government, that the Soviet Government felt itself inhibited in discussing the subject of a cease-fire in Korea.

795B.5/5–3151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 31, 1951—7 p. m.

311. On May 15 Austral Emb delivered msg [1] Prime Min Menzies to President outlining views Austral Govt question additional contribution UN forces Korea. Copy msg being forwarded by courier. Fol msg from Pres to Menzies delivered Austral Emb May 29:

"I have recd your msg of May 15 concerning the question of additional ground forces for Korea in which you outlined the considerations which, in the opinion of your Govt, would make it difficult for you to double the Australian contribution to the United Nations ground forces without impairing your training program and your capacity to assist as planned in the defense of the Middle East. I can assure you that we are fully mindful and appreciative of the fine contribution which Austral has made in Korea from the very beginning of hostilities. Furthermore I am aware of the energetic steps which you are taking recognizing present world dangers, to build up the mil strength of Austral through your national service training plan and other defense measures.

"Nevertheless I would again stress the great importance which we attach to increasing the contributions of other United Nations members to the United Nations forces resisting aggression in Korea. It is important that we make a maximum effort to end the aggression while persisting in our effort to avoid the spread of hostilities beyond Korea. Needless to say the latter development would seriously threaten the security of the Pacific.

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[1] Not printed.

"I shall reply to you further on this matter as soon as there has been an opportunity for your msg to be considered by the appropriate officials of this Govt.[2]

"With warm personal regards,

"Harry S. Truman."

ACHESON

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[2] See telegram 42, August 9, to Canberra, p. 796.

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 31, 1951—7:24 p. m.

JCS 92831. From JCS. The following directives, which are a compilation and condensation of existing directives, with minor modifications, have been prepared after consultation with mbrs your staff. They are now being cleared with Sec Def and the President. You will be informed when final clearance has been obtained.[1]

PART I—DIRECTIVE TO CINCFE

MISSION

1. In addition to the missions outlined in the Unified Command Plan (JCS 1259/27),[2] CINCFE will:

a. Support UN operations in Korea.

b. By air and naval action defend Formosa and the Pescadores against invasion or attack by Chinese Communist forces and insure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be used as bases of operations against the Chinese mainland by the Chinese nationalists.

2. In the event of Soviet attack on FECOM, the defense of Japan becomes your basic and overriding mission.

OPERATIONS

3. In the event of Chinese Communist air or sea attack against Formosa and the Pescadores:

a. Action by United States forces will be confined to air and naval action.

b. The immediate staging of United States aircraft through Formosan bases is authorized. However, this does not constitute authority to base forces in Formosa without specific authority of JCS and no commitment to the Chinese Nat Govt should be made. Limited prestockage of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition is authorized.

c. You will interpose no objection to the Chinese Nat Govt retaliating immediately against targets on the Chinese mainland. (This position has been conveyed to the Chinese Nat Govt through diplomatic channels.)

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[1] For information on the background of this directive, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 395.

[2] Dated December 14, 1946; see *ibid.*, p. 47, footnote 18.

4. In event of air or sea attacks against United States forces outside Korea such forces will take immediate and aggressive measures in self-defense, but retaliatory action against targets on the Chinese mainland, or in Manchuria, or in the USSR will be taken only with the approval of the JCS. The facts concerning such attack and CINCFE recommended retaliatory action, if any, will be reported by CINCFE to JCS.

5. You are authorized to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the coastal area of China to determine the imminence of attack upon Formosa but such reconnaissance will be limited to areas south of the 32nd parallel and north of Hong Kong.

6. Anchorages in Formosa and the Pescadores are authorized.

FORCES

7. All United States forces currently under your control are available to you for the conduct of your mission as stated herein axcept that no United States ground forces will be used in the conduct of your mission relating to Formosa and the Pescadores. The 40th and 45th Inf Divs will be employed only in the conduct of your mission relating to the Japanese islands except on authority from JCS.

8. There is no restriction on your employment of United States air and naval forces as between the support of Korean operations and the defense of Formosa.

9. Of those forces under your command, United States forces only will participate in operations relating to Formosa except with prior approval of JCS.

10. Your relationship to and your responsibility for MAAG Formosa are contained in DA 89170, Apr 51.[3]

OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

11. Only the President of the United States, as CINC of the armed forces, has authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the Chinese mainland.

12. Your mission in the event of Chinese Communist attack does not include participation in the defense of the islands now under Chinese Nat Govt control, other than Formosa and the Pescadores. You will not, however, stand in the way of Chinese Nat Govt support of defensive operations on or from these islands.

13. Without approval of JCS, and except as specified in para 5 herein, air and surface patrols will not operate within 12 miles to seaward of Manchuria, the USSR or USSR-held territory.

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[3] Not printed.

PLANNING

14. In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside Korea, to protect the security of UN and United States forces, and to provide for appropriate mil action in the event that UN forces are forced to evacuate Korea, you will expedite the development of plans for foll courses of action, if such action should later be deemed necessary. The development of such plans will not be disclosed to any non-United States personnel and the implementation of such plans will be undertaken only upon prior approval of JCS.

a. Mil action against selected targets held by Communist China outside Korea.

b. Participating defensively or offensively of Chinese Nat forces and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective.

In conjunction with the above and by separate directive, CINCPAC is being directed to develop plans for imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval forces.

PART II—DIRECTIVE TO CINCUNC

1. Foll instructions, which are a compilation and condensation with minor modification, of existing directives, constitute your authority as CINCUNC for conduct of mil operations in Korea. All previous directives or portions of directives in conflict herewith are rescinded.

2. UN Security Council in its resolution of 7 Jul 50 recommended that all mbrs providing mil forces and other assistance to ROK, pursuant to SC resolutions of 25 and 27 Jun 50, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

3. In acc therewith you have been designated as the cdr of those mil forces. Your title in this capacity will be CINCUNC.

4. In acc with appropriate UN resolutions, over-all mission of UN is to assist ROK in repelling the aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea.

MISSION

5. As CINCUNC you will, consistent with the security of forces under your command, inflict the maximum personnel and matériel losses on the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto, in order to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum,

a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements;

b. Establish the authority of ROK over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and mil defense, and in no case south of 38th parallel;

c. Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea;

d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK mil power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

OPERATIONS

6. In pursuit of your mission in Korea, you are authorized to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your mission. This specifically does not include authority to conduct air and naval action against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or against hydroelectric installations on the Yalu River, except with the approval of JCS, and as a matter of policy no air operations or naval surface operations will be conducted within 12 miles of USSR territory on the Asiatic mainland.

7. With regard to ground operations, you will obtain approval of JCS prior to undertaking any general advance beyond some line passing approximately through the Hwachon reservoir area. You are, however, authorized to conduct such tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to insure safety of your cmd, to maintain contact, and to continue to harass the enemy. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphib and airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

FORCES

8. As CINCUNC the foll forces are available to you:

a. All United States forces currently deployed in FECOM except 40th and 45th Divs. For planning purposes you may assume that in event implementation of jt outline emerg war plan is directed while UN forces are in conflict with Communist forces in Far East, all SAC units operating in Far East theater will be redeployed as required to support strategic air offensive. This does not include the 19th Bomb Wing.

b. Such ROK forces as are made available by ROK. You will not provide logistic support to any ROK units larger than bn strength other than those already being provided for except on prior approval of JCS. For your info, it is the policy of the United States to develop dependable ROK mil units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of UN forces in Korea. Consequently, you will keep this matter under review and submit recommendations thereon to JCS. At your discretion, the attachment of ROK personnel to UN units is authorized.

OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

9. Except with approval of JCS your forces will not cross Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.

10. Air and naval offensive surface operations should not be con-

ducted within 12 miles to seaward of the coasts of Manchuria or of USSR on the Asiatic mainland.

11. Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean terr, including coastal waters, is authorized, up to Yalu River on west coast but short of Korean-Soviet international boundary on east coast.

12. There is no restriction on your employment of United States naval and air forces as between support of Korean operations and def of Formosa.

13. You are prohibited from attacking Rashin with air and naval forces.

SOVIET INTERVENTION

14. In event of open or covert employment of major Soviet units in Korea (including "volunteers") you will, subj to security of your forces, assume the defensive, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to JCS. This is not to be interpreted as a restriction on conduct of air and naval operations in Korea.

15. If USSR announces in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea and gives warning either explicitly or implicitly that their forces should not be attacked, you will refer the matter immediately to JCS.

16. In event of an attempt to employ small Soviet units covertly in Korea you should continue your current action.

17. It is agreed in principle that, in event of Soviet attack against FECOM, United States and other UN forces will be withdrawn from Korea and you should plan accordingly. Sit may require some immediate movements of your forces by air. Subj to this, however, and to immediate security of your forces both in Korea and in Japan you will initiate major withdrawal from Korea only upon instructions furnished you after receipt of info from you as to conditions obtaining. Pending further instructions, you should not count on the use of any UN forces other than those of United States, in defense of FECOM outside Korea.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

18. You should make an intensive effort using all info media available to you to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive designed to support your mil mission.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

19. In South Korea the provisions of W 85117 Jul 50,[4] as currently implemented in field, remain applicable.

20. In North Korea provisions of JCS 95328 [29] Oct 50, as inter-

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[4] Not printed.

preted in W 95715 [2] Nov 50,[5] remain applicable. The changing sit requires reexamination of this directive by Depts of State and Defense and UN, and certain revisions may hereafter be necessary.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

21. Except as prescribed in para 8 *b*, foregoing, (Part II) you are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from sources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will report your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

22. With respect to logistic support of foreign forces under your cmd, W 90576 Sep 50 [6] will serve as your guidance.

CAPTURED MATÉRIEL

23. You will be guided with respect to the acquisition, use, and ultimate disposal of enemy matériel captured in Korea by instructions by JCS contained in JCS 99193 [19] Dec 50, as amplified by [JCS] 2171/2, dated 6 Apr 51,[6] fwdd to you by CSA on 24 Apr 51.

PRISONERS OF WAR

24. Handling of POWs will be in accordance with pertinent United States Army regs and international conventions.

25. Consistent with provisions of Geneva conv and other applicable regs, you should initiate and maintain a comprehensive program for interrogation, indoctrination, and reorientation of POWs with a view toward their eventual utilization as avowed anti-Communists.

CENSORSHIP

26. While it is recognized that you do not have the facilities to impose complete censorship within your command, you are in a position to impose delays and news blackouts from time to time. Therefore you are directed to impose a news blackout and impound pertinent communications immediately under your control in appropriate Korean areas whenever in your judgment necessity requires such action.

ARMISTICE

27. In event Communist mil leaders request an armistice in the field, you will immediately report that fact to JCS for instructions.

28. For your background info, views of JCS with respect to an armistice are contained in a memo for Sec Def dated 27 Mar 51 (encl to JCS 1776/201) fwdd to you by CSA 4 Apr 51.[7]

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[5] See footnote 4, p. 397.

[6] Not printed.

[7] For the text of the March 27 memorandum, see the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

29. Directives from unified command (United States Govt) will be transmitted to you through JCS. CSA will act as exec agent for JCS in these matters.

30. Requirement for rendering reports to the UN or operations of UN forces in Korea is contained in JCS 87422 Jul 50.[8]

31. With regard to public policy statements your attention is invited to JCS 98134 Dec 50.[9]

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[8] Not printed.

[9] Text in *Hearings*, p. 3536.

995B.61/5–3151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 31, 1951—8 p. m.

911. Eyes only for Muccio. JCS and Def have requested Dept bring strong pressure to bear on ROK Govt to correct Rhee's propensity make flagrant, damaging statements not in accordance with fact, such as that to press May 18 re arming additional "well trained" ROK soldiers and subsequent withdrawal Amer forces Korea, and have pointed out serious effect such public statements have upon full US-ROK mil coop. Dept fully concurs these views and is furthermore deeply concerned effect these statements have in misleading US and for opinion implying that mere provision additional arms wld be sufficient permit substantial reductions US and UN mil manpower Korea. ROK record recent mil performance does not substantiate this claim.

Request you urgently call Rhee's attn to damaging effect his ill advised statements can have on tremendous efforts being made at great sacrifice by US and other UN members to defeat Commie aggression and restore Korean freedom. If Rhee persists in making such irresponsible statements, inevitable result will be indicate to enemy and public lack vital US-ROK coop, thus fortifying enemy in determination continue hostilities, increase problem obtaining additional internatl support for Korean operations and thereby prejudice whole UN campaign save Korean people from Commie destruction.

While we fully appreciate natural desire Korean people contribute maximum to own defense, patience, self-control and full coop with UN forces essential. Inevitable differences of opinion can best be resolved by full and frank private interchange of views rather than by public controversy. Dept taking similar approach with ROK Emb here.

At ur discretion you authorized inform Rhee you have been instructed transmit to Dept outcome this conversation.

ACHESON

695.001/6-151

The Ambassador in Sweden (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM, June 1, 1951.

No. 1218

Subject: Soviet Peace Offer Reportedly Made Through Sweden.

On May 24 the Swedish press gave front-page prominence to a TT wire service story from New York concerning a Soviet peace offer which reportedly had been made earlier in May through the Swedish Foreign Office. According to this story, Mr. Sven Grafström (Sweden's UN delegate and member of Good Offices Committee) stated that his Foreign Office, through a private intermediary, had been in touch with some unidentified Soviet official who had said that the Soviet Union might be willing to discuss peace in Korea on the basis of a *status quo ante bellum*. It was later reported that Mr. Grafström had identified the intermediary as a naturalized Swedish citizen. The Foreign Office has declined any public comment on this matter.

Mr. Sverker Åström, Chief of the Coordination Bureau of the Swedish Foreign Office has pointed out in confidence that, having seen the telegram to Mr. Grafström concerning the "peace feeler", he could vouchsafe that the contents of the telegram were precisely as reported in the press except that he knew of no basis for identifying the intermediary as a naturalized Swedish citizen. He said that the cable had been drafted by the Foreign Minister (Mr. Unden) and that the source and intermediary in this peace offer were known only to the Foreign Minister and possibly to the Prime Minister.[1] Mr. Åström added that he understood that the Foreign Minister had hesitated to report this peace offer to Mr. Grafström, for he recognized that it was nebulous and probably unfounded. He finally felt compelled to do so on the remote chance that it had substance. Mr. Åström suggested that the Foreign Minister has been highly embarrassed by the leakage of this peace offer to the press.[2]

For the Ambassador:
MARSHALL GREEN
Second Secretary of Embassy

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[1] Tage Erlander.

[2] In despatch 1253, June 14, from Stockholm, not printed, Ambassador Butterworth expressed the view that "in all probability" the Russian personage believed to have initiated the peace feeler was the Soviet writer and celebrity Ilya Ehrenburg (795.00/6-1451).

357.AK/6–151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, June 1, 1951—7:15 p. m.

1599. Eyes only for Hickerson and Rusk—Re Korea. Ross and I met with Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom at lunch today and communicated to them substance of Deptel 953, May 29. I elaborated two points as follows: First, whether their proposed move would contribute to solidarity and unity of UN or the contrary, drawing conclusion that proposed move would be divisive rather than unifying; second, whether proposed move would be persuasive to Chi Coms, drawing conclusion that public approach of this character, given history of their attitude towards UN moves, would force them to antagonistic attitude.

Grafstrom agreed that approach would probably be divisive. He felt that argument on persuasive effect was hypothetical, but he was inclined to agree that proposed move would not be persuasive but contrary. Noting what we had said about possible greater efficacy approach through diplomatic channels, including GOC or otherwise, he questioned whether statement of aims necessary to provide a basis for diplomatic effort. He had in mind statement that would cover three points as follows: (1) Cease-fire on basis Dec conditions; (2) restoration of *status quo ante* on 38th parallel; (3) peaceful settlement re Korea (avoiding any commitment whatsoever concerning Formosa, Chi representation, etc.).

We warned against attaching too much symbolic importance to 38th parallel as such, particularly from point of view of avoiding UN action which might hamper mil tactics. Grafstrom and Padilla both again emphasized they attached great importance to political value 38th parallel as symbol.

Padilla discoursed at great length covering ground already gone over by him. Commenting on two points I raised, he said re first point that naturally we would not go into Assembly with move such as they had in mind without diplomatic preparation adequate to assure that move would contribute to unity rather than contrary.

Re second point Padilla said Chi Coms might fail to respond or reject any moves along suggested line. Even if they did so, however, two points would be clarified in their minds: (1) Dec cease-fire conditions stand as valid; (2) Oct Res would be clarified in sense UN forces would not go beyond 38th parallel if cease-fire could be arranged. (In this connection Padilla commented US generals in current hearings have emphasized we cannot throw Chi Coms out of NK.)

In addition to these points Padilla stressed following two points which he had covered earlier: (1) Russians have very substantial advantage in that they have initiative in present situation. No one knows what is in their minds but they seem clearly to have choice to make between two alternatives: (*a*) Bring about peaceful settlement in Korea, thereby relaxing tension and in turn slowing down free world rearmament effort; or (*b*) attempt to embroil US and free world more and more not only in Korea but in China and elsewhere, thereby immobilizing substantial part of western strength. (2) If they choose latter course by taking initiative in air attacks on US naval forces off Formosa (or by stirring up trouble further afield, e.g. Iran) demand for further action against aggressors will be overwhelming. Admiral Sherman had testified, Padilla went on, that further action such as naval blockade should have support of UN. Padilla doubted whether we would get UN support for further action in absence of prior new attempt at peaceful settlement which had demonstrably failed.

In general Padilla felt we were dealing in UN with vacuum situation requiring positive steps on our part.

We carefully noted comments made by Grafstrom and Padilla, and since Grafstrom still plans to leave for Sweden next Friday [1] for remainder of summer we agreed to meet with them again Monday afternoon.[2]

Gross

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[1] June 8.

[2] The meeting evidently took place on Tuesday, June 5; see telegrams 1607 and 1608 from New York, dated June 5, pp. 506 and 511.

795.00/6–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Pusan, June 1, 1951—8 p. m.

1006. Pass Tokyo. As Emb has reported, Koreans all types frightened, baffled and infuriated by press stories and rumors that UN may be ready to discuss settlement Korean War after aggressors thrown out of South Korea and that it wld then be consistent with peaceful purposes of UN to seek achievement its other objectives by peaceful means. To make such settlement on ground it wld help prevent third world war, sounds impressive but leaves Koreans cold since they are fighting war to achieve unification at all costs.

Must admit our experience since 1945 in obtaining polit objectives involving territorial adjustments affecting areas under Commie domination is not such as to inspire confidence that Korean unification likely to be achieved outside terms peace settlement itself. Trust we will not try kid ourselves or others on this point. It wld be tragic if pressures for peace settlement resulted in premature discussions as it is apparent our bargaining position improves daily. Furthermore, there is reason hope mil situation will continue to improve as full impact of defeats and losses sinks home among enemy troops and civilians.

Attitude of Koreans in post-hostilities period shld not be overlooked. If they feel they been sold out, no amount of pressure or cajolery likely to keep them quiet. They wld make things very difficult and possibly dangerous for UN and US missions in Korea. More important, their cries of woe abetted by Commie propaganda cld have serious repercussions in other nations in vulnerable positions. Although UN wld have saved face, victory in field hardly convincing if important countries in path of Sov imperialism left with impression UN not strong enough to deliver the real goods.

Sent Dept 1006; rptd info Tokyo 179.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

On June 1, Secretary of State Dean Acheson began his testimony before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. He testified daily through June 9, with the exception of Sunday, June 3; see *Hearings*, pages 1667 ff. On June 2, specifically in reply to questions from Republican Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Acheson stated that a cease-fire and military settlement at or near the 38th parallel in Korea would be acceptable to the United Nations, and that the Chinese Communist authorities would have to be dealt with on these matters; see *ibid.*, pages 1782–1783.

795.00/6–251

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET [undated.]

Following is text of telegram received by British Embassy from London delivered to Mr. Rusk, June 2, 1951:

I agree generally with the document on armistice arrangements,[2] subject to reservations on (1) the opening paragraphs dealing with prior Communist acceptance of basic terms of settlement and (2) membership of the proposed armistice committee.

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[1] The source text is a typed copy of the original which has not been found in the Department of State files. References in this document to numbered communications are to British messages which are not printed here.

[2] See the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, dated March 31, p. 285.

2. If it is intended to include in any document to be handed to the Chinese the two conditions mentioned in paragraph 1A of your telegram No. 1656, this would greatly reduce the chances of Communist acceptance and would not be favorably received either here or in any other countries. Even if this is intended only as a statement of UN requirements, it would be open to objection, since it implies that we would not be prepared to enter into any armistice unless we knew the Chinese would accept all our terms before any discussions began. The better course would seem to be the issue in the first place of a declaration of basic aims as suggested in my telegram under reference. If the Chinese made a favorable response, detailed armistice proposals, excluding paragraph 1A of your telegram No. 1656, could be communicated to them.

3. It is also important that provision be made for Chinese and North Korean participation in the armistice committee on the basis suggested in my telegram No. 2282. Without this there would be little chance of Chinese acceptance. I hope that the State Department would agree with this principle and would amend paragraph 1D to make this clear. In consequence the military observers referred to in paragraph 2A and B, with such armed guards as might be necessary, would be drawn from both sides.

4. My other comments on the document are:

(*a*) Paragraph 1B reference to the armistice being confined to Korea was included in the original American draft of last December. We objected to it then (my telegram No. 2331 to New York) and were informed that its inclusion was due to a misunderstanding, New York telegram No. 2055). Need this be included now?

(*b*) Paragraph 1D. The appointment both of a peace commission and an armistice committee seems unnecessarily cumbersome. Surely one committee, not necessarily under UN auspices, would be enough?

USUN Files: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 4, 1951—2:39 p. m.

Unmis 43. Re Korea—For Hickerson UNA from Gross. In giving consideration to possible steps which might take advantage of present situation in Korea from point of view of furthering efforts for honorable and appropriate peaceful solution in Korea, following is outline of a course which occurs to me as combining elements of effectiveness and simplicity. It would appear also to be "manageable" in that unlike suggestions which have been made for a GA res, it would avoid unpredictable and divisive debates or amendments. Furthermore, it would, I think, have the advantage of precision and would be within a military context, thereby avoiding diversionary questions such as the status of the "Five Principles" embodied in the Supplementary Report of the Cease-Fire Group.

(1) The GOC might confidentially advise the UC of its intention to submit an Interim Report to the GA, recounting the history of its efforts. The GOC might request a mtg with reps of the UC to ascertain what they consider to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire under present circumstances.

(2) Reps of the UC might meet in confidence with the GOC and advise latter that the eight points discussed with the Cease-Fire Group on Dec 15, 1950 still constitute a reasonable basis for discusssion. (You will recall that these points are set forth in the 1st Report of the Cease-Fire Group, Doc. A/C.1/643, 2 Jan 1951.) [1]

(3) The Pres of the GA might then secretly (probably through the Swed Min at Peiping) send a message similar in form to his message of Feb 14. That is to say, while not scuttling the GOC, he would leave the way open for Peiping to respond to him as GA Pres without implication of recognizing the "legality" of the GOC. The communication might advise Peiping of the intention of the GOC to file an Interim Report by a certain date. The communication would advise Peiping that the GOC felt that the eight points set forth in the Cease-Fire Group Rept of Jan 1, 1951 still "constitute a reasonable basis for discussion". (This is the language in which the Cease-Fire Group itself characterized the eight points.) The communication from the GA Pres would request the Peiping regime to comment, so that the GOC could complete its Interim Rept to the GA.

(4) If Peiping failed to reply to the GA Pres within a reasonable time, or by a fixed date, the GOC would then file its Report, bringing the whole matter up to date, including the confidential discussions held with the UC, as outlined in para (1) above, and its unanswered communication to Peiping.

(5) If the Peiping Govt should reply, the situation then arising would be examined in the light of the reply and the circumstances then existing.

One or two additional comments on the foregoing suggestion may be in order. In the first place, it would go a long way toward meeting the strong and growing sentiment here that "something should be done", a sentiment which is fully shared by the 3 members of the GOC (mytel No. 1433, Apr 21). Secondly, it would have the advantage referred to in Deptel 953 (TopSec) May 29, as being an effort to open negotiations "discreetly through the GOC or available diplomatic channels." Thirdly, it could be done consistently and simultaneously with a public move such as I understand the Dept has under consideration in terms of a declaration. I have studied Misun 49, June 2 transmitting UK text of revised draft of such a declaration.[2] I think the course outlined above would not only be wholly consistent with it, but would lay the basis for concrete implementation of Para (*a*) of the UK text. It would thus not only round out the record of our attempts to reach a satisfactory peaceful solution, but also would, I think, introduce an element of precaution into the situation.

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[1] Not printed.

The foregoing is, of course, entirely subject to the assumption (which I realize may or may not be a valid one) that the UC would be prepared under conditions existing today to reaffirm the eight points which I was authorized to give to the Cease-Fire Group on Dec 15, 1950. I stress also that the foregoing are entirely my personal ideas and have not been discussed with anyone outside the Mission nor have they been discussed with Austin who is out of town. I feel it important to comply with your request to send you the outline of the suggestion for your study in connection with the consideration you are urgently giving to the whole matter.

[GROSS]

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[2] Telegram Misun 49, June 2, to New York, not printed; for the text of the revised U.K. draft, see the annex to the memorandum by Wainhouse to Hickerson and Rusk, dated May 31, p. 480.

795.00/6-451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks—The British Ambassador
Mr. Matthews—G
Mr. Nitze—S/P
Mr. Perkins—EUR
Mr. Rusk—FE

The British Ambassador came in today to talk about Korea. He referred to the United States armistice terms which Mr. Rusk had furnished the British Ambassador, Mr. Acheson's message to Mr. Morrison of May 1,[1] a current study being made in London of our armistice terms, and Mr. Morrison's suggestion for a review of a possible political declaration. The Ambassador stated that it was important to sort out our minds on the inter-relationships among these several matters.

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[1] See telegram 4969, April 30, to London, p. 390.

The Ambassador said that the United Kingdom had been discussing the desirability of an agreed declaration setting forth the broad aims of policy regarding Korea. Although the question might arise as to whether the United Kingdom was merely reviewing an earlier thought, he thought there were a number of considerations in favor of such a declaration. He mentioned briefly Mr. Morrison's statement to the House of Commons that such a declaration was under consideration [2] and that, although Mr. Morrison had not been pressed by the House on the matter, the question would undoubtedly reoccur. The Ambassador said that he thought public opinion, in any event British public opinion, was somewhat confused as to what Korea is now about. From this point of view, there would be considerable gain in a general statement made by the proper authorities. He also said that, looking at Asia generally, the legitimacy of our aims in Korea should be periodically affirmed and re-affirmed. He said that the rest of the free world would probably remain free over the period of the next three years but that we could not be so sure of India and Asia. There had been Communist successes in Asia and our effort should be to set back these successes and incline Asia toward the West. This would require confidence by them in us, and such confidence might be engendered by a proper declaration. Further, the Ambassador said that, from the point of view of the United Nations, some things had been said in the past which might not be said today. Solidarity in the United Nations needed to be maintained and this solidarity would be strengthened by a declaration on what United Nations policy actually is. Mr. Morrison and the Foreign Office were anxious that the two "arms" of the United Nations be kept in being: (*a*) the arm of collective security, by which "the good people require the bad people" to act properly, and (*b*) the mediation and conciliation roles of the United Nations through which "the good people" try to get "the bad people" to be better.

The Ambassador then spoke on a personal basis and said he thought that the real arguments in favor of a declaration of aims lay outside of the question of a possible Chinese Communist response, the chances for which he considered are zero.

Still "talking aloud", the Ambassador commented further upon the British domestic aspects of a declaration. He alluded to the commitment made by Mr. Morrison to the House of Commons and then stated that there had been a considerable firming up of British policy regarding Russia. This firming up was reflected in the British budget, in the way in which the political controversy surrounding Mr. Bevan was resolved[3] and in the British attitude in the Paris talks. He said that this development in British policy had been "knocking back" the Left Wing of the Labor Party. One purpose of a public declaration regarding Korea was to show the Left Wing of the Party and the British public that everything that can be done has been done to establish peace. Such a declaration would therefore have an important unifying force in Britain.

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[2] Reference is to Mr. Morrison's statement of April 11; see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 486, col. 1025.

Mr. Matthews asked whether the British had any evidence of any change in attitude on the part of the Chinese Communists which might lead them to believe that the Chinese would accept a settlement. The Ambassador stated that so far as he knew they had none.

Mr. Rusk stated certain problems which we saw in a public statement. First, a public statement which contained any objectives in excess of our bare minimum (bargaining points) might repel the adversary and make a settlement more difficult. On the other hand, a statement which contained the minimum possible basis for settlement would not appear very attractive to the American people and the American Congress and would not be counter-balanced by the fact that at least peace had resulted. A unilateral declaration of our minimum position would therefore have disadvantages not balanced off by the advantage of peace.

Mr. Rusk then said that it was his impression that we and the British have now rolled up our sleeves and moved to the next steps on the Korean matter but that we had thought that the first job would be to get an agreement (which he did not think would be difficult) on the actual result we hoped to bring about in Korea; subsequently, we and they might consider what should be said about that result and what steps should be taken to accomplish it. Mr. Rusk said that it was his impression that the British view was that we should consider promptly a public statement and that such a statement would be useful so long as it did not interfere with the negotiating position or the development of a final position on Korea. The Ambassador affirmed that this was the case. Mr. Rusk then stated that we had not ourselves come to any final views on the matter of a statement and that we were in fact considering a draft in the event a decision was made that such a statement would be useful.

Mr. Matthews and Mr. Rusk indicated to the Ambassador that it might be helpful if we had any views which London might have on the problem of a possible approach to Peiping. The United States had no useful contact, we understand that the British channels are not entirely open and that Mr. Pannikar had not been an entirely satisfactory instrument.

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[3] Aneurin Bevan had resigned as British Minister of Labour on April 21 in disagreement with the Labour Government's policy of increased defense expenditures; for related documentation, see the compilation on the United Kingdom in volume IV.

The Ambassador asked if what had been said represented the views of the Secretary and was informed that there had not been an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Secretary and we would like to leave the Secretary's position open.

795B.5/3-2651

President Truman to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I very much appreciate your letter of March 26, 1951, in regard to the situation in Korea. I have also received your message of April 21, 1951,[1] transmitted to me by the American Ambassador to Korea, regarding the arming of additional divisions for the Army of the Republic of Korea. I assure you that your messages and the views expressed therein are being carefully studied by the appropriate officials of this Government.

This Government as the Unified Command will continue its endeavors to assist your Government to arm, train and equip Korean youths so that the Republic of Korea can effectively carry on its fight against aggression and defend itself from attack. Any program of increasing the strength of the armed forces of Korea must, of course, depend on the availability of trained and competent leadership without which newly created units would be unable to withstand a seasoned foe. This was demonstrated by the evident weakness of certain Korean contingents in recent combat. I believe, therefore, that immediate efforts must be concentrated upon the rapid development of such leaders in order to lay a sound basis for increasing the strength of your armed forces.

The Government and the people of the United States are confident that the Korean people will continue to stand against the Communist aggressors with that firm determination which has contributed so much to stem the Communist tide.

With assurances of my highest regard and personal good wishes.[2]

Sincerely yours, [HARRY S. TRUMAN]

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[1] Neither the March 26 nor the April 21 message is here printed.

[2] This letter was transmitted to Seoul under cover of instruction 32, June 21 (not printed), for communication to President Rhee (795B.5/6-651).

995B.61/6–551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PUSAN, June 5, 1951—10 a. m.

1010. Pass Tokyo. We took up with Pres Rhee subj Deptel 911 May 31. He was most contrite and promised be more careful in future. He stressed he was frequently misquoted that he had no intention giving impressions often times conveyed in US press and that he hoped Dept realized there were no divergencies between his govt and ours with respect to ROK Army. He referred to recent Drew Pearson statement that he felt ROK forces shld not be subordinate to UNC and said there was no semblance of truth in this. I pointed out danger involved giving off-the-cuff answers to carefully thought out questions by sharp correspondent and suggested whenever possible he ask for questions in advance and give written replies. Public statements attributed to him which gave impression of disunity cld create inestimable damage to common cause, particularly at time when US seeking obtain additional contributions from UN countries for fighting forces in Korea.

Pres Rhee asked what he cld do to set matters straight, suggesting some official statement on the subj, also possible letter to General Ridgway re Pearson statement. I told him I felt that damage had already been done and that follow-up wld do little good; that main object my call was to stress seriousness with which def authorities and Dept viewed his propensity for making ill-considered remarks and to urge caution in future. Pres Rhee indicated he wld do his best to comply. As this not first time I have cautioned him on handling of press am not too optimistic as to results this interview but hope for at least temporary improvement.

Sent Dept 1010, rptd info Tokyo 181. MUCCIO

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[1] A copy of this message was sent by Mr. Rusk to Mr. Lovett on June 6.

795.00/6–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1951.

Subject: Korean Fighting

Participants: Mr. Henri Bonnet—French Ambassador
Mr. Pierre Millet—Counselor, French Embassy
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

The French Ambassador came in to present some views of his

Government about a further step to bring about an end to the fighting in Korea. The French Government believed that the military situation indicated that the time was ripe for a new move toward a settlement. The French believed that the heads of government of the United States, United Kingdom and France might join in a tri-partite declaration to Moscow, with perhaps the United Kingdom making a similar *démarche* to Peiping at the same time. Such a tri-partite declaration would be public. Although the three western governments could not speak for the United Nations, they were responsible for the maintenance of peace and it would be appropriate for the three to take this action.

The French proposal envisaged a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone north of the 38th parallel which would be under the administration of the United Nations (UNCURK) and subsequent negotiations limited to the subject of Korea.

I asked the Ambassador if they had any information of any sort that Moscow or Peiping was interested in a settlement. He said that they had none. I asked him then whether he looked upon such a public move as a move to assist in producing a settlement or as a move to bring about collateral political advantages in the western world and in the United Nations. He stated that he thought the French Government looked on such a public declaration as a step which might lead toward an actual settlement.

I told the Ambassador that we were ourselves seriously considering what further move might be desirable but that we were dubious about the efficacy of a public move in moving us closer to a settlement. I said that a public declaration might have important collateral advantages. I told him we were also concerned that a public statement might rebuff the Communists if it contained more than our minimum position, that if it contained solely our barest minimum position it would create public discontent in South Korea and misgivings among sections of the American public and that discontent would be difficult to handle unless we were able to establish peace on the basis of our position.

In leaving, the Ambassador indicated that the French and British were having some talks on the same subject.[1]

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[1] **On June 13, Ambassador Bonnet handed Mr. Rusk a draft tripartite statement (not printed) along the lines indicated in the above memorandum. Mr. Rusk remarked that the United States might have some thoughts on a tripartite as against a broader statement and that for the moment the United States did not quite concur in the French idea of a tripartite declaration. (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Rusk, June 13; 795.00/6–1351)**

357.AK/6–551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, June 5, 1951—5:30 p. m.

1607. Eyes only for Hickerson and Rusk. Re GOC efforts. Following our return to mission after discussion this afternoon with Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo (separately reported in next following tel, Usun 1608, June 5)[1] Grafstrom telephoned Ross to say that he and Padilla were going to Washington tomorrow (June 6) to discuss with Entezam possible confidential approaches as follows in lieu of GA approach they have been discussing with US:

1. An approach here to Malik on Thursday[2] either (*a*) by GOC officially, or (*b*) by GOC members privately if Malik does not like idea of official approach.
2. A new approach to Chicoms through newly designated Swedish Amb to Peiping when latter presents his credentials. (He has been Swedish Minister in Bern; Grafstrom at moment is uncertain about his travel plans.)
3. An approach to NK's possibly as suggested by Padilla this afternoon through NK Amb in Peiping.

Assuming Entezam agreement, Grafstrom urgently (by Wednesday evening or early Thursday morning) requests our reaction to idea of approach to Malik so that he can participate in discussion with Malik on Thursday before his departure for Sweden on Friday.

They would also like urgently our reaction to other alternatives. All three alternatives are not considered to be mutually exclusive.

GROSS

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[1] *Post*, p. 511.
[2] June 7.

795.00/6–551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, June 5, 1951—6 p. m.

3516. 1. During talk June 5 Bajpai said he had noticed press rumors possibility of new peace offers to Chinese. He thought new peace offer to Peiping just now wld be ill-timed and might make possibility ceasefire even more remote than it was at present.

2. GOI had recently asked Panikkar explore and report whether his opinion peace move wld be opportune. Panikkar had replied negative. Said Peiping's attitude towards recent mil developments Korea quite different from the past. Chi Commies insist mil situation in Korea satisfactory and developing steadily their favor. Therefore, no desire

for peace for mil reasons. Panikkar said area disagreement between Commie Chi and US had also considerably widened. Peiping now placing more emphasis on Jap issue than on Korea. Commie Chi regarded US proposals for Jap treaty as in fact US-Jap mil alliance against Chi. Peiping therefore wld insist that any settlement Korea must include arrangements re Jap agreeable to it. Since US apparently had also stiffened and was not willing at present to discuss with Commie Chi in connection with cease-fire any problem other than Korea there seemed little to be gained just now at least from internatl point of view from new peace offers.

HENDERSON

795.00/5-2551

George F. Kennan to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

NEW YORK, June 5, 1951—7 p. m.

MR. MATTHEWS: The following is the report which I promised you by phone a few minutes ago.

The reception today was the same as the other time, if anything even more cordial and with a greater freedom of exchange.

After some talk about other things, I again introduced the subject of Korea. I said I had thought at length about our last conversation. I could understand, I said, why the Soviet Government might not care to express itself in this way on the questions I had introduced. But there was, as I hoped he would recognize, good reason on our part for making the inquiry. If we were to approach with a view to arriving at a cease-fire, the regimes whose forces were opposing us in Korea, a number of questions would certainly arise in which the Soviet Government would surely experience an interest and in which it would be useful for us to know their views. Who should be invited to participate in conversations looking to a cease-fire? What should be the status of the discussions? If a control commission were established to supervise the execution of the cease-fire, what countries should furnish it with its members and personnel? In the absence of any knowledge of the views of the Soviet Government on these matters we would have no choice but to work them out as best we could with whoever would talk to us. But in these circumstances we could certainly give no assurance that the arrangements arrived at would be ones agreeable to the Soviet Union. It had seemed advisable, therefore, to me that some effort be made to see whether there were views the Soviet Government wished to express in regard to these matters, and I had taken the liberty of advising our Government accordingly.

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[1] A typewritten note attached to the source text indicated that Grace Marshall, Mr. Kennan's secretary, received a telephone message at her apartment on June 4 at 6 p. m. informing her that the gentleman Mr. Kennan had asked to see (i.e. Mr. Malik) could meet with Mr. Kennan on Tuesday, June 5, at 3 p.m. at the site of the previous meeting (see footnote 4, p. 462).

I pointed out, as an example of the problem, the dilemma we would be in if the Chinese Communist forces just disappeared again from the Korean scene. Who could give us any assurance, in this case, that they would not reassemble their forces and intervene again in Korea at some future date.

My host then stated that he was in a position to say the following to me:

The Soviet Government wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution (*uregulirovanie*) of the Korean question—and at the earliest possible moment. However, since its forces were not participating in the hostilities in Korea, it did not feel that it could take part in any discussion of the question of a cease-fire.

He did not know whether I wanted his personal advice, but if I did, it would be that the United States Government get into touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter.

I told him that I found his statement a clear one and would take careful note of it. I could understand, as I had said before, why his Government might wish to take this position. I could not tell him what action my Government would take—whether or not, that is, it would wish to pursue the line he had suggested. But if it did, and if questions arose in the discussions which were of interest to the Soviet Government but on which, in the circumstances, its views could not be directly consulted, then I trusted his Government would take note of the fact that an effort had been made on our side to take account of a possible Soviet interest, and our conversations with others would not be taken as an indication that we were trying to solve the Korean problem for all times with no regard whatsoever to Soviet views and interests.

I said that if, as matters developed, they felt the need of any further discussion of this sort I would be glad to be useful in any way that I could. He replied by reiterating that they did not feel that they could take part in discussions of this subject for the reason that he had indicated. (I gathered that this was simply because his instructions allowed for no other reply.)

In order that the Department may have a full record of what was said, and not that it adds anything to the picture of Soviet reactions, I may add that I said to him, in the course of this discussion, that I thought we would find it hard to rely on anything the Chinese Communists or North Koreans might promise. He could, I conceded, counter this by saying: "Do you find it easy to rely on what *we* say"? My answer to that would be that I did not believe in the relevance of the word "trust" to the relations between great powers with conflicting ideologies, but I did believe in the value of what one actually *knew* about, [the] other party. The Soviet Government, so far as I could observe, was run by people who took a serious and responsible attitude toward what they conceived to be their own interests. The Chinese Communists on the contrary, seemed to us to be be excited, irresponsible people, on the consistency of whose reactions there could be no reliance.

He replied by charging that we were the people who had excited them, and by complaining about American statements to the effect that no agreement with the Soviet Union was worth anything. I said that in my opinion it depended on the subject of the agreement and the extent to which it corresponded to the interests of both parties. I was sure, I said, that he realized that there could be various attitudes towards agreements, even in the communist world, and reminded him of the reassuring words of Lenin to a disturbed party comrade who had deplored the Brest-Litovsk treaty and had said that at least he hoped it was not being observed on the Soviet side. Lenin, I recalled, had replied: "What the hell do you think we are? We have already broken it forty times."

In general, the conversation, like the first one, was replete with efforts on the part of the other gentleman to bring up the global complaint against American policy.

So much for the conversation. Now a word or two about my own analysis of it.

With regard to the reply, the following seems to be evident:

1. It was plain that he had memorized this statement and attached great importance to it. (I got him to repeat it before I left, so that I am quite sure of its tenor.) There is no question in my mind but that it represented precisely what he had been instructed by Moscow to say. I am also certain that an instruction of this nature on such a subject must have had Politburo approval. It should therefore be taken as a major policy statement of the Soviet Government—more significant, rather than less, by virtue of the fact that it was intended for communication in a non-public channel.

2. The words "at the earliest possible moment" (*kak mozhno skoree*) are, in my opinion, highly significant. They would not have been used without most careful consideration. They may even contain a note of warning: namely that if Korean hostilities do not cease in the near future, Soviet interests—in the view of the Kremlin—will be adversely affected. In any case, this is a hopeful sign, from the standpoint of arriving at an early cease-fire.

3. I take this reply to indicate that Soviet influence has already been brought to bear on the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists to show themselves amenable to proposals for a cease-fire. This should not be taken to mean that their attitude in any such discussions will be characterized by good will, sincerity, or cooperativeness. They will make all the trouble they can, and probably

advance extreme and absurd demands initially. I would think it likely, however, in the light of the Soviet reply, that cease-fire arrangements could finally be obtained from them with firmness and persistence on our part and at a cost in nerves and temper no greater than that which was involved in the final settlement of the Berlin blockade.

4. It is significant that on this second occasion no mention was made of the wider problems of international affairs in the Far East, such as Formosa, the Japanese peace treaty, etc. I think this may mean that the Soviet Government would like to see a cease-fire even if it did not involve a solution of these wider problems. We would make a mistake, however, in my opinion, to conclude from this that the Soviet Government would be willing, or indeed able, to put overriding pressure on the Chinese Communist regime to abandon (initially, at any rate) its desire to see these questions coupled with the Korean question. While I would accordingly attach no absolute and final significance to this Soviet omission, I think it nevertheless an encouraging sign and would doubt that the Chinese Communists would be able to maintain their position indefinitely, in the absence of Soviet support.

5. While the Soviet Government has been reluctant to participate directly in discussions looking to a cease-fire, we may expect that its desires and interests will find some reflection in any positions that may be taken by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. The North Koreans would be more likely to appear as the exclusive mouthpieces of the Kremlin; but the necessity to coordinate their statements with those of the Chinese Communists may mean that we cannot take even their statements as the pure distillation of Kremlin views. Nevertheless a high degree of Kremlin influence will be reflected in any discussions that representatives of those two regimes may conduct, and it will be up to us to figure out where one thing begins and the other thing ends.

For whatever it is worth, I would like to add a word about my impression of my host, whom I had not met before. I hold him to be one of the better Soviet types; not just a secret policy agent like some of his colleagues. I believe that he is substantially sincere in his enormous bitterness and plaintiveness against the conduct of our Government—his sincerity having, of course, a respectable admixture of that genius for rationalization which distinguishes the Soviet mind. I told him that he was making a great mistake in viewing the statements and activities of our Government as the end-product of some Wall Street conspiracy, and that insofar as these views of his might ever have had any relevance to reality they were at least twenty or thirty years out of date. This made no impression on him nor did I expect it to: I was just keeping up conversation. He is interested in this country but tortured in his interpretation of it, by his ideology, his genuine disgust with certain manifestations of American life, and the pathological envy and sense of inferiority that overcomes many

Soviet personalities when they view our material achievements. The result is a distortion of vision more pathetic than sinister. "You see our country," I said to him, when leaving, "as in a dream." "No, this is not the dream," he replied, with a certain air of desperation, "this is the deepest reality."

One word more, for whatever it is worth. I hope that we will not hesitate to grasp at once the nettle of action directed toward achieving a cease-fire. We may not succeed; but I have a feeling we are moving much closer to the edge of the precipice than most of us are aware, and that this is one of the times when the dangers of inaction far exceed those of action.

357.AK/6–551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 5, 1951—7:13 p. m.

1608. Eyes only for Hickerson and Rusk. Re GOC efforts. Ross and I called on Grafstrom and Padilla this afternoon and at their request I reviewed our attitude towards suggestion for GA peace approach as follows:

1. We had received no reply from Chicoms on approaches GOC had made.
2. The cards of the UN and the UC had, however, repeatedly been laid face up on the table.
3. We felt that if any approach at this time would serve a useful purpose it would be a discreet (confidential) approach rather than a public one as envisaged by their suggestion.
4. In considering any arrangements for a cease-fire the security of UN forces must be primary consideration. This in turn involved (*a*) arrangements guaranteeing that the aggression had ceased, and (*b*) arrangements guaranteeing against any resumption of hostilities.
5. In any action taken there must not be any implication of "repeal" of the implicit authority contained in the Oct 7 res permitting UN forces to go beyond the 38th Parallel as might be necessary from military viewpoint.

On last point Padilla inquired whether we had in mind implicit authority to go beyond 38th Parallel if necessary would continue even after a cessation of hostilities. I replied that in our view there should be no limitation on military action unless arrangements (guarantees) which we considered indispensable were provided against resumption of hostilities. This would involve, I added, necessity of being able to observe objectively that there was not in fact any action which might lead to resumption of hostilities.

Grafstrom said that he thought GOC members fully understood our views, which he added he felt might be boiled down to a simple objective of guarantees against resumption of hostilities. This in turn, he said, would of course involve right of reconnaissance and right even to strike in order to prevent resumption of hostilities.

Appearing to agree, as he had last Friday, with our view that a private approach would be preferable to a public one if any approach at all were worthwhile, Grafstrom then went on the question whether there was anything further GOC could do that it has not already done. Only thing that occurred to him was an attempt to contact the Russians. Also appearing to agree with our view, Padilla said that another possibility would be an effort to contact the NK's. He realized, he said, difficulty of getting in touch with them. He recalled, however, a conversation with Katz-Suchy[1] in which latter had inquired why GOC had not followed up NK approach. Padilla had replied that (*a*) GOC did not know attitude of Chicom Govt toward NK approach, and (*b*) did not know how NK authorities could be approached. Katz-Suchy had replied that prominence had been given to NK approach in Chinese media and that so far as approach to NK's was concerned NK's had an Amb in Peiping who could easily be approached. Padilla then observed to us that an approach to NK Amb in Peiping might be made through one of the govts having relations with Peiping.

Elaborating this possibility Padilla said that an oral approach to NK's through channel indicated inquiring whether NK authorities would be willing to establish contact would involve no disadvantage if rebuffed by NK's. They would have no document which would be useful to them for propaganda purposes and they would have no GOC commitment which they could misuse. Padilla summarized that he had in mind a possible approach that would (1) not commit UN in any way; (2) would not give any basis for a propaganda barrage; and (3) would not commit GOC in any way.

Referring to apparent desire of GOC to make some report to GA, I expressed view that a negative and discouraging impression would be created if they merely reported their failure to date. Whether or not they filed a report was, of course, their decision to make. I suggested, however, that they might wish to consider deferring any report at this time until possibly after another approach. Grafstrom said that their idea of reporting to the GA was wholly tied to their suggestion for possible GA action; if GA action were not going to be sought they would not make a report.

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[1] Juliusz Katz-Suchy, Permanent Representative of Poland at the United Nations.

Grafstrom went on to summarize his view as to possible approaches as follows:

1. He did not see that there was anything further to be done vis-à-vis the Chicoms. He said the Feb 14 communication from Entezam still stands and technically cannot be changed. It is available to the Chicoms for response at any time they wish to make a response.

2. The remaining possibilities would be approaches to the NK's and the Russians. The only aim of such approaches would be to establish contact "without giving anything away", the purpose of contact being to have "preliminary discussions".

Padilla thought that in addition to possible approaches to Russians and NK's a new query might be made to Peiping. In this connection he wondered whether the newly designated Swedish Amb to Peiping might not appropriately make such an inquiry.

On purely hypothetical assumption that there might be need for further consultations with them I inquired concerning mechanics contact with GOC in view of fact Grafstrom plans to leave for Sweden on Friday and Padilla had talked of necessity visiting Mexico. Grafstrom still hopes very much to leave by ship on Friday. At the moment he plans to return at end of August but would be available to return to New York by air on moment's notice. Padilla hopes to go to Mexico at end of June, among other things in order to avoid necessity of having to go to Geneva for ECOSOC and Art 73 mtgs this summer. He also could fly back on moment's notice. They both assured us that they would work out mechanics of their arrangements in such a way as to be able to deal with any matters which might arise.

In course of discussion both Padilla and Grafstrom indicated while they had not discussed specific proposals with other dels they have strong impression that general psychology among UN members is that they want to get something done, that with UN military position now good there is general feeling this is opportune moment to "do something". Grafstrom said many people currently emphasized 38th Parallel.

GROSS

795B.5/6–551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 5, 1951—8 p. m.

964. As you are aware US Govt concerned some time with gen problem securing additional ground force commitments from UN Members to support collective effort in Korea. This need has become increasingly urgent as consequence of extensive Chi Commie intervention in Korea, prospects for renewed Commie offensive, need to rotate troops which have served long, arduous tours, and fact that no date of termination of hostilities in Korea is foreseeable at this time.

Recently Defense Dept requested Dept to direct efforts towards securing substantial contributions rather than token forces. Dept desires to ensure that maximum effort has been made to obtain or increased ground troop commitments from all 53 UN Members who replied favorably to June 25 and June 27 Resolutions, even though some of 53 in position only to make token contributions.

Dept anxious UN maintain strong initiative in steps to increase universality and success of collective effort. Nevertheless it wld not be desirable for UN to make gen appeal to all 53 States supporting Korean operation in view of JCS policy of not requesting additional commitments from continental NATO States and from UK if commitments interfere with NATO schedules. In this connection, Dept inquiring whether JCS does not feel, in light of existing situation, that it shld reconsider lifting of injunction against asking NATO States on Eur Continent for additional troop contributions. UN appeal for additional forces shld be made as soon as possible.

Therefore appeal wld be limited to States replying favorably to June 25 and June 27 Resolutions which have not yet contributed armed forces. Appeal wld indicate that bilateral discussions are being carried on between UC and number other States, and in particular with States which have already contributed armed forces. The 15 States are Austral, Belg, Canad, Colom, Ethio, Fr, Greece, Lux, Neth, NZ, Phil, Thailand, Turk, USOAFR, and UK.

In this connection Dept considering most feasible approach through UN. Fol is present thinking Dept concerning two possible alternatives. Your views requested soonest: (1) submission of question of additional troops for Korea to AMC or Political and Security Comite of GA; (2) public appeal to UN Members for more troops from SYG on behalf UC.

As to first alternative, we believe advantage wld be in fact that it is multilateral UN approach from which propaganda benefits wld derive in event of agreement among Members of AMC to make appropriate recommendation to GA or agreement to ask SYG to appeal to Members on behalf AMC. Such AMC action wld be in accordance with its terms of reference and list of possible measures for consideration by Comite, prepared by Bureau and submitted Mar 8 (US/A/AC.52/12).[1] AMC recommendation for additional troops wld appear as logical corollary to steps being taken in respect to recommending additional economic measures and wld be clear reaffirmation of UN initiative in maintaining and reinforcing collective effort in Korea.

On other hand, use of AMC has number serious disadvantages.

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[1] Not printed.

Using AMC for discussion additional troops may lead to open debate concerning entire Korean situation, development which Dept wld consider undesirable. Bringing this question to AMC wld very likely cause extensive delays before positive measures cld be adopted. Majority of Members AMC have contributed armed forces and therefore appeal wld not be addressed to them. This situation likely to lessen effect of AMC action. Possible failure in getting AMC to make such recommendation wld tend to give additional credence to criticism leveled against our friends in respect to rather modest contributions of ground forces they have made thus far to the collective action in Korea. Furthermore, a vote in GA on recommendation from AMC in NR appreciably less than 53 supporting action of June 25 and 27 Resolutions wld be damaging and bring into open lack of strong and united support for Korean effort. Many states might be reluctant to support in GA measures which wld call for further specific commitments of additional ground forces.

Dept inclined to favor second alternative, an appeal on behalf UC through SYG. Dept realizes that appeal on behalf UC has more of a unilateral character and may possibly stir up old animosities which were stimulated when SYG on July 14 made his appeal for contributions from UN Members. However, we feel such eventuality can be avoided if an announcement from SYG clearly states it is being made upon request of UC. In July 14 announcement, a nr of Member Govts resented not being consulted prior to announcement. However, such situation can be avoided by prior diplomatic preparation.

An appeal on behalf of UC through SYG wld have advantage of speed, and wld avoid inevitable delay of AMC consideration. It wld serve to allay recent public criticisms alluding to UN inaction. The possibility that consideration of question additional troops in AMC wld open gen discussion on entire Korean situation wld be lessened. Such an appeal wld not require UN Members to respond to AMC or GA recommendation. Further, such public appeal might act as an immediate catalyst in bringing to fruition some of present bilateral negots UC is carrying on with nr Member States which previously gave support June Resolutions of SC.

In line with past procedure, Dept wld ask that offers of assistance be communicated to SYG in gen terms leaving detailed arrangements for such an agreement between respective Govts and UC. Dept has in mind draft note to SYG along fol lines:

> "SecState presents his compliments to H.E. the SYG of the UN and has the honor to address a communication on behalf of US, acting in its capacity as UC, concerning need for additional ground troops from Member Govts of UN for collective effort in Korea.
>
> "UC has conducted and is now conducting extensive bilateral con-

versations in connection with this problem with various Member States and in particular is conducting conversations with States which have already contributed armed forces.

"In order to further efforts of UC in this respect SYG is requested to send communication on behalf of UC to Member Govts which previously gave a favorable reply to either SC Res of June 25, 1950, or to its Res of June 27, 1950, but which have not yet contributed armed forces for collective effort in Korea advising the aforementioned Members of need for further ground assistance in Korea. There is real need for additional forces from Member States in the light of massive Chi Commie concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression. UC therefore desires SYG in his communication to appeal to Member Govts which have given their support to SC Resolutions but have not made contributions of armed forces that they give immediate consideration to making an initial contribution of ground forces of substantial character, consonant with their respective capabilities and other responsibilities.

"Further, it is requested that Member Govts be asked to notify SYG of offers in gen terms, detailed arrangements to be made by respective Member Govts and UC."

ACHESON

357.AK/5-2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 6, 1951—11 a. m.

966. Re Unmis 43.[1] 1. History of past efforts in UN to achieve peaceful settlement shows all these efforts floundered against determination of Commie aggressors to pursue their objective to drive UN out of Korea. Unless there is indication this objective changed every attempt achieve honorable settlement is doomed to failure.

2. While leading US officials only recently in Joint Senate Comite restated our views on honorable settlement on basis termination of fighting in general vicinity of 38th parallel, there has been not even scintilla of evidence of change of Commie attitude and indication of willingness to negotiate.

3. It occurs to us that procedure suggested in ref Unmis cld be adjusted to explore whether Commies willing to talk without necessity for restating again UN terms at least in first instance only to be again rebuffed.

4. It is our thought that Entezam might approach Peiping as envisaged in para 3 of ref Unmis. He might say it is his clear impression from testimony before Senate Joint Comite that if Commies willing to stop fighting in general vicinity of 38th parallel there exists basis for fruitful discussion. He cld inquire whether Commies care to comment.

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[1] Dated June 4, p. 498.

We have some question whether Entezam and GOC shld commit themselves at this time re filing of interim report in immediate future.

5. If this approach is rebuffed or ignored the account thereof wld be eventually included in GOC report. If Chi Commies answer in terms of their past propaganda proposals these will also be included in GOC report with appropriate GOC comments. If their reply contains indication they are willing to talk it will be carefully examined and further steps will be determined in light of circumstances.

6. If it becomes necessary for you to comment to Padilla or Grafstrom on matters raised in urtel 1599 June 1 we continue believe discreet approach at least in first instance has more chance of success than GA res (Deptel 593[*953*] May 29). If private approach unequivocally rejected consideration may be given public action designed demonstrate UN and UC doing all in its power obtain settlement in Korea. We still inclined believe UC report to SYG or statement by Govs with troops in Korea might be best method if and when public approach is chosen. We must keep in mind if public appeal fails demand for further UN measures may well increase.

7. Re Padilla's points in urtel 1599 concerning 38th parallel and Dec cease-fire conditions we wld consider necessary obtain agreement to end aggression in Korea with adequate guarantee against resumption of hostilities in line with Secy Acheson's testimony of Sat June 2.[2]

We must be careful that any GA res does not repeal provision of Oct 7 res re implied authority of UN forces proceed beyond 38th parallel. Padilla himself seems believe (Para 2 of urtel 1599) Sov in advantageous position and we cld not agree tying our hands any further without Commie agreement to end aggression in Korea and effective safeguards against resumption. Passing GA res in absence of positive response ties UN down leaving Commies free.

ACHESON

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 497.

895B.13/6-651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, June 6, 1951—3 p. m.

1019. Re Embtel 995, May 29. I recd letter dated June 3 from Pres Rhee replying to my letter of May 26 addressed to PriMin concerning need for establishment realistic counterpart rate. President's letter transmitted memorandum [1] he described as mtg "in effect" every major point suggested in my communication. Memorandum reiterated previous position of ROK that change of rate wld be inflationary but that

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[1] Neither the letter nor the memorandum is here printed.

ROK wld agree that "reps of the US or the UN or both may set the price of such goods as they see fit regardless of the official exchange rate." Memo also charged that *won* advanced to the UN forces, if continued, are alone "sufficient to wreck the natl economy and lead to financial collapse, to the detriment of the UN Forces in Korea as well as to the ROK Govt," and urges repayment of the "loan", more aid goods and rehabilitation Korean productive capacity as desirable deflationary program while ROK holds exchange rate at *won* 2,500 to $1. I returned letter and its enclosure to Pres with informal memo stating there seemed to be some misunderstanding as communication was contrary to understanding reached last week in that it failed to indicate agreement to any rate for use in calculating counterpart deposits. I therefore expressed reluctance to transmit document to Wash.

Fol impasse at ESC meeting May 26 Emb kept pressure on key ROK officials and until receipt above letter has reason to believe that some progress was being made toward acceptable solution. In two long sessions with Fin Min, Carwell reviewed need for more responsible fiscal and monetary policies. Reiterated and emphasized objections to persistent adherence ROK to "low price policy" for aid goods. Fin Min indicated general agreement with Emb's views but stated final decision rested with Pres. Carwell also called on PriMin who indicated his support for revision of counterpart rates. State Council had special mtg with Pres to consider rate question. Emb was informed that State Council finally agreed that:

(1) Counterpart rate shld be raised to *won* 6,000 to $1;

(2) Official exchange rate shld be maintained at *won* 22,500 to $1;

(3) Imported goods shld be priced at not less than *won* 6,000 to $1;

(4) Ministries shld be permitted to buy from office of supply at *won* 2,500 to $1 rate in order not to disrupt 1951/52 budget. Ministers of Communications and Commerce and Industry reportedly objected to bitter end to any change in rate. Subsequently, Carwell also had long talk with Pres who gave impression he was at least convinced that revision of counterpart rate was sound. Interview was cordial and export of scrap, tungsten mining, and responsibility of ROK toward UN, as well as urgent need for more responsible fiscal and monetary policies, were discussed. Letter of June 3, however, confirms earlier indications that despite detailed explanations both oral and written, Pres Rhee and several of his advisors have little understanding of nature of problem or of objectives intended to be served by econ assistance programs. Local press has also intensified its campaign against increase in counterpart rate.

Will advise further developments.

MUCCIO

357.AK/6-551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 6, 1951—5 p. m.

970. 1. Re three approaches raised urtel 1607, June 5, our view is that this is a matter GOC shld determine for itself. If GOC is desirous of making an approach we shld not raise objection. GOC is undoubtedly aware that Chi Commies regard it as "illegal" body, and a private approach through Entezam as Pres GA and as set out in Deptel 966, June 6, wld perhaps be less objectionable to Chi Commies.

2. Our reaction to approach to Chi Commies through newly apptd Swedish Amb to Peiping or to approach to NKs as suggested by Padilla through NK Emb in Peiping is same as set forth in para one.

3. We ourselves do not feel that an approach to Malik by GOC officially or by GOC members privately wld do any good. On the contrary, Malik might interpret such an approach as eagerness on our part. We, however, have no objection to approach to Malik. If such approach is made, it is important to make clear it is not induced or inspired by US.

4. We draw your attention to tel 3516 June 5 from New Delhi, rptd USUN. You will note from it that Bajpai, basing his views on report from Pannikar, feels new peace offer just now wld be ill-timed and might make possibility cease-fire even more remote than it is at present.

ACHESON

357.AK/6-651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 6, 1951—6:12 p. m.

1613. Eyes only for Hickerson, UNA from Gross, and Rusk from Gross. Re the efforts of GOC (confirming Gross-Hickerson telecon, 4:00 p. m., June 6).

I have just had a phone call from Washington from Entezam and Padilla, who are meeting with Grafstrom in Entezam's office. Padilla, who did most of the talking from their end, said that they were most anxious to have our comments concerning the suggestions which were in their minds and which were reported to Dept in ourtel No. 1607, June 5. I said that we had the following general reactions, pursuant to your phone conversation with me this a.m. I said that a subsequent conversation would be desirable before any action was taken.

General comments I made as follows:

With regard to their suggestion of approach to Malik, I said that my impression was that Dept felt that such a course did not have positive dangers, that the GOC would, we thought, run the risk of looking somewhat ridiculous, that Malik might make sport of the matter, and possibly hold them up to ridicule. But that in summarizing to the GOC what I understood to be the Dept's general reaction, I said it was a "mild discouragement" of such an approach. At the same time I added that naturally we felt this was a matter which the GOC would want to decide for itself, and we were simply giving our general advice on the basis of their request for general advice.

With regard to the other alternative, that is, the suggested approach to the NK Amb at Peiping, I said that I myself saw no danger in that course either, provided that they were careful to avoid any implication of substance in their approach to the NK's. In other words they made an approach to NK simply for the purpose of attempting to establish contact, which was course they took with Peiping regime in Feb, I could see no harm there. On the contrary, it seemed to me that if they got a reaction from NK's that way, it might be interesting.

Finally, they wanted to know what our reaction would be to their sounding out Malik (assuming they succeeded in talking to Malik in their corporate capacity) as to his reaction to their approaching the NK's. I said if they succeeded in meeting with Malik, I saw no danger in sounding out Malik to see what reaction they got from him, provided they did not get into any substantive questions in any of these approaches, but limited themselves at this time to establishing contact.

GOC understood we were to discuss matter again. Grafstrom and Padilla are returning to New York this evening and will telephone me then, at which time I will have further opportunity to clarify our views.

GROSS

795B.5/6–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 6, 1951—6:12 p. m.

1614. Re Korea—proposed appeal for increase in contributions by UN members. Appreciate opportunity to comment on Deptel 964, June 5. We, of course, agree that it is essential to maintain strong initiative to the end of ensuring maximum effort to obtain or increase ground troop commitments from all loyal UN members. It would, of course, be most desirable to have general rather than limited appeal.

Appeal by SYG on UC initiative would not generally be regarded by UN dels as a step promising much result. Not much fruit dropped when he shook the tree last time. Moreover, it is essentially a one-shot operation and therefore it does not lend itself to the purpose of continuing steady pressure. However, an appeal by SYG, as suggested in reftel, might be excellent prelude to subsequent AMC consideration. For example, SYG might conclude circular with statement of his intention to keep AMC advised of responses and results.

We might then confidentially explore with selected members AMC following possible steps in AMC, which would be taken only if they seemed to hold promise in light of diplomatic exploration. This preparatory groundwork is of particular importance because, among other things, 3 members AMC (Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) would be specially affected by contemplated appeal. At some reasonable interval following his circular, US might take initiative in AMC directly or through chairman Sarper, who is in excellent position to do so as rep of UN member with forces in Korea. AMC might meet to discuss desirability of additional troop commitments, and chairman might lead off such meeting with report of his own (prepared by, but not attributed to UC) concerning contributions previously made and responses, if any, to SYG circular. Diplomatic groundwork could be laid bilaterally with AMC members and this in itself would constitute a continuing pressure point.

Some such procedure as suggested above would, I think, combine the advantages of the 2 alternatives set forth in reftel, resulting in prompt issuance of one-shot appeal by SYG, coupled with continuing heat through AMC, both formally and informally. In connection with SYG appeal, only additional comment is that Dept may wish to consider laying foundation for SYG action by advance discussions with selected UN members. Sudden unheralded circular by SYG might be resented by some good friends.

GROSS

357.AK/6-751

Memorandum by John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY [NEW YORK,] June 7, 1951.

Subjects: GOC Decisions: Trygve Lie Program and GOC Reaction

Upon Grafstrom's return from Washington last night Gross gave him the substance of the Department's telegram #970, June 6, supplementing the observations Gross had made to Padilla yesterday (USUN's #1613, June 6).

GOC Decisions

Grafstrom told Gross that Padilla expected to make an approach today to Soldatov (Russian representative on the Trusteeship Council) to find out if Malik would be willing to receive Grafstrom and Padilla sometime in the course of the day.

In conversation with me this morning Grafstrom elaborated as follows: The Good Offices Committee had decided yesterday that Padilla would ask Soldatov to find out if Malik would receive Grafstrom and Padilla as members of the GOC. If the response were affirmative Grafstrom and Padilla would see Malik and would say to him that the GOC had been unable to establish contact and would ask Malik if he had any ideas about establishing contact. If Malik were unwilling to see them as members of the GOC but indicated he would be willing to see them in their capacities as representatives of their governments, it would be explained that Grafstrom had to leave for Sweden tomorrow (Friday) morning; Padilla would then follow up in the course of the next two or three days to have what Grafstrom described as a "cocktail sort of conversation", the objective being the same.

Grafstrom informed me this afternoon that the Trusteeship Council has been meeting all day and that Padilla has been unable to establish contact with Soldatov. Accordingly, Grafstrom plans to leave as scheduled tomorrow morning, and Padilla within the next day or two will try to find out through Soldatov whether Malik will receive Padilla as a member of the GOC, the rest of the procedure being as indicated above.

Grafstrom was authorized by the GOC yesterday to get in touch with the Swedish Ambassador Designate to Peiping and to brief him on the activities of the GOC. Assuming no objection on the part of the Swedish Government, Grafstrom is further authorized to ask the new Swedish Ambassador on behalf of the GOC to remind Mao on the occasion of presenting his credentials (which would probably be the only time he would see Mao) of Entezam's February 14 communication, and to ask Mao if the Chinese Communist authorities wanted to establish contact with the United Nations or not. Grafstrom was further authorized to take up with the new Swedish Ambassador the possibility of the latter establishing an informal contact with the North Korean Ambassador in Peiping. Finally, and particularly in this case assuming no objection on the part of the Swedish Government, Grafstrom himself was authorized in his discretion to get in touch with the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm. Grafstrom recalled in this connection that at the time of Entezam's

February 14 communication it had been passed through the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm as well as through the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping.

Trygve Lie Program and GOC Reaction

Grafstrom also informed me this morning that Lie had informed him (apparently on Tuesday) of the points Lie had in mind for a peaceful settlement in Korea. Lie had given his "plan" to Pearson (who Lie said had a favorable reaction) and to Jebb and Lacoste (both of whom, Grafstrom gathered, made no comment but said they would forward Lie's ideas to their governments). Lie's "plan" as Grafstrom gave it to me follows:

1. The First Committee would be called into session. Its first step would be dissolution of the GOC on its own initiative on the basis of a GOC report of failure.
2. An Assembly declaration of aims for settlement of the Korean affair would be formulated. This would involve a cease-fire along the 38th parallel with appropriate guarantees.
3. There would be a "rejuvenation" of the General Assembly's resolution of 19 September 1950 (A/1406) establishing a special committee to consider the question of Chinese representation.[1] Lie's idea, as Grafstrom gave it to me, was that this resolution would be "rejuvenated" in the sense of an instruction to the Committee to report to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.
4. The present session of the General Assembly would be dissolved.

The GOC discussed these ideas of Lie's in Washington yesterday. They reached the following conclusions which Grafstrom, on behalf of the GOC, communicated to Lie last night:

1. The GOC would take no (repeat no) initiative to bring about its own dissolution and would not make a report of failure.
2. The GOC did not know what kind of a declaration of aims Lie had in mind and reserved their position on this point. (Lie commented that he had in mind the same kind of declaration of aims as the GOC had in mind; Grafstrom responded that this was strange since the GOC itself did not know what kind of a declaration it had in mind.)
3. The GOC felt that there was "hardly a less suitable time" to raise the question of Chinese representation by rejuvenating the 19 September Resolution. They were strongly opposed to this course. Furthermore they did not think that rejuvenating that resolution would "do any good so far as the other side is concerned" because the composition of the committee in question was such as to preclude a recommendation that the Chinese Communists be seated in the UN. Grafstrom added to me the observation that he thought this point of Lie's was merely "stupid".
4. The GOC had no opinion as to whether the present session of the General Assembly should be dissolved. That was a matter they supposed that the majority of the Assembly should decide.

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[1] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 186 ff.

Grafstrom told me that Lie was "very angry" and said that the GOC did not "want to recognize the fact that the GOC was an obstacle" to peaceful settlement.

Grafstrom said he laughed at Lie.[2]

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[2] On June 12, Mr. Ross transmitted to Messrs. Hickerson and Rusk a subsequent memorandum on his talks that day with Jebb and Lacoste concerning Lie's "program" for a peaceful settlement in Korea. The June 12 memorandum read in part as follows:

"I told Jebb we had learned indirectly that Lie had some ideas on this subject; I expressed hope that we could discuss the matter a little more fully within the next few days but that meanwhile I wanted to let him know that we took a dim view of Lie's ideas. Jebb was a little evasive until I told him that I understood, also indirectly, that Lie had discussed his ideas with Jebb. Jebb also queried about adjourning the present session of the Assembly, saying that of course the Assembly could always be reconvened on 24 hours notice. I told him we did not think it was a good idea at all to adjourn this session of the Assembly and that so far as reconvening it on 24 hours notice was concerned this would obviously get us involved in all sorts of complications such as election of officers, et cetera.

"I had a somewhat fuller discussion with Lacoste, indicating our understanding of the points Lie has in mind and our understanding that Lie had spoken to both Jebb and Lacoste, as well as to Pearson. Lacoste said he was glad I had raised the question since he had been pledged to confidence and was uneasy about it. Since I raised the question he had no hesitation about discussing the matter. He said he had had a 'preliminary' instruction from his government which he had not yet communicated to Lie. His instructions were, and he understood that Jebb had similar instructions, to be 'polite but critical' of Lie's ideas. I commented on the four points as we understood them along the lines set forth in Mr. Hickerson's memorandum of June 8 [not printed]. Lacoste appeared to agree with all of these comments. He made, however, the following observations. He said that he thought Lie was motivated to a considerable degree by jealousy of Entezam. He said Lie had a negative attitude toward the Good Offices Committee and wanted to get rid of it because the GOC was a 'tool' of the United States which was not seeking to make peace. He said Lie had approached him in the spirit of trying to get France and the United Kingdom to adopt his ideas as their own and press them upon the United States." (357.AK/6–1251)

795.00/6–851 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 8, 1951—8 p. m.

779. In today's briefing session of Ambs on Korea, Tomlinson (UK) proposed powers with armed forces in Korea request UN SYG approach Chi and North Korean authorities and suggest they appoint Protecting Power under 1949 POW Convention. It was agreed discuss details at next session on basis of memo distributed by Tomlinson.[2]

Asst Secy Hickerson cautioned press leaks of present discussion of new efforts toward peaceful settlement wld make consultations in group of Ambs ineffective.

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[1] This message was sent to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and repeated to the Embassies in Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Cape Town, The Hague, London, Manila, Paris, and Wellington, and to the Legation in Luxembourg; it was repeated by airgram to the Embassies in Bogota and Ottawa.

[2] Not printed.

Hickerson said while he and Rusk not completely convinced time has come for new public statement, if such statement desirable we inclined favor report by Pres as head of UC to SYG along general lines of Mar draft circulated to Ambs at that time and postponed because of MacArthur affair and renewed Commie offensive. We wld tend prefer such report to statement by 16 participating powers but if others strongly supported latter we may go along. US believes public statement might have advantage from public opinion viewpoint but at this time will not contribute materially to settlement since our view enemy has not expended its fighting power. Our view statement shld be cast in general terms excluding detailed conditions of cease-fire. It might emphasize along lines of Acheson testimony that UN military objective wld be accomplished if enemy now stopped fighting. Hickerson emphasized there has been no public or private statement by Chi Commies or North Korean authorities indicating they had changed their objective to drive UN out of Korea. Any public statement issued prior to indication of any such change shld be limited to general terms and more specific terms can be put forth when we have indication Commies willing talk. Hickerson emphasized we have no new draft of statement and reached no conclusion but desire comments. He added, thought may be given also to private approach to precede or follow public statement.

Amb Wrong (Canada) said Canad Govt inclined towards private approach to be published only later. He thought Chi wld be more willing negotiate on private basis. Any approach might refer to what Secy Acheson said re 38th parallel.[3]

Amb Spender (Australia) opposed any offer to Commies as distinguished from declaration of objectives. Austral Govt believes time not ready for offer and rebuff wld create public pressure for more drastic action in some countries and impair unity free world. However, to show public opinion we are doing all we can Amb Spender strongly favored public declaration of principles to be made now stressing UN determination to fight on if aggression continues, no reward for aggressors, limited UN objectives in Korea. He favored statement by participating powers over UC report.

Amb Silvercruys (Belgium) believed Ambs must study more closely possible steps even though future consultations may be necessary to determine whether time for any step has come.

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 497. On June 7, Mr. Acheson, responding to a question from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, reiterated his previous statement that a cease-fire at the 38th parallel would be acceptable to the United Nations; see *Hearings*, p. 2085.

Hickerson suggested continuation of consultations at next briefing session.

ACHESON

795.00/6–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, June 9, 1951—10 a. m.

1032. See mytel 1006, June 1. Dept aware my concern Korean reaction to rumors statements that United States, United Nations favor cease fire at 38th parallel. Aside from issues involved, problem I face daily is how to handle numerous questions which I get in every interview with Rhee, members his Cabinet and other prominent Koreans. This is chief problem in their minds these days and they come to me seeking assurance situation not bad as seems. Fact they not more hysterical attributable to present conviction that Chi Commies will not make peace offers.

Point this msg is to seek clarification US policy, if that possible this stage, for my guidance and background and more specifically to request suggestions on how to calm fears Koreans. Dept's weekly info policy guidance not particularly helpful as it obviously not enough to stress success United Nations arms and firmness United Nations intentions at time when Koreans resent softening these intentions so far as unification Korea concerned.

Koreans do not believe possible restore peace and safeguard against renewal aggression (mentioned for conditions for cease fire) in divided Korea. They doubt negotiation after cease fire will produce agreement on democratic govt for all Korea unless all Korea already liberated by UN Forces. They convinced negots with Sovs or their puppets can only reflect power position of protagonists at time of talks. In their views even if gen agreement for all-Korean Govt reached as condition for cease fire at 38th situation wld be no better than 1945–1950 period when Sovs also committed to same principle. That period ended in aggression. Unless mil situation forced implementation of agreement on all-Korean Govt no real assurance it ever be implemented. Their mania to obtain unification such that they will not admit Chi defeat wld provide "reasonable assurance" that attacks not be resumed future if country not wholly united.

Koreans profess to understand overriding desire end bloodshed and thus end danger war spreading this area. On other hand they think that by continuing war little longer it may be possible secure peace security for all Korea whereas peace based on division Korea wld be short-lived.

Until recent developments I stressed in conversations with Koreans fact UN never committed achieve political objectives by force of arms and that first and paramount objective was mil one to defeat aggressors. Recently because of highly charged emotional atmosphere here I have avoided this line and attempted reassure anxious Koreans that we have not abandoned political objectives, but seek end of fighting soon as aggressors agree, provided can leave reasonable assurance aggression not be resumed; that defeat of enemy inherent in any cease fire wld in itself go long way convince him aggression against Korea doesn't pay; that I unable throw any light on what conditions wld be necessary to satisfy UN on future security Korea but agreed arrangement whereby UN controlled situation throughout peninsula wld be desirable. I also stressed importance not overlooking effect recent allied statements have on propaganda war, and their value in putting aggressors on spot as solely responsible for continuation bloodshed. I suggest this aspect alone justifies such statements.

My efforts reassure Koreans along these lines have been only partially successful and I wld welcome Dept's comments and further guidance.[1]

Muccio

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[1] The Department of State replied in telegram 944, June 9, 7 p. m., to Seoul, which read in part as follows:

"FYI and background in any discussions ROK officials:

"Amb Yang called on Rusk today on urgent instruction from Pusan ascertain basis report recd by ROK that US and other UN members contemplated seeking Commie acceptance settlement Korean conflict through new five-point peace proposal. Yang instructed ascertain Dept what five points were.

"Rusk categorically denied Dept knowledge any five-point peace proposal, or any other peace proposal by US Govt or UN and indicated Yang might so report to his Govt." (795.00/6-951)

895B.13/6-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Pusan, June 9, 1951—3 p. m.

1033. Re Embtel 1019, June 6; 959, May 16; 892, April 23 and Toeca 40, March 14.[1] PriMin and MinFin finally got approval for *won* 6,000 to 1 dollar counterpart rate over strong opposition of Pres who gave his approval with reluctance. Long impasse reached with ROK over counterpart rate and press clamor against revision of rate created strong feeling on part of public, as well as in govt circles, that increase in rate and nonpayment of "UN loan" are factors which will lead to further inflation. In order get full ROK support for measures to combat inflation, incl pricing and prompt sale of imported supplies at realistic counterpart rate, and to dissipate any feeling on part of public that Korea's financial woes are caused by UN–US policies rather than by deficiencies ROK Govt, believe wld be great psychological polit value if US, fol recent establishment new counterpart rate authorized: (1) partial settlement of *won* advances to UN forces by payment to Korea of dollars recd from personnel in exchange for *won* and (2) application of ECA counterpart fund balance on Govt overdraft. Public criticism of MinFin for his vigorous tax collection program is severe. Higher rate for imported aid goods also extremely unpopular with powerful groups as recent press and assembly comment indicates. Consider it essential that strongest possible support, by way of apparent accomplishments, be given soonest to those few officials who appear to recognize validity US recommendations and are willing cooperate in instituting more adequate fiscal and monetary policies.

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[1] For telegram 1019, June 6, see p. 517; the other three telegrams are not printed.

Muccio

795.00/6-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, June 9, 1951—7 p. m.

3567. 1. Bajpai asked see me today. Showed me tel from Panikkar substance of which fols:

Radio reports Acheson informed Senate comite US prepared accept cease-fire at 38th parallel and neither US nor UN contemplates attempt unify Korea by milit means. Furthermore, no reason why admission Commie Chi to UN shld not be discussed in that body.

Panikkar wld appreciate being informed whether this statement attributed Acheson correctly represents views US Govt. If he had formal assurance it does he might find opening take up matter with Chi Govt which thus far has taken position useless engage in discussions since US wld be sure make demands which wld be unacceptable.

2. Bajpai asked if I wld endeavor obtain appropriate statement from US Govt. I said I wld be glad endeavor do so but I had impression Panikkar might have mistaken idea re US attitude towards admission Peking in UN. I doubted US wld be willing make any statement which even indirectly might indicate it wld be willing drop position admission Commie Chi into UN in return for cease-fire and peace in Korea.

Bajpai said in any event it might be helpful if US Govt could state its present position. He thought perhaps at this point clear-cut statement by US in possession Panikkar might be more valuable than any 14-power declaration.

Henderson

795.00/6-1451

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1951.

Subject: Next steps in Korea

Your thoughtful memorandum on the "Next steps in Korea" received here on May 24,[1] was given the deserved attention by the officers concerned with the Korean problem including myself.

A number of points raised in that part of your memorandum which deals with the basic attitude of the United States Government toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question were since restated and clarified in the testimony of Secretary Acheson before the Joint Senate Committee, particularly on June 1 and June 2, 1951.

The Department's position on most of the recommendations set fourth in section VIII of your memorandum was indicated in the series of messages sent to USUN in response to the questions which had arisen out of the GOC discussions during the last two weeks.

Thus, the suggestions in section VIII A and B were considered generally in Department's telegrams 970 of June 6, and 966 of June 6, 1951, as far as the initiative by the GOC was concerned. The Department expressed the view that while a private approach may be useful to explore whether the Communists are willing to negotiate on an honorable basis, it would not be wise at this time for the United Nations to advance whether fact of terms of settlement, be it on the basis of the eight points of January 2 or on any other basis.

As you know, we have begun consultations at Washington with the fifteen powers participating in the armed operations in Korea. The purpose of these consultations is to determine whether the time has come for another effort toward a peaceful settlement and if so, what method should be employed. You will, of course, be kept informed of these consultations and it is our hope that you will continue to give the Department the benefit of your views as the consultations progress.

In the development of our thinking with respect to possible further steps in the Additional Measures Committee we shall keep in mind the ideas in section VIII of your memorandum. As you know we are inclined to avoid at this time a public debate or a resolution in the General Assembly on the United Nations objectives or terms of settlement for Korea.

With respect to paragraph VIII D, our security interests require that any arrangement to end the hostilities must include adequate guarantees against the renewal of the aggression. This would not admit of a unilateral declaration on our part "that the fighting would only be renewed if the aggressor renewed his attack." In the absence of adequate assurances the United Nations forces must remain free to ensure their own security in accordance with the requirements of a given military situation.

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[1] For the memorandum, dated May 23, see p. 447.

The Department will appreciate any further thoughts you may develop on this matter.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

795.00/6-1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 16, 1951—4 p. m.

993. In briefing session of Ambs on Korea June 15, Rusk reported we continue receive helpful suggestions from other Govts re possible statement on peaceful settlement of Korean question and expect further suggestions shortly. He had nothing new to report on US thinking but indicated he will be able to say more re US view shortly. In answer to question by Tomlinson (UK), Rusk said indications are more Ambs thought public approach wld have number of collateral advantages in terms of public opinion although it may not contribute appreciably to settlement in Korea. He said comments from others to date refer not so much to what shld be said but through what means it shld be said and how a public statement cld be related to a possible private approach.

Several Reps including van Roijen (Neth), Le Gallais (Lux), Bonnet (Fr), Wrong (Can), and Jarvie (So Af) supported UK suggestions made in previous briefing session re appointment of Protecting Power for Allied POWs in NK and Chinese hands. Tomlinson (UK) undertook circulate next week draft communication to SYG on this matter.[1]

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram 1020, June 26, to New York reported on the June 22 briefing session of Ambassadors in the following language:

"In June 22 briefing session of Ambs on Korea Tomlinson (UK) agreed circulate new draft of communication to SYG re UN POWs held by Chi Commies and North Koreans. New draft to include slight modifications suggested by US and others.

"No objection expressed to UK proposed procedure that all 16 UN Members with armed forces in Korea send separate similar communications to SYG.

"It was agreed Ambs will endeavor obtain approval from their Govts by July 3 to send separate communications along line of Tomlinson's draft.

"Wrong (Canada) stated Canad Govt agrees proceed on basis separate communications and accepts contents of Tomlinson's draft.

"Also agreed discuss question of possible efforts re Korean settlement in meeting June 27." (795.00/6-2651)

795.00/6-1651 : Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, June 16, 1951—5 p. m.

3661. Embtel 3567 June 9. Bajpai has asked whether Emb had recd info re US position in which GOI interested for purpose transmission Panikkar. I replied in negative.

In absence response I will assume Dept not interested providing special statement this character. Bajpai incidentally left Delhi today on 6 week holiday.

STEERE

795.00/6-1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong, and
Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
New Zealand—Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Benler, First Secretary
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States—FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
USUN, Mr. Gross
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Stein
R, Mr. Furnas
FE, Mr. Hackler
Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope stated that the heaviest enemy activity during the past three days had been in the area east of Kumhwa and north of Sohwa. Elsewhere, enemy activity had been limited to reaction and sometimes very determined reaction to aggressive UN patrols. He reported also that there had been an increase in enemy air activity since last Friday.[1] He read a list of Soviet weapons which had been definitely identified as being used by the Chinese Communists; the Far Eastern Command, however, had not listed the number of the various types of weapons which had been captured nor the number which it was estimated the Chinese Communists still possess.

In summarizing a Far East Command discussion on the enemy's capability to resume the offensive, Captain Pope reported that there had been no indications that reinforcement and re-supply had not continued. Enough time had elapsed to bring fresh troops to the patrol area and the enemy had been carefully screening his activities in the rear areas. In recent days the enemy had been extremely sensitive to UN probing patrols. If the usual pattern were followed, the enemy could now be expected to begin sending out probing patrols which would increase in size up to battalion or regimental strength, at which time of course a full offensive would be under way. In the past two weeks prisoners of war have referred to the last week in June as the time set for a new offensive. It was the estimate of G–2, however, that in view of his heavy losses the enemy would be hard-pressed to meet the deadline for an "anniversary" push.

Captain Pope pointed out a reduction in the enemy strengths which he listed as follows:

NKA on front	55,000
CCF on front	72,000
Total	127,000
NKA in rear	122,000
CCF in rear	205,000
Guerrillas	7,000
Total	461,000

Mr. Rusk referred to a proposal made at the last meeting by Mr. Tomlinson that a communication be addressed to the Secretary General concerning UN prisoners of war and asked Mr. Tomlinson if he had any further suggestion. Mr. Tomlinson stated that after further consideration of his proposal he felt that it would be better if each of the 16 governments sent separate communications to the Secretary General. He gave two reasons for this suggestion: one, that it would be impossible for all 16 governments to agree on the proper reference to the Chinese Communists since some governments recognized the Central People's Government and others did not, and; two, it would not be appropriate for any one government to speak on behalf of another government without having been asked to do so. Mr. Tomlinson said that the UK was anxious to take action at once on the subject of UN prisoners of war and that he hoped the representatives present would be able to decide at the next meeting on action to be taken. It was his suggestion that all of the governments send communications which would be similar or at least not in disagreement. He distributed copies of a suggested communication to the Secretary General[2] which, he said, contained the substance of the approach which the UK wished to make.

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[1] June 15.

In response to a question from Ambassador Silvercruys, Mr. Tomlinson answered that it was only procedure and not a matter of substance which was at issue in deciding whether a joint communication or individual communications should be addressed to the Secretary General. Ambassador Silvercruys suggested that the communication come from the Unified Command and Mr. Rusk agreed that it might be possible for such a communication to be issued by the Unified Command after consultation with the other governments whose armed forces are fighting in Korea. Mr. Millet suggested that the Unified Command had nothing to do with the civilians who had been captured by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists and that a communication from the Unified Command would not include them. Mr. Rusk pointed out that this question of civilian POWs was only one of the number of legal points which should be thoroughly examined. He proposed that all of the representatives attempt to determine the attitudes of their governments on the legal issues involved and the desirability of preparing a collective or individual communication so that the matter could be settled at the next meeting.

After pointing out that Mr. Gross, Deputy Representative to the UN, had come down from New York to attend this meeting, Mr. Rusk stated that there was no consensus either in Washington or at Lake Success on the general nature of any political step which could now be taken. He said that further suggestions would have to be made to see if any one could be accepted by all of the various groups involved. Mr. Gross said that he had nothing further to report. Mr. Rusk pointed out the serious problem in relation to any public statement which was posed by the attitude of the South Koreans; a public statement which clearly indicated a willingness to stop fighting before Korea was militarily unified, would undoubtedly cause very serious trouble in Korea for the UN forces. Practical complications as well as concern for the views of the South Koreans would have to be carefully considered.

Ambassador Silvercruys asked what was the lack of consensus.

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[2] Not printed.

Mr. Rusk replied that among the questions which had not been solved were the desirability of issuing a public statement at any time, of issuing it now, the proper channel to use in making a further political move, and the future of the Good Offices Committee. Ambassador Silvercruys suggested that all of these problems be discussed informally and without commitment at future meetings of the present group and Mr. Rusk made it clear that he agreed that the group was fully competent to decide what to discuss and in what matter.

Ambassador Wrong raised the question of making a statement on the first anniversary of the attack on the Republic of Korea and suggested that the Secretary General of the UN or the Unified Command should make such an anniversary statement. It was generally agreed that a statement containing any new conditions for settlement would have to be an agreed text and that it would be almost impossible to obtain agreement from the 16 countries involved before June 25. Ambassador Wrong suggested that no one could take exception to a statement by either the UN or the UC which merely brought together all of the previous important statements which had been made concerning Korea. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Hickerson to report to the group on Friday any arrangements which were in preparation for a UN or a UC statement.

It was agreed that in the near future the group would discuss informally the problem of making a public statement concerning a settlement and the proper time for releasing it.[3]

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[3] Consideration of a statement of Allied aims in Korea was in effect overtaken by the events which led to the military armistice talks; see the memorandum of conversation on the briefing of Ambassadors on June 27, p. 557.

795B.5/6–1951

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State has been continuing its efforts to obtain additional ground force contingents from other United Nations members for service in Korea along the lines set forth in my letter to you of April 26 and previous correspondence.

In order to reinforce our own efforts by all available means, this Department intends to ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to address another appeal for contributions of ground forces to United Nations members that have not yet contributed armed forces in the Korean conflict. A copy of the Department's proposed message to the Secretary General is attached.[1]

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[1] The text of the proposed message was the same as that embodied in telegram 964, June 5, to New York, p. 513.

You will note that the message requests that the appeal be sent only to those states that have not yet contributed armed forces. It was believed to be impractical to broaden this appeal to include a request for increased contributions from states already participating actively in the Korean conflict in view of the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional troops. In Acting Secretary Lovett's letter of March 31 it was stated that it would be desirable for the United Kingdom to increase its ground forces up to division strength if this result could be obtained without interference with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Schedules. In my letter to you of April 26, I requested the views of the Department of Defense on the question whether an increase in the United Kingdom contribution would now be possible under this condition.

In this connection the Department of State wishes to inquire whether it continues to be the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional troops for use in Korea.

We should appreciate your views on this question as soon as may be convenient.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

795B.5/6–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 19, 1951—7 p. m.

995. Re urtel 1614 June 6 regarding proposed appeal to UN Members for troop contributions to Korean effort, Dept, after further informal conversations with Defense, believes it desirable proceed soon as possible with appeal by SYG on behalf UC to those Members which heretofore have not made armed force contributions.

In this connection, Dept agrees with your view that foundation for SYG appeal be laid by advance discussions with number UN Members. Dept wishes avoid resentment which developed at time Jul 14 appeal last year when it was not clear that SYG action being taken on behalf UC. Further, number UN Members resented not being informed prior to appeal.

Dept has had under advisement fol: (1) Nature of discussions with other UN Members; (2) Number of UN Members which shld be approached informally prior to appeal.

As to first point, while Dept believes advance diplomatic preparation is necessary, we wish to avoid extensive exploratory conversations which cld cause undue delay and negate measurably advantage of speed which SYG appeal on behalf UC wld give. Dept anxious to make appeal soonest in hopes that such public request will act as catalyst in bringing to fruition number bilateral negotiations.

In order delay be avoided, Dept suggests discussions be limited to advance notification of action contemplated. Dept suggests further you outline generally contents of note we expect to send to SYG quoted in Deptel 964.[1] It may be desirable to place emphasis on fact that UC is making further appeal for additional troops because no end of hostilities is foreseeable at this time.

As to second point, USUN shld inform fol: (1) 52 Members which indicated support for either June 25 or 27 res; and (2) Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Yugoslavia. In event USUN is not able to inform some Members because of unavailability of reps at UN Headquarters, it is suggested you inform Dept which states not contacted.

Dept agrees with your view that we shld press for additional troops from UN Members on a continuing basis. However, rather than using AMC for this purpose, where discussions might possibly lead to an acrimonious debate on entire Korean situation causing delay in further UN efforts to get troops, Dept prefers at this time to continue pressing for additional troops by means of current bilateral negotiations being conducted with contributory and non-contributory UN Members.

Since appeal by SYG on behalf of UC wld be directed towards Members who have not previously contributed, only two NATO states, Norway and Denmark, wld thus be included. FYI Defense considers that communication of this nature from SYG to aforementioned two countries wld not be contrary to JCS injunction against "pressing" for additional troops for Korea from continental Eur NATO countries.

Dept recommends sending communication to SYG for publication prior to June 25.

ACHESON

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[1] Dated June 5, p. 513.

795.00/5-2551

George F. Kennan to the Secretary of State[1]

PRINCETON, June 20, 1951.

DEAR DEAN: I am taking this informal means to say to you something which is much on my mind, these days. I will ask you to forgive the penmanship, which is not improved by a dislocated collar-bone (the penalty of my old-fashionedness in riding a bicycle, and my new-fashionedness in riding it too fast).

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[1] Concerning the provenance of this document, see footnote 1, p. 460.

It has long been my conviction that ever since our entry into the Korean hostilities the dominant elements in the Kremlin's attitude toward the Korean situation have been (*a*) a reluctance to see this situation develop into an outright U.S.-Soviet conflict (meaning a world war), but (*b*) a mortal apprehension of the appearance of U.S. ground forces either in Manchuria or on the Soviet-Korean border, and of any U.S. air action against Soviet strategic positions or facilities in Manchuria,—coupled with a readiness to go to great lengths to deter us from any such actions and to resist them if they occur.

Nothing that has happened since the beginning of July last year seems to me to have thrown any doubt on this hypothesis; on the contrary, Soviet behavior has confirmed it at every turn. Of course, the Soviet leaders would like to see us tossed out of Korea; that would solve all their problems as far as we are concerned. But having once made their initial mistake of starting this business on the chance that we would not come in, and having realized the extent of their miscalculation, they are now concerned primarily to liquidate the business on terms not too damaging to their prestige or too disruptive of their relations with the Chinese communists.

On the other hand, they are congenitally suspicious of our motives and inclined to regard us as unfathomable and unreliable opponents (in the sense that "God knows what they will do"). Our talk about principles and the U.N. and aggression is to them only a sign of wily hypocrisy and devious motives on our part. And to this must be added the fact that they are pathologically sensitive about their borders and the areas adjacent to them, and for this reason the presence of our forces in that vicinity for nearly a year has been for them a nerve-wracking and excruciating experience, straining to the limit their self-control and patience.

Now when we went north of the parallel the first time, I believe it was with reluctance that the Kremlin encouraged the Chinese communists to intervene—that this was, in fact, a rather desperate measure on their part, taken because the only alternative seemed to be their own involvement, which they did not want.

Now that card has been played, and it hasn't worked. Today, if we continue to advance into North Korea without making vigorous efforts to achieve a cease-fire, I fear they will see no alternative but to intervene themselves. And my reason for writing you is simply to give you my impression—which I admit to be instinctive and not supportable by "intelligence"—that the silence and scrupulous non-interference in the Korean fighting on the part of the Soviet Union may conceal the most extreme turmoil of decision in the Kremlin, and that the hour of Soviet action, in the absence of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, may be much closer than we think. This action would not necessarily take the form of immediate intervention in Korea; it could be diversionary in nature—in which case a renewal of trouble in Berlin or some special effort to capitalize on the Iranian situation would seem the most likely possibilities. But my antennae tell me that if the Korean fighting does not stop soon, we should watch out for trouble.

For this reason, I hope the fighting will stop soon. For a war with the Soviet Union would probably prove a catastrophe for everyone concerned, including ourselves, when all was said and done. And the Korean operation has brought us much greater blessings then we seem to realize, even if it stops now at—or near—the parallel. Whether they show it or not, the Chinese communists have been taught a terrific lesson; and our action in Korea, so often denounced as futile, may prove to have been the thing that saved southeast Asia and laid the foundation for the renewal of some sort of stability in the Far East.

If you think fit, I would hope that these observations might be made available to Bedell Smith.[2]

With all best regards,

Sincerely, GEORGE KENNAN

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[2] Director of Central Intelligence.

795.00/6-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 20, 1951—7 p. m.

2225. Urtel 3567 Jun 9. Secy's statement Jun 2 on settlement in Korea is correctly quoted *N.Y. Times* Jun 3 page 65 columns 4, 5, and 6, and has also been transmitted to you by airgram.

Decision whether Panikkar approach Chicoms on basis Secy's testimony to determine whether Secy's statements provide basis for discussion entirely one for independent determination by GOI. However if this is done suggest GOI provide Panikkar full text, as second para urtel appears indicate Panikkar does not have full understanding Secy's statements. In particular note shld be made of necessity for reliable assurances against renewal aggression, and that issues relating to Formosa and Chicom admission UN not a part of Korean question.

Secy's statements entirely consistent with many other expressions

US policy set forth in public statements by Pres, and by other US officials in UN and elsewhere. No additional formal statements US views believed required at this time.

ACHESON

795B.5/6–2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, June 20, 1951—7:15 p. m.

1681. Re appeal for armed force contributions for Korea. We informed Lacoste (France) and, in Jebb's absence this afternoon, Laskey (UK), of Dept's decision (Deptel 995, June 19) address communication to SYG before June 25 concerning appeal for armed force contributions, giving to each of them close paraphrase of proposed communication as set forth in Deptel 964, June 5.

Laskey recalling that sometime past he had mentioned to Jebb that we had such an appeal under consideration said Jebb had so reported to FonOff. In response to this report FonOff has sent Jebb reaction as follows: FonOff did not much like idea of appeal as envisaged because they are doubtful if appeal would produce result desired. They felt that if, as was probable, appeal produced only lukewarm and evasive replies, more harm than good would be done. They felt that probably we have obtained about all we can obtain in way of useful contributions. They feel that best chance for additional contributions lies in private bilateral negotiations. They felt, however, that if assured in advance that at least two or three countries which have not yet made any contribution would pretty definitely come forward with fairly substantial contribution there might be something to be said for making appeal.

Laskey telephoned later to say he had reported to Jebb who had little to add to FonOff observations except to suggest that it might help to meet FonOff objections if SYG Lie were to issue a review or assessment of Korean operations over past year, including perhaps in such review an appeal for additional forces. With respect to all of these observations we made no comment except to say that we would, of course, transmit them to Department.

In communicating to Lacoste Dept's decision, as well as substance of proposed communication to SYG, we stressed as we had to Laskey and in accordance with Deptel 995, factor that further appeal be made because no end of hostilities foreseeable at this time. Lacoste commented on this point that it sounded a "dismal note". It will convey, he said, impression that there is no hope of letup in Korean war at time when many people here and abroad have been saying that there was such hope.

Lacoste thought there were two ways of looking at matter. On one hand impression would undoubtedly be created of hopeless situation and this impression would be used propagandawise against US and against UN by Communists. On other hand, Lacoste indicated he felt personally there was perhaps something to be said for making things as clear as possible in sense that since we have heard no indication of a desire for peace from Communists that we intend to see things through and are not weakening in any way.

Lacoste subsequently telephoned back to say that he had given further thought to matter. He recalled that at time of AMC discussions with UK and French dels, UK had urged that additional forces should be sought but that we had taken position that an appeal for additional forces was not very likely to bring substantial result. It was pointed out to Lacoste that the issue, of course, at that time was whether or not priority should be given to economic measures. Nevertheless, Lacoste went on, he "wondered" whether the comment which we made at that time was not still well-founded. He wondered whether unless we have info indicating that we may expect fairly substantial additional contributions it would serve any useful purpose to make an appeal. If we do not have such info he would expect that appeal would be relatively fruitless. At same time it would give appearance to Commies that we have serious need of additional forces; Commies would be encouraged, therefore, if appeal yields no substantial result.

We did not comment on Lacoste's observations except to say we would bring them to attention of Dept.

We also informed Feller (Secretariat) in sense indicated, in view of fact that Lie has frequently raised this question with us, and asked him to inform Lie. Feller asked if we wanted Lie's comments on proposed action. He was informed we are always glad to receive Lie's comments but our decision to address communication to Lie before June 25 was firm. Feller then commented on emphasis concerning no foreseeable end of hostilities at this time. He felt that this might embarrass Lie since Lie has had view that appeal for additional forces should follow new attempt at peaceful settlement. Feller wondered whether we might not make appropriate reference to our continuing desire to end war on honorable terms but that so far no response had been received from Commies to peaceful settlement overtures.

Additional conversations will be reported as promptly as possible.

Gross

357.AD/6-2151

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (Green)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1951.

Mr. Johnson (NA) told me yesterday, as a result of a telephone call which I made to him, that the Secretary had discussed with Under [*Deputy*] Secretary of Defense Lovett the question of the relationship agreement between the United Nations Command and UNKRA.

It had been arranged that Mr. Lovett would take this matter up with the Joint Secretaries of the Defense Department today. In preparation for that meeting the paper attached was supplied by FE to Mr. Lovett. I assume that the paper was cleared with someone in UNE but there is no indication of that. Mr. Johnson apologized for not having kept us informed of developments and sent me the attached copy of the paper at my request.

Mr. Hickerson and I have read the paper and we think it is a good presentation of the subject.

Please return the attachment to me.

DURWARD V. SANDIFER

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [undated.]

The Problem:

To determine the relationship between the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and the United Nations Command; specifically, the action to be recommended to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the letter of May 16, 1951, from the Secretary of State on this subject.[1]

Chronology:

The United States sponsored and strongly supported the establishment of a United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1950.[2] In deference to the United States point of view and recognition of the fact that the United States would be the major contributor, an American, Mr. Donald Kingsley, was appointed Agent General of this organization.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1297.

In February Mr. Kingsley agreed in principle, in consultation with General MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo, to a complete command relationship between CINCUNC and UNKRA until the termination of hostilities.

In March Mr. Kingsley advised the United States Government after strong objections from the United Nations Secretary General, the United Kingdom, Canadian and Australian Governments, it would not be possible for him to accept this command relationship for all phases of UNKRA activities.

In May Sir Arthur Rucker, Mr. Kingsley's Deputy, reached an agreement with General Ridgway in Tokyo involving independence in a very limited sphere of activity with tight coordination and complete power of veto by CINCUNC. CINCUNC recommended to the Department of the Army that this arrangement be accepted stating that the division of responsibility was regretted but that this was the best agreement it could get. The Secretary of State's letter of May 16, 1951, supports this position.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they do not concur in the arrangement recommended by UNKRA, CINCUNC and by the Department of State and have stated, "that from the military point of view, the JCS believes it absolutely essential for CINCUNC to retain undivided command over all economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue."

Discussion:

Economic assistance activities in Korea now include:

1. Provision of direct civilian relief assistance such as food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies and other consumer items.
2. Provision of other categories of needed supplies which serve common military and civilian purposes.
3. Provision of necessary equipment, raw materials and other supplies for the Korean civilian economy, together with appropriate technical assistance.
4. Assistance to local authorities to insure the proper distribution, issue and utilization of essential civilian supplies.
5. High level technical advice and assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea.
6. Planning for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea.

All parties concerned entirely agree that the first four of the above mentioned items must continue to be the entire responsibility of CINCUNC during the period of active hostilities. In accordance with the Secretary of State's letter of May 16, 1951, all UNKRA personnel engaged in such activities will be integrated into the staffs or units of the United Nations command until hostilities cease and CINCUNC concurs in UNKRA assuming these responsibilities.

Under the agreement arrived at between General Ridgway and UNKRA and recommended by the Secretary of State, UNKRA would be responsible for the performance of the last two of the above mentioned activities with complete coordination with the United Nations command and complete freedom by the United Nations command in determining whether any plans or recommendations by UNKRA effect his military mission and if so determined, complete power of veto by the UN command over the implementation of such plans or recommendations.

There is attached a draft letter from the Department of State to the Agent General of UNKRA which is acceptable to the Department of State as a replacement for the similar draft letter enclosed with the Secretary of State's letter of May 16, 1951.[3] This new draft is entirely consistent with the arrangements between UNKRA and General Ridgway but clarifies certain obscurities in the original draft letter.

It is the belief of the Department of State that these arrangements do not conflict with the principle of undivided responsibility of CINCUNC. The understanding gives to CINCUNC sole responsibility for short term economic aid, and an absolute veto over any plans or recommendations of UNKRA in the field of high level technical assistance and long range planning. Thus the substance of control remains with CINCUNC embodied in an understanding which will ensure that:

1. UNKRA can and will promptly undertake the very urgent and vital task of strengthening the non-military aspects of the ROK Government to correspond with the program for strengthening the ROK armed forces.
2. UNKRA will carry out necessary planning on a realistic basis for its post-hostilities operations and will be in position promptly to undertake such operations when able to do so.
3. There is maximum participation in and contributions to the relief and reconstruction task in Korea by other members of the UN.
4. There is an early announcement that UNKRA has undertaken some tasks in Korea which will assist in offsetting the present very adverse Korean reactions to public discussions of UN military objectives, as well as assist in offsetting the adverse effects of the deactivation of ECA which will be completed June 30.[4]

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[3] Neither draft is here printed, but the draft attached to this memorandum was substantially similar to the text of the letter as sent by Mr. Acheson to Mr. Kingsley on July 11, p. 656.

[4] Telegram 1686, June 21, from New York reported that Mr. Kingsley was greatly concerned over the long delay in approval of the UNC–UNKRA agreement and by rumors that the Unified Command in Washington had rejected it. The telegram went on to say that Kingsley was apparently fully prepared to withdraw UNKRA personnel from Korea if the stalemate continued. The U.N. Secretariat in turn was deeply concerned over what this move would mean for the entire role of the United Nations in Korea and the attitude of the governments participating in UNKRA and the emergency relief program. (357.AD/6–2151)

795B.5/6-2151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, June 21, 1951—5:15 p. m.

1684. Re appeal for armed force contributions for Korea further my tel 1681, June 20, and Deptel 995, June 19.

1. We have now informed UN members as instructed, except fol who cld not be reached: Burma, Ethiopia, Iceland, Luxemburg, Panama, El Salvador and Yemen.

2. In addition to comments reported mytel 1681, we have received fol: Castaneda (Guatemala) felt appeal to be a very good idea; Wan (Thailand) and Esquivel (Costa Rica) thoroughly approved the appeal; Hill (Australia) was pleased at idea of public effort aimed at those not yet contributing; Kakar (Afghanistan) commented that his govt has already made it clear that it cannot contribute troops for Korea for domestic economic and political reasons; Mendez (Philippines) felt appeal is in accordance with Philippine policy and not new; Munoz (Argentina) was personally pessimistic about affirmative reply by his govt since Pres. Peron after a demonstration at Rosario and other indications of apparent public apathy had issued a statement that no troops wld be sent abroad "unless the people wished it"; Chauvet (Haiti), pointing out that his govt has no organized army but merely *gendarmérie*, thought a number of volunteers could be collected without difficulty, their training and transportation to be paid by others; Blanco (Cuba) recalled Cuban offer of a company which administration wld then plan to increase to a battalion, but pending action by Cuban Senate administration cld do no more; Fabregat (Uruguay) attempted to interpret notification as an indication that a cease-fire is quite impossible; Quevedo (Ecuador) felt subject might have to be covered by Pres. Galo Plaza at his UN press conference June 26. Ecuadorean Army of about 3000 cld probably not supply contingent, considering pending boundary dispute with Peru which has far larger army, and considering needs of internal security.

GROSS

795B.5/6-2251

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 22, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of June 19th concerning additional ground force contingents from other United Nations Members for service in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now have under review the question of whether an increase in the United Kingdom contribution is now possible, as well as the matter of pressing the other NATO countries to furnish additional troops for use in Korea. Their re-examination of this matter is expected to be concluded in the near future.

As soon as these views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff become available I have asked the Secretary of the Army to undertake discussions with you on the subject. In the meantime, this Department concurs in the dispatch of your proposed message to the Secretary General of the United Nations asking him to address another appeal for contributions of ground forces to the United Nations Members that have not yet contributed armed forces in the Korean conflict.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

611.93/6–2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, June 22, 1951—4 p. m.

Unnumbered. Strictly eyes only for the Secretary personally. This Embassy's second in special series.[1]

Pursuant your second this series,[2] Chinese speaking First Secretary[3] called Peiping Embassy 1 p. m. today with informal personal note from me for delivery Peiping Ambassador.[4] Was received by Second Secretary who, altho informed note important, declined accept it on basis "no diplomatic relations exist". He did accept calling card bearing our First Secretary's telephone numbers to enable Chinese to get in touch discreetly with us further if they desire and he agreed inform his Minister in matter.

While note has thus not yet been delivered, we have established contact and channel for exchange. Seems possible that when Minister and Ambassador informed, we may hear further. Propose wait approximately 72 hours and if nothing has then been forthcoming that Embassy Secretary return and inquire whether Peiping Ambassador prepared receive me personally privately, for purpose delivery oral communication.

KIRK

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[1] A notation on the source text indicated that the first message in this series was not received in the Central Files of the Department of State at the time when this message was retired to the files in June 1955.

[2] No copies of the outgoing telegrams in this series have been found in the Department of State files.

[3] Richard M. Service.

[4] Wang Chia-hsiang.

795B.5/6–2251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 22, 1951—8:48 p. m.

1703. Re Korea: Appeal for additional ground forces. UN issued advance press release today of UNSYG's letter transmitting appeal of UC for additional troops in Korea. (Press release time 7 a. m., June 23). Press release states letter, together with UC's communication, has been sent following 39 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina. Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia. Following is text of letter:

"I have received from the US Govt, acting in its capacity as the UC, a communication concerning the need for additional ground troops from member govts of the UN for the collective effort in Korea.[1] The UC is conducting extensive discussions in connection with this problem. Particularly with states which are already contributing armed forces. It has requested me to send communications on its behalf to member govts which previously gave a favorable reply to either the SC res of 25 June 1950 or to its res of 27 June 1950, but which have not yet contributed armed forces for the collective effort in Korea.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a communication from the UC.

As SYG I respectfully request your govt to give earnest consideration to this appeal in the light of the necessity of strengthening the collective effort in Korea so long as the aggressors continue to fight against the UN forces there.

I should be grateful if you would inform me of the decision of your govt and would communicate with the UC about any detailed arrangements."

GROSS

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[1] The text of the communication from the Unified Command is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 53; it is the same text as that embodied in telegram 9[illegible]4, June 5, to New York (p. 513) except that it was sent to Secretary-General Lie from Mr. Gross rather than from Secretary Acheson.

Editorial Note

On the evening of Saturday, June 23, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, Yakov Malik, delivered a radio broadcast on "The

Price of Peace", the thirteenth in a series sponsored by the United Nations radio. In the course of his address, which was generally critical of United States postwar policy, Mr. Malik stated that the Soviet Union based its policy on the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, socialism and capitalism. The address concluded with the following words:

> "The Soviet Union will continue its struggle to strengthen peace and avert a new world war. The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that it is possible to defend the cause of peace.
>
> "The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled.
>
> "This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the thirty-eighth parallel.
>
> "Can such a step be taken?
>
> "I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.
>
> "I think that, surely, is not too great a price to pay in order to achieve peace in Korea."

An advance copy of the text was dispatched to the Department of State in niact telegram 1705, June 23, 3:50 p. m. from New York (310.361/6–2351), and the Department issued the following statement on the same day:

> "If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression in Korea, we are, as we have always been, ready to play our part in bringing an end to hostilities and in assuring against their resumption. But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than propaganda. If it is more than propaganda, adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict are available." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, page 45)

Two days later, on June 25, near the conclusion of an address given at noon at Tullahoma, Tennessee, President Truman made the following remarks:

> "We are ready to join in a peaceful settlement in Korea now, just as we have always been. But it must be a real settlement which fully ends the aggression and restores peace and security to the area and to the gallant people of Korea.
>
> "In Korea and in the rest of the world we must be ready to take any steps which truly advance us toward world peace. But we must avoid like the plague rash actions which would take unnecessary risks of world war or weak actions which would reward aggression." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pages 362–363)

310.361/6-2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1951.

Subject: Malik's June 23 Broadcast.

Participants: Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

Mr. Kim called today in the absence of the Ambassador who is in New York and stated that they had received instructions from their Government to inquire as to whether or not we had any information in addition to that which has been published and to express the desire of the ROK to be represented in any discussions that may take place.

Mr. Rusk assured them that we had no information of any kind in addition to that which had been published. He pointed out that Mr. Malik's statement on Korea obviously left many questions unanswered.

There followed a long discussion during which Mr. Kim and Mr. Han expressed the concern of the Government of the ROK as well as the Korean people over any return to the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950. Mr. Rusk developed in detail the problems involved. Mr. Rusk, in particular, pointed out that no Government has recognized the authority of the Government of the ROK over the territory north of the 38th parallel and that no Government has committed itself to unifying Korea by force. He pointed out the changes in the power situation of the world that have taken place during this generation and the vital necessity that the Koreans maintain the closest type of cooperation with the UN because only through such means would it be possible for them to take advantage of any situation which might arise in their favor and permit the attainment of unification.

In reply to Mr. Rusk's question, Mr. Kim stated that the Government of the ROK had received no indication whatever of any attempts by the North Korean regime to make contact with them.

611.93/6-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, June 25, 1951—3 p. m.

Unnumbered. Strictly eyes only for the Secretary personally. This is Embassy's third this special series. Embassy Secretary again called at Peiping Embassy 12 noon today 25th with view either (1) delivery informal note or (2) inquiry whether Peiping Ambassador would meet me privately. Chinese doorman after apparently seeking instructions in Embassy stated no one available to receive Secretary and no use his waiting.

In circumstances I conclude that Peiping Ambassador, who must have been informed calls last Friday [1] and today, not prepared have direct contact us here. There is, of course, channel of approach thru Russians and Swedes. If you desire utilize either of those, I suggest the Swedes but note Ambassador Sohlman [2] plans leave Moscow vacation Wednesday June 27. Doubt advisability using Indians and Indian Ambassador in Paris in any case.[3]

KIRK

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[1] June 22; see the unnumbered telegram on p. 545.

[2] Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow.

[3] No further messages in this series have been found in the Department of State files, nor any evidence that there were additional messages.

693.0024/6–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, June 25, 1951—4 p. m.

1087. Re Deptel 970, June 21.[1] Impressions POW team re conditions North Korea China, capabilities CCF, based purely fon interrogations recent prisoners as follows:

CCF morale entering last offensive good. Surrenders due hopelessness mil position. POW's report no food 2 or 3 days before capture, consequent breakdown discipline order. Psychological war operations encourage surrenders under these conditions. Morale based primarily on confidence victory thru numbers, record. Fourth FA victories December, January, promise rotation after 2 front-line battles.

Majority CCF troops China North Korea ex-CNA men. Many express pro-KMT, anti-CCP sentiments in POW camp, but battle records testimony others indicate this attempt secure preferential treatment. Believe ex-CNA troops in gen reliable, well-trained fighters for CCF.

Most CCF units Korea equipped Soviet weapons transport. Soviet troops training units seen Manchuria, no Soviets reported with CCF units in Korea, CCF propaganda effectively portrays war as Chinese not Soviet, Soviet aid as that of an ally. No feeling CCP becoming Soviet puppet.

Conditions North Korea greatly deteriorated. Food shortage, with extreme hardship some starvation among civilians near east-central front-line areas. CCF stopped requisitioning local food supplies about end April. Farm production down. Less than one-fifth fields cultivated near front-line areas, although to rear probably most land planted. Labor shortage, absolute lack fertilizer expected reduce yields. North Korean army now consists of manpower remnants; its effectiveness greatly reduced below July 1950, now useful principally in guerrilla-like operations, and probably will decline with casualties. North Korean regime operating at low effectiveness. Major effort to maintain farm output. Tenacity and ingenuity shown in effort restore rail lines major roads, but these efforts largely frustrated by continued bombing.

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[1] This telegram, dated June 19, is not printed (693.0024/6–1951). In it, the Department had requested information on the basis of interviews with recently captured Chinese soldiers on a number of topics which are covered in the source text.

Hardship resulting deterioration North Korean army civilian morale. Food shortage blamed on CCF. Rising animosity noted reciprocated between CCF troops and North Korean troops civilians.

Strain on CCF transport serious. Deterioration quality rations major source troop discontent during May. Mobility of troops limited by necessity rely fixed supply depots.

POW's agree best CCF armies destroyed. Peng Teh-huai[2] said personally directing last offensive to insure victory. Large number replacements evidenced, including new recruits of few months service and experienced troops from units in China. POW's believe CCF can and will continue fight, but quality of troops will drop. Mobilization program China regarded as source of ample new recruits, evidence CCF ability willingness sustain tremendous losses. POW's agree manpower short in northeast North China to point affecting farm output, believe future replacements from newly organized militia forces South China.

No serious unrest opposition to CCP reported within China.

Guerrillas successfully suppressed Szechwan, local militia now maintaining order. Reduced guerrilla forces may exist Kweichow, Yunnan. Guerrillas aligned with lawless predatory elements, generally discredited. Morale villages generally reported low due draft tax levies, but no evidence either active passive opposition.

Believe CCF has capacity continue pour disciplined armies into Korea, but due logistical difficulties cannot mount dangerous offensive barring significant increases Soviet commitments. Believe stalemate wld increase North Korean resentment towards CCF, increase CCF difficulties.

Sent Dept 1087, rptd info Tokyo 199.

MUCCIO

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[2] Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea.

795.00/6-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, June 25, 1951—7 p. m.

2166. Hedged though it may be as being expression of will of Soviet people rather than attitude of Soviet Govt itself and as being only first step in solution of problem, concept in Malik's radio address that cease fire should be arranged between belligerents in Korea and troops withdrawn from 38th Parallel represents significant new turn in Soviet approach to Korea in that it abandons as immediate conditions for talks about peaceful settlement in Korea, agreement for complete withdrawal foreign troops from Korea and discussion of admission CPR to UN and disposition of Formosa. This may reflect concern over deepening difficulties in FE for both USSR and CPR and hence may be indication their willingness settle on something less than previously announced objectives. This not necessarily so, of course, and Sovs have much to gain through this maneuver by enhancing alleged position as peacemaker and if offer does result in talks of any kind, having suitable forum for pounding home free propaganda themes. However, attitude of Sov people as expressed by Malik does appear to coincide with views of UN as expressed cease fire resolution as far as first step is concerned. Hence Embassy believes it would be desirable investigate any element of sincerity that may be contained. Malik's address does not constitute a proposal and makes no reference to machinery for getting together on basis of "belief of Soviet peoples". Believe we shld, in any answering statement, point out that we are interested to hear Sov views but have recd no indication from Commie belligerents that they desire to take such first step toward attaining peace in Korea.

Regardless of whether or not there is element of sincerity in views expressed by Malik Emb feels that strong counter blast shld be made to propaganda argumentation preceding his remarks on a cease fire and armistice in Korea. As usual they are sophistry throughout and can be very convincingly refuted. Self righteous Sov role of peacemaker wld appear less impressive before world if we note that Korean war started with Commie aggression and that hostilities cld have ended many months ago if Peiping Reds had not intervened and if Sovs had supported UNGA cease fire res. Main emphasis shld be placed on the ridiculous nature of the Sov position which continually castigates the govts of US, UK and Fr as reactionary and as not representing their peoples (thereby by clear implication not really capable of being responsible parties to any settlement) and then scoring them for not yielding to the demands of the Soviet Union as a national state. Much play shld be given to the fact that the USSR must be obliged to take into account fact that these govts do represent will of their peoples and that no real settlement possible until such recognition forthcoming. Issues such as Korea settlement fully placed before peoples of those countries and policies concerned are their response. On other hand, in spite of Malik's statements there is no evidence from inside or outside USSR that Soviet peoples are being accorded opportunity freely express themselves on settlement of Korean question or in fact any other specific international problem. Strong propaganda counter blast as suggested above wld, in Embassy opinion, in no way have detrimental effect on any possible serious discussions of matter. Even if Soviets desire with this approach to embark on path toward settlement, it is quite clear that they intend exploit every opportunity through propaganda to attain maximum support for their position on part of world public and we shld likewise not ignore any chance to do the same and above all not to let their specious arguments stand.

If Sovs hope that Malik's proposal will produce cease fire and armistice, it is possible that Commies, in face of inability to drive UN forces into sea with present Commie commitments in Korea, have in mind one of two courses: (*a*) to call off war in Korea as bad job which can be renewed under more favorable circumstances. Commies wld retain control North Korea and wld hope thru subversion in ROK to make some progress. They wld also hope that with cessation Korean hostilities unity of UN states which have supported collective action in Korea wld degenerate. Also, expense of keeping large UN forces in ROK wld be expected prove unattractive as time goes on; (*b*) to hope to use fairly short ceasefire period for improvement Commie mil sitn in North Korea to extent necessary to make further military effort.

Dept pass London, Paris, Tokyo. Sent Dept 2166, rptd info London 396, Paris 679, Tokyo 39.

KIRK

810.861/6-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, June 25, 1951—7 p. m.

6800. 1. At urgent request from FonOff Jebb, UKUN, has cabled to foll effect re Malik broadcast:

(*a*) Statement seriously meant;

(*b*) Doubtless made after consultation with CPG but CPG completely disassociated as officially they not belligerents;

(*c*) Intention perhaps arrange mtg between US and USSR; if mtg fruitful, then CPG may be brought in;

(*d*) Failure consult Malik as to meaning might give USSR propaganda advantage;

(*e*) Malik probably wld not wish talk to Entezam or even Indian reps UN, much less to Trygve Lie;

(*f*) Suggest convenient opportunity approach Malik afforded at SC dinner to be given by him Thursday.[1]

2. Dept has doubtless seen report *People's Daily* (official organ CCP) has strongly endorsed Malik broadcast. Broadcast likewise warmly supported by London *Daily Worker*. These facts wld seem to indicate consultation with CPG and party line well established in advance broadcast.

3. Judging from general round-up FonOff opinion it seems too early attempt assess meaning Malik move. Obviously west cannot take it for granted Malik insincere. Broadcast cleverly timed to follow immed after break-up of mtgs in Paris.[2] It enables USSR continue pose sponsor world peace. If any Malik-west conversations fruitful, USSR can show it took lead in bringing them about; if otherwise, blame will of course be laid to lack of sincerity of western nations. FonOff notes Vishinsky probably remains indisposed and therefore any conversations in Moscow this subject wld perforce be with Gromyko, thus extending familiar fruitless runaround, with Gromyko continuing control situation.

GIFFORD

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[1] June 28; for a report on Mr. Gross's talk with Malik at the dinner, see telegram Unmis 47, June 29, from New York, p. 590.

[2] The conference of Deputies of the Foreign Ministers adjourned on June 21 after 74 sessions without having achieved its basic purpose of drawing up an agenda for a Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting; for related documentation, see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

310.361/6-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 25, 1951—7 p. m.

831. Re Malik's Jun 23 broadcast and Dept statement same date carried Wireless Bulletin 152 Jun 24,[2] we believe it desirable to limit our discussion at this stage to an attempt to clarify Malik's statement on certain points. We do not wish to embark upon negots on the content of cease fire and armistice arrangements without knowing more about what Sov Govt had in mind on matters alluded to by Malik. Ur attitude, therefore, shld be one of seeking answers to questions in order that US Govt might understand what Malik in fact was saying; you shld not attempt to state views of US Govt on such points.

You shld seek clarification from Vishinsky or Gromyko (and USUN very discreetly from Malik) by means of the fol questions:

1. Mr. Malik used the expression "the Sov peoples believe". Are we entitled to believe that this is also the view of the Sov Govt? If so,

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[1] This telegram was repeated to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as 1018.

[2] The statement referred to is that printed in the editorial note, p. 546.

is the Sov Govt prepared to lend its support to taking of steps toward a peaceful settlement?

2. Is there any special significance to the phrase "a cease fire and an armistice"? What does Mr. Malik have in mind in appearing to draw a distinction between the two? Does this refer to a development of peaceful arrangements by stages? Does it contemplate provisions for assurance against the resumption of hostilities, as for example, by supervision of any cease fire or armistice arrangement?

3. What is the significance of the expression "to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question"? Does the Sov Govt have any specific steps in mind? If so, what precise arrangements do they envisage?

4. Does the Sov Govt know whether Mr. Malik's statement represents the view of the authorities in Peiping? If *not*, how does Sov Govt suggest views of Peiping be ascertained?

5. Shld one understand Mr. Malik's statement to mean that the Sov Govt is prepared to support a mtg of reps of the opposing commands in the field to discuss arrangements for a cease fire and an armistice which wld contain adequate assurances against renewal of hostilities?

ACHESON

795.00/6–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 25, 1951—7 p. m.

1019. Eyes only Gross. Dept this afternoon informed Brit Emb that you have been requested to make discreet approach to Malik for purpose of eliciting clarification re latter's statement June 23.

Dept accedes to Brit desire that you and Jebb see Malik together.

You may wish to inform Jebb re the questions which you expect to raise with Malik.

FYI we informed Brit Emb that Emb Moscow has been asked to see Vyshinsky or Gromyko on same subject matter and ask same questions.

ACHESON

357.AK/6–2651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 26, 1951—5:51 p. m.

1716. For Hickerson from Gross. Re: Deptel No. 966, June 6, efforts of GOC. On basis discussion in Dept during my visit June 19, I understand Dept wished USUN to hold up any action on suggestion in para 4, reftel, until Dept had opportunity to consider matter further. In light of Malik speech June 23 and its aftermath, I assume Dept does not wish action taken in accordance with para 4. Unless instructed to contrary, therefore, we shall regard para 4 as not presently operational.

Although purpose this message primarily for clarification of record, would appreciate any further guidance Dept may think appropriate re attitude toward GOC under present circumstances. For my part, I do not perceive need to take initiative in contacting GOC. However, it is possible that they may approach us on short notice at any time for our reactions to the present situation. If so, I recommend we be authorized to hear their views, and go no further than perhaps to outline to them some questions which appear to rise out of Malik speech, as summarized in Deptel No. 831 to Moscow, June 25.

GROSS

310.361/6–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT Moscow, June 26, 1951—6 p. m.

2175. Deptel 831, June 25. Am seeing Gromyko tomorrow. Vyshinski still absent "resting."

Asked to see Acting Foreign Minister Zorin today since Gromyko only arrived Berlin late yesterday but after several phone calls was given choice either Zorin or Gromyko tomorrow as both out of town today.

(You will recall one year ago today I failed after five tries to see Gromyko to ask Sov Govt intervention stop North Korean invasion).

For your information local AP and AFP had flashes this morning from their principals leaking idea your instructions sent me seek clarification.

Dept pass USUN. Sent Dept 2175, rptd info USUN 366.

KIRK

310.361/6–2651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 26, 1951—7:18 p. m.

1722. Re efforts to see Malik. Round-up of activities today re Deptel 1019, June 25, reported separately by memo to Hickerson.[1] I would appreciate guidance from Dept whether to make a renewed effort to see Malik during morning of June 27. I am continuing to concert closely with Jebb, who is making no separate effort to establish contact with Malik.

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[1] The memorandum is not printed, but the substance of it was communicated to Moscow by the Department in telegram 837, sent at 9 p. m. on June 26 as follows:

"FYI Gross this morning requested thru Malik's office an appointment and was informed that Malik was out of town; that they would try to communicate with him, but were not certain they could do so. He has had no further info." (310.361/6–2651)

In the event that our efforts to see Malik do not succeed, I would like instructions re attitude to take at SC dinner Thurs night.[2] There is no indication, at least as yet, that Malik will be unable to attend the dinner.

Lie, who is returning to New York morning June 27, will undoubtedly wish to see me urgently. Would appreciate discretion in dealing with him, subject of course to balancing amenity with security.

GROSS

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[2] See telegram Unmis 47 from New York, June 29, p. 590.

795.00/6-2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. McMurtrie Godley of the Office of Western European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: Mr. Malik's Proposal

Participants: Mr. Daridan, Chargé d'Affaires, French Embassy
Mr. Berard, First Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Webb—U
Mr. Kopper—NE[1]
Mr. Godley—WE

At the end of a conversation this morning on other matters Mr. Daridan inquired as to our reaction to Ambassador Malik's proposal of the other day. He said that the French Government was extremely interested in the proposal and, although accepting the possibility that it might be merely a propaganda maneuver, did not wish to brush aside lightly any prospect of peace. Although Paris, of course, accepted the fact that it might be just another maneuver following the dissolution of the Deputies' Conference, they had noted the fact that at the time the Chinese Communist offensive failed China had asked the Soviet Union what to do in the circumstances and that accordingly the Russians might at this time really be interested in some sort of peace settlement.

I replied that our attitude was substantially the same and that we certainly were seriously considering Malik's proposal. While we shared the French Government's view that this might be just another propaganda step we nevertheless were convinced that no effort toward peace must be overlooked. As Mr. Malik's real intentions might be obscure we were accordingly seeking further information from our mission in Moscow. Our attitude might, therefore, be summed up in that we were extremely anxious to have a satisfactory settlement at this time of the Korean situation but at the same time we were aware of the pitfalls entering into any negotiations that were basically a propaganda effort.

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[1] Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Daridan thanked me for this information and said that our views seemed to coincide with those held in Paris.

795.00/6-2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by John R. Heidemann of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Ambassador Spender
 Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys
 Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
 Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Mr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor
 Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Steel, Minister
 Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Ambassador van Roijen
 Mr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
New Zealand —Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Benler, First Secretary
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE—Mr. Rusk
 UMA, Mr. Hickerson
 FE, Mr. Merchant
 UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
 EUR, Mr. Raynor
 UNP, Mr. Stein
 FE, Mr. Conners
 S, Mr. White
 EUR, Mr. McClelland
 FE, Mr. Hackler
 FE, Mr. Heidemann
 Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope told the group that there had been fairly heavy ground activity in the preceding five days in the sector east of Kumhwa and north and northwest of Sohwa while ground activity elsewhere had been confined to small patrol clashes. He noted that enemy air activity was increasing, that from April [*June?*] 19 to April [*June?*] 26 there had been 18 incidents of air-to-air combat and that there had been some 15 heckler raids, generally within a 25 mile radius of Seoul and usually involving ancient, two-seater biplanes. When asked about enemy air activity south of the 38th parallel, Captain Pope said that there had been no air-to-air combat south of the Pyongyang area but that almost all of the heckler raids had occurred south of the parallel. Ambassador Spender asked whether any fortifications were being established back of the lines. Captain Pope replied that air observation had revealed that the enemy was erecting permanent or semipermanent gun emplacements, tank traps, etc. in a line from Kumsong to Kaesong just back of the front. Other fortifications are being constructed by the enemy, he said, in the Pyongyang area, perhaps as a precaution against amphibious landings. Rusk noted that the enemy was also reported to be building fortifications along the Yalu River.

Shifting to the political situation, Rusk said that we had, of course, had no advance indication that Malik would make a proposal such as he did on June 23. We had heard that he had requested time on the UN radio and had expected that he would use this time for the kind of bombast which, in fact, did make up the first 95 per cent of his broadcast. Rusk observed that it was of interest that the Soviet press and radio had given good play, not only to Malik's proposal, but also the comments made on it, including the remarks of President Truman on June 25. The Peiping radio, Rusk recalled, had remained silent for almost two days after Malik's broadcast and, when it broke this silence, it was to quote an editorial in a Peiping paper to the effect that the authorities in Peiping approved of Malik's line. After saying that if the Americans wanted peace they could accept all of the many offers made by the Chinese Communists, the Peiping radio dropped the subject and went back to emphasizing the current campaign to collect "donations" to buy war goods. Rusk remarked that the tone of the Peiping radio on the subject had been different from the tone of the Kremlin's propaganda organs, but that we were unable to assess the significance of this difference.

We were, Rusk continued, inclined to be quite cautious over Malik's proposal and, while we felt that no door to a peaceful settlement should be closed, we believed that Malik's proposal called for further clarification. For example, Malik's reference to the "Soviet people" raised a question as to the attitude of the Soviet Government; his reference to a "cease-fire and armistice" raised a question as to what distinction was being drawn between the two; his reference to "belligerents" raised a question of which parties were considered by the Soviets to be the belligerents in Korea, since, legalistically speaking, there were none and the Soviets insist they are not involved, the Chinese Communists insist on the "volunteer" label, and the North Koreans remain in the background. The degree of coordination and understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union was another and very important unanswered question, and we were hardly in a position to say what the Soviets meant. Rusk announced that we had asked our Ambassador in Moscow to see Gromyko, that he had done so but that a full report of the conversation had not yet been received in the Department. Rusk added that we had not heard of anyone's having successfully gotten in touch with the "indisposed" Malik in New York, although, our representatives and the representatives of other members were prepared to see him to seek clarification.

Rusk then called the group's attention to an observation made by Ambassador Spender: namely, that the group, upon meeting for the first time since Malik's broadcast, could hardly escape the burden of saying something to the press. Spender noted that the group, which was certainly responsible enough to discharge some function other than listening to a description of the tactical situation, could at least tell the press that it had considered Malik's statement and concluded thus and so. He said that his government felt that it would be a mistake to assume that the Malik offer was a fake. The free nations must, of course, be careful that it is not pure propaganda since the men in the Kremlin are master propagandists, propaganda being a major instrument of their foreign policy. Ambassador Spender offered a draft [1] of the kind of statement he felt the group could safely make. Rusk, noting that the Ambassador had been kind enough to hand us a copy of his draft statement before the meeting, offered a Department draft [1] which was in large part the Ambassador's draft with some textual changes to make it more acceptable to the group. There followed a discussion of the merits of the two drafts and it was determined to combine the two. This was accomplished and the resulting statement was issued to the press (Department press release number 569).[2]

Hickerson reminded the group that July 3 had been set as the date for reaching a final agreement on the British proposal involving the appointment of a Protective Power for UN prisoners of war. Mr. Tomlinson noted that the French Ambassador had made reference to the desirability of ~~incl~~uding interned civilians and suggested that those nations having civilians interned by the communists could add a paragraph to that effect in their statements.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The main portion of this statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 78. It pointed out that the member states of the United Nations were bound by the Charter not only to resist aggression but also to settle disputes amicably, in the light of which, the 16 member states having armed forces in Korea expressed their view that they had always been and still were ready to take part in any action designed to ensure a real and lasting peace there.

310.361/6-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT Moscow, June 27, 1951—4 p. m.

2180. Deptel 831, June 25 and Embtel 2175.[1] Saw Gromyko 2:30 this afternoon for 20 minutes June 27. Full telegraphic report in preparation and will go forward within few hours.[2] Meanwhile highlights conversation may be summarized as follows re Dept's questions seriatim:

1. Expression "the Soviet peoples believe" is self explanatory. Sov Govt speaking through Gromyko as official representative in responding questions is prepared support peaceful settlement (see para 5).
2. Sov Govt envisages meeting opposing commands (see also para 5) as arranging purely military dispositions for armistice and cease-fire to follow on agreement being reached therein.
3. Agreement between opposing commands constitutes entering on path peaceful settlement. Sovs have no additional ideas in mind.
4. Sov Govt unaware attitude "Chinese Govt" and no suggestions as to how views ascertained except "sure that US Govt can find means."
5. Sovs envisage meeting of opposing commands—Unified Command behalf all powers associated with US in military operations Korea plus South Koreans on the one hand and North Koreans plus representative of Chinese volunteers on other hand. Reps would arrange strictly military armistice (no provisions re ultimate political or territorial settlements) and upon reaching agreement cease-fire would take place.

Dept pass USUN niact. Sent Dept niact 2180; rptd info USUN niact 368.

KIRK

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[1] *Ante*, p. 553; Embtel 2175, dated June 26, p. 555.
[2] See telegram 2181, *infra*.

310.361/6-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT Moscow, June 27, 1951—5 p. m.

2181. Dept pass USUN.[1] Refmytel 2175, June 26 and niact 2180, June 27. I saw Gromyko today at 2:30 p. m. and, after opening remarks in consonance Deptel 831 June 25, para 1, put to him orally the questions contained therein.

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[1] A note on the source text indicated that the message was not passed to USUN. Presumably, this was because the text had already been received in New York directly from Moscow.

1. He stated that the expression used by Malik "the Soviet peoples believe" was self-explanatory and thus parried a direct answer. However, when I drew his attention to status Malik as official representative Sov Govt at seat UN, and that broadcast was from UN itself, Gromyko acknowledged that Malik was of course an official of Sov Govt, and then went on gratuitously to say he himself was willing to answer any questions on the substance of Malik's remarks. In answer to next question he said that Soviet Govt's views had been put forward long ago and that it had reacted favorably to British initiative in 1950 but since that time there had been no positive response from US and UK.

2. Gromyko indicated he considered cease-fire as part of what he terms "interim military armistice." By this he said he meant that the parties fighting in Korea would meet and conclude a military armistice which would include cease-fire, and which would be limited strictly to military questions and would not involve any political or territorial matters. As to assurance against resumption of hostilities Gromyko said that this would be subject of discussion between Commands in formulating terms of military armistice.

3. Gromyko stated that conclusion of military armistice would in fact be "entering on path of peaceful settlement," which was what Malik had in mind, and that on basis of armistice peaceful settlement could be taken up. As to latter, however, in response to query whether Sov Govt had any specific steps in mind he said it had "no proposals." It is up to parties in Korea to decide, and that also special arrangements would have to be made for political and territorial settlements.

4. He said Sov Govt does not know what is the view of Chinese Govt on Malik's statement and said that US may ask Chinese. When asked for suggestions how its view might be ascertained he said he felt sure that if US Govt wanted ascertain views Chinese Govt it would be able to find way to do so and that he had no suggestions.

5. In answer to question 5, he said that this was clearly set forth in Malik's statement. When queried on precise meaning of "belligerent parties" he said that what this means is that meeting should be held between military reps of Unified Command (he specified the "Unified Command" as American troops and those of other countries participating in the war in Korea) plus South Korean Command, and of the North Korean People's Republic Command plus representative of Chinese volunteer units.

I returned to question of relation Sov Govt to Malik's statement and Gromyko after attempting dodge issue again merely stated he had answered questions of substance and he was official rep of USSR.

Sent Dept 2181; rptd info USUN niact 369.

KIRK

795.00/6-2751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 27, 1951—6:41 p. m.

1728. Re Korea. Lacoste called at his request. Referring to discussions of Millet with Rusk,[1] he thought there might be a misunderstanding about the desire of France to be included in any discussions with Malik in which Jebb might be included. Lacoste stated and restated with emphasis his instructions that this is a subject that is too important to involve personal feelings or embarrassment. Therefore he did not ask to be included in any talks I might have with Malik. If, however, Jebb and I are to see Malik, he is under the strictest instructions to insist that he be included as well. I told Lacoste about the message from Malik that he hoped to see me at the SC dinner.

Lacoste was unwilling to let the matter rest there. He asked that if further talks should take place with Malik after the dinner he be included in them if Jebb is included. I commented that all decisions on this subject were being made by the Dept and I would, of course, forward his request.

On substance of Malik's speech Lacoste stated general French position of grave desire to see its possibilities explored so that a cease fire could be obtained as soon as possible. This is so advantageous that it might well lead to further negotiations to end the Korean case. Massigli, French Ambassador to UK, has suggested to FonOff that Ridgway might formulate an answer and suggest talks by field commanders. Paris agrees that this is a useful suggestion. Adding his personal comment, Lacoste felt that UN optimism should be tempered. He thought we should look beyond the great temptation of the cease fire and see to it that it is soundly based on part of a plan for military settlement.

GROSS

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Rusk, June 5, p. 504.

795.00/6-2751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 27, 1951—7:09 p. m.

1729. Lie's views re Malik statement; troop appeal. I saw Lie this afternoon at his request. He told me he had decided to return because of the Malik statement and also because of the problems rising re troop appeal. Concerning former, he expressed complete agreement with procedure we were following and expressed hope that it would lead to mtg between reps and military commanders in the field. He is convinced Malik's statement must be taken very seriously. In his view, great significance should be attached to repeated references in statement to "the Soviet people" which he thinks indicate that statement was designed primarily for consumption of Soviet dominated populations to prepare them for end of Korean war.

Just prior to seeing me he had talked with Entezam, Padilla Nervo and Rau together. Padilla apparently had suggested a new approach to Chi Coms which Lie vigorously opposed. Entezam appeared embarrassed by Malik refusal to see him and wished to beat a graceful retreat to Washington. Lie encouraged him to do so.

Rau apparently had no suggestions to offer but expressed view that Malik statement indicated real Soviet desire for peace in Korea.

I gave Lie frank account of our efforts to see Malik. He pressed me very hard for info re Kirk talk with Gromyko. I told him I had no info. (This excuse will wear thin very quickly and I should appreciate Dept's guidance as to how frank I should be with Lie, who wants to see me again tomorrow.)

Re troop appeal, Lie, while in Europe, had talked with Swedes, Danes and Norwegians. Malik speech hit like a bomb-shell and in Lie's judgment put to an end for the time being at least any hope of getting troop assistance from these countries. He urged that we talk to these dels here as well as selected others to recommend that they do not transmit negative replies. I recommend that we be authorized to take this action here promptly.

GROSS

795.00/6-2751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 27, 1951—7:09 p. m.

1730. Re Malik peace proposal. In conversation with Cory today Bebler (Yugo) offered fol insights into Malik proposal:

Bebler thought proposal has considerable substance and that, although it should be treated with reserve (as Belgrade has said), nevertheless facts that proposal made at all, the Sov press treatment of it as recounted in today's *NY Times* give promise that Sov Govt now ready for settlement in Korea. Bebler warned however that any Korean settlement would only be tactical move to relieve Kremlin from awkward position in Korea and free it for possible further operations against free world in some such place as Iran or Indochina where the Bao Dai-French Govt would get little sympathy from many UN members in case of a massive Chi Comm intervention a few months hence. Bebler seemed unworried by Cory's suggestion that those operations might be directed against Yugo and Cory's mention of article in today's *NY Times* recounting depopulation since June 15 of 30-mile strip of Rumanian territory along Yugo border. He appeared only slightly dismayed by Cory's observation that North Koreans performed similar depopulation along strip just north of 38th parallel approximately six months prior to their attack a year ago. Bebler said that Yugos are not like South Koreans, that they would be tough and dangerous nut for USSR to crack, that USSR knows this and also that oppressed Hungarians, Rumanians and Bulgarians would hardly have morale for such operation. Bebler thus seemed little disturbed by Cory's suggestion that present Sov peace moves may have some similarities to North Korean propaganda campaign which for some five weeks preceded North Korean aggression last year. He thought that Sovs this time are speaking sincerely as far as Korea concerned.

Cory suggested that if Malik peace maneuver is only camouflage for new aggression then presumably it has been under preparation for several months just as must have been North Korean campaign of year ago and that consequently goal of such Sov maneuver hardly likely to be Iran since Iranian crisis only about a month old. Bebler replied that while this is conceivably true he still thinks Yugo has not been chosen as next target of Sov aggression and that, even if it had been, Sov policy would be sufficiently flexible to permit rapid shifting from Yugo to Iran as target of aggression if opportunities arise.

Bebler explained fact that USSR made peace proposal in public broadcast rather than in response to private overtures from US by suggesting that USSR chose broadcast method in order to earn Kudos as protagonist of peace and thus avoid onus of responding favorably to a prior US peace proposal for which US would get credit.

Cory commented that he has impression Chi Comms seem more royalist than Sov King in their enthusiasm for Korean war and that they give impression of trying to draw Russians into war while Russians seem trying to draw Chi Comms out. Bebler enthusiastically endorsed this suggestion and said he personally feels Chi Comms, in full flush of their own revolution, are now trying to grasp leadership of Comm revolution in Asia while USSR, which wants always to retain all reins in its own hand, is resisting. He said this would tend to explain why Chi Comms now publicly complain about insufficient delivery of Sov arms for Chi Comms in Korea. Bebler said, as he has said before, that he is convinced USSR does not want powerful Comm China. As another reason for Sov failure to send more arms to Chi Comms, Bebler offered as he put it, a dialectician's explanation that a quantitative increase in Sov arms shipments to Comm China would eventually cause a qualitative change in Sov position in Korea. He said he was referring to fact that large amounts of Sov jet planes and heavy equipment would cause qualitative change in sense that Sov involvement in Korean war would become much greater and more apparent, a thing which USSR is trying to avoid.

When questioned about possible prior agreement between USSR and Comm Chi re Malik broadcast, Bebler said that typical Sov technique would be to "inform but not ask" Chi Comms for their approval just before broadcast. He said he thought Chi Comms thus had some warning at last minute and were enabled to reorientate their propaganda and public statements quickly but not immediately.

Bebler said a matter of such importance as Malik broadcast ordinarily is directed by very few men in Kremlin. He recalled occasion in 1946 when Molotov, without any warning, made in UN first Sov proposals on disarmament. Bebler said he himself was thunderstruck as he listened to Molotov's speech in GA. After speech, Bebler said, Molotov asked him what he thought of it. Bebler said he replied that Molotov's proposals hit GA like "an atomic bomb". Bebler continued that Molotov then smiled in satisfaction and said his speech on disarmament had been prepared in Moscow with such secrecy that it had not even been discussed in Politburo. Bebler concluded from this story that Stalin and Molotov must have prepared Sov disarmament proposals themselves. Bebler also recalled that in 1946 Molotov once undercut Yugo claims to Trieste in very abrupt and dishonest manner, notwithstanding close Yugo-Sov relations which existed at time.

Bebler said he thought whole story of Malik peace proposal probably held with great secrecy even in Kremlin and that Malik himself sees very little of whole picture. Bebler added that he is himself well acquainted with workings of Sov bureaucracy and believes Malik's alleged indisposition yesterday can be explained merely by fact Malik has not yet recd instructions from Moscow as to further action he shld take and that when these instructions do arrive they will come to Malik in bits and pieces. Bebler repeated statement he had made on previous occasions that Malik is not well informed of inner Kremlin policy.

GROSS

795.00/6-2751

Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: 1. Malik Peace Offer
2. Appeal for Troops

Participants: USUN—Ambassador Gross
UNA—Mr. Hickerson

Ambassador Gross telephoned Mr. Hickerson this evening to say that he has "cooled" off the UNSYG on the Malik "peace" offer.

Ambassador Gross went on to say that the UNSYG is concerned about the Norwegian and Danish responses to the UC request for troops. Both the Norwegians and Danes, prior to Malik's speech, were considering a favorable reply, the SYG told Ambassador Gross. In view of Malik's speech the SYG feels the Norwegians and Danes might reply in the negative. The SYG urged Ambassador Gross to speak to the Scandinavian representatives and urge them to hold off a negative reply for the time being pending developments on the Malik statement.

Mr. Hickerson told Ambassador Gross to see the Scandinavian representatives and suggest that they advise their governments that if they do not feel in a position to make an affirmative reply now (because of Malik's speech), they defer making a reply until the situation is clarified.

795.00/6-2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice. (Meeting with JCS at 10:30 A. M., June 28)

Participants: General Bradley
General Vandenberg
General Collins
Admiral McCormick [1]
General Bolte [2]
Vice Admiral Davis
Major General White
Major General Taylor
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. U. A. Johnson

Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by distributing the attached informal memorandum from which he talked at some length, particularly emphasizing the desirability of keeping the matter at the military level in Korea so as to avoid the introduction of extraneous and political subjects.

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[1] Adm. Lynde D. McCormick, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

[2] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.

General Bradley suggested that there was another alternative of direct communication with the Chinese, but agreed that this was not practicable or desirable as it would inevitably involve governmental and therefore political discussions.

General Collins stated that he saw considerable advantage to the suggestions Gromyko had made to Kirk. He pointed out the difficulty of the Chinese Government's agreeing to any terms that we might put forward, but that the *de facto* Chinese commander in the field could perhaps agree with them. He pointed out that it was essential to have a commission of some type to observe whether the Communists introduced additional personnel and matériel into North Korea and conceived of observation teams of such a commission being stationed, for example, on the Yalu bridges. If the other side would not agree to such observation, he saw no hope for an armistice. In response to Mr. Rusk's tentative suggestion that consideration should possibly be given to the use of a subcommittee of the UN Peace Observation Committee, on which the Soviets had accepted membership, General Collins expressed his strong opposition to any system which would permit Soviet observers to enter South Korea and the opinion that the commission should be composed of those having troops on each side, including each of the UN member nations having armed forces in Korea.

Mr. Rusk stated that the Department had given much thought to this question of the composition of any armistice commission, and that there was no ideal answer.

General Vandenberg stated that he was "unalterably opposed" to Alternative A of the attached memorandum—that is, a message from General Ridgway to the opposing command. He felt that the US should use the Soviet proposal as a springboard to place the onus on the North Koreans and the Chinese, and that any message from Ridgway would in effect mean that we are asking for peace, instead of the Communists. He stated that we are now hurting the Communists badly and that any respite given them by an armistice would only permit them to build up to start fighting again. The Communists have had serious losses of officers, non-coms and troops, and their present situation is very precarious. However, they are building up their air force, and recently for the first time they carried out a coordinated air attack on an island held by us. In addition to giving the Communists a breather to build up in Korea, an armistice would permit them to divert their attention to such areas as Indochina. Whenever the Communists want to stop fighting we should be careful to impose sufficiently tough restrictions on them to make sure that there is no build-up. If we say anything at all, it should not go beyond signifying our willingness to listen.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the build-up of Communist forces was a permanent part of the problem, whether the end of the fighting came within Korea or on the northern borders of Korea.

General Vandenberg expressed the opinion that the drain of hostilities was now beginning to tell on the Communist forces and that we should in no sense be put in the position of suing for peace at this point or stopping the fighting just when it was beginning to hurt the other side.

General Collins stated that we were now on a good defensive line in Korea and that we should take advantage of this apparently possible opportunity to end the fighting.

General Bradley stated that although an armistice might give the enemy a chance to build up and that we might continue to drain his resources by continued hostilities, we could not ignore the effect on the will of our people and other contributing UN member nations to continued support of the hostilities if we in effect turned down what appeared to be an opportunity to end the hostilities.

General Vandenberg expressed the fear that we stand to lose more than we gain by the proposed statement by Ridgway.

General Bradley stated that it was his own personal feeling that the Soviets "mean this" and that the suggestions by Gromyko were designed to give China a chance to save face. He felt that a simple statement from our side to the opposing side to the effect that if they agree with the proposals made by the Soviets, let us know and we will arrange a meeting did not in any sense mean that we were suing for peace.

General Collins expressed the opinion that we should reach a governmental decision on the terms of an armistice and immediately draft an instruction to Ridgway.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that in fact the first move in the immediate situation had been made by governments, viz. Malik's speech, our inquiry of the Soviets and the Soviet replies.

General Bradley expressed the opinion that a message should be issued by General Ridgway making it clear that he was acting under instructions and that he understood the other side might want to talk, and if so to let us know so that he can arrange a place.

After some general discussion it was the consensus that General Ridgway's first message might omit reference to time and place of meeting.

It was decided that a working group would draft a message to General Ridgway including the text of a proposed statement by him, to be considered by State and the Joint Chiefs the same afternoon.

[*Note:* Subsequent to the meeting, Admiral Davis and Mr. Johnson drafted a radio and suggested message to be issued by Ridgway, which was informally discussed with General Bradley and subsequently with Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Rusk, and the Secretary.

[At 2:30 P.M. another meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which General Marshall was also present. The draft was discussed, revised, and approved. The approved text is attached. Following approval by the President it was dispatched to General Ridgway.] [3]

[Attachment]

CHECK LIST ON ACTION TO MEET PRESENT KOREAN SITUATION

I. THE MAJOR ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ACTION

a. Invitation by Ridgway to meeting between Military Commanders.

b. Further diplomatic effort at clarification, either at Moscow or Peiping or both.

c. Effort at clarification by public declaration of U.S. and UN attitude toward cease fire.

d. Straight propaganda treatment.

Comment: There appears to be sufficient substance in Soviet statements thus far to hold out some prospect of an acceptable armistice and to make a prompt resort to straight propaganda treatment unwise and difficult.

It is unlikely that real advance toward a settlement could be made by a series of public declarations on both sides; in any event, this technique might subject us to the charge that we are merely making propaganda out of a reasonable effort on the part of the USSR to reach a settlement.

Further diplomatic effort at clarification in Moscow is likely to be unproductive; such an effort in Peiping offers little more prospect of success in light of Peiping's position that Chinese in Korea are volunteers; in any event, diplomatic moves on our part would be time consuming while the communists run away with the propaganda situation.

More importantly, there are advantages from the U.S. point of view in having the Korean problem settled for the short run on a military basis without involvement with a wide range of complex political issues now confronting us in the Pacific. We should not lightly turn down the USSR suggestion that Korea be dealt with in the first instance on a military basis.

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[3] The message was sent as telegram JCS 95174, June 28 at 3:40 p.m. to Tokyo and is printed on p. 577.

No record has been found in the Department of State files of the meetings here referred to nor the various drafts of the message to General Ridgway. Brackets in the source text.

An invitation by General Ridgway that representatives of the communist command attend a military conference would constitute a dramatic initiative on our part, would keep the Korean question on a military plane, and could put the matter of a satisfactory peace squarely up to the communists.

On balance, therefore, the first alternative appears the most advantageous.

II. ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDS IN KOREA

a. The first step would be a public announcement, as soon as possible, by General Ridgway at CINCUNC, inviting representatives of the communist command in Korea to meet with representatives on CINCUNC on board the Danish Hospital Ship *Jutlandia* at (Location) at (Time); *Jutlandia* to be under the full operational control of the Danish Government which has undertaken to make this ship available on a neutralized basis for this purpose. *Note:* An alternative would be a suitable location ashore near the front, such as Kaesong.

b. CINCUNC Representative, whose name should be included in the original announcement if possible, should be an officer of the rank of Major General or higher. He should be assisted by an officer of the ROK Army and by suitable staff.

c. CINÇUNC Representative should operate under directions from CINCUNC, who would himself be instructed by JCS on the basis of governmental decisions made in Washington. Negotiations with other UN Governments should be handled exclusively in Washington; CINCUNC should not negotiate with UN representatives in Tokyo or Korea on the subject matter of cease-fire discussions.

d. Instructions to CINCUNC should be based on NSC 48/5[4] and on the JCS memorandum of March 27,[5] as adapted, with the approval of the President, to meet the present military and political situation. A rough outline of the essential elements in such instructions is attached.[6]

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[4] Approved May 17; for text of a memorandum containing the sections on Korea, see p. 439.

[5] See the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.

[6] Attached to the file copy of the source text was the "Outline of Action Regarding Korea", dated February 11, 1951, drafted by Mr. Rusk (p. 165); the attached copy bore a notation by Mr. Battle, undated, that the Secretary of State had seen it.

III. UN MILITARY OPERATIONS BEFORE AND DURING CEASE-FIRE DISCUSSIONS

General Ridgway should be allowed maximum freedom of action in the conduct of military operations until such time as a satisfactory cease-fire shall have been arranged. He should continue to be guided by his existing military directives and should not be inhibited by cease-fire negotiations in taking such action as is necessary to maintain his military position and protect his forces in relation to enemy action. If he considers it advisable, he should feel free to reduce the scale of his operations while talks are in progress.

IV. RELATED POLITICAL STEPS

a. Consultation with UN Members with troops in Korea on nature of Moscow response and proposed U.S. line of action.

b. Possible consultation with countries such as India with diplomatic representation in Peiping.

c. Notification to UN and to GOC just prior to Ridgway broadcast, giving text of his broadcast and texts of exchange with Moscow.

d. A special instruction must be sent to Muccio as basis for dealing with the difficult ROK aspect of the problem.

V. INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ACTION

A special inter-departmental task group should be established under P leadership to prepare an effective information and propaganda program in support of the above line of action.

On Thursday, June 28, our line should be that we are considering Ambassador Kirk's report and are consulting UN governments with troops in Korea.

310.361/6–2851

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Moscow's Telegram 2181, June 27, 1951

The information contained in the above-mentioned telegram as to the Soviet concept of arrangements for bringing an end to hostilities in Korea raises, in my opinion, certain very serious factors which I believe must be carefully considered in any course of action which we may adopt. It seems to me obvious from the content of the telegram under reference, that the Soviet proposal would deal with a settlement in Korea in two basic and unrelated phases and that the points raised by Mr. Gromyko concern only the first phase.

The two phases to which I have reference are: (1) a purely military arrangement at a local level in Korea to bring about a cease-fire, and (2) leaving for the vague future any steps for an ultimate political settlement for Korea and possibly for other areas in the Far East. Paragraph three of the telegram under reference very clearly brings out this feature of the Soviet proposals. I would stress that the United Nations must be extremely careful to avoid to the maximum possible extent allowing itself to be placed in the position of agreeing merely to a cease-fire in Korea, leaving aside for subsequent discussions of an ultimate settlement for some time in the future. The repeated experience which the Western world has had with Soviet intransigence and its complete and cynical refusal to accept a just and reasonable settlement for world problems and, specifically, the difficulties which we have had in attaining any political solution to the Korean problem in the past, should make us fully aware of the virtually complete futility of relying upon discussions or efforts at political understandings or agreements on any major issue with the Communists. At this late date, we would be naive in the extreme if we were to allow ourselves to be persuaded, short of the most concrete proof of their sincerity, that the Soviets or the Chinese Communists would sincerely seek or accept an equitable and honorable solution in Korea by peaceful means. Certainly the North Koreans will not.

It would therefore, in my opinion, be a most serious mistake if we were maneuvered by Communist blandishments and the impulsive desire for peace on the part of Western Nations to accept a cease-fire or other military arrangements in Korea under conditions which would weaken our basic military position and strength in that country and yet would not provide as clear and firm an understanding as can be derived from our present position that the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans will accept the principles for the ultimate establishment for a unified, independent and democratic Korea; also, and perhaps even more important, would be their acceptance of long-range guarantees which would prevent further military aggression in the area. In my opinion, every possible advantage must be exacted from our acceptance of a cease-fire or before we, in any manner, relax the intensity of our military pressure upon the Communist forces.

There is also the danger that if such undertakings and guarantees are not exacted as a price for a cease-fire we may ultimately find ourselves in a position of having to take the initiative in resuming hostilities in order to defend the security of Korea and to carry out the military objectives of the United Nations to which we are committed. If the United Nations were forced under such circumstances to take this initiative, the results from the propaganda and psychological point of view throughout the world would inevitably do us tremendous harm; Communist propaganda could with some logic make it appear that it was the United Nations and specifically the United States which was responsible for the consequences of such a renewal of hostilities in terms of the further devastation and destruction which would inevitably result.

In summary, therefore, I think it essential that, despite assurances from the Communist side, we should be most reluctant to break off hostilities until as sound a basis as possible has been laid for the negotiation of a political settlement in Korea which will not prove a duplication of the fruitless efforts we have made in the past to accomplish our political objectives in Korea. Furthermore, it seems to me that the United States, together with the United Nations, has an inescapable and grave moral responsibility to the people of Korea that from the tremendous sacrifices and destruction which has been occasioned to them by this war we will, to the best of our ability, provide for the realization of those aspirations for unification and independence which are, for them of such overwhelming importance. In this we cannot afford to go too far in compromising with expediency nor relax our efforts in their behalf, unless it is clear that no other course is open to us. In the words of Ambassador Muccio (Telegram 1006, June 1) "It would be tragic if pressures for peace settlement resulted in premature discussions as it is apparent our bargaining position improves daily."

795.00/6–2851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 28, 1951—2:19 p. m.

1737. Re Korea: Ross gave Lie orally at noon today close paraphrase of Moscow's 2181, June 27, stressing that we wanted him to have this information personally. Lie had no comment except to express the hope that we could "keep this simple". Referring to Gromyko's reference that political and territorial matters were not involved, Lie observed that this was a victory for the UN reflecting the objective he had worked for for so long. He said obviously the thing to do now was to leave matters to Ridgway in the field. He interpreted general tenor of Gromyko's responses as indication Russians are very sensitive about offending Chinese Communists by appearing to interfere in Chinese Communist independence. He said he had questioned Zinchenko very closely about precise English translation of Russian text of Malik's speech and that with particular reference to term "belligerents", Zinchenko had made clear this meant the forces in the field. Lie, apparently expressing his own thought, said it was clear that the UC was the US Govt and that the UC commander in the field wld head the "delegation" on the UN side with full authority to act for the UN. On the other side, he said obviously the North Korean commander wld head the Communist "delegation" and that there wld be Chinese Communist "advisers" attached to him.

Lie also expressed conviction that this move was sincere, because Russians have lost great deal of prestige in Asia and cld not successfully cope at one and same time with problems of Asia, Atlantic Treaty, etc. He said he had studied Malik statement very closely and felt certain it had been prepared line by line with utmost care by highest level Soviet authorities and reflected Stalin's own view and participation.

Lacoste heard substantially the same views from Lie yesterday. On subject of Chinese Communist participation in negotiations, Lie told Lacoste that he had sent Zinchenko to clarify this precise point with Malik and that later Zinchenko reported apparently reflecting Malik's view that it shld be two negotiators mentioned and the North Korean commander wld probably have several Chinese Communist advisers.

Lie further expressed opinion to Lacoste that USSR wld not want direct overtures to PRC for reasons stated. Lacoste added as his own comment that after the weeks of negotiation among Paris deputies, Soviets may well have felt it desirable for political reasons to have discussion re clarification Malik statement held in Moscow.

GROSS

795.00/6-2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Peace Negotiations for Korea

Participants: Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

The Korean Ambassador called upon Mr. Hickerson at 3 o'clock this afternoon in lieu of Mr. Rusk, who had requested him to come in.

Mr. Hickerson explained that Mr. Rusk had suddenly been called to an urgent meeting at the Pentagon but that he himself was personally conversant with the subject which Mr. Rusk had intended to raise with the Ambassador.

Mr. Hickerson further explained that the Department wished to keep the Ambassador and his Government up to date on the latest developments concerning current moves looking toward a cease-fire in Korea,[1] and showed the Ambassador the original texts of the Department's telegram to Moscow 831, June 25 and Moscow's reply 2181, June 27. Mr. Hickerson explained to the Ambassador that these two telegrams constituted the sum total of our information concerning the Russian proposal and he gave the Ambassador paraphrased copies of those portions of the telegrams which contained the questions raised by the Department by way of seeking clarification, and Mr. Gromyko's answers. Mr. Hickerson pointed out this was the same procedure which we were currently following with the 15 other UN Members having military forces in Korea. He particularly wanted to stress that the United States Government at this point had not formulated a definitive attitude toward the Russian proposal but at this stage was giving it every consideration and studying it from all angles. Mr. Hickerson wished to impress upon the Ambassador that the Department is making every effort to keep the Korean Government informed concerning all developments.

The Ambassador expressed his great appreciation for the kindness of the Department in making what information it has on the peace proposals available to him and stated that he fully understood Mr. Hickerson's explanation of the fact that the U.S. Government had not yet made any final decisions with respect thereto.

The Ambassador then raised the question of his attendance at the periodic FE briefings of the other UN Ambassadors and pointed out the problem raised for him by the press, which was persistent in its demands to know why the Korean Government was being excluded from representation at these briefings. Mr. Hickerson replied that he was particularly pleased to be able to tell the Ambassador that not only had the Department given every consideration to his request for such attendance but that we had actively raised the matter with the other members of the group on the basis that, unless there were strong objection raised to the attendance of the Korean Ambassador, the Department would invite him to attend the meetings. Mr. Hickerson indicated that although this question had been put before the other members of the group some time ago, there had thus far been no such objection. He explained that tomorrow a further meeting was scheduled and if no objection were raised in that meeting which could not be overcome by the Department, he would give the Ambassador late tomorrow afternoon our invitation to attend the briefings. The Ambassador expressed his deep personal gratification at the action taken by the Department in this regard and stated that he knew that if the ROK were represented at these briefings it would be a source of great reassurance and satisfaction to his Government.

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[1] In telegram 1093, June 26, from Seoul, not printed, Ambassador Muccio had transmitted the text of a press statement by President Rhee, issued following a Cabinet meeting on that date, which read in part as follows:

"Any so-called 'peace plan' which involves division of this nation along any artificial border is entirely unacceptable to people of Korea, north and south. Any proposal which leaves aggressors in possession of any part of Korea would be an insult to this nation." (310.361/6-2651)

Mr. Hickerson then stated that while these briefing sessions were primarily concerned with the military situation in Korea, one substantive matter which was presently occupying its attention concerned a British proposal to send a communication to the Secretary General of the UN requesting him to bring before the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans a request that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, a neutral State be appointed to assume certain responsibilities for the welfare of UN prisoners of war in Communist hands. Mr. Hickerson explained that a draft of a formalized communication to the Secretary General along these lines had now been worked out through consultation among the 16 UN participating nations, a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador.[2] He stated that individual communications to the Secretary General by the 16 countries were contemplated, and that the Department had considered it most desirable that an opportunity be provided the ROK Government to associate itself with this move in a similar communication. He explained that the matter would again be discussed in the first briefing meeting next week in order to work out final details in this regard, and he thought the Ambassador might wish to study the draft and take any action which might be desirable in regard thereto.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Hickerson for his kindness in making available to him the various items of information and documents which Mr. Hickerson had provided, and assured him of the desire of the Korean people and their Government to continue full cooperation with the United States.

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[2] Not printed.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 16–A : Telegram[1]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 28, 1951—3:40 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 95174. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only, personal for.

1. Following is with reference to Malik's statement and to questions asked by Ambassador Kirk and Gromyko's replies thereto, copies of which have been transmitted to you.

2. Your comment and recommendations by telecon regardless of hour are urgently requested on the following:

3. General views:

a. Most practicable and desirable action is on military level;
b. Position must be that we are willing to discuss armistice terms and not that we are requesting such discussion.
c. You should initiate action through a message, draft of which is contained herein, expressing willingness to discuss armistice terms.
d. The message must make clear that it is based on instructions from higher authority.

4. Specific points:

a. Draft of message which would be addressed by you to the Commander of the Communist Armed Forces in Korea, and simultaneously publicly announced by you;
b. Place for meeting with representatives of the Communist command. Both Seoul and Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia* off Wonsan have been suggested;
c. Designation of your senior representative. It appears questionable whether or not you personally should participate in the first meeting.
d. ROK military participation. We believe that your senior representative should speak for the entire United Nations command, including the ROK forces, but we feel that a senior ROK officer should accompany your representative.

5. Draft message follows:

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you may wish to discuss the formulation of armistice terms by which the fighting can be stopped under conditions which will assure against the resumption of hostilities.

I, on my part, stand ready to designate suitable representatives to meet with representatives of your command at a time and place to be mutually agreed.

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[1] This Lot File contains the "Black Book on Cease Fire" kept at the time in the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk. See the Note on Sources, p. VII.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired, I will designate appropriate representatives and am prepared to suggest a time and place for meeting.

6. Your present instructions regarding armistice terms will be modified as may be necessary prior to any meeting with representatives of the Communist command in Korea.

795.00/6-2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Soviet Peace Proposals Korea

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet
The Secretary
Mr. Merchant—FE
Mr. Godley—WE

Ambassador Bonnet called this afternoon at his request to discuss Mr. Malik's recent proposal and particularly Ambassador Kirk's conversation yesterday with Gromyko. As the Ambassador had evidently not yet seen our release on Ambassador Kirk's report I showed it to him and he read it carefully.[1]

He then asked whether I could indicate our thinking on the question of the cease-fire and the armistice in that this point appeared to him to be a bit confusing. I said that we also had at first been confused, but upon further study were of the opinion that the cease-fire and the armistice were practically the same and that we envisaged discussions taking place between the military commanders to determine the time of the cease-fire and the conditions governing the armistice. The Ambassador then expressed the opinion that it would be essential for some sort of observation or inspection of the area not only between the troops but also behind both forces. I agreed fully with this view and the Ambassador then asked whether we were thinking of a military, civilian, UN, or neutral group providing this check. I replied that the actual form of this inspection remains to be seen and that it undoubtedly would require difficult negotiations. The Ambassador asked whether we agreed that after the cease-fire and an armistice were arranged we would then discuss the broader political questions which should be purely in the framework of the Korean problem, i.e., not including Formosa and related Chinese problems. I said this was our thinking and that we certainly agreed that the follow-up discussions should be limited to those pertaining to Korea.

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[1] The text of the Department of State press release, dated June 28, which summarized the contents of telegram 2181, June 27, from Moscow, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 45.

The Ambassador inquired what we thought the next step would be and when General Ridgway would be told to discuss the armistice and cease-fire terms with the North Koreans and the representatives of the "Chinese Volunteers". I answered that we were presently studying this problem with the military authorities and that we were pressing it actively. The Ambassador commented that his government felt that these conversations should be expedited, to which I fully agreed and reassured him that they were going on as rapidly as possible. I told him that this would entail not only discussions with our military authorities here but that they would undoubtedly want to consult with General Ridgway and we, of course, would want to confer with Ambassadors in Washington of countries involved in the Korean operations.

With regard to Mr. Gromyko's discussion yesterday with Ambassador Kirk, Ambassador Bonnet remarked that he was rather amused in that Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement. He said that this might complicate the negotiations and cause additional difficulties. I answered that we shared this view and purposely refrained in our statement from making the obvious propaganda remark that this was one of the first times Mr. Gromyko has expressed ignorance of Chinese Communist policy. I continued that we would have to be extremely careful lest we fall into a trap. Accordingly, the armistice terms would have to be carefully prepared and some provision for inspection and control was all the more essential.

The Ambassador thanked me for these views, and said they were about the same as those held by his government.

795.00/6–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, June 28, 1951—4 p. m.

2186. Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27. Dept pass USUN. My comment re Gromyko interview fols:

Gromyko remarks indicate Commies clearly supporting Malik proposal, this pointed up by Gromyko's relatively specific on the spot answers to important questions. As noted Embtel 2166 June 25, Commies have nothing to lose by sponsoring peace move at this time, if played adroitly, they can gain propaganda-wise regardless of outcome. Now clear that Chi Commies are also behind move (as was to be anticipated) with *Pravda* today quoting from *Jen Min Jih Pao*, official organ CC of CCP (Embtel 2182, June 28).[1]

Also clear that Sovs are playing careful game of official non-involvement, thus retaining freedom of action, and that Commies are holding cards close to chest, enabling full exploitation situation as it develops. Latter shown by Gromyko insistence that political and territorial questions are specifically excluded from negots for cease-fire and armistice. Obvious implication is that such questions reserved for further negots, concerning which Gromyko refused to make suggestions. Emb has no evidence that Commie terms for settlement polit and territorial questions will not include everything Commies have sought in past, i.e. seating CPR in UN, Commie control Formosa, CPR and KPDR participation Jap peace treaty, removal all fon troops from Korea.

There undoubtedly is great significance to Commie proposal at this time, ignoring as it does the prerequisites of a cease-fire specified by Commies in past. Appears likely that Commie move is at least in part dictated by UN strength in field. Emb inclined to suspect that proposal may reflect CPR unwillingness to carry on bloody and expensive campaign endlessly if possible Commies retain NK, without further hostilities. Sacrifices required of CPR to carry on war cannot be matched by Sov material assistance, no matter how generous, and Chi Commies may well have discovered that urgent requirements their over-all program necessitate abandonment Korean venture, at least for present. In speculating this vein, Emb not minimizing Chi Commie wholehearted cooperation with Kremlin, but we believe status CCP with Kremlin, and long-range importance to latter of careful handling most important Sov satellite, constrain Kremlin to react with greater flexibility to CPR views than is usual in relations with satellites. Obvious that considerations of face wld make Chi Commies prefer peace approach being advanced by Sov, particularly as CPR not officially involved in Korean war; move also fits in nicely with Sov propaganda role peacemaker.

Importance attached by Commies to CPR role in Korea shown by Gromyko's forthright declaration that Rep of Chi volunteer units is to participate in initial negots. Not only wld Peiping regime find itself in embarrassing posture before Chi people if it did not assume important role in negots, but it undoubtedly expects to utilize this opportunity as precedent for continuing participate in internatl negots affecting FE.

Sent Dept 2186; rptd info USUN 372.

KIRK

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[1] Telegram 2182 not printed; concerning the Chinese reaction to Mr. Malik's remarks, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Heidemann, June 27, p. 557.

Editorial Note

On June 28, the United States Government forwarded to the United Nations Secretary-General the 22d report from the United Nations Command in Korea covering the period May 16–31; the text is in United Nations document S/2217. In it, General Ridgway categorically dismissed as "wholly groundless and manifestly absurd" Communist charges by the North Korean authorities that the United Nations forces were employing bacteriological warfare against them (S/2142/Rev. 1).

310.361/6–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, June 28, 1951—6 p. m.

6897. Now that talks in Moscow and New York have apparently established fact there was something more than bombast to Malik broadcast, FonOff is planning ask Dept whether it agrees do a little preliminary sounding out of Chi Commies and North Koreans. Brit and Indian reps Peiping might jointly ask whether views of USSR as expressed by Malik are also those of CPG, and raise with CPG questions similar to those Amb Kirk asked Gromyko. If CPG reasonably responsive, it might then be asked whether North Koreans similarly disposed toward a truce. If, as anticipated, CPG replies North Koreans shld be consulted direct, there wld still be two alternatives (*a*) ask USSR approach North Koreans and, given favorable reply, it would be up to Ridgway talk to commanders in field or, as second choice, (*b*) have SYG Lie make direct attempt get four field commanders together.

FonOff has drafted telegram to Wash along above lines but as of this afternoon, it had not yet been approved by Morrison.

Sent Dept priority 6897 rptd info priority Moscow 206.

GIFFORD

795.00/6–2851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 28, 1951—7:13 p. m.

1738. In connection with Malik speech and subsequent developments, following points are suggested for consideration of Dept:

1. It is to be expected that UN membership generally agree that UC possesses requisite authority under existing UN resolutions to

negotiate and accomplish a cease-fire and armistice. Question arises, however, whether subsequent UN action is necessary or desirable. It will be recalled that point 8 of cease-fire points published by group on cease-fire (A/C.1/643, Jan. 2, 1951) provides that the GA should be asked to confirm the cease-fire arrangements, which shall continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by UN. Following questions are suggested by this provision:

(*a*) Should GA confirmation be sought in a res which is confined exclusively to military arrangements made by field commanders? There may be advantage in treating this question in a more general res. Such a res might give due weight to high priority of economic rehabilitation in post-armistice phase. With regard to the post armistice political problems, a res might modify terms of reference and composition of UNCURK, and define its relationship with such armistice supervisory group as may be constituted. Consideration might also be given to future role of UNKRA, its composition and its relationship to occupational authorities. It is clear that the difficulties which have arisen with regard to settling the role of the Agent General cannot continue to be tolerated and that it is of the utmost importance to place this matter at once in a position which will make it possible to do the job which will remain to be done after an armistice.

(*b*) What UN political aspects may arise with regard to question of withdrawal of Chi Com forces? If Chi Com are required to withdraw by "appropriate stages" or otherwise beyond the Yalu River, there may be pressure for UN guarantees to respect Chi frontier with Korea and to protect legitimate Chi and Korean interests in the frontier zone. Dept will recall this provision in six-power res (A/C.1/638, Dec 6, 1950) which was vetoed in SC.[1] This problem also suggests question what commitments might be made or expected of NK authorities without involving establishment of status for NK regime.

(*c*) If GA confirmation is sought, question may arise re participation of Chi Coms and NK authorities at GA deliberations. It is suggested that Dept consider this in advance of question arising and advise us of position to be taken in diplomatic preparation.

2. Korean armistice may well result in renewed pressures to seat Chi Coms in UN organs. Such development is foreshadowed by public statements of Morrison, Lange and others, favoring postponement of consideration of question until peace has been arranged. In addition, SYG Lie, Rau and others may renew suggestions to re-activate GA comite of 7 on Chi representation. I suggest Dept urgently consider whether we should not without delay engage in vigorous diplomatic activity and obtain as many commitments as possible from member states to refrain from raising question of Chi Com representation after accomplishment of armistice. If we delay such diplomatic activity until after armistice, we may be confronted with pressures which might now be anticipated and prevented.

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[1] The Soviet veto took place on November 30, 1950; see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1268.

3. Relationship of GOC to armistice negotiations. Clearly Soviet maneuver and Malik refusal to see Entezam are calculated designs to bypass GOC. Although I do not see any necessity for us to take initiative with the GOC, there may be advantage from UN standpoint in our maintaining friendly relations with GOC and conferring with them (subject to obvious security requirements). Specific suggestion is made that Entezam might be invited to Dept for consultation.

4. Special problem might arise with regard to the creation and composition of an armistice supervisory comm. Unless such a commission is to be composed exclusively of military personnel, it may be necessary to consult with SYG and selected UN members to agree upon commission membership. It will be recalled that when Crittenberger and I discussed this matter with cease-fire group in Dec. (ourtel No. 974, Dec. 15, 1950),[2] various alternatives, possibilities were discussed, although of course no conclusion was reached. If UNCURK or a designee of UNCURK were to be used, this would require consultations here and possibly GA action.

GROSS

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1554.

795.00/6-2951

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1951—8:21 p. m.

Nr. DA TT 4890

Subject: Msg JCS 95174—28 June 51.

Conferees:

Washington:	*Tokyo:*
Gen O N Bradley CJCS	Gen Ridgway CINCFE
Mr H F Matthews A/Secy State	Adm Sherman CNO
Mr D Rusk A/Secy State	Adm Joy COMNAVFE
Vice Adm A C Davis JCS	Gen Weyland ComGen FEAF
Gen J L Collins CSA	Gen Hickey C/S FECOM
Adm L D McCormick CNO	Gen Ennis G2 FECOM
Lt Gen C L Bolte DCS/P	Gen Wright G3 FECOM
Maj Gen T D White AF	Col Moorman SGS FECOM
Col E H J Carns JCS	Col Surles Deputy SGS FECOM
Mr U A Johnson State	Mr Paul Nitze State Dept
Lt Col J B Matthews G3	
Lt Col W F Kaufman G3	

. . . .

Tokyo: FEC–O2 Official Top Secret

1. . . .

2. Concur your paragraph 3.[1]

3. Your paragraph 4A—subject to and upon your approval, shall send following msg by radio in clear: "Cmdr in Chief, Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, Supreme Comdr, North Korean Forces. I am informed that you may desire a meeting to discuss an armistice for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea.

If you desire such a meeting, I request you so inform me.

I am directed to inform you that in the event of your informing me that you desire such a meeting, I shall be prepared to name my participants. I would then suggest a time at which they could meet with yours aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor. Signed M B Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command", and simultaneously release to press, informing you of exact hour of proposed release.

Your paragraph 4B—if proposed meeting place is rejected, shall then propose Yo-Do, an island near Wonsan, which we occupy.

Your paragraph 4C—prefer to be represented at outset until evidence clear of intention in good faith to proceed with discussions, but, I would be in immediate vicinity of meeting place.

Your paragraph 4D—agree. Will select some senior ROK officer after consultation with Van Fleet.

(End FEC–2)

Washington: DA–3 Top Secret

Comments on your draft FEC–2:

First, message will only be sent on receipt directive from President thru JCS.

Second, it is considered important that your message state initially that you are acting under instructions, although it is not considered desirable that specific reference be made to US Government. Reason for this is to indicate you are acting with full authority but at same time to avoid introducing governmental aspect which Russians and Chinese apparently wish to avoid.

Third, although it is our desire to make it clear that Communists have taken initiative in seeking armistice talks, we do not wish by tone of message to raise prestige obstacles by stressing that they have sued for peace.

Fourth, it was our thought that we should not suggest time or place in your first message but rather that we should expect some response from opposing commander before making any specific proposal.

Fifth, some such phrase as "assure against the resumption of hostilities" should be included in order, without going into details, to cover essential conditions such as adequate supervision of armistice terms.

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[1] Reference is to telegram JCS 95174, June 28, p. 577.

Sixth, glad to see that in general your text is fairly close to our proposal as slated in paragraph 5, JCS 95174 however exact text your message must be determined here in relation to UN and other consultations.

Final directive from here will contain exact text but we would be glad to have any comments on differences between your text and ours.

Seventh, we contemplate possible release time of 0800 hours Saturday[2] Tokyo time. This would permit certain diplomatic and Congressional preparation here. Would that release time be convenient to you?

[(End DA-3)]

Tokyo: FEC-5 Official Top Secret

Ref DA-3.

First para—roger.

Second para—suggest modification of body of msg to read:

"As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

"I am informed that you may desire a meeting to discuss an armistice for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea;

"If you desire such a meeting, I request you so inform me.

"In the event that you so inform me, I shall be prepared to name my participants. I would also at that time suggest a date at which they could meet with yours aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.

"M. B. Ridgway,
"General, United States Army
"Commander in Chief
"United Nations Command."

Third para—no comment.

Fourth para—have not suggested time. Gave careful thought to inclusion of suggested place, concluding it better to do so in order to retain initiative. Meeting aboard ship would be more advantageous to us if accepted. To fail to suggest place would relinquish initiative and consume more time in reaching agreement.

Fifth para—basic factor to me is retention of maximum initiative and freedom of action until enemy representatives have given concrete and acceptable evidence of good faith. Any indication on our part in this initial msg implying that regardless of course of armistice negotiations we would not resume hostilities would be premature and to our distinct disadvantage. Uniform pattern of Communist duplicity and faithlessness is strongest reason for avoiding commitment until positive and acceptable assurances of good faith have been made.

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[2] June 30.

Seventh para—concur.[3]

[(End FE–5)]

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[3] The final message from Washington in this conference read:

"Your comments will be given full consideration before final decision. Nothing further here. Many thanks. Goodnight."

795.00/6–2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice (Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 A. M., June 29)

Participants:		
	General Bradley	Mr. Rusk
	General Collins	Mr. Johnson
	General White	
	Admiral McCormick	
	Vice Admiral Davis	

The meeting discussed informally the suggestions received from General Ridgway at a Telecon the preceding night (DA TT 4890)[1] concerning the text of his proposed message to the other side.

It was the consensus of the meeting that the text suggested by General Ridgway unnecessarily involved questions of Communist Chinese prestige to a degree that might well jeopardize any possibility that there might be that armistice talks could be developed. However, there was general acceptance of General Ridgway's suggestion that the place of the meeting be suggested in the message.

The message was thereupon redrafted to the text released. It was agreed that immediately upon approval by the President[2] the text would be transmitted to General Ridgway with instructions to release the message at 6 P. M., June 29, Washington time (8 A. M., June 30, Tokyo time).[3]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] See Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 458.

[3] The message and instructions were sent to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram 95258, June 29, 12:27 p. m. (Lot 55D128: Black Book: Tab 16–B). The message was also sent to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and to the Embassy in Seoul for transmission, prior to release, to Secretary-General Lie and President Rhee, respectively (795.00/6–2951). As printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 43, the text of the message broadcast by General Ridgway read as follows:

"Message to the Commander in Chief, Communist Forces in Korea.

A JSSC draft paper[4] on instructions to General Ridgway concerning armistice terms was informally and briefly considered.

There was general agreement that reconsideration should be given particularly to those portions of the paper which suggested that the armistice terms require the other side immediately to undertake "peace negotiations" and limit the duration of the armistice to a period of 21 days with a possible extension for one additional period of 21 days.

It was agreed that a working group should be established to draft instructions to General Ridgway for consideration by State and the JCS at a meeting later in the day.

"As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following: 'I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

" 'Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship [*Jutlandia*] in Wonsan Harbor.' "

[4] Not printed.

795.00/6–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT Moscow, June 29, 1951—11 a. m.

2193. London tel 6897, June 28. Brit proposal exploratory soundings Chi North Korea and possibly further with USSR re Korean armistice seems to us to overlook what is generally regarded in diplomatic circles here as well as by ourselves as studied effort Gromyko to avoid further governmental discussions in favor of direct negotiations between milit commanders. Gromyko's refusal to express opinion or ascertain Chi Govt's views and his specific designation of "representative of Chi volunteer units" as belligerent commander has earmarks of formula especially devised to finesse issue of Chi Govt representation. In circumstances we feel next move shld be directed toward meeting Field Commanders without additional preliminary steps, opening being made preferably by Ridgway and South Korean commander. Direct attempt SYG Lie get 4 Field Commanders together probably second best bet. Element making Lie approach less attractive is that while it avoids governmental negotiations it is still not clear what Russian attitude may now be toward position UN in Korean affair.

Dept pass London; sent Dept 2193, rptd info niact London 399.

KIRK

795.00/6–2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 29, 1951—11 a. m.

1003. Eyes only Muccio. US Govt at this point unable gauge with confidence seriousness or purpose of Sovts in apparent move for cease-fire in Malik broadcast Jun 23. Absence insistence as in past on concurrent settlement Formosan and UN representation, coupled with gen endorsement by Peiping, Sov press treatment, and promptness if not satis character Gromyko's replies to Kirk's questions, prevent discounting overture as propaganda only. Dept will keep you informed of developments.

You shld know that if further exploration confirms willingness other side accept armistice at or in neighborhood present battle line with appropriate safeguards for security UN forces, and against renewal hostilities, USGovt and other UN members principally involved prepared accept armistice on such terms and attempt negotiate more durable arrangement permitting gradual withdrawal US forces from Korea. Dept aware this is explosive issue with ROK. You will have to muster every available resource and argument to avoid development ugly situation which might jeopardize security UN forces and their lines of communication in ROK. Dept can understand basis for Rhee's and other leaders' opposition to any settlement Korean war leaving country divided and with risk of new invasion omni-present. Dept in this msg attempting provide you additional background and arguments to supplement and reinforce those you have been employing so vigorously in ur successful effort up to this point to prevent situation's getting out of hand. Dept desires ur suggestions as to any actions which might be initiated here further to support ur hand. Are there, for example, any private or unofficial influences in US which cld helpfully be mobilized to apply to Rhee? Wld visit to this country by PriMin to talk to top US officials, or early visit to Pusan by influential and well known US personage be helpful and effective?

In ur discussions with Rhee and other officials Dept believes you should constantly hammer fol points:

(1) ROK does not possess, and never has, any internatl recognition of any present auth north of 38th Parallel.

(2) An independent and unified Korea has been US polit aim since 1943 and UN aim since 1947 but neither US nor UN at any time has taken position that unification shld be achieved by force regardless of circumstances.

(3) Jun 25 and 27 SC resolutions related to repelling the aggression and restoring internatl peace and security in the area: Oct 7 GA Res authorized but did not require pacification North Korea and

unification of country by mil means. Under circumstances early Oct when North Korean armies were in dissolution and presumption was tenable that neither Sovts nor Chi Commies wld attempt salvage situation, unification appeared possible by UN forces filling vacuum in North Korea. Entrance Chi in force and increasingly meanacing attitude USSR created new situation involving global power relationship Sov bloc versus free world and required US in own natl security interest to reassess its position and review proportion its total mil resources which cld be committed on Korean peninsula.

(4) ROKs must be brought realize outbreak of world war wld be for them a disaster since major theaters wld be elsewhere and their future then wld be indefinite prolongation horrors of war and probability of being overrun and destroyed as a nation.

(5) All ROK's future hopes rest on free world which brought it into existence and has supported it in its hour of need. Future peace and prosperity ROK dependent on peace of world. This in turn rests on free world's ability build its strength and thereby make possible comprehensive and enduring settlement with Sov bloc which will remove menace which now hangs over entire free world and which in Korea has challenged very existence ROK. If a settlement of Korean hostilities, with assurances that the aggression will not be renewed, can be obtained at this time in the interest of reducing the risk of world-wide hostilities and gaining further time for free world to rebuild its strength and defenses, then it is clearly in interest of ROKS themselves to accept with all possible grace such an arrangement. ROKS must realize their security and hopes for a unified country can only be found in context of abandonment Commie aggressive designs by confrontation Moscow and its satellites with situation of strength in free world which wld remove all incentive for aggression anywhere.

(6) Lastly, just as long-term future of hope and promise for ROKs depends on continuing loyal assn with US and free world, so all hope of reconstruction in immed period fol local settlement rests on resources and will to help of US. US's post V–J Day and pre-invasion record of material and moral support, as well as US instant reaction to invasion by North Koreans, shld adequately testify to what collaborative future with US wld hold. On other hand, if ROKs by intransigent and inflammatory statements and provocative or violent actions shld jeopardize or make more difficult settlement at this time in Korea, which wld be acceptable to US and UN, then ROKs can inevitably expect a revulsion of feeling against them on part of Amer people who are so keenly conscious that at cost of nearly 100,000 battle casualties US has saved ROK from destruction, in addition to sacrifice made in World War II from which came hope for free Korea.

I am fully aware immense difficulty ur task and appreciative ur accomplishment. The days immed ahead promise to be even more difficult and will require combination of hardbitten realism and sympathetic understanding in ur handling of Rhee and his Govt. If satis settlement in vicinity of present battle line can be achieved we will be able understand disappointment and dashed hopes of ROKs but we cannot accept reckless or foolish action which wld place in jeopardy their and our own natl security interests.

It is possible that ROK leaders may be able to give assurances that, despite their contd public position on unification, they wld act with moderation and not permit relations with us to become marked with hostility and acrimony.

ACHESON

330/6-2951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, June 29, 1951—2:39 p. m.

Unmis 47. For Hickerson, UNA from Gross, USUN re conversation at the USSR SC dinner.[1] When I arrived, I greeted Malik with formality. Shortly afterward he came up to me and expressed regret that he had not been able to see me during the past two days. With great particularity he explained the circumstances of his illness and said he had been under doctor's orders to stay in bed until Saturday.[2] He said he had violated his orders by attending his dinner.

He proceeded to say he had received word today about Gromyko's talk with Kirk, in which former had explained certain points raised by our Ambassador.

I said I had a report about this, and asked Malik if there was anything he would like to add. He replied he thought Gromyko had covered subject. He added: "We can hope for peace."

Malik then volunteered the comment that he was "very sorry about the breakdown of the conference in Paris".[3] He said the Atlantic Pact was the great problem between our two countries. He described it as obviously an aggressive plan directed against the Soviet Union.

I replied that he had often said this to me but that he must be perfectly well aware the Atlantic Pact was concluded only because Soviet policies made necessary a defensive alliance to protect its members against the threat of aggression. I said that it was my own personal experience that the U.S. Senate would not have ratified the treaty unless they had been convinced by several years of experience after the war that the Soviet Union was intent upon aggression. Their maintenance of huge armies and policy of the Iron Curtain, building up armies in Eastern Europe and above all aggression in Korea have created deep fears of their intentions. For us, the Atlantic Pact was the result of tension created by the Soviet Union and we did not agree that it could be considered as a cause of tension.

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[1] The dinner took place on June 28; see telegram 6800, June 25, from London, p. 552.

[2] June 30.

[3] The Conference of the Deputies of the Four Foreign Ministers, in session at the Palais Rose since March 5, had adjourned on June 21 without having accomplished its purpose of preparing an agenda for a Foreign Ministers Conference. For related documentation, see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

Malik replied, "I would hope you would invite us to participate in the Atlantic Pact." I pretended not to understand him. He repeated these quoted words without apparent sarcasm or facetiousness.

I said we had invited them to join the Marshall Plan but they had refused to do so and even had made Czech change her mind. Malik then went into a ritualistic song and dance about the "political conditions" we had attached to the Marshall Plan. He insisted with emphasis that the Soviet Union had at first been willing to join the Marshall Plan while it seemed to be a fair economic program with "mutual trade arrangements", but when they saw we were "trying to dominate Westtern Europe" with our economic power they, of course, would have nothing to do with it. I challenged his comments.

Returning to subject of the Atlantic Pact, Malik said we were frightened by our own propaganda. Although we talked about large Russian armies, we never talk about our own huge navy, air force and "atom bomb stockpile". We say we are afraid of the Soviet Union but we keep bases near her borders. On other hand, the Soviet Union has no bases near our frontiers. He was firmly convinced that we wanted the Atlantic Pact in order to get bases in Europe, and this proved our aggressive intentions. He could not understand why we were "not willing to co-exist". Instead of trying to reach an agreement with Soviet Union, we kept talking about their building up "small armies in small countries." At same time we ourselves were making big armaments to add to our navy, air force and atom-bomb stockpile. He was "formly [*firmly?*] convinced" that the American people did not approve of this course.

They did not want war any more than the Soviet people wanted war.

I replied that it was extremely difficult for us to know what the Soviet people wanted, and that one of the basic causes of our fears and suspicions was the Iron Curtain. So long as Sov maintained a closed system, forbidding free exchange of people and communications, it could not be expected that people in other parts of world would develop confidence in Soviet intentions. Moreover, so far as I was aware, there was no capitalist fifth column in Moscow. Malik replied we had the real Iron Curtain, pointing to our refusal to permit artists and musicians such as Shostakovich coming to US.

Malik told me he was leaving on *Gripsholm* on July 6 and hoped to have long rest. He said he was very tired and was planning now to stay in bed for several days. He hoped that we might have a talk with each other before he left if he found he had the opportunity.

Later in the evening I had a brief talk with Soldatov of the Sov Delegation. I found him unusually affable, as was Zinchenko who joined us. Soldatov insisted upon importance of our two countries "understanding each other." He said it was impossible to conceive that we would "destroy each other." He insisted that we make a great mistake when we talk about so-called Sov plans to dominate the world. The Sov Government "believes in co-existence" and Stalin has made this clear. Our great mistake, Soldatov said, was to fail to realize that since Stalin is head of state, it is important to "consider what he says now" and not what he or others may have said many years ago. Truman and Acheson attacked Stalin but we should realize Stalin has not attacked Truman and Acheson. Moreover, the Soviet press does not tell their people how much the American press writes against the Soviet Union. If they did, the Russian people "would be very disturbed" and would not be willing to accept agreements between us.

At another point during the evening, while I was talking with Zinchenko and Quevedo, the latter brought up question of the offer by the Government of Ecuador of rice for shipment to Korea. Zinchenko, with a smile, said that "soon we will have peace in Korea and it will not be necessary to send the rice."

Throughout the evening it was quite clear that Malik, Soldatov and Zinchenko were most amiable in their approaches to me and in our conversations.

GROSS

795.00/6-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by John R. Heidemann of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys
Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Ambassador Apriano Restrepo-Jaramil
Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Ambassador Bonnet
Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor

Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Ambassador Wan
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Ambassador Jooste
Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE, Mr. Merchant
FE, Mr. Connors
EUR, Mr. Raynor
UNP, Mr. Stein
EUR, Mr. McClelland
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Heidemann
Army, Captain Pope

Following a brief résumé by Captain Pope of the military developments in the past two days, Mr. Rusk stated that we had been considering what further steps should be taken in regard to a possible cease-fire in Korea since we felt that we had received all the clarification from the Soviets we would be getting. We had moved, Mr. Rusk declared, on the assumption that the communists did want a bona fide cease-fire. But we had been embarrassed by having no information on the precise steps the North Korean and Chinese Communists would be willing to take to achieve this end. We now wished to determine whether the opposing commanders in the field felt the same way about a cease-fire as Moscow and Peiping. We had discussed with General Ridgway the type of statement he might make at this time, the General stating that he felt it would be practical to indicate to the opposing commanders that a meeting could be arranged. Mr. Rusk informed the group that a statement on the cease-fire had been drafted and that General Ridgway was scheduled to make it public at six p. m., Washington time.[1] After having distributed a copy of the statement to the group, Mr. Rusk explained that the purpose of the statement was to discover whether the commanders on the other side would be interested in a meeting in the field to arrange a cease-fire. We felt that it was important to continue with the idea that the other side had taken the initiative in this matter but not to say that they were suing for peace, thereby raising prestige obstacles. But we did desire to put the responsibility on the communists, to get the idea across that they had brought the topic up. Noting that Ridgway had been cast as the United

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[1] See footnote 3 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, p. 586.

Nations Commander, Mr. Rusk commented that the word government had purposely not been injected into the statement in order to accommodate the other side. At the same time, we wished to make it clear that Ridgway had received instructions, we having had unfortunate experiences in this respect. We did not pretend that Ridgway himself had been approached but rather that he had been informed that an approach had been made. We did not suggest a date, but in order to move the whole matter ahead a step we had proposed a place, aboard a Danish hospital ship in the harbor of Wonsan, which, we felt, would be convenient to both sides. Mr. Rusk reported that the Danish ship would function for this purpose as a Danish rather than a United Nations ship and that the Danish Government, when approached, had declared that it would be happy to make the ship available for this purpose.

In any cease-fire negotiations, General Ridgway will operate under directives from Washington and inter-government negotiations will take place here, since it would be too great a burden for Ridgway to conduct such negotiations in Tokyo in addition to all his other pressing duties. Ambassador Jooste asked whether there would be further collaboration in Washington on the directives to be sent Ridgway. Mr. Rusk said that discussions were to be held here on the general nature of the directives concerning a cease-fire. He pointed out that we already have an important area of agreement with the other side, namely, that any cease-fire talks should be military and not political in nature. He noted that an important element in the truce would be the question of supervision. We felt that it should be made difficult for either side surreptiously to build up its forces with a view to renewing hostilities and, to this end, we felt that the opposing commanders should have knowledge of any prejudicial activity on the part of the other. He declared that we would not accede to any demand to withdraw the United Nations Air Force. Mr. Rusk stated that we are drafting a set of general cease-fire principles, but have reached no final decision on the matter. He said that he would have to find out from his seniors just how much consultation we would undertake with the group. Upon Mr. McNichol's asking whether the group would be consulted on the progress of the cease-fire, Mr. Rusk stated that we would discuss those developments which could be reasonably discussed but would make no commitment that something might arise which might better be kept quiet. We would not, he observed, like to see the peace we all hope for ruined by premature public debate. In regard to Gromyko's several references to political and territorial matters, which the Ambassador of Colombia found somewhat contradictory, Mr. Rusk voiced our view that political and territorial questions should remain for intergovernment exploration. Mr. Rusk went on to say that it was necessary in these first military steps to get something we could live with for some time, since it might prove difficult to reach any solution on the broader aspects of the situation.

Mr. Tomlinson, recalling ROK President Rhee's bitter reaction to Malik's speech, asked what the attitude of the ROK would be since its loyalty might well prove extremely important. Mr. Rusk said we have had no clear and certain indication of the ROK's attitude. He told the group that the public statements made by ROK representatives so far have been made in spite of our approaches and that the private statements we have from them have been entirely consistent with their public statements. He announced that the Korean Ambassador was going to join the group as an observer and said that the group must be careful not to let the Koreans feel that their views are not closely considered. We are hopeful, Mr. Rusk declared, that even though the ROK can't abandon the unification of Korea as a national policy, its immediate action would be in line with UN and US policy.

Mr. Rusk concluded the session by observing that if we can reasonably call off the fighting in Korea, we should do so, because such an action would be in accord with UN objectives and because, if the conflict continues, there is every possibility that it will grow rather than shrink. Our choice, therefore, is clearly an acceptable cease-fire or an expansion of the conflict. Mr. Rusk added that he had heard no member of the group speak in favor of the latter course and that he assumed their respective governments all favored an effort to achieve a cease-fire.

795.00/6-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet
Mr. Rusk, FE
Mr. Godley, WE

After this afternoon's briefing of the Ambassadors, Ambassador Bonnet returned to my office and opened the conversation by complimenting us upon our statement that was given to the Ambassadors and which he said was excellent.

The Ambassador then inquired as to our thinking on the observers to which I replied that we had in mind pairs of American (or other UN) and North Korean or Chinese military officers who would inspect behind both lines. This, it was felt, was essential in that in the absence of some such arrangement it would be impossible for us to reallocate troops in that we had to know whether or not masses of enemy troops were being built up. The Ambassador said he agreed to this point of view and asked whether or not this would be on a United Nations' basis. I answered that we were not thinking of observers representing the United Nations "per se" but rather the military forces in that were they United Nations it would complicate an already difficult problem and might give the enemy grounds for refusal.

We then discussed the question of a neutral zone, and I was unable to give the Ambassador any definite information on this pointing out that it would have to be negotiated by General Ridgway and might either be a relatively wide zone between the two armies or else more restricted. Its location, of course, would depend upon General Ridgway's conversations and we had at present no idea what the enemy would demand.

The Ambassador remarked that he was glad to note that we were presently regarding negotiations as an exclusively military matter and that only once the armistice and cease-fire had been arranged would we get into political questions.

Among the difficulties that we anticipate, I referred to prisoners of war and pointed out that as we had some 15,000 Chinese and some 135,000 North Koreans against only some 5,000 United Nations' troops in enemy hands, this might prove a difficult point in the negotiations.

We also discussed the extent to which the United Nations should be brought into the present negotiations, and the Ambassador expressed his personal agreement with our belief that for the time being the discussions should remain completely military and the United Nations should not be directly involved. He asked if we anticipated any trouble in this connection to which I replied in the negative.

The Ambassador then mentioned the post-armistice problems regarding the political settlement and asked our views on this subject. I pointed out that this was a bridge that we had not yet crossed and thought there would be considerable time before this was broached. The Ambassador concurred and expressed his personal view that the Soviets and/or Chinese Communists would want to keep North Korea as a buffer state between Manchuria and South Korea. I replied that this appeared logical but that we, of course, have to await developments.

795.00/6–2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice (Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3:15 P. M., June 29)

Participants:	General Collins	Mr. Rusk
	Admiral McCormick	Mr. Johnson
	General White	
	Vice Admiral Davis	

[*Note:* Following the morning meeting[1] a draft of instructions[2] to General Ridgway was prepared by Mr. Rusk, Vice Admiral Davis and Mr. Johnson.][3]

This draft was considered and discussed in detail at the afternoon meeting. There was general agreement and approval of the principles of the draft, and the discussion was largely confined to technical details.

Near the close of the meeting (and following the departure of Mr. Rusk), Major General White stated that he "had been instructed" to state that the Air Force had grave doubts with regard to the policy that was being followed concerning an armistice and questioned whether it was to our advantage. General Collins replied that the decision with respect to policy had been made at the meeting the preceding day with the concurrence of all of the Chiefs and it was now far too late to reopen the question. At the request of General White, the meeting awaited the arrival of General Twining, who stated his serious concern over entering into an armistice without adequate guarantees as to what the other side would do. Upon General Collins' pointing out that no consideration had or was being given to an armistice until the other side had agreed to acceptable armistice terms which would include provision for adequate observation of North Korea, General Twining entered no further objection.

[*Note:* The draft approved at this meeting was discussed with the President[4] by Secretary Acheson, Mr. Rusk, General Marshall and General Bradley at a meeting aboard the *Williamsburg* the evening of June 29, at which an instruction to General Ridgway was approved and transmitted the same evening.][5]

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation, p. 586.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Brackets throughout in the source text.

[4] See Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 458–459.

[5] The instruction was transmitted in telegram JCS 95354, June 30, *infra*.

795.00/6–3051 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1951—12:25 a. m.

JCS 95354. Noforn. Personal for General Ridgway eyes only from JCS.

1. This message cancels our previous directives regarding armistice terms and contains instructions regarding such terms for your guidance in any conversations which might develop between you and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea. It is believed that the chance for a successful conclusion of such negotiation may depend upon secrecy in at least the opening stages; it is not, therefore, intended to make these instructions public.

2. General policy.

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations forces, as set forth in NSC 48/5,[1] copy of which you have received. General policy and background guidance is found in the same paper.

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to reach arrangements which would be acceptable to us over an extended period of time, even though no progress is made in reaching agreement on political and territorial questions.

c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions; you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental level.

3. You are authorized to adopt, for negotiating purposes, initial positions more favorable to us than the minimum conditions set forth in these instructions. However, great care should be used, in putting forward a negotiating position, not to allow talks to break down except in case of failure to accept our minimum terms; not to appear to over-reach to an extent to cause world opinion to question our good faith; and not so to engage US prestige in a negotiating position as to make retreat to our minimum terms impossible. Our minimum position is essential to us but we must recognize that it will not be

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[1] Dated May 17; see the memorandum containing the sections on Korea, p. 439.

easy for opponents to accept; the difficulty of your negotiation is fully appreciated here.

4. Pursuant to the above, the armistice agreements:

a. Shall be confined to Korea and strictly military matters therein, and shall not involve any political or territorial matters.

b. Shall continue in effect until superseded by other arrangements.

c. Shall require the commanders concerned to order a cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea; shall require the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and shall require all ground forces in Korea to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof;

d. Shall provide for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice arrangements by a Military Armistice Commission of mixed membership of an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations command and by the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces. The Commission and teams of observers appointed by the Commission shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and shall be given all possible assistance and cooperation in carrying out their functions.

e. Shall require the commanders concerned to cease the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing air, ground or naval units or personnel during the armistice. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the exchange of units or individual personnel on a man-for-man basis;

f. Shall require the commanders concerned to refrain from increasing the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Commission nor the vehicles, ships or aircraft used to transport such supplies.

5. The following specific details are essential to the above armistice arrangements:

a. The Military Armistice Commission must be empowered to inspect to insure that the terms, conditions, and arrangements as agreed to are carried out by all armed forces, including guerillas. It shall be provided with competent assistants designated equally by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, in numbers sufficient to enable it to carry out its duties and functions;

b. The armistice arrangements should not become effective until the Commission has been organized and is ready to exercise its functions;

c. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, to be determined by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, based generally upon the positions of the opposing forces at the time the armistice arrangements are agreed upon. For purposes of negotiation your initial demand might be that the Communist forces must withdraw 20 miles or more along the entire front. If it becomes necessary for purposes of bargaining for you to agree to some withdrawal of United Nations forces, you may do so to the extent that your present strong military position and your ability to carry out your military mission are not placed in jeopardy. You may agree to continued Communist control of the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas for purposes of the armistice only. If the Communist Commander refers to statements attributed to United States Government officials that the United States is prepared to accept a settlement on or around the 38th parallel, you should take the position that such statements are not applicable to an armistice in the field but are properly the subject for governmental negotiation as to a political settlement. Further, you should state that in any event the military arrangements you propose involve certain areas under Communist military control south of the 38th parallel and certain areas under UN control north thereof. The net result, while military in character, does not prejudice political and territorial questions which would be for further consideration by appropriate authorities.

d. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing ground forces in Korea. These forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

e. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing naval forces. Naval elements shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land areas under the control of the opposing force, to the limit of three miles off-shore.

f. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing air forces. These forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

g. Vehicles, naval units and aircraft required for special missions authorized by the Commission shall be excepted from subparagraphs *d*, *e*, and *f*, above.

h. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

i. Organized bodies of armed forces including guerillas initially in advance of the demilitarized zone shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces.[2]

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[2] The following addition to the directive was forwarded to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram JCS 95843, dated July 9:

"Add new para 6 to JSC 95354, 30 Jun 51:

" 'Para 6. The foll provision is considered desirable, though not essential, for inclusion in the Armistice Arrangement:

" 'Graves Registration personnel of the mil services shall be permitted free and unlimited access to all of Korea for the purposes of search, recovery, and evacuation of deceased and missing mil personnel. Provision for such matters as identification of Graves Registration personnel and escorts therefor shall be arranged as mutually agreed between CINCUNC and the Commander, Communist Forces in Korea.' " (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 44)

795.00/6-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1951.

Subject: ROK Position Concerning Armistice in Korea

Participants: Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs.

The Korean Ambassador, Dr. Yang, called on Mr. Rusk this morning at 11:30 by previous appointment. In opening the conversation, the Ambassador expressed gratification at his having been invited to attend the periodic briefings of the Ambassadors of those United Nations countries having forces in Korea. He stated that he had reported this invitation to his Government. Mr. Rusk replied that he was pleased that the Ambassador would be joining the group and explained the details as to the briefing meetings. He pointed out that since the meetings were informal, no written invitation would be issued to the Ambassador unless he so requested. The Ambassador said that would not be necessary. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that if the Ambassador did not desire to attend all of the meetings personally, he could send a representative from his Embassy. Mr. Rusk explained the delay in issuing the invitation to the Ambassador on the basis that it had been necessary to get the reaction of the other members of the group, none of whom had raised objection. He therefore was certain that the Ambassador would find a very friendly atmosphere within the group.

Ambassador Yang then handed Mr. Rusk a communication addressed to the Secretary outlining five points which the Republic of Korea Government desired to bring to the attention of the United States Government as representing its position concerning an armistice in Korea (copy attached).[1] He explained that this communication was being given to the Department upon instructions from his Government, and that he wished to discuss it with the Department. The Ambassador remarked that he did not think that the Korean position on an armistice was too far removed from that of the United States, but that, in any event, his Government believed that it should place on public record its views concerning the question of an armistice. The Ambassador emphasized that despite any seeming differences which might be represented by the five points in relation to United

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[1] Not printed.

States policy on this subject, he could assure the Department that the Korean Government would, in fact, cooperate with the United States and United Nations policy. Mr. Rusk replied that this was a very important point and that he would so report to President Truman. He stated that the United States fully sympathized with Korean aspirations for independence and unity, that the attainment of these objectives would continue to be the firm policy of the United States and the United Nations and that we would make no commitments in contradiction of that policy. Mr. Rusk pointed out, however, that the armistice was purely a military matter and that political questions would not be taken up in the armistice negotiations. He emphasized that this was an important distinction, which must be clearly understood.

In discussing the first of the five points contained in the Ambassador's communication, Mr. Rusk stated that the United States contemplated a phased withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces on both sides. He expressed the view, however, that the timing of this withdrawal in relation to the implementation of the armistice was of great importance, since it would appear essential to keep at least token United Nations forces in Korea until the general situation was satisfactorily secure. Any insistence, therefore, upon an early withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops which, in the nature of things, would have to be accompanied by corresponding withdrawal of United Nations forces, would be premature if it resulted in any temptation to the Chinese Communists to renew the attack before a satisfactory security situation could be developed. The Ambassador said that he agreed with this and remarked that the failure of an armistice at this time would undoubtedly make World War III a much greater possibility.

With regard to the second and third points, Mr. Rusk recalled that there had been tremendous devastation in North Korea with a corresponding deterioration of military potential, and that the USSR had, on the basis of past experience, shown a marked disinclination to render assistance to the North Korean and Chinese Communists without exacting payment therefor; this had undoubtedly been a sore point with the Chinese Communists. Mr. Rusk believed, therefore, that any possible assistance which might be rendered to the North Koreans by the USSR, would clearly be more than counterbalanced by the broad program of assistance to the Republic of Korea which, as a matter of policy, the United States, together with the other United Nations Members, was determined to carry out. He cited the figure of $250 million in United Nations economic assistance which has been scheduled for the Korean economic rehabilitation program during the first year of operations, and remarked that President Truman was personally most deeply concerned that this rehabilitation program should be carried into full effectiveness. Mr. Rusk believed that the Koreans should also be reassured by the extensive program now being worked out by the American military authorities for the strengthening of the Republic of Korea forces in order that the security of South Korea be assured in the face of any possible future threat from North Korea. In this connection he emphasized the necessity for the training of competent ROK officers, particularly at the battalion level.

Ambassador Yang mentioned that President Rhee was anxious to send a number of senior ROK officers to the United States Command and General Staff School. He remarked that while the Koreans are not fundamentally a warlike people, they will fight desperately for their freedom if compelled to do so. He said that, speaking as an individual Korean, he was convinced that his Government would never sanction any use of ROK military forces, or take other action, which would be in conflict with United States policy. Dr. Yang stated that what his Government feared was the possibility that, following conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the United States and the other United Nations Members would relax their vigilance and be lulled into a sense of false security which might result in the ROK being exposed, without adequate safeguards, to a sudden fatal blow from the Communists.

Mr. Rusk replied that, regardless of the existence of an armistice in Korea, the United States, together with the other United Nations Members, would move forward with their program for strengthening the military resources of the free world; he referred specifically to the strengthening of Western Europe and the incorporation of Japan into the Western system of collective security.

Mr. Rusk again impressed upon the Ambassador that on the basis of the past record of the performance of the United States and the United Nations in rendering economic and military aid to Korea, it would be highly unlikely that we would remain indifferent to the welfare of Korea in the future. The Ambassador replied that the Koreans fully realized that their only salvation lay in supporting and cooperating with United States policy and that to do otherwise would mean disaster.

In connection with the fourth point, Mr. Rusk indicated that the Department fully concurred in the desirability of Korean representation in discussions and conferences bearing upon the future of Korea, remarking upon the excellent work which had been done by the Korean Delegation at the Paris meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,[2] and stated that the United States Government would continue to consult closely with the Republic of Korea. He pointed out that the United States intended that a senior ROK military officer should be on the staff of General Ridgway's representative in any armistice negotiations with the Communists.

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[2] Reference is to the First Part of the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in Paris, September 21–December 12, 1948; for documentation relating to Korea, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, pp. 1079 ff.

With regard to the last point in the Ambassador's communication, Mr. Rusk again referred to the determination of the United States and the United Nations to continue to seek the unification and independence of Korea by political means, and emphasized the great importance of Korean interest in and support of our efforts along these lines. He summed up the Ambassador's communication by saying that, with the possible exception of the first and second points, he could perceive nothing which would appear to present any particular problem.

The Ambassador then raised the question of the admittance of the Republic of Korea into the United Nations and wondered what steps might be taken to overcome the obstacle presented by the Soviet veto. Mr. Rusk thought that there was little chance that the United Nations Charter might be altered, but suggested that some other way of working out the problem might be found, as for instance, by mutual concession with the USSR on the admittance of various candidates which each side might put forward. Mr. Rusk remarked upon how much Mr. Hickerson of UNA had enjoyed his recent talk with the Ambassador and stated Mr. Hickerson was most conversant, from long experience, with the various ramifications of United Nations affairs. Mr. Rusk suggested that the Ambassador might take the opportunity to have further talks with Mr. Hickerson.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Rusk for this very frank and friendly talk and again reiterated the determination of his Government to work in harmony with the United States and United Nations.[3]

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[3] The substance of this memorandum of conversation was communicated to the Embassy in Pusan in the Department's telegram 1, July 1, not printed (795.00/6-3051).

795.00/6-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, June 30, 1951—2 p. m.

1103. Immed upon receipt Dept's 1004[1] I phoned President Rhee that I had draft msg wished to deliver at once. Upon arrival his residence I found he had already summoned Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. He read General Ridgway's communiqué aloud. For the next hour there was great deal of talk, far fetched and irrelevant, mainly by the President but also by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. For instance, President Rhee said he wld call an immediate Cabinet meeting and decide terms under which they wld take part in the conversations. I took occasion to caution against hasty decisions and particularly public pronouncements and suggested advisability of talking matter over with UNCURK. The Foreign Minister mentioned he had called a press conference for 10 o'clock. The President instructed him to call this off. The Prime Minister remarked we should not talk to Commies until all had been driven from Korea. I thereupon called attention to the adverse reaction to the many statements against cease-fire by Korean officials and expressed feeling better line wld be willingness to explore armistice possibilities at the same time urging all proper guarantees against further aggression.

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[1] Not printed; it contained the text of the message broadcast by General Ridgway (see footnote 3 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, p. 586).

Sent Dept 1103, rptd info Tokyo 202.

Muccio

795.00/6-3051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL New York, June 30, 1951—2:15 p. m.

1750. Re authority of UC to negotiate cease-fire in Korea.

Following is text of memorandum prepared for SYG-UN by Feller (UN):

"In its res of 7 July 1950 the SC, after referring to its recommendation (of 27 June) that 'members of the UN furnish such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area', took the following steps among others:

(*a*) It recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance 'make such forces and other assistance available to a UC under the US'.

(2) [*sic*] Requested the US to designate the commander of such forces.

(3) Requested the US to provide the SC with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the UC.

The res of 7 July, therefore, constituted in effect a delegation by the SC to the US of the military responsibilities involved in repelling the armed attack. Since the res of 7 July neither the SC nor the GA have given the UC any directions with regard to the conduct of military operations (asterisk). Such steps as for example, conducting air and ground operations north of the 38 Parallel, have been undertaken by the UC on its own responsibility.

The question now arises whether the UC possesses the authority to negotiate and conclude a cease-fire, truce or armistice.

The SC res of 25 June 1950 called for 'the immediate cessation of hostilities'. This call was repeated in the res of 27 June. It is still in effect since it has not been modified or withdrawn by any action of the council.

The conclusion of arrangements for the suspension of hostilities has been generally considered by belligerents to be within the authority of military commanders. For example, the armistice of 11 November 1918 in the First World War was entered into by Marshal Foch, representing the Allies, and by the German commanders on the other side. In the Second World War the instruments of surrender which constituted the suspension of hostilities were entered into by the military commanders of the Allied Powers and of Germany.

(Asterisk) The only further direction given to the UC was the request in SC res of 31 July 1950 to undertake responsibility regarding relief for the civilian population of Korea. (End asterisk).

The UC, having been delegated the responsibility of military operations, is authorized, in accordance with customary practice, to enter into agreements for the suspension of these hostilities either by way of a cease-fire, truce or armistice. In making any such agreement the UC would, in effect, be implementing the resolutions of 25 June and 27 June. Under the res of 7 July the UC would, of course, be required to report any agreements to the SC, which could discuss and take action on them if it so decided. It should be noted that the authority of the UC would extend no further than the suspending of hostilities, including appropriate arrangements to insure against their renewal. It would not appear to have authority to enter into any agreements which would involve political arrangements regarding the future of Korea in the absence of further action by either the SC or the GA.

It is also desirable to clarify the legal position of the representatives of the 16 participating govts which have met from time to time in Washington. Under the res of 7 July the SC had recommended that all members providing military forces in Korea, make these forces available to the UC. The reps of these members are, therefore, assisting the UC in the discharge of its responsibilities under the res of 7 July. This group of reps cannot be considered as an organ of the UN, since the responsibility was delegated to the UC and not the collectivity of member states furnishing military assistance. The group may be appropriately characterized as a consultative body to the UC."

GROSS

795.00/6–3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PUSAN, June 30, 1951—7 p. m.

1108. News Gen Ridgway's message to commander Commie forces spread widely and rapidly here this morning, causing great speculation. Natl Assembly immed took matter under debate; usual extreme statements and garbles, however, more than balanced in open session by advocates caution. In considering motion to send delegation to UN GA, National Assembly decided await decision state council. Emb informed text sent Embtel 1107[1] represents views cabinet as unanimously endorsed by National Assembly in secret session, after interpellating PriMin.

Especially notable in National Assembly consideration that they clearly recognized two stages, one military on ceasefire, second political. View offered that ceasefire not necessarily on 38th Parallel, and opposing view that despite sacrifices, etc., 38th Parallel will be revived.

ROK OPI release just recd repeats five points Embtel 1107, but states in introduction "time has come for ROK to clarify its position on proposed ceasefire. We are not prepossessed [*predisposed?*] to oppose ceasefire. We mean rather to offer clear-cut conditions in order to preclude danger being tricked by Commies. We are prepared participate in any cease fire talks, if five conditions met . . . ."

Based on conversations officials as well as foregoing, I am reasonably certain that negotiation ceasefire presents no insuperable difficulties in relations ROK provided: (1) ROK military officer participates; (2) no use 38th Parallel as delineation, but rather actual front.

Sent Dept 1108, rptd info Tokyo 203.

MUCCIO

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted the text, handed to Ambassador Muccio by the Korean Foreign Minister, of the five basic conditions for a cease-fire, which were contained in the note from the Korean Ambassador (Yang), June 30. See memorandum of conversation, June 30, p. 601.

795.00/7-151 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET — TOKYO, July 1, 1951—6:25 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 66160. Urmsg JCS 95354, 30 June 1951. This message in two parts.

Part 1. To time of dispatch of this message, no communication has been received from any Communist source in reply to my initial message. Assuming a favorable reply is received, I plan to broadcast second message to Communist Commander suggesting initial contact between opposing forces be made by liaison officers either at Wonsan Airfield or on main Seoul-Kaesong highway between Kaesong and

Imjin River. Purpose of this "preliminary meeting" is strictly for arranging details for the first meeting to include time, place, routes and procedures for movement, size of delegations, safe conduct for representatives and necessary safety zones.

Part 2. Assuming arrangements for first meeting satisfactorily made, I propose to send Vice Admiral Joy with credentials to act as my representative.[1] Delegation with Admiral Joy will be Major General Hodes, Eighth Army; Major General Craigie, FEAF; Rear Admiral Burke, NAVFE; General Paik, ROK Army,[2] and small staff. Objectives of first meeting are:

a. To establish formal contact between CINCUNC and the enemy commander through the medium of a personal representative of Flag (general officer) rank.

b. To determine through discussion with the enemy delegation whether the enemy is acting in good faith and is willing to seek agreement on terms for bringing about a cessation of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea, under conditions which will provide for the security of the armed forces of each belligerent and assurance against the resumption of fighting in Korea for an extended period.

c. To establish in the minds of the enemy, and to secure tentative enemy reaction thereto, the agenda items which from the standpoint of the United Nations are essential for discussion at a second meeting.

d. To receive enemy agenda items, if any.

e. To seek agreement on an agenda for a second meeting provided the good faith of the enemy had been established to the satisfaction of CINCUNC representative.

f. To arrange the mechanics of the second meeting at which armistice terms will be discussed.

The agenda proposed for the second meeting, as a minimum, will include the following items:

a. Adoption of agenda.

b. Limitation of discussions at this and all subsequent meetings to purely military matters related to Korea only,

c. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea for an indefinite period,

d. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea,

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[1] Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy was Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East.

[2] Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes was Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Eighth Army; Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie was Vice Commander, U.S. Far East Air Forces; Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke was Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East; and Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup was Commanding General, I Corps, Republic of Korea Army.

e. Composition, authority and functions of Military Armistice Commission,

f. Agreement on principle of unrestricted inspection within Korea by military observer teams, functioning under Military Armistice Commission,

g. Composition and functions of these teams,

h. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

795.00/7–251 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 2, 1951—8 : 41 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 66183. Several versions of a reply to my msg to the Commander-in-Chief, Communist forces in Korea, have been recd. In order to insure coordination, I recommend that the following be agreed upon as the official reply and that the JCS confirm to me that in their deliberations they will use this version:

"Peking—Here is important news from the Korean front. After consultations held today between General Kim Il Sung, Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army,[1] and General Peng Te-Huai, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, a joint notice was sent to General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces, in reply to the broadcast msg from General Ridgway on June 30 in which he expressed willingness to dispatch delegates to hold cease-fire talks with our delegates. The contents of the notice are as follows:

"General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of United Nations forces:

"Your broadcast msg of June 30, regarding peace talks, has been recd. We are authorized to tell you that we agree to suspend military activities and to hold peace negotiations, and that our delegates will meet with yours.

"We suggest, in regard to the place for holding talks, that such talks be held at Kaesong, on the 38th parallel.

"If you agree to this, our delegates will be prepared to meet your delegates between July 10 and 15, 1951.

"Signed Kim Il Sung, Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Peoples Army, and Peng Te-Huai, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

My recommended reaction to this response will be forwarded soonest.

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[1] Marshal Kim Il Sung was also Prime Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

795.00/7-251 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, July 2, 1951—11:41 a. m.

CX 66188. Please refer to text of radio broadcast from Communist commanders in Korea transmitted to you in mymsg CX 66183. Their intent is clear that mil act shall be suspended from beginning of armistice negotiations. Such action might gravely prejudice safety and security of United Nations forces. I consider this wholly unacceptable and, unless otherwise instructed, I shall categorically reject it. My reasons follow:

Our intelligence to date indicates following:

a. Buildup of hostile offensive capability continues.

b. Total vehicular sightings by friendly air during past week are up approximately 70 per cent over preceding week, with our reconnaissance flights producing this intelligence up only 10 per cent.

c. Bulk of this vehicular traffic was south of 39 parallel.

d. Rail traffic likewise up during same period.

e. Reports not verified of presence of one CCF mechanized Army in Koksan, coordinates BT 9999.

f. Reports also received only partly confirmed of presence of Soviet antiaircraft matériel and personnel in Korea.

g. Reports, unconfirmed of the presence in Korea of International Brigade of substantial strength.

h. PW interrogations have repeatedly referred to next offensive as scheduled on or before 15 July.

i. Weather conditions expected to deteriorate about same period with maximum hampering effect on our air and ground mobility beginning about that time.

j. General Chu Te Commander in Chief CCF speaking on 30 June at Thirtieth Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party, declared that all US armed forces should be withdrawn from Korea as price of peace, failing which Chinese people will assist Koreans in repelling foreign troops and protecting Chinese northeast frontier. A pre-release of this speech was made on 28 June in numerous propaganda broadcasts.

k. His efforts to build new and rehabilitate old airfields in North Korea continues.

To summarize. Intelligence to date reveals a clearly developing pattern of capability to exercise an increasing offensive potential at any time from 10 July on. It is to be expected that if exercised optimum advantage would be taken of weather. It is further to be expected that enemy will intensify his efforts to increase this offensive potential throughout the period of negotiations, if conducted as he suggests they be conducted. If negotiations so conducted, we would be incapable of checking his military activities in Korea, particularly his preparation for major offensive action by ground and air.

Request your approval of my proposed action soonest. Immediately upon receipt of your reply, I plan to answer the Communist commanders' message accepting Kaesong as the location, making provision for cessation of hostilities along the Munsan-Kaesong road and in the Kaesong area, but urging that the date be advanced.

795.00/7-251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 2, 1951—6 p. m.

3. ReDeptel 1003, June 29. Recent visits Gens. Ridgway, Van Fleet to Pres Rhee have been most helpful in relations ROK. In particular continued daily presence, availability Gen. Coulter who enjoys outstanding personal prestige with Pres Rhee most valuable. View this I see no present necessity visit PriMin to US or visit here by influential US personage.

Gen. Coulter accompanied me this morning on call on Rhee. ROK Govt unadvised results Amb Yang's call to Dept; I verbally paraphrased contents Deptel 1, July 1.[1] Burden Rhee's lengthy conversation was his conviction settlement with Commies at present time was indication weakness which wld lead to third world war, but he nonetheless concluded that ROK wld of course have to go along with US and UN decisions. He added that in order prevent loose talk he today told Cabinet to preserve public silence on ceasefire issue.

While in nature of problem and of Korean sentiments I can only expect further publicity on "marching to Yalu" theme, I believe that responsible quarters ROK are facing realities of situation in a manner better than may have been expected. It appears to me that the initial emotional reaction has been passed as regards ceasefire issue per se.

Sent Dept 3 rptd info Tokyo 2.

MUCCIO

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 604.

795.00/7-251 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 2, 1951—6:04 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 95438. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only. Personal for

Ridgway. Foll msg in 3 parts reur CX 66160,[1] C 66126,[2] C 66128,[3] CX 66183 and CX 66188,[4] and JCS 95354.[5]

Part I. Reur CX 66183, the version transmitted in Mandarin from Peiping, as translated in Washington before Peiping broadcast in English, is in agreement with version later transmitted in English from Peiping, and is accepted as official by State and Defense. It reads as follows: "Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received. We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the 38th Parallel; if you agree, our representatives are prepared to meet your representatives between July 10 and 15, 1951."

Part II. Your reply to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai should be along the following lines:

> "I have received your reply to my message of 30 June.
>
> "I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaesong on July 10 or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date.
>
> "Since agreement on Armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating the meetings and in reaching agreement will prolong the fighting and increase the losses."

You are at liberty to make such minor changes in above quoted dispatch as you desire, except that last para thereof should not be materially altered.

Foll is for your guidance:

a. We must not appear eager to advance date of mtg and therefore you should not urge an earlier mtg.

b. Mention of 38th Parallel must be avoided in the mil discussions or in msgs referring to the place of the proposed mtg.

c. Your proposed agenda for the mtg is considered to be satisfactory.

d. Your idea that a preliminary mtg should be held is concurred in. You are authorized to make any arrangements for such preliminary meeting as you desire.

e. If titles other than "General" are used to address your msg to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, refer to the latter as the "Commanding General, Chinese Communist Forces in Korea" and not as "Commander of the Chinese Volunteers."

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[1] Dated July 1, p. 607.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed. In this message, dated July 1, General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his intention to tell the Korean Foreign Minister, who had forwarded to Ridgway the five basic conditions for a cease-fire (see footnote 1, p. 607), that such matters were beyond his purview as military commander and should be addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General (795.00/7-151).

[4] Both dated July 2, pp. 609 and 610.

[5] Dated June 30, p. 598.

f. Delegation proposed by you is satisfactory, but should be reviewed by you when composition of the Communist Delegation is known.

g. There must be no relaxation in mil effort on our part until proper arrangements for cessation of hostilities have been agreed upon as contained in the Armistice terms.

h. Provisions of JCS 95354 continue to apply. Note particularly Para 4 A, with respect to phrase in enemy msg which reads "and establishment of peace."

Part III. Reur C 66128, your proposed reply to Min Pyun is satisfactory except that the last sentence should be modified to read: "You realize, of course, that such questions as your Govt has raised in this letter are beyond my purview as Mil Cdr and should be, as I assume that they have been discussed on the Governmental levels."

795.00/7-351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
	Great Britain	—Mr. Steel, Minister Mr. Greenhill, First Secretary
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Korea	—Ambassador Yu Chan Yang
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Corner, First Secretary
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde

Thailand —Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Benler, First Secretary
Union of South Africa—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
Mr. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, First Secretary
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
NA, Mr. Johnson
WE, Mr. McClelland
UNP, Mr. Henkin
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
R, Mr. Trueheart
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Lockhart
Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope stated that the enemy over the week-end continued to make probing attacks at various points on the central front in the Kumwha area and that while these attacks were for the most part light ones there had been a notable increase in the amount of enemy artillery and mortar fire directed at the United Nations forces. He added that enemy air activity continued to be light and confined to defensive action in the Yalu River area. There were, however, two air incidents further south; an unidentified plane made a strafing attack near Seoul and another unidentified plane dropped flares near Chorwon. Captain Pope added that United Nations naval units exchanged fire with enemy shore batteries off Wonsan and that naval units of the Republic of Korea supported landings of guerrilla units on the west coast.

After giving the locations and engagements of the individual units of the United Nations forces, Captain Pope discussed enemy capabilities, stating that reports of an enemy buildup in the Sibyon area had been received. He also stated that there were reports that Chinese Communists were relieving the North Koreans on the east coast and that Chinese Communists were located southeast of Wonson: both reports, he said, were unconfirmed. Air sightings of enemy vehicular traffic over the week-end, however, confirmed the enemy buildup in the immediate rear areas looking toward an early resumption of the offensive, the number of southbound vehicles sighted being more than adequate to supply the daily enemy requirements and stockpile needs. He said that the Far Eastern Command estimated that, barring substantial Soviet commitments, the enemy did not have the capability of launching a sustained offensive. Mr. Hickerson inquired as to the possibilities of a limited enemy offensive prior to or during the armistice talks and asked whether from a military standpoint the enemy could improve his field position in any way bearing upon the armistice talks.

Captain Pope replied that it was difficult to assess what the enemy stood to gain militarily by launching an offensive during the armistice talks and that in his opinion the enemy, with the strength it now possesses and could move into position before next week, could launch an offensive on a scale equal to its last offensive but could probably make but limited gains. In reply to another question by Mr. Hickerson as to an enemy air buildup, Captain Pope stated that the Far Eastern Air Force considers that the enemy pilots are now battlewise. He added that the Far Eastern Air Force estimates that the enemy intends to continue its defense of the Yalu River area and to broaden its defensive air operations to cover all communist-held areas.

Enemy strength in Korea was listed as:

North Koreans at the front	55,000
Chinese Communists at the front	74,000
North Koreans in the rear	170,000
Chinese Communists in the rear	204,000
Guerrillas	7,000
	510,000

After welcoming the Korean Ambassador upon the occasion of his initial participation as an observer at the briefing sessions, Mr. Rusk stated that the pending armistice talks brought up the question of whether to proceed to act on the British proposal for the appointment of a Protecting Power to look after the interests of the United Nations personnel held as prisoners by the other side, since the question of prisoners of war would be one of the topics in the armistice talks. Mr. Hickerson stated that the United States was inclined to proceed on a business-as-usual basis but wished the views of the Ambassadors. The South African representative questioned whether the proposal might not have an adverse effect upon public opinion if published during the armistice talks. The British representative pointed out that it would probably be impossible to issue the statement before the beginning of the talks because a text agreed upon during the briefing sessions would have to be cleared with the Foreign Office in London. Mr. Rusk pointed out that there might well be a protracted period during the talks and before an armistice could come into force and be implemented in which a Protecting Power could be of service. The British representative stated that the proposal might be regarded in some circles as a political matter, coming as it would from the briefing sessions and might in that sense interfere with the purely military discussions at the armistice talks, thus probably leading to an undesirable situation. The Belgian Ambassador suggested the possibility of amending the text without prejudice to the contemplated armistice negotiations, thus having as a matter of record the position of the United Nations countries having forces fighting the aggression if the armistice talks prove abortive. It was agreed to hold over action on the British proposal until the next briefing session, affording the representatives the opportunity to discuss the question with the Department and with their governments.

Copies of the text of the joint message from General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai accepting the offer to meet to discuss an armistice,[1] and of the text of General Ridgway's reply were distributed.[2] Mr. Rusk stated that the joint enemy message contained several interesting points. It was couched in courteous tones and indicated that they would like to have a meeting. It also contained the first enemy acknowledgment of the United Nations forces as such. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the enemy's use of the words "we are authorized" brought up the interesting point of just who authorized Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai to conduct jointly the talks since Kim was ostensibly head of state of North Korea and Peng was ostensibly commander of the unofficial "Chinese volunteers". Rusk also pointed out that the enemy acceptance established the objective of the talks as being the "cessation of military action and establishment of peace", whereas Gromyko's clarification of Malik's speech defined the talks as involving only "military and not political or territorial matters" and as constituting an entering upon of "the path to a peaceful settlement". Mr. Rusk also pointed out that General Ridgway in his reply avoided the generality of "in the area of Kaesong" by saying "at Kaesong" and also omitted any reference to the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk also speculated that the enemy's suggestion to set the date of July 10–15 could possibly be explained in the enemy's own terminology; that there were technical difficulties. He noted that there are in fact technical difficulties involved, such as security, communications, guaranteeing the demilitarization of the area of the talks, safe passage, identification and the like. Mr. Rusk also admitted that we too had been thinking in terms of Kaesong as an alternative site for the meeting.

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[1] Reference is to the message embodied in Part I of telegram JCS 95438, *supra*.

[2] General Ridgway's reply to the message from the enemy commanders was issued at 2:30 p. m. on July 3 in Tokyo; the text, as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 43, read:

"To General Kim Il Sung
"General Peng Teh-Huai

"I have received your reply to my message of 30 June. I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaesong on July 10, or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date. Since agreement on Armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating the meetings and in reaching agreement will prolong the fighting and increase the losses. To insure efficient arrangement of the many details connected with the first meeting, I propose that not to exceed 3 of my liaison officers have a preliminary meeting with an equal number of yours in Kaesong on 5 July, or as soon thereafter as practicable. If you concur, my liaison officers, the senior of whom will not be above the rank of Colonel will depart Kimpo Airfield, southwest of Seoul by helicopter at 2300 GMT on 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting, proceeding direct to Kaesong.

"In the event of bad weather, these officers will proceed in a convoy of 3 unarmed 1-quarter ton trucks, commonly known as jeeps, along the main road from Seoul to Kaesong. Each vehicle will bear a large white flag. The convoy will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at about 2300 hours GMT, 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting. The convoy bearing your liaison officers to and from the meeting will be granted immunity from attack by my forces, providing you advise me of its route and schedule, and the manner by which my forces may identify it.

"Your reply is requested.

"M. B. Ridgway
"General, United States Army
"Commander-in-Chief
"United Nations Command"

Mr. Rusk, after noting that Drew Pearson [3] had picked up the published January 2 peace terms as a "scoop" in the day's column, stated that our general approach to the conditions of an armistice was as follows:

1. The talks would be confined to strictly military matters. Any agreement would be military in character and would not involve political questions. No commitment would be made involving a violation of the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Korea. Gromyko had specified that the talks were to be limited to military matters. Mr. Rusk stated that we prefer this course since a meeting of field commanders does not constitute a proper forum for a discussion of political and territorial questions.
2. No limitation would be imposed upon General Ridgway's conduct of the military campaign until an agreement is reached. Details of a military line and arrangements on the details of a demilitarized zone must be left with some discretion to him. A bare cease-fire especially involving a cessation of UN air activity during the negotiations before an armistice would place the United Nations in a disadvantageous position and permit an enemy buildup and therefore neither a preliminary cease-fire nor the permitting of any change in the enemy's military position is contemplated. The forces of the United Nations are to remain in their present strong and favorable positions, which we do not wish to give up and later find ourselves in a vulnerable position if the talks should break down. Comment on a final military line must be withheld at this time.
3. Final armistice arrangements would apply to all air, ground, naval and guerrilla forces. Respect for the demilitarized area, areas in the hands of the opposing forces and the territorial waters within the 3 mile limit would be observed.
4. No military reinforcement, either in personnel or in the level of supply, would be permitted. Exchanges on a man for man basis, such as the United States rotation system, would be permitted.

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[3] American journalist whose syndicated column appeared in the *Washington Post*.

5. Prisoners of war would be exchanged initially on a man to man basis since a wholesale repatriation of prisoners of war would virtually restore intact to North Korea forces equivalent to the number it possessed at the time of the aggression and thus entirely change the military situation. This problem involves great difficulty since there are some 150,000 prisoners in United Nations hands and less than 10,000 United Nations personnel in enemy hands.

6. One of our greatest concerns is over proper supervision of the implementation of the armistice. The representatives at the talks might arrange a mixed military commission for observation to assure each side against military buildups. The Soviet bloc in the past has not taken kindly to military observation teams having complete freedom of movement, but such a commission might be permitted to observe key points, such as the Yalu River bridges, rail junctions, important ports in order to give assurances. Full reciprocity would be required and both sides must have assurances that the armistice was not being violated. Our view is that such a commission would be composed of military representatives of the two sides to the conflict but we would be willing to consider the possibility of the commission being composed of parties neutral to the conflict.

In reply to a question as to when the United Nations would have an official connection with the negotiations, Mr. Hickerson stated that the agreement in the field should be sent to the United Nations, either the General Assembly or the Security Council, but it was not contemplated that the armistice would be held up pending an approval of the agreement by the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk suggested that open discussion of armistice terms be held over for future briefing sessions, especially since the enemy terms and intentions were not now known and since the exact course of the negotiations could not be ascertained in advance.

357.AD/7-351

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 3, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have considered carefully the question of the relationship between the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the Unified Command which was the subject of your letter of 16 May 1951.[1] I concur in the draft memorandum for the President which you inclosed and in the draft letter to be addressed by the Department of State to the United Nations Agent General for Korean

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[1] Not printed, but see the memorandum by Sandifer to Green, dated June 21, and the attachment thereto, p. 541. For Secretary Acheson's reply to this letter, see p. 768.

Reconstruction, which was inclosed with Assistant Secretary Rusk's letter of 20 June 1951.[2]

I should like to point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed to me their view that the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command should retain undivided command over all economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue. In expressing the concurrence of the Department of Defense in the solution which you have proposed to the problem of organization relationships, I have been guided by the belief that this solution affords adequate protection to the integrity of General Ridgway's command, as well as by the urgent need for some arrangement whereby UNKRA may commence operations in the near future. I should, therefore, like to make explicit my understanding that the final authority and control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the ground during hostilities is not intended to be affected by these arrangements and that the scope of the responsibility to be exercised by UNKRA for any program of economic aid additional to the United Nations Command Program shall remain subject to the exigencies of military necessity as determined by General Ridgway.

I consider it important that these arrangements be consummated in such a way as to avoid the creation of a precedent for the commitment of the Government of the United States to the acceptance of the principle of the independent functioning of an international body in an active theater of military operation. It is the view of the Department of Defense that the agreement with respect to UNKRA is appropriate only in the particular circumstances of the present instance.

I should like also to call your attention to a potential problem involving budgetary considerations. During the period of hostilities, the military authorities must have sufficient funds to finance civilian relief in Korea. The relatively sizeable funds available to UNKRA under the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1951 [3] as compared to those allocated in the Defense budget for civil relief may tend to prejudice Congress against the allocation of supplemental funds for civil relief which may in time be necessary to complete the military mission. The denial by Congress of additional funds for civil relief might place the Department of Defense in the position of having to request funds from UNKRA or to invite the participation of UNKRA in current operations where its participation would not be desirable from a military point of view. It is hoped that due consideration may be given to this problem in the presentation of budgetary requests to the Congress.

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 543.

[3] The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was approved on October 10, 1951 (P.L. 165; 65 Stat. 373); for the authorization and appropriation provisions, see 65 Stat. 376 and 731.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

895B.13/6-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1951—4 p. m.

4. This is Joint State–ECA Msg. Reurtel 1033[1] efforts being made reach agreement re partial settlement *won* advances to UN forces by payment to Korea of dols recd from UN personnel exchange for *won*.

Interested agencies believe application ECA counterpart fund balance on Govt overdraft undesirable now. With inflationary pressures active in Kor economy see neither necessity nor advantage in releasing CP fund balance to cancel part of overdraft. If such cancellation permitted further expansion overdraft may result. We fear making CP balances avail Kor Govt may slow down present commendable endeavor maximize current Govt revenues.

Ur success in raising CP rate appreciated.

ACHESON

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[1] Dated June 9, p. 527.

795B.5/7-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1951—8 p. m.

5. A nr of States which were considering affirmative responses to UN SYG's message of June 22 requesting additional ground forces for Korea have suggested that Korea question has entered into new phase as result of armistice discussions.

US considers that regardless of outcome of armistice discussions, it wld be desirable for States to respond affirmatively to UN SYG's message. Unified Command has no assurance that armistice discussions will result in termination of hostilities and must therefore plan for continuation of hostilities. Even if hostilities terminated, strong likelihood that substantial ground forces must remain for considerable time in Korea. Affirmative responses wld be helpful to US in armistice discussions and wld likewise have favorable effect on public opinion in US.

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[1] Repeated to the Embassies in Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro, San Salvador, Havana, Lima, and Managua.

If States unwilling to respond affirmatively in view of armistice discussions, you may in your discretion endeavor to prevent or delay negative responses.

Acheson

795.00/7–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY Pusan, July 4, 1951—4 p. m.

10. I uninformed instructions under which cease-fire talks are to be conducted and so somewhat hesitant send this msg but polit import of any agreements reached is so self-evident I feel I must bring few points to Dept's attn.

It appears basic that cease-fire arrangements shld envisage possibility no other settlement of territorial and polit issues will be reached in foreseeable future and that this premise shld be weighed with every decision. This fact shld influence composition of negotiating team. Believe Korean member shld be given as prominent public position as possible in order make decisions more palatable to ROK and for Asiatic public opinion.

I understand proposal may be made to set-up buffer zone about 20 miles wide. Immed problem this raises is question of admin such area. No doubt armistice commission wld police area to assure it remains demilitarized but negotiators shld be aware danger of creating, possibly on semi-permanent basis, third territorial entity in Korea. It therefore seems important not only to agree on northern and southern boundaries of buffer zone but also to give must careful attn to delimiting the line approx in middle of buffer zone which may for long time to come be frontier between two Koreas. It cld then be agreed that northern and southern halves of zone wld be under laws and admin of applicable Korean regime. In initial states, considering fact these districts are in forward area under mil control respective CAC units no doubt wld continue to operate pending their phasing out. (Same wld be true of all areas between new frontier and 38th Parallel).

From the beginning buffer zone shld be described and have significance and as demilitarized area. Psychologically it might be preferable not to speak of it as one zone but to speak of demilitarized districts of South Korea and North Korea. Pending unification of course. Point is it shld not be permitted to become no man's land under separate non-Korean control. I shudder to think what wld happen if some UN group comprised of reps acceptable to both belligerent camps attempted cope with immed practical difficulties and polit headaches inherent in running such an entity over a long period. Econ problems alone wld present almost insuperable difficulties.

I aware importance of southern border of buffer zone as real mil frontier of ROK and believe we should go all out to get best possible strategic position. However, to get agreement we will have to recognize similar North Korean interests in setting northern boundary of zone. Seems important therefore to adopt principle of flexibility in determining width of buffer zone. I trust I correct in assuming 38th Parallel will take back seat in discussions and that we will insist territorial matters be discussed realistically on basis position our troops at the time. As Dept aware parallel is anathema to ROKs. Every public expression has been "no cease fire on 38th". Any other line wld be less difficult. Loss of Ongjin Peninsula to ROK more than offset by gains elsewhere and unless border considerably north of 38th that peninsula strategic liability anyway.

One aspect POW problem has polit significance in ROK. I refer to ROK long standing claim that 40,000 Korean POW's are South Koreans impressed into North Korean Army after first Commie advance into ROK. Dept aware this problem and CINCUNC policy, under strict interpretation Geneva Convention, to give this group no preferred treatment. Special problem this creates in connection cease-fire shld be studied at once. In any case they shld not be turned over to tender mercies of North Koreans. Views of ICRC wld be useful.

Question of return of North Korean refugees, particularly those evacuated from Hungnam, probably will be raised. This again requires policy decision. I assume no refugees be returned against their will in accordance traditional US policy toward polit refugees. Right of repatriation missions to visit camps with definite restrictions on their activities may have to be authorized.

All these problems if mishandled can boomerang on US Govt and Emb at later date, and I am putting these suggestions forward merely because I have no info whether these particular problems being actively considered, what policies adopted, or what guidance sent.

Sent Dept 10, rptd info Tokyo 4.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

On July 4, the Communist side responded to General Ridgway's message of July 3 (see footnote 2, page 616) in a communication the text of which is here reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, page 44:

"General Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the U.N. Forces. Your reply of July 3 to us has been received. In order to guarantee effectively steps regarding various processes for the first conference of representatives of both sides, we agree to the despatching of (3) liaison officers by each side to hold a preparatory conference in the Kaesong area as you proposed. If you agree to our proposal for setting the date for the conference of liaison officers as July 8, we will notify you of further business preparations for the meeting of liaison officers from both sides.

"Kim Il Sung, *Supreme Commander of Korean Peoples Armed Forces*

"Peng Teh-huai, *Commander of the Peoples Volunteer Forces*

Pyongyang City, July 4, 1951."

On the following day, July 5, General Ridgway responded by accepting the date of July 8 for an initial meeting and requesting safe conduct for the 3 liaison officers and 2 interpreters who would accompany them to Kaesong. The text of Ridgway's message is printed *ibid.*

795.00/7–551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 5, 1951—6 p. m.

8. Eyes only Muccio from Rusk. Next fol tel eyes only to you will contain text basic directive to Ridgway on mil talks concerning possible armistice.[1] This is furnished strictly for your own info to enable you to deal with top ROK officials in full knowledge of situation. We will keep you currently informed of position during course of negots. We do not believe you shld acquaint ROK with content these instrs since Gen Ridgway must be allowed broad discretion in way in which mil talks are to be conducted and time and circumstances of any disclosure to ROK officials. Ridgway will be acting under directives from US Govt transmitted through JCS. Inter-governmental negots among UN Govts will take place in Wash. Wld greatly appreciate your comments from time to time and, particularly, your anticipation of troublesome questions such as were raised urtel 10 Jul 4. Difficulty of problem with ROK fully appreciated highest levels here and we shall do what we can to help. Cordial regards. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram 9, July 5, to Pusan (not printed), forwarded the text of the instructions to General Ridgway contained in telegram JCS 95354, June 30, p. 598.

Editorial Note

On July 6, the following exchange of messages took place between the respective commands in Korea in connection with the meeting of liaison officers in Kaesong on July 8.

"General Ridgway,
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces

"We have received your second reply dated July 5. We agree to the number of liaison officers and their aides that you are sending and the time of their departure from Kaesong.

"We undertake to assure their safe conduct, but for their more certain safety and to cut down the possibility of misunderstanding we suggest that they proceed to Kaesong by a convoy of jeeps.

"At the same time, we inform you that our three liaison officers, one of whom is a colonel, together with two interpreters and reception personnel, will set out at 5 P. M. Pyongyang time on July 7 the day before the preliminary meeting from the Pyongyang area on five jeeps and five motor trucks for the Kaesong area via Sariwon and Namchonjom to prepare and take part in the preliminary meeting agreed upon by both parties.

"Each motor vehicle will have a white flag set on top of it. Please take note of this information.

"Kim Il Sung,
Supreme Commander of Korean People's Armed Forces.
"Peng Teh-Huai,
Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces."

"To General Kim Il Sung
"General Peng Teh Huai

"I have received your message dated 6 July. I agree to your plan of movement of your Liaison Group from Pyongyang via Sariwon and Namchonjom to Kaesong, leaving Pyongyang time on 7 July in 5 jeeps and 5 motor transports carrying white flags. This convoy will be immune from attack by my forces during its travel from Pyongyang to Kaesong. In addition, the area within a 5 mile radius from the center of Kaesong will be observed by me as a neutral zone from the time of arrival of your delegates in Kaesong. My delegates will proceed by helicopter or jeep as dictated by the weather. In either case they will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at 0900 Tokyo time, 8 July, and proceed to Kaesong along this route. Your assurance of safe conduct for these delegates is accepted.

"M. B. Ridgway
General United States Army
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command."

795.00/7-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Ambassador Apriano Restrepo-Jaramil Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
	Great Britain	—Mr. Greenhill, First Secretary
	Greece	—Ambassador Politis
	Korea	—Ambassador Yu Chan Yang
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Corner, First Secretary
	Philippines	—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
	Turkey	—Mr. Benler, First Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor Mr. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, First Secretary
	United States	—FE, Mr. Rusk UNA, Mr. Hickerson EUR, Mr. Raynor UNP, Mr. Wainhouse EUR, Mr. McClelland FE, Mr. Hackler FE, Mr. Lockhart Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope stated that the enemy was continuing to make light probing attacks in the west and the east and that the United Nations forces in the central sector were receiving a considerable amount of artillery and mortar fire from the enemy. The greatest amount of enemy artillery and mortar fire was received in the area held by the 1st United States Cavalry Division. The 9th and 2nd Divisions of the Republic of Korea were repulsing daily enemy attacks. On July 5 the enemy made a rather heavy attack at another point in the central sector forcing the right flank of a United Nations unit to retire under heavy pressure.

Captain Pope stated that of the average of 2,000 enemy vehicles sighted daily about 1,000 were southbound. This indicated, according to the Far Eastern Command, that the enemy was receiving enough supplies in excess of its daily requirements to permit a build-up of strength. In this connection, the Far Eastern Command estimated that the enemy will continue to exercise its capability to reinforce with Chinese Communist personnel. Such is indicated by a reliable report received by the Command that 80,000 fresh enemy troops had recently arrived in North Korea from Manchuria.

Captain Pope stated that the Far Eastern Command had also received an unassessed informational report to the effect that the enemy representatives going to the Kaesong talks would come as representatives of the victors in the Korean war and would not accede to any demands set forth by the Republic of Korea. The informational report also stated that the enemy would resume the offensive. At a later point in the briefing, the Korean Ambassador inquired whether the Chinese Communists had announced that they would not accede to any objectives of the Republic of Korea. It was clarified for the Ambassador that the report mentioned by the Far Eastern Command was merely a report which had not been evaluated or confirmed, and that it was not an announcement by Peiping.

Mr. Hickerson stated that we had given more thought to the matter of the British proposal for the appointment of a Protecting Power to look after the interests of the United Nations personnel held as prisoners of war by the enemy and were now inclined to the view that if the statement were sent on the verge of the armistice talks at Kaesong confusion in the public mind might result. He asked for the views of the Ambassadors. Led off by the Canadian and the Greek Ambassadors and the British representatives, the group agreed that the proposed statement should be postponed for the time being, until there was some indication as to what direction the armistice talks would take. The Netherlands representative noted that his Government had no objection to the proposal put forward by the Belgian Ambassador at the last briefing suggesting that the statement, if issued at this time, be amended so as not to prejudice the matter of prisoners of war to be discussed at the armistice talks in Kaesong.[1]

In connection with the Kaesong talks, the British representative stated that his Government was most interested in having consideration given during the talks to the matter of giving priority to the repatriation of the sick and wounded prisoners of war in enemy hands so as to provide them immediate medical care. He asked whether such meritorious arrangements could be undertaken without complicating the issue. Mr. Rusk replied that we could give further thought to the suggestion and stated that we had no information how General Ridgway proposed to proceed on the matter. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the enemy had adamantly refused to give information concerning the condition or locations of prisoners and other details which could facilitate such a repatriation. He added that we hope to get the International Red Cross into the prisoner camps as soon as possible.

The Australian representative asked whether the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) would have any connection with the impending armistice arrangements. Mr. Hickerson said that it would have no connection since the negotiations and any armistice would be entirely on the military level.

The South African representative asked whether the envisaged mixed military commission to observe the carrying-out of the armistice terms would be continued as such and whether at some future stage the United Nations per se would be brought into the task. Mr. Hickerson replied that it was intended that the commission would be purely military initially to avoid any difficulty since in the past the Chinese Communists had consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of United Nations bodies. A present attempt to use United Nations machinery would certainly delay a military settlement, Mr. Hickerson stated, adding that we certainly should not insist upon using any. Mr. Rusk pointed out that we are not adverse to using United Nations machinery but the other side is. He added that General Ridgway of course would call upon the full help of the United Nations forces in Korea in the negotiations and would probably select observers from all the United Nations units.

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[1] Between October 15 and 19, 1951, all the governments contributing forces to the United Nations action in Korea requested the U.N. Secretary-General to approach the Chinese and North Korean Governments on behalf of the U.N. prisoners of war with the suggestion that the Communist powers permit a neutral state or a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC to act as a Protecting Power for the prisoners under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. U.N. Secretary-General Lie forwarded a telegram to the Chinese and North Korean authorities conveying the request on November 15, 1951, but no acknowledgment or response was received during the remainder of the year. (398.571/11-2151 and /2-1952)

The Korean Ambassador asked whether the Chinese Communist "volunteers" would be invited to participate in discussions of political and territorial matters affecting Korea if the armistice is accepted and such political discussions follow. Mr. Hickerson reminded the Ambassador that the purely military aspect had to be settled first and suggested that any discussion of such a question in the group be postponed, pending the direction of the military talks.

The Canadian Ambassador asked whether the restrictions on the press at Kaesong, to which he had no objection, would continue during the armistice talks. Mr. Hickerson replied that in all probability they would since the fine points of negotiation and policy demanded secrecy and security during the period of negotiations. He added that he wished something could be done about the press in New York which had recently centered stories around the United Nations. One such sensational story had erroneously reported that the General Assembly would be called into special session to discuss the armistice. He pointed out that the General Assembly is officially in session at this time, although in recess. He added that such stories could give a false impression and create an unfortunate situation. He reiterated that a report containing the decision reached at the Kaesong talks should go to the United Nations, either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for approval but that nothing should be done by the United Nations to hold up the agreement reached or to cast any doubt upon the validity of an armistice agreement.

The Belgian Ambassador asked what was planned in connection with keeping the briefing group informed of the progress of the armistice talks and whether special meetings of the Ambassadors would be called. Mr. Hickerson noted that the initial meeting at Kaesong on July 8 would be confined to making the mechanical arrangements for the ensuing talks and that since nothing substantive would be discussed until the meeting tentatively scheduled for the 10th, a special meeting of the Ambassadors was not considered necessary. Mr. Rusk pointed out that calling the Ambassadors into session only upon the receipt of substantive information coming from the armistice talks on the 10th might alert the press into believing that something "big" had taken place. He suggested that the regular meeting on Tuesday [2] be held as scheduled but delayed until 5 p. m. to allow for the time differential between Washington and Tokyo and to allow sufficient time for transmission and processing of such information as is sent. It was agreed that the next session would be held at that time.

Copies of the latest exchanges of messages between General Ridgway and the commanders of the opposing forces were distributed.[3]

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[2] July 10.

[3] See editorial note, *supra*.

795.00/7-651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 6, 1951—7:25 p. m.

38. Re Korea. As reported to Hickerson by telephone this morning there has been during past 2 or 3 days very considerable development of interest and discussion among UN dels concerning next steps following conclusion of cease-fire in Korea. In general there seems to be strong current of optimism that present discussions will in fact lead to cease-fire. Most of questions raised with us were anticipated in our 1738, June 28.

Lacoste and Jebb have requested opportunity to discuss "next steps" and we plan to meet with them Monday afternoon, July 9. Jebb, as president SC this month, observed in telephone call to me this morning that we cannot be certain that cease-fire will not be accomplished within very brief time, perhaps matter of days. He is particularly anxious, therefore, to know our thinking concerning report by UC on cease-fire, what we contemplate as to nature of report, whether we contemplate report would go to SC or to GA or to some combination of both.

In brief conversation with Padilla Nervo last night he assumed we would be reporting to GA but he also raised question of report to SC. Without stating any conclusion of his own, he wondered whether report should not be addressed to SC since UC was created by SC and is operating under SC resolutions to halt aggression in Korea.

If present cease-fire discussions are successful he assumed there would be clear sailing in SC which in turn could pass report on for GA consideration. If cease-fire discussions do not go altogether well, Padilla questioned whether SC might not be proper forum for attempting to iron out difficulties. If such effort failed in SC, then jurisdiction could, of course, always be transferred to GA. At about this point in conversation Eban joined us. It was clear in context his remarks that Padilla was thinking that process he outlined would take place immediately after conclusion cease-fire discussions. Eban took rather strong and dogmatic exception to this notion. Passing once over lightly question of UC report on cease-fire Eban went on to say quite dogmatically that he felt it would be great mistake for Assembly to become involved immediately after conclusion cease-fire in problem of peaceful settlement of other Korean issues. On contrary he said he felt there should be a "cooling-off period" and that Assembly should not take up question of future of Korea until it convened in its sixth session in Paris.

To all of these remarks I made no comment except to express interest in views Padilla and Eban expressed and to say I knew these matters were being carefully considered in Dept and that we would, of course, wish to take their views into account.

Rafael informed Gross last night that Eban had been to see Malik for discussion of Suez matter (separately reported in mytel 39, July 6).[1] In course of Eban-Malik conversation latter was apparently quite willing to talk about Korea, was amiable and optimistic concerning cease-fire prospects. At same time he apparently indicated to Eban that he felt there should not be any rush about getting into settlement of political aspects. There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Israelis are quite actively promoting idea of armistice supervisory commission of which Israel would be a member. We have learned through French del, for example, that France-Presse correspondent here claims to have this story from Israelis.

Later in evening I had quite long talk with Von Balluseck (Netherlands) on his initiative. He inquired about next steps following accomplishment cease-fire about which he was very optimistic. I countered by asking his views. He said, in very much same terms Eban had earlier, he thought there should be cooling-off period before taking up in GA question of peaceful settlement of Korean issues. Assuming cease-fire might be accomplished by about Aug. 1, he said he thought cooling-off period might last until Paris assembly. He said he thought by that time opportunity might be very good for accomplishing peaceful settlement.

I asked Balluseck if he had discussed these views with very many dels and if he felt they reflected in any way general opinion. He was little evasive but finally said that although he did not know for sure he thought UKDel (Jebb at least) and Lacoste felt there should be cooling-off period. He then went on to say he had had long luncheon discussion with Malik (apparently on Balluseck's initiative). He found Malik quite willing to discuss Korea and he thought so far as Russians were concerned prospects for peaceful settlement following a cooling-off period might be good. I asked Balluseck if he could elaborate Malik's views. He said Malik had talked about a conference (or commission) of "interested powers" which at suitable time might work out solution of political questions involved in Korea and at same time pick up and deal with those agenda items on which agreement had been reached by deputies in Paris. I asked Balluseck if Malik had given any definition of "interested powers." Balluseck said Malik had not expressed himself in such detail. Balluseck himself went on to say to me (and I have little doubt he may have said same to Malik) he thought we might consider the powers referred to in connection with fifth of five principles of Jan 13 as being the "interested powers."[2] I indicated skepticism both as to method and composition.

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[1] Not printed. Documentation on the Suez Canal is printed in vol. v, pp. 343 ff.

Returning to question of cooling-off period, Balluseck said he thought if we waited until sixth session "views of some people might change" re factors involved in peaceful settlement. I asked Balluseck whose views and what factors he was talking about. He mentioned Chinese representation, saying this had been and obviously continued to be an important factor in peaceful settlement of Korean issue. He said of course US view of such matters as Chi representation had "hardened" considerably in recent weeks. He said perhaps our views on this issue might change between now and Paris assembly.

I said that I was not competent to express opinion concerning views of other people but I had not slightest hesitation in expressing opinion that there was not slightest chance of views of American people on this issue changing between now and Paris assembly. Balluseck indicated some hope our view of this matter would nevertheless change. He said issue was bound to arise in assembly and that it would be most unfortunate if when it arises there becomes manifest a sharp division of opinion between US and many of its closest free-world friends. In this connection he referred to UK position, saying that UK had only very recently taken position that consideration of this issue should be postponed only until end of hostilities. We are now confronted with prospect of an early end of hostilities and he assumed that British, therefore, will revert to their earlier position of supporting Chi Commie representation. This was one reason, he said, why he felt it would be better to have cooling-off period since it would be most unfortunate to have division on this and other issues publicly raised in Assembly immediately after accomplishment of cease-fire. I made no comment on these remarks except to repeat that in my view the opinion of the American people would not change on this matter so soon.

Balluseck then said that he thought we Americans were too tough and that too many Americans in high position were probably taking too tough a line. I asked him what Americans he had in mind and what he meant by too tough a line. He mentioned the President's July 4th speech.[3] I told him I thought this speech was one of strongest I had ever read in support of UN and collective security and asked him what difficulty it created in his mind. He backed away from President's speech and referring vaguely to American leaders said he thought they were stressing much too much at this time the theme of suspicion of the Russians. I told him I found it impossible to understand how anyone who had any knowledge of or experience with Communist behavior during past 5 or 6 years could have any attitude other than one of extreme caution. I said that regardless of one's views concerning sincerity or lack of sincerity of Malik cease-fire overture, certainly a by-product of this Soviet move which must have been anticipated by the Russians in their interests was the most serious and grave risk that the free nations individually and collectively in the UN would let down their guard. I said that however hopeful one might be that a cease-fire could be accomplished in Korea, it seemed overwhelmingly clear that free-world nations must not only maintain but must increase their effort to build up their defense strength.

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[2] I.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China; see the editorial note, p. 64.

[3] Text in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 370.

Balluseck said he agreed that we must be on our guard and that the effort to build up our defenses must be continued. He said, however, that European people desire peace more than anything else and that he felt very frankly that statements by American leaders were viewed in the eyes of Europeans as overemphasizing the Communist risk and urging too strongly necessity to maintain rearmament effort.

I said there was no people on earth who desired peace more fervently than American people. I also said I thought American people had very realistic understanding of the threat to free nations and of what was necessary to cope with that threat. I said that while of course all of our peoples desired peace it was essential for them to realize fully the necessity of sacrifice to achieve peace. I added that I thought it was the responsibility of govts to bring these lessons home to their peoples and this was precisely, as I saw it, what our American leaders were trying to do.

Balluseck said maybe I was right but he still felt the European reaction to our present attitude was not conducive to the ends we shared.

In course of our discussion Balluseck asked our intentions concerning strategic embargo after a cease-fire. I asked him what he had in mind. He said he felt that following achievement of a cease-fire steps should be taken to lift the strategic embargo. I told him we did not have any new instructions on this question but that speaking personally it seemed very clear to me that precipitate action to lift the embargo might be worst possible mistake we could make. I said it seemed to me that the embargo should be maintained for as long as might be necessary to assure faithful carrying out of any cease-fire. Balluseck observed that since the Communists now seem to be in the mood to make peace we really should leave no stone unturned to make peace and this, in his view, would involve lifting the embargo.[4]

[G]ROSS

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[4] The Department's reply is contained in telegram 30, July 14, to New York, p. 678.

795.00/7-651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951—8 p. m.

13. Fol are Dept's comments on urtel 1738 June 28 re Korea.

Re Para 1 in our view no legitimate question can arise re UC authority to negotiate armistice as phase of military operations for which UC is responsible. This appears to be in accord with Feller memo on subject (urtel 1750, June 30).

Re Para 1(*a*) our present thinking is if armistice is signed GA, as first step, wld pass simple res noting with approval termination of fighting and armistice arrangements, and reaffirming UN determination to continue seek establishment of unified, democratic and independent Korea. Any subsequent action re embargo, relief and rehabilitation and political settlement shld we believe be taken by separate resolutions. In view of fact that eight cease-fire points Jan 2 and five principles never accepted by aggressors no reference shld be made to them.

Re Para 1(*b*) we believe this matter will be handled through negotiations in field.

Re Para 1(*c*) we do not consider GA shld invite Chi Commie or North Koreans to participate in GA discussions of simple Res noting armistice. Moreover, Chi Commie participation may be inconsistent with their own fiction of Chi "volunteers" and Sov theory that GA action on Korea is illegal because of overriding SC jurisdiction. If there is any indication that Chi Commies or North Koreans will request hearing pls consult Dept.

Re Para 2 we do not believe it necessary or desirable that an intensified campaign be undertaken at this time on question Chi representation. If such campaign were started now and armistice talks fail, we might be charged with contributing to their failure by these efforts. Extreme caution is, we think, indicated with respect to prospect of success of forthcoming talks. Although certain procedural advance has been made, there is as yet no indication that opposing commanders can agree on difficult questions of substance. If there is no armistice, we assume Chi representation question wld remain on present basis with general understanding that question shld be postponed. If armistice is concluded, we will promptly consider what further steps we shld take in Chi representation question, in light of all circumstances, including of course a consideration of any further Chi Commie aggressive action elsewhere, their attitude toward a Korean settlement, way they observe armistice terms, etc.

Pls keep Dept informed as to any indications that other Dels might raise matter in GA or SC so that Dept might consider appropriate steps.

Re Para 3. In response ur suggestion, Hickerson saw Entezam as head of GOC June 29 and 30 to inform him of development and brought him fully up to date. US will continue keep GOC informed and we agree we shld maintain close and friendly relations with its members.

Re Para 4. We have given thought suggesting UNCURK as armistice commission but do not believe it wld be acceptable to other side. FYI our present thinking is composition of armistice commission will be determined by armistice agreement and probably composed of military reps from both sides in equal numbers.

ACHESON

795.00/7-751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 7, 1951—6 p.m.

20. For Rusk. Pres Rhee in conversations with Emb, Gen Coulter, Under Sec Alexander [1] and others continues very much same line as he and ROK officials have taken publicly on cease fire issue. Anticipate he will tackle Gov Dewey [2] in same vein when they meet tomorrow. Fon Min, who has been interpolated in Natl Assembly every day this week, has had rough going on basis his alleged ignorance what going on and inept diplomacy in obtaining acceptance ROK views abroad. In addition to ROK belief cease-fire will only restore uneasy sitn of 1945–50 period, responsible officials have frequently in private conversations expressed their deep concern lest US and UN on conclusion hostilities will leave Korea to her fate. They have in mind both military security and continuing need for econ and tech assistance in post-hostilities period. Most helpful development counteracting this point of view is info just recd that UNKRA to be activated shortly. This very welcome news. Trust exchange letters and public announcement can be made next few days.[3]

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[1] Under Secretary of the Army Archibald S. Alexander.

[2] Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, titular head of the Republican Party, was at this time making a tour of the Far East; see telegram 22, July 9, from Pusan, p. 640.

[3] See the letter from Hickerson to Kingsley, July 11, p. 656.

Wld also be helpful if fol additional steps could be taken as means allaying ROK sensitivity and anxiety these issues and their misgivings and concern over prospects early conclusion Jap peace treaty:

(1) Every effort be made to effect partial settlement *won* advances to UN forces by payment dollars recd from UN personnel in exchange for *won*. ROK has requested settlement repeatedly and issue has gained polit and psychological importance entirely out proportion to immed econ benefits which may be expected accrue to Korean economy. Believe prompt settlement wld demonstrate US not completely disregarding ROK views in all fields and give those ROK officials who are counseling moderation in present cease-fire crisis some success to point to in their negots with US. View long delay in arriving at decision this subj more than routine handling called for if settlement to be achieved in view to help ease tension present period.

(2) During period of uncertainty DA should make extraordinary effort effect delivery of consumers goods and raw materials on CRIK call-forwards.[4]

Sent Dept 20, rptd info priority Tokyo 6.

Muccio

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[4] Telegram 34, July 11, to Pusan, responding to this paragraph, read in part as follows:

"Concur important delivery CRIK consumer goods and raw materials be expedited. We have been consulting actively with DA to assure continued flow adequate quantity such items." (795.00/7–751)

795.00/7–751: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, July 7, 1951—7 p. m.

21. Local anti-cease-fire campaign reached new heights when Pusan paper carried in two installments July 4 and 5 open letter to Pres. Truman. This not only violently attacked cease-fire idea but constituted scurrilous attack on President personally, calling him *inter alia* "cowardly". (Text being airpouched).[1] ROK office of public info yesterday issued release [1] disclaiming official nature of article though writer employee that office.

I today protested this attack in strong terms to PriMin, stressing absolute necessity cooperation in endeavor reach common goal. I remarked that apology tendered by OPI chief yesterday and PriMin's offer to make official public apology would not redress harm done. He has since phoned me that author of attack has been dismissed and that FonMin is sending me official apology.

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[1] Not printed.

While I am hopeful incident will not be reported foreign press, OPI release and mention in yesterday's Natl Assembly session has focussed some attention on it. Advising Dept for background.

MUCCIO

IV. JULY 8-AUGUST 23. INITIATION OF CEASE-FIRE TALKS; DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF AN AGENDA ON JULY 26; DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE DEMARCATION LINE PRIOR TO DISCONTINUATION OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE ON AUGUST 23

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 39 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOKYO, July 8, 1951—6 : 46 p. m.

C-66608. Our Liaison Group established contact with Communist Liaison Group at 080933K.[1] Conference during day interrupted for 1 period of 3 hours to permit Communist Group to obtain instructions from superiors. Our group returned Munsan-Ni at 081640K.[2]

Agreements reached as follows:

1. Date for first conference 10 July 1951. Conference to be held in private residence in North Central Kaesong.
2. Communist Delegation for first conference to be: General Nam Il, North Korean Army,[3] Major General Lee Sang Cho, North Korean Army,[4] General Tung Hua, Chinese Communist Forces,[5] General Hsieh Fang, Chinese Communist Forces.[6]
3. Communist Liaison Group agreed to composition of our delegation to first conference, including service support.
4. Communist group assured the security of UN Delegation in Kaesong area.
5. Agreement reached for Eighth Army to clear and improve road from Munsan-Ni to Pangmunjom (BT 950033). Communist will clear road Pangmunjom to Kaesong.
6. Both participants to guarantee security of conference personnel in Kaesong area and enroute thereto when vehicles marked by white flags. Attitude of Communist Liaison Gp reported cooperative.

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[1] The time indicated here was 9 : 33 a. m., Korean time, on July 8.

[2] i.e., July 8, 4 : 40 p. m., Korean time.

[3] General Nam Il was Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army and Deputy Prime Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

[4] Chief of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Army.

[5] Commander of the 15th Army Group, People's Liberation Army.

[6] Chief of Propaganda, Northeast Military District of China.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 40 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET [Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army,]
FLASH Korea,[1] July 9, 1951—5:06 p. m.

G 670–TAC KCG. Personal for Gen Hickey.[2] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. I have been considering the advisability of making a public statement on a proper occasion. The primary purpose would be a continuation of efforts of [*to*] accomplish the approved United States Government objective of detaching Communist China as an effective ally of the USSR.

The draft of my proposed statement appears in part 2 herein. The statement itself is intended to have been derived from settled United States Govt policy, which desires the political and territorial integrity of China, which has not slightest desire for acquisition of any Chinese territory, and which is based upon the historical record of loyal friendship by the American people for the Chinese people.

Part 2. Draft statement fols:

"At the historic moment in which the opposing military forces in Korea are commencing discussions of a possible armistice, it is timely, I believe, to express the hope that a mutually acceptable agreement may be reached on the military terms for terminating the armed conflict in Korea.

"In the long series of Communist acts which have brought dissension, disaster, and death to the world, there has been none more tragic than the conflict which has set Chinese and American soldiers against each other.

"With its compelling fear of the truth, Communist imperialism has sought repeatedly to obscure the long and loyal record of friendship between the Chinese and American peoples. To fabricate a pretext for sacrificing Chinese soldiers as instruments of their aggression in Korea, the Communists have tried to convince the Chinese people that the United States planned an invasion of Chinese territory. The enormity of this falsehood is exceeded only by the sinister significance of the objective it was designed to cloak.

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[1] The source text indicated that this message was sent from the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, Van Fleet, and signed by General Ridgway who was then in Korea. At this time, a tent headquarters had been set up at Munsan-ni for the United Nations Command negotiators (see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 19–20).

Due to the time difference between Korea and Washington, this message was received in time for the reply to be sent out by mid-afternoon of July 9, Washington time; see *infra*.

[2] Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey was Chief of Staff for the three commands held by General Ridgway: the United Nations Command (UNC); the Far East Command (FEC); and Supreme Command, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP); see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 58. This message had been sent for information to Headquarters, Far East Command, in Toyko, as were the other messages from Ridgway in Korea.

"While Chinese soldiers by the hundreds of thousand suffered, fought, and died on foreign battlefields in a futile, and imaginary cause, alien Communist imperialism has secretly pursued its inexorable encroachment upon Chinese territory. Mongolia is gone. Manchuria and Sinkiang are next. The preoccupation of China's Armies in a costly foreign war has made it immeasurably easier for this alien imperialism to strengthen its deadly grip on vast areas of China. Its influence, following the unchanging pattern of more than a century, now shamelessly moves to degrade China's historic culture and destroy its traditional way of life. The principles on which Chinese civilization has rested for generations have now been placed in grave jeopardy by the encroachment of Soviet imperialism which cynically pretends friendship and falsely promises assistance.

"The Chinese people, whose ancient and honorable history has long since made clear to them the true source of danger, will not however be easily led to forget and abandon the traditional warm friendship of the American people.

"Throughout modern times, the United States has been the most vigorous and unfailing champion of Chinese sovereignty and independence. The preservation of the Chinese nation and the integrity of its territory and people are cardinal and cherished principles of American policy. The present Communist degradation of Chinese sovereignty confronts China with the gravest danger in its long and epic history. In my own opinion, I am confident that the Chinese people, in their inherent wisdom, recognize this threat despite the efforts of Communist imperialism to camouflage it through campaigns of studied hatred against China's traditional friends."

Part 3. The Armistice negotiations now beginning and in which I am not initially participating personally, will offer, in my opinion, favorable opportunities for the release of a statement of this kind.

However, it so closely relates to foreign policy that even though the policy to which I have directly connected it has Presidential approval, I feel it would be preferable for this to have official sanction before release.

Ur comments are requested soonest, as opportunity for its use may arise any day.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 41 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 9, 1951—3 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 95862. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only. Personal for Ridgway. JCS have considered your proposal to issue a public statement similar to that proposed in part 2 your G 670–TAC KCG.[1] Although we recognize that it has some merit insofar as the Chinese people are concerned, we feel that on an overall basis the issuance of such a statement on the eve of armistice negotiations would be inappropriate. At the maximum, it might well lead to a breakdown of negotiations; at the minimum, it would have undesirable domestic and international political repercussions. We feel that it would be particularly inappropriate for you as the UN Mil Cdr to issue such a statement even though you are not participating directly in the armistice negotiations. At a later date if armistice negotiations should fail, such a statement may well be appropriate. However we feel that if it is then made it should be done on the highest governmental level.

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[1] *Supra.*

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 45 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 9, 1951—3:09 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 95863. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only. Personal for Ridgway. We consider it essential that the press of the United Nations have representation at Kaesong as to pictures and news coverage at least equal to that assumed by the Communists.[1]

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[1] General Ridgway sent the following reply in his telegram HNC–044, dated July 10:

"Urmsg JCS 95863.

"No information here at this time of Communist planned press coverage of Kaesong Conference. Senior UN delegate will propose at first meeting 10 July that 16 representative correspondents be in Kaesong area during conference meetings daily. They will not be admitted to conference room. These 16 are broken down as follows: 4, agencies; 5, independent; 2, still photographers; 3, news reel and television; 2, radio. Remainder of the press will be briefed in this area throughout the sessions on background highlights." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 46)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 43 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1951—3 : 28 p. m.

JCS 95864. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only. Personal for Ridgway.

1. Ref JCS 95841,[1] State Dept has received msg[2] from Sebald indicating that he is proceeding to Munsan at your request to act, together with Amb Muccio, as your pol advisers.

2. Consider here that such arrangement may have serious drawbacks even though we understand they will not participate in actual discussions. While we do not want to take any action which will hamper you in your negotiations, we believe every effort must be made to confine discussions to mil matters connected with armistice terms.

3. We feel that presence of Sebald and/or Muccio would invite impression that talks are to go beyond mil basis. The time for political participation is after conclusion of armistice.

4. In addition, Sebald has been thoroughly associated with SCAP and strictly Japanese subjects; we are most anxious not to connect Japanese Peace Treaty with Korean problems.

5. We do not concur in the presence of Muccio or Sebald at Munsan. However, if you consider pol adviser essential at this stage, suggest you consider use of Bond[3] and Lightner[4] who could be designated as liaison personnel and therefore would not attract the same attention or publicity as would Sebald or Muccio.

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[1] The text of this message, sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway at 11 : 13 a.m. on July 9, read as follows:

"Consider it questionable for you to use Sebald or Muccio as advisers at this stage of negotiations. Full msg follows." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 42)

[2] Not printed.

[3] Niles W. Bond was First Secretary and Consul at Tokyo in the Office of William J. Sebald, the Political Adviser to SCAP.

[4] E. Allan Lightner was Counselor of Embassy at Seoul.

795.5/7–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PUSAN, July 9, 1951—5 p. m.

22. Governor Dewey, who was in Pusan about three hours yesterday, met ROK President, Cabinet, leading members Natl Assembly, UNCURK and UNKRA; he talked with President for one hour; appeared before crowded special mtg Natl Assembly; and visited

UN cemetery en route to airport. Entire Cabinet and many Assembly members were at airport to greet him and he recd ovation at Assembly. On whole I feel his visit helped ease tension ROK Govt circles. As influential US politician and one of leading members of opposition his assurances on US unity on big foreign policy issues, US continuing interest Korean fate, etc., reassured Koreans in sensitive spot at timely moment.

Fol are brief notes on interview with President Rhee in presence of PriMin, FonMin, General Coulter, and myself. President expressed appreciation for help recd from US but soon launched into subj of cease-fire. He said there was no doubt Chinese and NK defeated and he was sure Russia wld not come in if fighting continued to Yalu. Dewey asked how President cld be so sure of latter point. Rhee evaded question and said we were making big mistake treating aggressors as equals; US didn't appreciate importance of prestige in orient and wld lose face with Orientals in mtg defeated enemy as equals in negots. Enemy already taking advantage of this and now proclaiming they are victorious and we suing for peace. Dewey asked who President thought we shld deal with and Rhee replied he thought we should make Russians come forward. (I gathered he is irked at prominent role Kim Il Sung will play in negots as contrasted negligible role of ROK.) Rhee reiterated misgiving that once there is cease-fire it will be possible to obtain political settlement and cited experience 1946–47 under Joint Commission. He claimed Korea can't live if divided. If others didn't want to continue fight Korean boys shld be allowed carry on alone. Dewey felt this wld be rash in view hordes of Chinese and asked if Rhee wld not expect UN forces come back and rescue ROKs. President evaded question. Dewey continued that we cld of course push few more miles north but beyond that we unable supply our troops or prevent enemy reinforcing and supplying theirs; therefore he did not believe Korea cld be united by force. I added that temper of people of free world much different now than in period mentioned by Rhee; much more aware Commie tactics and making great strides toward preparedness each month.

Dewey mentioned he had an opinion of which he wld like President's views: He felt Soviets never strike twice in same place and therefore Korea shld be free from attack for long time to come if cease-fire arranged. Rhee throughout interview was inclined change subject when pinned down rather than pursue specific points to logical conclusion. In this case he again dodged question reiterating that Commies were now defeated and we shld obtain fruits of victory (unification of Korea). Cease-fire is admission we unable obtain our objectives although fact is enemy is defeated and objectives readily obtainable. All we apparently getting out of terrific sacrifices is divided Korea and all evils of before 1950, and in process we lose face throughout Far East.

Dewey closed interview with fine statement concerning need for patience, restraint and full collaboration of free world during this very tense period.

Rhee struck me as being in better mental condition than he has been in several weeks. Nevertheless Dewey remarked to me later that the old man appeared to be pretty senile and guided by emotions.

Party then proceeded to Natl Assembly where packed house (probably 1,000 people including visitors) gave Dewey ovation. After greeting by acting chairman, Dewey spoke extemporaneously of unlimited admiration of American people for heroic courage of Korean people and sympathy for their sufferings. He recalled he spoke as private citizen and member opposition party. He said he cld not make remarks of political character in view of delicacy of present situation. Referred to Ambassador Dulles' remarks to Assembly little over year ago that Koreans do not stand alone.[1] Those words proved prophetic. In crisis Koreans had not stood alone and do not stand alone today. Americans are dedicated to principle of collective security and are building up through UN force so overwhelming that no aggressor dare challenge it. Our purpose to build free association of nations with full equality and dignity for all. Common partnership in Korea has built bond of friendship between our peoples which it is hoped will grow in expanding free world and bring unity to all peoples of free world including those of Korea.

In view of short time at his disposal in Pusan, Dewey had intended merely see President and was a bit nettled when he learned he was expected appear before Natl Assembly. However on departure he told me it had been most worthwhile experience and he had enjoyed it. As indicated above, I am convinced his brief public appearance and well-chosen remarks had beneficial influence at timely moment. Also consider interview with President was helpful, at least in giving Rhee chance give vent to his emotions.

Sent Dept 22, repeated info Tokyo 7.

MUCCIO

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[1] For the text of a statement made by Dulles before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, 1950, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 12.

895B.10/7–1051

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State is concerned about the status of the Special Deposit Account with the Treasurer of the United States (suspense account) accruing under the provisions of the Financial Agreement of July 28, 1950,[1] with the Republic of Korea. We believe that there should immediately be released from the suspense account to the Government of the Republic of Korea that amount which has accumulated from sales of Korean currency to individual members of the United Nations forces for their personal expenditures.

The American Ambassador in Korea has repeatedly emphasized the desirable political and economic consequences which will flow from a release of these funds from the suspense account. At the present moment, however, this question has assumed a special urgency because of the armistice negotiations which are now in progress. As the Ambassador points out in the attached program [*telegram*],[2] the removal of this longstanding source of friction and irritation would do much to assure the Korean Government of our continued interest and support.

Recent messages from Korea have stressed that the Korean economy cannot produce the goods and services necessary to sustain the military effort and to maintain the civilian population without considerable outside assistance. Strong inflationary pressures have been generated as a consequence. Local currency expenditures of the United Nations forces have considerably aggravated this problem by increasing the money supply without providing for equivalent imports of goods. The release of funds from the suspense account, accruing at present at the rate of $1.7 million per month, would not by itself bring about the turning point of the inflation. The amount is not nearly large enough. However, it could be used as a fund for Korean procurement of essential imports of commodities which are available now in Japan or in the Far East, thereby alleviating the burden of the United Nations Command aid program, strengthening Korean foreign trade, and lessening inflationary pressures by absorbing some of the currency in circulation through the sale of the imported commodities.

It is our belief, therefore, that there are sound political and economic reasons for a release of a portion of the dollars in the suspense account. The maximum political advantage will be gained if the Korean Government can be notified of the release before the conclusion of the armistice discussions. If you agree in principle with the proposed action, officers of our two departments can promptly work out the necessary procedures, in consultation with representatives of the Department of the Treasury.[3]

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

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[1] For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2135, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 705.

[2] Reference is to telegram 20, July 7, from Pusan, p. 634.

[3] The reply to this message is contained in the letter from Mr. Lovett to Secretary Acheson, August 30, p. 864.

795.00/7-1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 10, 1951—10:34 a. m.

59. Re Korea. At meeting here yesterday afternoon with Jebb (UK) and LaCoste (France) present, Jebb raised problem of Korea, asking what step would follow if armistice should be arranged. Gross said we have been thinking UC might report armistice to GA and ask GA to take note and approve. UC thereafter might send copy of report to SC. He explained that we prefer GA to be action body because (*a*) we think it undesirable to put Korea back on SC agenda; (*b*) post-armistice, UC reports, would over next few months undoubtedly deal with economic, political, and other matters as well as military, and GA more indicated for this task; (*c*) in SC, USSR would probably have to raise Chinese rep question since it holds that SC is illegally constituted without Peking Govt; GA already has its seven-member committee on Chinese rep, so point could be ruled out of order in GA.

As for GA's simply noting and approving, Gross pointed out intolerable military situation that would arise if armistice agreement had to be signed in field *ad referendum* to UN body.

Jebb emphatically disagreed with Gross thesis that GA was indicated over SC and said he would recommend otherwise at once to London. He said, (*a*) SC created UC and so UC reported to it; (*b*) if UC did not, there would be widespread accusation SC being destroyed and GA put in its place under uniting for peace resolution; (*c*) he did not fear Chinese rep matter in SC since as soon as USSR vetoed, case would go, and properly, to GA.

Jebb suggested USSR position on this point be ascertained. If it had no objection to SC receiving armistice agreement report, he felt reasons for using SC overwhelming.

LaCoste declared he had no instructions but was sure his govt would favor course which would build up SC authority.

AUSTIN

795.00/7-1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 10, 1951—1 p. m.

29. Emb has attempted in numerous messages in past week to give Dept picture Korean attitude towards cease fire negots. I have not reported details every conversation with Pres Rhee, PriMin and others,

in which I emphasized arguments outlined Dept's special guidance but there have been many such conversations, including those attended by Army Undersecretary Alexander and Gov Dewey. Koreans have put up same case each time with practically no variations despite fact during this period they increasingly aware these unwanted negots sure to take place.

Gen impression I have gathered is that Rhee, Chang Myun and others are principally concerned lest arrangements leading to cessation of fighting result in withdrawal UN troops and situation which in effect will leave ROK undefended and unsupported. I have endeavored reassure Koreans on this point and Gov Dewey's remarks, as reported, were helpful. Fact is, regardless of protestations from any quarter that US and UN have continuing interests Koreans welfare, ROK leaders likely remain highly skeptical and hence fearful. Behind this fear is doubt that any subsequent polit negots will advance cause of unification, which to them means extension ROK sovereignty. They also have qualms that UN, in anxiety to achieve polit agreement, might go too far in placating Commies. In view foregoing their only hope at the moment is that present cease-fire talks will break down.

It is difficult to judge effects this attitude may have on collaboration between ROK and US–UN. Fol armistice, I doubt whether ROK Govt will take overt action of serious nature. On other hand Rhee has committed himself so far in opposition whole idea of cease-fire that he cannot well publicly reverse himself when faced by *fait accompli.*

I have impression he already is soft pedalling his open opposition. If talks fail he will be successful champion ROK people; if talks produce armistice he will probably maintain his position to the end and only accept the situation grudgingly as something which he did not have power to prevent.

ROK leaders, recognizing their powerlessness to influence turn of events, are understandably sensitive to minor role they permitted to play in negots. Rhee personally has been annoyed by prominent role accorded Kim Il Sung. I have suggested to Ridgway importance playing up, particularly from publicity point of view, participation of ROK representatives. Feel move (this morning) to invite Pres Rhee to Seoul for preliminary briefing may go far to eliminate issue over alleged inadequate ROK representation. Nevertheless believe Dept shld keep this aspect in mind in order to play up in publicity media ROK participation throughout the conference.

Sent Dept 29, rptd info Tokyo 9.

Muccio

795.00/7–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1951—4 p. m.

28. USIE media in Korea shld exercise extraordinary tact in explaining factors bearing upon armistice in Korea. Obvious in present circumstances personal direction of ambassador essential. Deptel 1003, June 29 etc. provide understanding US policy armistice. Reiterate armistice is purely mil matter, with polit issues to be considered later. Use utmost discretion in conveying ideas that acceptable armistice wld have to include satis guarantees against renewal of aggression; that US will not abandon UN polit objectives in Korea, including independence and unification; and that US is not indifferent to the future welfare of Korea, toward which we have already extended enormous aid and sacrificed thousands of lives.

Without appearing to lecture or admonish, and using discretion in timing in relation to armistice developments, efforts shld be made to demonstrate that Koreans in own self interest shld accept and support pattern of collective security which proved effective in mtg the North Korean aggression, and that undue insistence upon fulfillment polit objectives by mil means probably wld result in prolongation and even extension of the war with inevitably disastrous consequences to future of Korea.

ACHESON

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 10, 1951—5 : 24 p. m.

JCS 95977. From JCS for CINCUNC.

1. Folg instructions, which are a compilation and condensation with minor modification, of existing directives, constitute your authority as CINCUNC for conduct of mil operations in Korea. All previous directives or portions of directives in conflict herewith are rescinded.[1]

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[1] During June the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the draft directives sent to CINCFE in JCS 92831, p. 487, in light of the tactical situation in Korea and had submitted revised directives to the Secretary of Defense on June 27.

Secretary of State Acheson, in a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated July 6, suggested some additional changes, all but two of which were acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to the deletion of the word "surface" in the second sentence of paragraph 6 and in paragraph 10, and, for reasons of communications security, to the addition of a paragraph in the section on operations restrictions with regard to action to be taken in the event of a massive enemy air attack.

On July 10, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and Defense in the final draft, after which he took it to the President, who approved it. (JCS Files)

2. UN Security Council in its resolution of 7 Jul 50 recommended that all mbrs providing mil forces and other assistance to ROK, pursuant to Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 Jun 50, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

3. In accordance therewith you have been designated as the cdr of those mil forces. Your title in this capacity will be CINCUNC.

4. In accordance with appropriate UN resolutions, the over-all mission of UN Mil Forces is to assist ROK in repelling the aggression against ROK and to restore international peace and security in Korea.

(*Mission*)

5. As CINCUNC you will, consistent with the security of forces under your command, inflict the maximum personnel and matériel losses on the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto. The policy objective of your mil mission is to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum:

(*a*). Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements;
(*b*). Establish the authority of ROK over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th parallel;
(*c*). Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea;
(*d*). Permit the building of sufficient ROK mil power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

(*Operations*)

6. In pursuit of your mission in Korea, you are authd to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your mission. This specifically does not include auth to conduct air and naval action against Manchuria or other Chinese territory, against USSR territory, or against hydroelectric installations on Yalu River, except with approval of JCS, and as a matter of policy no air operations or naval surface operations will be conducted within 12 miles of USSR territory on the Asiatic Mainland.

7. With regard to ground operations you are authorized to conduct such tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to support your mission, to insure the safety of your command, and to continue to harass the enemy. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphibious and airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram corresponding to the text of telegram JCS 92831, May 31, Part II, page 489, except that paragraph 28 of telegram JCS 95977 indicated that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to an armistice were contained in telegrams JCS 95354 (page 598), JCS 95438 (page 611), and JCS 95843 (printed in footnote 2, page 600).

[The rest of the directive to General Ridgway was transmitted in telegram JCS 95978, July 10, to Tokyo, which corresponded to Part I of telegram JCS 92831, May 31, page 487.]

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 47 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH KOREA, 10 July 1951—10 : 22 p. m.

HNC–047. This msg in two parts.

Part 1. Re your 95864.[1] Ambassador Sebald returned Tokyo this date without proceeding beyond Pusan. Ambassador Muccio's advice and counsel highly important to me on military matters and urgency of his advice on such subjects requires, in my opinion, his presence nearby. Had intended he remain with me in base camp, Munsan, but in view of your msg have requested him remain at Seoul.

Part 2. On afternoon of 9 July I had made the decision that we must have press coverage at Kaesong. I called a meeting of representatives of all media to meet with me at 1800 in Seoul that afternoon. Approximately 150 attended. I told them of two decisions just made:

First, that I would arrange for press coverage at Kaesong by a representative limited number of the entire corps, beginning on the second day of the meetings, or as soon as agreement could be reached; that until this conference was well established, with a reasonable expectation that it would continue, I have decided it unwise to seek to change arrangements already made with the Communist representatives for the first meeting.

Second, that the entire corps was invited to Munsan, and that a train providing living and messing facilities for the entire corps would be available to take them from Seoul to Munsan.

Reception accorded these two decisions seemed to be one of enthusiastic appreciation.

The correspondents were informed at this same meeting that the preliminary meeting of liaison officers on 8 July had been covered by an official Signal Corps photographer, who took both still and movies, all of which were available to the entire corps, and that the same procedure was being followed for the first meeting of the delegations themselves on 10 July.

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[1] Dated July 9, p. 640.

The foregoing measures were decided in my judgment as those most likely to comply with JCS guidance concerning secrecy of initial meetings and the importance of avoiding risking a breakup of the conference at the outset.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 51 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 10 July 1951—11:10 p. m.

HNC-048. This msg in 10 parts covers first meeting with Communist representatives.

Part 1. Opening remarks by the Senior United Nations Command Delegate, Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy.

"The United Nations Command Delegation here represents and speaks for the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. It does so fully and solemnly conscious of the great importance to the peoples of the entire world of the discussions begun here today.

"It is understood, of course, that hostilities will continue in all areas, except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved Armistice Commission is prepared to function. The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with the representatives of the Communist Forces in Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption.

"This delegation is here for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject.

"This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind.

"This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.

"Success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations here present. With good faith on both sides there can be created an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In such an atmosphere there is every reason to hope for success. Such an atmosphere can exist where truth prevails.

"As the Senior United Nations Command Delegate and personal representative of the Commander in Chief of the United Nations

Command, I desire to state with the utmost earnestness and emphasis and in language so clear that it cannot be misunderstood, except by those who deliberately desire to misunderstand, that the United Nations Command Delegation will act in good faith. We must assume that the representatives of the Communist Forces in Korea here present will do likewise.

"Before proceeding further with the work which brought us together, the United Nations Command Delegation proposes that we come to a full agreement to limit our discussions at this and all subsequent meetings solely to military matters related to Korea only."

Part 2. The North Korean Delegate General Nam Il made this opening statement:

"The Korean people have always maintained and now still maintain that the Korean War should be brought to an end speedily and ardently support the suggestion made on June 23 by Mr. Malik that the belligerents hold talks for cease fire, and that the armed forces on both sides withdraw from the 38 Parallel in order to end the Korean War. We deem it necessary to settle such important considerations as the withdrawal of armed forces from both sides from the 38 Parallel as the basic condition for the realization of an armistice in Korea, and to insure against the rekindling of the flames of war in Korea, etc. In view of this, I make the following proposals in the name of the Korean Peoples Army:

"1. On the basis of mutual agreement, both sides to issue orders simultaneously to cease all hostile military actions against each other. The armed forces to cease fire, naval forces to cease fire and bombardment, the air force to cease bombardment and reconnaissance activities. It is obvious that a cease fire on both sides would not only reduce loss of life and property, but would constitute the first step towards the establishment of extinguishing the flames of war in Korea.

"2. To establish the 38 Parallel as the Military Demarkation Line, the armed forces of both sides to withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38 Parallel, and simultaneously complete the withdrawal within a definite time limit, leaving the evacuated area as a demilitarized zone, and the civilian administration shall be restored as it was before June 25, 1950. At the same time, to talk over the exchange of prisoners of war, so that the prisoners of war of various countries may return to their homes and rejoin their families at an early date.

"3. The armed forces of all foreign countries should be withdrawn as early as possible. As soon as the armed forces are withdrawn, the people of Korea and China, and all peace-loving people of the world, including the United States and Britain, ardently demand an early peaceful settlement of the war. I hope we can reach an agreement through these talks so as to meet the demands of the wide mass of the people."

Part 3. The sequence of events at the first meeting are briefly as a matter of interest:

a. 1105 convened meeting formal and very proper. Chief delegates exchanged credentials. United Nations Command Chief Delegate gave opening address, see Part 1. Communist Chief Delegate responded, see Part 2. Chinese Chief Delegate gave short speech agreeing with North Korean Chief Delegate. United Nations Command proposed agreement to limit meeting and subsequent meeting to military matters in Korea only. After 30 minutes of stalling with no agreement, United Nations Command presented proposed agenda for second meeting, see Part 5. Communist Delegation attempted 3 times to carry out detailed discussions of United Nations Command agenda items. They particularly mentioned importance of 38 Parallel in any truce terms. This was countered by United Nations Command requesting Communist agenda. Communist at 1225 requested adjournment until 1600. United Nations Command demurred but finally accepted on understanding not agreed to by Communists that after adjournment the Communists present their agenda.

b. Reconvened 1601 Communists again asked for a point by point explanation UN Command agenda. United Nations Command continued to request Communist agenda. During this interchange, the Chief North Korean Delegate made the statement it was not proper to call them Communist troops since their proper designations were Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Volunteer Forces. 1615 Communists finally produced 3 smooth copies of their agenda in Korean, Chinese and English, see Part 7. At this point a half dozen photographers dashed in and commenced taking pictures. United Nations Command protested and requested they be withdrawn. After delay and continuing of taking pictures photographers were finally removed. It should be understood Kaesong and entire conference area is continually heavily guarded and no freedom given United Nations Command Delegation. Result during adjournment when United Nations Command attempted send off officer courier to Ridgway courier stopped by guard and authorization could not be gained to proceed in time to complete mission. With this in mind, United Nations Command at 1617, registered protest and demanded free access. Communist apologized for inconvenience and insisted they must and would safeguard but needed to know well in advance each trip. United Nations Command finally took position would possibly be 5–6 courier trips daily besides trips to and from. Finally dropped on semi-agreement basis United Nations Command maintaining stand Communists stating must be notified to insure safety. United Nations Command stated they proposed to adjourn at 1800. 1620 UN Command stated proposed introduce 20 press subsequent meeting. Communists requested complete breakdown by newsreel cameramen photographers etc finally agreement on mutual basis for 20 press. This was a memorable agreement being the first. UN Command suggested establishing CW communication between Delegation to facilitate arrangements. Communists insisted they would take it under consideration but would not answer at present. 1710, United Nations Command requested 15 minutes recess. Purpose was to discuss privately Communists agenda. 1725 reconvened. United

Nations Command presented comments on their agenda (see Part 8). The Communists replied in detail (See Part 9). An interesting highlight occurred here when the NK Chief Delegate defined, "foreign troops" as, "we mean all troops who are here under the permission of their governments so the foreign troops under the name of United Nations in Korea they are all foreign troops". A short time later the NK Chief Delegate again stated, "by foreign troops we mean those troops not Korean, not in Korean Armies". The United Nations Command proposed adjournment until tomorrow. The Communist stated he could not grant authorization for press, that he had consulted his Supreme Commander and he had received no reply. The discussion and argument ensued. The United Nations Command finally stated its Liaison Officer was to be informed in the morning by the Communists and he would inform United Nations Command Delegation.

1815, meeting adjourned to reconvene 1000, 11 July 51.

Part 4. The attitude of the Communist Delegates can be summarized as follows:

"The United Nations Command Delegation felt that the Communist Delegates believed prior to todays conference that acceptance could be obtained of a cease fire solution along the 38 Parallel and the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces (including Chinese) from Korea. They have refused, thus far, to deviate from that stand. It is too early to determine whether this is the final or only the initial party line. On matters not pertaining to the 3 main points of the Communist agenda it was apparent that decision had to be obtained from authority higher than the delegates. No major concessions and few minor ones were made by the Communists. The North Korean spokesman was generally the spokesman for the entire delegation. It was obvious that the North Korean Delegation had the final say.

"Nam Il is the dominant figure on the Communist side.

"He gives impression of being extremely confident and sure of himself. The other North Korean Generals never speak.

"The Chinese Delegates had little to say. General Teng Hua's opening statement had been carefully prepared to support Nam Il's statement.

"General Teng Hua did, however, make the statement that the military and political aspects of the Korean problem were so interrelated that it would be impossible to completely separate them. The attitude was militarily proper, serious and earnest on such items as were of particular interest to the Communists."

Part 5. The following United Nations Command proposed agenda was next presented to the Communist Delegation:

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Location of, and authority for International Red Cross representatives to visit prisoner of war camps.
3. Limitation of discussions at this and all subsequent meetings to purely military matters related to Korea only.

4. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea.
5. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea.
6. Composition, authority and functions of Military Armistice Commission.
7. Agreement on principle of inspection within Korea by military observer teams, functioning under a Military Armistice Commission.
8. Composition and functions of these teams.
9. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

Part 6. Communist delegation made these general comments on our proposed agenda:

a. "Agenda proposal has not been arranged in order. For instance, problem of prisoners of war should not be discussed first. When question of armistice by having 38 Parallel the line of demarkation has been met, then question of prisoners of war will naturally be discussed.

b. "Reference agenda item 3, this matter has not received special attention because our meeting is confined to military matters.

c. "Items numbers 4 and 5 are not concrete. It has not been clearly shown on what demarkation line should cease fire be agreed.

d. "Remaining questions can be discussed when we discuss the other concrete matters, it is not necessary to put this in the agenda at all."

Part 7. The Communists then presented the following proposed agenda to the United Nations Delegation:

1. Adoption of agenda;
2. Establishment of the 38 Parallel as the Military Demarkation Line between both sides and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea;
3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea;
4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea;
5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war following the armistice.

Part 8. Admiral Joy then made the following comments on the Communist proposed agenda:

"We accept items 1, 4 and 5 in your proposed agenda for later discussion at subsequent meeting. We are not prepared to change any of the items on our agenda which we have submitted to you. In addition, we have these specific comments on your items 2 and 3: Re item 2: Definition of the demilitarized zone. It is the position of the representatives of the United Nations Command that the proper order of business is to first establish the general topics which both sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreements, the details, on which agreement can be reached. Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone. The Communist Delegation offered a particular demarkation line and a particular demilitarized zone as an agenda item. The United Nations Command Delegation believes that first it should be agreed that discussion of some demarkation line, some demilitarized zone, is desired by and agreeable to both parties. Once this general topic is agreed, later meetings can approach the question of which particular line and zone can be agreed upon. It is for this reason that the United Nations Command agenda contains items which only describe the general area of discussion, as for example, the question of arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war (item 9). No effort should be made to state, in an agenda, what the details of those arrangements will be. Rather, the United Nations Command agenda item 9 indicates only that both parties are willing to discuss arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war. Agreement to place such an item on the agenda in no way commits either delegation to any specific detail of such arrangements. The same is the case with a demilitarized zone. Both delegations wish to discuss a demilitarized zone. Exactly where this zone shall be will become a topic of later discussion. We both can agree, however, that the general question of a demilitarized zone would be one of the items to be discussed on the agenda. At the later meeting which the agreed agenda governs, the exact definition of the demilitarized zone may be reached.

"Re item 3: Position on the withdrawal of foreign armed forces.

"The various governments of the many nations with armed forces in Korea operating with the United Nations Command have authorized these armed forces to be in Korea. Therefore, the withdrawal of these armed forces from Korea must be approved by those same governments as well as the United Nations itself. The Delegation of the United Nations Command can make arrangements only pertaining to the cessation of military action of these armed forces within Korea. Only after an armistice has been agreed to, and military action has ceased, can the matter of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea be discussed by the governments concerned. Therefore, it is our view that this matter cannot be placed upon an agenda for the military representatives to discuss."

Part 9. General Nam Il, North Korean Army then made the following closing statement as given by interpreter in English:

"We will continue the meeting. We have thought over the proposals you presented to us about the agenda, and now I am going to tell you what my opinion of it is. At first I am going to talk about the principle of the agenda. At first I want to mention that your agenda proposal has not been arranged in order. For instance, under item 2, the question of prisoners of war is presented. The problem of prisoners of war should not be discussed first. When the question of the armistice by having the 38 Parallel the line of demarkation has been discussed and met, then the question of prisoners of war will naturally be discussed. Therefore, this question cannot be discussed as an initial question, but we have got to discuss first about the cease fire. As for number 3. The matter has not got to be discussed as a special item because our meeting is a military meeting and all matters will necessarily be confined to military matters. Numbers 4 and 5 are not concrete. It has not been clearly disclosed on what demarkation line should cease fire be agreed. The remaining questions can be discussed when we discuss the other concrete matters, and I find it not necessary to have them as separate items in the agenda at all."

United Nations Command: "Please repeat that last."

Nam Il: "The remaining question can be discussed when we have discussed the main problems. They are the supplementary problems to our main problems. Now comes the question of prisoners of war and as I have mentioned already, when the main problems are solved, the question of the prisoners of war can be settled. That is why I think that our proposal of the agenda is proper. Our second item, the establishment of the 38 Parallel as a line of demarkation must be discussed first, because that is the main thing we have got to settle first. The establishment of the 38 Parallel as the line of demarkation and the establishment of the demilitarized zone are the basic conditions for cessation of war in Korea. The next item is the withdrawal of the armed forces of foreign countries from Korea. That is the important question, because without that it would be very difficult to have an armistice. As to agreeing on a cease fire, that is the first step for a peaceful solution of the Korean question, but if you want to solve the Korean question a peaceful way, it is impossible if there are foreign troops in our country. The next is the question of arrangements for cease fire and armistice in Korea. Then we must first adopt a concrete proposal for the solution of the two problems. At the end, of course, of the armistice discussion, then the question of the prisoners of war can be discussed. In our proposed agenda, the main problems are included. If all these things are properly settled, we can have the cease fire and the Korean problem can be solved peacefully. Therefore, I say that the agenda we propose is the most adequate one."

Part 10. I have made arrangements for the press (newsmen, radio broadcaster, movie and television) to be housed on a special train near my advanced headquarters. It was my plan to send selected number totalling 20 with United Nations Delegation to Kaesong for second meeting, 11 July. This was proposed to Communists by United Nations Delegation in todays meeting. It was first agreed to by Communists that 20 press personnel would be acceptable and that each side should be represented by equal numbers. One hour later, they informed Admiral Joy that the activities of press had been submitted to their Supreme Commander and before press could come to Kaesong they would need an answer from him. No details of todays meeting have been released to the press other than Admiral Joy's opening remarks and a non committal communiqué as follows: "The first meeting of Armistice Negotiations was held at 1100 hours as scheduled in an open and formal atmosphere at Kaesong today. Vice Admiral Joy, United States Navy Senior Delegate of the UN Command reported that each delegation presented its agenda for consideration.

"The second meeting of the negotiating parties will be held at 1000 hours Wednesday 11 July."

357.AD/7-1151

The Secretary of State to the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (Kingsley)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 11, 1951.

SIR: Reference is made to my letter of March 29, 1951 and to your reply of April 16, 1951 [1] regarding an understanding to govern relations in the present phase between the United Nations instrumentalities in Korea, the United Nations Command, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

As a result of your letter of April 16 and further consideration of the problem by the Unified Command, it is now proposed that relations between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency be established in accordance with the following provisions:

1. The responsibility of the United Nations Command for the operation of the United Nations Command programs of relief and short-term economic aid will continue until such time as the military operations will permit the transfer of this responsibility to UNKRA. The time for this transfer will be determined in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of December 1, 1950, namely, by agreement of the Unified Command, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Agent General. It is not possible to estimate at this time when this transfer will take place but with a view to making the transfer as smooth as possible, it is desired to introduce UNKRA into the entire operation as it progresses.

2. Two phases are envisaged:

(1) The period starting upon your acceptance of these proposals during which the responsibilities of the United Nations Command and UNKRA will be as defined below. This period will terminate when military operations permit and as agreed by the Unified Command, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Agent General.

(2) The period starting at the termination of phase (1) when UNKRA has assumed responsibility and is possibly being assisted

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[1] Neither printed.

by the United Nations Command, principally in the field of procurement and transportation.

3. During phase (1) the United Nations Command will have sole responsibility for all relief and short-term economic aid essential to the military operations. UNKRA will have responsibility for long-range planning and high level technical assistance to the Korean Government and for any program of economic aid additional to the United Nations Command program which the military situation may permit UNKRA to implement.

4. In phase (2) UNKRA will have responsibility for all United Nations relief and rehabilitation activities, being assisted possibly by the United Nations Command in the field of procurement and transportation.

5. During phase (1) UNKRA personnel operating in Korea would consist of two groups as follows:

a. The first group consisting of a small group of governmental economic and industrial technical advisers and personnel engaged in long-range planning who will operate as a group under the direction of the Agent General and be responsible to him.

b. The second group will consist of personnel engaged in programming, short-range planning, determining requirements, and actually supplying for the needs of relief and short-range rehabilitation and reconstruction. Personnel in this group may be integrated in staffs or units of the United Nations Command. The duties of the personnel in this operating group will be as prescribed by the United Nations Command.

6. The responsibilities of the UNKRA personnel in the first group would be as follows:

a. Technical advice and assistance to the Korean Government.

b. Planning for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea.

c. Implementation, to the extent permitted by the military situation, of any program of economic aid additional to the United Nations Command program.

d. Assisting the operating group by recommendations and in certain cases when called upon, by advice as to specific problems. Close coordination with the second group will be an essential part of the responsibilities of the first group.

e. Such plans or recommendations as may be made will be coordinated with the United Nations Command for determination as to whether or not they affect the Mission of the United Nations Command. Any plans or recommendations which in the opinion of the United Nations Command affect its Mission will be implemented only with the concurrence of the United Nations Command. Approved plans requiring implementation by the United Nations Command will be carried out by its operating agencies in accordance with current procedures.

7. The United Nations Command will be responsible for the logistic support of both groups.

These arrangements are considered workable only if the procedures set forth above for ensuring close coordination and avoiding any action by UNKRA which would conflict with the military necessities are carefully observed. The final authority and control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the ground during hostilities are not intended to be affected by these arrangements.

If these proposals are acceptable, will you please advise us as soon as possible so that the understanding may be officially communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and put into operation promptly.[3]

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
JOHN D. HICKERSON
Assistant Secretary of State
of the United States of America

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[3] Telegram 54, July 16, from Geneva, where Mr. Kingsley then was, informed the Department of his assent to the terms of the UNC–UNKRA agreement (857.AD/7–1651).

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 53: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL FLASH KOREA, 11 July 1951—9:15 a. m.

HNC–051. My instructions to Admiral Joy for the meeting on 11 July include the following.

1. Prior to substantive discussion of the agendas presented yesterday, you will inform the Senior Communist Delegate courteously but firmly that:

"*a.* I have been instructed to inform you that the Commander in Chief United Nations Command cannot accept the restrictions you have imposed on us at this conference:

(1) You were informed yesterday the United Nations Command Delegation requires free access to the conference site from the Imjin River area during daylight hours without prior notification.

(2) We also advised that approximately 20 newsmen would be included with the United Nations Command Delegation.

"*b.* Your answers are unacceptable to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

"*c.* I will repeat our requirements:

(1) Freedom of movement during daylight hours to, from and within the conference site. All motor vehicles to use the Munsan Kae-

song road; all aircraft to follow the gen courses of this road with such deviation as safety and weather may necessitate.

(2) The presence of newsmen at conferences of major import, and the reporting of such events to the world at large by professional newsmen is an accepted procedure at all important world conferences. At meetings of the United Nations Security Council, during which major military questions are considered, participant nations such as the Soviet Union raise no objection to the presence of newsmen. The United Nations Command, must therefore insist that newsmen be admitted to the area of this conference without further delay. They will not be admitted to the conference room.

"*d.* The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command requests an immediate answer covering both items. Can you give an answer now?"

2. In the event a satisfactory answer cannot be obtained immediately you will inform the Senior Communist Delegate:

"We will recess the conference and return South of the Imjin River until your answer is received."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 55 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET **FLASH** KOREA, 11 July 1951—12:55 p. m.

HNC–055 CINCFE personal for Hickey. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. Mymsg HNC 051. The following report was received from Admiral Joy at 111135K, July:

"They have accepted all our requirements regarding freedom of movement but refuse to meet our requirements concerning newsmen. We are proceeding with the conference until directed otherwise by you".

Part 2. I have instructed Admiral Joy as follows:

At time of your choosing, perhaps just prior to adjournment, I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as follows:

"The presence of a selected number of newsmen at a conference of such major importance to the entire world is considered an inherent right by members of the United Nations. Therefore, a selected group of professional newsmen, photographers and newsreel cameramen numbering approximately 20, will accompany and be an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to any or all future sessions beginning on 12 July. This party of newsmen will be controlled by our officer personnel. United Nations Command neither asks nor desires that newsmen be admitted to the conference room".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 57 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 11 July 1951—9:20 p. m.

HNC-060. This message in 6 parts.

Part 1. Considerable agreement was reached in administrative matters such as freedom of movement and communications between headquarters and respective delegations. Most of day spent in explanation of terms and meaning of phrases. Some misunderstandings arose due to poor translations into English by their interpreter. They appeared quite concerned when he misunderstood their intentions, especially when our understanding of a statement was of more serious nature than they intended it should be. With the explanations and propaganda behind us, it seems we should make more progress at next meeting.

Part 2. Main items discussed by United Nations Command Delegation:

a. Admission of newsmen to conference area.

b. Disinterest in imaginary line across Korea which we stated had no military significance.

c. Statement of impossibility of including question of withdrawal from Korea of non Korean troops as an agenda item.

d. Explanation of terms and meanings of items on United Nations Command proposed agenda.

Part 3. Main items discussed by Communist Delegation:

a. Reasons why admission of International Committee of the Red Cross inspectors to prisoner of war camps should not be included on agenda.

b. Priority of items on agenda, and an adamant stand for their agenda and apparent unwillingness to change items 2 and 3 on their agenda.

Part 4. Sequence of events:

1. Conference convened 1000K. Communist began by reiterating that they do not plan any restrictions on UNC Delegation. They said again their concern is mainly for our safety. After we pressed the issue of free transit from Imjin River to conference area and within designated place in the area, Communists agreed to let properly marked vehicles move if we notify them when they depart from Imjin River or other designated areas. Arrangements made for wire communications from Munsan to Kaesong with link-up with Communist at Panmunjon their outpost check point. Radio voice circuit between Munsan and Kaesong being arranged for communications between delegations.

2. Discussion on admittance of UNC press, photographers, etcetera. Communists feel that it is not important now and besides there is no agreement on agenda yet. (See Part 6).

3. UNC Delegation stated its views that the IRC should be permitted to visit POW camps for which reason a report on location of camps is necessary. Also explained meaning of (1) limitations of discussions to military matters in Korea, (2) demarcation line and demilitarized zone, (3) Armistice Commission and Observer Teams. We repeated reasons why "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea" could not be discussed by Military Commanders. Further stated we could not discuss imaginary line that had no military significance.

4. NK Delegation answered with many questions. They said there is no relationship between the Red Cross visiting PW camps and the cease fire. They did not understand what was meant by "guarantee against resumption of hostilities", "inspection teams", and "Armistice Commission". They could not see how armistice could be guaranteed without withdrawal of foreign troops. Meeting adjourned at 1227K.

5. Conference resumed at 1400K. UNC Delegation further explained our position on the Red Cross visiting PW camps. Stated we could not understand how NK delegate could take opposite view that his Government took 13 July 1950.[1] We further explained what was meant by Armistice Commission, Observer Teams, and demilitarized zone.

6. One hour of discussion between Delegations concerning the order of priority of items to be discussed. Communists insist that "cease fire", "demarcation of 38 parallel" and "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea" are the basic points which must be placed first on the agenda. They felt that their agenda was proper and adequate.

7. UNC Delegation asked if Communist were willing to broaden their agenda item concerning the establishment of the demilitarized zone on the 38 parallel since this is only one line and there are many possible lines and zones which ought be discussed. They quickly asked what line did UNC Delegate suggest. They appear anxious to start discussions even prior to adoption of agenda. They also stated they did not consider 38 parallel an imaginary line. This line existed before and war broke out on that line. Therefore cease fire must be concluded on this line and must be on agenda. UNC Delegation then stated its understanding that the Communists had made it very clear that they refused to generalize their item reference demilitarized zone involving 38 parallel. We closed meeting 1554K on press problem as stated in para [*Part*] 6.

Part 5. Attitude of the NK and CCF Delegates. (The following represents the consensus of the Delegates).

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[1] See Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 10, p. 59.

The opposing delegation continued to conduct themselves in a precise military manner and were serious and earnest on all items discussed.

Nam Il remained the dominant figure, appeared confident and sure of himself and expressed himself forcefully. In most cases, he kept notes himself and at his proper turn talked directly from his notes without prior consultation with other delegates. In a few instances, he conversed with the second NK Delegate on matters and through a Chinese interpreter to General Teng Hua. On matters relating to security of the UNC Delegation and duties of liaison officers in the area, handling security of personnel, he asked and received advice of the second ranking Chinese General who apparently is in command of the CCF Forces in the immediate area.

In one instance, just prior to Nam Il's last statement on the 38 parallel, Nam Il wrote a note to CCF Generals through interpreters who nodded agreement and returned note to Nam Il who then made his statement reference meaning of 38 parallel to his forces. There appeared to be no schism between the NK and CCF members although the latter appeared as the junior and silent partner in todays negotiations.

NK Delegates appeared extremely sensitive to any proposition concerning inspections or reports by IRC Teams. Nam Il appeared desirous of making progress in the discussions evidencing slight irritability over what he considered minor matters. Noticeable anxiety in NK group occurred when Admiral Joy's final statement regarding press representatives was misunderstood to mean an immediate and irrevocable termination of all future discussions.

Statements reflecting a political slant appeared to have been prepared in writing before hand, or during the interpretations, by an officer behind Nam Il who passed written notes to him. Contents generally concerned reference to 38 parallel or withdrawal of forces.

The NK Delegates appeared extremely anxious to be sure that their interpretations of translations were correct.

Part 6. Reference HNC 055.[2] Senior Communist Delegate stated in afternoon session that his answer to the question of admittance of newsmen to conference area did not constitute a refusal, but that the matter must be held in abeyance in the interest of proceeding with the main problem.

Admiral Joy complied with my instructions quoted in part 2 cited message just prior to adjournment, and asked for response by 120730K July. Nam Il reacted with noticeable agitation. He inquired if this meant that the United Nations Command Delegation wanted to discontinue the meetings. He was advised that we wished to continue the meetings but would recess until sessions can be resumed with newsmen present in conference area. Their concern was apparent from inquiry as to how they could convey their reply to the United Nations Command Delegation by the deadline.

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[2] *Supra*.

In event of favorable Communist reaction, next meeting will be held 121000K July.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 62 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 July 1951—11:28 a.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 96160. Personal for Ridgway from JCS for CINCUNC.

1. We thoroughly approve your determination to insist upon full reciprocity of treatment in connection present talks. You are authorized in your discretion to inform opposing commanders that talks can proceed only on the basis of complete reciprocity of treatment. Such reciprocity could be arranged in any of the following ways:

a. Kaesong to be completely demilitarized to radius of (say 5 miles) in all directions; road from Munsan to Kaesong be left entirely free to any travel to and from armistice talks authorized by UN Commander; each side to agree that each delegation in Kaesong be limited to (say 50) unarmed personnel and (say 20) armed guards. It should also be clear that you retain right to designate your delegation yourself, including press members thereof, although any entry of press or photographers into meeting itself would be matter for agreement on both sides.

b. Meetings at some intermediate point between present UN and Communist positions, with reciprocal arrangements as in (*a*) above.

c. Alternate meetings with complete reciprocity of treatment in Kaesong and Munsan.

2. If any of above is communicated to opposing commanders, you should release it at once to your own press.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 59 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH KOREA, 12 July 1951—11:35 a. m.

HNC-063. Reference my HNC 055 and my HNC 060. United Nations Liaison Officer landed Pan Mun Jom 120730 July 1951 to receive the answer of the Communist Delegation on the question of the presence of press at the meeting on 12 July. The Communist Liaison Officer stated: "I have been instructed by our Senior Delegate to inform you formally with regard to the question of correspondents that we are in favor of having newsmen from both sides come to Kaesong at the opportune time. When agreement is reached on our negotiations we shall welcome newsmen to come here to do their press coverage. We wish that we could state a definite date and we hope that such a date will arrive very soon but this depends on the efforts made by both sides during the conference and cannot be determined by our side alone." My Liaison Officer replied as follows: "Due to the fact that radio communications would not or were not made during last night we have just now at 0730 received your answer. On the assumption that you would not allow the conference to be delayed over the small issue of admitting 20 newsmen to the conference area, we placed our convoy on the road to arrive in time to prepare for the conference at 0900. The convoy includes the 20 newsmen. If you do not wish to resume the conference with newsmen present please refuse the convoy permission to enter. The officer in charge has been directed to return to our lines if you refuse him entrance."

2. The United Nations Command convoy was halted by the enemy outpost at 120837 July at Pan Mun Jom. The convoy commander requested instructions from me and was instructed to inform the Communist outpost that the convoy would remain in place until 0930 and if at that time all vehicles and personnel were not allowed to pass, the convoy would return. During resulting conversations the enemy outpost commander stated that the convoy could pass if the correspondents remained at the outpost. He further stated that if the correspondents remained at the outpost they might be allowed to pass later after the 2 delegations were in session. At 0930 the convoy commander turned his vehicles around and returned to the base camp arriving at 1038.

3. I have instructed Admiral Joy to dispatch the following message to the Senior Communist delegate by Liaison Officer:

> "(1) At 0930, 12 July 1951, my motor convoy, proceeding along the Munsan-Kaesong Road, bearing personnel desired by me at the conference site, was refused passage past your control point by your armed guards at that point.
>
> "(2) I have ordered this convoy to return to the United Nations lines.
>
> "(3) I am prepared to return with my delegation and continue the discussions which were recessed yesterday, upon notification from

you that my convoy, bearing the personnel of my choosing, including such press representation as I consider necessary, will be cleared to the conference site."

The Liaison Officer carrying this message arrived Kaesong at 1104, 12 July and has not yet returned.

4. Message contained in Para 3 above has been released to press.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 61 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 12 July 1951—2:55 p. m.

HNC-065. CINCFE personal for Hickey.

1. Further to my HNC 063. United Nations Command Liaison Officer landed at Kaesong 121030K, and was met by the Chinese Liaison Officer. Admiral Joy's message was delivered. At about this time Colonel Chang, North Korean Army, the Senior Liaison Officer arrived and took over the discussion. He required the letter to be read to him and gave this reply. "Please tell your Commander there wasn't any such thing as is written here. There was only a case in which we stopped newsmen coming through the line. So they all withdrew. Now I would like to relay this message to your senior delegate. It is now already past the meeting time. Why are you not here for the conference? If it is only because of the question of newsmen I shall inform you once again of the opinion of our senior delegate. We are in favor of having newsmen from both sides come to Kaesong at the opportune time. When agreement is reached on our negotiations we shall welcome newsmen to come here to do their press coverage. We wish that we could state a definite date and we hope that such a date will arrive very soon but this depends on the efforts made by both sides during the conference and cannot be determined by our side alone." Colonel Chang then requested the Liaison Officer to remain at the airfield until he could show the letter to his senior delegate. At 12:45 both North Korean and Chinese Liaison Officers returned with the following message, "our senior delegate has received the message of your senior delegate. He will give answer to your senior delegate by means of wireless telephone or by other means. In case the wireless telephone does not function normally, I expect to meet your Liaison Officer at the airfield by 0630 Pyongyang time. Signed Chang Chun Sam, Liaison Officer."

2. No further movement of United Nations Command delegation to conference site will be made until satisfactory reply is received from Communist delegation.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 68 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 12 July 1951—7:35 p. m.

HNC–067. Subject is United Nations military and civilian personnel now in hands of Communists. Item number 2 on our agenda presented at the first meeting had for its simple purpose to produce a list of the locations of Communist prisoner of war camps and to secure Communist agreement to visits to those camps by representatives of the International Red Cross. It was my feeling that much time might elapse before the actual discussions of arrangements for the exchange of prisoners could begin, and much more before exchange itself could start. In the meantime the situation of these prisoners might be materially ameliorated if the International Red Cross were granted permission to visit them.

The Communist representatives have appeared both sensitive and obstructive with respect to this item. Their replies to our questions on this subject are summarized as follows:

> "The Communist delegation agrees that the question of prisoners of war is a military question, but they do not agree that the question of sending International Red Cross representatives to inspect prisoner of war camps is a military question. Therefore, they state they cannot agree to the inclusion on the agenda of our second item. The Communist delegation mentioned the declaration which the North Korean Government made on 13 July 1950, and added that they had 'observed international law as to the treatment of prisoners of war' ".

I am instructing the United Nations Command delegation to make one more effort to secure the information and agreement referred to above and if both fail, at least to get both our requests into the record. I will report results.

Meanwhile it seems to me that Communist refusal to report the location of these camps in order that International Red Cross representatives might visit them and Communist replies to our questions on the subject, offer an excellent basis for renewed efforts in the United Nations to bring pressure to bear to compel compliance with the Geneva Convention. Either this subject must be faced as a military subject and therefore within the purview of these armistice negotiations, or they become proper subjects for further United Nations action.

795.00/7–1351

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 13 July 1951.

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea.

1. In the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy. However, they do not recommend action which would involve us in a general war with Communist China. They recommend, therefore, that the following actions be taken:

a. Continue preparations to place the Nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice;
b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;
c. Remove all restrictions concerning advances into North Korea, at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;
d. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, including restrictions against attacks on Rashin, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River;
e. Extend the area for pursuit and the air-to-air action in air engagements initiated over Korea by disregarding the border between Korea and Manchuria (loosely termed "hot pursuit"), such pursuit to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing antiaircraft fire;
f. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:

(1) Aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and
(2) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

g. Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces; and
h. Develop and equip dependable South Korean military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually the major responsibility for the defense of Korea.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that the sixteen nations participating in the Korean campaign be pressed to support the following courses of action:

a. Bring to bear on the Communist Government of China additional political and economic pressures with a view toward forcing the withdrawal of Chinese Communists from Korea;

b. Expand immediately the potential for military operations in the Korean campaign through the commitment of additional armed force contingents; and

c. Impose a naval blockade of Communist China.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain Presidential approval of the foregoing recommended courses of action in order that there may be no delay in implementing them if the negotiations break down.[1]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[1] On July 18, these recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forwarded to President Truman by Secretary Marshall without comment, Marshall indicating that he was not ready to express an opinion at the time. (Truman Library, Truman Papers, PSF–Subject File) See the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated August 29, p. 880.

357.AD/7–1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1951.

Subject: Future of UNCURK.

Participants:
Mr. Trucco—Chilean Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Rodriguez—Minister Counselor, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Wainhouse—UNP
Mr. Emmons—NA

Mr. Trucco, until recently Chilean representative on UNCURK came in to see Mr. Hickerson today. He was accompanied by Mr. Rodriguez, Minister Counselor of the Chilean Embassy. Mr. Trucco's visit resulted from a visit which Mr. Hickerson had from Ambassador Santa Cruz last week.

Mr. Hickerson stated that he understood Mr. Trucco was going to act as the Chilean Representative at the UN in place of Ambassador Santa Cruz and would be one of the Chilean delegates to the General Assembly in Paris this fall. Mr. Trucco said that that was so and he was returning to Chile to resume his duties as Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs after the General Assembly session.

Mr. Hickerson spoke of the frustration UNCURK is undergoing, and recalled the circumstances under which UNCURK was created, the military situation in October–November 1950, the important task given to the Commission, the high-level personnel necessary for this important task, the intervention in force of the Chinese Communists in Korea in late November, and the effect that this has produced on the functions of UNCURK. Mr. Hickerson expressed sympathy for the members of UNCURK in their frustration. No one, he said, could have foreseen the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.

Mr. Trucco fully agreed with Mr. Hickerson on the frustration which UNCURK had experienced and recalled the Commission's meetings with MacArthur on the 21st and 24th of November in Tokyo, and the high hopes entertained for the unification of Korea after the restoration of international peace and security. But with the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the military developments that followed, the creation of the GOC and the appointment of the Agent General under UNKRA for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, UNCURK's frustration was pretty nearly complete. He spoke of the low morale of the Commission, its desire to disband, and how he and Mr. Plimsoll (the Australian member on UNCURK) kept the Commission together. Mr. Trucco went on to say that the Commission should be "extricated" from Korea. (While Mr. Trucco did not explain what he meant by "extricated", we understand from the conversations which he has had with officers in USUN and others in New York that he meant bringing the Commission to New York where it might write its report and recommend its dissolution.) UNCURK, he argued, as the name signifies, is a symbol associated with unification. If the present armistice negotiations should be successful along the present military lines, Korea in fact would be divided, at least for the present. Since the Commission is identified with unification it would not be psychologically desirable to have the Commission remain in Korea. The presence of the Commission under these circumstances would tend to emphasize the "partition" of Korea. It should be "extricated". In the light of this, it seemed to Mr. Trucco that a new United Nations body with new terms of reference is necessary. Mr. Trucco referred to the visit of the Cordier party to Korea and said that Mr. Cordier shared the views which he had expressed about the Commission and its future work.

Mr. Hickerson explained at some length the importance both politically and psychologically, of maintaining a United Nations instrumentality in Korea pending a fresh look at the entire problem when the Sixth General Assembly meets. It is important that the ROK not be given the feeling that the United Nations is abandoning it. Mr. Hickerson feared that such an inference might be drawn by the ROK if the Commission were withdrawn. We have no intention of giving up our aims in Korea.

Mr. Wainhouse felt that the Commission should remain in the area, write its report in Tokyo perhaps leaving a skeleton staff in Pusan to maintain liaison with it. It was Mr. Wainhouse's view that the Commission might select one of the representatives to be present when the General Assembly discusses the report of the Commission in Paris.

Mr. Emmons agreed that the withdrawal of UNCURK from Korea at this time might have unfortunate psychological repercussions upon the Korean population. He also expressed interest in the question of any report which UNCURK might be preparing on the Korean situation for submission to the UN Secretariat and indicated that the American Embassy at Pusan had been instructed to turn over to UNCURK certain background information and material on North Korea which might be of use in the preparation of such a report.

Mr. Trucco asked whether we had any views as to how the Commission might be reconstituted at the next General Assembly. Mr. Hickerson stated that we are giving the matter consideration but that we have not come to any definite conclusions. If an armistice agreement is concluded along the present military lines, this would obviously be but a first step. Mr. Hickerson said our objective remains that of the United Nations—a unified, democratic and independent Korea and that the GA will have to deal with this problem at its next session. Mr. Hickerson said that while we have not come to any definite conclusions, the GA might wish to reduce the size of the Commission to three, or appoint a single representative, or for that matter a single representative supported by a commission made up of say three members.

Mr. Trucco asked whether the UN would play any role in the implementation of the armistice agreement. Mr. Hickerson replied that we would like very much to see a role of the UN in addition to that played by the Unified Command, in the implementation of the agreement, but we know very well that the other side would not look with favor upon a UN role. The armistice is military in nature and would very likely be implemented by the military representatives of both sides. Mr. Trucco said he saw no role for UNCURK in the implementation of the armistice agreement.

Mr. Trucco inquired how we intended to deal with the armistice agreement from the standpoint of the UN. Mr. Hickerson stated that, of course, the UN should take some official action such as noting with approval the armistice agreement. We think this should be done in the Security Council or the General Assembly. We, at this time, have no fixed views.

Mr. Trucco expressed some concern about democracies being unable to take the propaganda offensive. He, of course, appreciated the enormous difficulties democracies face in the propaganda field. He felt that the Soviet Union at the forthcoming GA session would more than likely take advantage of the Korean armistice agreement and pose as the great exponent of peace in what might be another of their peace offensives. He felt, somehow or other, we should wrest the initiative from them, as difficult as this may be. Mr. Hickerson agreed in toto with Mr. Trucco and said that the problem of propaganda is a constant preoccupation with us and we were giving this matter our most earnest consideration.

Editorial Note

On July 13, at 1 p. m., Tokyo time, General Ridgway made the following broadcast over the Armed Forces Radio; the text, which is here taken from Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 76, is virtually identical with that printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 23, 1951, pages 152–153.

"To Gen. Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-Huai:

"In my initial message to you on 30 June I proposed that representatives meet aboard a Danish hospital ship. I suggested that site since it would have afforded equal freedom of access to both parties, including any elements such as newsmen associated with the party. It would have provided a completely neutral atmosphere free of the menacing presence of armed troops of either side. It would have provided adequate communications facilities of all kinds.

"Your reply to my message made no reference to my proposed meeting place. Instead you proposed Kaesong. In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate the good faith under which the United Nations command was proceeding, I accepted Kaesong as the site for our discussion.

"In so doing I expected the condition referred to above, vital to the success of any such discussions, would be afforded at Kaesong. In order to provide further assurances that such conditions would in fact exist at the conference site, my liaison officers in the initial meeting with yours on July 8 proposed that a 10-mile-wide corridor centered on the Kumchong-Kaesong-Munsan road and limited by Kumchon on the north and Munsan on the south be established a neutral zone free of any hostile action by either party.

"They further recommended that United Nations forces within this corridor remain south of an east-west line to the south edge of Kaesong while your forces within this corridor remained north of an east-west line to the north edge of Kaesong, leaving the town of Kaesong restricted to entry only by those individuals in the delegation party.

"Agreement on this proposal would have insured freedom of movement to both delegations, to and from the meetings and within the town of Kaesong. However, your liaison officers declined to agree to this proposal, stating that it was not needed to insure satisfactory conditions at the conference site for both delegations.

"To show good faith and to avoid delay I accepted your assurances instead of my proposal to establish a neutral zone. Since the opening of the conference it has been evident that the equality of treatment so essential to the conduct of armistice negotiations is lacking. Since the first meeting at Kaesong your delegation has placed restrictions on the movement of our delegation. It has subjected our personnel to the close proximity of your armed guard, it has delayed and blocked passage of our couriers. It has withheld its cooperation in establishment of two-way communications with our base even though it agreed to do so immediately. It has refused admittance to the conference area certain personnel in our convoy which I desire and for whose conduct I stated I assumed full responsibility.

"Extension of the present recess and the delay in resuming the conference of our delegation is solely due to those unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions against which my representatives have repeatedly protested.

"As pointed out to your representatives by Vice Admiral Joy, my personal representative in the first meeting of 10 July, the hope for success of these discussions rested upon the good faith of both sides. With good faith, mutual confidence might be established, an atmosphere of truth created and the attainment of an honorable and enduring settlement brought measurably nearer.

"The record of the United Nations command delegation to date is open for world inspection. It established beyond any shadow of doubt their honorable intentions and good faith at every stage of the proceedings. With full and solemn realization of the vital importance of our conferences to all the peoples of the world, the United Nations command delegation is prepared to continue our discussions in the same spirit of good faith at any time that we receive assurance that your delegation will proceed in like spirit.

"The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary prerequisites the establishment of an agreed conference area of suitable extent completely free of armed personnel of either side. Each delegation must have complete reciprocity of treatment to include complete and equal freedom of movement to, from and within the agreed conference area and complete and equal freedom at all times in the selection of the personnel in its delegation party to include representatives of the press.

"I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center approximately at the center of Kaesong and with a 5-mile radius be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Pan-Mun-Jon. I propose that we both agree to refrain from any hostile acts within this zone during the entire period of our conference. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the roads leading thereto used by personnel of both delegation parties be completely free of armed personnel.

"I further propose we both agree that the total personnel of each delegation within the neutral area at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. I propose that we agree that the composition of each delegation be at the discretion of its commander. It is understood that personnel to be admitted to the actual conference chamber should be limited to these agreed upon by your representatives and mine.

"If you agree to these proposals the present recess can be terminated and the conference resumed without delay and with some expectation of progress. Radio telephone is available to you for communication to me of your reply. If you prefer to send your reply by liaison officer I guarantee his safety within my lines during daylight providing you inform me of the time and route by which he will travel and the manner by which he may be identified. Should you continue to insist that restrictions are necessary for our personal safety or for any other person, I propose that the conference site be moved to a locality which will afford the few simple assurances I have specified herein.

"Signed: M. B. Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 66 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 13 July 1951—3:18 p. m.

HNC-077. CINCFE personal for Hickey.

1. Further to my message HNC-064.[1] No message received from Nam Il during night 12-13 July in reply to our request for press representation. At 0910K, 12 July, I received this message from their Liaison Officer: "Would like to send a delegate to Pan Mum Jom with an answer to the letter from the United Nations senior delegate issued yesterday. I wish that your Liaison Officer will come to Pan Mun Jom and receive it at 0930, Pyongyang time, this morning. Sgd., Chang Chan San (Communist Liaison Officer)."

2. Our reply at 0915K, 13 July was: "Our liaison officer will come to Pan Mun Jom to receive your answer at the time indicated (0930 Pyongyang time) this morning."

3 *a.* My Liaison Officer arrived Pan Mun Jom 1025K, 13 July. En Liaison Officers were delayed due to asserted vehicle breakdown. However they arrived at 1055K and delivered from Nam Il a message in substance as follows: "We did not stop your convoy, only the newsmen. Your failure to come to conference on 12th is unreasonable. Only after delegates have met and agreed on the matter can newsmen be admitted to site of conference. We suggest a meeting at 0900, 13 July".

b. When the North Korean officer finished reading the above, the Chinese representative withdrew from his pocket a paper, written in

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[1] Not printed. This telegram, dated July 12, transmitted the text of a press release issued by General Ridgway concerning the inability of the United Nations side to secure agreement from the Communist delegation on admission of newsmen with the United Nations Command to the vicinity of the conference at Kaesong (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 60).

Chinese characters. As the Chinese unfolded the paper, the North Korean reached for it. The Chinese said: "I will handle this" and pushed aside the North Korean's arm. The manner of the Chinese was that of a superior to an inferior who had interrupted at a time when interruption was not desired. The Chinese then read his paper in English, and returned it to his pocket. The paper read by the Chinese was in substance, as follows: "Both sides must agree in respect to the delegations, including newsmen. We are prepared to discuss the matter of newsmen with your delegates on the basis of that principle. We suggest a meeting at 1300, 13 July since 0900 is now past."

c. When Col Kinney turned to depart, the Chinese representative (but not the North Korean) called to him to ask if there was any reply at that time.

d. From the above incidents, it is Colonel Kinney's impression that the Chinese was more anxious for resumption of the conference than was the North Korean.

4. Admiral Joy is replying as follows: "To General Nam Il: I have received your message of this date. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command will communicate directly with General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh Huai. The United Nations command delegation desires to continue the recess until further notice".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 67 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET KOREA, 13 July 1951—3:57 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

HNC–078. Intelligence reports from EUSAK given me this morning include the reported displacement of the Eighth North Korean Division Southeast across the Yesong River on or about 1 July. Reports derive both from our agents and prisoner of war interrogations. EUSAK now accepted that en/division in the area South and Southwest of Kaesong.

The dates of this movement, if correctly reported, coincide with the first broadcast message from the en commanders to me in which they evidenced their desire to initiate armistice discussions. I consider this item of major significance as further evidence that the en commanders have not approached and do not yet approach this conference—in good faith. Further, the unremitting flow of radio broadcasts on the official Pyongyang and Peiping stations continues to conceal and pervert the basic major factors of our meetings and discussions to date. In order that a major effort may be made by all influential agencies to establish our meetings and discussions in an atmosphere of good faith, I respectfully suggest prompt consideration by appropriate authorities, including those of the United Nations, of some prompt effort to cause these stations to cease these viciously false broadcasts. They can seriously prejudice such chances as may exist for fruitful discussions concerning an armistice. I am considering what further action I should propose to the en commanders that they take with respect to any forces they may have in an area which so dominates Kaesong as that in which the Eighth North Korean Division is reported recently to have entered.

795.00/7-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1951.

Subject: British Views Regarding Post-Armistice Procedure for Korea.

Participants: Mr. Greenhill, British Embassy
Mr. Johnson, NA

Mr. Greenhill called this morning to leave the attached extracts of a message from the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador concerning the UK desire to exchange views with the Secretary of State on post-armistice developments in Korea.

Mr. Greenhill stated that the Embassy hoped that it would be possible for the Department to discuss Mr. Morrison's message early next week. I assured him that it would be immediately brought to the attention of Mr. Rusk and the Secretary and that we would get in touch with the Embassy when we were prepared to discuss it.[1]

[Attachment]

FOLLOWING ARE THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE [FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS] TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR [IN WASHINGTON]

SECRET

"I would like to exchange ideas with Mr. Acheson about the possible developments over Korea. The immediate aim is, of course, an armistice and cease-fire, but we might profitably consider now the situation that may arise later.

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[1] A manuscript note in the source text by Mr. Acheson's Special Assistant Lucius D. Battle indicated that the Secretary saw this memorandum and the attachment.

2. The present basis for armistice negotiations as reported by you is acceptable to us. I have full confidence in General Ridgway but I expect the negotiations to be long and difficult. I assume we shall continue to be fully consulted in the course of the negotiations in view of their great importance.

3. I am cautiously optimistic that we can bring the fighting in Korea to an end. I am fairly well satisfied that the Russians genuinely desire this, and probably the North Koreans also. I am less sure about the Chinese, though they probably desire at least a breathing space. There is nothing in our reports from Peking to suggest that they are abandoning the build-up of their military striking power. In particular, the Chinese may wish to insist on widening the scope of the negotiations beyond purely military matters. It is thus possible that there may be some difference of attitude between the Chinese and Russians and it is of course in the Russian power to deny supplies to the Chinese. But we cannot expect to see any public rift between them; both must be fully aware that neither can afford this.

4. I am apprehensive less the attitude of the South Koreans may prejudice the success of the negotiations. I am sure the United States Government will take the responsibility of ensuring that this does not happen. There would be an unfortunate reaction in the United Kingdom if the British public believed that the South Koreans were responsible for a break-down in the negotiations.

5. Let us however assume that an armistice has been agreed upon. I am less optimistic about the next stage. We would like to see a general settlement in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations—elections throughout the country under United Nations supervisions; the dissolution of the South Korean Government; a vigorous rehabilitation programme; withdrawal of all non-Korean forces, but leaving United Nations personnel and advisers (including police advisers) for a period. (In this connexion I am attracted by Mr. Lie's proposals for a single mediator.)[2]

6. A settlement on these lines would open the way to discussions of other Far Eastern problems and would offer the best hope of a gradual relaxation in tension and of general improvement in the international situation.

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[2] Mr. Lie had suggested that, as in the case of the mediation effort by the late Count Folke Bernadotte in Palestine, a mediator might be assigned the responsibility for bringing the North and South Koreans together, arranging for elections and troop withdrawals, and dealing with other post-armistice problems. (Memorandum from Gross to Hickerson, July 2, 1951; IO Files: US/A/3231)

7. This is the type of solution which would be acceptable to us, but I confess that the prospects of bringing it about are not good. From the Chinese point of view, if some such solution were to be achieved, they would have to agree to confine talks to Korea, and to accept a settlement in Korea without having had an opportunity to discuss Formosa and Japan, or having obtained satisfaction in regard to the representation of the Peking Government in the United Nations. Moreover, the terms of the settlement in Korea (unification under United Nations auspices) would constitute a political reverse for both China and Russia, both of whom, I am convinced, will not easily abandon their goal of a communist-controlled Korea.

8. I am therefore not hopeful that a general settlement can be brought about in Korea, and I think that after the armistice we must expect a prolonged stalemate lasting perhaps for several years, with a divided Korea. In default of a settlement a stalemate would be preferable, from our point of view, to either of the alternatives—efforts to break the stalemate by military force, or complete withdrawal from Korea. Our instinct would be to stay put in Korea, avoid provocative action there or elsewhere, maintain such contacts as are possible with China, wait in the hope that tempers would cool and that as western rearmament began to show results our bargaining position would gradually become stronger, and perhaps in the end reach an understanding with the communist bloc either by a general settlement or by a series of local settlements. By that time Japan should also be less of a liability from the defence point of view, and, assuming that Japanese policy was friendly to the west, she would be an additional factor making for stability in Asia.

9. In the event of a stalemate such as I am contemplating I would expect Chinese energies to be directed primarily at internal reconstruction and at building up her military power. I doubt whether China would engage in direct military adventures elsewhere, e.g. against Indo-China or Burma, though the Chinese would lose no opportunity to stir up trouble throughout South East Asia by means of propaganda, aid and encouragement to communist and Chinese groups there, and perhaps by "volunteers", though not on the Korean scale. There would however always be a danger of China intervening again in Korea, and meanwhile both she and Russia could be expected to give assistance to the North Koreans to re-arm and consolidate. The Korean situation, despite the stalemate, would remain potentially explosive.

10. All this assumes an armistice. We must also consider the position that would arise in the event of the armistice negotiations breaking down. General Ridgway will of course be taking the necessary military precautions to guard against a resumption of the offensive. In the political field it is essential that the responsibility for any resumption

of the fighting must not only lie with the Chinese and North Koreans, but must be publicly recognised as lying there beyond any doubt. Whilst I would not suggest fettering General Ridgway's freedom of action I earnestly trust that the utmost care will be taken to guard against what might be considered provocative action on the part of United Nations forces.

11. These are no more than general speculations about the possible course of events in connexion with Korea. There are many unknown factors, and in any case I cannot commit His Majesty's Government in advance of discussion with my colleagues on the basis of a known situation. Nevertheless, I would be glad to know how far they accord with Mr. Acheson's own thinking." [3]

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[3] For Secretary Acheson's response, see the letter to Morrison, July 19, p. 698.

795.00/7-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 14, 1951—2 p. m.

30. Fol is Dept's thinking on questions raised urtels 38, July 6; 59, July 10.

1. As indicated in Deptel 13, July 6, Dept's present thinking is that if armistice is achieved, there shld be some official UN action shortly thereafter to note approval of armistice. While in our view, as well as that of UN Secretariat (urtel 1750 June 30), US as UC has authority to enter into armistice in Korea, and any such armistice wld take effect without further UN action, it is nevertheless desirable to have some formal expression in an appropriate UN organ noting approval of armistice. Since UN forces went into Korea pursuant to UN resolutions, it is appropriate and desirable that UN note accomplishment of their mission. We wld want UN action which wld put armistice in context of previous resolutions on Korea and leave record clear as to purpose of UN action in Korea. UN shld also reaffirm its political objectives in Korea. Thus, we are thinking of res or resolutions along lines which wld:

a) recall past SC and GA Res;

b) note with approval armistice agreement of —— which confirms that armed attack against ROK has been repelled, that fighting has come to an end, that internat'l peace and security in area are being restored;

c) reaffirm that it remains firm purpose of UN to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, democratic and independent Govt in Korea.

We are also considering desirability of para which wld confirm that UN forces shld remain in Korea, under authority UC, so long as is necessary to assure that internat'l peace and security in area will be maintained.

2. This Dept considers minimum objective of formal UN action. There may be dels who will not agree that res along lines above is kind of action called for in present circumstances. Some may believe it advisable to take no action at all. Others may wish to see armistice noted with approval in SG only, in such form that it will gain Sov support, and will insist that no further UN action be taken which will not have Sov approval and which wld therefore disturb "new harmony".

This approach raises serious questions. In Dept's view passage of res which does not reaffirm UN's case in Korea, might tend to confuse world as to real character and purpose of UN action in Korea. It is impt that achievement of armistice in no way becloud or confuse record on Korea; it must remain clear that there was Commie aggression in Korea; that UN action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that such action has been successful in meeting aggression and achieving mil objectives of UN. Further, it will mean that there wld be no GA action to reaffirm pol objectives in Korea or to take any other measures which do not have full consent of Sov Union, thus giving USSR in effect a new veto in GA.

This approach, in Dept's view, grossly misconceives USSR's objectives in agreeing to armistice. If encouraged, attitude wld have serious consequences going beyond question of UN action re Korea. US is always ready to welcome true Sov cooperation in support of UN Charter; we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We wld have to have much more and stronger evidence of Sov change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Commie imperialism and has started on path of peaceful cooperation. Sov approach to armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on internat'l scene. Such an impression would lull us into false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up strength of free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of UN. Within UN it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some dels might feel wld antagonize Russians.

3. Assuming that there is agreement on UN action along lines indicated para 1, there remains question of organ or organs in which such action shld be taken. As we see it, there are three possibilities.

a) Bring res of kind we want directly to GA. Arguments for this course are: Since GA must in any event deal with pol and econ aspects, it might as well deal with mil aspects which so intimately intertwined. Further, GA is logical body to go to. It is GA which has been effectively in charge of Korean question since Oct; indeed entire Korean question has been removed from SC agenda and left to GA. It is GA which approved decision to cross 38th parallel. It carried on all cease-fire efforts; it adopted Feb 1 res finding that Chi Commies have engaged in aggression and affirming determination of UN to continue its action in Korea; it recommended strategic embargo against Commies. GA action at this time, therefore is merely a continuation of GA's exercise of authority and raises no constitutional question.

Arguments against this course are, of course, arguments in favor of SC action, at least in first instance, as set forth below. Moreover, if this course followed and UK and others continue feel strongly that SC shld act first, their attitude in GA debate might prejudice attainment desired objective of prompt passage by large majority of res along above lines.

b) Seek res of the kind we want in SC Arguments in favor: Action in SC is favored by a number of dels. They wld argue that UN action was initiated in SC, that SC resolutions are still on books and in effect, and that SC res wld be obvious way to wind up fighting. As matter of constitutional practice, questions of this kind shld go to SC which has primary responsibility for maintaining peace, at least in first instance; to bypass SC in this case wld further weaken Council and establish a precedent for taking questions to GA without even going to SC, which raises serious constitutional questions and goes beyond ideas of Uniting for Peace Program.

Arguments vs: Question of Korea has been removed from SC and wld have to be put back on agenda, this might raise doubts as to legality of GA action, past and future. Also, convening Council to discuss Korea case wld almost certainly result in Sov Union raising Chi rep question right at beginning; this question wld be particularly troublesome to us in SC. Further, it seems hardly likely that kind of res we want cld pass SC. Sov Union wld not agree to any mention of previous res on Korea which it had declared illegal; they wld not agree to any res which in any way reaffirmed that Commies committed aggression and that UN forces went to Korea to meet this aggression. Bringing our kind of res to SC therefore is only a futile gesture; we wld then have to bring it to GA in any event. More important there wld be efforts, perhaps by countries like India or Egypt, to water down and neutralize our proposal in an effort to get Sov concurrence or acquiescence. This wld only cause confusion and recrimination, and make more difficult our task in GA thereafter.

c) Another alternative is to present in SC short res which USSR cld vote for and by which SC wld simply note with approval conclusion of armistice, and to seek passage in GA immediately thereafter of full res along lines outlined in para one. Arguments for this include arguments favoring principle of some prior SC action cited para 3 (*b*) above. In addition it is argued that here is opportunity for exploiting measure of agreement or *rapprochement* which armistice implies; that it wld be very desirable to have Sov del raise his hand in support of res putting an end to Korean fighting; that wld not only constitute Russian commitment to respect armistice, but it might even have propaganda value to have Russians support res ending a war which they had previously argued shld never have been launched by SC.

Arguments vs this course are: that it is unnecessarily complicated and confusing, and that entire results cld better be achieved simply in GA as argued in para 3 (*a*). More important, those dels who do not agree on the kind of res outlined in para one as minimum objective for formal UN action might later resist approval by GA of res desired on the ground that such a step wld be likely to upset frail, young bloom of harmony which armistice and agreed SC res will be held to represent. Thus, if this third alternative were followed, it wld be highly important obtain widest possible prior commitment UK and other leading dels for wholehearted support for prompt GA action along desired lines as soon as SC res passed.

On balance, Dept leans toward first alternative, i.e., direct action in GA. (Special UC report on armistice wld go to SC, like previous UC reports, without calling for action.) Before adopting a position, however, we wld appreciate your comments and recommendations.

ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 68 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL FLASH KOREA, 15 July 1951—12:35 p. m.

HNC-096. In order to provide the opposing delegates with an opportunity to avoid unacceptable loss of face and to provide them with a "golden bridge" by which they may gracefully recede from their apparent inflexible insistence on including in the agenda an item providing for "withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea", I am considering authorizing Admiral Joy to make a statement at an appropriate time of his choosing. This proposed statement follows:

"We cannot consent to inclusion on the agenda of any topic intended to open discussion of 'withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.'

"The simple reason for our position is that decision to withdraw United Nations forces from Korea can only be taken by those governments whose decisions placed them there.

"The question therefore is purely political and one to be decided on governmental levels.

"We can state, however, that this question is of high importance to some, if not all, of the governments represented in the United Nations Command. We feel sure that it is already receiving their earnest attention. We would even state that, subject to prior approval by our proper authority, we would be willing to act solely in the capacity of a transmitting agency in the event you should desire to pass certain communications on this subject to the governments we represent. With respect to this last point, I wish to repeat and emphasize 2 points: First, we would have to refer this matter to proper authority and receive prior approval. Second, in the event you wish to follow this procedure we could serve only as a mechanical means of transmission of your communications through our military channels to our proper authorities, and without any comment whatever by the United Nations Command delegation."

Would be grateful for your comments soonest.[1]

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[1] This message was sent for information to Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, Naval Aide to President Truman. Admiral Dennison on the afternoon of July 15 informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, that President Truman wished to have the comments of the Secretaries of State and Defense in addition to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before any reply was sent to General Ridgway. (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 71)

On July 16, General Ridgway sent the following additional message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his telegram HNC–103 from Korea:

"Mymsg HNC 096 of 15 Jul, to which no reply has been recd up to this moment. With respect to current Communist insistence on inclusion in the agenda of the item 'withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea,' I have directed Admiral Joy that at any time this point is raised in the future, he will inform the Communist delegation that the United Nations Command delegation will not consent to the inclusion of this item on the agenda for reasons it has already repeatedly stated. Neither will the United Nations Command delegation discuss this matter further.

"It is possible that the conference may deadlock on this issue. If so, I am prepared to recess the conference, pending Communist agreement with our view, or contrary instructions from you." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 72)

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 69: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 15 July 1951—12:50 p. m.

HNC–097. CINCFE personal for Hickey. This message in 5 parts.

Part 1. The following message was received here via radio telephone from The North Korean station at Kaesong at 0015K, 15 July:

"From our Liaison Officer. To your Liaison Officer.

"We will deliver to you the official copy of the message of General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh Huai to General Ridgway at Pan Mum Jom at 6 o'clock in the morning, Pyongyang time tomorrow.

Please come to Pan Mum Jom to receive it. Signed Chang Chung San, Liaison Officer, Korean Peoples Army."

Part 2. a. My Liaison Officer, at 0640K, received this message at Pan Mum Jom, written in Korean and Chinese. English translation of the North Korean version is:

"To General Ridgway.

"We have received your letter of 13 July.

"In order to carry out the peace conference smoothly we agreed to the proposals that the misunderstandings and arguments on some minor details will be eliminated, that the Kaesong area will be a neutral zone during the conference period, and that hostilities of both groups will be suspended, and that the roads to the conference site which are used by both delegates, and the area of the conference site will be cleared of all armed personnel.

"However, we propose that the limits of the conference area, and other concrete problems in connection with this should be left to and settled by a meeting of the delegates of both sides.

"The current problem of newspapermen which was the reason for this recess has no connection with the problem of establishment of a neutral zone. In regard to the question of a neutral zone aside from the raising of the question once by your Liaison Officers at the meeting of 8 July your delegates never raised this question.

"The mission of the Liaison Officers was to discuss minor details, but not problems such as the establishment of a neutral zone.

"The problem of the newspaper reporters which was the reason for this recess is a minor one. This is not a sufficient reason to cause a recess and even more, it is not a sufficient reason to bring about a break in the conference.

"At the time when your delegation raised this question at the conference table, our delegates were of the opinion that as there were yet no results in the meeting, and even more, the agenda had not even been determined, [they] did not feel that it was appropriate for newspapermen of various countries to come to Kaesong. It was for this reason that agreement could not be obtained. We maintain the principal that all matters will be carried out with the agreement of both sides. We believe that such a principle is the most impartial, and leaves no room for argument or opposition.

"Inasmuch as we have not reached agreement on the question of newspapermen, it should not be put into effect forcefully by your side alone.

"In order to avoid a long recess for a breakup of this conference because of such a small question we agree to your proposal. Namely: We agree to 20 news representatives of your side being part of the working personnel of your delegation.

"We have already issued the order that our delegates shall provide convenience for your delegates. Signed Kim Il Sung, CINC Korean Peoples Army; Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers Army."

b. English translation of Chinese version is:

[Here follows the English translation of the Chinese text which did not differ substantively from the version printed in paragraph *a*. The text of the message as broadcast in English over the Peking radio is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 23, 1951, pages 153–154.]

Part 3. This message was delivered by my Liaison Officer at 1020K 15 July to the Communist Liaison Officer at Kaesong:

"To: General Nam Il, Senior Delegate. I propose a meeting of delegations under the conditions now agreed between your commanders and mine, at 1400, July 15, Seoul time. If you agree, request immediate reply. Signed Vice Admiral Joy, Senior Delegate".

Part 4. At 1055, the following reply was delivered to my Liaison Officer, Lt Col Lee, ROK Army: "This is official message from General Nam Il to Admiral Joy.

"General Nam Il welcomes the United Nations delegates proposal to have a meeting at 1 o'clock Pyongyang time."

Part 5. All of the above messages have been released to the press.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 70 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 15 July 1951—9:45 p. m.

HNC–098. This message in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice conference at Kaesong on 15 July 51.

Part 1. Summary: Conference opened at 1409K, 15 July by United Nations Command Delegation stating the administrative requirements necessary if the conferences were to continue. Communist Delegation agreed to all proposals. (Details in Part 3). Next 45 minutes spent by North Korean delegate criticizing United Nations Command agenda and justifying his own. Stress was laid on the 38 parallel being the basic principle upon which the Korean armistice must be solved. There was no concession by them on the agenda. United States Command Delegation agreed to remove the "International Red Cross visiting PW camps" item from the agenda and discuss it under the general topic of prisoners of war. We also agreed to remove the item which stated that only military matters in Korea would be discussed, since

Communists had given us their assurance that this was their intention. We further explained that we could not accept any particular military demarcation line as an item for discussion as a basis for establishing an agenda. Conference adjourned at 1601K with an agreement to meet at 1000K, 16 July.

Part 2. Generally, the opposing delegates seemed willing and anxious to get down to business as if they wanted to show results or determine the United Nations position as quickly as possible. They were serious and attentive throughout.

When Admiral Joy told of being stopped by guard on road and told he must wait until main convoy caught up, Nam Il and Lee Song Cho evidence surprise but the two Chinese appeared very much annoyed and showed it in their quick glance at Nam Il.

When Nam Il read a prepared paper concerning the agenda, he hesitated and stammered several times. He appeared a little more nervous today than in previous meetings. The Chinese seemed particularly impressed by Admiral Joy's argument regarding the military difference between a line of parallel and defensible line.

Nam Il and two associates listened until Admiral Joy said he had been directed by the Commander in Chief to request that they convey to their superior a request that the location of prisoner of war camps be given to the International Red Cross and that representatives be allowed to visit them, then all three grabbed pencils and began taking notes with a deep frown on their faces which relaxed considerably when Admiral Joy later explained the prisoner of war matter would be given less important place on agenda. Nam Il was particularly interested in discussion of 38th parallel and asked that certain part be read again in English.

Part 3. Progress made.

1. Agreement reached that: *a.* A neutral zone 5 miles in radius centered on traffic circle in Kaesong be established. Pan Mun Jom on eastern edge to be included therein. *b.* Each side refrain from hostile acts in neutral zone. *c.* All military forces to be removed from neutral zone except those necessary for military police duty and armed only as necessary for this function. *d.* Area of conference be established of ½ mile radius centered on conference house. *e.* All armed personnel to be removed from conference area. *f.* Main road from Pan Mun Jom to conference area to be free of armed guards and that United Nations Command delegation has unrestricted use of this road during daylight hours without notification.

2. Very little progress made in arriving at agreed agenda but consider atmosphere more favorable for tomorrow's meeting.

Part 4. Sequence of events: United Nations Command delegation secured agreement on administrative requirements. Communist delegation took 15 minutes recess after our proposals were made. After the recess they agreed to a neutral zone and suggested Liaison Officers handle the other technical matters which was done after the conference adjourned. North Korean delegation then stated they had studied our agenda and the remarks which they previously had made regarding it and that they still consider that their analysis of it is correct. They insist that their agenda is appropriate and ours inappropriate. Their criticism was that United Nations Command agenda (*a*) Does not put most important items first (*b*) Does not separate the important items from the unimportant (*c*) Includes matters which are not of sufficient importance to be separate items. They repeated that they could see no relationship between "The location of prisoner of war camps and authority for International Red Cross to visit them" and the cease fire problem. On the next item they argued that we both agreed to discuss military matters in Korea only and saw no need for an item of this nature on the agenda. They considered our agenda item concerning the cease fire and the conditions on which it is to be based is too abstract. They repeated the reasons previously given why the main points are (1) The 38th parallel is the basic principle upon which the armistice must be based, (2) Cease fire and establishment of demilitarized zone and, (3) Withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. They argued that whether we were empowered to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea or not, it was essential to discuss this matter if the armistice were to be discussed. They could not see why we expected to consider only some part of the armistice discussions and not one of the major items. United Nations Command delegation then read statement on Red Cross observation of prisoner of war camps, arguing that it was for humanitarian reasons that we included it high on the agenda. After asking them to request their commanders to report the location of prisoner of war camps to the International Red Cross and to permit representatives to visit these camps without further delay, we agreed to withdraw this item from the agenda which referred to limiting discussions to military matters in Korea only. We then gave our arguments against placing any particular line as the military demarcation line as an item on the agenda. We concluded the meeting with statement that we won't discuss any particular line in the formulation of an agenda and that we will continue our remarks tomorrow.

Part 5.

Conclusions: We conclude that (*a*) Communist delegates have been instructed to get down to business and stop quibbling on administrative matters. This is evidenced by their complete withdrawal of armed guards along the road and in the conference area. Only guards seen with arms were two acting as military policemen at road junctions to direct traffic. (*b*) Communist delegation may be under the impression that these armistice talks are for the final settlement of peace in Korea as evidenced by their insistence upon the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea as part of the armistice discussion. (*c*) Pressure by the Chinese may have been put on North Korean delegates to get along with the talks. (*d*) Communist delegation either believes or strongly hopes that United Nations Command delegation is or will be directed to settle for 38th parallel. Communists intend to press this point to fullest. (*e*) Communist delegation intends to force issue of withdrawal of foreign troops on to the agenda, and will continue to insist strongly that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea must be considered during the armistice discussions.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 75 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 July 1951—2:55 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 96421. From JCS for CINCUNC. Reur HNC 096.

1. We see no objection to attempt to afford opponents opportunity to recede from inflexible position, provided it can be done without giving away important points of our own.

2. We do not wish to leave impression that UN Forces will withdraw in near future; not only would this impression be contrary to probable course of events but it would cause deep fears and misgivings among South Koreans at very time they need to feel reliance upon continued UN support.

3. We do not believe you should become a transmittal agency through which political questions can be raised by commanders who we consider are not entitled to raise them on a governmental level. If you transmit their views on this question, they would undoubtedly expect answers and would quickly avail themselves of opportunity to raise other political questions by same means.

4. We believe amended statement given below is about as far as we can go and provides face-saving device if opponents wish to use one. This is authorized for your use at such time as you feel desirable.

"1. We cannot consent to inclusion on the agenda of these mil discussions of any topic intended to open discussion of 'withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea'.

"2. The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops is a question which should be discussed at the governmental level in connection with the final settlement of the Korean problem. The decision to withdraw United Nations Forces from Korea can be taken only by the United Nations and by those govts whose decisions placed them there at the request of the United Nations. The United Nations Command, as a mil command, is not authorized to represent the United Nations and the several govts concerned on this question. It cannot be discussed in these present talks, which are limited strictly to mil armistice questions within the purview of mil commanders. It is expected that following a mil armistice as a first step, questions concerning a final settlement of the Korean problem could be taken up at a governmental level.

"3. The foregoing does not minimize in any way the importance of the question of the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, in relation to an over-all settlement of the Korean question. Its importance is recognized in the public declarations of the United Nations as well as of individual govts having troops in the United Nations Command. However, this question is only one of those which must be considered on the governmental level in effecting a permanent settlement and which cannot be discussed separately or in advance of agreement on, and implementation of, armistice terms." [1]

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[1] General Ridgway sent the following reply in his telegram C-67196, from Tokyo, dated July 17:

"Grateful for your 96421 of 17 [*16*] July. Have authorized Admiral Joy to use first 2 subparagraphs amended statement as contained Paragraph 4 of your message but not the 3rd and final subparagraph. Shall not use this 3rd paragraph for reasons stated in 2nd paragraph of your message." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 77)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 73 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 16 July 1951—9 p. m.

HNC-104. This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice conf at Kaesong, 16 Jul 1951.

Part 1. Summary: Morning session of 50 minutes entirely taken up by United Nations Command delegation laying the foundation for presentation of a revised agenda to the Communist delegation. Immediately upon the receipt of United Nations Command revised agenda, Communists requested a 2 hour recess. Afternoon session of 45 minutes consisted of discussion of revised United Nations Command agenda by Communist delegation. Concessions were made by them when they agreed to eliminate the 38 Parallel specifically from the agenda.

They offered a revised version to our item 2 (see part 2). They remained adamant on the issue of "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea" and insisted it is a necessary agenda item which must be discussed in any cease fire talks. United Nations Command delegation made brief rebuttal and suggested a recess until tomorrow so each delegation could study proposals submitted. Communists quickly agreed. Next meeting scheduled for 1100K, 17 July.

Part 2. Progress made: The following revised agenda was proposed by the United Nations delegation:

Item 1. Adoption of agenda.

Item 2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

Item 3. Concrete arrangements for a cease fire and armistice in Korea which will insure against a resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea pending a final peace settlement.

a. Military Armistice Commission, including composition, authority and functions.

b. Military observer teams, including composition, authority and functions.

Item 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war. Nam Il, speaking for the Communist delegation, indicated in a number of instances throughout the meeting that their delegation was interested in arriving at some agreement on the content of an agenda. Indications of this interest were noted in certain favorable comments made on the United Nations new proposed agenda and in the several concessions made by the Communist delegation in order to more closely align their proposals with our new agenda.

Part 3. Attitudes.

Generally speaking, the Communist delegates indicated more of a spirit of cooperation than thus far exhibited.

The Chinese were particularly interested in Admiral Joy's discussion of UNC proposed agenda; the Communist proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea; and what must be done to prevent a resumption of war. When each session recessed, Teng Hua smiled and nodded to UNC delegate opposite him when they arose to depart.

Lee Sang Cho was silent but very observing (General Paik said that Lee Sang Cho wrote on a pad, "armistice called by Mister Malik and cease fire at 38 Parallel".

The Communist delegation seemed pleased that the meeting recessed early.

Part 4.

a. United Nations Command delegation opened morning session at 1000K, 16 Jul with continuation of remarks of day before. Emphasis was placed on the purpose of an agenda and reasons why it must be of general nature. We stressed that these meetings were for sole purpose of discussing an armistice and not a final peace settlement. We defined armistice as "an armistice is not a partial or temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the extent and under conditions agreed upon by the parties concerned". We again criticized the 38 Parallel as an agenda item and offered a more general item (item 3 in part 2) which covers the views of both sides. We presented a revised agenda (part 2). Communist delegation requested a 2 hour recess to study our agenda.

b. Communist delegation opened the afternoon session at 1300K with their preliminary review of our revised agenda. They stated they could not give up the principle of the 38 Parallel being the military demarcation line and the basis for discussion of the cease fire in Korea, however, in order to reach agreement on the agenda, they were willing to word the agenda item in more general terms. They suggested "establishment of a military demarcation line between both sides to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for a cease fire in Korea". Following this concession, they insisted that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was the next item which should be on the agenda. They argued that, even though UNC delegation refused to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea the fact remained that this is closely related to the cease fire talks and must be discussed. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea in their estimation is the guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea, and therefore is an important item for the agenda and must be discussed. Concerning UNC item 3 (see part 2) on revised agenda, they considered it more acceptable than that of previous agenda, but felt that "A" and "B" sub-item were not particularly necessary. Nam Il said that his were preliminary opinions and that he would study our agenda more and give an opinion at a later meeting.

c. UNC delegation restated its position on the discussion of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. The reason for the armistice commission and observer teams were further explained. UNC delegations suggested a recess until 1000K, 17 Jul in order for each side to study the proposals presented today. Communists quickly agreed and suggested the time of meeting be 1100K. UNC concurred.

Part 5. Conclusions: We concluded that:

a. Communists are willing to cooperate to some extent towards reaching an agreed agenda. They appear anxious to get down to the substantial matters of a cease fire.

b. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is a main consideration of the Communists in cease fire talks and they will probably remain adamant that this matter be included on an agenda.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 74 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 16 July 1951—9:05 p. m.

HNC-105. Much evidence revealed in contacts to date with en delegation of existence of their belief that an armistice is the short way to the attainment of their unchanged objective at minimum cost. Our delegates believe opposing delegates think that an armistice, if concluded, will result in same sequence of events as those terminating hostilities in last war, namely that the United States and consequently the United Nations will promptly withdraw their forces, removing the only effective barrier to prompt Communist conquest of whole of Korea.

I concur in this estimate.

I therefore suggest repetition on several occasions of positive statements by authoritative United States Government officials, preferably supported by corresponding statements by United Nations authorities, that armistice or no armistice, the United States and United Nations military forces propose to remain in Korea until political settlement acceptable to them shall have been effected.

Am aware that our President has recently made some such statement.[1] However I feel very strongly that only through frequent repetition can we hope to carry conviction to our enemies, and I therefore respectfully recommend consideration of reiteration of this position at a very early date.

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[1] No such statement had recently been made by President Truman, although the question was under consideration in Washington at this time. Secretary of Defense Marshall on July 13 had forwarded to Mr. Acheson a draft statement on this subject (795.00/7-1351), but no high level statement was actually issued until July 19 (see telegram JCS 96802, July 19, p. 704).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 78 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH KOREA, 17 July 1951—8:15 p. m.

HNC-108. This msg in five parts. Subj: Armistice conference at Kaesong 17 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary: Morning session of 50 minutes taken up by Communist attempt to get United Nations Comd delegation to divulge specific info on substance of items and to determine whether we might concede add points. United Nations Comd delegation held firm on a rqst that Communists provide us with their formal views on United Nations Comd proposed revised agenda. (HNC 104 part 2.) Communists asked for two hour recess to study United Nations Comd revised agenda. Afternoon session opened by Communists and consisted of 35 minutes of reiteration of their views on each item of their agenda. At the conclusion of their speech they proposed a revised agenda for the adoption (part 2). Next meeting scheduled for 1000, 18 Jul 1951.

Part 2. Progress made:

Based on revised agenda submitted by United Nations Comd delegation (ref HNC 104, 16 Jul 51). Communist delegation submitted a proposed agenda. This agenda approaches United Nations Comd views more closely than past Communist agenda on all items except their item on withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. Communists proposed this agenda.

"*Item 1.* Adoption of agenda.

"*Item 2.* Fixing a demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

"*Item 3.* Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea to insure against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea.

"*Item 4.* Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

"*Item 5.* Arrangements relating to prisoners of war."

The Communist delegation spent much time building a case for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and indicated that forceful and persistent efforts would be continued to insure this item's inclusion on the agenda.

Part 3. Communist attitudes.

Nam Il's opening remarks at the morning session was in question form designed to insure that the United Nations Comd delegation would take the floor. He attempted to keep the United Nations Comd delegation on the floor and thus obtain a more concise statement of our views on his preliminary opinions. This might well have been a play for time while awaiting direction which would permit him to firm up his formerly expressed preliminary opinions.

The afternoon session opened in a changed atmosphere. Nam Il took the initiative and in a positive manner led up to the presentation of his agenda. His approach however, was to present firm statements rather than to argue or discuss the problem in detail. It appeared that definite official instruction had been received since the noon recess.

The regular English translator read faster and used better English than normally, indicating either a more studied approach or the possibility that the translation had been furnished him and prepared by an individual having better comd of the English language.

Part 4. Sequence of events.

a. Communist delegation opened morning session at 1100K stating they were ready to listen to further remarks of United Nations Comd delegation. United Nations Comd delegation rqstd the formal opinion of Communists concerning the proposed revised United Nations Comd agenda which had been submitted the day before. It was obvious the Communists were not prepared to present their views on this matter during the morning session and stalled for time by asking questions about the armistice commission and observer teams. United Nations Comd delegation held firm to its rqst that they state their views on United Nations Comd revised agenda. After 50 minutes, Communists rqstd two hour recess for further study of United Nations Comd agenda. Just prior to recess Nam Il stated that United Nations soldiers fired towards town of Pan Mun Jom during period 1850–1905K, 16 Jul. He stated this was in violation of the agreement on neutral zone. We responded that this matter would be investigated. Morning session recessed at 1150K.

b. Communist delegation opened afternoon session at 1400K by a discussion of their agenda items and explaining more fully why they should be adopted. The main point stressed was the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. Communists maintained this is the basic point in guaranteeing against the resumption of hostilities in Korea once the cease fire has been ordered. They insist that this matter is a military matter and must be discussed by the delegates present. They stated it was the responsibility and duty of the delegates at this cease fire conference to make arrangements for this matter. After this long explanation the Communists presented a revised agenda which they recommended be adopted. (See part 2). United Nations Comd delegation rqstd the meeting adjourn until tomorrow in order that new Communist agenda could be studied. Meeting adjourned at 1437K with agreement that next meeting would be held at 1000K, 18 Jul.

Part 5. Conclusions: We conclude that:

a. Communists still desire to reach early agreement on agenda in spite of delays today. They were either uninstructed or unprepared for the morning session.

b. They intend to stand firm for the present at least, on the point that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is a military matter and must be on the agenda for discussion. However, it is too early to predict whether this will be a breaking point.

795.00/7-1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 17, 1951—11 p. m.

52. When Gen Ridgway met with Pres Rhee on July 10 he offered to keep the President informed of progress at cease-fire mtgs.[1] With a view to gaining Pres Rhee's assent to our basic thinking and at the insistence of the ROK del, Maj Gen Paik, who felt very uneasy, Gen Ridgway again met with Pres Rhee on July 16. Mtg was attended by ROK Defense Min,[2] Maj Gen Paik, Maj Gen Hodes and myself.

Believe Dept will be interested in following fairly detailed summary of conversation which is revealing of President's attitude.

At opening Gen Hodes read a most carefully prepared statement as to our thinking on line of demarcation as a basis for the demilitarized zone. Pres Rhee at once challenged concept of cease fire, stating since enemy forces lacked naval and air strength he thought it better if UN forces pushed on to Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Ridgway pointed out that any substantial movement to the north would require tremendous increase in UN forces. In reply to further questioning he stated advance further north impossible without greater forces which countries participating in Korea apparently not able to supply in view of other worldwide commitments. In any case for many months roads and railways unable transport huge quantities supplies required to support such troops. Problem supplying civilian population in liberated areas in north added further complication to logistics difficulties.

Rhee stated he did not lack confidence in Ridgway but it was unfortunate idea of cease fire in vicinity of thirty-eighth parallel should have originated with State Dept. This seemed all the more strange to Korean people considering fact UN forces were winning the war. Ridgway commented UN delegation has already informed Commies it will not discuss thirty-eighth parallel nor withdrawal UN forces; that current talks have sole purpose ending hostilities, not reaching peace settlement; and UN motives completely sincere.

Rhee warned that cease fire wld be used by Russians for propaganda and Commies everywhere wld believe they were victors and that US had sued for peace. Soviet objective was to eject US from South Korea and he saw no polit possibility ever inducing Soviets get out of Korea. Thus if Korea ever to be united short of world war III it must be done now by mil means. Ridgway commented we hoped avoid global showdown and democracies wld not start it. If it came, we wanted to be in position to insure victory. Rhee reiterated belief Chinese wld quit if UN advanced further north and that Soviets wld not come to their rescue. Ridgway again stated point was physical inability make major northward advance unless Chinese withdrew.

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[1] See telegram 29, July 10, from Pusan, p. 644.

[2] Lee Kee Poong.

Rhee insisted Koreans desired to reunite at any cost and obliterate memory of thirty-eighth parallel. He said that in signing cease fire UN would be helping Commies and WW III could never be avoided that way. Ridgway rejoined that if WW III inevitable UN could not afford to exhaust themselves in Korea. In reply to question why we did not use atomic bomb, Ridgway stated that would only precipitate WW III. He reminded Rhee there wld be no cease fire if terms of armistice not agreed; that terms wld include safeguard of inspection and prevention reinforcement of troops which was improvement over 1945 situation.

Rhee stated he could not argue with point that advance to north was beyond our capabilities and that he would try to influence public opinion and would inform Cabinet they must accept situation. He appreciated info received on capabilities was top secret.

Ridgway, after mentioning this decision was on governmental level and approved by Pres Truman, pointed out best hopes for Korean independence in long run lay in split between Chinese and Russians which would offer chance for political settlement for united Korea. Rhee felt best possibility obtain such split would be by pressing on with the fighting to the north; that defeat of enemy would shake Soviet satellite empire; and that this might do more to prevent next World War than stopping fighting in Korea now.

Gen Paik put in plug for training and equipping ROK army to point where it could take care of itself in three or four years. He pointed out danger in northward advance in view of necessity for forces to diverge. Lack of troops made it impossible contemplate major advance now. He also suggested Seoul not good site for capital if proposed demilitarized zone established.

I mentioned I thought I detected concern in President's mind that US–UN might back out of Korea. I assured him this was impossible and that we wld see Korea through or collapse as a collective community.

For two hours Gen Ridgway most forcefully and with the utmost sincerity and conviction explained why it was impossible to move north by force at this time. Although most of the info re our position should have been known to him before, Pres Rhee left meeting rather shaky. Upon taking his leave of Gen Ridgway he remarked, "All your arguments have not convinced me that you cannot move north".

Foregoing résumé of conversation shows single track on which Rhee's mind is working. It is most important next few days and weeks to get him to see impossibility of course he recommends and inevitability, if not acceptability, of armistice.

I returned to Pusan today as I felt that in view of Rhee's unpredictability and present frame of mind it important I be here for few days.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 81 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH KOREA, 18 July 1951—8:40 p. m.

HNC-112. Personal from Ridgway. This msg in five parts. Subj: Armistice conf in Kaesong, 18 Jul 51.

"*Part 1.* Summary:

"*a.* Morning session of 55 minutes taken up by UNC delegation presentation on its views of the revised agenda submitted by Communists yesterday. (HNC 108) With minor changes, UNC accepted all items on the revised agenda except item 3 concerning withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. UNC made strong statement that this item would not be discussed by UNC nor would UNC agree to placing it on the agenda. Communist requested two hr recess to study UNC proposals.

"*b.* Afternoon session of two hrs consisted of Communists either stalling for time or attempting to obtain information of UNC positions. They apparently were without instructions and used afternoon session to continue propaganda on the '38th parallel' and 'withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea'. They were adamant that the latter be on the agenda. They attempted to draw UNC delegation into discussion reference the methods of establishing a demilitarized zone. UNC accepted Communists wording of item 2 which put Communists in position of having to make the next move. Realizing that Communists were not willing at this time to delete their item on withdrawal of foreign troops and were probably stalling for further instructions, UNC delegation suggested at 1525K that meeting recess until 1100K the following day.

"*Part 2.* Progress: The following agenda items were agreed to by both delegations:

"*a.* Adoption of agenda.

"*b.* Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

"*c.* Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

"*d.* Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

"The Communists again insisted that their item on withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea must be on the agenda. United Nations Command delegation refused to accept this item.

"*Part 3.* Attitudes:

"*a.* There was no apparent change in attitude of any significance. Chinese delegates continue to show intense interest and take voluminous notes. Discussion between Chinese and North Koreans at conf table brief and infrequent. Nothing to date would indicate a cleavage between Chinese and North Koreans.

"*b.* In making its reservation regarding the non-inclusion of specific mention of an armistice commission and observation teams in item 3, UNC delegation stated it considered commission and observation teams with unrestricted access to all of Korea essential and would insist on discussing later. Nam Il reacted strongly to idea of specific details, apparently being sensitive to 'inspection' prospect, by saying he could not accept such substantive details prior to substantive discussion of item 3.

"*Part 4.* Sequence of events:

"*a.* UNC delegation opened morning session at 1000K with statement that each item on Communist proposed agenda (HNC 108) would be taken up separately and discussed. Item 1 ref adoption of the agenda, and item 5 ref prisoners of war, were assumed to be agreed upon. UNC accepted the Communist wording of item 4 ref cease fire and arrangements therefor. UNC suggested minor change in wording of item 2 ref the demilitarized zone which was agreed to by Communist delegation. UNC stated that item 3, ref the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, would not be discussed by UNC delegation. The concessions made by UNC delegation were summarized and a proposed agenda was submitted by UNC for Communist approval. Communists requested a recess at 1053K until 1300K to study UNC proposals.

"*b.* Afternoon session previously scheduled for 1300K was delayed at the request of the Communists until 1327K. They opened the session with a statement that they considered great difference in principle between the agenda UNC proposed and the one they proposed. They continued for 30 minutes stressing their intentions for utilizing the 38th parallel as the basis for their negotiation. In addition, they were adamant in regard to the inclusion of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea on the agenda. The remainder of the afternoon was taken up by their questioning of our meaning of the phrase 'or fixing lines' which UNC had inserted in their item 2. It appeared that the Communists were trying to get the UNC delegation to disclose its views on how and where the demilitarized zone would be established. UNC delegation stated it would agree to the exact wording the Communists had proposed yesterday for item 2, as long as it was understood that each side would present its views on the establishment of the demilitarized zone in its own way. At 1528K the afternoon session adjourned at the suggestion of the UNC delegation that the conf be resumed the following day at 1100K.

"*Part 5.* Conclusions. It appears that Communists continue to hope for settlement of an armistice based primarily on:

"*a.* The 38th parallel, and

"*b.* Withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea."

795.00/7-1951

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 19, 1951.

DEAR MR. MORRISON: I was most happy to get, through Sir Oliver Franks, your thoughts on possible developments in Korea.[2] It is most helpful to me to get your ideas on this personal and tentative basis and I hasten to give you mine in the same way. My colleagues in the Department will go over with me what you have said and I shall write you again in a short time. It may be useful to you in the meantime to have the impressions which have been forming in my mind. These, of course, do not represent governmental views.

I was delighted that you express such confidence in General Ridgway. I have known him for some time and everything that I have seen of him has increased my admiration. In fact, some years ago I tried to steal him from the Army for a limited period. But I failed. I am glad now that I did not succeed because I am sure that it would have interrupted his military career and that he would not now be where he is. He is a fine soldier and administrator. In addition, he has gifts of leadership and statesmanship which are just what is needed at the present time both in Japan and in Korea. I think you can be sure that he will conduct the negotiations with wisdom and firmness, that he understands the delicacy of the situation, the importance of the objectives, and that he will do nothing provocative or untoward.

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[1] Telegram 468, July 19, to London (not printed), which transmitted to the Embassy a summary of this letter, indicated that the text was given to Ambassador Franks by the Secretary for forwarding to Mr. Morrison (795.00/7-1951).

[2] See the attachment to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, July 14, p. 675.

You can be sure also that we will keep in close touch with you throughout the negotiations through Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Gifford as well as by personal correspondence when the time permits. Only by such consultation can we have the full understanding which the great importance of the matters at stake requires.

I think my own attitude toward the possibility of success in the negotiations is one, more of caution than of optimism. I agree with you that the signs point to a desire on the part of the Russians to end the fighting, but I think that they wish to end it on terms and in a way which will not interfere with the achievement of their purposes. I, too, am less sure about the Chinese. But again believe that if they do desire to end the fighting, it is on terms which will be advantageous to them and to which they will stubbornly adhere. The reports from the field confirm your reports from Peiping that the build-up of their military striking force is continuing. Their wish to widen the negotiations beyond purely military matters seems directed to achieve two points—the acceptance of the 38th parallel as the median point of the demilitarized zone, and the agreement now for a rapid evacuation of all non-Korean forces. If there is a difference in the attitude of the Chinese and the Russians, it seems likely to me that it lies in the scope of what they seek to accomplish through these negotiations. I believe that both wish to achieve Communist control of the peninsula. I think it likely that the Russians have a wider purpose which is to use the armistice as the first step in a series of proposals designed to slow down, if not stop, the building of the military defenses of the West. If this is so, the Russians may be inclined to take a longer range view than the Chinese of the narrower purpose of achieving control of the peninsula. But I agree with you fully that we cannot expect any public rift between them.

The attitude of the South Koreans is a problem of which we are very much aware and with which we are doing all in our power to cope. Here there are two main problems. One is a wide fear and apprehension among government officials and the population generally of being left alone to be overwhelmed by the Communists. After what the country has been through, I think this worry is natural and one which we are trying to meet forthrightly. They are entitled, I think, to valid assurance that militarily, economically and politically the nations associated in their defense through the United Nations will stand behind them. The other problem lies in the personality and attitude of President Rhee, who believes, I think, quite genuinely that the failure to unify Korea by force is a defeat and if accepted as a basis of the armistice will result in the destruction of the Republic. Both General Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio have been at great pains to go over the whole situation with him, and, although he continues to revert to this point of view, I am hopeful that they will make progress in convincing him that his attitude is not in the true interest of Korea. I do not believe that the negotiations will break down by reason of any action by the Korean Government.

In regard to "a general settlement in Korea" I have given, and am giving, a great deal of thought to the matter. My present thoughts are only tentative ones but they accord with your own views that the prospects of bringing one about are not good. I think it probable that we should regard an armistice as something with which we must live for a considerable time and that therefore it must be adapted to this end. In thinking about a general settlement, two things seem to stand out. One is that the purpose on the Communist side is to eliminate us and all western influence from Korea. The other is that, although they have not been able to do this, the military cost and the consequences of our attempting to unify Korea by force are greater than it is wise or possible to pay. Therefore it seems to me that the idea of unifying Korea through the UN by negotiation involves the attempt to get the Communists to give up their basic and publicly-stated policy and also to achieve a result which we are not able to achieve by force. I see no reason to believe that this can be done and that therefore to accept any sort of a unification which the Communists would be willing to give would be to concede to them a Communist-dominated Korea.

If this analysis is right and one turns to a general settlement based upon a divided Korea, one then encounters the grave probability that the South Koreans would not accept such a settlement and might be driven to actions which would either make an armistice impossible or lead to a renewal of conflict if an armistice had been entered into.

Furthermore, a general settlement based upon an agreed document seems to me to have certain illusory aspects. Such a document would not change the Communists' purposes. It would not prevent the build-up of Communist forces in Manchuria, but it might create a political and military situation in which great temptations remained to the Communists to attempt another coup. Perhaps then the best hope is that an armistice might develop into a situation of enough stability so that, with the presence of some UN forces over a period of time and with the general increase of the strength of the West, including the development through the peace treaty of a friendly Japan, temptation toward renewed effort by the Communists in Korea might be removed by the obvious seriousness of such action.

I think those thoughts bring me out at about the point where your own thinking has taken you. I am sure they have developed nothing new but it may be useful to you to see how my mind is running.

It is very hard for me to guess whether the Chinese, were the situation to develop somewhat as I have suggested, would turn to their internal problems or whether they would break out in adventures elsewhere. As a pure speculation, I put forward the suggestion that perhaps here Russian and Chinese desires might be different. If the Russians are intent, as all signs seem to me to indicate, upon a program of lulling us all into abandoning our defensive efforts, and if they correctly understand the reactions of the West (which is very doubtful) they ought to want a period of quiet in the Far East. This ought to lead them to deprecate outbreaks by the Chinese and to dissuade the Chinese from them. But their thinking might lead them to different conclusions. They might believe that continued trouble in the Far East might lead us to enter into some general agreements which they could use to the grave detriment of the whole western position in the Far East. I think they would be wrong as to this reaction, at least in the United States.

To the Chinese, the situation might appear differently. It might seem to them that the prizes to be obtained by aggression in Indochina or Burma or Siam or in all of them, were very great and that the costs were not very high. They might believe that actions of this sort would help them internally. I think we can have no assurance that they would not take such an attitude, but I again hasten to say that these thoughts are pure speculation.

General Ridgway is fully alive to the military situation in the event that the armistice negotiations break down. He is taking all necessary precautions. I am assured that his position is very strong indeed. While this is so, we fully agree that the responsibility for any resumption of the fighting must lie with the other side and that this must be the clear public understanding. I think that the way General Ridgway has handled the negotiations shows how fully he appreciates this.[3]

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

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[3] Mr. Morrison replied in a personal message to Mr. Acheson, dated July 24, the text of which was delivered to the Department of State on July 25 and read as follows:

"Thank you very much for your personal message on possible developments in Korea which I received through Sir Oliver Franks.

"I am extremely interested in the views you express and very gratified to know that our thinking on the problem of Korea is on the same lines. There is no easy solution to the problem and we shall have to wait and see the way things work out, meanwhile remaining vigilant, as you so rightly point out, against any Russian attempt to throw us off our guard and to undermine the defence of the West.

"We shall be giving further thought to the whole problem in the light of our preliminary exchange of views and of developments in the situation; and I shall much look forward to having a talk with you about Korea when we meet in September.

"In response to your request I have taken steps to treat your letter in a most personal and secret way." (795.00/7-2551)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 83 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 19 July 1951—5:45 p. m.

HNC-115. This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice conference in Kaesong, 19th July 1951.

Part 1.

Summary: Only 1 session of 2 hours 20 minutes during which each delegation held firm to its stand of the previous day. Communists are adamant that the item concerning "the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea" be included as a major item on the agenda. Communist initial speech may have been intended for propaganda purposes (see part 4). United Nations Command delegation held firm to the view that this problem could not be discussed at the Armistice conference and would not be accepted by United Nations Command as an item on the agenda. Next meeting scheduled for 1000K, 20 July 1951.

Part 2.

Progress made: None.

Part 3.

Attitudes: There was no apparent change in attitude of the Communist delegates during this conference session.

Part 4.

Sequence of events: A Communist delegation opened conference at 1100K. They asked United Nations Command delegation for its opinion of the Communist item 3, which concerns the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and further asked if it were agreeable to include it on the agenda. United Nations Command replied that its position had been made clear during previous sessions that this item was not acceptable for the agenda and recommended that the 4 items now mutually agreed upon be accepted as the agenda for the Armistice conference (HNC 112, part 2). Communist spokesman replied with a prepared speech which appeared to be phrased for its propaganda value. Initial translation of this speech is:

"I would like to explain further our viewpoint. In order to reach speedily an agreement on an agenda and enter quickly into discussions of its substance, I shall not hesitate to repeat once again our firm and unchangeable stand on the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The aim of our conference is to reach an armistice in Korea on a just and reasonable basis. Furthermore, the aim of this armistice is to end the Korean war and restore peace in Korea. To achieve this aim, it is necessary that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn. It is only by doing this that the flames of war in Korea can be extinguished and resumption of war in Korea can be prevented. The appearance of foreign armed forces in Korea has been the source of the Korean war and the continuance of war in Korea. It is only by elimination of this source that the prevention of resumption of war in Korea can be definitely insured. It is therefore obvious that the delegates who are here for negotiation should discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces as an assurance against the resumption of war in Korea. Repeatedly I emphasized against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force. Thus we cannot assure ourselves on the good faith of the party which continues to insist on such refusal. I must further point out that there is no excuse for refusal to discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. Since our conference is to settle the question of cease fire and armistice and since the aim of cease fire and armistice is to end war and restore peace, we must discuss this fundamental question of war in Korea and withdrawal of all foreign armed forces in Korea. The fact that you refuse to discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea only demonstrates that you do not have yet a sincerity for peace to bring about the conclusion of the Korean war. War is not travel and troops are not tourists. Should the cease fire be ordered and armistice achieved, yet the foreign armed forces still stay where they are, it is clear that the intention is not possible to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of Korea and I must also point out with emphasis the attitude of any party toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. is a test whether, it is sincerely for peace. We consider that the aim of the cease fire and armistice in Korea is the conclusion of the Korean war and restoration of peace in Korea. That is why we have maintained consistently and firmly that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea should be placed in an important position on the agenda, as we have proposed.

"It is our unshakable stand. We hope that you will give it careful consideration and alter your firm opinion so that a proposed agenda will be agreed upon and we can proceed with the substance of its items without delay."

It was clear that the above statement was made for propaganda purposes. A proposed answer to the statement will follow in another message, with a view toward using it on a separate occasion.

After this speech United Nations Command requested one half hour recess. Following recess United Nations Command restated its previous position and said that the Communist item 3 was not acceptable for the agenda and recommended that our original proposal of the 4 item agenda be agreed upon as the agenda for the Armistice conf. The remainder of the session was taken up by the Communist attempt to secure United Nations Command agreement on their item 3 and the United Nations Command delegation refusing to accept this item. This argument continued for one and a half hours, at the end of which time United Nations Command suggested a recess for lunch until 1430K. Communists suggested the recess be extended until 1600K. United Nations Command then suggested we meet the following day at 1000K which was agreed upon.

Part 5.

Conclusions:

a. It is the opinion of the United Nations Command delegation that the Communist delegation is using tactics of introducing propaganda on withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea with the apparent design of creating enough political pressure to force the instruction of the United Nations Command and the delegation to accept that topic as an agenda item.

b. I have the impression that recent press reports of substantial progress being made in armistice negotiations are apt to create in the minds of a considerable segment of both American and free world public opinion, a belief that an armistice is measurably near. In cold fact, current negotiations concern only topics for inclusion in an agenda. Even if and when complete agreement is reached on an agenda we shall then merely have entered the discussion stage of an armistice itself.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 84 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 19 July 1951—6 : 15 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 96802. From JCS for CINCUNC.

Subj is Communist insistence upon discussing withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

1. We cannot withdraw UN Forces from Korea for a long time nor can we now undertake a commitment to do so in the future. If Communists insist upon this item's being on the agenda, it may well be the breaking point and we would expect full support both at home and by our Allies in treating it as such.

2. The present question, therefore, is whether the mil refusal to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops is in fact a breaking point for the Communists, and if so, how we should proceed to clarify the situation both in the mtg and before public opinion.

3. As for the agenda itself, we believe you should try now to obtain a broad item which does not commit us to mil discussion of withdrawal of troops, or concede that it is part of armistice arrangements, even though it is broad enough to permit the other side to air its views on the subj unilaterally. In connection with item 3 of the proposed Com-

munist agenda as contained in your HNC 048 [1] we suggest that you might at a suitable time propose that their item 3 might be amended to read: "Measures to insure against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea." Your negotiators in suggesting this amendment might orally state that the proposal is broad enough to permit Communists to air their views unilaterally on subj of withdrawal of foreign troops. The basic position which you have taken in regard to mil discussion of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea continues to receive our fullest approval.

4. In further negotiations on this point you should continue to use folg themes:

A. Present talks are strictly mil in character and have to do with a mil armistice. Mil cdrs are not to become involved in political questions which can only be settled by UN and by govts concerned. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is a matter which can only be considered in relation to a final settlement of Korean question.

B. UN Forces are in Korea by reason of decisions made by govts to send them to Korea in response to a request of UN. Their withdrawal is a matter to be decided by the same authorities.

5. If necessary to avoid a breakdown in armistice talks we are prepared to make a distinction between eventual discussion of mutual reduction of foreign forces in Korea and discussion of withdrawal of all such forces. If an acceptable armistice is concluded and its terms are carried out faithfully by all concerned, a reduction in foreign forces in Korea might be accomplished at some time in the future as a mil matter. You are authorized to agree, at the appropriate time in negotiations, that some mil machinery representing opposing cdrs might take up at some time in future the question of mutual reduction of foreign forces in Korea. No reduction can be agreed upon or discussed prior to or in connection with an armistice and no agreement can now be made as to formula on which mutual reduction might take place. Such questions must be determined by circumstances at the time.

6. Unless Communist delegations have instructions to persist in a full and early withdrawal of all foreign forces in Korea, to which we cannot agree, position authorized in para 5, above, might be a major card in your hand in relation to bargining on other points. We strongly prefer solution suggested in para 3, above.

7. There is some press speculation from Korea to effect that Friday [2] is the day of decision and that talks may break down on that day. We believe it important that talks not break down until there has been an opportunity for full governmental consideration of the situation and for discussion with certain other key govts. Unless other side clearly

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[1] Dated July 10, p. 649.

[2] July 20.

breaks off talks, you should break off only on specific instructions to do so.

8. In connection with para 4, above, Sec State has today made folg statement:

"Communist delegation at Kaesong has raised question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in connection with an armistice. UN delegation has stated that it cannot go into this question, which is political in character and can only be settled by UN and the govts concerned.

"This is no theoretical argument as to whether question is political or mil. UN Forces are in Korea because of decisions made by govts to send them to Korea in response to a request by UN. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.

"If there is an effective armistice, a UN Force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression. Size of UN Force remaining in Korea will depend upon circumstances and, particularly, upon faithfulness with which an armistice is carried out.

"Korea's neighbors know that presence of UN Forces in Korea constitutes no danger or threat to themselves. Repeated expressions of policy by UN and, indeed, the very nature of that organization, furnish them entirely adequate guarantees on this point.

"Once before, foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a UN plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against ROK. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated." [3]

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[3] Mr. Acheson's statement was released to the press on July 19 and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1951, p. 188.

General Ridgway made the following comment in his telegram C-67348, July 20, from Tokyo:

"I believe that Secretary Acheson's statement of 19 July regarding 'the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea' will have a positive beneficial effect on the general situation here and perhaps on the armistice negotiations. The timing of this statement was especially fortunate, coming as it did immediately after Admiral Joy, on my instructions, had informed the Communist delegation that the United Nations Command delegation would definitely not agree to the inclusion of this item on the agenda, and would not discuss the matter further." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 90)

795.00/7-2051

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with a proposed draft reply to General Ridgway's HNC 096 of 15 July 1951, which we discussed at our meeting on 16 July and which has now been transmitted to

General Ridgway,[1] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised me as follows:

> "The matters covered in this exchange of messages emphasize the importance of making all necessary preparations now to start the political and diplomatic settlement immediately upon an armistice being implemented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, and have been so throughout the discussions of a possible armistice, as to the dangerous effect of any delay in pursuing the negotiations on a governmental level leading to final settlement of the Korean problem. This danger will exist and increase with any delay regardless of the degree of the effectiveness of the armistice."

I fully concur with these views, and hope that every possible means will be taken to avoid the danger of any delay in starting negotiations for a political settlement following immediately upon an armistice. Accordingly, I would appreciate receiving assurances from you that preparations for the political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean problem are now under way for implementation immediately upon the arrangement of an armistice. It would also be helpful if the Department of State would keep the Defense Department informed of the terms and the time for the negotiations of the political and diplomatic settlement.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

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[1] The reply to telegram HNC-096 was contained in telegram JCS 96421, July 16, p. 687.

795.00/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 20, 1951—2 p. m.

61. Fol is summary of long communication addressed to Gen Ridgway by Pres Rhee setting forth in writing position ROK Govt toward cease-fire talks. Original ltr signed by Rhee and members his War Cabinet was handed to me by FonMin yesterday afternoon and was transmitted by special courier to Gen Ridgway last night.[1]

Ltr pays tribute to Gen Ridgway's skill as mil commander, his wisdom as administrator US-UN policies in pending cease-fire negots and states, "I feel it incumbent upon me to declare to you in writing the views of my Govt, which I expressed in our conf in Seoul on Monday afternoon.[2] Substance of position of my Govt is that we cannot maintain our nation in half our country. A divided Korea is a ruined Korea, unstable economically, politically, and militarily. Wholly aside from broad and significant question of value to US of maintaining principle of collective security by punishment of the aggressor in Korea, fact is clear to us that Korean nation must be committed to simple but vital principle of reunification. . . . Separate maintenance of north and south divisions cld only be by sufferance of and through direct support by foreign powers. Korea must in effect either cease to be independent entity or it must become all one body—all Democratic or all Communistic."

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[1] The complete text of President Rhee's letter was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 22, July 20, from Pusan, not printed (795.00/7-2051).

[2] See telegram 52, July 17, from Pusan, p. 694.

Ltr then describes econ and mil plight of country if left divided. Polit consequences wld be frustration and despair of people, abridgement of processes of democratic govt, fertile soil of discontent and probably eventual though reluctant acceptance Commie demands by large segment ROK population. If UN forces were defeated on battlefield ROK wld have no choice but accept surrender. However, it is enemy which has suffered mil defeat "even though it continues to hold the polit initiative." Ltr states familiar ROK case that if Soviets intended intervene Korean war they wld have done so before and therefore they will not do so in future. Biggest Sov weapon is fear among democratic nations of another world war. "In world that is basically in conflict, if one power is willing to risk war and the other is not, the power whose policies are characterized by daring will always triumph."

Sovs enormously successful expanding their empire by winning psychological victory, undermining will to resist. ROK determination to resist gave free world chance to end this psychological aggression and Korean nation has paid frightful price. All this to what avail? "Is free world to abandon role of resistance and submit once again to psychological aggression? Are we once more to confront condition in which Sov Union will frighten peoples into surrender. . . . In such case Korea will have suffered tragically for decision to stand for natl independence on [*and*] equally tragically free world will have lost best chance to stop aggression before it can succeed in undermining very foundation upon which final security must rest. . . . To agree to continued division of our nation wld be to accept inevitable defeat of our freedom. We would rather die on the field than lie down supinely before relentless foe. It is our earnest hope that UN may not now leave us to pursue our course alone. But it is not our intention stubbornly to insist upon infallability our own judgment."

Ltr continues these views shared by almost all Koreans North or South who believe reunification inevitable either through democratic means or through Commie aggression. Best informed fon observers agree this analysis although contrary policies being urged by persons "far removed both in understanding and in sympathy from realities of power situation in Far East."

Ltr concludes that much may be said for ROK position in terms of welfare of entire free world but this is matter for sound judgment of policy makers of other free nations. In every Korean heart and mind is belief nation wld be plunged into irrevocable disaster if continues divided. At same time there is conviction that forces of freedom not so weak as to be forced to bow before Sov menace. Actually democracies are strong and Commie empire rampant with internal weakness. He saw no need to settle short of goal of unification and free elections.

My interpretation of letter, which only reiterates well defined ROK position, is that it was written largely for the record. It is eloquent appeal deserving sympathy and understanding as expressing widespread Korean convictions. Its fears for future, particularly prospects of continuing economic mil dependence on other nations, can hardly be refuted. On other hand Pres and most Koreans seem unable or unwilling recognize realities of situation, their position in global sphere and consequences to them of outbreak of world conflict. I do not feel that Rhee ltr adds very much to situation as known before but it highlights continuing need on our part to continue through all available media to explain US–UN position.

I called on Pres shortly after receiving Ridgway ltr. He recalled his request spring of 1949 for some sort of agreement between US and Korea.[3] He suggested possibility of affirmation of amity clause on the Korean-American defense alliance.[4] He further stated he wished Koreans might serve as part of UN security forces. Pres claimed he personally satisfied US will not abandon Korea but hoped for something to ease mind of people and thought alliance of some kind wld be helpful from every standpoint. He asked me to forward his ideas to my govt.

Sent priority Dept 61, rptd info priority Toyko 24 CINCFE.

Muccio

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[3] For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 940 ff.

[4] Presumably, this is an allusion to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 26, 1950; text in TIAS No. 2019, 1 UST 137. No bilateral mutual defense treaty was signed until October 1, 1953, and that treaty did not enter into force until November 17, 1954; text in TIAS No. 3097, 5 UST 2368.

The comment attributed to Prime Minister Chang in telegram 65, *infra*, also appears to indicate that a mutual defense treaty was what the Korean officials had in mind.

795.00/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, July 20, 1951—3 p. m.

65. PriMin this morning stated with ref Rhee's ltr to General Ridgway he hoped we understood that ROK Govt had no intention claiming infallability of judgment on cease-fire issue and that ltr did not mean ROK Govt opposed cease-fire as such but that it did oppose continued division of Korea. He recognized, however, cease-fire arrangements wld probably involve such division of Korea, despite ROK point of view, he stressed seriousness of situation which we wld then face as outlined Ridgway ltr and said it was not exaggerated picture. He was very much concerned as to public and official reaction at that time and foresaw terrific defeatism consequences of which wld be dangerous not only to Korea but free world. Minimum offsetting constructive action which we cld take to help in such circumstances wld be strong effort to convince Koreans we continue stand by them. The more specific our assurances can be, the better.

As reported mytel 61, July 20, President Rhee yesterday stressed desirability from ROK standpoint of formal treaty with US. PriMin, who was aware of Rhee's suggestion, agreed that in whatever form assurances made they shld come from US rather than UN. Despite UN record Korean war he indicated certain lack of confidence in UN citing conglomerate membership and possibility decisive action to aid Korea second time might not be forthcoming. PriMin did not seem to be particularly interested in Rhee's ideas for treaty relationship which wld at best take long time to consummate and stressed importance of obtaining security assurances of informal nature right away; at latest by time armistice agreed. He felt that if US sincerely had intention stick by ROK in future it shld be possible for high-level spokesman to make clear statement to that effect.[1]

Sent Dept 65, rptd info Tokyo 28.

MUCCIO

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[1] The Department of State made the following reply in telegram 60, July 21, to Pusan:

"Re urtel 65, July 20.

"Assume you have now received and are making maximum use with Rhee of Secretary's statement July 19 transmitted wireless bulletin same day re withdrawal foreign forces from Korea. Believe portion statement re no withdrawal UN forces until genuine peace firmly estab and Korean people have assurance against fear of aggression shld be particularly stressed with Rhee as well as consistent position of UN Deleg in ceasefire negot." (795.00/7-1051)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 91 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 20 July 1951—11: 05 p. m.[1]

CX-67390. This message in 4 parts.

Part 1. Your 96802 of 20 July delivered to me 2200 Tokyo time today.[2]

I discussed matter in detail with full United Nations Command Delegation at Munsan late yesterday afternoon and there made and announced my decisions as stated herein. I am now in Tokyo. Had weather not prevented our Delegation from reaching conference site today,[3] Admiral Joy had my authority and instructions to make the following closing statement in event Communist Delegation continued to insist on inclusion in agenda of the item "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea". The intended statement follows:

> "We have listened long and patiently to your efforts to have included in the agenda an item entirely irrelevant to a military armistice in Korea. You have used arguments at complete variance with what you know to be facts. You have made accusations that you must know have no basis in fact. Either you intend to delay the substantive discussions and in turn an armistice agreement, or you hope to force us to deviate from the main purpose for which we are assembled. By this time you should be able to appreciate fully our position. We believe you do understand it. Furthermore, you should realize that the 4 agenda items mutually agreed upon adequately cover all the items necessary to permit discussions of the essential topics for negotiating a military armistice. Unless you are now prepared to accept the 4 agreed items as an agenda, we will recess this meeting and wait until such time as you have something new and constructive to offer. We are prepared to begin substantive discussion of the 4 item agenda whenever you accept it."

I am leaving these instructions to Admiral Joy unchanged in anticipation that the conference will convene again at 211000 July Tokyo time.

Part 2. In order to clarify the situation in the minds of the Communist Delegation and to prepare public opinion both at home and abroad, I am prepared in the eventuality stated above to release to the press not only the above quoted instructions to Admiral Joy, but also simultaneously the following:

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[1] Due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram arrived in Washington on July 20 prior to the discussions recorded in Mr. Johnson's memorandum, *infra.*

[2] Telegram JCS 96802 (p. 704) was dispatched in the evening of July 19, EDT, by which time it was already July 20 in Tokyo.

[3] General Ridgway, in his telegram HNC-120, July 20, not printed, had already informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the scheduled meeting had been postponed until the following morning due to swollen streams which made road travel to Kaesong impossible and bad weather which prevented helicopter travel. (Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 91)

"The United Nations Command Delegation has today informed the Communist Delegation that it desires a recess in the current armistice negotiations.

"During the 8 meetings which have so far been held, an attempt has been made to reach an agreement on an agenda for the negotiations of a military armistice for the suspension of hostilities. The adoption of such an agenda would be the first step in the substantive discussions which must take place before hostilities can cease.

"On 3 July 51, the Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command, informed General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh Huai that agreement on armistice terms must precede cessation of hostilities. Until an agreement acceptable to the United Nations Command is reached, and until the supervisory machinery is set up and ready to function, and the armistice terms themselves enter into effect, the United Nations Command will continue, by any or all means at its disposal, its military operations against the Communist aggression in Korea.

"As a result of the meetings held so far, 4 agenda items have been agreed to by both Delegations. These are:

"1. Adoption of agenda.

"2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

"3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and function of a supervising organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

"4. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

"An agenda composed of these items covers all the points essential for a full discussion of the problems pertaining to a military armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation is therefore prepared to begin these discussions.

"The Communist Delegation, on the other hand, refused to begin the discussions and has delayed the negotiations by attempting to introduce into the agenda items of a political and a propaganda nature. Although they agreed with the original proposal by the United Nations Command Delegation that these talks should be confined to military matters, they have informed the United Nations Delegation that they will not accept any agenda which does not include 'the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea'. Thus, it has become apparent that the Communist Delegation, by its insistence on this item, is knowingly and persistently delaying the initiation of concrete steps to end the fighting in Korea, and is attempting to use these negotiations as a means for reaching a political settlement in Korea on its own terms.

"The United Nations Command Delegation is ready to resume the discussions whenever it is assured that the Communist Delegation is sincere and is acting in good faith in an attempt to reach a military armistice."

Part 3. There are 3 basic factors as I see them in connection with the foregoing. First and of most vital importance is the maintenance unimpaired of the complete support by the United States Government and the United Nations here represented of the position taken and publicly announced by the United Nations Command Delegation. To undermine this in the slightest degree by any concession of any kind at this stage of our discussions would be instantly recognized and seized upon as a fundamental weakness and exploited to the fullest. It could, in my opinion, destroy all that the United Nations Command Delegation has so far accomplished, through its reasonable but unmistakable firm insistence on logic and its right.

Second is the distinction between "breaking off" and "recessing" the current discussions. In the 2 statements quoted herein and in fact on other prior occasions the United Nations Command Delegation has made clear and apparently has achieved acceptance by the Communist Delegation of the difference between "breaking off" and "recessing". In the event the 2 proposed press releases quoted above should be made, I believe this distinction would continue to be accepted. I am convinced at this moment that the Communists would not "break off" our discussions on this issue as I propose to present it.

The third factor concerns the 4 agenda items already agreed to by both delegations. Proposed agenda item 3 provides an adequate opportunity for the Communist Delegation to air its views unilaterally on the subject of "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea".

Part 4. In the belief that the action planned, as stated above, best meets the current situation and in no substantial sense deviates from the spirit of the instructions and guidance contained in your 96802, I intend to proceed as indicated above unless your contrary instructions are received here prior to 210700 July Tokyo time.[4]

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[4] A manuscript note in the source text indicated that this corresponded to 5 p. m., July 20, EDT; see *infra*.

795.00/7-2351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) of Conversations Held on July 20

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice (Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Participants:	General Collins	Mr. Matthews
	Admiral McCormick	Mr. Hickerson
	General White	Mr. Rusk
	Vice Admiral Davis	Mr. Johnson

The foregoing persons met at the Pentagon at 3:00 p. m., July 20, to discuss a telegram received from General Ridgway concerning a proposed statement for Admiral Joy and a public statement to be issued by General Ridgway with regard to Communist insistence on the adding to the agenda an item with regard to withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.[1]

It was apparent that the Joint Chiefs were prepared to transmit a message to General Ridgway in general approving his proposed course of action.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that:

(1) We could not be sure that the action proposed by General Ridgway would not cause a break in the negotiations. Whereas the action previously taken with respect to neutralization of Kaesong and reciprocity of treatment for both delegations succeeded, the present situation involved quite different considerations and there could be no certainty that General Ridgway's proposed action would succeed—in fact success in the previous case would make it more difficult for the Communists again to concede to what in effect would be an ultimatum.

(2) It is questionable whether General Ridgway's action would not raise the prestige factor for the other side to such a degree as to make it more difficult for them to concede on this point. Additionally, the prestige factor would make it difficult for them again to pay a price so soon for continuation of negotiations.

(3) General Ridgway's proposal would give the Communists an opportunity to make what would publicly appear to be another major concession when in fact it would constitute no substantive concession at all. Thus when it came to a discussion of the substantive issues the pressure would be upon the UN Command to make corresponding concessions at a time when it would be in fact impossible for us to make concessions upon our minimum position, such as the location of the demarcation line between the two forces.

General Collins stated that he believed our position was somewhat weak as it had not been made clear that we in fact desire to withdraw all UN forces as soon as it is possible to do so. He felt that the position would be considerably strengthened if a statement, possibly by the Secretary of State, in amplification of his statement of February [*July*] 19, could be made. Obviously we must have an armistice before withdrawal can be discussed. It should be made clear that we will discuss withdrawal or reduction of forces at an appropriate time and place if there is an armistice. After further general discussion, it was agreed that it would be impossible to arrive at a position on General Ridgway's proposal in time for him to receive a reply by the deadline of 5:00 p.m. Washington time, July 20. Therefore, a short telegram to General Ridgway approving the issuance by him of certain portions of his proposed statement and the statement by Admiral Joy, but specifically instructing him not to take any action for the time being which would in effect be a UN request for an indefinite recess conditional upon concession by the Communists as the price of resuming the talks, was drafted and approved.[2]

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[1] See telegram CX-67390, *supra*.

Following the foregoing meeting a full reply to General Ridgway's message was drafted in the Department, discussed with and approved by the Secretary.

This reply was discussed with the JCS at 6:30 p.m. The same persons were present with the addition of Mr. Paul Nitze. There was but little difference in the substance of the operative portions of a similar message which had been drafted by the JCS and the meeting was largely spent in combining the two messages into a single message to General Ridgway which was approved by the representatives of both departments. It was agreed that the JCS would accept responsibility for clearing the message with the President.[3]

At this meeting, General Collins again reiterated his conviction that a statement should be shortly issued by some political leader in the Government concerning our willingness to withdraw and/or reduce UN forces at an appropriate time. He also strongly urged that some type of statement be issued which would make it clear to the Communists that the United States is considering a tougher war if the armistice negotiations break down, in order that the other side will be under no illusions on this point.

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[2] The message under reference was sent to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 96836, July 20, which read as follows:

"1. Cannot secure top clearance on full reply to proposals in your CX 67390 by deadline set by you. You should not, pending further instructions, propose a recess of indefinite duration or a recess under conditions which would make convening another meeting contingent upon Communist concession on deletion of agenda item on withdrawal of foreign troops. No objection to your making your own proposed statement minus first and last para and minus all but first sentence of penultimate para. Joy's statement should be modified accordingly, at least by deleting last two sentences.

"2. Will send you further instructions soon as possible." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 92)

[3] See telegram JCS 96930, July 21, *infra*.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 93 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 21 July 1951—11:15 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 96930. From JCS. Reur CX 67390,[1] JCS 95354,[2] JCS 96802,[3] JCS 96836[4] and JCS 96421.[5]

1. You have complete backing of United States Govt in your position on discussion of withdrawal of Foreign troops and there is no intention here to depart from basic guidance contained in JCS 95354 which remains in effect.

2. It is important that, if and when breakdown of negotiations occurs, the onus for failure shall rest clearly and wholly upon the Communists. This is the basis for guidance you are currently receiving.

3. Technique by which you obtained success in connection with arrangements at Kaesong may not work as readily in dealing with major difference on such a fundamental policy matter as withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. From what Communists have reportedly said in meeting thus far and from Moscow and Peiping propaganda line, this point may be breaking point with Communists as well as with us. In any event, most difficult prestige issue would be created by us if Communists are told at this stage that, in effect, the price of further meetings is concession by them on point to which they have publicly attached such importance.

4. A recess which developed into a break-up of talks on simple issue that UN Delegation would not attend the meetings unless Communists agree not to press for inclusion on agenda of item of withdrawal of troops would not present sufficiently clear and powerful issue before world public opinion, even though issue of withdrawal of troops itself is one on which we would have full support.

5. Although it may be that your estimate is correct that Communists would not break off discussions on this issue, position we take must also be entirely satisfactory as to issue, time and circumstances in the event Communists do in fact break. Precipitation of break must be accompanied by prior diplomatic and public opinion preparation which must be firmly based upon issues readily understood and generally supported by the free world. In addition, such a break

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[1] Dated July 20, p. 711.
[2] Dated June 30, p. 598.
[3] Dated July 19, p. 704.
[4] See footnote 2, *supra*.
[5] Dated July 16, p. 687.

might require additional mil measures, now under study here, which cannot be resolved for some days.

6. If, on other hand, Communists do concede on this agenda point, concession under what would appear to be an ultimatum would be widely interpreted as a major concession by them. In fact, they will have made no concession to our own essential demands. If Communists make concession under these circumstances, discussions would then presumably turn to consideration of the substance of an acceptable armistice. When we reach a predictable impasse on such points as Kansas line and adequate inspection, Communists would be in propaganda position of having made two major concessions in response to UN ultimata; this would enormously increase political pressure on UN to make some concession, but at that stage concession would be impossible since minimum UN terms for armistice would be involved.

7. In meetings as reported thus far, Communists have themselves attempted repeatedly to discuss substance of agenda items prior to formal agreement upon complete agenda. If Communists should be willing to discuss substance of agreed agenda items in full knowledge that we shall not discuss or come to any agreement on withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, you could proceed on that basis. This would force Communists themselves to break talks if they insist upon agenda item or, alternatively, permit discussions to proceed to determine whether armistice acceptable to us is possible. There would be advantage, if talks break down later upon such issues as Kansas line and adequate inspection, to have withdrawal of troops issue also in the picture as still another reason why Communists position is totally unreasonable and unacceptable.

8. In light of the foregoing we suggest that you proceed as follows:

A. We believe that you should first present your view that your proposed agenda Item 3 provides an adequate opportunity for the Communist Delegation to air its views unilaterally on subj "Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Korea".

B. We believe that your next step, if it becomes apparent that no progress can otherwise be made, might be to suggest that further consideration of a complete agenda be suspended and that discussion proceed on Items 2, 3, and 4, as contained in your CX 67390; they must be left under no impression that we are thereby holding out possibility of later concession by us on withdrawal of troops.

C. If agreement can not be obtained to the above approach, you might then consider the approach set forth in Para 3 JCS 96802.

D. Hold in abeyance any action along lines suggested in Para 5 JCS 96802.

9. You are not authorized, without further instructions, to recess talks indefinitely, to be reconvened on condition of Communist concession.

10. If there are mil reasons arising from the developing situation in Korea which in your judgment will, unless a satisfactory armistice is promptly arranged, force us to a break-up of armistice talks, you are requested to furnish your estimate on such situation.[6]

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[6] This message did not arrive in Korea in time for the armistice talks held on July 21, which are summarized in telegram C-67483, July 22, p. 719.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 95 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 21 July 1951—10:11 p. m.

C-67474. As part of my overall plan for unrelenting pressure on Communist forces by land, sea and air operation, until such time as an armistice may have been arranged and entered into effect, I have planned and expect to execute an all out air strike against Pyongyang, employing aprx 140 medium and light bombers and 230 ftr. Elaborate prior planning for this atk to include pinpointing mil tgt and warning civil populace by leaflet drops to be accomplished at least 36 hours prior to the atk, will constitute practicable guarantee against unnecessary killing of non-combatants.

This operation is planned for the first suitable wea on or after 24 July.

This tgt has been selected by reason of its large nr of mil tgt, including marshalling yards, motor veh repair shops, sup dumps, trp billets, afld, concealed aircraft parks and comm fac. The timing is planned to take advantage of the accelerated buildup of sup and pers in which this tgt is a key area; to strike a devastating blow at the North Korean capital; and to make up in part for the substantial curtailment in the nr of sorties in the past several days by reason of bad wea.

Fol is the text of the warning leaflets to be dropped at the proper time and places:

"Citizens of Pyongyang, Chinnampo, Kangye and Wonsan! Within a day or so United Nations bombers will atk one of your cities in which your Communist leaders have built war factories and concentrated mil sup to be used in killing other Koreans! UN planes will destroy all mil installations, including railway marshalling yards, com cen, war material factories, sup depots, barracks areas, afld and mil hqs.

"The UN Air Force will do everything possible to protect innocent civ from the war forced on Korea by the Communist traitors. But you must act quickly. Leave these cities. Many others have wisely left cities where the Communists have arms depots and war installations. Join them, and preserve your lives so that you can help build a strong, free Korea after the Communists have been driven out. The UN forces wish to avoid harming civ."[1]

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[1] The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following reply in telegram JCS 96938, dated July 21:

"Reur C 67474 without wanting to interfere with your overall plan JCS nevertheless believe that the specific strike and scale thereof have such serious and far reaching political implications at this time and under current circumstances that they desire you defer the specific scaled action until further instructions." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 95)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 99 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 22 July 1951—12:41 p. m.

C-67483. This msg in 4 parts. Subj: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 21 Jul 51.

Part 1. Summary:

Conference opened by Communists rqsting United Nations Comd views on the question of withdrawal of fgn trps fm Korea and agenda item. United Nations Comd delegation stated its previous psn that agenda of 4 items United Nations Comd delegation proposed were all that were nec for discussion of a mil armistice. At this pnt, Nam Il consulted with Chinese delegates concerning their next move. Apparently they had two courses of action prepared. Nam Il then read a prepared statement rpting same views on the withdrawal of fgn trps previously given. After only one reply by the United National Comd which stood firm on it's previous psn, Nam Il, recommended a recess until 1100K, 25 Jul for the purpose of each side seriously considering the proposals of the other side. After half hour recess, UN Comd delegation acceded to their rqst stating that communications should be kept open and that UN Comd would be prepared to continue negotiations sooner if the Communists so desired. Communists agreed to keep communications open.

Part 2. Progress:

No significant progress made in arriving at an agenda, however, atmosphere more favorable to break apparent stalemate of the previous meeting.

Part 3. Attitudes:

Nam Il read his initial speech with less forcefullness than normal.

It was apparent that they recognized the fact that the UN Comd delegation would not change its stand unless directed to by higher authority. Nam Il in his speech stated that certain actions of a political nature would have to be passed on to future conferences for settlement. However, these matters must be on the agenda for the Armistice Conference at which resolutions would be made to pass these matters on to another conference for discussion. The Chinese delegates took great interest in a statement made by Admiral Joy that the withdrawal of trps must be discussed at governmental level and that action might be taken unilaterally by the govts concerned. The Chinese rqstd a repeat on the phrase which contained "Unilaterally".

Part 4. Sequence of Events:

UN Comd opened conference at 1000K stating its regrets concerning the inability to arrive at Kaesong on 20 Jul due to weather. Communists asked for United Nations Comd opinion on their item three, withdrawal of fgn trps fm Korea. United Nations Comd responded with the statement that the arguments put forth by the Communists had not changed the United Nations Comd opinion concerning this matter. UN Comd held firm that the 4 item agenda contained all that is nec for the discussion of a mil armistice. Nam Il, after discussion with the Chinese delegates, selected a prepared statement consisting of the arguments which had been presented in previous meetings. This speech touched on the doubt of UN Comd good faith, the need for guaranteeing the armistice, the principal of the 38th Parallel, and a statement that although certain political actions must be passed to future conferences, this should be done so by a resolution of this conference and therefore must be on the agenda to be discussed. UN Comd rqstd a repeat of the statement concerning political matters. After the statement was repeated, United Nations Comd made a short statement concerning the difference between an armistice and a peace settlement. United Nations Comd again recommended that the Communists reconsider their stand. Nam Il, after again consulting with the Chinese delegates, recommended a recess until 1100K, 25 Jul for each side to reconsider the views presented by the other side. United Nations Comd rqstd a half hour recess to consider this matter. After recess, United Nations Comd delegation stated the delay was regretted but were willing to accede to the views of the Communist delegation concerning the recess until 25 Jul. UN Comd suggested that communications be kept open so that negotiations can be continued sooner if the Communists so desired. Communists countered with the statement that they didn't like the delay either but they felt that this was such an important question which must be decided now, that the time spent would be well worthwhile. The conference adjourned at 1137K with the agreement that the next scheduled meeting would be at 1100K, 25 Jul 51. Complete transcript of today's proceedings will follow in subsequent message.[1]

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[1] The transcript was sent in telegram C-67482, not printed, after which General Ridgway made the following observation in his telegram C-67485, dated July 22:

"Mymsg C 67482, subj: Transcript of 21 Jul 51 armistice proceedings, attention is invited to that portion of the North Korean statement made at 1002K which reads: 'On such questions, we should naturally adopt resolutions referring them to another suitable conference or organization for settlement'. This may prove to be the key to the position the enemy delegation will take at the next conference." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 100)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 101 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 July 1951—1:45 p.m.

C 67520. Re my C 67474 and your JCS 96938 [1] in reply thereto, appreciate potentialities of my proposed action. It was for that primary reason that I reported in advance this element of planned operations in Korea.

It is my belief that substantial buildup of hostile offensive potential has cont since prior to the enemys first positive step taken in connection with current negotiations and at an accelerated rate throughout that period. It is my estimate that these negotiations, however long cont, may fail of agreement on at least one basic condition without which we cannot agree to cease hostilities, and that is the issue of unrestricted inspection in Korea. Finally, it is my estimate that the hostile offensive potential will be used to its max, possibly incl air, at such time as it becomes evident to the Kremlin that its proposals will be rejected, and local conditions become suitable.

The en offensive potential, if and when exercised, means add heavy loss of American lives, and if en air is employed, probably heavier than any so far suffered in any single offensive.

Withholding of this atck, an element in other planned operations, may therefore, result in serious and avoidable losses. Successful delivery of the atck will probably inflict serious logistics losses, materially reduce his offensive capabilities at this time, and subject the whole Communist combine to increased stresses and strains.

I feel obliged to present these add thought prior to your decision thereon, because this issue involves a fundamental in the responsibilities with which you have charged me, namely the scty of UN Forces and the conservation of their lives. I do so with full recognition that my views are based primarily on conditions within a single theatre, and that the problem has world-wide aspects.

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[1] Both dated July 21; see p. 718 and footnote 1, p. 719.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 102 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 July 1951—2:11 p. m.

C–67521. Reference JCS 96930. In Tokyo conference with Joy it has been decided that upon termination of the recess on 25 Jul, the United Nations Command delegation will initially take the position outlined in your para 8A of referenced msg. If this step does not produce satisfactory results the United Nations Command delegation will then shift to course outlined in your paragraph 8B of reference msg.

In this connection in proceedings of 21 Jul, Nam Il makes reference to adoption of resolutions referring political questions related to armistice negotiations to another suitable conference or organization for settlement.

It is anticipated that shortly after reconvening, the Communist delegation may possibly agree to omitting the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the agenda, and propose in lieu thereof that the United Nations Command delegation obtain assurances from the United Nations, or from the governments concerned, that this question will be taken up in some other manner a short time after the signing of a military armistice.

Assuming the Communist delegation takes this course of action, the position of the United Nations Command delegation would be improved if it were then able to state that it was authorized to give assurances that the governments concerned would be receptive to such a proposal after the military armistice had entered into effect and sufficient time had elapsed to establish the fact that its provisions were being observed by both sides.

Your views on last paragraph are requested.

795.00/7–2351 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, July 23, 1951—6 p. m.

292. Usually reliable source informs ConGen that fairly high Commie official who came Hong Kong last week declared to guests at small

informal dinner that there wld definitely be truce in Korea. He added that fon truce second step wld be polit negots, also to be conducted with UN which wld pave way for entry Commie China into UN. After this accomplished, gradual withdrawal of Seventh Fleet from Formosa cld be brought about.

Informant commented that Commie official undoubtedly instructed to make above statements but for what purpose and whether true or not remained matter for speculation. Categorical manner in which he affirmed there wld be truce in Korea appears most significant portion of statement.

Dept pass Pusan. Sent Dept 292, rptd info Taipei 22, Tokyo 14, Pusan 5.

McConaughy

795.00/7-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL Pusan, July 24, 1951—2 p. m.

76. Re Deptel 60, July 21.[1] Secy's statement July 19[2] cld not have been better timed both with respect to cease-fire talks and local reaction. Pres Rhee, upon return from Chinhae last evening, told me that it was a great relief and has eased everyone's mind. At ceremony celebrating the third anniversary his election to presidency he referred to statement and remarked that Koreans need not fear, that UN will not abandon them. You will recall PriMin has been urging some such statement for some time. He has just informed me, "Secy's msg was fine, very reassuring, just what we wanted." Natl Assembly yesterday unanimously approved msg of gratitude to US Govt for the Secy's statement.[3]

Sent Dept 76, rptd info Tokyo 32.

Muccio

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 710.

[2] See paragraph 8 of telegram JCS 96802, July 19, p. 706.

[3] On July 24, Secretary of Defense Marshall issued a press statement which reinforced Mr. Acheson's of five days earlier in saying that troop withdrawal was not a subject for the armistice talks but should await conclusion of a general peace settlement. (Department of Defense press release No. 165-51 in Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 108)

Editorial Note

On July 24, Chang Han-Fu, Vice Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement, broadcast over the Peking radio, protesting recent violations by

American military aircraft of Chinese air space during the period since July 11, but most recently on July 21 in the area of Northeast China. This last incident, according to the statement, was a serious provocation in view of its occurrence during the cease-fire talks. A telegram, also dated July 24 to General Twining, Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, from Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland, Commanding General, United States Far East Air Forces, stated that a probable violation of the border had occurred but termed it unintentional. (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tabs 105 and 106)

At the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on July 17, during a discussion of air reconnaissance over China, General Vandenberg indicated that United States planes had been intercepted on several occasions in the past over Manchuria. With regard to the question of future photo reconnaissance flights over China, Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews stated at a State–JCS meeting on the following day that Mr. Acheson felt such efforts should be confined to coastal cities while the Korean negotiations were going on. (Lot 64D563; State–JCS meetings of July 17 and 18, 1951)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 107 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 25 July 1951—4:45 p. m.[1]

CX–67670. Subject: Armistice Negotiations.

Part 1:

Meeting on 25 July opened at 1100K. Senior delegate United Nations Command delegation made following statement:

"We have carefully reviewed the positions expressed by both delegations in connection with the question of whether to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. We have examined and reexamined the arguments you put forward, so that we could be sure we fully understood them. In this review the United Nations Command delegation has been guided by three premises on which your delegation has indicated agreement with ours: (1) we are mutually concerned with a military armistice conference at this time, not with a final peace settlement (2) we must confine ourselves to those subjects with which military commanders are properly engaged (3) we are presently discussing an agenda, a general framework within which specific discussions can evolve, not a listing of preconceived conclusions.

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[1] Due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this message was received prior to the dispatch of telegram JCS 97220, *infra*.

"With this agreed guidance before us, it became apparent that not one of the arguments you have used to support your contention has been shown to be valid. You did state that a major consideration of this conference was to provide against resumption of hostilities after a cease fire had once been ordered. We agreed with that. You further stated, however, that the withdrawal of foreign troops was the basic and principal guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. We cannot agree with you on that. Were this true, certainly the United Nations Command delegation would favor the earliest withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as quickly as possible. Consequently, we examined with great care your assertion that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would insure against resumption of hostilities.

"In our review of the question, one fact immediately stood out like a beacon: There were no foreign forces in Korea in June of 1950, when the hostilities began. Thus, history demonstrates clearly that hostilities did occur in Korea in the absence of foreign forces. How, then could absence of foreign forces be a guarantee against hostilities resuming in Korea? You assert that the absence of foreign forces will insure against repetition of violent events which in fact occurred in the absence of foreign forces. This is total conclusion to cause and effect. This is upside-down reasoning.

"Furthermore, we recall that for a period of time after the end of World War II, foreign troops were in Korea. No war occurred as a result of the presence of those troops; rather, their presence was an aspect of the ending of a war. However, only a short time after the foreign troops were withdrawn from Korea, the threat of hostilities in Korea appeared, and was followed all too soon by actual fighting.

"You have stated that the presence of foreign forces prevents the Korean people from settling their problems themselves. By what means was the settlement of these problems progressing in June of 1950, before the appearance of foreign forces in Korea? By guns, tanks, aircraft—by war, as all the world knows. By immediately withdrawing foreign forces from Korea, we would restore the condition as to presence of troops in Korea that was the case in June of 1950. Would we have a guarantee against resumption of hostilities? The absence of foreign troops served as no guarantee on June 25, 1950.

"The facts show that the withdrawal of foreign troops is no guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. On the contrary, over-rapid withdrawal of foreign troops could well be the direct cause of resumption of hostilities. Certainly, the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, on the orders of the governments which sent them to Korea, is to be expected. Their withdrawal must be kept in accurate phase, however, with the development of assurance that hostilities will not begin again. The sooner the governments whose troops are in Korea are convinced that a genuine military armistice has been honestly implemented, the sooner the groundwork can be laid for settling the other problems of Korea including the question of foreign forces. Thus, it is perfectly clear to the United Nations Command delegation that your proposal to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces is a proposal based on a totally false promise. It is a proposal conceived in error and containing the seed of fresh danger and suffering for Korea.

"We have pointed out to you that the question of withdrawing foreign forces from Korea is a question for determination by the governments which sent them to Korea. It is beyond the scope of a military armistice, beyond the purview of this conference. We have reminded you that a decision regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not necessary to accomplish a military armistice. A military armistice is merely a suspension of hostilities, usually a prelude to broader settlements which could properly include politico-military topics, and resolve them. We have emphasized that this conference must be confined to military matters essential only to the negotiation of a military armistice. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not one of these. We have shown clearly how fallacious is your basic reason for urging that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea be made an agenda item. We have demonstrated that far from being a guarantee against resumption of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would endanger the military armistice. We have expressed our belief that as the military armistice proves itself reliable, the governments concerned will take up the matter of withdrawing their forces from Korea, along with other problems relating to Korea.

"In connection with our agreed agenda items 2, 3, and 4, both of our delegations have announced the purpose of presenting unilateral views on details not expressly mentioned in the wording of the agenda item this understanding has become a basic part of our agreement on wording of agenda items. You, for example, have made clear your intent to present views with reference to a specific parallel in connection with the agreed items. We have likewise expressed an intent to present views on matters not specifically covered in the wording of the agenda items, such as the International Red Cross visits to prisoner of war camps. It is clearly the right of either delegation to voice its views on any subject it sincerely believes to be pertinent to the question under consideration. In fact, it was to make provision for exercising this right, that the United Nations Command delegation has advocated generalized wording of agenda items. Certainly our agreed item dealing with arrangements for an armistice provides ample opportunity for you to express any views you may entertain on such questions as withdrawal of forces from Korea. Of course, neither delegation is obliged to accept such unilaterally submitted views as correct or even pertinent.

"The foregoing does not minimize in any way the importance of the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea in relation to an overall settlement of the Korean question. Its importance is recognized in the public declarations of the U.N. as well as of the individual governments having troops in the U.N.C. However, this question is only one of those which must be considered on the governmental level in effecting a permanent settlement and which cannot be discussed separately or in advance of agreement on, and implementation of, armistice terms.

"In view of this established understanding, the United Nations Command delegation does not perceive the need for additional agenda items. As we have said, the agreed agenda item dealing with arrangements for a military armistice provides you with ample opportunity to put forward your views on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. In the interests of making progress toward stopping bloodshed in Korea, we therefore, urge that you accept the agreed items as the agenda, so that our work can go forward."

Part 2.

Communist delegation requested a recess until 1400K. When meeting reconvened Communist delegation made following proposal:

"We therefore propose to add a 5th item to the four items on the agenda already agreed upon—'recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides' so that after discussing and obtaining concrete agreements on the four items, we may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the countries on both sides that within a definite time limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal by stages of all foreign armed forces from Korea. We consider that such an item on the agenda and the content of the recommendations we are prepared to put forward when this item is under discussion will not only be conducive to an early realization of our desire for an armistice agreement but also enhance the hope of assuring peace in Korea. We believe that the delegation of the United Nations force will surely agree to our proposal."

1426K

United Nations:

In order that we can make no mistakes about your proposal we should like to have in writing exactly what you said.

1427K

North Korea:

That we can do.

1427K

United Nations:

Can we have it now?

Recessed at 1427K hours.

Reconvened at 1500K hours.

1500K

United Nations:

Do we understand your actual proposed item to be, and I quote: "Recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides", and I unquote. Correct?

North Korea:

Yes, that is the recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

United Nations:

We understand.

North Korea:

And I explained the content of it.

United Nations:

You mean the rest, in other words, is just explanation?

North Korea:

Yes.

United Nations:

Is it intended that your new item 5 be discussed by our two delegations after an armistice agreement based on the four mutual agreed upon items is signed and in effect?

North Korea:

Then I will explain it again. That means after having discussed the four items and reached an agreement on them, we will recommend to the governments concerned on both sides, and then we may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the countries concerned that within a definite time-limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal by stages of all foreign armed forces from Korea.

United Nations:

In other words, you mean this is another agenda item which must be discussed before the agreement is signed?

North Korea:

To have the agreement on the armistice smoothly. See? So we present the first four items first and when we have discussed the armistice items. That is only a technical question. Before the signing or after. We want to have a 15-minute recess to consider that.

United Nations:

What I want to get clear is this—whether you mean if both delegations do not agree on the recommendation, you will not sign the agreement?

North Korea:

Your statement is duly noted.

Part 3:

I have instructed Admiral Joy as follows:

"Your recommendation 'acceptance of the Communist proposed item 5 is recommended' is approved. I am at once reporting my action to JCS, which, of course, may otherwise instruct me. If so, you will be promptly informed."

Part 4:

In the event you have other instructions they should reach me by 260800 [2] Tokyo time.

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[2] July 26, 8 a. m.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 111 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET — WASHINGTON, 25 July 1951—1:33 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 97220. From JCS for CINCUNC. This msg in two parts.

Part 1. Reur C 67521.[1] This seems to have been partially overtaken by your CX 67670.[2] However, as pointed out para 3 JCS 96421 [3] we believe it undesirable for you to become transmittal agency for political questions as Communists would quickly avail themselves of opportunity to raise other political questions by same means. The UN would have no objection to having this question taken up along with other polit questions involved in a settlement in Korea in some other manner after a mil armistice has entered into effect and sufficient time has elapsed to establish the fact that its provisions were being faithfully observed.

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[1] Dated July 23, p. 722.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated July 16, p. 687.

Part 2. Reur CX 67670. Your proposal to agree to inclusion in agenda of item 5 reading "recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides" is approved. However, in agreeing, you should have in mind that agreement to include item on agenda does not mean agreement to Communist statement accompanying their proposal. Further instructions will be sent as soon as possible on substantive position when item 5 is reached.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 112 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 25 July 1951—2:08 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 97223. From JCS. Reur C 67474,[1] C 67520,[2] CX 67652[3] and JCS 96938.[4] JCS withheld approval your C 67474 because they considered it undesirable to issue warning in manner suggested and because to single out Pyongyang as the target for an all-out strike during the time we are holding conferences might in the eyes of the world appear as an attempt to break off negotiations.

In view of your C 67520 in which you emphasize over-riding military requirements, and your CX 67652 in which you suggest no warnings be given, objections to this strike are removed if you consider Pyongyang as your most important target. No publicity will be given to "mass" nature of this raid. Your public attitude should be this strike a normal operation against persistent enemy build-up. In this connection, JCS agree that mass raids constitute effective utilization of air power and assume you are considering similar raids against other targets.[5]

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[1] Dated July 21, p. 718.

[2] Dated July 23, p. 721.

[3] This message, dated July 25, read in part as follows:

" . . . I would, if permitted to execute this plan, amend it by omitting all advance warning. Supporting reasons are:

"(*a*) United Nations air has been bombing military installations in urban areas continuously for over a year.

"(*b*) Civil populace of North Korea has been warned in the past to vacate areas in vicinity military installations and, accordingly, will be relatively insensitive to one more warning.

"(*c*) Weather uncertainties might cause appreciable delay in strike and thereby afford enemy unusual opportunity to improve and/or augment active and passive defense means with resultant increased losses of attacking aircraft.

"(*d*) Advance warning would subtantially, if not seriously reduce expected tactical benefits. . . ." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 109)

[4] See footnote 1, p. 719.

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[5] General Ridgway responded in telegram C-67729, July 26, from Tokyo which read as follows:

"Implications contained in your JCS 97223 fully appreciated here. I am having my chief of information and my major commanders give the publicity aspect their full attention. I suggest that it may be worthwhile for you to alert the appropriate public information agencies in Washington to this important matter." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 113)

The raid on Pyongyang took place on July 30. According to the report of the United Nations Command for the period July 16–31, 1951, it was a "comparatively large attack" which produced "considerable damage to military installations." (U.N. document S/2333; see also Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 33–34)

795.00/7-2551: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY New York, July 25, 1951—6:27 p. m.

145. Re Korea—Reporting to UN on armistice.

We are most appreciative of opportunity to comment on Deptel 30, July 14, on question of reporting to UN on Korean armistice. We have given careful consideration to possible courses of action set forth in Deptel and to arguments pro and con in each case and we feel approach along lines of course (*c*) a combination of SC and GA action, is preferable. Comments below are, of course, based on (*a*) assumption that armistice on terms satisfactory to us will be concluded, and (*b*) essentiality keeping in foreground our thinking in planning UN action that Korean developments but one phase in broad and complex program to resist Communist aggression.

I. *SC action.*

a. From constitutional viewpoint as well as in long term interest of maintaining effective collective security system involving strength and unity of UN members, report in our opinion should be made to SC in first instance. From charter viewpoint SC continues to be UN organ primarily concerned with maintenance peace and security and therefore logically equally concerned with termination hostilities. Furthermore, resolutions of SC initiated military action to repel aggression and established UC under US, requesting that US report to SC. From viewpoint solidarity within UN we are impressed, of course, by strong UK and French view that report must go to SC.

b. We have carefully considered question what type of res would be consistent with SC function, assuming that there would be subsequent GA action. Most important objective to be achieved in SC is to get SC approval in simple, clear-cut terms of substance of armistice. We have in mind a res which would (1) call attention to para 6 of res of July 7, 1950 and to the report on the armistice submitted by USG pursuant to that res; and (2) note with approval the terms of the armistice. We also feel that it would be desirable to devise a formula for reference to the GA. This might be accomplished by simple clause informing GA of action taken by SC. Alternatively, consideration should be given to a special report to GA as envisaged by art 24(3) of the charter.

c. In considering SC action question of risk of possible Soviet veto must be considered. We favor foregoing notwithstanding risk of veto. Should Soviets veto we would, of course, take matter immediately to GA. Furthermore, if an armistice is in fact concluded it will presumably be with Soviet concurrence behind the scenes; therefore, occasion for them to exercise veto because of armistice terms would not arise. It would be difficult, we feel, for Soviets to veto type of res envisaged in *b* above.

d. Dept will have noted Jebb's thought (Usun 59, July 10) that Soviet views be ascertained before initiating SC action. In this connection and with reference not only to SC but also GA action, we feel there are substantial advantages to be gained by wresting initiative from Russians in UN on "peace offensive" front. It is perhaps not generally nor adequately comprehended either at home or abroad that UN, having successfully repelled aggression first against NK's and second against Chicoms, has achieved great victory by forcing capitulation Communist aggressors. One of best ways for us to seize initiative would be for me, as president of SC in August, to convene an informal consultation of permanent members of SC as envisaged in GA res 267 (III) of April 14, 1949. Purpose of consultation would be to ascertain Soviet views re SC action on armistice agreement.

II. *GA action.*

Assuming that course of action outlined is followed in SC, next question is nature of action desired in GA. As we envisage situation SC would be convened within day or two following filing of report and GA (or First Comite) would be convened within day or two following SC action.

a. First objective to be sought would be approval by GA of armistice in order to add to SC approval, cachet of GA approval and, as corollary, to give non-members of SC opportunity to register their approval of armistice terms either by their votes or by public statements.

b. Next objective would be reaffirmation by assembly of UN political objective of unified, independent and democratic Korea. We thoroughly agree with Dept's view of importance of such reaffirmation.

c. 1. Third objective GA action we feel should be some positive and tangible step toward achievement of UN political objective. Mere reaffirmation of principle will not by any means be enough, as we see it, to fill political vacuum we otherwise envisage developing in post-hostilities period, both in Korea and in UN. On contrary we feel that positive UN initiative looking toward achievement of UN political objectives is essential in order to (*a*) reassure our own people; (*b*) reassure Korean people and ROK; (*c*) forestall backsliding on part UN members on this fundamental issue; and (*d*) prevent Commies from capitalizing on political vacuum situation.

2. Tangible step we have in mind would be appointment of a UN rep as successor to UNCURK to "represent the UN in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic govt of all Korea" (2.(A) II, GA res Oct. 7, 1950–A/1435). Comments on this approach follow:

a. Generally we think it would be very advantageous to make fullest possible use of UN in post-hostilities period in order (1) to spread as widely as possible burden of responsibilities for developments in Korea, and (2) carrying along with us maximum possible free-world support for achievement of objectives there.

b. So far as UNCURK is concerned its composition both as to govts and individuals has proved sadly lacking and it is, perhaps not altogether through fault of its own, very generally and thoroughly discredited. We feel it would be mistake, therefore, to leave UNCURK withering on the vine during post-hostilities period.

c. A smaller and stronger commission would undoubtedly be better than present UNCURK. However, we feel there are substantial disadvantages in commission approach to Korean problem at this time. Entire concept of commission tends to involve compromise with mediocrity. It would be extremely difficult to hold size down to effective number. We would inevitably become involved in problem of providing for representation for different geographic groups and different viewpoints concerning solution of Korean problem. Because of divergent viewpoints and obvious difficulties any commission has in functioning effectively, we doubt very much whether it would be possible so to establish commission and its terms of reference as to provide for effective operation or one that would not leave us at hopeless disadvantage vis-à-vis the Communists.

d. Test of UN rep approach would, of course, be finding right man (preferably an American) but we feel it should be possible accomplish this purpose. We do not have in mind that UN rep would in any sense be "mediator", nor do we believe that he could easily accomplish his mission in a brief time. On contrary we have in mind that he would study and explore the problem with view to reporting to sixth session of GA, possibly with suggestions as to its solution. He would presumably visit Korea for consultation with ROK and other authorities; he might well also wish to visit Moscow, Peiping and other capitals. He would not have authority to commit UN or US.

e. Fourth objective of GA action would be to note agreement concluded by UNKRA with UC and reaffirm and reinforce to extent necessary program for relief and rehabilitation in Korea. We are inclined to consider minimum action in this field essential in order stiffen morale of Korean people and of UNKRA, and in order stimulate continuing support rather than backsliding on part UN members.

f. 1. In summary we envisage GA res along following lines:

a. Noting with approval terms of armistice agreement;
b. Reaffirming UN objective of a unified, etc. Korea;
c. Appointing a UN rep to represent UN in bringing about this objective; and
d. Reaffirming relief program.

2. In terms of vigorous US leadership in peace offensive initiative of our own we feel that program along these lines would be best calculated to maintain and expand strength and unity of UN against Commie aggression. It would capitalize on any chance there may be, however remote, that Russians and Chicoms are prepared to liquidate Korean problem. At same time from tactical viewpoint we feel that this program would enable us to deal most effectively and affirmatively with controversial issues such as (*a*) withdrawal foreign troops; (*b*) status 38th parallel; (*c*) Chi representation; (*d*) Formosa; (*e*) Japanese peace treaty, and the like. Any or all of these issues might at any time in the proceedings be raised by Russians or their satellites, including Chicoms. We feel that program envisaged above would be best calculated to confound Russians and maintain maximum support for our own views. It is also possible, if there is political vacuum in UN, that others (e.g., UK, India, Indonesia) may be tempted to raise controversial issues. We feel that with minimum program we have in mind it should be possible to convince our friends that first things must come first, that the armistice is only the first step in a long and complicated process, that the next step is peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and that the first step toward settlement of this problem is the initiation of action looking to unification, etc of Korea.

III. If approach as outlined above commends itself to Dept we would suggest prompt initiation program of diplomatic preparation along following lines:

a. Discussion general approach with considerable number key UN dels in order assure maximum support in advance and avoid diversionary and dilatory developments.

b. Emphasis in discussion with other dels on reaffirmation of UN political objective in Korea and appointment UN rep to explore problem and report to sixth session GA.

c. Efforts to get general agreement among UN members to effect that pending achievement real progress in peaceful settlement Korean question line must be held against (1) seating Chicoms in UN, and (2) endeavoring settle prematurely in UN other FE questions.

Additional comments on certain questions raised herein will follow.

Austin

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 115 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 26 July 1951—7:46 p. m.

HNC-142. This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 26 Jul 1951.

Part 1. End Summary:

The agenda for the Military Armistice Conference was agreed upon and formally adopted at 1409K. The agreed agenda is:

"1. Adoption of agenda.

"2. Fixing a military demarcation line, between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.

"3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice.

"4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

"5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides."

UNC suggested outline for armistice agreement and a procedure to follow in subsequent discussions. UNC provided Communists with written outline and a suggested preamble. Preamble suggested:

"The undersigned Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Commanders in Chief, North Korean People's Army and Chinese Volunteer Army, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping further conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until such time as a final peaceful settlement of the conflict in Korea is achieved, do, individually, collectively, and mutually, agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea."

(Attention is invited to our reference above to Communist commanders and the titles they insist on utilizing).

Communists presented their views on military demarcation line and demilitarized zone with 38th parallel as the basic issue. Next conference scheduled for 1000K, 27 July 1951.

Part 2. Progress:

Agenda agreed upon and formally adopted. Discussion on Item 2 was started.

Part 3. Attitudes:

The Chinese seemed pleased that the agenda was agreed upon while the North Koreans showed little expression. The attitude throughout the meeting appeared to be one of anxiousness to start the substantive discussions. They appeared anxious to obtain UNC views on the military demarcation line. When UNC stated these views would be presented at the next meeting, the Communists, rather than let the meeting recess for the day, restated their views on this matter.

Part 4. Sequence of Events:

Communists opened conference at 1400K requesting UNC views on Communist proposed Item 5. UNC accepted with this statement: "We accept your proposed Item 5, which you have stated as follows: 'Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides'. In accepting this item we wish to make it clear that, as in the case of all other agenda items, the UNC delegation does not commit itself in advance to any specific agreement regarding this item. In response to your query of 25 July the UNC delegation wishes to assure you that we will discuss this item fully and in good faith in an endeavor to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement." Communists read the agenda for confirmation and provided written copies in Korean, Chinese and English. Agenda formally adopted at 1409K. Communists suggested discussions begin on Item 2. UNC offered a procedure to be followed in subsequent discussions and suggested an outline for the armistice agreement. This outline is:

"Preamble.

"Article 1. Demilitarized Zone.

"Article 2. Concrete arrangements for the armistice.
"Article 3. Prisoner of war matters.
"Article 4. Concluding statements.
"Article 5. Recommendations."

Communists apparently were not prepared for this matter and reserved their opinion until next meeting. Communists then asked if the conference could proceed to discussion of Item 2. UNC stated that it would be pleased to hear Communist views on the matter. Communists attempted to obtain UNC views. After UNC stated these views would be presented following day, Communists requested 15 minute recess. After recess Communists presented these reasons why 38th parallel should be the military demarcation line:

(1) Consistent with historical fact and well known to the whole world. Basic to the armistice talks.

(2) Outbreak of war caused by one belligerent violating the 38th parallel and later on the war could not be stopped because one of the belligerents violated the line.

(3) Present battle lines cannot be taken because no stable line exists. 38th parallel presents the best line since both sides occupy territory north and south of this line and forces would have to be withdrawn about equally.

UNC read proposed preamble (Part 1) and provided a copy for Communist consideration. UNC stated its intentions to release the agreed agenda to the press upon return to base camp. UNC suggested next meeting be held 1000K, 27 July 51 which was agreed to. Conference adjourned 1510K.

Part 5. Conclusions:

It is concluded that the Communist delegation is anxious to determine the views of the UNC on the agenda items and desires to continue the negotiations as rapidly as possible.

795.00/7-2051

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 27, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State entirely concurs with the view expressed in your letter of July 20, 1951, to the effect that preparations should now be made for a political and diplomatic settlement immediately upon an armistice in Korea being implemented.

As you are aware, the Department of State is regularly consulting with all of the Governments participating in the military action in

Korea with the objective of concerting support for United States policy toward the conduct of hostilities and following the termination of hostilities, if an armistice arrangement is concluded.

It is the view of the Department of State that if an armistice agreement is concluded it should promptly be transmitted to the UN by a special report from the Unified Command submitted in accordance with the Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, and should shortly be followed by some official UN action noting the agreement with approval. It is the view of the Department that this could best be accomplished by a UN resolution which would make reference to the previous pertinent resolutions of the UN, note with approval the armistice agreement which confirms that the armed attack against the ROK has been repelled, that fighting has come to an end, that international peace and security are being restored in the area, and would reaffirm the UN purpose of seeking to bring about by peaceful means a unified, democratic and independent Korea.

Further political or diplomatic action looking toward a settlement of the Korean problem is, of course, under constant study and you will be kept informed of plans in this regard. The Department of State wishes to point out, of course, that a final political settlement of the Korean problem will require agreement by the Communists, an agreement which will be difficult to achieve. For this reason, as noted in paragraph 2*b* of the instructions of June 29, 1951,[1] to General Ridgway regarding the armistice, it is of the utmost importance that any armistice arrangement be acceptable to us over an extended period of time, in the event no progress is made, despite our efforts, in reaching an agreement on political and territorial questions.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

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[1] The reference is to telegram JCS 95354, June 30, p. 598.

795.00/7-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, July 27, 1951—1 p. m.

85. Early this morning I recd message from Admiral Joy and Gen Ridgway that Korean delegate Gen Paik was refusing to attend today's conference in view of instructions he had recd not to take part in discussions on line of demarcation and that he felt it better not to appear at conference than to have to get up and walk out.

Gen Coulter and I spent some two hours with President and PriMin. President insisted he had not instructed Paik to walk out, that Paik had sent word to him he could not be loyal to the Korean govt's five point policy nor to people of Korea if he took part in any discussion of line of demarcation which inevitably wld be permanent division of Korea.

It evident Rhee had never expected an agreement even on agenda and therefore made pretense of going along with talks. He still does not like idea. He roamed all over the universe during the talks and played well-worn "gramophone record" of all his mistrusts and misgivings. He asked for assurances from Gen Ridgway that polit discussions later wld not consider any line demarcation. I pointed out that this was polit matter and Gen Ridgway's instructions were to confine himself to mil matters bearing directly on armistice. I pointed out that Gen Ridgway on two occasions had very clearly stated his position directly to the President and the second time in the presence of Mil Defense and Korean delegate to conference and that if the President wld like any further clarification I was confident Gen Ridgway wld be ready to come for further talks with him. With a view to dissuading Rhee, I mentioned he send a message to my govt, direct to Pres Truman, further detailing his concerns. He said he wanted to.

At the end, Pres Rhee agreed to send word to Gen Paik to continue attending conferences "for the time being" and that he wld prepare message for Pres Truman for me to forward.

Whole incident is further indication Pres Rhee on blindly emotional grounds is attempting sabotage armistice. He is completely unpredictable and if one method fails accomplish his purpose he can be expected try another if he can get away with it.

This also sent info to Ridgway to pass Joy.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 117 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 27 July 1951—8:47 p. m.

C–67826. This msg in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong, 27 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary:

Today's meeting opened with Nam Il discussing UNC Delegation's proposals of 26 July regarding procedures, which Nam Il accepted in principle. Nam Il reserved comment on proposed preamble. It was agreed that articles of any armistice document would be titled with full text of agenda item wording. Admiral Joy read statement giving

UNC Delegation's initial position on demilitarized zone. Enemy called recess until 1000K 28 July.

Part 2. Progress:

Nothing significant other than agreement on mechanical procedures.

Part 3. Attitudes:

Enemy delegates showed irritation over Joy statement but absolutely no surprise. On glancing at map outlining UNC proposed zone Nam Il remarked: "Yes, the battle line."

Part 4. Sequence of events:

Conference reconvened 271000K: Nam Il opened. He accepted in principle the proposed organization and structure of armistice agreement as proposed by Admiral Joy yesterday. He then expressed willingness to try the proposed mechanical procedure for drafting the articles of the agreement reserving the right to propose any improved procedure which might be discovered during the progress of the work. In furtherance of this procedure he named 3 officers, including Col Chang as his representatives. He suggested United Nations Command delegation representatives might wish to remain in Kaesong nights for this work and offered welcome and working space. Commenting on the United Nations Command proposed preamble, he stated that the armed forces he represented were incorrectly named and the names were inappropriate. Correct names were "Peoples Army of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea" and "The Chinese Peoples Volunteers".

Admiral Joy accepted minor revisions proposed by Nam Il with respect to these technical matters and appointed Staff Officers to collaborate with Commie Staff Officers in translating agreement of the delegates into mutually acceptable draft articles.

Admiral Joy then offered a brief rebuttal of Nam Il's statement of the 27th on the selection of the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line and followed with the opening statement of the United Nations Command delegation on the demilitarized zone. Both statements follow in full.

First, brief rebuttal:

"In your opening statement yesterday on agenda item number 2 you proposed that the 38th parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line and that both sides withdraw an equal distance from this line. Among the reasons advanced by you was that this selection would be consistent with historical fact. That is, hostilities started at the 38th, therefore, *ipso facto*, they should end on the 38th.

"It is true as you say, that the war began on the 38th parallel. This fact, by itself, constitutes no basis whatever for the contention that this line should be selected as the military demarcation line under current conditions. Following the start of hostilities and before the United Nations were able to implement fully their resolution to assist the Republic of Korea, their military forces withdrew to the Naktong River, where the military situation stabilized. Had an armistice been concluded a year ago today, it is difficult to believe that you would have agreed to a military demarcation line along the 38th parallel.

"Subsequent to the 15th of September 1950 your forces withdrew to the region of the Yalu River. Had an armistice been concluded at that time, you could not reasonably have expected us to agree to accept the 38th parallel as a cease fire line.

"From the standpoint of history then and of military realism, it is obvious that not since the outbreak of the war, on 25 June 1950, has there been any valid basis for considering the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line.

"A military demarcation line, or line to limit the advance of opposing forces during an armistice, bears no relation to past history. Such a line, moreover, does not involve the question of good faith; neither is it concerned with long-term territorial readjustments of a political nature. Finally, no demarcation line is essential for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Your position in this regard is therefore untenable.

"In summary, none of the several arguments you advanced in support of your proposal that the 38th parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line has any validity whatever. On the contrary they imply a lack of understanding of the true nature of such a line."

Second, opening statement on demilitarized zone:

"You have agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established across Korea. Within this zone all armed forces are to be excluded. We contend that the delineation of this zone must be based on practical military considerations as they exist at present and that it be entirely uninfluenced by consideration of any ultimate settlement at governmental level of political and territorial problems. On the other hand, every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of both opposing forces, must be thoroughly and impartially considered.

"Therefore, an imaginary geographical line such as a parallel of latitude has no validity whatsover in developing a military armistice. In approaching the problem of a demilitarized zone, the United Nations Command delegation desires to call attention to certain military realities.

"Under the terms of any armistice agreement which we may arrive at there will be in fact, 3 zones of military significance.

"First, the Air Zone. The United Nations Command maintains air superiority over all of Korea.

"Second, the Sea Zone. The United Nations Command controls the entire sea area around Korea.

"Third, the Ground Zone. The United Nations Command controls everything south of a line running roughly from Chodo-Ri on the east coast of Korea in a westerly direction through the high ground south of Pyongyang; thence south-westerly through Pan Mun Jom to Haechang-Ni and along the northern banks of the Han River to its mouth.

"The effect of Air and Naval power, as well as ground force effectiveness, all 3 considered together, influence materially the location of the ground demilitarized zone. In other words, the ground demilitarized zone must be kept in proper focus in its relation to the other military zones carved out by Air and Naval power, the impact of which you are fully cognizant.

"Due consideration must be given, therefore, to the effects the Air and Naval forces have on ground operations. The United Nations Command Air Force and Naval Air have restricted the freedom of movement of your forces and have inflicted heavy casualties on your ground troops. The attacks of the United Nations Command Air Forces in your rear areas have compelled you to employ large numbers of troops and guns in rear area AA defenses, troops and guns otherwise available for employment on the ground battle lines. Your capabilities for concentrating troops and supplies in the battle area have been materially reduced. Your capabilities for providing air surveillance and close air support to your ground troops are practically nil.

"Again, with respect to Naval power you fully appreciate the realities. At the present time you are landlocked. The United Nations Command has free access to the seas contiguous to the entire area of Korea while your use of sea lines of communications is restricted. Your roads and rail lines along both coasts are subject to effective Naval gunfire. The United Nations Command retains the capability of conducting amphibious operations, requiring you to deploy sizeable forces along the coasts against the threat of these landings. Your ports, military installations, lines of communications, and supply depots near the coasts are subject to Naval bombardment at will. In contrast South Korea is free from a Naval blockade and from attacks by Naval forces.

"The military realities of the situation are clearly shown geographically on this map. Your attention is directed toward the large areas which the United Nations Command control by its Air power and Naval power. It includes all of North Korea, from the present line cf contact to the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers. You have nothing comparable in South Korea.

"In considering the ground situation alone our respective capabilities may lend themselves to a more nearly equal comparison. However, here again we must be realistic and consider thoroughly and impartially every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of the opposing forces in their present positions.

"It must be clear by this time that the line you have frequently proposed to use in determining the demilitarized zone is entirely unrelated to the overall military situation as it exists in Korea at this time. It is not even related to the present line of ground contacts. It fails completely in reflecting the effectiveness of Air and Naval forces. It is far less related to the overall military situation in Korea than would be the case of a line of demarcation running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan. In other words, the advantages given by you in a withdrawal of your ground forces to the north of a line running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan would in no way equal the advantages you would gain by the United Nations Command withdrawing its Air and Naval power from North Korea.

"The ground forces, yours and ours, are in general contact at this time along a specific line, known to you and to us so well that it is not necessary to go into detail as to its location. Considering only ground forces a cease fire arrangement with all forces remaining in place would appear reasonable. This, however, would stop only a part of the hostile action. Our Navy would still be free to blockade and bombard along both coasts of North Korea. Our Air Forces would still be free to reconnoiter and inflict military damage over all of North Korea. If, then, we are to agree on an armistice whereby our Ground, Air and Naval Forces cease operations against your forces we contend that the location of the demilitarized zone, in all fairness, must be appropriately influenced by all of these factors.

"These, in our opinion, and I am sure in yours, are matters worthy of the most serious consideration. These factors all influence the location of the ground demilitarized zone. All of these factors must be considered in any discussion concerning the military advantages which each side may have to concede in order to arrive at an equitable and effective armistice.

"In general, then, you must be aware that a cease fire on the ground, in the air and along the coasts on the part of the United Nations Command Forces is a concession far greater than a cease fire by all the North Korean and Chinese forces in Korea under present conditions. It is at a minimum, equivalent to a major withdrawal to the North of North Korean and Chinese ground forces.

"The depth of the demilitarized zone should be sufficient to prevent the occurrence of minor but disturbing incidents between individuals of both sides during the period of the armistice. This is a simple precautionary measure that each commander has the right to expect. To accomplish this without unduly complicating the administrative arrangements within the zone, we propose that, in general, the demilitarized zone be approximately 20 miles in depth.

"As we indicated many times during the preliminary conferences, there are several methods by which the zone can be delineated. Inasmuch as this zone represents a temporary military expedient to insure against misunderstandings which might delay progress toward final settlement of the Korean problem, we consider that it should be delineated by easily recognized ground or terrain features.

"In consideration of the foregoing remarks, we now propose the following:

"1. Cessation of all ground action, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone from which all military forces will be withdrawn. The ground demilitarized zone proposed is outlined on the map which I presently will hand you.

"2. Cessation of our air effort in the area extending southward from the Yalu and Tumen Rivers to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.

"3. Cessation of our Naval bombardment and blockade along the coasts of Korea from the mouth of the Yalu on the west coast and the mouth of the Tumen River on the east coast, southward to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.

"This map[1] at a scale of 1:250,000 outlines in general the zone but does not define it in the detail that will be required later for administrative purposes."

Description of boundaries and demarcation line fol: Zone shown on 1:250,000 map. All lines from west to east.

Northern boundary: From point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 4095 north to coast at YC 4211 northeast to Yulla-Ri, at YC 5225, northeast to BT 6741, northeast to Hanan-Ni at CT 0149, northeast to road junction at Songhung-Ni at CT 1465 northeast to Songmun at CT 5080 east to DT 0076 northeast to DT 0779, northeast to Sogibau at DT 1487 to coast at Saho-Ri at DT 2594 and extending 3 miles off-shore.

Southern boundary: From point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 6085, north to coast at YB 6090, north to mouth of Hwayang-Chon River at YC 6102 northeast to Paekchom at BT 6407 northeast to Bench Mark 355 at CT 1818 northeast to CT 2124, northeast to CT 2430 northeast to Songhyon at CT 3238, northeast to CT 5048 east to Hill 1062 at CT 6546, east to CT 8047, southeast to Tonson-Gol at DT 0142, east to Mundung-Ni at DT 1142, northeast to Ousil at DT 2451, northeast to DT 3562 to coast at DT 4669, extending to 3 miles off-shore.

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[1] Not printed.

Demarcation line: From a point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 5094 north to coast at YB 5199, northeast to YC 5307, northeast to YC 5713, northeast to Sinmhong-Ni at BT 6223 to BT 7727, to CT 0733, to Chumak-Tong at CT 0935, northeast to CT 2352, northeast to CT 5062, northeast to CT 6064, east to CT 8362, southeast to Bench Mark 1068 at DT 0159, northeast to DT 1061, northeast to DT 2068, northeast to coast at DT 4085, extending 3 miles off-shore.

At 271115K Nam Il proposed a recess until 281000K.

Part 5. Conclusion: Enemy delegation fully expected UNC location of demilitarized zone at least as far north as presented.

795B.11/7–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PUSAN, July 28, 1951—noon.

89. President Rhee requests fol letter be delivered to President Truman.

"July 28, 1951.

"My Dear Mr. President: Our people regard the question of the re-unification of our nation with such seriousness that a rejection of this goal by the UN wld cause an inevitable reaction of bitter disillusionment with the democratic alliance upon which we have staked our natl existence. I am addressing Your Excellency directly in the hope that a solution may still be found.

"If a line of mil demarcation must be accepted as a basis for the armistice in Korea, my people want a solid assurance that such a dividing line will not again be allowed to assume polit significance. We shall agree to such a temporary mil line if the United States will guarantee that no such line will be accepted as part of the political settlement to be discussed following the cease-fire arrangements.

"Before the attack of June 25, 1950, no nation outside the Soviet orbit recognized the North Korean regime or the 38th Parallel. Now the United Nations is dealing with that regime officially and the dividing line threatens to become a part of United Nations policy. Before the attack we had only Korean Commies in the north to deal with. Now the Chinese are established there to threaten us further.

"Koreans regard the continuance of a dividing line as a death warrant for our nation. Millions of refugees returning to their ruined villages and to the ashes which were their homes will not be able to abide the abandonment of the northern half of our country by the agreement of our allies. What has happened to China could very well happen to us. Our people have proved strong but there is a point beyond which they cannot continue to resist.

"If Your Excellency's Govt does not feel like making a pledge not to accept another dividing line, I might suggest as another alternative that the contending armies remain just as they are, without agreeing to a dividing line, and that meanwhile the polit discussions shall begin. That will provide full opportunity without damaging concessions to discover whether the Commie powers really do desire to reach a lasting and just settlement.

"Your momentous decision of June 27, 1950, rallied the spirits of the entire free world and offered a bright hope of preventing the outbreak of World War III. A continuance of that same spirit now will bring your bold program to a successful conclusion. The Soviet Union has come to understand that it cannot win on the battlefield and dissension has already broken out between Russia and Red China. A firm stand a little longer will achieve the result for which we are all struggling.

"With fullest expression of our high esteem for Your Excellency, I am

"Sincerely yours, (signed) Syngman Rhee.
"His Excellency Harry S. Truman.
"President of the United States of America.
"The White House.
"Washington, D.C."

MUCCIO

795B.11/7-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 28, 1951—2 p. m.

91. Text Pres Rhee's letter to Pres Truman cabled separate msg. While letter gives Rhee chance let off steam and express ROK (Rhee's) position it cannot be considered more than temporary solution present difficulty. As indicated msg yesterday, instructions to Gen Paik are to attend mtgs "for time being" only. Impossible predict what new device may be dreamed up in next few days.

As I see it, Rhee feels he cannot publicly do anything which wld cause impression he accepts partition Korea. As long as he was hopeful agenda wld not be agreed, problem having ROK rep attend meeting not serious but now that possibility exists that armistice may be achieved, participation ROK rep implies Rhee's approval agreements reached, which makes him furious.

In conversation yesterday, he asked why we did not stay where we were and have no armistice agreement. He also asked for assurance an agreement on line of demarcation wld be temporary and that in conf on polit questions no such line wld be agreed. These points reiterated Truman letter.

I assume our position in polit talks in fact wld be to put emphasis on possibilities of unification not division of Korea and only after it is evident no agreement possible wld we consider temporary *de facto* line. Adversaries no doubt wld revert to demands this be on 38th and we wld hold out for armistice line. Both sides, committed to objective of unification, wld carefully avoid recognizing line as permanent. This position seems evident and is understood by Rhee in his more lucid moments. It is hard therefore to describe reasons for his letter except in terms of baffled old man searching for any expedient to protect his position.

It is going to be most difficult in course of negots to keep him mollified and to keep from publicly disassociating himself from negots or from indicating he is being forced to go along. It wld obviously ease situation here and avoid further precipitant and embarrassing moves on Rhee's part if some way cld be found to remove him from scene for spell. Thought occurs to me that in view of his letter to Pres Truman and present ROK attitudes on both cease-fire and Jap peace treaty; he might jump at chance to go to US for visit if officially invited. I hesitate for several reasons to advance such suggestion and merely put it out for Dept's consideration without any strong recommendation on my part.

Sent Dept 91 rptd info priority Tokyo for Ridgway 36.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 118 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 28 July 1951—10:02 p. m.

C–67877. This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice Conf at Kaesong, 28 Jul 1951.

Part 1: Summary:

Entire day spent in debate over loc of demilitarized zone. Nam Il delivered atk on United Nations Command proposed zone reiterated 38 parallel as only basis of zone. United Nations Command Delegation gave rebuttal in afternoon, atk 38 parallel as basis for zone and reaffirming psn on zone as described in our msg of 27 Jul. Meetings to continue tomorrow at 1100K.

Part 2. Progress:

No progress other than further elaboration of respective psns.

Part 3. Attitude:

Enemy delegation attempted to exhibit righteous indignation over

United Nations Command proposed zone. Considerable bluster indulged in by Nam Il in his morning speech, but toned down noticeably after Admiral Joy's response in afternoon.

Part 4. Sequence of events:

Conference reconvened at 1000K. Nam Il, having given Admiral Joy an opportunity to open, opened with a rebuttal of United Nations Command Delegations psn on loc of demilitarized zone. This follows in full.

"Now we will speak. Yesterday I heard with surprise your incredible statement and had a glance at that map of yours on which were 3 lines which anybody with red, blue and black pencils could have drawn. One of the 3 lines was apparently advocated by you to be fixed as the military demarcation line. At the time I already felt that such lines drawn at random were not worthy of attention and when I had heard the arguments you raised in support of these lines I was even more convinced that they were not worthy of attention, because your arguments were naive and illogical. What did you say actually in support of the lines you had drawn? You maintained that the fixing of this military demarcation line and the delineation of a demilitarized zone must start from the consideration of the existing military realities and be free from the influence of any political or territorial considerations. Now among the so-called military considerations, you advocated the doctrine of military effectiveness. You contended that you held Air and Naval superiority and that therefore, the demarcation line drawn across the land must enable the area occupied by your ground forces to be pushed forward a great step into our area so as to reflect the present military situation. We consider that this theory of yours is based on a one-sided, simple and incorrect military point of view. We consider that in fixing a military demarcation line, due attention should indeed be paid to the military realities on the battlefront. Yet the armistice we seek is the first step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and is not intended for the resumption of fighting. Therefore, in fixing this military demarcation line, apart from giving due consideration to the military realities on the battlefield, we must also give consideration to the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Judging by this criterion, the entire tenor of your statement was to boast about the so-called military power and effectiveness on your side in an attempt to intimidate. You should be aware that such a gesture can intimidate nobody but, what is more important. such a gesture can only have a harmful effect on the armistice negotiations as the first step towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. You asserted that the advantages we would gain by the cessation of Air and Naval attacks by the United Nations Forces would be greater than the advantages given up by us in the withdrawal by our ground forces to the line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan. I would like to know, since the situation is so preponderantly favorable on your side, why did you not hold your ground in the Pyongyang-Wonsan line you had reached instead of withdrawing all the way to Suwon Area, the Han River, under the cover and support of your Naval and Air Forces? May I advise you sincerely that these naive remarks you have made can have no good purpose for our negotiations while they can intimidate nobody. The less there are of such remarks, the better it would be.

With regards to the military realities on the present battlefront, naturally we cannot ignore the comparison of military power of both sides, which is primarily constituted by the effectiveness of the various arms of the forces employed by both sides.

Yet it would be a gross mistake to think that this constitutes all the factors of the war powers of the two sides. Have you never lent a thought to the following question? Can it be explained purely by the so-called effectiveness of the various arms of the forces that, in spite of the wanton bombing and bombardment by your Air and Naval Forces your battle lines rolled back from the Yalu River to the vicinity of the 38 parallel? No.

The factors constituting war power in fact are much more complicated than the effectiveness of the various arms of the forces. We have repeatedly stressed other factors as manpower, morale, political conditions, etc. Of course, I have not sufficient time to discuss military theories at present. I will only make a few remarks about the ridiculous theory about the 3 zones; land, air and sea.

It mentions in any military manual worthy of its name that military power is the sum total of the power of all arms of the forces. The position gained by any one of the arms is dependent upon the coordination of the other arms. That is to say, the position occupied by your ground forces for the time being is inseparable from the support of your Air and Naval Forces. In other words, your battle lines on the ground are the concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air and sea forces.

I must further point out that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your Naval and Air Forces have in the past year only destroyed a large number of peaceful towns and villages, killed and wounded innocent civilians of our country without being able to intimidate the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. In fact, we are steadily overcoming the difficulties caused by your bombing and bombardment and are progressing in large strides. This is a fact known to all, yet you are still boasting that there are three isolated battle zones, that you have forced us to withdraw on the ground, and you have established a separate royal domain in the air and on the sea. You maintain that once all hostilities cease, you will be at a disadvantage and hence you propose that the military demarcation line must be deep in our side so that it will be no loss to you. Such logic of yours can only deceive those who are neurotic and muddle headed. Therefore the military demarcation line which you have proposed on such a fallacious theory is completely groundless and hence unworthy of consideration and cannot be considered. On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides reflects from the viewpoint of military consideration the relative war power of both sides at the present state. From the viewpoint that our negotiation should be the first step towards peaceful settlement of the Korean question, our proposal is also one which is recognized by the whole world and one that is reasonable, realistic and practicable. What are the characteristics of the battlefront at the present stage? Since this year the situation of the battlefront has been changing all the time. In January the troops of our side advanced to the Suwon region South of the 38 parallel. Since then the battleline of contact between both sides has been shifting South and North of the 38 parallel all the time. You are aware and I am also aware that the present positions occupied by both sides are similarly changing all the time.

This kind of situation will continue until agreement is reached through our negotiations and implemented. Therefore the present situation of the battlefront cannot be taken as reflecting the military realities of the battlefront. Thus all attempts to take the present military situation as the basis of the military demarcation line cannot reflect the military realities and consequently cannot be subject for consideration. This the necessary conclusion drawn from one of the characteristics of the Korean battlefront.

Secondly, another characteristic of the battlefront is that the battlelines are changing all the time, while on the whole, remaining within the sphere of the region of the 38 parallel. Obviously any clear-headed military observer or military commander has to admit this powerful fact. From this characteristic we cannot avoid the following conclusion that is, at the present state the 38 parallel approximately reflects the situation of both sides on the battle front. Therefore, proceeding purely from the military viewpoint alone, we deem that the 38 parallel as a military demarcation line is reasonable, realistic, and practicable. Therefore we specifically propose the following proposal for the second item on the agenda:

"1. Fix the 38 parallel as the demarcation line between both sides.

"2. Withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel.

"3. Taking the area 20 kilometers in depth from which the armed forces are withdrawn as the demilitarized zone.

"After giving you my deliberating criticism of your statement of yesterday, I would like to put to you a question. Seeing that you make such a completely absurd and arrogant statement for what actually have you come here? Have you come here to negotiate for peace or just to look for an excuse for extending the war? I formally ask you to give us your answer to this question."

At 1047K Admiral Joy requested a recess until 1330K to consider these remarks.

Conference reconvened at 1330K. Nam Il opened with following statement:

> "I left out something in my translation this morning. I am going to correct it now. In fact, I left out following statement in my English version: In fact it is only by relying on indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your Air and Naval Forces in violation of the international law that the present position of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment the ground forces would long since have withdrawn to no one knows where".

Admiral Joy's rebuttal of Nam Il consisted of (1) an answer to his rhetorical question (2) a comment on the tone of Nam Il's statement (3) assertion that United Nations Command Delegation statement of position was not designed to intimidate but to depict the military realities of the situation (4) a rebuttal of Nam Il's contention that the present battle line reflects fully the United Nations Command Air and Naval capabilities (5) a refutation of the contention that the 38 parallel represents the composite fluid battle line of the war and an assertion that the present battle position represents the most stable line of war since the breakout from the Naktong River line as there have been no major changes there since 15 June. Statements (1) and (2) above are quoted:

"(1) You closed your statement this morning with a rhetorical question so inappropriate, so irrelevant and so discourteous as to be unworthy of a reply. But you compounded this rude and graceless act by a formal request for a formal reply. It is for that reason that I dignify your question with an answer. In making that reply I need only cite the presence of the United Nations Command Delegation in this Armistice Conference as evidence of our sincere intent to seek an honorable and equitable basis for the termination of hostilities. If it were, as you imply, our objective to prolong hostilities, we should not need to come to an armistice conference in search of an excuse."

"(2) I wish to comment briefly on the tone of your remarks this morning. In your statement this morning you expressed yourself in rude terms applied to the United Nations Command Delegation, including many discourteous adjectives. In your discourtesy, you have resorted to bluster directed at this delegation. All here are presumed to be military men. Those peoples whose military organizations are respected throughout the world are proud of the reputation for courtesy and for objective mental attitudes towards serious questions unfailingly demonstrated by the personnel of their armed services. Military men are expected to be sufficiently mature to realize that bluster and bombast phrased in intemperate language do not and cannot affect the facts of any military situation. No amount of such vituperation as was indulged in by you this morning will sway the concentration of the United Nations Command Delegation on the serious problems before this conference. No amt of discourtesy will tempt the United Nations Command Delegation to utilize similar tactics.

"You should understand, however, that rudeness such as you have displayed will lead to only one end if continued. That is, the United Nations Command Delegation will be compelled to conclude you have no serious or sincere purpose at this conference, and the prospect of peace in Korea will be greatly dimmed. With all the earnestness at my command I urge you to consider most seriously where your recent attitude may lead. I hope to note in your further remarks, tangible evidence that this conference will resume the high level of traditional courtesy between military men, which until this morning, it had enjoyed, so that progress in an atmosphere of logic and reason may go rapidly forward.

"I shall now proceed to more important business."

At 1412 Nam Il replied saying he only criticized United Nations Command unclear and unilateral statement. Courtesy must be observed on both sides. United Nations Command Delegation cannot intimidate his delegation. Already commented on yesterday's statement and its ridiculous and fallacious doctrines. He had also given a correct opinion but United Nations Command today gave the same old views. Extremely regretable. Minimized effects United Nations Command Naval and Air Forces. "If you are so powerful as you say why did you retreat to Taegu last summer and to the Han last winter?

"Since tenor of remarks is the same the less said the better. Yesterday you suggested cease fire on the ground without any in the air and on the sea and today you suggested the same. We are not here to vaunt our strength, but to reach an armistice. Hence we are fair and just. Our proposal of 38 parallel testifies to our attitude and standpoint."

At 1430 Admiral Joy requested 30 minutes recess.

At 1500 Admiral Joy reopened with another statement to rebut Nam Il's effect to minimize independent Air and Naval capabilities. Nam Il replied that he had already given his views on this and added some comments on effect of these operations on civil population. Admiral Joy asserted that Nam Il's remarks contained nothing new and that he had only one more point. He corrected Nam Il's remark that United Nations Command Delegation had proposed ground cease fire alone with continuation Air and Naval operations.

Nam Il asserted his position on 38 parallel had been clear from first day. His stand righteous and immovable. He had analyzed United Nations Command proposal and had nothing more to say.

Again Nam Il repeated present line of contact is not a fixed line. "That is, it can be changed even during the negotiations". If so how can one think of starting from this line? Proposed again acceptance Communist position Item nbr 2.

In final statement for today Nam Il mentioned righteousness of his proposal, said he understood the United Nations Command proposal precisely and added that if United Nations Command had nothing more to say he proposed a recess until 291100K. Recessed at 281542K July 51.

Part 5. Conclusions.

Enemy delegation is either waiting for a compromise offer by United Nations Command Delegation on loc of zone, or has no authority to do other than hold for 38 parallel at this time. Although it is too early to predict the possibility exists that discussions may deadlock on the issue of the 38 parallel.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 119 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 29 July 1951—8 : 55 p. m.

C–67939. This msg in 5 parts. Subj Armistice Conference at Kaesong 29 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary: In morning Nam Il reiterated his stand on 38th parallel, attacked United Nation Command proposal regarding zone. Joy delivered rebuttal on salient points of Nam Il's speech, reaffirmed United Nations Command proposed zone. In afternoon Joy again explained United Nations Command position on zone, giving reasons and principles on which based. Military advantages of cease fire to Communists pointed out. Need for defensible position stressed. Nam Il repeated his position on 38th parallel as demarcation line. Joy ended meeting with firm statement holding to United Nations Command proposal, rejecting 38th parallel. Recess until tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitude: Nam Il very mild in presentation, carefully polite, sought to create impression of patient reasonableness.

Part 4. Sequence of Events: Conference opened at 1102K. Communists asked if United Nations Command Delegation had any opinion on the Communists position as stated 28th July. United Nations Command replied "nothing except propose that we adopt our demilitarized zone as a basis for continuing discussions". Nam Il then spoke as follows: "I will make my statement. I have again made a careful study of the statement you made yesterday afternoon. I have to say frankly that it has caused us great disappointment. Your arguments show no improvement at all on what you said the day before yesterday. You say that your proposal is logical and tenable. Yet, I cannot but point out that the arguments you employ in support of your proposal are entirely illogical and therefore untenable. I would like to make some comment on the fundamental viewpoint you take with regards to the question of fixing a military demarcation line to establish a demilitarized zone. You have repeatedly stressed that only military considerations, pure and simple, should be considered in solving this question. These military considerations of yours are in fact an exaggeration of your own military strength and an attempt to secure through illogical reasoning an advantageous position which does not actually exist. Such considerations of yours make it difficult to believe that you have come to this Armistice Conference for the genuine conclusion of the Korean war, and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. As you have asserted, to exaggerate one's own military strength in an attempt to secure more advantageous military position surely cannot but give people the impression that this is to prepare to fight again. Our position on this question is different from yours. We consider that this Armistice Conference itself is the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, while fixing the military demarcation line is the basic condition of an armistice. In view of your not foregoing to fix the military demarcation line, it is not only necessary to take into consideration the present situation on the battlefront, but also to make sure that the decision made on this should be reasonable and equitable to both sides, and beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This position of ours can be made public to the world and is supported by all the peace-loving peoples of the world. But what is more incomprehensible are the so-called military considerations you have raised. Your considerations are directed toward attaining one result, that is the pushing the military demarcation line into our present positions. In seeking to achieve this apparent aim, you have resorted to a most illogical logic to support your viewpoint. You make the arbitrary assertion that you hold the superiority on the sea and in the air, that since the armistice has to be an armistice of the air, sea, and ground forces, this will be unfavorable to the superiority of your air and naval forces, and that therefore the front line on the ground should be pushed back into our side, and fixed as the military demarcation line so as to compensate for the advantages given up by your air and naval forces. Indeed, I cannot believe that you yourselves really believed in this theory because it is—excuse my saying it—too illogical. In my statement yesterday I have already made a thorough criticism on this theory of yours, which I am not going to repeat here. But then, you seem to be concerned over whether I understood what you meant and enumerated once again the 6 military roles played by your air force and of the power wielded by your navy. I appreciate your concern. But allow me to tell you sincerely that among the roles played by your naval and air forces, you have forgotten to mention the most important role, which has been and is still being played in Korea by your naval and air forces—that is the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of the civilians and cities and villages, in violation of International Law, a brutal action which should be regarded as the shame of 20th Century mankind. This is a most important fact. We believe any soldiers with a sense of honor should not take brutality as strength, much less pride themselves on it. Of course, you will ask, "do our naval and air operations really have no effect at all on your military action?" With the same sincerity, I would like to point out that they produce a certain amount of effect, but what is more important is that we have been steadily overcoming those effects, and are victoriously accomplishing our tasks in battle. You claim that you possess 3 forces—air, naval and ground—while we possess only a ground force. Even if to a certain extent this is true, would not the fact that our army by itself [off] setting your air and naval forces prove that our army is at least equivalent in valor to the total of your 3 forces, if not greater than [them]. What does this mean? I said yesterday that in fact it is only by the line of indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces in violation of International Law that the present position of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would have long been withdrawn to no one knows where. You stated that the situation of the ground forces of both sides approximately reflects the relative strength of the ground forces of both sides, but in fact, it is only under the support and cover of your air and naval forces that your ground forces barely and temporarily maintain their present positions. On the other hand, our ground forces have advanced from the Yalu River all the way to the region of the 38th parallel, by overcoming the difficulties of a certain extent that the wanton bombing and bombardment of your air and naval forces have been able to bring to our military actions. Hence, if the effectiveness of all of the armed forces is not taken into consideration, the existing situation of the ground forces cannot certainly be considered as reflecting the relative combat power of the ground forces of both sides. Military power is, of course, the sum total of the effectiveness of all the arms of the forces. The ground forces, however, play a decisive role. Considered from the viewpoint of winning the war, the air and naval forces can only support the arms of the forces and they in themselves alone cannot settle the battle. That is, in fact, no novel viewpoint. Anyone with some military knowledge knows this truth. For example, not long ago this was expressed by a person who is well acquainted with military affairs. He said that in his view, it is wholly untenable to think of waging wars with any special marvelous weapon without employing ground forces. We can and may very likely start from the air or the sea, but once it has started it will very quickly pass into land operations. Without ground activities, air bases cannot be occupied and maintained. No matter what gains have been made by the activities of the air or naval forces, they must be guarded by land forces. Excuse me, I made a mistake. "War can and may very likely start from the air or the sea, but once it has started, it will very quickly pass into land operations. Without ground operations, air bases cannot be occupied and maintained. No matter what gains have been made by the activities of the air or naval forces, they must be guarded by land forces." Excuse me. This should be self-evident truth. But you refuse to recognize the decisive role of the ground forces and contend that the air and naval forces can wage war extensively and independently and even win victories. In doing this you have unknowingly committed a grave mistake. You said that in the last war Japan was defeated as a result of blows inflicted by your naval and air forces. You have forgotten that it was the Korean peoples liberation struggle and as a result of the Chinese peoples war of 8 years war and resistance by the Soviet Union, in addition to the operations of the other wartime allies, which defeated the forces of Japanese imperialism and that the decisive role was played by operations conducted mainly by the ground forces of China and the Soviet Union. Your naval and air forces fought Japan for nearly 3 years without being able to defeat them. It was only participation by the Soviet Army that a crushing blow was dealt that Japan was finally defeated. Can these historical facts be negated lightly? Your own action [tends?] to refute your own theory.

When war broke out in Korea on June 25th, 1950, the United States Government imagined that it could interfere with the Korean Civil War successfully by dispatching air and naval forces alone, but such a calculation and course of action went bankrupt a few days later and in view of this also it was under those conditions that the United States Government decided to dispatch its ground forces to fight in Korea, hence we have the situation today. By this fact I think I have fully refuted your reasons that the air and naval forces can win victories independently and the naval and ground forces can be taken into consideration separately. We consider the lines you have drawn to be unworthy of attention as the arguments supporting them are unattainable. There is not necessity to give consideration to the lines themselves. You said yesterday that the present battle line [is] the most stable line since the battle of Naktong River. This is still more groundless. Leaving aside the cause of the war last year, for the time being, we can see that since this year alone the ground battle lines have never been stabilized during the 7 months. The contact line between the two sides has shifted twice along the 38th parallel. We pushed twice south and you pushed twice north of the 38th parallel. Isn't this proof enough that the ground battle lines are very unstable?

What is more worthy of notice—during the last 7 months our troops stayed nearly 5 months south of the 38th parallel and the period during which your troops twice stayed north of the 38th parallel amounted to a little more than 2 months. The positions held by you at present are only less than 2 months old. How then can it be called as stable? When our troops advanced south of the 38th Parallel the first time this year and reached the Han River area, they stayed there 3½ months. That is nearly double the length of time your troops have stayed at the present positions. If the Han River lines are not said to be stable, what reasons can you bring forth to prove that the positions held by you for less than 2 months are stable? How then can the lines be considered stable? The present battle line is only a temporary military situation. They are not in consonance with the military realities. I made a mistake—temporary. I mentioned already yesterday that the present battle line is constantly changing. Before an agreement is reached and our Armistice Negotiations are implemented present military situation should not and cannot be taken as the primary military consideration in fixing a military demarcation line. For the past 7 months the battle line has been changing constantly but through out these changes, there is a definite tendency—that is the movement of both sides did not in the main get beyond the region of the 38th parallel although the length of time, width, depth of penetration of our troops south of the 38th parallel were far greater than the penetration of your troops north of the 38th parallel.

We contend, therefore, that even from the exclusive viewpoint of military reality the 38th parallel reflects approximately the relative military strength of both sides at their present stage and should be made the military demarcation line between both sides. We have already mentioned in the foregoing that in fixing a military demarcation line we should take into account the present military realities before the armistice which we seek for [it?] is one which leads to the overall settlement of the Korean question. The first step in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question therefore at the same time we must take into account the military realities in fixing a military demarcation line, we must also take in account that fact that our decision must be beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and must not be harmful or destructive to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Seen from this aspect, our stand of fixing the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is clearly recognized by the whole world as just, equitable, reasonable, realistic and workable. Our position is real, considering the logic, and is therefore firm and unshakeable. I sincerely hope you will consider seriously and accept our proposal. Admiral Joy then presented a rebuttal to the charge of indiscriminate bombing, pointing out that while that charge has long been a favorite of the Communist propagandists, the enemy delegations are fully aware that the targets attacked by United Nations Command aircraft have had either real or apparent military significance. He further pointed out that if soldiers disguise themselves as civilians and hide military trucks, tanks, etc, in civilian houses that civilians will inevitably suffer, etc, etc. To leave propaganda for the propagandist and to concern ourselves here solely with military facts.

Admiral Joy followed this with an analysis of the preceding days meeting, pointing out that discussions had digressed from the subject of the establishment of a demilitarized zone and outlining the course discussion should take in order to confine the remarks to the subject.

The conference recessed at 1245K.

Reconvened at 1504K.

Admiral Joy opened with a reiteration of the United Nations Command position on the principles that must be considered in establishing a demilitarized zone which are briefly: *a*. The zone must be located geographically in relation to the existing overall military situation; *b*. The zone must be outlined by easily recognized terrain features; *c*. Suitable defensive positions must be available on both sides and in close proximity to the zone.

He followed with a statement outlining the advantages to the enemy of a cease fire prefaced with the remark that the advantages the enemy gains are not those that are necessarily reflected in the current situation both those which accrue to him in an armistice and which are, in turn, a distinct loss to United Nations troops; that his superiority is in numbers of ground forces, United Nations superiority in air and at sea. He pointed out that the enemy ground forces gained primarily in the logistic field during the armistice in that he would be able to repair at liberty his lines of communication and communications and industrial facilities, and would consequently be in a greatly improved position militarily should unforeseen events lead to a resumption of hostilities. He stated that it would take weeks for our air and naval power to again place the enemy in a logistic situation such as presently faces him. He reminded the enemy that no corresponding advantage could accrue to us through an armistice since our communications were not now subject to attack.

Admiral Joy then again pointed out that although we sincerely hoped that any armistice agreed here would be lasting, that it provides only a bridge for discussions and settlements at a higher level designed to bring about a permanent settlement; that the demilitarized zone should be so located tactically as to create a balance of military advantage and thus provide defensible positions to provide for the security of the forces of either side in case the armistice were violated. He pointed out that the United Nations Command is now in a defensible position and that it does not intend to jeopardize the security of its forces by relinquishing such a position during the period of the armistice and that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th parallel would provide no reasonable sound defensible position.

Nam Il referred to agenda item of demarcation line, and proposed that after the line was discussed, a return could be made to the demilitarized zone. Admiral Joy replied that United Nations Command delegation had reserved the right to present the demilitarized zone as it saw fit and the Commies had agreed. However, since they wanted a demarcation line they had been given one. Nam Il said this line is drawn with no basis whatever; for the United Nations military benefit and not for solution of armistice problem. 38th parallel as oft repeated is fair and must be demarcation line. Could not accept United Nations proposal.

Admiral Joy then concluded with the following remarks: We are disappointed in the remarks you have made thus far, inasmuch as you have made no move toward an area of possible agreement. We have told you before, and we tell you again, your proposal of the 38th parallel as the basis of a demilitarized zone is unsound, unrelated to the military situation, and unacceptable. The sooner you accept the fact that agreements reached at this conference are going to be confined to the military realities of the present situation, including the location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, the sooner we will be able to make progress. We are firmly convinced of the justice and equity of the demilitarized zone we have proposed. We leave that thought with you in the hope you will give it thorough consideration, and accordingly will drop further reference to non military lines.

Nam Il again proposed the 38th parallel and expressed hope United Nations Command Delegation would seriously consider and accept his stand. At 291610K meeting recessed until 301100K July.

Part 5. Conclusions: No new evidence upon which to base further conclusions.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 122 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 30 July 1951—5:45 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-67984. Subject: Armistice Negotiations.

Repeated herewith for your information is teleconference between UNC Delegation and CINCFE at 1800 [*0800?*] 30 July.

"(CINADV-1).

Secret

Official

The Communists remained adamant on their stand that the only military demarcation line they would consider was the 38th Parallel and they did not indicate interest in ideas in our papers.[1] On the other hand, there was no indication that they did not desire to continue the conference. They did not submit any new ideas and did not seem to have any other ideas to present nor any papers ready other than the one they presented today. They appear to be expecting that we will eventually weaken and accept the 38th Parallel in view of indications previously from other sources that settlement on basis of 38th Parallel would be satisfactory to us.

There are 4 possible courses of action open to us:

a. Continue meetings and our present stand.

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[1] Reference is to the meeting of July 29; see telegram C-67939, *supra*.

b. Try to shift discussions to concrete arrangements—Item 3—to determine their position on military armistice commission and inspection teams as indicated in para 7 JCS 96930.[2]

c. Go to our final demilitarized zone position in hopes that such a compromise will cause them to discuss a line other than the 38th Parallel.

d. Recess for several days during which Washington issue strong statements that we will not consider the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line so that the Communists realize that our position will be adhered to by the highest authorities. After recess, UNC Delegation would state in strongest possible terms that 38th Parallel will not be considered.

We believe that the Communists may remain adamant on 38th Parallel at least until they are assured that neither the Delegation or the United Nations will ever deviate from the stand that the Delegation will not consider the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line.

The UNC Delegation recommends course (*a*) for 2 more days or until answer received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the stand the JCS will take on course (*d*).

Course (*c*) not recommended until Communists state they will consider some line or zone other than 38th Parallel. Delegation believes present circumstances not suitable for course *b*.

Delegation is somewhat reluctant to use this course because it may be interpreted by Commies as a sign that we are weakening.

(End CINADV-1)

(CINADV-2)

Secret

Official

Under course (*a*) it is my present intention to meet each day only long enough to elaborate our often repeated stand and then recess until the following day unless Nam Il has additional papers to present. Of course, should a weakening be indicated in the Commies attitude we would remain longer to determine their position and seek an agreement.

(End CINADV-2)

(CINADV-4)[3]

Secret

Official

I also intend to close my daily statements by reiterating "A buffer zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command".

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[2] Dated July 21, p. 716.

[3] The source text contained no mention of a "CINADV-3" nor an "FEC-3" in response.

(End CINADV-4)[4]

FEC-1

Secret

Official

Ref CINADV-1

Your recommendation with respect to course *a* approved.

Instructions concerning your course *b* and *c* will follow at later date.

With respect to your course *d*, believe sufficiently positive statements have been made. These include that of Secretary of Defense of 24 July, amplified and strengthened by AP dispatch quoted below:

"General Matthew B. Ridgway's truce instructions will permit him to make minor adjustments but no concessions in the UN demand that an armistice buffer zone in Korea follow the present battle line. Informed officials said that the United States intends to stand absolutely firm on this issue, which has produced a head-on clash with Communist negotiators at Kaesong, and on the question of an adequate system for inspection of all troops in Korea after an armistice is established. Ridgway's instructions were described as covering a wide range of possible moves and counter moves for use as negotiations developed. But in the State Department there was strong belief today that long, hard sessions around the conference table will now have to precede any really significant break in the situation."

Believe in pursuing course *a* for next 2 succeeding days or even longer, you should refrain from any suggestion of recess, forcing Communists to suggest recess or some other method of relieving impasse.

Developments you are now experiencing are in strict accord with the ancient oriental custom. Firmness and patience are the only effective counter measures, and must outdo theirs.

(End FEC-1)

FEC-2

Secret

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[4] General Ridgway reported on the 14th meeting, which took place at Kaesong on July 30, in his telegram C-67997, not printed. The summary and conclusion of that telegram read as follows:

"Summary: The two delegations exchanged rebuttals of the other's arguments, with Commies bringing forth no new arguments, merely repeating old ones. Admiral Joy offered broad invitation to en delegation to engage in discussion of UNC proposed zone with a view to minor adjustment, but Communists did not react. No evidence offered by either side of willingness to abandon its basic psn.

"Conclusion: The conference is making no progress past the issue of 38th parallel.

"No evidence of intent on part of enemy to yield, and no evidence of intent on their part to break off conferences." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 124)

Official
Ref CINADV-2
Concur.
(End FEC-2)
FEC-4
Secret
Official
Ref CINADV-4
Concur.
(End FEC-4)

[Here follows the brief concluding portion of this message, which did not contribute substantively to the preceding exchanges.]

795.00/7-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 31, 1951—4 p. m.

101. Dept will have seen Hoberecht's story from UN peace camp (UP) indicating ROK member of UN cease-fire team will withdraw from conference if his associates agree to Commies demands for revival of 38th parallel as demarcation line. This story appeared *Stars and Stripes* July 31 and in Korean press. Story attributed to "source close to President Syngman Rhee" who stated General Paik had had "some misgiving about talks at certain stages and already on one occasion almost did not go to Kaesong." Paik will walk out if settlement made on line the Koreans do not like. If he walks out he will be acting on order from higher authorities in Korean Govt. Story goes on that Koreans have feeling Russians never intended to compromise during conference with American occupation leaders after World War II when they stalled for time. Koreans feel same thing now taking place. Hence Koreans want Admiral Joy to tell Commie dels either to agree at once to cease-fire proposals or get on with fighting.

This is latest example Rhee's underhanded methods to sabotage talks. He fully aware effects such publicity can have in both Allied and Commie circles: Impression will be created there is split between UN and ROK and weakening of purpose on UN side, which presumably seriously considering concession on 38th parallel issue; Commies may well obtain same impression, despite forceful uncompromising stand taken in mtgs by Admiral Joy, and thus be less inclined to meet UN terms. None of these serious considerations fazes Rhee since in his tortuous mind this monkey wrench may stop machinery which he so anxious to bring to halt.

Sent Dept 101, priority Tokyo 38 (for Ridgway).

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 126 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 31 July 1951—6:45 p. m.

C–68020. This msg in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 31 July 51.

Part 1. Summary: Meeting consisted of each side offering rebuttals of other sides positions and reaffirming own position. Adm Joy condemned 38th parallel, offered to discuss any proposal regarding zone other than one based on 38th parallel, stated 38th parallel totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command as basis of zone. Nam Il concluded a reiteration of arguments used many times previously with statement that he had no line to offer other than the 38th parallel. Extemporaneous exchanges occurred throughout meeting. Meeting continues tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitude: No significant change.

Part 4. Sequence of events:

[Here follows a lengthy part, consisting mostly of the exchanges between Admiral Joy and Nam Il.]

Part 5. Conclusion: This UNC Delegation feels that no evidence the enemy is ready to shift from his 38th parallel position and I concur.

795.00/7–3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, July 31, 1951—7 p. m.

106. At General Ridgway's suggestion I have verbally protested action of President Rhee and/or members his cabinet in giving direct orders to General Paik.

I explained that General Ridgway had asked me to discuss with President his great concern—which I shared fully—over confused situation arising out of orders issued direct General Paik. Rhee immediately reiterated what he had said last Friday morning that he had issued no orders General Paik.[1] I continued that if he had not issued orders direct, Ministers Defense and Foreign Affairs, Director of OPI, Chiefs of Staff of Korean Army, Navy and Air Force had been continuously visiting and conveying msgs Gen Paik. I went on that Gen Ridgway had made special efforts keep President Rhee fully informed of his position and that he should have same frank and full understanding from Koreans; otherwise, under present conditions there was no hope.

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[1] See telegram 85, dated July 27, p. 738.

For next 15 minutes President reviewed what happened to Korean King in 1904–1905 when US disavowed 1883 Treaty. I finally injected that I saw no parallel and that I was personally gratified to see determined stand being taken by many nations, mentioning specifically Australia, against any weakening to Communism. I stated that I assumed his Ambassador who attended the meetings in Washington reported to him on such matters and that if the spirit of collective security on which future of free world—including Korea—depended were to succeed every member of baseball team had to play together.

President Rhee reiterated that he had not ordered Gen Paik not to attend but he could not order him to agree to a division of country. He went on that to be able to go along with cease-fire proposals he wld have to be able to explain whole situation fully to state council and perhaps Korean people and he could not do this if he did not have definite assurance that subsequent political discussions wld not recognize any division of Korea. This is same basic point he made in his letter President Truman.

My impression is Rhee thoroughly enjoys situation this kind and sadistically delights in feeling he temporarily in driver's seat and able to embarrass if not thwart UN proceedings. Hence, appeals to reason fall on deaf ears. Certainly he was far from chastened by our conversation this morning. In view this attitude and flagrant example bad faith exhibited in damaging publicity contained in Rhee-inspired UP story this morning, I suggest President Truman's reply to Rhee's ltr of July 28 might well be put in sterner language than otherwise contemplated. At least considerable emphasis should be placed on vital importance for free world to stand together. ROK's dependence on collective security might again be pointed out together with fact this involves duties and responsibilities to work in harmony with free world as well as benefits. Koreans concern for their own unity is understood and remains UN objective but Koreans must not forget larger unity of free nations on which Korean survival as free nation depends and for which men of many nations dying every day.

Sent Dept priority 106, rptd info Tokyo priority 39.

Muccio

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 127 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 1 August 1951—9:21 p. m.

C–68130. "This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 1 Aug 51.

"*Part 1.*

"Summary:

"Meeting consisted of continuation of rebuttals, and reaffirmations of own positions by each side. No new thoughts offered by enemy. Adm Joy offered several opportunities to Nam Il to engage in map study, and to propose zones based on lines other than 38th parallel. Nam Il exhibited no interest. Adm Joy repeated several times statement that as a basis for establishing demilitarized zone, 38th parallel was totally unacceptable to United Nations Comd. Nam Il held rigidly to 38th as only solution.

"*Part 2.*

"Progress: None.

"*Part 3.*

"Attitudes: No significant change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged version of the transcript of the day's proceedings.]

"*Part 5.* Conclusion: The UNC delegation feels that:

"1. Conference is still in a deadlock over the issue of 38 Parallel.

"2. No evidence that enemy is likely to shift from his psn reference 38 Parallel.

"3. It is obvious that Nam Il is building up the record. Whether this is for purpose of defending a request for recess or is an attempt to place the onus on us for a break in the negotiations is not known. I concur."

G Files : Lot 53D413 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 1 August 1951—10:21 p. m.

C–68131. Ref your msg JCS 90943 Sept 50[1] and para 13 your msg JCS 95977 July 51.[2]

1. Aerial recon has revealed extensive stockpiling of matériel and

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[1] In this message, not printed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed General MacArthur that they wished no further attacks to be made against Rashin; see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 346, and *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, footnote 1, p. 722.

[2] Dated July 10, p. 646.

sup at Najin (Rashin) (42 degrees 15 minutes North–130 degrees 19 minutes East). Oil storage fac and rail repair shops are located in this area which also contains extensive marshalling yards and dock areas. The highway and rail complex into and out of Najin is suitable for funnelling sup through this city to all areas to the south. There is every indication that Najin is a principal focal point for intensifying the enemy sup build-up in the battle area.

2. Recent intel repts indicate Najin now being utilized for covert ocean shipping to east coast enemy ports.

3. Recm restriction be lifted earliest against atk Najin (Rashin) with FECOM Air and Naval Forces.

4. Am convinced atk can be made against this vital enemy installation without violating Soviet border and to substantial advantage of UN Comd in Korea.[3]

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[3] The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 3 requested the Secretary of Defense to secure the approval of the President for lifting the restriction on the bombing of Rashin. On August 8 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following telegram, JCS 98380, to CINCFE:

"Prior to making decision and in order to assess carefully the risks surrounding actions which might follow approval of recommendation in Para 3 your C 68131, request early info as to details of your plans for operations against Rashin."

General Ridgway in telegram CX–68643, dated August 10, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a major strike was not considered desirable because weather conditions made visual bombing conditions uncertain, but one or more normal effort strikes by B–29's could better accomplish the purpose and the target could be destroyed without violating the border.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 10 again requested the Secretary of Defense to obtain the President's approval, and the President on August 10 approved the telegram to CINCFE, JCS 98632, which read as follows:

"From JCS. Reur C–68131 and CX–68643.

"1. Restrictions on attacks on Rashin are removed insofar as air action is concerned. Naval surface bombardment will not be employed without further reference to JCS. Air attacks will be subject to following stipulations:

"*a.* Air attacks will be made only under visual conditions.

"*b.* Every element of attacking air elements will be thoroughly briefed to avoid violation of Soviet and Manchurian borders.

"*c.* No unusual publicity will be accorded such attacks.

"2. Above instructions do not rescind previous instructions contained in JCS 95977, Jul 51, to effect that 'no air operations or naval surface operations will be conducted within 12 miles of USSR territory on the Asiatic mainland.'" (JCS Files)

795.00/8–251

The Counselor of the British Embassy (Tomlinson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 2, 1951.

DEAR LIVY, I enclose a copy of the telegram about which I spoke to you on the telephone this morning giving the views of our Chiefs of Staff on certain aspects of the negotiations at Kaesong.

With reference to the point made in the second paragraph the Foreign Office will now be aware that Admiral Joy has, in fact, given broad hints that minor concessions might be possible provided that the general position taken by the United Nations negotiators is accepted as a basis for discussion.

Yours sincerely, TOMMY

[Enclosure]

Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the British Ambassador in Washington (Franks)

SECRET [LONDON,] August 1, 1951.

KOREAN ARMISTICE TALKS

The Chiefs of Staff agree generally with the discretion which General Ridgway has been given to make concessions. They do not think that it would be militarily sound to accept the northern edge of the Kansas Line as the southern extremity of a demilitarised zone. The Kansas Line is the main defensive position and they consider it essential that there should be sufficient space between it and the demilitarised zone to enable effective patrolling north of the Line to take place.

2. If the negotiations should break down on this particular issue it is essential that the responsibility should be placed on the Chinese and North Koreans. As General Ridgway has discretion to make limited concessions on the lines mentioned in your telegram under reference it seems to me important that an indication of these intentions should not be delayed so long as to lead the Communist negotiators to the definite conclusion that Admiral Joy's present proposals represent our last word. The time when such an indication should be given must, I fully realise, be left to the men on the spot but I hope this point will not be overlooked.

3. Please speak to the State Department further on these lines.

357.AD/7-351

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 2, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of July 3, 1951, concerning the relationship between the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the United Nations Command. I believe, with you, that the agreed solution affords adequate protection to the integrity of General Ridgway's command and satisfies the urgent need for some arrangement making it possible for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency to commence its activities in the near future.

Attached is a copy of the letter which was sent by the Department of State to Mr. Kingsley on July 11. You will observe that a sentence has been added to the next to the last paragraph, affirming the final authority and control of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. By telegram of July 16, Mr. Kingsley has stated his complete acceptance of the proposals made in the letter of July 11.

I concur in the importance of adequate funds to finance civilian relief in Korea, as pointed out in your letter. The Department of State will seek to avoid any action which might result in putting the Department of Defense in the position of having to request funds from UNKRA or having to invite the participation of UNKRA in current operations where its participation would not be desirable from a military point of view.

The memorandum to the President in which you also concurred in your letter of July 3, 1951, has required certain revisions in view of the time elapsed since it was originally prepared.

It is now under consideration by officers of our respective departments, and of the Economic Cooperation Administration. The concurrence of the Department of Defense will be obtained to all changes made in it.

Sincerely yours, [DEAN ACHESON]

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 129 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 2 August 1951—6:48 p. m.

C-68177. "This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 2 August 51.

"*Part 1.* Summary:

"Meeting consisted of a relatively few terse emphatic statements by both delegations, each firmly maintaining its previously expressed positions. Nam Il dodged and evaded when Joy asked if Nam Il agreed that each commander should insure the security of his forces in time of armistice. No significant change in basic situation of locked horns. Meetings continue tomorrow.

"*Part 2.* Progress: None.

"*Part 3.* Attitudes: No change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged transcript of the proceedings of the meeting.]

"*Part 5.* Conclusions:

"The UNC Delegation feels that there is no new evidence warranting conclusions beyond those previously transmitted. No evidence of weakening on part of enemy on stand about 38th parallel. I concur."

795.00/8-351

Memorandum by John D. Hickerson and Livingston T. Merchant to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1951.

Subject: Course of Action to be followed if Armistice Negotiations are Successful

There is general agreement that the United States and United Nations should seize the initiative in the post-armistice phase. We are publicly committed to enter political discussions leading to the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem after the conclusion of an armistice. There seems to be no good reason to drag our feet and excellent reason for making a proposal looking toward the prompt convocation of a conference for this purpose. Moreover, if we do not make a proposal we can be certain that the enemy will, in which case we will be forced into the defensive position of rejecting or seeking to modify a proposal which can be expected to be objectionable.

The main questions which must be answered seem to be what would we wish to derive from such a conference, when and where do we propose it be held, and who should participate.

Purpose of Political Conference

In a political conference we should seek agreement:

a) on the establishment, under UN supervision, of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist subversion or aggression and with a program for the rehabilitation of all of Korea under UNKRA; (No UNKRA funds would be spent in North Korea until a full political settlement had been reached and entered into force.)

b) following agreement on the steps leading to unification, on the plan for the phased withdrawal of all foreign forces under conditions which would assure internal security throughout Korea and provide reasonable assurance against external aggression.

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[1] A notation on the source text indicated that this document was seen by Mr. Acheson.

If an agreement embodying these points cannot be reached, we should be prepared to continue under the armistice without a political settlement at this time. This would not prevent subsequent *ad hoc* agreements, including perhaps provision for mutual reduction in forces. The objective of unifying Korea would be kept alive by the UN, which would maintain machinery and continue efforts to achieve it.

Procedure Leading to Discussion

After the armistice is signed, the General Assembly would adopt a resolution noting the armistice with approval and appointing a UN Delegation (the US and possibly Australia and Thailand) to represent the UN in efforts to achieve a permanent settlement of the Korean problem. This Delegation would, by any appropriate means, make contact with the North Koreans and Chinese Communists and set up a conference in which the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists, the ROK, and the UN Delegation would participate.

It is suggested that the conference be held at Kaesong or in the demilitarized zone as soon as possible after it appears that the armistice terms are being faithfully carried out.

UN Approval of Political Settlement

Any agreement reached in discussions among the interested parties would be *ad referendum* and would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.

795.00/8-351

Memorandum by John D. Hickerson and Livingston T. Merchant to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1951.

Subject: Courses of Action in the Event No Armistice is Achieved.

It is assumed that the courses of action to follow upon a failure of armistice talks will depend on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the character and intensity of renewed hostilities by the Communists. We envisage the following possibilities:

A. *Alternative One:* The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;
(2) The Communists launch mass offensive against UN forces;
(3) The enemy does *not* initiate massive air attacks.

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[1] A notation on the source text indicated that this document was seen by Mr. Acheson.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Continue preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea (except Rashin), the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. GA resolution recondemning the aggressor, reaffirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

d. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to place blame for armistice breakdown on Communists, including wide publication Ridgway report;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow.

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Stepped up national preparation for possible war;

c. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices;

d. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in Far East.

B. *Alternative Two:* In addition to circumstances described in Alternative One enemy begins to use massive air attacks against UN ground or naval forces.

Course of Action: Same as under Alternative One; in addition:

Military

a. After consultation with the participating nations to the extent permitted by situation, institute "hot pursuit", attacks on air bases in Manchuria and China (except Port Arthur and Dairen) from which enemy planes are launched, and on anti-aircraft installations protecting such bases.

b. Re-examine desirability of Chinese Nationalists for use in Korea and against China mainland.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to inform world that Communists are responsible for prolongation and extension of hostilities, that UN will continue all efforts to keep area of hostilities limited to that required by military necessities, and that UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III.

C. *Alternative Three:* Assumptions:

1. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility open for renewal at any time;
2. Communists do not launch offensive or massive air attacks.
3. No evidence of major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of *de facto* cease-fire without agreement.)

Course of Action:

Military

a. Maintain Kansas line defensive positions;

b. Make only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent possible build-up.

c. Continue air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks.

d. Build up ROK forces so they can take over increasing share of UN defense position.

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

Diplomatic

a. Efforts, perhaps through the USSR, to resume armistice negotiations on basis consistent with UN objectives in Korea.

b. Efforts to obtain additional troops to better distribute defense burden and to increase number of countries contributing troops.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on negotiations after some time has elapsed.

b. In Sixth GA, another GA resolution calling on Communists to give up their aggression and resume peace talks on UN basis.

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

795.00/8–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 3, 1951—5 p. m.

101. Unless you perceive overwhelming objection thereto, the Pres requests that you deliver fol letter to Pres Rhee:

"August 3, 1951

"My dear Mr. Pres:

I have recd your letter of July 28, 1951, re the present discussions concerning an armistice in Korea. I appreciate the frank expression of your views and desire to reply to you in that same spirit of mutual confidence that has thus far happily characterized the relations between our two countries.

It is in that spirit that I must also express to you my great concern over reports that I have recd to the effect that your Govt was giving consideration to withdrawing the Republic of Korea Army officer participating in the armistice discussions and has supported public demonstrations opposed to the discussions.

It might be well to review with you some facts in the present situation.

It is only by the collective action of the free world operating within the framework of the UN fighting side by side with your own forces that your gallant country has been saved from extinction by the treacherous Commie attack. The US has made a major contribution to this collective action in support of the great principle of collective security.

After more than one year of hostilities and thousands of casualties the United Nations forces, together with those of your country, have succeeded in repelling the Communist attack and have therefore achieved the basic purposes of the United Nations military action in Korea.

The peaceful character of our aims obliges us to attempt, as we are doing, to determine whether the aggressor is willing now to stop the fighting on conditions that would assure against renewal of the attack upon the Republic of Korea. As has been repeatedly pointed out, the present discussions are entirely military in character and the United Nations Command has not considered and will not consider or discuss any political or territorial questions in connection therewith.

General Ridgway is seeking to achieve an armistice on lines approximating the present battle front and only when such an armistice is agreed to is it contemplated that there will be any polit discussions. This course of action is consistent with my understanding of the suggestion contained in your letter, namely 'That the contending armies remain just as they are, without agreeing to a dividing line, and that meanwhile the polit discussions shall begin.'

I can fully understand your concern over the division of Korea. As you know, since 1943 it has been the consistent policy of the US to seek a united, independent and democratic Korea. The US sponsored the adoption of the same policy by the UN in 1947 and I can categorically assure you that it is the intent of the US Govt to continue vigorously to support that policy. We shall continue to seek the achievement of this aspiration of the Korean people. However, the UN has never accepted the obligation to achieve that objective by force of arms which wld be contrary to the very purpose of the UN Charter. Such action might well plunge the world into a gen conflict which wld be a particular disaster for Korea.

Up to the present time, the United Nations action in Korea has been marked by an unparalleled unity of purpose among all of the countries participating, including your own. Now that representatives of the United Nations Command are engaged in these discussions the same unity must prevail if success is to be achieved. We can be sure that the enemy will exploit to his maximum advantage any indications of disunity or divided purpose that may appear with the result that the grievous sacrifices made by both of our countries may well have been made in vain.

I am sure that you must realize that there could only be the most serious consequences if the people of this country and the governments and peoples of other countries whose forces are fighting in Korea to defend the principles of collective security are given any valid basis for the belief that action by your Government is endangering the success of the common effort. In order to avoid this possibility it is of the utmost importance that your Government take no unilateral action which would jeopardize the armistice discussions.

To this end I would like to have your assurance that your Government will continue to preserve our unity of purpose in Korea and demonstrate its cooperation with the Unified Command by making it clear to your military representative that he should continue his participation in the Kaesong armistice negotiations and by refraining from acts which might otherwise jeopardize a successful conclusion to all our efforts.

The end which the Republic of Korea and the United Nations equally seek for Korea is a united, peaceful, prosperous future worthy of its gallant people, their sacrifices, and their great exertions. With unity and with confidence we must persevere to the achievement of our common purpose.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed:) Harry S. Truman"

Signed original being transmitted air pouch.[1]

Repeat to: SCAP, Tokyo, priority 176 for USPolAd info: OOA.

ACHESON

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[1] Ambassador Muccio reported to the Department in his telegram 125, August 6, that the text of the letter had been given to President Rhee at 5 p. m. on that day (795.00/8-651).

357.AD/8-351: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 3, 1951—6 p. m.

104. For McClurkin[1] Congressman Richards, Chairman House Comite on Fon Affairs has introduced bill HR5020 reducing request for Korean rehabilitation by $100 million. Richards' statement of Aug 1, 1951 stated, "No one, including myself, underestimates the importance or magnitude of the Korean rehabilitation problem. However, the war is not yet over; rehabilitation cannot begin. When rehabilitation can begin, the United States can and should do its part. The authorization in the bill is for a contribution to a United Nations Agency[2] which is still essentially on a 'stand-by basis.' Other nations

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[1] Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] The reference is to UNKRA.

should be encouraged to undertake a suitable share of this burden. In any event, there is now a balance of about $50 million left over from fiscal year 1951 that could be made available for Korea—$50 million unobligated from fiscal year 1951 and $12.5 of new request as proposed in my bill. For these reasons, the cut of $100 million can be justified." Dept seeking counter Richards objection to full authorization of $162.5 at this time. If Kingsley initiates subj request you indicate that in Dept's opinion stop-over Wash cld be helpful.

[Repeat to:] USPolAd Tokyo—Topad 177.

ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 1 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 3 August 1951—9 : 35 p. m.

C–68266. "This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice conf at Kaesong 3 Aug 51.

"*Part 1.* Summary: The meeting consisted of two short statements by Joy, reaffirming United Nations Command proposed zone and rejecting 38th parallel, together with a 108 minute speech by Nam Il which generally reviewed enemy arguments for 38th parallel, criticized United Nations Command proposed zone. Nam Il's speech firm in tone, well-organized, typically illogical. Only new feature introduced was repetition 14 times of statement that United Nations Command proposed demarcation line was north of the 38th parallel, north of line of contact, and deep within Communist present psns. Nam Il offered copy of speech, already translated into English, and Joy accepted. Joy reiterated rejection of 38th. Meetings continue tomorrow.

"*Part 2.* Progress: None.

"*Part 3.* Attitude: No significant change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged version of the proceedings of the meeting.]

"*Part 5.* Conclusions: The UNC delegation believes:

(1) Extraordinary repetition by Nam Il of description of United Nations Command proposed demarcation line as north of 38th parallel, north of present line of contact, and deep within Communist present psns is appropriate propaganda for either continuation of Communist adamant stand or acceptance by them of line of contact as demarcation line.

(2) Nam Il indicated, by answers to Joy's questions that enemy definitely desires to continue negotiations at this time. I concur."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 4 : Telegram

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 4 August 1951—8:40 a. m.

DA TT 5018

Subject: Violation of Neutral Zone.

Conferees:

Present Washington:

Hon R A Lovett Dep SecDef
Adm L O McCormick Actg CNO (mc)
Gen J E Hull VCS Army
Lt Gen T D White OCS AF
Mr H Freeman Matthews Dep Undsec State
Mr J D Hickerson Asst Sec State
VAdm D B Duncan Dep Chf Naval OP
VAdm A C Davis JCS
Lt Gen C L Bolte DCS Army
Mr L T Merchant State
Mr U A Johnson State
Maj Gen C P Cabell Dir Intell AF
Maj Gen A R Bolling G2 Army
Maj Gen F L Parks CINFO Army
Brig Gen J Weckerling G2 Army
Brig Gen C D Eddleman G3 Army
Capt M M Stephens JCS

Present Tokyo:

Gen Ridgway CINC
Lt Gen Hickey COFS
Brig Gen Ennis G2
Brig Gen Wright G3
Col Moorman SGS
Col Surles SGS
Col Welch PIO
WO McCleary Pers Secy CINC

FEC-1. Top Secret.

Official.

For JCS from CINCFE

Subject: Armistice Conference Today.

Part I.

I received the following message from Munsan from Adm Joy at 040820Z Aug.

"In an attempt to get word to you before press does, report that about one company armed Chinese troops marched past within 300 yards United Nations house in Kaesong about 1345K today as UNC delegation proceeded to conference site.[1] Adm Joy notified Nam Il this violation both of half mile zone in which no armed troops were to be present and of five mile zone in which organized armed forces except military police were to be excluded. Nam Il replied would investigate and report.

"News photographers have story with stills and television movies."

Part II.

On my request for immediate verification of incident I received the following from Adm Joy:

"Time 1345K

"Place: On road between UNC house and conference house—300 yards from UNC house. 100 yards from conference house.

"Composition: Approx one infantry company marching in single file.

"Armament: Small arms including rifles, pistols and grenades observed by all members of delegation and staffs. Mortars reported by Norman Soong and other press photographers.

"Direction of movement: East.

"Names of eye-witnesses immediately avail: Joy, Craigie, Paik, Hodes, Burke, Nuckolls.

"Names of press who witnessed Chinese company: Norman Soong—Pan Asia; James Healy—Acme Photograph; James Pringle—AP Photographer; Robert McCoy—Time Life Reporter Photographer; Wade Bingham—Telenews Motion Picture Cameraman.

"Armament seen: Bren, 60 MM mortars, plus small arms, one of Chinese officers reached for gun while Wade Bingham photographing troop column.

"Norman Soong believes his prints will show both Bren guns and mortars.

"Jim Healy knows his film will show Bren guns and grenades.

"Pringle same as Healy.

"Undeveloped film arriving Tokyo tomorrow."

Will supply you film earliest.

Part III.

My broadcast to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai on this matter contained the following: "message from General Ridgway to General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-Huai at 13 July 1951.[2]

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[1] General Ridgway reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the conference of August 4 in his telegram C–68310, not printed, stating that no progress had been made and that the Communist side showed no sign of weakening in its adamant stand that the 38th parallel be made the military demarcation line (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 2).

[2] See the editorial note, p. 671.

1. The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary pre-requisites the establishment of an agreed conference area, of suitable extent, completely free of armed personnel of either side.

2. I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center at approximately the center of Kaesong, and with a five-mile radius, be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The Eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Pan Mun Jom. I propose that we both agree to refrain from hostile acts of any kind within this zone during the entire period of our conferences. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the roads leading thereto used by personnel of both delegation parties be completely free of armed personnel."

The reply by General Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai received at 2245K 14 July contained the following:

> "General Ridgway: We have received the proposition dated 13 July and have agreed to make Kaesong the neutral zone as you have proposed. Signed Kim Il Sung Peng Teh-Huai".[3]

Part IV.

Admiral Joy now reports that the UNC delegation believes that there is a definite possibility that the violation of the neutral zone was intentional. The UNC delegation is unable to understand the reason for such an intentional violation unless Communists want to break the conference on this issue rather than on an agenda item. UNC delegation is unanimous in the belief that Nam Il was unusually arrogant and confident today.

Part V.

Subject to such modifications as you may direct, I propose broadcasting the following message with the least practicable delay: "To Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai: It has been officially verified by eye witnesses, confirmed with still and movie photography, that on or about 1345 hours 4 August, armed military forces not belonging to the United Nations Command, were observed in Kaesong within approximately 100 yards of conference house. These forces, approximating an infantry company, were proceeding in an Easterly direction on foot and were armed with rifles, pistols, grenades, automatic weapons and mortars.

"Your attention is invited to the following: On 13 July 1951, I broadcast a message addressed to you which contained the following passages: 'The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary pre-requisites the establishment of an agreed conference area, of suitable extent, completely free of armed personnel of either side.' In the same message I stated 'I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center at approximately the center of Kaesong, and with a five-mile radius, be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The Eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Pan Mun Jom.

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[3] See telegram HNC-097, July 15, from Korea, p. 682.

" 'I propose that we both agree to refrain from hostile acts of any kind within this zone during the entire period of our conference. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the roads leading thereto used by personnel of both delegation parties be completely free of armed personnel'.

"On 14 July 1951, you broadcast to me a reply to this message which stated among other things, 'We have received the proposition dated 13 July and have agreed to make Kaesong the neutral zone as you have proposed'.

"I now invite your attention to this flagrant violation of the assurances which I required and which you promised. I hereby demand a prompt explanation of this flagrant violation of your agreement, a statement satisfactory to me of the corrective action taken and acceptable guarantees against a recurrence. I desire to inform you that until such explanation, report of corrective action taken and acceptable guarantees against recurrence are received, the United Nations Command delegation will remain within United Nations lines. If and when you have complied with the foregoing the United Nations Command delegation will be prepared to resume discussions now interrupted by your complete disregard of your commitments."

Request your instructions soonest.

Signed. Ridgway.

DA-1. Secret.

Received your UNC 173[4] a short time ago—Adm Davis.

DA-2. Top Secret.

Official.

For Ridgway from JCS.

Your proposed broadcast approved except delete final portion of message beginning "I hereby demand" and ending "Your commitments" and substitute the following "The UNC delegation is prepared to continue conversations as soon as satisfactory explanation of this violation and assurances of non-recurrence are received. I await your reply."

FEC-2. Top Secret.

Official.

Ref DA-2.

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[4] This was the message quoted in Part I of this teletype conference.

Respectfully submit that Communists understand strength only. Revised text will be interpreted as weakness.

In any event strongly recommend interpolation of following as next to last sentence of your revision: "Meanwhile United Nations Command delegation will remain within United Nations lines." Ridgway.

DA–3. Secret.

Official.

For Ridgway from JCS.

To explain probable absence of Joy suggest you give consideration to delivering copy of your broadcast statement to Communist representatives at Kaesong in addition to broadcasting it.

FEC–3. Top Secret.

Official.

Ref DA–3.

Extremely reluctant to commit any United Nations personnel to Kaesong until satisfactory explanation and guarantees are received.

DA–6. Secret.

Official.

Reference FEC–3 our DA–3.

Fully agree.

FEC–4. Top Secret.

Official.

Am I authorized to interpolate sentence quoted in FEC–2.

DA–5. Secret.

Official.

For Ridgway from JCS.

Reference our DA–2 your FEC–2 our reason for deletion was that we felt statement could be interpreted as weakness and submission to intimidation. However if you feel it is desirable agree to leave matter your discretion.

FEC–5. Top Secret.

Official.

Ref DA–5.

Your DA–5 not entirely clear. If left to my discretion would broadcast my entire message as given in my FEC–1, Part V.

Please confirm that this is left to my discretion.

DA–7. Secret.

Official.

For Ridgway from JCS.

Reur FEC–5.

Intention of our DA–5 is only that you may interpolate sentence proposed in your FEC–2 if you wish. Except for above we reaffirm change in your broadcast as contained in our DA–2.

FEC–6. Secret.
Official.
Ref DA–7.
Roger. Nothing further here.[5]

DA–4. Restricted.
Official.
For Ridgway from JCS.
We think Joy and his delegation are doing a wonderful job.

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[5] The text of General Ridgway's broadcast, which was made over the Armed Forces Radio Service at 6 a. m., August 5 (4 p. m., August 4, EDT), and which conformed to the wording agreed on in this teletype conference, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 13, 1951, p. 269.

795.00/7–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 4, 1951—3 p. m.

75. Re Korea. Urtel 145 July 25. In light of your thoughtful analysis and strong UK and Fr preference we agree that combination of SC and GA action following Korean armistice would be desirable. However, as emphasized in Deptel 30 July 14 it is highly important obtain widest possible prior commitment from UK and other leading Dels, for whole-hearted support for GA action along desired lines as soon as SC resolution is passed.

1. SC Action.

Under our present thinking SC resolution would *a*) refer in preamble to SC resolutions on Korea of June 25, 27 and July 7, 1950, and to report on armistice to be submitted by UC under resolution of July 7, *b*) note with approval terms of armistice, and *c*) request SYG to transmit present resolution to GA in connection with GA task of considering permanent settlement of Korean problem.

We agree that since preamble suggested in *a*) above places proposed resolution in context of the UN action in Korea there will be a risk of Soviet veto. USSR might ask for separate vote under SC Rule 32; it might vote against preamble but might vote for the resolution as a whole since veto would be difficult to reconcile with Sov pose as "champion of peace". If Soviets should seek to veto preamble only we may take position separate vote on preamble is preliminary and veto to be effective must be asserted against entire resolution. Another alternative would be for US and other co-sponsors of resolution to exercise right under Rule 32 to oppose separate vote. This alternative may be less desirable propaganda-wise. In event, of veto of entire resolution we would move immediately into GA.

There is also question of sponsorship for a SC resolution. We are inclined to believe that widest possible sponsorship may be desirable.

2. GA Action.

Our ideas re contents of GA resolution are given in para 1, sub-para *a*, *b*, and *c* of Deptel 30 July 14. These are consistent with objectives for GA action set forth in Section II urtel. We agree that resolution might also provide for some UN machinery calculated to achieve political settlement consistent with UN objective in Korea but we are unable at this time to indicate what form such machinery should take. One of possibilities we are considering is the appointment of UN representative to assist in negotiations for political settlement.

While we agree that UNCURK should not be continued for any considerable period of time following conclusion of armistice, it appears desirable to postpone its liquidation and its replacement by new long term machinery until there is some indication as to prospects and course of discussions on political settlement.

We do not believe it advisable to have GA note UC–UNKRA agreement. This is an operating agreement not requiring such notice. If GA notes it, presumably any future change in agreement would also have to be brought before GA. Moreover, it is not clear what useful purpose would be served by opening GA discussions of UNKRA until new action in this field is called for.

On basis of above we agree you may in your discretion initiate discussions with other dels as suggested in Section III urtel. You should make it clear that discussions are wholly tentative and exploratory since armistice negotiations to date have barely reached substantive questions, and course of discussion affords no basis for optimism that agreement can be reached on difficult basic questions involved. In these circumstances we believe question of possible Five Power consultations (Section I D of urtel) should be held in abeyance and not raised with other Dels.

ACHESON

795.00/8–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, August 4, 1951—6 p. m.

123. Is interesting to note two recent public statements by Fon and Def Mins denying they ordered Gen Paik to withdraw Kaesong talks.

We assume Pres Rhee, after leaking story to UP, requested Mins, who at forward area at time, to issue statements denying truth of story. This typical Rhee tactic in sitn where he desirous spread story but same time deny he or his govt behind it.

Whole incident was based on objection to any agreement on 38th Parallel, which Rhee knew at time UN del not even considering. Having been talked out of ordering Gen Paik withdraw, he probably considered publicity wld at least point up once again Kor objections to 38th and by threatening allied solidarity might help maintain UN del's stiff attitude on issue.

Sihn Sung-Mo's[1] Aug 2 mission conveying Gen Ridgway's objections to conflicting orders sent Paik and concern lest Rhee's attitude toward armistice negots harm UN solidarity apparently had little influence on Rhee's mind. Sihn told me after seeing Rhee he had rather cold reception. Rhee commented at end, "so they've taken you into their camp in three weeks".

I believe Secy's strong statement at his last press conference further clarifying our stand that 38th Parallel cannot be accepted as basis for buffer zone has again come at timely moment.[2] I am hopeful no further trouble on Gen Paik's participation in talks will arise.[3]

Sent Dept 123; rptd info Tokyo 46.

Muccio

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[1] Head of the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan.

[2] Mr. Acheson made this observation at his news conference on August 1.

[3] On August 3, General Paik transmitted a letter to General Ridgway indicating that President Rhee had instructed him to continue attending the peace talks regardless of their outcome, with the definite understanding that his presence in no way indicated Korean acceptance of any agreement which might be reached during the talks. Such acceptance would have to be left to a decision of the Government of the Republic of Korea. (Copy of letter embodied in telegram 147, August 11, from Pusan; 795.00/8–1151)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 7 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH Tokyo, 7 August 1951—1:10 a. m.[1]

C–68437. This msg in 8 parts.

Part 1. Following is the text received here at 060800K August of the English language broadcast from Peiping:

"General Ridgway:

"Your message to hand. Concerning the incident at 1300 hours on August 4, when in violation of the agreement a group of guards of our side belonging to the neutral zone of Kaesong carrying improper arms by mistake entered the area of the meeting place, our chief delegate ordered his liaison officer, Colonel Chang Chung San, to inform your delegation at 9:30 hours on the 5th how this came about, and in addition to make it clear that our chief delegate has again ordered the personnel responsible for the guards in the neutral zone of Kaesong to pay serious attention to the prohibition on guards entering the area of the meeting place, and to guarantee strict fulfillment of the order so as to prevent any recurrence of such an incident.

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[1] Due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this message was received in Washington during the middle of the day on August 6.

"In order that our meeting shall not be impeded by such accidental, minor incidents, we have once again ordered our guards in the neutral zone of Kaesong to obey strictly the agreement of July 14, and to guarantee that there will be no such violations of the agreement.

"We hope that on receipt of this reply, you will immediately order your delegation to come to Kaesong, and resume the meetings. Signed: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army; Peng Te Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers".

Part 2. Following is an exact copy of the English language text of the official communication signed by Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, and delivered to Colonel Kinney, UNC Liaison Officer at Pan Mun Jom at 060900K August: "August 6, 1951. Gen Ridgway: Your radio broadcast has been received.

"With regard to the infringement of the agreement by our guards in the Kaesong neutral zone in carrying inappropriate arms and inadvertently entering the conference area at 1300 hours, Aug 4, our senior delegate has instructed his liaison officer, Col Chang Chon San, to inform your delegation at 0930, Aug 5, as to how the incident occurred, and to inform your delegation that our senior delegate has again ordered the responsible officer of the guards for Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the regulation that no armed guards should enter into the conference area and to insure strict carrying out of this order so that similar incidents shall not occur again.

"In order that our conference will not be obstructed by accidental side issues, we have again ordered our guards in the Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the agreement of July 14 and to insure that incidents violating the agreement shall not occur again.

"We hope that after receiving our reply, you will immediately instruct your delegation to come to Kaesong to resume the meeting. Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

Part 3. Following is translation made by our best translators here of the Japanese language broadcast from Peiping received here at 060630K August:

"General Ridgway:

"We have received your message.

"On the matter concerning the Kaesong area guard unit of our forces inadvertently entering the conference area carrying improper weapons at 1300, 4 August, in violation of our agreement, the chief delegate on our side had already ordered our liaison officer, Colonel Chang Chung San, at 0930, 5 August, to report to your delegation the details of the occurrence of the most recent incident which was in violation of our agreement, and at the same time it was ordered that your delegation be notified that the chief delegate of our side had carefully called attention of the officers in charge of the Kaesong neutral area guards to the fact that the guards must not enter the conference area, and that they had been further ordered that they strictly follow this order to make sure that such an incident will not recur.

"In order that our conference will not be obstructed by such accidental trivial incidents, we have again ordered the guard unit of the Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the agreement of 14 July and to assure against recurrence of such a violation of the agreement.

"We desire that immediately upon receipt of this reply you order your delegation to proceed at once to Kasong for resumption of the negotiations.

"Signed: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and Peng Te-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteers."

Part 4. It is to be noted that the final paragraph of the English text of both the broadcast and the written message is of temperate tenor and language. The same passage in the Japanese text is insolent in tone and peremptory in tenor. Whether this difference is due to translation is partially in doubt. It is, however, a tenable theory that translation did not enter into it, that the difference was deliberately done to give Asiatic hearers the impression that they, the Communists, were dictating to their vanquished UN enemies.

Part 5. I wish respectfully to invite attention at this point to a few salient facts.

The armistice talks are military. They are neither political nor diplomatic. Hence, in these discussions, the language of diplomacy is inappropriate and ineffective.

The discussions are between soldiers. ½ of them are Communists who understand only what they want to understand; who consider courtesy as concession and concession as weakness; who are uninhibited in repudiating their own solemn obligations; who view such obligations solely as means for attaining their ends; who attained to power through murderous conspiracy and who remain in power by that and other equally infamous practices.

To sit down with these men and deal with them as with representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride one's own dignity and to invite the disaster their treachery will inevitably bring upon us.

I propose to direct the UNC delegation to govern its utterances accordingly and while remaining, as they have, scrupulously factual and properly temperate in word and deed, to employ such language and methods as these treacherous savages cannot fail to understand, and understanding, respect.

Part 6. The enemy capability for major offensive action continues to increase. Indications multiply of his deliberate intention to employ these armistice discussions for the purpose of gaining time in which to prepare for and to increase the chance of success of major offensive action. My estimate, on which the foregoing statements are based, is contained in my C-68428 of this date, forwarded separately.[2]

Part 7. Subject to your contrary instructions, I now plan to broadcast the following message at the earliest practicable moment:

"I have received and noted the contents of your message of 6 August. You state that orders have again been issued to your Kaesong area guards to adhere strictly to the regulation that no armed guards would enter the conference area; in order that incidents similar to that of 4 August will not occur again.

"I have also noted that you describe such incidents as minor, accidental and trivial. Such incidents are of fundamental importance, as I have before pointed out. The incidents are neither minor nor trivial and their accidental nature remains in doubt. Their re-occurrence will not be tolerated.

"The statement that orders to your Kaesong guards have again been issued indicates that your original orders were believed adequate to insure compliance with our agreement of 14 July. The appearance of elements of your armed military forces in the immediate vicinity of the conference area on 4 August indicates either gross carelessness in the execution of your obligations, or your inability to compel compliance by your troops with your own orders. Since the only armed forces in the neutral area were to be those required for military police functions, it is somewhat difficult to understand why mortar and machine-gun squads, with their equipment, were present in the unit violating your agreement. Photographs are hard to refute.

"Your carelessness in such a matter is of grave significance. Your violation of agreed neutrality justifies the conclusion that your assurances are unreliable. While actually demonstrating the unreliability of these assurances, you continue to propose that the United Nations Command accept indefensible positions during an armistice. You urge that it give up strong defensive positions, and that it rely for the security of its forces on your mere verbal assurances of good intent. I no longer accept such assurances.

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[2] Not printed.

"You have not taken satisfactory measures to prevent recurring incidents in the neutral area. Resumption of negotiations under these conditions which you have allowed to exist is unacceptable.

"I therefore propose that a joint inspection team, consisting of 3 individuals designated by you and 3 designated by me, be organized to perform joint inspections of the Kaesong neutral zone in order to guarantee against recurrence of these violations.

In the event you do not agree to the formation of such a joint inspection team, and to accord it free movement within the Kaesong neutral zone, I shall insist upon a new site for the resumption of negotiations where the United Nations Command can and will guarantee against the violation of neutral areas established by agreement.

"My liaison officers will be prepared on receipt of your reply to discuss the necessary details."

Part 8. Your comments on part 7 are requested soonest.[3]

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[3] An interim response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 6 directed General Ridgway to withhold his proposed broadcast pending further consideration in Washington, to which Ridgway agreed. (Telegrams JCS 98189 and C-68438; Black Book, Tabs 10 and 11)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 11 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 6 August 1951—6:48 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–98216. From JCS. Reur C 68437.[1]

1. Fully appreciate your attitude concerning Communist propaganda but consider that in effect they have accepted your conditions in your last broadcast. To impose new conditions now would be difficult to justify in many important quarters. Believe you should continue negotiations after making folg broadcast.

"I have received and noted contents of your message of 6 Aug. You state that orders have again been issued to your Kaesong area guards to adhere strictly to the regulation that no armed guards would enter the conference area; in order that incidents similar to that of 4 Aug will not occur again.

"I have also noted that you describe such incidents as minor, accidental and trivial. Such incidents are of fundamental importance, as I have before pointed out. The incidents are neither minor nor trivial. Their accidental nature is in doubt, since mortar and machinegun squads, in violation of your agreement, were present with their equipment in the neutral area, whereas the only armed forces in the neutral area were to be those required for mil police functions.

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[1] *Supra.*

"It must be clearly understood that my acceptance of a resumption of the armistice talks is conditional on complete compliance with your guarantees of neutralization of the Kaesong area. Any further failure in this regard will be interpreted as a deliberate move on your part to terminate the armistice negotiations." [2]

2. JCS 98189 [3] downgraded to secret.

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[2] The text of the broadcast as made by General Ridgway on August 7 contained the following concluding sentence: "I await your acceptance of this condition." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 20, 1951, p. 306)

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

795.00/8–751

Memorandum for the Files by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1951.

Subject: UN Action on Korea

Ambassador Gross telephoned Mr. Hickerson shortly after noon on August 7 to seek clarification regarding some questions raised in the Department's telegram no. 75 dated August 4.

Ambassador Gross, who was preparing to consult with Jebb and Lacoste, wanted to know how much importance we attached to having the Security Council resolution refer specifically in its preamble to the June 25 and June 27 Security Council resolutions. I told him that we attached considerable importance to this point, and that we felt that a failure to mention these resolutions would be regarded as in essence a gesture of appeasement toward the USSR. Ambassador Gross wondered what our reaction would be to a reference only to the Security Council resolution of July 7, noting that pursuant to this resolution a report had been received from the Unified Command on the conclusion of an armistice. I told Ambassador Gross that I could see little logic in referring to the July 7 resolution alone and doubted it would be much more acceptable to the Soviets than our original position. I told the Ambassador that some other areas of the Department were inclined to agree with the British and French in their reluctance to include references to the June 1950 resolutions but that I felt that from a United Nations standpoint this was important.

Ambassador Gross asked whether we were concerned about the possibility of a Soviet veto on the matter. I told him that we were not particularly worried by this prospect.

The Ambassador asked us whether we would insist on having the Security Council resolution include provision for transmission of the Unified Command report to the General Assembly for action by the Assembly. I indicated that there was a little more flexibility here; the main point was that we must be certain that Assembly action would follow after Security Council proceedings had been concluded.

The Ambassador then turned to the question of sponsorship. He assumed that our references to "widest possible sponsorship" of the Security Council resolution did not include the USSR. I agreed. I suggested that it would be appropriate for all Security Council members contributing forces to the Unified Command to co-sponsor such a resolution.

The Ambassador then referred to our telegram no. 30 to New York dated July 14 and asked whether we wanted to spell out in an Assembly resolution Point 1b ("note with approval armistice agreement of ——— which confirms that armed attack against ROK has been repelled, that fighting has come to an end, that international peace and security in area are being restored"). I said that we wished these concepts to be included in the resolution but that the wording might perhaps be changed. It was important not to leave any doubt that the mere conclusion of an armistice did not of itself restore international peace and security in the area.

In answer to further questions by Ambassador Gross, I told him that we had no objection to inclusion in a General Assembly resolution of a paragraph reaffirming the desirability of support for Korean rehabilitation, *without* specific reference to the UC–UNKRA agreement; that we had not yet made any decision on time — i. e., how quickly we would move in the General Assembly after conclusion of an armistice; that we preferred a single General Assembly resolution to a number of resolutions; and that we had doubts about the wisdom of Five-Power consultations and expected that USUN would so indicate if other delegations again referred to this possibility.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

695A.0024/8-851

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 8 August 1951.

Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum on the above subject which we have just forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. I am sending this copy to you because the subject is, I know, one of extreme interest to you, and, in addition, I believe that it should be handled by NSC as soon as practicable. A copy of the enclosure has been forwarded to General Smith.

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 8 August 1951.

Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners.

1. The following proposed policy has been recommended to and considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners remaining under United Nations control after all exchanges agreed to during current armistice negotiations have been completed, that:

a. Subject to adequate safeguards for United Nations prisoners in Communist hands, the United Nations Commander in Korea be authorized, in his discretion, not to repatriate Chinese or North Korean prisoners of war to Communist-controlled territory without their full consent;

b. Subject to adequate safeguards for United Nations prisoners in Communist hands, the United Nations Commander in Korea be authorized to repatriate to Formosa all Chinese prisoners of war who are found to be acceptable to the Chinese Nationalist Government and who claim to be ex-Nationalists or Nationalists at heart and elect such repatriation; and

c. Provision should be included in the safeguards mentioned above for United Nations authorities to interview immediately all prisoners remaining in Communist custody after initial agreed exchanges are made. A like provision should be made applicable to Communist prisoners in United Nations custody.

2. The following may be stated in justification of this policy:

a. There is grave likelihood that those Chinese and North Korean prisoners who are forcibly repatriated to the Communists will be executed or condemned to slave labor. Humanitarian considerations prompt that these prisoners not be forced to return;

b. In the conduct of psychological warfare in Korea, the United Nations Commander promised safety and asylum to those Chinese and North Korean military personnel who would voluntarily surrender to his forces. Forceful repatriation to the Communists of such individuals will be in violation of his promise;

c. In light of the ideological struggle throughout the world for the minds of men and the despotic totalitarian methods employed by the Communists to force men to join with them, it would be of great value to establish in the free world not only the reliability of the promises of the United Nations Commander but also the principle of United Nations asylum from terrorism; and

d. The effectiveness of future United States psychological warfare programs would be enhanced by the adoption of this policy.

3. The disadvantages inherent in the policy are as follows:

a. It would establish a precedent for future wars which might prevent complete repatriation after the cessation of hostilities. Specifically, the Communists could claim justification for not returning United Nations armed forces personnel whom they now or may in the future hold as prisoners of war, and there would be no assurance that the retention of such personnel was in accordance with the freely expressed choice of the individual.

b. It would also establish a precedent contrary to Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (to which, however, the United States is not a signatory).[1] This article includes a provision that "prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." The policy proposed in paragraph 1 above would, in effect, redefine "repatriation" by limiting it to those who voluntarily elect such repatriation;

c. It would provide the Communists with propaganda material inasmuch as the USSR undoubtedly would claim that the United States was forcibly holding prisoners who wished to return; and

d. Subsequent to agreement on an armistice in Korea, it might be used by the Communists as a reason for breaking off peace negotiations and for Communist renewal of hostilities in that country.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, have no objection to the adoption of the proposed policy expressed in paragraph 1 above. On balance, they are inclined to favor it because of its extreme importance to the effectiveness of psychological warfare. They recognize, however, that the matter transcends the military.

5. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed policy be submitted to the National Security Council for consideration.

6. In view of the fact that CINCUNC may need guidance on this matter before the armistice negotiations in Korea reach the exchange of prisoners agenda item, copies of this memorandum are being handed

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[1] For the text of Art. 118, see 6 UST 3406. The Convention was signed by the United States on August 12, 1949, but it did not enter into force for the United States until February 2, 1956, subsequent to ratification by the U.S. Government. The principles of the Convention, however, had been accepted by the United States as regards the fighting in Korea in July 1950; see Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 10, p. 60.

informally to the State Department and the CIA in order that consideration by the National Security Council may be expedited.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 13: Telegram

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate in Korea (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET FLASH KOREA, 8 August 1951—8:04 p. m.

HNC–188 1. In response to telephone rqst from Colonel Chang, Senior Communist Liaison Officer, Colonel Kinney, Senior UN Comd Liaison Off met Chang at outpost line vic of Pan Mun Jom at 1500K hours this date. Chang handed Kinney an unaddressed statement in English as follows:

> "At 1045 AM Aug 7, over 40 armed personnel of your side advanced along the highway to the bridge 500 meters from Pan Mun Jom and on arriving near the bridge fired with light machine gun at Pan Mun Jom neutral zone.
>
> "At 1100 AM 6 of the over 40 men (among them one carrying a pistol and the rest carrying automatic rifles and tommy guns) crossed the bridge and on reaching over 200 meters from Pan Mun Jom fired at unarmed personnel of our side in the Pan Mun Jom neutral zone. At the same time heavy and light machine guns East of the bridge kept up their fire on the neutral zone. The automatic rifles and tommy guns fired altogether more than 60 rounds and the light machine gun fired 1 burst. Your side frequently fire at Pan Mun Jom from hills North and South of Kam Aedong and there are bullets to prove this. The above-mentioned incident further occurred yesterday. I am instructed by our senior delegate to call the serious attention of your side to the above-mentioned situation."

2. Kinney asked Chang for whom the statement was intended. The Communist officer replied "for you but I rqst you take the matter up with Admiral Joy at once."

3. I recommend that Commanding General, Eighth Army be rqstd to investigate this matter without delay and report soonest.

4. Suspicion exists in minds of some staff officers here if such incident actually did occur it might possibly have been inspired by certain elements among ROK's.

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[1] Repeated for information to Washington for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (Van Fleet).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 15 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 9 August 1951—3 :01 p. m.

CX-68595. In response to radio-telephone request from Colonel Chang, Senior Communist Liaison Officer, Colonel Murray, United Nations Command Liaison Officer met Chang at outpost line vicinity of Pan Mun Jom at 1015K hours this date. Chang handed Murray the following message in English and Korean. The Korean copy was signed. The English copy was unsigned. However, interpreters here state that both versions are substantially the same in word and tone: "To Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Senior Delegate of the Delegation of United Nations Forces:

"At 1500 hours, August 7, a supply truck of our delegation, with white cloth over its hood and carrying a white flag in conformity with agreement, encountered 2 airplanes of your side 6 kilometers north of Sibyonri, while on its way from Kaesong to Pyongyang. These airplanes of your side circled for a long time above the truck of our delegation and machine-gunned the truck twice consecutively, destroying its engine and incapacitating the truck. We have full proof to substantiate the above fact.

"In the preparatory meeting of the Liaison Officers of both sides on July 8, it was clearly and definitely agreed that airplanes of your side should not attack trucks of our delegation carrying white flags. On July 21, our Liaison Officer called the attention of your side to the fact that 4 supply trucks of our delegation carrying white flags had been attacked by airplanes of your side at Hwangju and Sariwon. Your side assured again at that time that henceforth trucks of our delegation with white flags and white cloth over their hoods would not be attacked.

"The above-mentioned fact is obviously a clear violation of the agreement between both sides. It is worthwhile to point out that this is a further violation of the agreement, which followed closely the shooting at Pan Mun Jom neutral zone by your armed personnel. I hereby lodge a grave protest on this matter with you and hope that you will guarantee against recurrence of any such violation of the agreement. (Signed) General Nam Il, Senior Delegate, the Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

I have authorized Admiral Joy to make the following reply:

"I have received your letter complaining of an air attack made on one of your vehicles at Sibyon-Ni, approx 25 miles northeast of Kaesong. Your complaint is completely without validity. On 8 July your Senior Liaison Officer, Colonel Chang, was told verbally by the Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer, Colonel Kinney, that vehicles serving your delegation at Kaesong would be exempt from attack if prior notification of their route and time of travel were provided the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and if such vehicles were plainly marked with white. In addition Colonel Kinney, Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer, furnished Colonel Chang, Senior Communist Liaison Officer, the foregoing in writing. I [quote] from the information sheet for the Communist Liaison Officer, given to Colonel Chang by Colonel Kinney on 8 July:

> 'A Communist convoy marked with white crosses will not be attacked by United Nations Forces in transit to and from Kaesong at such time and over such route as is communicated to Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command'.

"As a result, you did furnish Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, notification of the time and route of transit of your convoy proceeding to Kaesong on 9 July, thus indicating your understanding of the requirement for notification. In addition, on 21 July, Colonel Kinney again informed Colonel Chang that notification of the time and route of travel of your vehicles between Pyongyang and Kaesong was a necessary pre-requisite to exemption from attack. Again Col Chang indicated his understanding of this requirement by complaining that it was difficult to communicate such notification in each instance. Colonel Kinney then informed Colonel Chang for the third time that without such notification, exemption from attack could not be guaranteed. You are of course, aware that communication between your station at Kaesong and the United Nations Command Delegation south of the Imjin is maintained constantly.

"I note that the location of the attacks you allege is considerably east of the main road between Pyongyang and Kaesong. This fact raises the question in my mind whether your forces are abusing the use of white markings for purposes other than serving your delegation.

"As to the report made by Colonel Chang to Colonel Kinney on 8 August of an incident alleged to have occurred at Pan Mun Jom on 7 Aug, I note that you delayed more than 24 hours in transmitting this report. This thereby precluded a timely investigation. However, the matter is now being given such consideration as it deserves."

795B.5/8–951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 9, 1951—4 p. m.

42. Deptel 311 May 31, 1951. Fol msg from Pres to Menzies delivered Austral Emb Aug 8:

"In your msg to me you outlined the considerations, which, in the opinion of the Govt of Austral, would make it difficult for you to double the Austral contribution to the UN ground forces without impairing your training program and your capacity to assist as planned in the defense of the Middle East. As a consequence of the increase in over-all global tensions resulting from Chinese-Commie participation in the Korean war it has been necessary for the nations of the free world to re-examine and accelerate their mobilization plans.

"The US Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the mobilization responsibilities of Austral in the event of global war and are agreed that these responsibilities must have paramount consideration and that nothing should be done to impair Austral's capabilities of mobilization. While endorsing this view, I would nevertheless stress the importance which we attach to the need for replacements and for the rotation of battle-weary troops. Furthermore there are obvious advantages, from a mobilization point of view, in obtaining a sizable group of troops trained in combined operations.

"We would urge, therefore, the desirability of the training of additional ground forces so that at least a brigade of Austral ground combat troops can be maintained in Korea. Even if hostilities shld be terminated, forces of UN members will continue to be required.

"I shld like again to express appreciation of the contribution which Austral is making in Korea and at the same time to pay tribute to the heroism of the Austral forces which have been engaged in the hostilities.

"With warm personal regards, Harry S. Truman."

In response to question raised by Emb it was explained msg not intended as reaffirmation our request made immed after Austral election for additional troops Korea at this time. Msg suggested training additional troops so that in due course strength at least brigade could be maintained Korea.[1]

ACHESON

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[1] On October 4, the Australian Government announced a contribution of an additional brigade of ground troops for the U.N. effort in Korea, thus doubling the Australian infantry forces already there, with the troops to arrive early in 1952. The U.S. Government immediately expressed its gratification at this announcement; see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 15, 1951, p. 634.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 16 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 9 August 1951—4:45 p. m.

C-68607. Ref HNC 188 from CINCUNC Adv, passed to you on 8 Aug 51. Fol receipt of rept contained in ref msg, I directed CG Army Eight to conduct an immediate invest. The fol summary of invest has been recd from Gen Van Fleet:

"The fol is a summary of invest conducted by CG, I US Corps.

"On 7 Aug 51, 5 patrols were dispatched by 1st ROK Div. Of these, 3 remained east of the CS-CT 00 north-south grid line and therefore are not discussed in this msg. One of the remaining 2 patrols, that from 5th KMC Bn, did not adv farther north than the BS 90 east-west grid line. The 5th patrol, from the Div Recon Co departed from a fwd patrol base vic BT 993024 (4500 meters east of Pan Mun Jom) at 0500K and proceeded north arriving vic BT 9905 at 1100 hours without contact or obsn of the enemy. By 1400K the patrol had adv to BT 994068 from which pnt 20 enemy were observed aprx 800 yards to the north. There was no exchange of fire. At 1500K the patrol had moved west aprx 1000 meters to BT 988068 from which pnt it moved southwest to CT 005049. At 1700K the patrol began withdrawing to Div Recon Patrol Base at BS 973969, arriving there at 1900K. During the entire patrol no ammo was fired. This patrol consisted of 1 Off and 25 men armed with 19 M-1, 4 Carbines, 3 BAR, 1 LMG and 2 rocket launchers. At no time were any elms of this patrol closer than 4000 meters to Pan Mun Jom.

"On 16 Jul 51, CG, I US Corps carefully defined the limits of the neutral zone to his subordinate comdrs and on the same date CG 1 ROK Div established a patrol limit line which at its closest pnt is apprx 2500 meters from Pan Mun Jom.

"From detailed rept of invest conducted by CG I US Corps, it is concluded that no United Nations Unit could have been involved in the incident in ques.

"The full written rept of invest by CG I US Corps will be delivered to Adm Joy by Off Courier without delay."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 17 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 9 August 1951—11:50 p. m.

C-68633. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. The fol msg was delivered to UN Command Liaison Officer by Communist Liaison Officer at outpost line located vic of Pan Mun Jom at 1700K hours this date.

"Aug 9th, 1951, General Ridgway, your msg of Aug 7 has been received. We informed you in our reply dated Aug 6 that 'We have again ordered our guards in the Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the agreement of July 14 and to ensure that incidents violating the agreement shall not occur again.' You must be aware that this agreement is in the agreement concerning the neutralization of the Kaesong area referred to in your same msg of Aug 7. As we have seriously ensured the strict adherence to the agreement concerning the neutralization of the Kaesong area, it is inconceivable that there will be any further failure on our part to comply with the agreement, unless you should deliberately fabricate incidents as an excuse to terminate the armistice negotiations. On our part, we definitely will not terminate the negotiations rashly and irresponsibly without going through the procedural steps of protest, investigation, consultation and settlement, should a similar failure on your part occur. We continue to hope that you instruct your delegates to come to Kaesong to resume the conference. Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army. Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples volunteers."

Part 2. I have instructed Admiral Joy as fols: "Inform the Senior Communist Liaison Officer as fols: 'I have been instructed by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to resume the conference on the basis that it is inconceivable that there will be any further failure on their part to comply with the agreement regarding neutralization of the Kaesong area, as stated in msg of 9 Aug to General Ridgway from General Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai. Accordingly I suggest we resume the conference at 1100 hours 10 Aug, Seoul time'.[1]

"It is desired that concurrently with delivery of this msg to the Senior Communist Liaison Officer you release the identical msg to the press."

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[1] The time of the August 10 meeting was changed to 1:30 p.m., Korean time.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 20 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED PRIORITY TOKYO, 10 August 1951—3:58 p.m.

CX-68655. This message in 3 Parts.

Part 1. Armistice conferences resumed at 1330K, 10 August. During meeting today, Admiral Joy will positively re-affirm to the Communist delegation our position regarding the safety of Communist Delegation vehicles from UNC air attacks. He will also refute Communist charges of violations of neutral zone by UNC patrols by presenting report of investigation, with maps and copies of statements of appropriate commanders. All such Communist charges, without exception, are false.

Part 2. The Communist Liaison Officer delivered the following message to the UNC Liaison Officer at 0915K, 10 August at Pan Mun Jom:

"I have received your reply concerning the machine-gunning by your airplanes of a supply truck of our delegation carrying a white flag and with a white cloth over its hood. Your reply is completely unsatisfactory.

"Regarding the question that aircraft of your side should not attack vehicles of our delegation carrying white flags at the preparatory meeting of the Liaison Officers of both sides on July 8, we never agreed to your request that there should be prior notification of the route and time of travel. The statement in your message that we furnished notification to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces of the time and route of transit of our convoy proceeding to Kaesong on July 9 is sheer fabrication. This is sufficient to prove that we have never agreed to your above-mentioned request. In fact, since the preparatory meeting of the Liaison Officers of both sides, we have never notified your side of the time and route of travel of the vehicles of our delegation carrying white flags. We have consistently held that, after the preparatory meeting of the Liaison Officers of both sides, there should no longer be any necessity for prior notification to your side of the time and route of travel of vehicles of our delegation carrying white flags.

"On July 21, your Liaison Officer Colonel Kinney further clearly agreed that all vehicles of our delegation with markings of white flags and white cloth would not be attacked and it would not be necessary to give prior notification to your side of the time and route of their travel. When our Liaison Officer called the attention of your side to the fact that 4 supply trucks of our delegation carrying white flags had been attacked by airplanes of your side at Hwangju and Sariwon, your Liaison Officer did request once again that we give, as far as possible, prior notification of the route and time of travel of the vehicles of our delegation. But after our Liaison Officer stated that it was our consistent understanding that there should be no necessity to give prior notification of the route and time of travel of vehicles of our delegation carrying white flags, your Liaison Officer Colonel Kinney expressed clear agreement and only requested that the vehicles of our delegation be covered with white cloth over their hoods in addition to carrying white flags so as to facilitate recognition. Since then, vehicles of our delegation have been covered with white cloth over their hoods as well as carrying white flags. The supply truck of our side attacked by your airplane near Sibyonri on August 7 was marked with a white cloth over its hood in addition to the white flag.

"You insinuated in your letter that our forces abused the use of white markings. Such a slanderous insinuation is entirely groundless. The location of the attack by your airplanes on the truck of our delegation on August 7 is on one of the two main roads between Pyongyang and Kaesong. The fact that you made such a slanderous remark after your side had repeatedly violated the agreement cannot but make people doubt whether such an action on your part can be attributed to any accidental cause.

"The fact that the shooting at Pan Mun Jom by your armed personnel followed in close succession a few hours after the attack on the truck of our delegation by your airplanes raised the question in my mind whether these two incidents were not created by your side according to plan.

"With regard to the repeated violations on August 7 of the agreement on your part, I once more lodge with you a grave protest, and hope that you will guarantee against the recurrence of such violations of the agreement.

"Signed Nam Il, General, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers." This message was written in English and Korean. The Korean copy was signed. Interpreters stated the English and Korean versions are substantially the same in word and tone.

Part 3. I have suggested to Admiral Joy that he release to the press the text of the message quoted in Part 2, above, together with a full, forceful, factual, reply.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 22 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 11 August 1951—12:05 a. m.

C–68672. "There follows in 5 parts the report of the UNC Delegation. Subject: Armistice conference at Kaesong 10 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Joy delivered firm speech rejecting 38 parallel, announcing willingness of United Nations command delegation to discuss at any time a line of demarcation based on military realities, and stating United Nations Command delegation would no longer be responsive to enemy efforts to engage United Nations Command delegation in discussion of 38 parallel as line of demarcation. Nam Il delivered speech repeating well worn arguments for 38 parallel, against United Nations Command bombing. Joy stated he had nothing further to add. An unbroken silence of 2 hours and 11 minutes followed. Joy then asked Nam Il if he had anything further to say and when answer was in negative proposed to shift to item 3 in order to make progress. Nam Il refused. Meetings continue tomorrow.

Part 2: Progress: None.

Part 3: Attitudes: No change.

Part 4: Sequence of events: Conference reconvened 1331K hours.

Nam Il opened as follows: It is very regrettable that our conference has been adjourned for 5½ days on account [of] a question unrelated to the main topic under discussion. The conference is now resumed. I would like to know if you have given up your previous proposal concerning the military demarcation line and are prepared to accept our fair and reasonable proposal. I am waiting for your answer.

Adm Joy: Is that all you have to say?

Nam Il: At present that is all. I am waiting for your answer to this question.

Adm Joy: For days these meetings have made no progress. I will briefly review the sequence of events which have resulted in lack of progress. When the question of location of a demilitarized zone was taken up by the delegations, you proposed a zone based on the 38 parallel. You offered no valid military reasons for that proposal. You did not because you cannot cause the 38 parallel to reflect the present military situation. You asserted that the 38 parallel would be a bridge to peace, despite the fact that it has proven to be an invitation to war. You did not show that there are defensible positions for either side adjacent to the zone you proposed. You did not because you cannot. At no time in the Korean war has either side been able to hold defensible positions near that zone. In attempting to support your proposed 38 parallel zone, you denied the total effect of the air and naval forces of the United Nations Command. Yet, you irrationally and erroneously claimed that but for these same United Nations Command air and sea forces, your ground forces would have driven ours from Korea. By your own illogical statements, you revealed your true motive in seeking the 38 parallel zone. We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38 parallel from which this unprovoked war of aggression began. You confirmed that your only purpose is the political division of Korea.

In our turn, the United Nations Command Delegation presented a proposed demilitarized zone. This zone is based on a fair assessment of the present overall military situation. It provides defensible positions for both sides. It recognizes the changed military capabilities of both forces resulting from any period of armistice. It has no political connotation whatever. It adheres strictly to military realities.

You refused to consider seriously the equitable zone proposed by the United Nations Command delegation. You refused to discuss this zone with the aid of a map so that at least a clear understanding of it could be assured. You rejected the offer of the United Nations Command Delegation to discuss possible adjustments of the proposed zone. You stated you have absolutely no proposal to offer other than that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military line of demarcation. Your attitude has been inflexible, and without any reason so far stated to justify that attitude.

It seems clear to us that you seek to gain, through negotiation of a military armistice, a political division of Korea. The fundamental incompatibility of your political objectives with the strictly military nature of a military armistice renders your case for the 38 parallel zone illogical, unrealistic, and totally unacceptable to us. It can only raise doubts in the minds of the peoples of the world who have access to the truth and who recognize it when presented, that you have any honest intention of seeking an honorable end to hostilities.

Whenever you are willing to discuss strictly military matters connected with a military armistice, we are of the opinion that an equitable arrangement can be worked out.

As long as you continue to cling to your discredited 38 parallel zone with its impossible conditions this conference cannot make progress. For that reason, the United Nations Command Delegation now informs you that it is through discussing the 38 parallel. It is through considering your flimsy arguments related to the 38 parallel.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not discuss further the 38 parallel as a military demarcation line. We trust this is quite clear.

Nam Il: I have one thing to ask which I don't understand in your statement. In your statement as a reason for your opposition against our stand—our fair and reasonable stand that the 38 parallel should be made the military demarcation line, you said that we said we want to go back to the 38 parallel where the aggressive war was broken out. What is meant by the 'aggressive war' which you say, and whom do you mean is the aggressor? Whom do you mean—who has provoked the aggressive war?

Adm Joy: I will reread the statement. 'We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38 parallel, from which this unprovoked war of aggression began'. That statement does not say anything about who provoked the war. My statement had no implications unless you take it as such.

Nam Il: It is not quite reasonable to say that the aggressive war was broken out, and say that nobody provoked the aggressive war. The fact itself that the aggressive war broke out means that there was an aggressor. Therefore, I request a clear explanation of your statement.

Adm Joy: Aggression in Korea and the identity of the aggressor has been established by the vast majority of the nations of the world in councils assembled and after thorough investigation of the facts. It is not the purpose of this conference to determine who was the aggressor. That has already been determined.

Nam Il: As for this question you want—you tried to dodge a full-sided answer?

Adm Joy: I am not trying to dodge the answer. I told you the purpose of this conference was not to determine who was an aggressor in any war.

Nam Il: I don't mean that the object of this meeting is to decide who the aggressor is, but as you say in your statement about the aggressive war, I want to clarify it—I want to have you clarify it. If we take your answer as the full-sided answer to my question, I would take it for thus: (United Nations interpreter: 'I would understand it as follows') I will take the side to be aggressor which all the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of the world think aggressor. (United Nations interpreter: 'I consider to be the aggressor the side which all freedom loving and peace-loving peoples of the world know to be the aggressor'). And now I further express my opinion—I would like to continue to give our view with regards to the question of the military demarcation line on which no agreement has so far been reached, as a result of your insistence on your unreasonable proposal. After I have repeatedly refuted clearly and completely the thoughtless basis of your proposal, I cannot understand how you can still insist upon your absurd and arrogant proposal. The correctness and reasonableness of my arguments should have long ago been perceived by anybody with an open mind, but I shall not be adverse to restating them once again in the hope that you will give up your absurd and arrogant proposal, and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line. You have repeatedly vaunted the effectiveness of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, and insisted upon getting a compensation for it on the ground in the armistice agreement, attempting thereby to push your troops a great distance to the north of the 38 parallel, and within our positions, and demand our troops to withdraw from a large area of territory. I have pointed out again and again the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of innocent inhabitants and peaceful cities by your air and naval forces, in violation of international law, should be regarded as a shame by any self-respecting military man. Furthermore, exaggeration of the military effectiveness of certain complementary armed services in isolation of the war as a whole, and contention that these services are sufficient to decide the outcome of the war and play an independent part, should not be the logic of anyone who is militarily minded. As a matter of fact, it is only under the support of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, in violation of international law, that your ground forces have barely and temporarily maintained the present situation on the battlefield. If there were no cover and support of such indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would have long ago been driven out of the Korean Peninsula. What is more, your naval and air forces certainly cannot dominate unchallenged the Korean sea and the Korean air. The naval and air forces of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers are constantly growing and have dealt considerable blows to your naval and air forces. The serious losses of your naval and air forces admitted by yourselves, are a clear proof of this point. Your apparent belief, which appears persistently in your statements, that we have no naval and air forces at all, is therefore completely at variance with facts. You say that should your air and naval forces stop fighting, various advantages would accrue to us, and therefore you must be compensated. Has it occurred to you that according to your logic, should our Army, acknowledged as mighty and superior by the whole world, stop fighting so that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we not entitled to an even greater compensation, and to propose a demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the neighborhood of the Naktong river? But you can rest assured that we shall not make such an illogical proposal because such a proposal would be as absurd as yours, and as incompatible with the spirit of settling problems in our negotiations. Again you have repeatedly emphasized the so-called necessity of defensible positions, and assurance of the security of troops, and insisted upon the establishment of your defensive positions north of the 38 parallel, above the present battleline, and within our positions. Regarding this, I have repeatedly pointed out that the establishment of defensible positions should not in any case be taken as the main and decisive questions in fixing the military demarcation line, and that it is even less justified to seek to fix the military demarcation line north of the 38 parallel, above the present battleline and within our positions under the excuse of establishing defensive positions. I have also pointed out again and again that the best measure to guarantee the security of troops of both sides is to fix the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line, and withdraw the armed forces of both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel respectively, so as to establish a demilitarized zone. You say that you are not looking for defensible positions north of the present line of contact, and that you merely demand the stationing of certain guards along a certain boundary of your proposed demarcation zone. Has it never occurred to you that according to your logic, we could also demand the stationing of guards south of the Han River. We did not, and we shall not do so, for that would be as naive as your demand and just as incapable of deceiving anyone, and would indefinitely protract our armistice negotiations. On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line, with both sides withdrawing their armed forces 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone, does reflect the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. It is fair and reasonable to both sides, and is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I have repeatedly pointed out that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront demonstrates clearly that our proposal reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. You say you are not interested in history, that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront are all of no significance, but even your highest military men could not but repeatedly admit that the greatest military achievement you could attain would be to maintain your positions on the 38 parallel. Our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is fair and reasonable to both sides, because the 38 parallel is occupied today by both sides, and both sides occupy sectors similar in area on the 2 sides of the 38 parallel. The withdrawal by both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone is consistent with the principle of equality and reciprocity, and does not involve any loss to either side. Furthermore, our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the demarcation line is unfavorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question—is favorable, excuse me! Our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, because this is recognized by the whole world as the basis of ending the Korean war. Without such a basis, not only would we be unable to settle the question of delineation of a demilitarized zone, or to discuss other questions of armistice, but we would also be unable to pave the way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I sincerely requested that you seriously consider and accept our proposal.

Nam Il: You say that you would not discuss any more about fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line. I would like to know what you mean by this information? Does it mean that you mean to deprive us of our sacred right to insist upon our stand in discussion of fixing the military demarcation line? We think that it is our right, which we cannot be deprived of, to insist on, as a fair and reasonable demarcation line, on having the 38 parallel as the demarcation line, and you have no reason whatever to deprive us of this right. That is all and we are waiting for your answer to the question.

Adm Joy: We do not deprive you of the right to say what you please. I will read again what we say, what we mean. We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38 parallel as a military line of demarcation. That is all.

Nam Il: At present we have nothing more to say.

Adm Joy: Neither do we. (Here ensued 2 hour and 11 minute period of silence).

Adm Joy: Would you like to say something?

Nam Il: At present I have nothing to say.

Adm Joy: We continue to make no progress. So far you have failed to offer any proposal for the location of a demilitarized zone based solely on current mil realities. We are left no recourse but to believe that your objective is only a face-saving one. You wish only to return to the conditions of 25 June 1950.

We have proposed to you the general loc of a reasonable demilitarized zone. It has been arrived at after long and careful study. It is in the general area of the battle line. It is based on a fair assessment of the current overall mil situation.

Your attitude is inflexible and unreasonable. We have offered to discuss adjustments to this demilitarized zone. We continue to remain flexible to reasonable, logical and pertinent discussion within the mil field but on no other grounds.

We are always willing to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current mil realities. For the second time I trust this is clear. We will not discuss further the 38 parallel as a mil demarcation line. It appears that we are temporarily deadlocked on item 2. How do you propose this deadlock be broken? That is all.

Nam Il: We oppose any scheme which fixes the mil demarcation line north of the 38 parallel. We oppose the scheme of fixing the demarcation line at the present battle line, that is, the scheme of armistice at present positions, but in particular what we cannot possibly tolerate is the absurd proposal that you make that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38 parallel above the present battle line and within our positions. We have repeatedly demonstrated that this proposal of yours is based on an argument which is illogical and contrary to the principle of logic and reasonableness but you have not given any answer to our refutations. I hope that you will seriously reconsider the fair and reasonable proposal we made that the 38 parallel be fixed as the mil demarcation line. The solution of the deadlock in our discussions on the second item is to have the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line.

Adm Joy: I thought I made it clear that we will not, discuss further any line of demarcation or demilitarized zone based on the 38 parallel. You have not made a proposal yet as to how the deadlock may be broken.

Nam Il: I repeatedly stated that it is reasonable, fair, and in conformity with the present mil realities to make the 38 parallel the mil demarcation line. In spite of it, you said today that you are not going to discuss any more about the 38 parallel and I think it is not right. We make it clear that we will continue—we will always insist on having the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line and we make it also clear that it must be accepted. And this stand of ours is unshakable.

Adm Joy: Since you have no proposal to offer there may be some merit in dropping agenda item 2 temporarily. By so doing we may find areas of mutual agreement in which some of our mutual problems could be quickly settled. In addition, by discussing other items, it is possible that agenda item 2 may be received later in a different light. By so doing we may save time in arriving at an over-all mil armistice agreement. I therefore propose we proceed to discussion of item 3 of the agenda. That is all.

Nam Il: It is indeed very regrettable that we have not been able to reach an agreement on agenda item 2 although many days have been taken for its discussion. This, however, does not mean that item 2 cannot, or should not, continue to be discussed. I consider that in order to solve the other questions in our agenda we must first and foremost solve the most crucial question in the agenda, that is, the question of fixing the mil demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone. Speaking in general, the agenda items of a conference are arranged in the order of the importance of questions to be dealt with. Once an agenda is formulated, the agreeing parties should proceed with discussion of items in accordance with the agenda order. The order should not be altered unless demanded by special important reasons. Our agreed agenda has been arranged correctly, according to the importance of the questions we are to settle. We consider that the question of fixing the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone is the prerequisite question in stopping the Korean war, that is to say, the basic condition of the Armistice. Once this fundamental question is solved, the various questions of concrete arrangements included in the following items are not difficult to be settled, that is, the questions of supervised organs and war prisoners. Conversely, if the fundamental question of fixing the mil demarcation line is not solved, all these questions of concrete arrangements will be impossible to discuss, that is, the questions of the supervised organ and prisoners of war. And even if discussed, it will be as baseless as castles in the air and a waste of time. In view of the above mentioned reasons, we would rather spend more time and energy on the continued discussion of this item. If you have good faith, I believe it should be possible to solve this question speedily. On the contrary, if you should continue to maintain your former attitude in discussing the questions, it would not be certain whether our work will make speedy progress, even if the order of the agenda items were reversed. We hope you will consider your stand and continue to discuss item 2 with us in good faith. And if we solve this question, the other questions can also be solved and the desire and the demand of the peoples of the world for peace can be realized. That is all.

Adm Joy: You have failed to offer any proposal for the location of demilitarized zone based solely on the overall mil situation. You have refused to discuss the adjustment of the demilitarized zone we proposed. This you have refused even though you know in general it is a fair representation of the overall mil situation. You have refused to proceed by temporarily passing to the discussion of item 3. It should have been perfectly clear that such action might have had the advantage of saving time and permitting some progress to be registered by this conference. In view of your unreasonable and so far inflexible stand it appears that nothing is to be gained by continuing the conference today. I propose that we recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow. It is hoped that by so doing you will reconsider your position on the points I have mentioned above. It is further hoped that you will return tomorrow with 1 or more proposals designed to further, rather than hinder, these negotiations.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current mil realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38 parallel as a mil line of demarcation.

My reply to your last msg concerning the alleged UNC air violations of 7 August, will be formally presented to your Senior Liaison Officer today.

He will also be given the formal report of the UNC investigation into the alleged 7 August incident of the patrols at Pan Mun Jom.

We wish to thank you for the use of your transportation from the airfield today.

Nam Il: I have something which I must inform you. The information you gave us is completely absurd and arrogant and is in complete violation of the principle of equality and reciprocity between the 2 parties at the conference. We absolutely cannot agree to such an unreasonable information given by your side. I must also state again that our proposal of making the 38 parallel the mil demarcation line is absolutely unshakable. Tomorrow I shall continue to state our views in connection with this fair, reasonable and just proposal of ours.

We agree to your proposal to recess till 11 o'clock by your time and 10 o'clock by our time tomorrow.

Part 5. Conclusions:

a. No evidence of change or of likely change in position of enemy reference 38 parallel.

b. Delegation strongly believes that now is the time to intensify efforts to influence world opinion by pointing out the arbitrary, intransigent and unreasoning attitude of Communist delegation and their obvious desire to deadlock negotiations if UNC does not meet their original demand."

This concludes the delegations report. My comments follow.

a. The record to date is devoid of evidence of Communist good faith and is recently replete with evidence of intention to force us either to yield on issue of 38 parallel, or to break-off the conference.

b. Accordingly, I am directing UNC delegation to meet once more Saturday, 11 Aug, and there to inform the Communists that the UNC delegation flatly, formally and finally refuses further discussion of the 38 parallel as a line of demarcation; that the UNC delegation remains ready to discuss a line of demarcation based on present military positions, as repeatedly explained in previous meetings; that the UNC delegation again states its willingness to put aside item 2 of the agenda and pass to the next item, returning later to item 2; that the UNC delegation will await notification of acceptance of 1 or the other of these proposals; and finally, that failing to receive such notification of acceptance within 72 hours will consider the conference terminated by the deliberate act of the Communists.

c. Request your approval or other instructions by Flash message.

d. Recommend that whatever action is taken be released to press in Wash at such time and in such language as will place the onus for this impasse squarely on the Communists where it belongs.[1]

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[1] The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 98637, transmitted from Washington on August 10 at 5:02 p. m., read as follows:

"Action proposed para *b* your comments following Part 5 your C–68672 not approved. Your instructions require that you not break off meetings without previous instructions from Wash. You should continue meetings until further guidance received." (Black Book, Tab 23)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 27 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 11 August 1951—12 : 56 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–98713. From JCS.[1] Reur C 68672 and JCS 98637.

1. Conduct of negotiations by you and Admiral Joy fully approved. Persistence and patience with which UN position has been set forth, despite provocative action and attitude Communist delegation, have strengthened our position.

2. It is basic to your present directives that you not break off armistice discussions without specific instructions to do so (see Para 7, JCS 96802) ; [2] also that you should not, without further instructions, recess talks indefinitely, to be reconvened on condition of Communist concession (see Para 9, JCS 96930).[3]

3. In view of possibility of communications delays and of necessity for highest level consideration, you should not set in motion any action contrary to above directives without prior JCS authorization. Termination of discussions is of such governmental importance as not to be left to exigencies of clearances or communications by some deadline hour.

4. For your background, follg are basic considerations underlying United States attitude on termination of armistice discussions:

A. It is the United States objective to accomplish an armistice in accordance with the terms furnished you as basis for your negotiation.

B. If armistice discussions fail, it is of the greatest importance that clear responsibility for failure rest upon Communists and that issues be such as to engage fullest possible support for our position. It will not be enough for us to say that Communists are at fault because they do not agree with us; it must be abundantly clear that we have used persistence and patience to obtain agreement on terms which will appeal to world opinion as reasonable and just.

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[1] On the morning of August 11 a meeting had been held by General Bradley and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, Hickerson, Reinhardt, and Johnson of the Department of State for the purpose of discussing a full reply to the suggestion made by General Ridgway in Part 5 of his telegram C–68672, August 11 (*supra*), on terminating the talks in Korea. Mr. Johnson's memorandum of conversation of that meeting read in part as follows:

"The meeting discussed a full draft reply prepared in the Department of State. There was full agreement with the substance of State's draft. The meeting was largely devoted to discussing relatively few verbal changes. At the suggestion of General White a paragraph was added to the effect that General Ridgway should anticipate no change in his instructions on the UN position rejecting the 38th parallel as a demarcation line. The approved message was transmitted to General Ridgway as JCS 98713, August 11." (795.00/8–1151)

[2] Dated July 19, p. 704.

[3] Dated July 21, p. 716.

C. It was to be expected that a period of deadlock would be reached in armistice talks after adoption of agenda when opposing views on essential points of substance confronted each other. There is reason to believe that Communists expected us to agree on 38th Parallel, based upon Malik statement and public discussion here and elsewhere prior to Malik's statement. It will take time for Moscow and Peiping to amend their position; we can not yet assume that difference between your proposals and 38th Parallel is breaking point for Communists. Underlying Korea are world-wide issues of most fundamental importance. If an acceptable settlement is to be reached, it can be expected to take time. Protracted and difficult negotiations have been standard in dealings with Communists in post-war period; Berlin Blockade discussions extending over many weeks are typical example.

D. If there is any difference between Moscow and Peiping as to what constitutes a breaking point, we should allow time for such differences to mature.

E. Although we have full support for firm stand we are taking on location of armistice line, we could not expect to have such support if talks were terminated now on ground that Communists have not accepted our proposals. Patient reiteration and explanation of position by UNC delegation and repeated indication of willingness to discuss minor adjustments in our proposed line or other items on agenda have made most favorable impression and are laying excellent groundwork for propaganda battle if talks fail.

5. In light of above, we believe UNC delegation attitude should continue to be characterized by calmness, firmness, patience and that briefing of press should reflect such attitude. We believe that as contrasted with crisis atmosphere, we thereby subject opponents to maximum strain and at same time maintain unity and strength of our own side.

6. UN position on rejection of 38th Parallel remains entirely firm and you should anticipate no change in your instructions on that point.[4]

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[4] General Ridgway's reply, contained in telegram C-68670, August 12, from Tokyo, read: "Urmsg JCS 98713 completely understood." (Black Book, Tab 28)

795.00/8-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, August 11, 1951—6 p. m.

150. Anti-cease-fire pro-unification activities continue about same tempo; certainly not on increasing scale. Actually campaign has never reached virulence of campaign vs. withdrawal US troops spring 1949. I have impression as time drags on and subject takes on aspect of old story that it more and more difficult for govt stir up enthusiasm. Koreans almost unanimous feelings they want undivided country have

been well aired; but despite govt attitude that must have cake and eat it too, I suspect considerable number Koreans more realistic and prepared accept *de facto* division if armistice not on 38th is agreed.

Whether this more reasonable attitude will influence President Rhee remains to be seen. He has not as yet mentioned President Truman's ltr to me altho he said to General Coulter yesterday he welcomed renewed assurances of US support and that he mainly concerned with preventing any temporary dividing line from being accepted as permanent. He also said he wondered how President Truman got idea that cease-fire demonstrations, rallies, etc., were govt-inspired.[1] I shall discuss Rhee's position further separate msg.[2]

While I do not want underplay significance ROK campaign against armistice and am fully aware Rhee playing wily game seeking sabotage it, there one aspect on psychological warfare and propaganda side which I have not mentioned and which I think deserves attention as it on favorable side. I refer to fact Commie propaganda has been strangely silent on ROK attitudes and suggest this fact should be analyzed and exploited in some way to our advantage. Is admittedly tricky subject.

North Koreans aspirations for unified country just strong as South Koreans. In fact there danger that fol armistice or breakdown political talks full barrage of Commie propaganda will attempt convince South that North Koreans real champs unity. This wld be consistent with similar campaign from eastern Germany. ROK activities opposing cease-fire demanding unity thus have effect stealing thunder from North Koreans. Is noteworthy in any event that since Secretary issued strong statement troop withdrawal issue, neither Radio Peiping nor radio Pyongyang have mentioned ROK anti-cease-fire attitude nor have they picked up US press stories or rumors General Paik withdrawal from conference on 38th parallel issue. Inference we draw is that Commies seriously embarrassed by this aspect ROK policy. They may also believe ROK campaign clever propaganda move on part US-UN. Whatever reasons are, possibility exists for us to exploit situation to help give lie to Commie propaganda themes that (1) ROK Govt stooge of US; (2) North Korean Commies originators and leaders unification movement; (3) US solely responsible for tough position at Kaesong; and (4) all Koreans demanding peace, withdrawal troops.

I suggest Dept consider whether carefully prepared informational material citing demonstrations resolutions, etc., as evidence popular

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[1] Telegram 137, August 9, from Pusan had reported on a speech by President Rhee on August 6 wherein he was quoted as saying that the South Koreans would oppose to the death any dividing line south of the Yalu wherever that line might be set (795.00/8–951).

[2] Not printed.

ROK opposition to return 38th parallel and popular desire for unification can be used for propaganda purposes outside ROK as means strengthening our stand especially amongst Asians. Obviously great care must be exercised to avoid giving impression ROKs opposing UN. Possibly should be handled covert basis.

Sent Dept 150. Repeated info Tokyo 59.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 26 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 11 August 1951—8:03 p. m.

C–68769. This msg in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 11 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Meeting included continued attempted rebuttal by Communist of United Nations Command position on Demilitarized Zone. Joy delivered a statement refusing to discuss 38th Parallel, and connecting unreliability shown by Commies by neutrality violations to need for defensible positions during armistice. Nam Il proposed to refer details of question of neutrality of Kaesong Zone to Liaison Officers. Joy deferred without committment. Joy gave vigorous denunciation of unreasoning and arbitrary stand of Communists, including offer to shift to Item 3, and willingness to discuss zone based on present military situation. Meeting resumes 12 August at 1100 hours K.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitude: No change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged transcript of the proceedings of the 21st session.]

Part 5. The UNC delegation feels there is no evidence warranting conclusion Communists will change their position on 38th Parallel as demarcation line and I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 30 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 August 1951—5:36 p. m.

C–68797. This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 12 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Agreement arrived at for meeting on 13 August of Liaison Officers of both delegations to discuss Kaesong neutral zone regulations. Nam Il delivered long argument attempting to defend against Joys denunciation of yesterday. In the course of his oration Nam Il displayed map showing line of contact, 38th Parallel and United Nations Comd proposed zone. Line of contact shown approximately 5 miles south of actual contact line throughout length. Nam Il challenged United Nations Command to make its proposed zone public. Joy answered with refusal to discuss 38th Parallel, willingness to discuss any zone based on present military situation, willingness to shift to Item 3 of 4 of Agenda. Communist map is in hands of United Nations Command Delegation. Meetings continue tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: Display of map by Nam Il may be construed as slight progress, though may only be propaganda device.

Part 3. Attitude: Nam Il gave some evidence of being on the defensive.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged version of the transcript of the proceedings of the 22d session.]

Part 5. Conclusions:

(1) No evidence warranting conclusion enemy is likely to relinquish his demand for 38th Parallel at Demarcation Line.

(2) Some evidence enemy is preparing to broaden his discussion of demilitarized zones, though whether for propaganda or bargaining purposes is not known here. And I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 31 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 August 1951—4:44 p. m.

C-68855. This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 13 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Meeting consisted of Joy giving answers to 5 questions posed by Nam Il on 12 August 51. Answers reaffirm position of United Nations Command on Demilitarized Zone and offer to discuss adjustments based on military logic. Nam Il declared answers unsatisfactory, reaffirmed his position on 38th Parallel as Demarcation Line. Joy presented Nam Il map showing the actual line of contact compared with line of contact shown by Communists on their map presented yesterday. Joy again suggested shift to item 3 or 4. Nam Il refused. Meetings continued tomorrow at 1100K.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitudes: No change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged transcript of the proceedings of the 23d session.]

Part 5. Conclusion: The UNC Delegation believes: Communists appear very anxious to hear another proposal concerning zone from United Nations Command Delegation. However, no evidence warranting conclusion Communists ready to drop 38th Parallel as Demarcation Line. I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 33 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 13 August 1951—10:07 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-68876. Opinion here unanimous that we must utilize every possible means to make clear to the world that the UNC delegation at Kaesong is determined to continue the negotiations in an attempt to conclude a peace in Korea. To accomplish this end and to assure the free world of our calmness, firmness and patience during the negotiations and that our aims to insure peace in Korea are unmistakeable, it is believed that releases to the press and to the radio should be factual and complete. The statements of the UNC delegation to the Communist delegation during the course of negotiations provide us with our most fruitful material. In order that we may present our story to the world earlier than the news is given to the Communist world, releases will be made daily and promptly upon the conclusion of that day's session. In order to accomplish this objective, effective 14 Aug, I shall initiate a daily release of pertinent parts of the statements made by the UNC delegation at the armistice conference that day. Facilities for distribution of releases from the advanced base camp in Korea are adequate for world dissemination via radio and wire services. The delay in forwarding these releases for approval in Wash would deny us the opportunity to compete with the presentation of Communist propaganda relative these same discussions.[1]

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[1] A manuscript note attached to the source text addressed to Assistant Secretary Rusk by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) read as follows:

"Gen. Bradley called Doc Matthews re this. I told Doc, who agreed and so informed Bradley, we concurred on understanding material released would be carefully selected and not entire text of proceedings."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 35 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 August 1951—7:41 p. m.

C-68927. "This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 14 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Nam Il read long statement denouncing United Nations Command proposed demilitarized zone and United Nations Command attitude, charging United Nations Command delayed progress toward Armistice. Joy countered with charge that record proved Commies were delaying progress, pointed out political nature of Commie objectives in negotiations, reasserted United Nations Command argument that we require defensible positions as result of withdrawal of air and naval efforts, requested enemy to propose adjustments to United Nations Command zone. Nam Il reacted only with more of virtues of 38 parallel. Meetings continued tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitude: No change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged transcript of the proceedings of the 24th session.]

"*Part 5.* Conclusions: The UNC delegation believes that there is no evidence that enemy intends to drop his insistence on 38th parallel as line of demarcation". I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 39

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1951.

Subject: Korea and the San Francisco Conference

Participants: Australian Ambassador, Mr. Spender
Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Carl Berendson
Mr. Frank Corner, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
Canadian Minister, Mr. W. D. Matthews
Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Basil Jarvie, Counselor, South African Embassy
FE—Mr. Rusk
NA—Mr. Johnson
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

At the request of the Australian Ambassador, Mr. Spender, I met with him and with other Commonwealth representatives today to discuss the situation in Korea and the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. Mr. Spender took the initiative in arranging this meeting (memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Spender August 9, 1951, subject Korea).[1] I read to the group the directive of August 11 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway on the conduct of the Kaesong negotiations.[2] In the discussion which followed no one present registered any dissent from our present course of action in the negotiations nor from the view that we should continue along these lines, at least for the next week.

The Australian Ambassador expressed the opinion it was not generally understood that there was a distinction between a military cease-fire line along present battle lines and the 38th parallel as a political dividing line. He suggested that it might be helpful if the Secretary or some one else were to make this distinction clear in a public statement. In commenting on the Ambassador's suggestion, I said that no one had ever recognized the 38th parallel as a political dividing line, it was merely the line used in determining who would receive the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea at the end of the war. Furthermore, the Communist negotiators have no standing on the question of the 38th parallel, the Chinese have no legitimate interest in it and the North Koreans are recognized only as the military commanders of a force engaged in hostilities. Sir Carl Berendson observed that if there were military arguments against the 38th parallel as a demarcation line for the cease-fire, then these arguments likewise applied against the 38th parallel as a political line. Ambassador Spender did not pursue his suggestion further.

In discussing relative advantages and disadvantages of a prolongation of the talks at Kaesong, I told the group that the Far East command believed the Communists now had the capacity, as a result of their buildup, to launch an attack at any time and maintain it for fifteen days. I said that we did not believe the talks had given the Communists an advantage in this build-up. Air action had been reduced during the past few weeks because of the weather, and furthermore, the UN forces are now deployed along the best available defense line and would prefer to receive an attack, if one is launched, in those positions. Mr. Spender remarked that a military appreciation of the situation resulting from prolongation of the talks would be helpful.

I asked whether any of the representatives present had a theory to offer about the connection between the development of the Korean talks and Russian attendance at the San Francisco Conference. Sir Carl Berendson thought there was no connection. Mr. Tomlinson expressed the opinion that a cease-fire agreement would precede by several days the opening of the San Francisco Conference,[3] thus giving the Russians a propaganda point in their attempts to disrupt the Conference. Their line might be that a first step in a general Far Eastern settlement had been taken with agreement on a cease-fire in Korea, and further progress should not be jeopardized by signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty without further discussion of its terms.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See JCS-98713, August 11, p. 811.

In the discussion of probable Russian disruptive tactics at San Francisco, the point was made by several of those present, including Mr. Spender and Sir Carl Berendson, that the Russians could be expected to use every parliamentary trick at their command to prolong the Conference. Sir Carl Berendson remarked on the need for a strong chairman to counter Russian attempts to involve the Conference in parliamentary wrangling. Mr. Spender thought that quite a number of friendly nations might be confused by the Russian tactics and suggested the desirability of going to work on these nations immediately to develop a solid front in the Conference. It was suggested that a schedule for the Conference might be circulated allotting time for speeches and fixing a time for the signing. I mentioned the fact that with some countries only their ability to make a statement explaining their position permitted them to sign the Treaty. This was a factor to be kept in mind in any efforts to limit debate.

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[3] The conference for the conclusion and signature of the peace treaty with Japan was held in San Francisco from September 4 to 8, 1951; for related documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 37 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 August 1951—4:35 p. m.

C–68959. "This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 15 August 51.

"*Part 1.* Summary: Nam Il delivered long blustering rejection of United Nations Command demilitarized zone. Joy explained effect of withdrawing United Nations Command air and naval forces during the period of armistice and consequent need of United Nations Command for strong ground defensive position during armistice. Joy proposed creation of subcommittee of one delegate from each side to seek ways and means of breaking deadlock on item 2. Nam Il agreed to consider. On Nam Il's suggestion, recess until tomorrow at 1300K.

"*Part 2.* Progress: None.

"*Part 3.* Attitude: Some members of United Nations Command delegation thought enemy delegation seemed to reveal thinly veiled air of smugness and satisfaction derived from cause completely unknown to United Nations Command delegation. Delegation unable to evaluate.

[Here follows the main portion of Part 4, an abridged transcript of the proceedings of the 25th session.]

"Adm Joy:

"I want to make a statement before we leave. We have hung in deadlock on item 2 of our agenda for many days. We show no prospect of progress along present lines of procedure. I, therefore, recommend a new effort to break this deadlock.

"One of our prime difficulties is the formality of each delegation regarding the points at issue. This is necessary in order to preserve order in these meetings involving 10 delegates and their various assistants. Nevertheless, our present manner of exchanging views is tedious and somewhat stilted.

"We suggest that each delegation appoint one delegate to membership in a joint sub-committee of the delegations. We suggest that these two delegates meet informally, to exchange views on item 2 of our agenda. We suggest that the two delegations jointly charge this sub-committee to make recommendations to the two delegations as to ways and means of emerging from the present deadlock.

"We suggest two assistants, including interpreters, be appointed for each side.

"It is our thought that neither delegation be bound by implication or contract to honor the recommendations of the joint sub-committee. Such recommendations would of course require ratification by the delegations. It is our thought that this sub-committee meet around, rather than across a table, and seek objectively to work out a solution to our present problem.

"I am prepared to nominate my delegate and staff assistants. If you desire to think this over for a period, you can let us know tomorrow when we meet again. If you agree in principle, but not in the details, we will consider such proposal as you may offer.

"We suggest either 11 o'clock or 1 o'clock tomorrow afternoon our time. That is, 10 o'clock your time, or 12 o'clock your time, and not 11 o'clock your time.

"Nam Il:

"Your proposal has been duly noted, but we would like to have it in writing.

"As for the recess, it is better we meet again tomorrow at 12 o'clock by our time, and 1 o'clock by your time.

"Recessed 1244K.

"*Part 5.* Conclusions:

"The UNC Delegation believes that indications are that enemy intends to hold firm to his position on 38th parallel as line of demarcation." I concur.

795B.56/8-1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by H. O. H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1951.

Participants: Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Noel Hemmindinger, NA
Mr. H. O. H. Frelinghuysen, NA

The Korean Ambassador, at his request, called on Mr. Rusk this morning and discussed the following matters: The 21 million dollar OFLC obligations; the reduction of the Congressional authorization for the United States contribution to UNKRA; the suspense account; and ROK participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty.

OFLC Obligation

Ambassador Yang expressed the hope that the United States would cancel the 21 million dollar surplus property obligation which he claims had been made by the American Military Government in 1947,[1] and accepted by the Korean Government in the belief that it was only a formality and would later be cancelled. Mr. Rusk explained to the Ambassador that it would take an act of Congress to cancel or alter the terms of the debt and that any such action would probably result in like demands by other nations who have similar, but much larger, obligations. Mr. Rusk advised the Korean Ambassador that, inasmuch as the annual interest on the obligation was minor in comparison to the huge sums the US was putting into Korea through the military and relief programs, it would be wiser if the Korean Government did not press this matter at this time. Mr. Rusk pointed out that to introduce this subject into Congress at this time when it is harassed by tremendous problems would only serve as an irritant.

Congressional Reduction of U.S. Contribution to UNKRA

The Ambassador expressed concern that the Congressional committee had reduced the authorization for the United States contribution to UNKRA by 100 million dollars. He said that he had discussed this matter with President Truman who had assured him that he should have no fear on this point as the United States would continue to provide the necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea. Mr. Rusk explained that the Congressional committee had cut the requested authorization because UNKRA was not yet in a position to assume relief functions and because the Military was now providing the necessary assistance. He emphasized that Chairman Richards, who had proposed the reduction, recognized the need for relief and rehabilitation assistance to Korea but believed that the 61 million dollars which remained for UNKRA together with the assistance provided by the Military was sufficient for the time being. When UNKRA could assume responsibility for the relief functions, Congress could then consider a bill for further assistance.

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[1] See *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VI, pp. 727, 786, and 789.

Mr. Rusk told the Ambassador that he had pointed out to the Senate Committee that to refuse the full authorization for UNKRA would adversely affect the morale of the Korean people, and United States ability to persuade other UN member states to contribute, and might result in the unavailability of funds when they are needed. The administration would continue to press this view upon the Congress, but it was possible that it would not be accepted even by friends of the administration, since there were strong pressures in the Congress to reduce the over-all Mutual Security appropriation, and this appeared to be one place where a cut would not hurt. Korea need not worry, Mr. Rusk concluded, since there was every indication that Congress would authorize the funds when needed.

The Suspense Account

Ambassador Yang expressed the hope that, in light of Korea's mounting inflation, the United States Government would repay in dollars the *won* advanced by the ROK Government. He estimated that *won* advances to date amounted to approximately 100 million dollars for which the Korean Government has been printing almost one billion *won* daily. Mr. Han said that 53% of the expenses of the Korean Government were accounted for by *won* advances to the United Nations Command. Mr. Rusk said that not only had Ambassador Muccio been an earnest advocate on behalf of the Korean Government in this matter, but that there was sympathy in Washington for the Korean Government's request. He thought he would be able to inform the Ambassador soon that an agreement in principle had been reached to reimburse Korea for *won* sold to individual members of the U.S. forces. The details would take a little longer to work out.

ROK Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

Ambassador Yang said that he must again express his Government's earnest desire to attend the conference at San Francisco as a signatory to the Japanese Peace Treaty. He emphasized that not only would this do much to boost the morale of his people but also that it would have a beneficial influence in the Far East by refuting the Communist claim that American imperialism acted without consideration of the desires of the peoples of the Far East. He suggested that the Soviet decision to attend might occasion a reconsideration by the U.S. and that it would improve the position of his government in any dealings which the ROK might later have with Japan with reference to other problems such as a fishing agreement. Mr. Rusk said that, although he could give the Ambassador little encouragement on this point and doubted whether the Soviet Union's presence at the conference would have much effect upon the decision, he would take the matter up with Mr. Dulles. Mr. Rusk explained to the Ambassador that the primary consideration at the conference would be to maintain a unity of purpose and that inasmuch as Korea's presence at the conference was not a point on which there was such unity, largely because the ROK had only been recognized as a lawful government in 1948, he did not think that the ROK's presence would contribute significantly to combatting Soviet efforts to create disunity. He also pointed out to the Ambassador that the absence of a ROK delegation should not be considered as a loss of prestige for ROK, and that it might be wiser for the ROK not to make such an issue of the matter that loss of prestige appeared to result.[2]

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[2] Shortly after this conversation the Republic of Korea was invited to attend the Peace Conference as a non-signatory power; for related documentation, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

795.00/8-651

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1951.

Subject: Ambassador Jessup's Suggestion Regarding "Outlawry" of Communist Forces in Korea

Without attempting to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of Ambassador Jessup's suggestion in the underlying memorandum of

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted via the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Livingston T. Merchant who indicated his agreement with the views expressed herein.

August 6[2] that if Communist forces in Korea refuse to conclude an armistice and resume full scale attacks, these forces be "outlawed" by the United Nations, CA would point out that the action suggested, if taken, would seem largely to eliminate any future possibility of arriving at a *negotiated* settlement of the Korean fighting. Having declared the Communist forces in Korea and all persons giving them assistance or support, guilty of a crime against international peace and security and having pledged itself to hold such "criminals" responsible and to bring them to justice, the United Nations would in all probability find it impossible to abandon this pledge. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible that in circumstances short of unconditional surrender the Chinese Communist regime would accept responsibility for a crime against international peace and security or permit its officers and men engaged in operations in Korea to be brought to justice. Although possibilities of any resumption of negotiations respecting settlement in Korea following breakdown of present negotiations and large scale Communist attack would appear slight, the fact that the course of action suggested would tend to close the door to such negotiations definitively, would probably result in strong opposition to the proposal in the United Nations. Furthermore, the psychological effect on the enemy in Korea of action along the suggested lines would probably be increased determination and will to resist rather than the contrary.

An alternative form of action which the U.N. might take without the disadvantages described above would be to call upon all members to withdraw diplomatic representation from Peiping until such time as the regime ceases its defiance of the U.N. and its aggression in Korea.

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[2] Not printed.

795B.5/8-1651

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 16, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter of 22 June,[1] I advised you at that time that the Secretary of the Army would undertake discussions with you on the general subject of additional ground force contingents from other United Nations Members for service in Korea. Subsequently, the armistice talks were initiated, and the Secretary of the Army recommended, in light of this development, that the revised views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be communicated to the Department of State by letter, rather than by him personally, as was originally contemplated.

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[1] See the letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall, p. 544.

Past correspondence between the Department of State and the Department of Defense indicates that the two Departments are in full accord as to the necessity of obtaining additional forces for Korea, either in the form of substantial contributions from nations which have not contributed any forces, or in the form of appreciable increases in the size of contingents that have been contributed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that recommendations as to the feasibility of requesting certain nations for contributions, and to the extent to which pressure should be maintained on nations which have expressed a reluctance to make initial contributions or to increase their forces, should be based on the following:

a. The military desirability of having contingents not smaller than regimental combat teams or brigades. In a recent radio, attached hereto, General Van Fleet and General Ridgway set forth their comments and recommendations on the size, composition and training of United Nations contingents in Korea.[2] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in general, accept those views of the field commanders.

b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments and schedules, and the military capabilities of NATO nations.

c. The military capabilities, and present or probable future security requirements, of other U.N. nations.

d. The fact that, except for a few nations, a proportionally large increase in the size of a national contingent in Korea will result in only a proportionally small decrease in the size of forces stationed within the boundaries of the nation.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must reserve the right to consider the desirability of accepting each offer, in light of equipment and training requirements, after it is made.

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[2] The message referred to was telegram CX-63852, dated June 1, which read as follows:

"1. Quoted in Para 2 is a recent comment by CG Eighth Army concerning UN (other than US) ground forces.

"2. 'The following comments and recommendations are submitted with respect to United Nations forces that may be sent to this command in the future. Although some bn size units have performed magnificently in this campaign they do present some problems in command, fire support and logistic support. It is therefore recommended that member nations of the UN be encouraged to send not less than a regimental combat team or brig in which fire support, logistic support and administration are integrated and that those units of bn size now in Korea be increased to brig size without delay. It is further recommended that units sent to this command be trained prior to arrival. It is recognized that some physical hardening and weapons familiarization must be conducted here; however, the limited training facilities of this command make it highly desirable that basic and unit training be conducted elsewhere.'

"3. CINCFE concurs with Eighth Army views as stated in Para 2 and requests DA initiate action to accomplish recommendation contained therein. Limitation on training facilities in Korea (as stated in Para 2) has even greater application to FEC areas outside of Korea and it is strongly recommended that basic and unit training of all UN forces be accomplished before troops are shipped to this area."

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to each of the nations mentioned in your letters of 26 April, 2 May and 25 May 1951 are attached hereto.[3]

Faithfully yours,
ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Annex]

Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff Regarding Additional Ground Force Contingents From Other United Nations Members for Service in Korea

a. Great Britain and NATO countries on the European Continent. As pointed out by the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that "Great Britain and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional forces," and the Department of Defense took the position that "it would be desirable, if it could be done without interference with the NATO schedules, for Great Britain to bring her forces [in Korea] up to division strength." It is considered that the latter position is still sound. In addition, if the British should present NATO commitments as a bar to augmenting their forces in Korea, it can be suggested that the British may find it possible to increase their over-all forces or speed up their NATO schedules. With respect to NATO nations on the continent, in view of General Van Fleet's and General Ridgway's recommendation and considering that a large proportional increase in forces in Korea would result in only a small proportional decrease in forces in Europe, it would seem reasonable to further revise the initial position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so as to provide for an increase specifically in the Netherlands and Belgian battalions now in Korea and to remove any injunction against pressing other NATO countries on the mainland for contributions, such to be accomplished in a manner similar to that set forth above for the United Kingdom. However, in the case of France, it is considered that any decrease in European forces should be only for the purpose of increasing French forces in Indochina.

b. Australia and New Zealand. The views of the Joint Chiefs of

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[3] The letter of April 26 is printed on p. 380; the letters of May 2 and 25, not printed, dealt with Australia and New Zealand; see footnote 4 below.

There were no additional exchanges during the balance of 1951 between the Secretaries of State and Defense on the subject of overall U.N. troop contributions, nor were any substantial troop contributions made by U.N. countries, other than Australia, through the remainder of the year. For a table showing U.N. troop strength as of June 1951 and 1952 and July 1953 along with a country by country breakdown of the totals, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 513.

Staff with regard to Australia and New Zealand were forwarded to the Department of State by letter from this Department, dated 10 July 1951.[4]

c. Canada. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it would be inadvisable to request the Canadians to divert to Korea troops which are earmarked for Europe. However, they consider that further approaches should be made to the Canadian Government with a view to encouraging the Government to increase its over-all forces or to speed up its program.

d. Turkey. While the Turks already have a brigade in Korea, it is believed that a further approach might produce results in view of the U.S. position with regard to Turkey's entry into NATO. Furthermore, it is possible that the Turks would send additional forces to Korea if suitable financial arrangements are made.

e. Greece. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the Greeks have been approached to increase their contribution to a brigade. They concur in this action.

f. Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the Secretary of State that Iran is in a precarious position on the Soviet perimeter. However, it is considered that the precariousness of the position would be increased very little by the reduction of Iranian forces to the extent of a regimental combat team and that, ultimately, the rotation of combat experienced Iranians should strengthen the Iranian defense capabilities appreciably. It is realized that a unilateral approach by the U.S. at this time may not be desirable.

g. Ethiopia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no further request should be made for Ethiopian troops until the military effectiveness of the unit now in Korea has been tested in combat.

h. Israel and the Arab States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that an approach to certain of these nations would serve as a desirable indication of U.S. confidence in their military capabilities and in the United Nations as an instrument for preserving peace in the the Middle East. It is considered, for instance, that Egypt and Israel could each furnish one brigade, although it is realized that strong objections might be made in regard to the latter because of the existing tense situation.

i. Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Pakistan be approached, first, because Pakistan troops would probably provide a substantial contribution to the military effectiveness of the U.N. Command and, second, because such an approach would indicate U.S. confidence in a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.

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[4] The letter of July 10 is not printed, but the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Australia were incorporated in the message from President Truman to Prime Minister Menzies in telegram 42, August 9, to Canberra, p. 796. Regarding New Zealand, the Joint Chiefs had suggested that no further increase in forces be requested, particularly in view of the fact that, on a relative population basis, New Zealand's contingent was second in size only to that of the United States. (795B.5/7-1051)

j. India. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not doubt the accuracy of the view that "India's policy is such that an approach . . . would not be welcomed," they consider that India, as evidenced by the presence of the medical unit in Korea, has not remained aloof from the conflict and that an approach should be made in view of the military effectiveness of many Indian units. It may be expedient to point out the military balance of power as between the Indians and Pakistani.

k. Philippines. The requirements for maintaining internal security in the Philippines preclude an attempt to obtain increases in the Philippine forces now pledged to Korea.

l. Thailand. Because of the low military value of Thai forces in cold weather, the limited military resources of Thailand and the situation in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that no approach be made for an increase in Thai forces.

m. Latin American Nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Latin America is probably the most promising source of substantial contributions. They recommend that efforts be continued to obtain forces from the nations reported on by the Secretary of State, including Mexico, and that Argentina be requested to make substantial contribution. It is considered that offers by Argentina and Brazil should be on the order of a division each.

n. Sweden. In addition to the nations previously referred to herein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Sweden may be receptive to a suggestion that the country offer a combat unit for service in Korea.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 41 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 August 1951—7 : 11 p. m.

C-69026. "This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong 16 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Joy asked for answer to United Nations Command Delegations proposal of subdelegation to seek solution to Item 2. Nam Il, after criticizing United Nations Command Delegation for refusing to discuss 38th Parallel, agreed to subdelegation arrangement. Subdelegation to be composed of 2 delegates, 1 Staff Officer, and 1 interpreter from each side. There is to be no formality and no recorders.

Subdelegation is charged to find ways and means of breaking deadlock. Nam Il proposed main delegations recess during period subdelegation was meeting, to resume meeting on recommendation of subdelegation, or on mutual agreement of senior delegates. General Hodes nominated for United Nations Command with addition of other delegate reserved by Joy at his own discretion. Commie delegates are Lee, North Korean Army and Fang Communist Chinese Forces. Subdelegation meets tomorrow 1100K.

Part 2. Progress: As indicated in summary.

Part 3. Attitude: No change.

[Here follows Part 4, an abridged version of the transcript of the proceedings of the 26th session.]

Part 5. Conclusions: The UNC delegation feels the Communists are either now in earnest in search for solution to Demarcation Line problem, or are using sub-delegation procedure as means of stalling. No assurance of special significance attached to Communist acceptance of United Nations Comd proposal since the acceptance obviously constitutes no commitment."

I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 43 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 17 August 1951—10:58 p. m.

C-69108. This msg in 3 parts. "Subj is meeting of subdelegation at Kaesong 17 Aug.

"*Part 1.* Summary:

"*a.* Subdelegation first met very informally around two foot round table. Hodes explained possible ways break deadlock such as Communists give up 38th parallel or we give up our proposed zone or they suggest adjustments to our zone or go to another agenda item. Communists asked for our specific proposal. Hodes countered with trying to get agreement on these 3 points:

"(1) Military armistice has nothing to do with ultimate territory arrangements in Korea.

"(2) Demilitarized zone should be positioned so that balance of military advantages existing at time of armistice is not upset.

"(3) Each side should have defensible positions.

"*b.* They would not state specifically whether they agreed or not but did state they wanted equitable armistice based on 38th parallel. Hsieh Fang proposed we all look at a map. Looked at United Nations map showing their proposed zone, our proposed zone and battle lines.

Much repetition covering same ground as plenary sessions but faster and more direct. They maintain:

"(1) 38th parallel only sound solution.

"(2) Battle line does not represent military situation. I say again for emphasis 'that the ground battle line now existing does not represent military situation'.

"(3) Their ground forces can push us south of 38th parallel at any time and therefore balance of power is now on their side.

"(4) We should accept their word as a guarantee they will not attack during armistice.

"(5) Air and Navy have some minor effects on war but only on position of battle line (we did not like that either).

"*c.* We explained reasons for our original zone and possible hypothetical adjustments such as narrowing zone and adjusting southern boundary. Asked them for proposal. They discussed 38th parallel as military demarcation line showing adjustments in demilitarized zone possible in width of zone and adjustments of boundaries to fit terrain but keeping 38th parallel as military demarcation line within the demilitarized zone.

"*d.* In discussion of other agenda items they asked what could be decided unless demilitarized zone was first decided. We replied exchange information on location prisoner of war camps, number prisoners in each camp, names of prisoners, inspection of camps by Red Cross and even exchange was possible. They not interested. In discussing inspection teams it evident they now thinking only of inspection within demilitarized zone and not behind it stating we have to take their word in good faith. They refused to discuss other agenda items until item 2 decided. Our subdelegation made it very plain several times that the United Nations, the United Nations Command, our main delegation and our subdelegation would not accept the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line. A demilitarized zone including the 38th parallel would not be acceptable. We would discuss any zone or any military demarcation line based on the present military situation. Subdelegation meetings continue tomorrow.

"*Part 2.* Progress: None.

"*Part 3.* Conclusions:

"The UNC Delegation feels that they expect to milk us for as much information as possible before giving up 38th parallel or breaking conference. Chinese apparently prefers subdelegation method of meeting because they can then talk. Hsieh spoke frequently and poured oil when waters got troubled. Maybe Chinese will be willing to discuss some zone other than one based on 38th parallel but evidence of that extremely slight so far."

I concur.

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 98

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1951.
WFM T-10

UN ACTION IN KOREA IN CASE OF AN ARMISTICE

PROBLEM

To obtain British and French support for the U.S. position with respect to UN courses of action in Korea in case an armistice is successfully negotiated.

U.S. OBJECTIVE

To achieve a unified independent and democratic Korea with maximum assurance against Communist domination.

PROBABLE POSITIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH

The British and French will probably support the U.S. position in general; they will likely prefer replacement of ROK and North Korean governments by newly constituted regime for all of Korea to assumption of jurisdiction over North Korea by ROK.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

1. Political discussions on Korea must follow an armistice.

2. Political discussions of other Far Eastern problems cannot take place prior to a Korean political settlement.

3. The purpose of political discussions on Korea would be to obtain agreement on the following:

a. Establishment under UN supervision of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist domination.
b. Activation of a rehabilitation problem for all of Korea under UNKRA, no funds to be spent in North Korea until political settlement in force.
c. Plan for phased withdrawal of foreign forces with reasonable assurances against internal disorder and external aggression.

4. Unification of Korea without Communist domination might be

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[1] A cover sheet, not printed, indicated that this document was prepared in the Department of State in anticipation of the forthcoming Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington, involving the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which was held from September 10 to 14, and which is documented fully in vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff. At this time, the document was being transmitted to the Department of Defense for clearance; see p. 877.

achieved either by *a*) integration of North Korea into the existing ROK, or *b*) replacement of the North Korean regime and the ROK government by a successor government for all of Korea. The United States should reserve its position on which of these methods to support pending further study of the situation and analysis of the attitudes of UN members and the ROK.

5. Procedure leading to a political conference should take the following form:

a. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Delegation to represent the UN in working out a Korean settlement.

b. The UN Delegation would set up a conference in Kaesong in which the participants might be: the UN Delegation, the ROK, the North Koreans, Chinese Communists, and the USSR.

c. Agreements achieved by the conference would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.

DISCUSSION

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN EVENT ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL

1. *General Policy*

a. There is general agreement that the United States and the United Nations should seize the initiative in the post-armistice phase. We are publicly committed to enter political discussions leading to the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem after the conclusion of an armistice. There seems to be no good reason to drag our feet and excellent reason for making a proposal looking toward the prompt convocation of a conference for this purpose. Moreover, if we do not make a proposal we can be certain that the enemy will, in which case we will be forced into the defensive position of rejecting or seeking to modify a proposal which can be expected to be objectionable.

b. The United States should adopt the position that it will not participate in a conference on other Far Eastern problems until after there is a cessation of hostilities under a satisfactory armistice agreement and a political settlement of the Korean problem. It should likewise be the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided under an armistice agreement than to permit a unification of the country under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.

c. The main questions which must be answered are: what would we wish to derive from a conference on Korea; what would be our position therein; when and where do we propose it be held; and who should participate.

2. *Purpose of Political Conference*

a. In a political conference we should seek agreement:

1) On the establishment, under UN supervision, of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist subversion or aggression and with a program for the rehabilitation of all of Korea under UNKRA (no UNKRA funds would be spent in North Korea until a full political settlement had been reached and entered into force).

2) Following agreement on the steps leading to unification, on a plan for a phased withdrawal of all foreign forces under conditions which would assure internal security throughout Korea and provide reasonable assurance against external aggression.

3. *United States Position in any Political Conference*

a. There are two principal methods to achieve a non-Communist unified government in Korea.

b. The first method would involve, in effect, the integration of North Korea into the presently existing Republic of Korea. This would be done by the holding of free elections in North Korea for seats reserved for North Koreans in the Republic of Korea National Assembly under the auspices of a UN body. The terms of the present ROK assembly elected in 1950 under UN observed elections expire in 1954. This augmented assembly would, in accordance with the ROK constitution, elect a president for the new term beginning in 1952, who could then form a government of his own choice. While involving the least disturbance to the already functioning ROK government and being the course which would be supported by that government, this method would be strongly opposed by a substantial number of important non-Communist foreign governments and would unquestionably be entirely unacceptable to the Communists as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

c. The second method would, in effect, involve the disappearance of both the Republic of Korea and the North Korean regime in favor of a single successor government to be formed by a constituent assembly selected by elections held throughout Korea under the auspices of a United Nations body. This method would be supported by most non-Communist foreign governments, and while it would probably initially be opposed by the Republic of Korea, that government would not necessarily remain entirely adamant in its opposition as the preponderance of population in South Korea together with the control of the governmental machinery in that area during the period of the election should enable officials of the present Republic of Korea government to achieve a dominant voice in the formation of the new government.

d. Either of the above methods would result in the disappearance of the Communist regime in North Korea, and are, therefore, most unlikely of acceptance by the Communists.

e. It is not now feasible to reach a firm decision on which method of unification the United States should support. It would probably not be practicable or desirable to adopt the first method as an initial bargaining position with the view of changing to the second method during negotiations. Both methods present serious difficulties, the first with our Allies and the second with the Republic of Korea. However, it would be to the interest of both the United States and the Republic of Korea to adopt a negotiating position from which the maximum advantage of world opinion can be gained. The greatest advantage would be gained if the Republic of Korea could be persuaded itself to propose the second method. Therefore, efforts should be undertaken at the earliest suitable opportunity to gain the concurrence of the Republic of Korea to this course of action.

f. Failing agreement on unification, the United States should, without prejudicing the principle that only by a unification of Korea under conditions acceptable to the United Nations can the Korean problem satisfactorily be solved, seek *ad hoc* agreement on such other matters as may be possible, including a mutual *reduction* of forces.

g. In discussing any reduction of foreign forces in Korea the United States should make it clear that the Chinese forces, having engaged in an act of aggression, are illegally in Korea, while the United Nations forces are in Korea pursuant to United Nations resolutions in order to repel aggression and to restore peace and security. Nevertheless, recognizing the realities of the situation and the desirability of some Chinese Communist forces remaining in Korea so as to enable us to utilize the threat of action against China in event of violation of the armistice, the United States should be prepared to accept the retention of some Chinese Communist forces in North Korea.

4. *Procedure Leading to a Political Conference*

a. After the armistice is signed, the General Assembly should adopt a resolution noting the armistice with approval and appointing a United Nations Delegation (the United States and possibly Australia and Thailand) to represent the United Nations in efforts to achieve a permanent settlement of the Korean problem. This Delegation would, by any appropriate means, make contact with the North Korean and Chinese Communists and set up a conference in which the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists, the USSR, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations delegation would participate.

b. It is suggested that the conference be held at Kaesong or in the demilitarized zone as soon as possible after it appears that the armistice terms are being faithfully carried out.

5. *United Nations Approval of Political Settlement*

a. Any agreement reached in discussions among the interested parties would be *ad referendum* and would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.

[Annex]

WFM T-10 (Supplement)

VIEWS OF THE EMBASSY IN LONDON ON PROBABLE BRITISH ATTITUDES ON SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS

KOREA (IF ARMISTICE)

The British fear that Korea may fall to the Communists by political means, and they may suggest general talks outside UN in order to facilitate Chinese Communist participation, preferably limited to Korea but in any event with Korea as first agenda item and agreement on other subjects dependent upon reaching an agreement on Korea.

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 98

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1951.

WFM T-10/1

UN ACTION IN KOREA IN CASE OF NO ARMISTICE

PROBLEM

To obtain British and French support for the United States position respecting UN courses of action in Korea in the event no armistice is signed.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

Without relinquishing the objectives set forth in NSC 48/5,[2] to develop and maintain for the United States the optimum position of readiness for a general war, to preserve the security of UN forces in Korea, and to bring an end to the aggression by the Chinese and North Korean Communists, with maximum support of UN members and while continuing to seek to avoid precipitating general war. If the enemy seeks a stalemate, we should continue military action along present lines and generally in present position, and intensify political and economic action. If the enemy launches an offensive, we should intensify military action as well.

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra*. For the comments of the Department of Defense, see p. 877.

[2] Dated May 17; for extracts from NSC 48/5 dealing with Korea, see the memorandum, p. 439.

PROBABLE POSITIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH

1. United Kingdom: would probably be reluctant to intensify hostilities unless clearly forced by Communist action.

2. France: probably similar to the above, conditioned by fear of Chinese Communist action in Indochina.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

1. If the enemy, after failure of armistice talks, appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of *de facto* cease-fire without agreement, the following general courses of action are proposed:

a. Maintain present defensive positions, making only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent build up, with air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks.

b. Develop and equip additional effective ROK units.

c. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces.

d. Support action by the General Assembly to reaffirm United Nations determination to continue resistance to aggression and to apply additional economic measures against China, up to and including complete economic blockade.

e. Exert efforts to obtain increased military forces from United Nations Members.

f. Conduct intensified psychological warfare operations to maintain and increase world support to UN and to promote dissension within Communist orbit.

2. If, after definitive end to negotiations, Communists launch a massive ground offensive, the following courses are proposed in place of course 1*a* and in addition to 1*b* through 1*f*:

a. Accelerate defense preparations to correspond to the increased threat.

b. After consultation with participating nations, direct CINCUNC to increase scale of military operations to maximum extent consistent with the capabilities and security of available forces, including advances up to the neck of the North Korean peninsula as required by the military situation.

c. After consultation with participating nations, remove restrictions against air attacks on Yalu River dams and power installations.

3. If, in addition to launching an offensive, the Communists include massive air attacks against UN ground, air or naval forces, the following additional course is proposed:

a. After consultation with participating nations to extent permitted by situation, permit United Nations aircraft to pursue enemy planes to landing fields in Manchuria or China (except Port Arthur and Dairen), and, if necessary, destroy such planes after landing, as well as neutralize opposing anti-aircraft protecting these landing fields.

DISCUSSION

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN EVENT NO ARMISTICE IS ACHIEVED

It is assumed that the courses of action to follow upon a failure of armistice talks will depend on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the character and intensity of renewed hostilities by the Communists. We envisage the following possibilities:

I. *Alternative One:* The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;

(2) The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks against UN ground, air or naval forces.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Accelerate present pace of preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on the assumption that the Communist action has greatly increased the likelihood of general hostilities;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available or made available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible, with a view to their assuming an increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River; the question of attacks on Rashin should be reviewed in the light of the then existing circumstances;

h. After consultation with the participating nations to the extent permitted by the situation, extend the area for pursuit and air to air action in air engagement initiated over Korea by permitting UN aircraft to disregard the Korean-Manchurian border during such engagements and to pursue such enemy planes to their landing fields in Manchuria or China (except Port Arthur and Dairen) and, if necessary, destroy such planes after landing as well as to neutralize opposing anti-aircraft fire protecting such landing fields;

i. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China;

j. Re-examine desirability of use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against China mainland.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. Provided it is concluded at the time that the results thereof would be effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, adoption of a GA resolution re-affirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

Diplomatic

a. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to inform world that Communists are responsible for prolongation and extension of hostilities, that UN will continue all efforts to keep area of hostilities limited to that required by military necessities, and that UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow;

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices and increased mobilization pace;

c. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in the Far East.

II. *Alternative Two:* The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;

(2) The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;

(3) The enemy does *not* initiate massive air attacks against UN ground or naval forces and his counter-action to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong so as seriously to interfere with the effectiveness of UN air operations.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Continue preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice making every additional effort necessary to achieve the present objectives on schedule;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed;

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible with a view to their assuming an increasing share of responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River; the question of attacks on Rashin should be reviewed in the light of the then existing circumstances;

h. Direct CINCUNC fully and currently to report upon any increase in the scale and scope of enemy air operations in Korea, as well as, to the extent possible under present restrictions, upon enemy air buildup in Manchuria, so that Washington can re-examine, if necessary, the question of authorizing UN counter-action in Manchuria or China against enemy aircraft and, if such counter-action appears necessary, take action to obtain support from other participating countries for such counter-action;

i. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. Provided it is concluded at the time that the results thereof would be effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, adoption of a GA resolution re-affirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

Diplomatic

a. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to place blame for armistice breakdown on Communists, including wide publication Ridgway report;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow.

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices;

c. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in Far East.

III. *Alternative Three:* Assumptions:

(1) Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility open for renewal at any time;

(2) Communists do not launch offensive or massive air attacks;

(3) Enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of *de facto* cease-fire without agreement.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Maintain Kansas line defensive positions;

b. Make only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent possible buildup;

c. Continue air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks;

d. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

e. Direct CINCUNC fully and currently to report upon any increase in the scale or scope of enemy ground or air buildup in Korea or Manchuria to the extent possible under then existing conditions, so that Washington may, if necessary, consider the question of authorizing UN counter-action necessary to the continued security of UN forces;

f. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

g. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China;

h. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed;

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and
(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communication.

Diplomatic

a. Efforts, perhaps through the USSR, to ascertain to the extent possible enemy intentions;

b. Efforts to obtain additional troops better to distribute defense burden and to increase number of countries contributing troops.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on negotiations after sufficient time has lapsed to clarify situation;

b. In Sixth GA, another GA resolution calling on Communists to give up their aggression and resume peace talks on UN basis;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternative to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

[Annex]

WFM T-10/1
(Supplement)

VIEWS OF THE EMBASSY IN LONDON ON PROBABLE BRITISH ATTITUDES ON SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS

KOREA (IF NO ARMISTICE)

The chief concern of the British is that the US may renew full-scale military effort. They hope for an effective stalemate in absence of major air intervention, in which case they would probably be prepared to accept full-scale war with China, perhaps leading to general war.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 44 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 18 August 1951—9:45 p. m.

C-69184. This msg in 3 parts. Subj is meeting of sub-delegation at Kaesong 18 Aug.

1. Summary:

a. Subdelegation again gathered in an informal atmosphere. The Communists produced a map of the scale of 1:200,000 outlining the UNC proposed zone, the 38th Parallel Zone and the battle line. The 38th Parallel Zone had been modified by adjustment in the eastern portion of the southern boundary which gave the UNC positions about 4 kilometers nearer the 38th Parallel and an equal adjustment in the western portion of the zone on the northern boundary giving the Communists a similar advance to the south. Their so called adjustment resulted in no concession on their part; rather a trade of equal areas with 38th zone. The entire morning was devoted to sparring, with each side reviewing the fairness of its proposal and refuting the arguments of the other side. They continue their illogical arguments with no military basis. Their only real argument, which they repeated several times during the day, proposes a reasonable equal exchange of real estate along the 38th Parallel which has no bearing on the present situation. The Communists insisted that the basic principle in an armistice was the pledged word of each side not to resume hostilities and that the demilitarized zone itself provided all necessary additional security. The United Nations Command subdelegation agreed that the pledged word was an important principle but maintained that neither it nor the demilitarized zone in themselves provided the security that we demand for our troops and that adequate defensive positions were also essential. The United Nations Command subdelegation stressed on numerous occasions the necessity for the maintenance of balance between the two forces during the armistice and stressed the principle that neither side improve its military position. This is a requirement the Communists refused to admit. The Communists proposed that we (1) drop from the map the United Nations Command proposed zone (2) drop hypothetically the 38th Parallel zone although we should in doing so remember that it is still the Communists basic proposal, (3) drop the battle line and (4) start fresh, with the United Nations Command subdelegation placing on the map a new zone completely unrelated to any of the lines that were formerly on the map. The UNC subdelegation countered with a suggestion that the Communists place on the map their concept of such a zone. The Communists refused. The UNC subdelegation then proposed that a coin be tossed to determine who would place a zone related to the battle line on a clean map. In refusing this request the Communists stated flatly that they had no proposal in mind except one based on the 38th Parallel. The Communists realized the spot they would be in if they lost the toss and couldn't make a proposal. Neither side offered a new proposal during the afternoon session. Discussion centered on UNC subdelegation attempting to get agreement on fundamentals without success. The Communists in replying to a question relative to military balance during the armistice stated that only line representing true military balance was the 38th Parallel. The UNC subdelegation then asked this direct question 3 times: "Is any zone not based on the 38th Parallel acceptable to you?" The Communists beat around the bush each time and would not give a direct answer. The UNC subdelegation then stated: "You have led me to believe you are here to negotiate an armistice only if it is based on the 38th Parallel. Is my impression correct?" The statement and question repeated after the Communists fumbled in trying to keep from replying. The Communists finally replied by stating that their basic principle was to retain the 38th Parallel but that this morning they had proposed some adjustments. They added that they still believed their first proposal was fair and reasonable but that did not mean that they refused to discuss a solution that was better than theirs. They stated, "Your proposals to date continue to be unacceptable." The United Nations Command subdelegation then proposed that subcommittees be formed to concurrently discuss agenda items 2, 3 and 4. The Communists refused by stating that until item 2 was settled it was useless to go to any other item. The UNC subdelegation then stated that they wanted it clearly understood that they were not going to accept the 38th Parallel zone. The Communists replied that it should be perfectly clear that they would not accept the UNC proposal or any adjustments thus far proposed. The UNC subdelegation then attempted to determine if any proposal other than one based upon 38th Parallel would be acceptable. The Communists would not reply directly but indicated that nothing other than a zone based upon the 38th Parallel would interest them. They added that if the UNC would drop their exaggerated demands for compensation of the air and naval withdrawal they could then see the 38th Parallel as a just and reasonable offer. In reply to a question by UNC subdelegation the Communists indicated that the width of the zone was immaterial; it could be 5 kilometers or 100 kilometers. Subdelegation meetings continue tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Conclusions: The UNC delegation feels that there is a clear indication that the Communist subdelegation has no authority to make a specific proposal other than the 38th Parallel zone. They are authorized to discuss hypothetically any such proposal we might put up for discussion. They utilize the subdelegation meetings to seek all possible information from us and to resist all UNC efforts to obtain information in return. The subdelegation is finding itself in the same position as was the full delegation at the plenary sessions. I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 47 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 19 August 1951—2:56 p. m.

C–69215. This msg in 3 parts. Subject is meeting of sub-delegation at Kaesong 19 Aug.

Part 1. Summary: Non productive session again today. Hodes and Burke constituted sub-delegation. Hsieh did most enemy talking but used same old arguments. They continue insist on 38th parallel as basis for all lines and zones. We insisted military balance must be maintained and our ground positions be defensible during period of armistice. Meetings continue tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Conclusions: The UNC delegation draws same conclusions as on 18 Aug. I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 48 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 20 August 1951—5:23 p. m.

C–69262. This msg in 3 parts. Subject is meeting of sub delegation at Kaesong 20 August:

Part 1.

1. Summary: Burke presented UNC position arguments for demilitarized zone in the general area of the battle line. Stated necessity for maintaining present even balance of military effectiveness in order to prevent one side from gaining strength and other losing strength and thereby encourage violation of armistice. Pointed out that the Communist proposal would almost double length of line; that area which we would acquire in west would be indefensible; and that in the east we

would be required to retire from defensible positions to indefensible ones far to south. Lee stated that difference of opinion resulted from the fact that we viewed the question from the standpoint of maintaining military balance while they viewed it from the standpoint of military realities and living up to international agreements. He drew distinction between "line of contact" and "general area of the battle line" and stated that as long as we adhere to our position that the demilitarized zone must be in the latter area no progress would be made by the sub committee. At this point Communist delegation advised that they desired to recess to attend memorial services for Chinese officer killed yesterday in neutral zone.

2. They stated the peace loving people of the area had spontaneously organized these services. Communists led up to inviting UN sub delegation to attend services in "honor of first man who had given his life for the success of conferences" by a long tirade aimed at "UN forces guilt proven beyond doubt". Preliminary statements prior to invitation about same as those contained in Nam Il msg to Joy.[1]

3. Hodes decided to express regrets and decline invitation to attend for several reasons. First, our investigation incomplete but no evidence yet that UN forces guilty of incident. Second, the manner in which they led up to the invitation created suspicion as to their motives.

4. Fully realize that the Commies will make propaganda out of the services whether or not we attended.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Conclusions: Same as 18 August.

I concur.

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[1] The message from Gen. Nam Il to Admiral Joy, dated August 19, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1951, p. 392. The text of Admiral Joy's reply, dated August 22, is printed *ibid.*, p. 389. In it, Joy pointed out that an investigation by the U.N. Command had shown that none of its forces were involved in the incident but that the attack was carried out by a group of partisan irregulars, some of whom wore civilian clothing.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 49: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET — TOKYO, 21 August 1951—5:28 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-69346. Reference JCS 95354.[1]

1. Statements of Communists in sub-delegation meeting at Kaesong yesterday can be interpreted as willingness to discuss line of demarca-

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[1] Dated June 30, p. 598.

tion on basis of "line of contact" as opposed to "the general area of the battle line", which to date has been our proposal. Our delegates are exploring this possibility.

2. If we should find an actual willingness to abandon their adamant stand on the 38 parallel and to negotiate a demilitarized zone based on the present approximate line of contact or opposing forces, I would like to be in a position to negotiate along these lines and, if I then consider it advisable, to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than 4 kilometers in width, with the line of contact as the median line thereof.

3. Such a demilitarized zone would eliminate many anticipated serious difficulties of both military and civil control inherent in a 20 mile wide zone, as currently proposed in your instructions to me. It would place opposing military forces outside of small arms range of each other, it would, if accepted, be a face saving device for the Communists, avoiding the necessity of any substantial withdrawal of their armed forces from terrain presently occupied.

4. Negotiation on the foregoing basis will almost certainly be opposed by the ROKA representative. I believe, however, that the effects of that opposition could be minimized, if not eliminated, within our delegation. I further believe that if negotiation on this basis should prove acceptable to the Communists, substantial progress might be made toward the objectives outlined in your 95354.

5. Your authorization is requested to proceed at my discretion as outlined above, if it develops that the Communists are willing to negotiate on the basis of the present line of contact.[3]

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[3] A brief memorandum attached to the source text by Mr. Rusk as well as a manuscript notation by Mr. Matthews on a copy of this message in Lot File 53D413 both indicated that State Department approval of General Ridgway's request was given following discussions by Secretary Acheson with Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, and Hickerson. The following message was then sent to Tokyo on August 21 in telegram JCS 99477:

"From JCS. Reur C-69346. You are authorized to negotiate on basis indicated in ref radio. Understood here that this action, if agreed to, will in no way jeopardize ability to defend line Kansas." (Black Book, Tab 52)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 50 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 21 August 1951—6:21 p. m.

C-69359. This msg in three parts. Subj is Fifth Meeting of Subdelegation of Kaesong 21 Aug.

"*Part 1.* Summary: Lengthy general discussion by both sides on general subj of demilitarized zone in vic ground battle line. Communists continue blame United Nations Command subdelegation as well as United Nations Command delegation for deadlock claiming lack of good faith and lack of earnestness to break deadlock. All of above allegations are of course countered as rapidly as they are made and countercharges likewise made. Communists continue attempts to milk United Nations Command subdelegation for new proposals more advantageous to them than original proposal to which we have repeatedly suggested adjustments for discussion. Adjustments we suggested included narrowing zone all in their favor, moving line of demarcation southward in their favor and combinations of these two. Yet Communists insist we have in no way altered our basic unacceptable requirement except to make it less painful. Meetings of subdelegation continue at 1100K 22 Aug.

"*Part 2.* Progress: None.

"*Part 3.* Conclusions: No change."

I concur.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 53 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 August 1951—5:50 p. m.

C-69406. This msg in 3 parts. Subj is Sixth Meeting of Sub Delegation at Kaesong 22 Aug.

Part 1. Summary: The discussions followed the same trend as that of former meetings and concluded with an exploration of the principle of adjustments to the battle line as means of establishing the military demarcation line.

In the exchanges each party again reviewed in some detail certain arguments for their proposals and counter arguments against the proposals of the other side. Lee several times made the statement that no progress could be made until United Nations Command Delegation gave up not only the concept under which UNC is compensated on the ground for its Air and Navy but also any plan based upon the line of contact. Hsieh on other hand said no progress could be made until UNC gave up at least its first proposal. Numerous attempts were made to determine if, in fact, there was a difference between statements of Lee and Hsieh. It was agreed that no definite conclusion to that effect is justified. Toward the end of the day's conference the question of the relationship of the line of contact to the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone was brought up by the Commies and explored. Both parties agreed to the broad principle that adjustments could be made to the line of contact by withdrawals and advances by both sides in such a way as to fix a military demarcation line. Not yet known why Commies pressed for agreement on this principle. Again we emphasized that all proposed adjustments would be judged on merits alone and that 38th Parallel has no merit. Meetings continue 23 Aug.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Conclusions: No change.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 58: Telegram

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate in Korea (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

SECRET FLASH KOREA, 23 August 1951—6:55 a. m.

HNC–258. At 2330K Communist Liasion Officer contacted United Nations Command base camp by radio telephone. In an agitated voice he stated the Armistice conference site was bombed and strafed at 2320K. He requested Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer to come immediately to make an investigation. Difficulties of hour and half journey through front lines at night were cited. Liaison Officer was insistent in his request. Since United Nations Command delegation had previously chided Communists for delay in protesting alleged incident, I ordered United Nations Command Liaison Officers Colonels Kinney and Murray to investigate. They travelled by jeep to Kaesong arriving there about 0145K. Delay in arrival was due to necessity our liaison party crossing Imjin river by boat.

On arrival at the conference house in Kaesong, Colonel Chang and Lt Col Tsai surrounded by Communist press corps awaited the United Nations Command Liaison Officers. Col Chang stated a United Nations Command aircraft had attacked the Kaesong neutral zone at 2320K. The attack included strikes within the immediate conference area. Lt Col Tsai produced 2 marble size bits of metal which he alleged had hit the jeep of the Senior Communist delegate. On inquiry by Col Kinney, Col Chang could not say whether one or more aircraft involved. He stated he did not know how many bombs were dropped or how many passes the aircraft made. Col Chang stated all present heard the aircraft. All present included Communist Liaison Officers and staff assistants, Communist news reporters and photographers, but none of the Communist delegates were present. Kinney and Murray were escorted to within 100 yards of United Nations Command delegation house, and there were shown a rumpled piece of rolled metal about 18 to 30 inches covered with oil and lying in the road. Chang asserted this was napalm bomb. There was no bomb crater near, and no scorched earth. The piece of metal appeared to be part of a tank of some sort. About 25 yards away was a minor depression in the earth perhaps 6 inches deep and approximately 24 inches in diameter. Murray judges possible result partially buried explosive of force equivalent to grenade. Kinney judges clearly not a bomb crater. Near residence of Communist Delegates, 3 other pieces of metal were pointed out. Two of these appeared to be pieces of United Nations Command aircraft. Flush riveting noted.[1] Each piece about one foot square. Third piece was fin of rocket. No craters, no furrows apparent. Pieces of metal either lying on surface of ground or penetrate a few inches. On return to Conference House Col Kinney asserted evidence plainly not result of United Nations Command bombing. Pointed out no damage to any structure, person or even crop. Chang immediately announced, from written notes, that there would be no further meetings. Kinney inquired if Chang meant subdelegation meetings as well as liaison meetings. Chang replied, all meetings "were off from this time".[2] United Nations Command Liaison Officers departed to camp. Halfway to Pan Mun Jom they were overtaken by Chang and Tsai, asked to return to Kaesong to view more evidence. Kinney and Murray protested darkness, rain precluded satisfactory investigation, but returned to Kaesong. Two more pieces of flush riveted metal were pointed out in area near Communist delegation residence. There was a hole nearby about 1 foot deep, 2 feet in diameter. Colonel Murray judged this hole could possibly be the result of grenade size explosion pre-set in ground. Judged by Kinney clearly not bomb crater. Final piece of metal also flush riveted, and was laying in only small amount of liquid possibly poor grade of napalm. Three or four scorched areas about 15 square inches each nearby.

Kinney requested [return?] in morning in better light. Chang refused, saying investigation was complete. Kinney requested all evidence be left in place for examination in daylight since darkness prevented proper observation. Chang stated evidence had to be taken in for analysis.

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[1] A statement issued later on August 23 by General Ridgway made the following observation on this point:

"A flush-riveted piece of metal, which was identified by the Communist liaison officer as a part of the napalm bomb utilized in the attack, is not of the construction used by the United Nations Command, as flush riveting is not employed in the manufacture of napalm tanks. They are of rough construction, more economically produced as they are used only once." (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1951, p. 390)

[2] A statement issued on August 23 by President Truman noted that it was unclear whether the Communist side intended to stop the talks for a day, several days, or permanently; until this could be clarified, no appraisal of the Communist action could be made, save to note that it was not designed to move the negotiations forward toward an armistice (*ibid.*, p. 391).

In course of discussion at last site, Kinney asked if anyone present had actually seen an aircraft. A CCF soldier was put forward who declared he saw aircraft at 2320K. Kinney asked if aircraft showed lights. Soldier answered yes, lights were on—headlights. European Communist newspaperman intervened, charging Kinney with tricking soldier by trap question. Kinney required Chang to clear area of news reporters immediately. Chang complied after argument.

As United Nations Command liaison officers prepared to depart again Chang demanded Kinney accept responsibility for attack. Kinney declared evidence ridiculous, but would transmit to Joy. Liaison officers advance 2 possible explanations of incident. First, the so called evidence manufactured on ground out of whole cloth with Communist aircraft flying over to touch off show. Second, holes might actually be result of dropping by Communist aircraft of small cans napalm and small explosive charges such as grenades with doctoring up by addition of aircraft metal.

Preliminary telephonic report by Joint Operations Center Fifth Air Force indicates no United Nations Command aircraft in Kaesong area during night. No United Nations Command aircraft off course, lost, or in difficulty during night. Bogie on Fifth Air Force radar at 2130K west of Kaesong. This being checked further.

Obviously, suspension of these meetings required high level decision. This could scarcely have been secured in interval from 2320K to 0145K. This considered confirmatory evidence of fraudulent nature of incident.

Total lack of damage and wide distribution of evidence suggests metal pieces might have been dropped by Communist aircraft, possible including very small explosives such as grenades to mark drops. Conclusion of Kinney and Murray is that incident was unquestionably staged by Communists.

V. AUGUST 24–OCTOBER 24. PLANNING IN REGARD TO KOREA DURING THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION OF CEASE-FIRE TALKS; DISCUSSIONS BY UNITED NATIONS AND COMMUNIST LIAISON OFFICERS LOOKING TOWARD A RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS; THE KIRK-VYSHINSKY CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW; AGREEMENT ON RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD AT PANMUNJOM

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 3 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 24 August 1951—9 : 55 p. m.

CX–69566. This message in four parts and part 4 requests instructions.

Part 1. There follows the English text of a letter delivered to Lt Col Lee, United Nations Command Delegation Liaison Officer at Pan Mun Jom, 241100–K, August 1951. The text of this letter is identical with the English Morse broadcast from Peiping Radio made earlier the same day:

"Aug 23, 1951, General M B Ridgway: Before the blood of our brave fighter, Platoon Commander Yao Ching-Hsiang sacrificed under the unlawful murder by your armed personnel could dry, aircraft of your side further unlawfully intruded into the air above the conference site area in the Kaesong neutral zone at 2220 hrs, Aug 22, to carry out bombing and strafing with the residence of our delegation as tgt. Although filled with the utmost indignation, our delegation still notified your side at 2235 hrs, Aug 22, to send over your personnel to conduct an investigation, in order to make known the facts of this incident to the whole world and to deprive your side of all pretexts to attribute the incident to accidental causes. The Liaison Officers sent by your side saw with their own eyes the craters and shrapnel left by the bombs dropped by your acft and the evidences that the bombs were dropped only a few hours ago, and could not but keep silent. As a matter of fact, even if there had been no joint investigation with the participation of your Liaison Officers, the testimonies and evidences in our possession were already sufficient to prove the undeniable provocative act on the part of your side.

"The reason why you dared continue to undertake wantonly such provocative actions is that you have erroneously taken our patience in winning peace as a sign of weakness. You believe that we would, in no case, be willing to see the negotiations broken off on account of such matters, and therefore you did not hesitate to shoot at Pan Mun Jom in the first instance, to murder our mil police, and finally even to attempt to murder our delegation. We must tell you that you are mistaken in believing so. It is true that it has been our consistent attitude to be extremely patient and tolerant for the sake of armistice and peace. But there is a limit to our patience. And further, we are well aware that peace will not be attainable with our side alone demanding peace unilaterally. Since your side has wantonly undertaken such provocative acts outside of the conference room, while within the conference room you have persistently insisted upon your arrogant proposal of pushing the military demarcation line into our positions to stall the negotiations, it is already crystal clear what good faith you could have in the armistice negotiations.

"We hope that our armistice negotiations may proceed smoothly and reach a fair and reasonable agreement acceptable to both sides. But as, following your murder of our military police, your side further carried out purposeful murderous bombing with our delegation as tgt, how could such a hope be realized? Consequently, our delegation could not but declare a suspension of the armistice negotiations on Aug 23, to await your responsible settlement of this serious provocative incident by your side. When the neutral zone is of no significance to you who are prepared at any time to murder our unarmed delegates present in the neutral zone for the purpose of the armistice negotiations, how then can you deem it possible for us to continue the armistice negotiations.

"It should be clear to you that all the dealings between our side and your side so far are based on the principle of equality and reciprocity. If your side does not show with deeds that you respect this principle, but on the contrary brazenly assumes the air of a victor and wantonly violates all the agreements based on this principle, including the Kaesong neutral zone agreement, the responsibility resulting therefrom and all the consequences rest entirely with your side.

"With regard to the provocative incident of bombing the Kaesong neutral zone by your armed forces at 2220 hrs, Aug 22, with the intention of murdering our delegation, we hereby raise a strong protest before all the just people of the world, and await a satisfactory reply from your side. Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers."

Part 2. Analysis.

a. Facts:

1. The "bombing incident" was a complete and premeditated fabrication. (The "fabrication" is attested to by the investigation made by Colonels Kinney and Murray. The "premeditation" is evidenced by the immediate announcement from written notes by the Communist Liaison Officer, Colonel Chang, that there would be no further meetings and the assurance by this same officer under questioning that all meetings "were off from this time". The decision must obviously have been made in advance at the highest level.)

2. The Communists have announced that negotiations are suspended pending a satisfactory reply to the allegation. (This announcement was made in several languages beginning at 240115K August and continuing through 241200K August.)

b. Possible Motivation:

1. The Communists desire an "excuse" to bring an end to the negotiations, with the object of seeking to fix the blame for the cessation upon the United Nations. It is possible that, with no desire for an ultimate peace in Korea, they have accomplished their original program during the time that the negotiations have now run. This is borne out, to some extent, but [*by*] tactical operations now in progress

and pending. A "suspension" can well be the preliminary to a complete "break-off" at a time of their own choosing.

2. The incident is designed to provide a stalling procedure to meet the timing of the Kaesong talks with global events such as the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco and the Russian peace offensive.

3. The Communists desire a suspension based on manufactured incidents in order to strengthen their propaganda position and regain the initiative in the conduct of negotiations.

Part 3. I propose to broadcast subject to your comments, hereinafter requested, the following message to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai:

"Your message of 24 August, pertaining to an alleged United Nations aerial attack on Kaesong on the evening of 22 August, has been received.

"This most recent addition to the alleged incidents by elements of the United Nations Command, so utterly false, so preposterous and so obviously manufactured for your own questionable purposes does not, in its own right, merit a reply. Nor do the other incidents you have cited as intentional violations by the United Nations Command of the neutral zone at Kaesong. When not fabricated by you for your own propaganda needs, these incidents have proven to be the actions of irregular groups which you have been unable to control and your fear of which I fully understand.

"In spite of this, I have consistently required my senior delegate and the commanders of the forces under my command to grant you the courtesy of a full inspection and report of every alleged incident, regardless of its manifest falsity.

"The evidence in this most recent alleged violation was even more palpably compounded for your insidious propaganda purposes than your earlier efforts. In line, however, with our constant endeavor to abide by ethics of decency I have in this case, as in all others, fully investigated your charges. My senior Army, Navy and Air Force commanders have individually certified to me in writing that none of their elements have violated, or could possibly have violated, the Kaesong neutral zone in this or any other instance of alleged violations reported by you.

"I have caused the results of the investigation into this most recent allegation to be widely publicized, so that the entire world will be fully cognizant of your quite evident intent to use a 'manufactured' incident in order to evade your responsibility for having suspended the negotiations.

"The allegations made in your several recent communications concerning the alleged firing on Pan Mun Jom; the alleged ambush of

19 August; and the alleged bombing and strafing of Wednesday night, 22 August, are rejected without qualification as malicious falsehoods totally without foundation in fact.

"When you are prepared to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations, which you declared on 23 August, and cease placing such groundless obstacles in the path of those negotiations, I will be prepared to consider directing my representatives to meet with yours, with a view to seeking a reasonable armistice agreement, which your words would indicate you desire, but which your deeds belie."

Part 4. Because of the far-reaching potentialities of this situation, I believe you will wish to review this proposed broadcast before release. I believe it to be in accord with your current directives. Request your comments.[1]

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[1] The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in the following message, telegram JCS 99793, dated August 24:

"Reur CX-69566.

"We approve your proposed broadcast subj to:

"(1) Insertion of 'by United Nations forces' after '19 August' in penultimate para, and

"(2) Revision of final para to read as follows:

" 'When you are prepared to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August, I will direct my representatives to meet with yours, with a view to seeking a reasonable armistice agreement.' " (Black Book, Tab 4)

General Ridgway assented to these changes and informed the Joint Chiefs that the broadcast would be made at 11:30 a. m. (Korean time) on August 25. (Telegram C-69568, August 25; Black Book, Tab 5) See also *infra*.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 6: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 25 August 1951—10:15 a. m.

C-69570. Broadcast of message contained in part 3 of my CX 69566 will contain the following modifications in addition to those prescribed in JCS 99793.

Last sentence of second paragraph will read "when not fabricated by you for your own propaganda needs, these incidents have proven to be the actions of irregular groups without the slightest connection overtly or covertly with any forces or agencies under my control".

The second sentence of paragraph four will read: "In line, however, with our constant adherence to ethics of decency, I have in this case, as in all others, fully investigated your charges." [1]

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[1] These changes were approved by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (telegram DA-99893, August 25, to Tokyo; Black Book Tab 8). The text of General Ridgway's message, as delivered, incorporated these changes and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 10, 1951, p. 439.

795.00/8–2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by John R. Heidemann of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. Moodie, Counselor
Belgium —Mr. Taymans, Counselor
Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Absent
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Ambassador Yang
Mr. Han, First Secretary
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. van Schalkwyk, First Secretary
Mr. Botha, Second Secretary
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE, Mr. Merchant
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Henkin
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Heidemann
Army, Capt. Pope

Captain Pope, in reviewing for the group the latest information relevant to the enemy's military capabilities, noted that the Far Eastern Command had tentatively accepted the presence of three communist armored divisions in positions just behind the front, that the pattern of enemy troop movements to and from the front in the central sector suggested that preparations were going forward for a new offensive, and that the enemy stockpile, which was the largest accumulated thus far in the war, was deemed capable of supporting 46 divisions—the enemy has that many between the 39th parallel and the front—for a period of 26 days. Captain Pope recalled that the failures of the enemy's previous offensives were largely the result of his poor handling of the re-supply problem, a shortcoming which he was doubtless striving to correct. Mr. Rusk commented that flying conditions in Korea would presently become better and that we had reinforced our air force and the enemy would shortly begin to feel the effects of the increased UN air action. Mr. Rusk said that the latest communist message to General Ridgway does not change the situation except insofar as the communists have now said that further investigations were needed.[1] He recalled that the communist liaison officer told our liaison officer on the night of the "bombing" that a daylight investigation would not be possible since the evidence had to be taken up and analyzed. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the military build up in Korea, the sharpness of the communist propaganda, and the latest communist message on the suspension of the talks have forced us to consider the possibility that the other side wants a real break-off. He remarked that it was practically impossible that there could be any cease-fire in Korea by the time the Japanese peace treaty conference convened in San Francisco. Noting that the odds were in favor of there being some connection between the two events, Mr. Rusk suggested that the communists might feel that if the Kaesong talks were in abeyance they would be able to play upon the uncertainties arising from the situation. Or they might be planning to produce a military success or to be in the midst of a new offensive at the time of the San Francisco conference. If the conference were to get underway at a time when the UN forces in Korea were giving way, as they well might be in the early stages of a new offensive, the communists might feel that this would have a highly desirable political effect. Mr. Rusk went on to note that the Soviet radio has suggested that we broke off the talks just as the communists were prepared to make concessions in the sub-delegation's meetings. He observed that there had indeed been some indication that the negotiators might be able to make certain adjustments and arrive at an acceptable military demarcation line. Mr. Tomlinson was told that it was still too early to say what General Ridgway's reply to the latest communist message would be, but, Mr. Rusk noted, the General's instructions were to clarify the communist attitude toward the talks. Mr. Hickerson said that General Ridgway was studying the matter.

Commenting on the bombing of Rashin,[2] a Korean city some 17 miles from the Soviet border, Mr. Rusk said that, while it had been bombed earlier in the fighting, it was determined that the military value derived from such bombings was not worth the risks involved. However, in the face of the enemy's military build up in general and the use to which he was putting Rashin in particular—perhaps with the idea derived from the Senate hearings that it was a safe place—it seemed advisable to accept the risks involved and to strike selected targets in the city. The border was not crossed. Mr. Hickerson revealed that in an earlier raid, UN fighters had crossed the border and strafed an airfield. Mr. Rusk added that the other side had not reacted, perhaps out of embarrassment that the planes had gotten through.

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[1] The message under reference, dated August 27, was broadcast over Peking radio on August 28; the text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 10, 1951, p. 440. In it, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai called on General Ridgway to order his liaison officers to Kaesong to carry out a reinvestigation of the alleged bombing raid of August 22.

[2] An attack had been made on Rashin on August 25; regarding restrictions on bombing Rashin, see footnote 3, p. 767, and Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 108.

Mr. Millet asked about the press speculation that General Ridgway might ask for the talks to be moved away from Kaesong and Mr. Rusk replied that this was probably one of the points Ridgway had in mind since he had a standing authorization to do so if he so chose.

693.0024/8–1451

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 27, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received Mr. Lovett's letter of August 14, 1951, enclosing a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the policy on repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war.[1]

It is suggested that if and when the present armistice discussions reach the question of exchange of prisoners of war, the over-riding consideration should be the prompt return of all United Nations and Republic of Korea prisoners of war held by the Communists. With this consideration in mind, the Department of State is seriously concerned over the possibility that the proposed policy might jeopardize the prompt return of all United Nations and Republic of Korea prisoners of war following the conclusion of an armistice agreement. While the proposed policy is conditional upon "adequate safeguards for United Nations prisoners in Communist hands", it is not clear how such safeguards could effectively be established.

While the possible psychological warfare advantages of the proposed policy are recognized, it is difficult to see how such a policy could be carried out without conflict with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which the United States as the Unified

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[1] Mr. Lovett's letter, not printed, was merely a covering note formally transmitting the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had been sent to Mr. Matthews on August 8, p. 791.

Command has expressed its intention of observing in the Korean conflict. The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949 requires, among other things, the prompt return of all prisoners of war upon the cessation of active hostilities. Although neither the North Koreans nor the Chinese Communists have observed the terms of that Convention, it appears to the Department of State that our best hope for alleviating the plight of United Nations and Republic of Korea personnel held as prisoners of war by the Communists and for obtaining their return lies in our continuing strictly to observe the terms of that Convention. In a broader sense, United States interests in this and future conflicts dictate, in my opinion, strict observance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

In order to achieve in so far as possible the desired psychological warfare and humane objectives, the Department of State suggests that, prior to the reaching of an armistice agreement, individuals who have rendered outstanding assistance to the United Nations command or whose return to the Communists would, in all probability, result in their deaths, might be paroled as provided for in the Geneva Convention. Moreover, under no circumstances should Republic of Korea personnel who were forcibly impressed into the North Korean Army be returned to the Communists. This problem might be handled by taking steps prior to the conclusion of any armistice agreement to release such persons in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea. The foregoing suggestions are considered to be consistent with the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention and thus do not afford a valid pretext for Communist failure to return United Nations and Republic of Korea prisoners of war.

The Department of State recognizes that this procedure presents certain complications, particularly as regards timing of release, safeguards, etc.

In view of the foregoing, and dependent upon the number of United Nations and Republic of Korea prisoners of war actually held by the Communists, it may be necessary to reexamine the present instructions to General Ridgway providing for an exchange on a man-for-man basis.

In addition to exchange of military personnel, the Department of State suggests that General Ridgway be instructed to make whatever arrangements he considers feasible, without becoming involved in the question of Korean civilian prisoners held by both the Republic of Korea and the North Korean regime, for the release of civilian internees such as the staffs of the British and French diplomatic missions in Seoul, the Apostolic Delegate, press correspondents, and other Americans and nationals of United Nations members, principally missionaries captured at the time of the invasion.

I would be very pleased to have representatives of the Department of State discuss the foregoing questions in greater detail with the Department of Defense in an effort to work out a practicable solution.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 13 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 28 August 1951—10:11 p. m.

CX-69802. Subject to some new development here in interim, I shall broadcast to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai at 290900K Aug 51 the following msg:

"Your message of 28 Aug has been received.

"A reinvestigation of the alleged incident of 22 Aug will serve no purpose other than to continue this unjustifiable delay in the armistice negotiations.

"As stated in my previous msg of 25 Aug, when you are prepared to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations, which you declared on 23 Aug, I will direct my representatives to meet with yours, with a view to seeking a reasonable armistice agreement."[1]

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[1] The following revision of the second paragraph was drafted in the Department of State by U. Alexis Johnson, approved by Messrs. Acheson, Matthews, and Rusk, and communicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway, who incorporated it in his message as broadcast on August 29:

"On the night August 23 your liaison officer Col. Chang specifically refused the requests of my liaison officer to continue the investigation during daylight and to leave all of the alleged evidence in place. The offer you now make to permit a reinvestigation after this lapse of time could serve no purpose other than to continue this unjustifiable delay in the armistice negotiations." (Black Book, Tabs 14, 15, 16)

S/P Files : Lot 64D563, Box 728

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 29, 1951—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (23). Messrs. Matthews, Hickerson, and Rusk were the principal participants for the Department of State during the discussion on Korea. Messrs. Lay and Gleason were present for the National Security Council staff. General

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[1] The source text, drafted by Charles Burton Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, represents a State Department draft not cleared with any of the participants.

Bradley attended the meeting along with Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, and General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

[The first portion of the memorandum, not here printed, covers discussion on topics unrelated to Korea.]

General Bradley introduced the question of courses subsequent to an armistice or a breakdown of negotiations in Korea. He said that the prospect was that we were more likely to have to deal soon with the second rather than the first. He said the military view as to courses of action differed from the State view in that the military saw two possible situations, an armistice or a breakdown, whereas State saw three—an armistice, a breakdown followed by vigorous renewal of hostilities, and a breakdown followed by a quiet military situation.

Mr. Rusk said political aspects did differ somewhat from military ones. He commented that the two crucial questions in the sequel to a breakdown of armistice talks were: (*a*) Are we prepared to try to find out whether the other side is disposed to a military situation constituting a sort of *de facto* cease fire? (*b*) Are we prepared to accept risks involved in acting ourselves to step up the tempo of military action? He said this second involved the question whether we could produce greater pressure in an effective way toward a solution or would we merely irritate the adversary into reacting.

General Bradley said the military had not taken into consideration the idea of a *de facto* armistice produced by a quiet military situation, and he doubted whether this was realistically in prospect. He said: (*a*) There could be no fadeaway of forces without an armistice as it would "put Ridgway into too much of a hole". To fadeaway on the basis of a *de facto* situation would permit the enemy a situation where he could "knock the hell out of you".

Mr. Matthews said that a reduction of our forces would be undertaken only as the enemy indicated a reduction on his side.

General Bradley said the crux was that the enemy would not have to come back so far as our forces would and that the element of danger to our remaining reduced forces was not eliminated by the consideration that the enemy had also withdrawn part of his forces.

General Hull said he could not visualize the *de facto* cessation of hostilities inasmuch as the enemy had been building up and making himself able to jump at a moment's notice and it would be impossible for our forces to sit idly by and give him an invitation to do so.

General Bradley said that a sort of *de facto* reduction of hostilities on the ground now existed in Korea and that recent attacks had been on a regimental basis or less. He said he could not visualize our calling off our air and navy in a *de facto* situation following a cessation of talks.

Mr. Hickerson said the State Department view contemplated continuation of air and navy actions as before.

General Bradley said it was unrealistic to suppose that one could fade out with respect to one arm and maintain full activity with the other two.

General Hull said he could visualize that sort of situation.

Mr. Rusk said that a *de facto* cease-fire would not solve the prisoner-of-war problem.

General Hull said it would not be a solution to anything whatever. He said Ridgway had to have freedom of action to keep pressure on the enemy so as to prevent the enemy from achieving a build-up beyond Ridgway's capacity to contain. He commented that the deterrent on the enemy must always be that he would be cut to pieces badly by a counterthrust and a rollback, and this circumstance prevented a static situation and a fadeout except with an armistice.

Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hickerson commented that this capacity to counterthrust and roll back raised the question of the Neck or the Yalu as the ultimate limit.

General Hull said that the Neck was preferable as overextension would weaken our forces logistically.

Mr. Matthews raised in addition the prospect of Russian reaction in event of too close an approach to the Yalu.

General Bradley addressed himself to the State Department's view of what additional action should be taken by the UN side in the new phase of increased hostilities following a cessation of armistice talks. He enumerated these as: Removal of restrictions on certain North Korean targets, permission for hot pursuit of enemy aircraft beyond the borders of Korea, including attacks on airbases and anti-aircraft installations. He commented that it would be necessary to do more; it would not suffice to slap the enemy on the arm instead of on the wrist; it would be necessary to knock him out. He said one of the things required was blockade.

Mr. Hickerson said this was in the State Department's list of actions.

General Bradley said that his impression was that it was not.

Mr. Rusk explained that the State Department's approach to the question was to get the other Governments to forbid their ships to go to China and then give the UN navy forces authority to police shipping to that end rather than to attempt to rely on physical presence of naval forces alone as the basis for blockade.[3]

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[3] For the text of a Department of State paper (Document WFM T-10/2a), dated August 27, dealing with the question of economic controls on China and North Korea, see p. 2009; the response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 31, is printed on p. 2011.

General Bradley said that the requirement was to take action necessary to solve the situation and bring it to a definitive end. He said in event of no armistice, we could not sit there to see what the enemy was going to do, as that might involve sitting there five years. He said that would not be supported by the public and it would be necessary to take positive steps, not just wait and see.

Mr. Rusk commented that the State Department paper,[3] prepared a month ago,[4] was based on the premise that if there was a cessation of talks and yet the enemy did not come in with a massive attack, using large scale air forces, it would be hard for us to carry the attack by air into Manchuria, if for no reason than that such action would involve the risk of incurring retaliation against Japan.

General Hull said that if negotiations broke down and hostilities continue, every effort would have to be made to force the enemy to call off the fighting—that is every effort within our means. He commented that our means were limited but we must use them to their limits. He said that public insistence on taking the steps necessary to enable bringing the boys home would be very great.

General Bradley referred to the great amount of support General MacArthur had elicited by his prescription for ending the war and getting the boys home. The point, he said, was not as to the fallacy of MacArthur's approach but as to its public effectiveness.

Mr. Rusk raised the question whether we were in position to hit the enemy sufficiently hard to gain that result.

General Bradley then compared the State Department paper and the JCS paper[5] item by item. He noted that they differed on one item—whether to remove restrictions on bombing of Rashin—now an obsolete issue since the restriction had been removed. He summarized the crucial differences as turning on these ideas: Don't wait for the other side to take the initiative. Don't take risks. He said an additional difference concerned the question whether to do certain things without further consultation or to consult first with the allies concerned.

Mr. Rusk said it would be necessary to consult on blockade and that it would certainly be well, in our own interests, to consult on hot pursuit and related action against anti-aircraft installations beyond Korean borders.

General Bradley expressed a doubt about this, commenting that air action involved only our forces, not the forces of our allies.

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[3] Reference is to Document WFM T-10/1, August 18, p. 835.

[4] See the memorandum by Messrs. Hickerson and Merchant, August 3, p. 771, which formed a basis for the preparation of Document WFM T-10/1.

[5] The paper from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 29, responding to Document WFM T-10/1 is printed as an attachment to the letter of September 4 from Secretary Marshall to Secretary Acheson, p. 880.

Mr. Hickerson commented that the participating allies had already been told that in event of massive air attacks on our forces we might have to respond beyond present limits without there being time for consultation in the event.

General Hull asked what if we should consult and find a big objection?

Mr. Matthews said the allies' governments would be in a better position if told even though they did not concur in the action.

General Bradley said that if the action were taken without their concurrence after consultation some might pull their troops back.

Mr. Rusk said that our actions might involve precipitating general war, and we would be in much better shape with our allies if we had taken them into confidence, and our allies' governments would likewise be in a better position with their peoples.

Mr. Matthews said this was particularly true as to the British.

Mr. Rusk said it would be more serious if splits developed between peoples and governments on our side even if they developed as among governments.

Mr. Hickerson said agreement on the issue would be easy in event of massive air attacks; the difficulties were foreseeable only if the initiative was taken by us.

Admiral Fechteler asked whether it would be true that we could not talk these things in candour with our allies, especially the British.

Mr. Hickerson said not talk, but agreement, was the crux.

Mr. Rusk said that perhaps the difference in view between State and the military should be taken up to the President.

General Bradley said the differences were on these points: The possibility of a *de facto* cease-fire; consultation with allies, the idea of sitting and waiting.

Mr. Hickerson said the *de facto* cease-fire and fade-out was a remote possibility.

Mr. Rusk said there was also the question of whether we could afford the risks now of widening the conflict. He asked as to the air defenses of Japan.

General Twining said they were weak.

General Eddleman [6] said there were 13 AA battalions there.

Mr. Lay said the most pressing question was that of our action in response to a greatly stepped up attack while the San Francisco conference was in progress, and all that should be decided before the President got out of town.

General Bradley went over the immediate requirements in this situation one by one, and the consensus was that instructions already covered this situation.

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[6] Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army.

Mr. Lay said the question then was getting ready to act promptly on matters beyond the immediate actions in response to an enemy offensive.

Mr. Rusk pointed out the tensions incident to having the President, the Secretary, and so on out of town next week. He asked whether the Joint Chiefs would be in Washington.

General Bradley assured him they would be.

895B.10/8-3051

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 30, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As I wrote you in my letter of 16 July 1951[1] regarding your proposal of 10 July[2] that certain funds be released to the Government of the Republic of Korea from a Suspense Account in the Treasury Department, we referred the proposal to the three military departments for an expression of their views.

After full consideration of these views, I wish to propose that the matter be deferred until a later date. The reasons for this counter-proposal are as follows:

(*a*) Under the terms of the financial agreement of 28 July 1950 between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea, settlement of any claims arising out of the use of Korean currency for U.S. troops are to be negotiated at a time which is mutually agreeable to both Governments. While the amount in question might be considered a debt to the Republic of Korea by the United States, there has already been accrued, as a result of direct military aid, an amount due from the Korean Government to the United States in far greater amount, and it is considered appropriate that any sums owing to the Republic of Korea should be set off against this larger amount as an incident to final settlement. Any earlier liquidation of a portion of the overall debt might prejudice the chances of the United States to settle by offset. This raises a serious question as to whether partial settlement now is "mutually agreeable".

(*b*) On previous occasions, when U.S. troops were engaged in combat operations on foreign soil, the United States Government has negotiated final settlement for the use of currency only after the cessation of hostilities. In these settlements, no distinction has been made between currencies used for official military purposes and currencies sold to troops for their personal use. We believe it to be to the best interests of the United States that this pattern be continued.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] *Ante*, p. 642.

(*c*) The amount of money is not large enough to provide appreciable improvement in the present inflationary or economic conditions in Korea.

(*d*) Any partial settlement at this time by the Government of the United States in a unilateral action before cessation of hostilites might provide a source of pressure on the governments of the other member states of the United Nations operating in Korea, to settle for the currencies they have been acquiring for use of their troops. Any pressure of this kind might be looked upon as premature and result in embarrassment to those governments. Such embarrassment should, in our opinion, be carefully avoided because of its possible effect on future military operations where joint United Nations action is desirable.

If there are any political considerations of sufficient weight to override those presented above and make the release of funds desirable from a political standpoint, we would defer to your evaluation of these considerations.

It has been suggested, however, and I concur, that should it be decided to release these funds because of overriding political considerations, the funds should be released only after appropriate Congressional committees have been consulted. In our opinion, furthermore, the funds, if released, should be made available subject to certain controls by the United States Government covering the use to which the funds are put. These controls and conditions could be worked out by representatives of our respective departments in consultation with those of the Department of the Treasury.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

795.00/8-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1951.

Subject: Political Steps in Event of Armistice in Korea.

Participants: Mr. F.S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

I today handed to Mr. Tomlinson the attached memorandum in reply to the memorandum of August 6 left with the Department by the British Embassy.[1] I told Mr. Tomlinson that this was an informal and unofficial memorandum comparable to the communication we had received from them.

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[1] Not printed.

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM

The following comments refer to the memorandum of August 6 left with the Department by the British Embassy.

1. We agree wholeheartedly with the United Kingdom view that we must firmly maintain that any political discussions after a cease-fire must in the first instance be confined to Korea alone. (Paras 2, 3). This we take to mean that unless there were agreement on a political settlement in Korea, discussion of other Far Eastern questions would not take place in any conference.

2. The answer to the United Kingdom's specific question (Para 4) is that the United States Government would be prepared after a cease-fire to hold political discussions on a settlement in Korea which might include in some appropriate way the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. The United States does not recognize either of these regimes as legally constituted governments, but would be prepared to have them participate in multilateral discussions about a Korean settlement which, as a practical matter, cannot be solved without their agreement.

3. In regard to the proper method for bringing about a Korean settlement, we agree that the Lie proposal for a mediator is not likely to be acceptable to the Communists and would achieve no practical results. The United Nations Commission idea is subject to the same objection. Experience has shown that direct discussions with the Communists offer the best if not the only hope of solution. We do not, however, favor the alternatives preferred by the United Kingdom. The Five-Power or Seven-Power conference reflects an approach, similar to that of the United Kingdom proposal made last April, which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the Great Powers, without any participation by the United Nations or by other countries vitally interested in the Pacific such as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, and at most with only "associate" participation by the Koreans. (Para 4) According to the United Kingdom proposal, the same conference would also discuss other Far Eastern questions thereafter (Para 11). A Five-Power conference has the disadvantage of seeking to resolve problems by the big powers alone without regard for all the real parties in interest. Further, the United States could not agree to any arrangement which might give the impression that we are treating Peiping as the Government of China.

4. It is important that the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem be discussed by the real parties in interest. (The Communists,

too, seem to have adopted a similar approach, judging by the discussion to date in regard to Item 5 of the armistice agenda). As we see it, therefore, discussions for a Korean settlement should be held by the Republic of Korea, the North Koreans, the Soviet Union and Peiping as neighbors with frontier and other interests in Korea, and the United Nations. The United Nations should be represented by a delegation from among the nations which have participated in the fighting in Korea. The United Nations delegation would be designated by the General Assembly and given broad terms of reference. Any agreement reached by the delegation with the other interested parties would be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

5. We agree that the attitude of the Russians on the question of a Korean settlement will be crucial (Para 6). We see no objection to discussions with the Russians telling them of the procedural steps we have in mind. We see no advantage, however, in suggesting alternative procedures since the Russians will of course pick the one least advantageous to us. It would in our view be preferable for the principal allies to reach agreement and thereafter to seek Soviet agreement on these steps. We recognize, however, that it might be desirable to raise with the USSR the question of their participation.

We do not believe there is any advantage in raising the question with the Russians before there is agreement on an armistice. To do so might well adversely affect our bargaining position at the armistice. We can take the initiative by prompt steps as soon as agreement is achieved.

6. As for the meeting place for a conference, we see disadvantages in holding a conference on Korea in a European city. We suggest some point in the demilitarized zone established by the armistice, a point which can be made neutral in every detail as to arrangements.

7. We do not envisage that a conference on other Far Eastern problems would follow immediately in the same forum upon a settlement of the Korean problem (United Kingdom paragraph 11). In our view, neither the Five or the Seven-Power conference would be representative of the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese representation and Formosa. After a Korean settlement we would be prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate forum which would include all the parties with interests in the questions to be discussed.

8. The United Kingdom memorandum refers also to the Department's desire to have a General Assembly resolution to "put the record straight" on Korea. The question of the kind of United Nations resolution appropriate to note approval of the armistice, and the body which should adopt it, is only indirectly related to the problem of political settlement, and is being discussed with the United Kingdom at length.

In general, it is our view that (*a*) the United Nations should note the armistice with approval shortly after it is concluded; and (*b*) in doing so the United Nations should avoid giving the impression that it has abandoned its version of what happened in Korea and is prepared to treat the armistice as a cessation of hostilities between equally culpable belligerents. We continue to believe that action by the GA is important in order to avoid this erroneous impression, but subject to that would have no objection to an initial step in the SC. Beyond that we agree that we should avoid steps which might antagonize the Communists and make peaceful settlement of the Korean problem more difficult.

795.00/8-3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. Upton, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Colombia —Absent
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Absent
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Ambassador Yang
Mr. Han, First Secretary
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Charet, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbal, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Botha, Second Secretary
United States —UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE, Mr. Merchant
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Henkin
FE, Mr. Hacklor
FE, Mr. Lockhart
Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope, after informing the Ambassadors that flood conditions along the Yesong and Taedong Rivers had washed out or covered most of the enemy's bridges, stated that most military activity was centered in the east-central sector where the United Nations forces were consolidating their positions and were continuing to make slight advances. South Korean forces made some progress in a limited objective attack toward Punchbowl Valley east of the Pukhan River. Sightings of enemy vehicular traffic revealed that the enemy continued to deliver supplies forward in amounts in excess of daily requirements. Captain Pope explained that since the enemy had brought up additional personnel replacements for its units and had begun using more mortar and artillery, the Far Eastern Command had revised upward its estimate of the enemy's daily requirement. The enemy now needs 50 tons of food, ammunition, petroleum products and other supplies per day to sustain one division in contact or 60 tons per day to sustain one division in attack. In reply to a question by the Canadian representative, Captain Pope stated that he had no new information which would indicate that the enemy intended to launch an offensive. Mr. Hickerson recalled that the Far Eastern Command had estimated that the enemy had the capability of launching and sustaining an attack for 26 days using all of its 46 divisions.

Mr. Hickerson then informed the group that there was little new information to report. The communists had not replied to General Ridgway's broadcast, he stated. He then read the texts[1] of two protests given to the United Nations Command's liaison officer by the North Koreans: one charged that a United Nations airplane had dropped a parachute flare in the Kaesong area on August 30; the other alleged that a group of ten uniformed South Korean soldiers had entered the neutral zone, captured three military police and subsequently upon retirement murdered two and seriously wounded one of them. These two protests from Nam Il were turned over to the proper authorities, the Air Force Commanding General and the 1st Corps Commander for investigation, Mr. Hickerson stated, and added that replies will be made to these probable fabrications.

Mr. Hickerson asked if these two protests shed any light upon the enemy's intentions. None of the group saw any new revelation. Mr. Hickerson observed that everything still pointed to deliberate stalling by the communists for some unknown reason and to a continued military build-up on the part of the enemy. Mr. Merchant remarked that the longer the enemy stalled the more there would appear to be some connection with the San Francisco Conference. This remark led Ambassador Yang to observe that the Soviets, according to the press, apparently intended to stay in San Francisco for six weeks. Mr. Hickerson replied that the press had subsequently reported that the Soviets had rented a mansion for only three weeks. The Canadian representative asked whether there was anything substantive behind press reports emanating from the United Nations in New York to the effect that there would be no break-off in the Kaesong talks. Mr. Hickerson suggested that the story resulted from background briefings of the press and stated that there was nothing new in this respect.

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[1] Not here printed.

It was agreed to hold the next briefing on September 5 at 5 p. m.[2]

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[2] The record of the meeting of September 5 is not printed.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 24 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 1 September 1951.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–50075. 1. Admiral Joy will present to the Communist liaison officer at 0900K, 2 Sep. the fol reply to Gen Nam Il's ltr of 30 Aug regarding alleged violations of neutral zone by United Nations comd acft:

"Gen Nam Il,

"Sr Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

"I have recd your ltr of 30 Aug[1] concerning an alleged violation of the Kaesong neutral zone by acft of the United Nations Comd. This charge is totally false. On receipt of your allegation that at 0240 hours on 29 Aug a United Nations Comd acft dropped a parachute flare near the Kaesong conference site, the CINCUNC caused a thorough check to be made of the psn of all UNC acft airborne at that hour. It was found that at the hour of the alleged attack UNC acft dropped photographic flash bombs at two points, one 20, and one 25 miles north of Kaesong. The acft which dropped the photo flash bombs were using the light from these flashes for making photos. These photos have been developed, and they prove conclusively that the UNC acft taking pictures were at least 15 miles north of the outer edge of the Kaesong neutral zone. The completed investigation established that on the night of Aug 29, no UNC acft was over the neutral zone and no UNC acft dropped a flare or any other mechanism in the neutral zone. You state an acft circled low and dropped a parachute flare in the vic of the conference site at 0240, 29 Aug. UNC acft do not 'circle low' while dropping flares. I concluded, therefore, that your pers have again attempted, to fix a false charge upon the United Nations Comd.

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[1] Not printed, but see *supra*.

"Your careless regard for truth is further illustrated by the recklessness with which you state that an agreement had previously been reached concerning an air space reservation above the Kaesong neutral zone. In your ltr you made the fol statement, among others:

> "'After the reaching of the Kaesong neutrality agreement, your acft still continued their unlawful invasion of the air above the neutral zone in repeated violation of the agreement.'

"In many other sentences of your ltr you refer to an alleged agreement between us regarding air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone. As you know well, the initiation of recent discussions between our liaison officers regarding the Kaesong neutral zone was at your instance. On 11 Aug you stated:

> "'I propose that the liaison officers of both sides meet again to discuss this question and to agree upon a draft of detailed provisions of neutralization. This draft may then be ratified by our two delegations as an agreement to be observed by both sides.'

"You are fully aware that no ratification of any draft provided by our liaison officers has ever occurred. You are fully aware that no agreement concerning an air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone has ever been considered, much less ratified by our two delegations. In fact on Aug 18, Col Chang submitted to Col Kinney a document setting forth proposed agreements regarding the Kaesong neutral zone, one of which was concerned with an air space reservation over the Kaesong zone. The record of this meeting of liaison officers reveals that Col Kinney accepted Col Chang's document with the statement:

> "'We will study this paper and give you our comment the day after tomorrow.'

"The liaison officers have not resumed their discussions since that time, obviously, no agreement could be in effect. Yet, not less than eight times in your ltr of Aug 30, you made ref to an alleged agreement regarding an air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone. Such disregard for facts can serve no purpose other than to delay the resumption of the armistice conference."

2. The above reply will be released to the press here at the same time.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 33 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 1 September 1951—8 : 33 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–50076. 1. Admiral Joy will present to the Communist Liaison Officer at 0900K 2 Sep, the fol reply to Gen Nam Il's ltr of 30 Aug[1] regarding alleged atk on Communist pers at Chong-Dam-Dong and firing into Pan Mun Jom area:

"1. This acknowledges receipt of your ltr of 30 Aug alleging:

(*a*) An atk on your pers at Chong-Dam-Dong at 300600 Aug by 10 or more armed men and:

(*b*) Firing in the Pan Mun Jom area at 300610 Aug.

"2. It is noted that you delayed more than 11 hours in reporting the incidents despite the fact that there is continuous telephone comm between our Hq.

"3. It is noted, too, that you did not rqst a representative of the United Nations comd to be present at any investigation which may have been made of these incidents.

"4. Since receipt of your report I have caused a thorough investigation to be made among all elements of the United Nations comd which could under any circumstances have been in a psn to participate in these alleged incidents. That investigation has established that no trps of the United Nations comd were west of the road running southward from Wan-Dang through Oryongpo-Songhyon-Ni Kwangmyon-Ni-Panqchuk-Tong on the day alleged. Thus, on the day alleged, none were nearer than 2500 yards from Pan Mun Jom and 500 yards from Chong-Dam-Dong.

"5. My ltr of 22 Aug[2] made ref to the partisan activity which you have acknowledged exists within the neutral zone. The existence of such activity is not surprising. It is to be expected that residents of the area would be restive under an oppressive occupation. Kaesong is converted into a relative haven for their activities. What is surprising is that you should protest to the United Nations Comd fol every manifestation of minor disturbance in the neutral zone. Surely you recognize that the status of mil occupation carries with it the responsibility for the preservation of order within the area. Why then do you file protests with the United Nations Comd every time a shot is fired in the zone or a group of irregulars atks 1 of your police units?

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[1] Not printed, but see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Lockhart, August 31, p. 868.

[2] See footnote 1 to telegram C–69262, p. 845.

"6. If the alleged incidents of 30 Aug actually occurred, it is reasonable to assume that they were perpetuated by the same group of irregulars that was involved in the incident of 19 Aug. If so, there is a good possibility that this band has been operating within the zone continuously since about 15 Aug. The agreement concerning the neutral zone does not deprive you of the capability of dealing effectively with groups of this size. Why then do you continuously complain to the United Nations Comd concerning the incidents which transpire within the zone?

"7. I can only conclude that your protests are not motivated by a genuine desire to maintain the neutrality of the Kaesong area. This neutral area was supposedly established in order to provide conditions favorable to the armistice talks. As in the case of the fabricated bombing of the conference site on 22 Aug, you are evidently using your mil occupation of the neutral zone to create conditions which tend to prevent resumption of the armistice talks."

2. The above reply will be released to the press here at the same hour.[3]

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[3] On September 4, General Ridgway forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the texts of three communications from the Communist delegation rejecting the explanations given by the United Nations Command in its letters of August 22 and September 2 concerning the alleged violations in the Kaesong neutral area. In each case, General Ridgway suggested that a brief reply be made by Admiral Joy rejecting, in turn, the reiterated charges made by the Communist side. (Telegrams C-50183, C-50184, C-50185, September 4, from Tokyo; Black Book, Tabs 38, 39, 40)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 35 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET Tokyo, 3 September 1951—1:05 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-50114. Ref mymsg C-50113.[1] The fol is a translation of the Chinese version of the msg delivered to a UNC Liaison off at Pan Mun Jom at 021900K September:

"1 September 1951

"Gen Ridgway:

"At 0030 hours on 1 September, a mil acft of your side again illegally intruded into the air space over our Kaesong neutral zone and carried out bombing. It has now been established by investigation that the two bombs dropped were only 500-600 meters from the residence of our senior del, Gen Nam Il.

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[1] Telegram C-50113, not printed, conveyed the text, as broadcast over Peking radio, of the message of protest from the Communist commanders contained in telegram C-50114 (Black Book, Tab 34).

"This is another serious provocative action of your mil acft, fol the bombing of our delegation's residence on the night of 22 Aug. We hereby lodge a serious protest against you. After the incident of 22 Aug, not only did your side display an attitude of total irresponsibility toward this provocative act, but your reply of 29 Aug rejected our demand that this matter be reinvestigated; furthermore, you cont to dispatch South Korean trp to enter the neutral zone illegally and on 30 Aug once again murdered 2 mil police of our side. At the same time, you cont to send your mil acft continuously into the air space over the Kaesong neutral zone. In the 8 days from 23 through 30 Aug, 25 sorties appeared.

"At 0240 hours on 29 Aug a flare was dropped in the vic of the Kaesong conf site. Our senior del Gen Nam Il had continually protested against this string of provocative acts on your part. Nevertheless, your delegation and yourself have, on the one hand, denied and repudiated the bombing completely ignoring the facts while on the other, your armed forces cont to provoke hostilities openly and shamelessly and without the slightest scruple, with the second airplane bombing of the Kaesong neutral zone manifesting on 1 September.

"Even today, while your liaison officers were conducting the investigation in Kaesong, one of your mil acft still flew over the air space of Kaesong neutral zone illegally. This was eye-witnessed by those pers present at the scene, including pressmen of both sides. The obj of your ceaseless action in violating the Kaesong neutrality agreement could not have any excuse or explanation other than that you obviously harbor the intention of destroying the Kaesong armistice talks and to render it impossible to cont the Kaesong conf. Your liaison officers, having this date come to Kaesong and made a local investigation, can in no way deny the actual results created by the bombing of your acft within the Kaesong neutral zone at 0030 hours on 1 September. However, your liaison officers still repudiated by saying that it was not a United Nations Comd acft, in the same manner as during the incident of 22 Aug. It is beyond all dispute that the aerial bombing this time had been cfm by your liaison officers. Thus the previous aerial bombing, which was investigated by your liaison officers who, however, dared not come again to reinves, also had become an obvious iron fact without doubt. Your side merely repudiated by saying this was not a United Nations Comd acft; would it be possible that our acft would bomb our own delegation? The entire just and well-disposed people of the world will not believe your such exceedingly absurd repudiation and prevarication. In fact, after the bombing of the Kaesong neutral zone by your mil acft at 0030 hours 1 September, your acft still recon the air space over Kaesong neutral zone throughout the night and carried out bombing at the environ of the Kaesong neutral zone. Is this not the clearest proof of the inescapable involvement of United Nations Comd acft? Now we gravely point out to you, that if your side is determined to break off the negotiations, then you should openly and formally announce your determination, but must not ceaselessly carry out such worthless provocative actions. If your side still intends to resume the Kaesong conf so as to seek a just and reasonable armistice agreement, then your side should agree to our fol demand, that: Your side must seriously and responsibly take disposition of the series of grave provocative incidents that occurred between 22 Aug and 1 September, and absolutely guarantee against recurrence of such actions and the violations of the Kaesong neutrality agreement, so that the Kaesong Armistice Conf may be reopened.

"Awaiting your reply, Kim Il Sung, Supreme Comd, Korean Peoples Army; Peng Teh-Huai Comd, Chinese Peoples Vol Army".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 37 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 3 September 1951—1:16 a. m.

C-50115. Early in the armistice negotiations it became apparent that the Communists could not or would not control the Kaesong neutral zone in a manner guaranteeing security for both sides. Beginning with the military police violation on 4 August they began to utilize the insecurity of the area for propaganda purposes by means of incidents either manufactured by them or perpetrated by nonmilitary groups of unknown attachment which they were unable to control.

In spite of United Nations Command efforts to establish understanding and agreements providing for greater security of the area the Communists have rebuffed all efforts in this direction. In view of the desire to continue negotiations, even in the face of recognized danger, the United Nations Command delegation was forced to enter the conference area over routes having no security guarantees and which were always subject to hostile ground or air attack. It is possible that members of the delegation will be ambushed by persons whose identity or status can not be determined. The probability of such action increases with every incident charged against the United Nations Command by the Communists. Should they be charged with responsibility for injury to United Nations Command delegation personnel under the conditions stated, the Communists logically could and would deny such responsibility.

Subsequent to the military police incident of 4 August I felt it desirable to insist on a new location for the negotiations, providing for an area within which security for both sides could be guaranteed. At that time I proposed that my broadcast reply to the Communists message of 6 August contain the following conditions under which the United Nations Command would resume negotiations (see my C 68437, 6[7] August 51):[1]

"You have not taken satisfactory measures to prevent recurring incidents in the neutral area. Resumption of negotiations under these conditions which you have allowed to exist is unacceptable.

"I therefore propose that a joint inspection team, consisting of 3 individuals designated by you and 3 designated by me, be organized to perform joint inspections of the Kaesong neutral zone in order to guarantee against recurrence of these violations.

"In the event you do not agree to the formation of such a joint inspection team, and to accord it free movement within the Kaesong neutral zone, I shall insist upon a new site for the resumption of negotiations where the United Nations Command can and will guarantee against the violation of neutral areas established by agreement." For reasons which you brought out at the time (your DA [*JCS*] 98216)[2] you did not consider it desirable to insist on these conditions and the quotation above was covered in my broadcast by the following.

"It must be clearly understood that my acceptance of a resumption of the armistice talks is conditional on complete compliance with your guarantee of neutralization of the Kaesong area. Any further failure in this regard will be interpreted as a deliberate move on your part to terminate the armistice negotiations."

At a later date an attempt was made through the liaison officers of each side to arrive at agreements which might provide greater security in the zone and in the approaches thereto. These discussions were interrupted by the series of alleged incidents charged to the United Nations Command, beginning 22 August, which suspended all negotiations.

The United Nations Command has made every effort within its power to avoid incidents. The physical location of the Kaesong site, however, renders these efforts abortive long as the enemy refuses to cooperate. He gives every evidence that he does not intend to cooperate. In the meantime, the immunity of the Kaesong zone is imposing definite restrictions on United Nations Command military operations while military advantages are accruing to the enemy. The build-up of charges and counter-charge regarding the Kaesong area has reached the point of apparent impasse. Neither side can abandon, without loss of prestige, their diametrically opposed positions.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 785.
[2] Dated August 6, p. 789.

There are no indications that the Communists intend an early cessation of their complaints against alleged violations of the Kaesong neutral zone, or that they intend to provide steps for the reopening of negotiations. Continued Communist allegation of ground violations in the Kaesong area provides the United Nations Command an excellent basis for charging the Communists with manifest inability to provide security for the area. It provides a logical basis for proposing a new site, if and when negotiations are resumed. Should an agreement be obtained for a new conference site it would provide opportunity for the introduction of positive methods toward negating charges of violations, would improve our military capabilities and would alleviate the danger to the United Nations Command delegation, a matter of urgent concern to me. In fact I know of no way in which the personal safety of our delegation can be reasonably assured in event negotiations are resumed in the Kaesong area.

I therefore request the following actions as a matter of urgency:

a. That I be authorized, at such time and in such manner as I consider appropriate, to insist upon a new and satisfactory conference site within which security for both sides can be guaranteed beyond any reasonable doubt, and,

b. That I be authorized as an included action in the foregoing to categorically refuse any further negotiations within the Kaesong area.

740.5/9–451

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Attached hereto are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the draft position paper (WFM T–10) entitled "UN Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice", dated 18 August 1951, prepared for use in the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite Talks).

I concur in the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The following additional changes to the paper are also suggested:

a. Under *U.S. Objective* (page 1)

"To achieve a unified independent and democratic Korea with maximum assurance against Communist ~~domination~~ *subversion or aggression.*"

b. Under *Position to be Presented* (page 1)

"3. *a.* Establishment under UN supervision of a unified, independent and democratic Korea~~, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist domination,~~ *with maximum assurance against Communist subversion or aggression.*"

"3. *c.* "Plan for phased withdrawal of foreign forces with ~~reasonable~~ *maximum* assurances against ~~internal disorder and external aggression.~~ *Communist subversion or aggression.*"

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 31 August 1951.

Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T-10), Dated 18 August 1951, Entitled "United Nations Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice."

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point of view, the following views on the Department of State draft position paper, subject as above.

2. The paper as a whole is not clear concerning the relation of the political conference following an armistice in Korea to discussions of other Far Eastern problems. (See paragraphs 1, 2, and 5 *b* of the *Position to be Presented.*) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no other Far Eastern problem should be taken up in connection with the contemplated political settlement and accordingly recommend that it be made clear that the conference will be strictly limited to discussion of matters pertaining solely to Korea.

3. Although the United Nations action in Korea is without precedent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff find it difficult to understand why nonbelligerent nations are being considered other than in their status as members of the United Nations for inclusion in the Korean political conference. Communist China has been consistent in maintaining that it is not a belligerent in the Korean War and that the Chinese forces in Korea are merely "volunteers." This fiction has been continued during the armistice negotiations. There is no evidence that forces of the USSR have participated in the Korean War. Inasmuch as the USSR is a member of the United Nations, it should be assumed that its interests will be amply protected by the United Nations Delegation and, in any event, the USSR should not be accorded a voice in the *two* forums. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the political conference be limited to repre-

sentatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations.

4. In paragraph 5 *b* of the *Position to be Presented* it is suggested the conference be held at Kaesong or in the demilitarized zone of Korea. Difficulties already encountered at Kaesong would indicate that this location should not be used for the peace conference. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that reference to Kaesong as the location of conferences be deleted from the paper (See also paragraph 4 *b* of *Courses of Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations are Successful*).

5. In paragraph 3 *f* of the *Courses of Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations are Successful* it is stated that, "Failing agreement on unification, the United States should . . . seek *ad hoc* agreement on such other matters as may be possible, including a mutual *reduction* of forces." This mutual reduction of forces is acceptable, from the military point of view, only if it is linked to the maintenance of a boundary between the two states which is militarily acceptable to the United States.

6. In paragraph 3 *g* of the *Courses of Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations are Successful* it is stated that it would be desirable for some Communist Chinese forces to remain in Korea so as to enable us to utilize the threat of action against China in the event of violation of the armistice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the last sentence of paragraph 3 *g* be amended as follows, changes shown in the usual manner: "Nevertheless, recognizing the realities of the situation ~~and the desirability of some Chinese Communist forces remaining in Korea so as to enable us to utilize the threat of action against China in event of violation of the armistice,~~ the United States should be prepared to accept the retention of some Chinese Communist forces in North Korea."

7. Subject to the acceptance of the changes recommended in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, concur in the subject paper.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

795.00/9–451

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of Defense has considered your department's Draft Position Paper (WFM–T–10/1) dated

18 August 1951, and entitled "United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice".

The Department of Defense is unable to concur in this paper for the reasons set forth in the enclosed memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 August 1951, and 13 July 1951.[1] I am in agreement with the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in these two memoranda with the exception of the recommendation in paragraph 1–*e* of the memorandum of 13 July.

Because of the important implications involved in this particular recommendation, I am reserving my position with respect to it and am transmitting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council for early consideration.[2]

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 29 August 1951.

Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite and British Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T–10/1), Dated 18 August 1951, Entitled "UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice."

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point of view, the following statement of views on the Department of State draft position paper, subject as above.

2. On 13 July 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to you a memorandum on the subject of "United States Courses of Action in Korea" on which they recommended you obtain Presidential approval. The memorandum included the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of additional actions to be taken to increase military pressure on the enemy in the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail. In the formulation of this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered and rejected any concept of relating United States actions in Korea to specific enemy actions. The subject Department of State position paper attempts to relate both the military actions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several political actions within Department of State capabilities to hypothetical military contingencies following failure of the armistice talks.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, consider this concept to be not only unsound but so dangerous militarily

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[1] Below and p. 667.

[2] See *infra*.

as possibly to jeopardize the security of the United Nations forces in Korea. Specifically they would point out that:

a. Both the commander in the field and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be unnecessarily limited in their freedom of action in view of the consultations which are required; and

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff previously recommended and they now reaffirm their recommendation that all of the military actions included in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951 be initiated after the failure of the armistice negotiations and that none of them await such contingencies as *de facto* cease fire, massed enemy ground attack, or massed enemy air attack. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be unwilling to accept the military risk incident to consultation with the sixteen participating nations preliminary to initiation of countermeasures set forth in paragraph 1 of their memorandum referred to above. Furthermore, from the military point of view, there is not and cannot be a truly *de facto* cease fire without agreement.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in the Department of State draft position paper WFM T-10/1. They adhere to the recommendations contained in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951 subject to the following change:

Delete from subparagraph 1 *d* the word "Rashin" and the comma which follows.

Reason: This change is necessitated by the governmental decision to bomb Rashin.[3]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[3] See footnote 3, p. 767.

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1951.

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea

There have been recent consultations between the State and Defense Departments with respect to the courses of action which should be followed in the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail. With one exception, these proposed courses of action appear to fall within the scope of existing National Security Council policies, as set forth in NSC 48/5.

The exception in question is set forth in the following course of action which has been recommended to me by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Extend the area for pursuit and the air-to-air action in air engagements initiated over Korea by disregarding the border between

Korea and Manchuria (loosely termed 'hot pursuit'), such pursuit to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing antiaircraft fire;"

The foregoing proposed course of action is submitted for the early consideration of the NSC.[1]

G. C. MARSHALL

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[1] On September 5, this document was circulated by the Acting Executive Secretary (Gleason) for the consideration of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 43: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, 5 September 1951—8:38 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–80658. From JCS. Reur C 50115.[2] JCS recognize undesirability of retaining Kaesong as conference site and further recognize desirability of advancing some new proposal in a constructive effort to break current impasse. However, JCS must reiterate their views expressed in para 4 B of JCS 98713.[3] Your proposal B is considered contrary to those views in that it contains the possibility of a final break in negotiations without at same time fixing clear responsibility for failure on Communists or involving an issue which would receive fullest possible support of our allies. The need for our taking no action which could be construed as leading to a final breakdown is particularly important during the critical period of Japanese peace treaty conference.

At the same time, JCS fully share your concern regarding the safety of UNC delegation. However, on balance JCS consider that your proposal A should be made at this time without the condition contained in your proposal B. Accordingly, you are authorized, at such time and in such manner as you deem appropriate, to propose a new site in which security can be reasonably guaranteed. Should this approach not produce favorable results JCS are prepared to consider your proposal to refuse further negotiations in the Kaesong area.

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[1] This message, which had been drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Department of Defense and by Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, was sent on September 4 to San Francisco for the approval of President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson who were attending the Conference on the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Their approval was received in the Department of State early on September 5. (Telegram JCS 80608, September 4, to San Francisco, and Telegram Actel 5, September 4, from San Francisco; Black Book, Tabs 41 and 42)

[2] Dated September 3, p. 875.

[3] Dated August 11, p. 811.

In advancing your proposal of a new site, JCS consider it important that it not be couched in such terms as would be interpreted as constituting an ultimatum but that it should appear as a constructive suggestion to further the attainment of a reasonable armistice. Accordingly, JCS suggest that following points might be included in your proposal:

A. UNC originally proposed a site (Danish Hospital Ship) which was removed from the area of ground contact and at which security was assured.

B. UNC accepted Communist proposal of Kaesong in good faith and under assumption that Communists were dealing in equally good faith and could insure security of conference site.

C. Now evident that Communists cannot insure security of conference site.

D. This insecurity and instability within conference site zone is of as much or more concern to UNC as to Communists.

E. Complete and thorough investigations prove conclusively that UNC forces could not have been involved in the alleged violations of the neutrality of the Kaesong area.

F. Accordingly, UNC proposes a new site, preferably named by CINCUNC, accessible to both parties, and in which security can be reasonably assured.

795.00/9–651

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1951.[2]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY FOR POSSIBLE USE IN NSC CONSIDERATION OF SECRETARY MARSHALL'S MEMORANDUM OF SEPTEMBER 4[3]

The State Department does not concur in the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in Secretary Marshall's memorandum of September 4, 1951, for the following reasons:

1. Unless we are prepared to accept the consequences of an extension of the air action sufficient to permit of a significant reduction of Chinese air capabilities over Korea, it would appear doubtful whether

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[1] This memorandum was forwarded to the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State under cover of a memorandum dated September 6 by Mr. Merchant which stated that it had been approved by him and by Messrs. Matthews, Jessup, and Hickerson. Mr. Merchant asked that Mr. Nitze's memorandum be sent on to Mr. Acheson as expeditiously as possible.

[2] The drafting date given on the source text read "9/6/51", possibly because it was forwarded with Mr. Merchant's memorandum of September 6 mentioned in footnote 1 above.

[3] Reference is to the memorandum to the National Security Council from Secretary Marshall, p. 881.

the military advantages of the action would be sufficient to be a controlling factor.

2. It would seem doubtful whether the proposed expansion of air action over Manchuria could in fact be limited to that envisaged by the recommendation. It would seem likely that enemy countermeasures would call for further measures on our part, resulting in an extension of the fighting of an indeterminate magnitude.

3. The possible consequences of widespread air action over Manchuria (and possibly China) were testified to in considerable detail during the MacArthur hearings. It does not appear that changes in the situation since the MacArthur hearings have altered the considered judgment of these consequences as expressed in the testimony at the hearings, or that failure to achieve an armistice in Korea would in itself alter this judgment.

4. The Joint Chiefs' recommendation does not advance considerations which would warrant a reversal of previous NSC policy that it would be unwise to accept these possible consequences unless forced to do so by the enemy.

5. Our previous discussions with the other governments with forces participating under the Unified Command have been based on the position that only in the event of massive air attacks on our forces, ships or bases from bases outside of Korea would we retaliate by attacking the bases from which the attack was launched (and then only after consultation if this were at all practicable). A breakdown in negotiations would not, under present circumstances, be understood by our allies as being a sufficient basis for reversing that position.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 43 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TOKYO, September 6, 1951—9 : 57 a. m.

CX-50292. Fol will be released to press simultaneously Tokyo and CINCUNC Adv at 1230 hours Tokyo time this date:

"General Kim Il Sung, Peng Teh-Huai:

"Your message to me, dated 1 Sept 51 and received 2 Sept,[1] is yet another of your false charges in which, without the slightest basis in fact, you have again impugned the good faith of the United Nations

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[1] See telegram C-50114, September 3, from Tokyo, p. 873.

Forces. The charges you have levied in these alleged incidents are baseless and intentionally false. I have stated, and will again positively state, that our thorough investigations have indicated no instances where forces under my command have violated any of the agreements made by me or my representatives. Therefore, if the incidents did, in fact, occur, they were presumably initiated and perpetrated by your forces in order to provide spurious evidence for false and malevolent accusations against the United Nations Command.

"I cannot provide you with guarantees against your own failure to exercise control in an area from which you are responsible. I cannot prevent the occurrence of incidents deliberately and maliciously manufactured by your forces in an area under your control. I previously guaranteed that our forces would not violate the terms of the agreement concerning the Kaesong neutral zone. My forces have scrupulously observed the terms of that agreement. My guarantee remains effective.

"That you should permit the forces of your side to indulge in their constant deceit and invective is incomprehensible, unless you have the ulterior motive of completely breaking off negotiations with the further scurrilous accusation that the blame therefore rests upon the United Nations Command rather than upon you.

"In the interest of the millions of people in the United Nations whom I represent as the Commander of their forces in the field, I call upon you to cease these despicable practices which have received worldwide condemnation.

"These military armistice discussions at Kaesong have been in progress 7 weeks. You must share my concern over the lack of progress achieved.

"I have repeatedly emphasized that my principal concern is to achieve a just and honorable military armistice. Events of the past weeks have made it plainly evident to me and to the world at large that further use of the present conference site at Kaesong will inevitably result in additional interruptions of our armistice talks and further delays in reaching agreement. When you decide to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August, I propose that our liaison officers meet immediately at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations can be continued without interruptions.

"Signed M B Ridgway, General United States Army, Commander in Chief United Nations Command."

795.00/9-751

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1951.

Subject: JCS and Defense Comments on FE Position Papers for WFM.

The Department has received from General Marshall JCS and Department of Defense comments on two FE Position Papers relating to Korea.[1] The following is for use in discussions with representatives of the Department of Defense or JCS.

1) WFM T-10/1, *UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice.*[2]

The substance of this paper has been under discussion between the State and Defense Departments, as a result of which the attached revised draft "Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice is Achieved" has been prepared.[3]

The Department is transmitting to General Marshall this revised draft which is believed to meet the objections of the JCS with the exception of the recommendation with respect to "hot pursuit", which has been referred to the National Security Council for consideration.

2) WFM T-10 "*UN Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice.*"[4]

Regarding paragraph 2 of the section entitled "Position to be Presented", the Department suggests that, in order to remove any uncertainty, this paragraph be amended to read as follows:

> "A settlement on Korea cannot be related to other Far Eastern problems and must be dealt with entirely on its own merits. Political discussions of other Far Eastern problems cannot take place prior to a Korean political settlement."[5]

The Department does not concur in the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a political conference concerning Korea shall be limited to "representatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations." A political settlement of the Korean problem is distinct from a military armistice in Korea. Participation in such a political settlement, therefore, has no necessary relationship to a status as a belligerent in the conflict. The Department agrees that theoretically a discussion of a political solution of the Korean problem might be restricted to representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Korean people with the participation of the United Nations, which has played a substantial role in this problem in the past. As a realistic matter, however, particularly since the armistice would leave Chinese and possibly USSR forces in

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[1] See the two letters from General Marshall dated September 4, pp. 877 and 879.

[2] Dated August 18, p. 835.

[3] For the text of the final version of this paper, WFM T-10/1a, dated September 8, which was identical to the revised draft under reference, see p. 889.

[4] Dated August 18, p. 831.

[5] For the text of the final version of this paper, WFM T-10a, see *infra*.

Korea in large numbers, no settlement of the Korean problem is possible without the agreement or acquiescence of the Chinese Communists and of the USSR. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union could claim a right to participate on a basis of geographic contiguity to Korea and the long history of relations with that country.

While the Department's position paper in paragraph 5 b uses the wording "the participants *might* be", our present thinking is that the countries named should be given an opportunity to participate. It is far from clear that they will wish to take part formally. The Communists may prefer to maintain the fiction that their troops were only "volunteers" and that the Chinese government has no specific relationship to the Korean problem. The Soviet Union also may prefer to speak through its satellites and have the advantage of participating in fact without being formally bound by the results of the conference.

While, from a theoretical point of view, the Soviet Union would have dual representation in such a conference, due to its membership in the United Nations, actually the opposition and obstruction of the Soviet Union to all action taken by the United Nations with respect to Korea since the question of Korea came before the UN, makes it impossible for any United Nations Delegation to represent the "interests" of the USSR.

With regard to paragraph 5 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department's draft position paper assumes that a satisfactory armistice would be in effect before any mutual reduction of forces were undertaken. Such an armistice would undoubtedly provide for a boundary militarily acceptable to the United States.

The Department has no objection to the other changes suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Secretary Marshall.

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 99

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings, Tripartite, and British Talks[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1951.
WFM T-10a

UN ACTION IN KOREA IN CASE OF AN ARMISTICE

PROBLEM

To obtain British and French support for the U.S. position with respect to UN courses of action in Korea in case an armistice is successfully negotiated.

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[1] A cover sheet to the source text in the form of a memorandum by Robbins P. Gilman, Secretary to the U.S. Delegation, read as follows: "The attached document has been revised to take into consideration comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document now stands approved."

U.S. OBJECTIVE

To achieve a unified independent and democratic Korea with maximum assurance against Communist domination.

PROBABLE POSITIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH

The British and French will probably support the U.S. position in general; they will likely prefer replacement of ROK and North Korean governments by newly constituted regime for all of Korea to assumption of jurisdiction over North Korea by ROK.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

1. Political discussions on Korea must follow an armistice.

2. A settlement on Korea cannot be related to other Far Eastern problems and must be dealt with entirely on its own merits. Political discussions of other Far Eastern problems cannot take place prior to a Korean political settlement.

3. The purpose of political discussions on Korea would be to obtain agreement on the following:

a. Establishment under UN supervision of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist domination.

b. Activation of a rehabilitation program for all of Korea under UNKRA, no funds to be spent in North Korea until political settlement in force.

c. Plan for phased withdrawal of foreign forces with reasonable assurances against internal disorder and external aggression.

4. Unification of Korea without Communist domination might be achieved either by *a*) integration of North Korea into the existing ROK, or *b*) replacement of the North Korean regime and the ROK government by a successor government for all of Korea. The United States should reserve its position on which of these methods to support pending further study of the situation and analysis of the attitudes of UN members and the ROK.

5. Procedure leading to a political conference for a Korean settlement should take the following form:

a. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Delegation to represent the UN in working out a Korean settlement.

b. The UN Delegation would set up a conference in which the participants might be: the UN Delegation, the ROK, the North Koreans, Chinese Communists, and the USSR.

c. Agreements achieved by the conference would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.[2]

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[2] The remainder of the document was identical with the text of WFM T-10, August 18, p. 831.

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 99

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings, Tripartite, and British Talks[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1951.

WFM T-10/1a

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN THE EVENT NO ARMISTICE IS ACHIEVED

PROBLEM

1. To determine courses of action to be followed by the United States with respect to Korea in case negotiations for an armistice come to a definite end.

General Courses of Action

2. *Military Actions.*

a. The United States should:

(1) Accelerate the present pace of preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on the assumption that the Communist action has greatly increased the likelihood of general hostilities;

(2) Direct the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available or made available;

(3) Impose no restrictions on advances into North Korea at least to the neck of the North Korean Peninsula;

(4) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(*a*) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(*b*) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

(5) Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

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[1] A cover sheet to the source text in the form of a memorandum by Mr. Gilman indicated that this document now stood approved, having been revised to take into account the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was forwarded to Secretary of Defense Marshall under cover of a note from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews on September 10 (795.00/9-451).

(6) Expedite the development and equipment of additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible, with a view to their assuming an increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea;

(7) Remove all restrictions against air attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River. Air attacks on Rashin should continue to be individually approved in advance by the JCS and UN aircraft should continue to remain well clear of the USSR border;

(8) Take the necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below, looking toward a UN blockade of shipments to Communist China;

(9) Re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against the China mainland.

b. In case the Communists launch massive air attacks against UN forces in the Korean area, General Ridgway should carry out standing instructions.[3]

3. *Actions in the United Nations.*

a. General Ridgway should report to the United Nations on the breakdown of the armistice negotiations;

b. The United States should initiate or support actions in the United Nations which would be considered effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, such as a GA resolution reaffirming the UN determination to carry on the fight and requesting further assistance.

c. The United States should take appropriate action, both diplomatically and through an initiative in the United Nations, calculated to bring political pressure to bear on the Chinese and North Korean Communists.

d. The United States should press for additional economic measures against China, looking toward a complete economic blockade. The imposition of a naval blockade through action in the UN is probably impracticable. The US should seek agreement within the UN or unilaterally with as many nations as possible to prohibit their ships from calling at Chinese ports and to accept assistance from the UN in enforcing such prohibition.

4. *Diplomatic Actions.*

a. Additional vigorous efforts should be exerted to obtain increased military forces, on a basis acceptable to the JCS, from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

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[3] See the telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway, dated April 28, p. 386.

5. *Psychological Warfare Actions.*

a. A program should be developed to inform the world that the Communists are responsible for the prolongation and extension of hostilities, that the UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III;

b. Efforts should be exerted:

(1) To maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;
(2) To spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;
(3) To promote discord between Peiping and Moscow.

6. *Domestic Actions.*

a. The President should address the nation;

b. Domestic opinion should be prepared for greater sacrifices and for an increased mobilization pace;

c. A public campaign should be instituted to stress patience and to resist pressures for a preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in the Far East.

895B.10/8-3051

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State has given very careful consideration to the views expressed by the Department of Defense in Mr. Lovett's letter of August 30, 1951, with respect to the release to the Government of the Republic of Korea of funds now in suspense account in the Treasury Department, accumulated from sales of Korean currency to individual members of the United Nations forces for their personal expenditures. That letter suggests that the matter be deferred until a later date, but adds that if there are political factors which have sufficient weight to counterbalance the considerations set forth, the Department of Defense will defer to our evaluation of these factors.

While appreciating the importance which the Department of Defense attaches to these problems, the Department of State believes that the release of the funds can be accomplished in such a way as to avoid the difficulties which you foresee, and that there are political considerations which have sufficient weight to make it desirable to take this action. First, it is important to the objectives of the United States in Korea to take action to support the Government of the Republic of Korea in its adoption of difficult and unpopular measures designed to strengthen the Korean economy. In addition, it is equally important to satisfy the Government and the people of the Republic of Korea, particularly while the armistice negotiations are in progress, of the continued interest and support of the United States.

These political factors are inextricably related to compelling economic considerations which likewise lead us to believe that the release of those funds is desirable. Although the military action of the United Nations in Korea is sustained in very large measure by equipment and resources introduced into Korea by the United States and other participating governments, the continuing hostilities have placed a tremendous burden upon the weak economy of South Korea. The Republic of Korea not only must continue to provide support for its armed forces, but must also furnish the local currency required by the United Nations forces. Consequently, every appropriate effort should be made to offset the inflationary effect of the *won* drawings of the United Nations forces. The immediate release of the funds in question will allow the Republic of Korea, in consultation with the United Nations Command, to import consumers goods in sufficient quantity to have a significant counter-inflationary impact. In addition, a decision to release the funds will have considerable political and psychological value in inducing the Korean Government to take other measures which are required to counteract the present inflation.

The Department of State believes that the action which is recommended in this letter is consistent with actions which have been taken by the United States in other allied and liberated countries, in some of which the United States has had financial arrangements similar to the financial agreement of July 28, 1950, with the Republic of Korea.

If the release of funds is to result in maximum benefits, it should be accomplished as soon as possible. Accordingly, it is requested that representatives of the Department of Defense join promptly with officers of the Department of State and of the Treasury Department in working out the conditions of release and appropriate controls.

The Department of State entirely agrees that the availability of the funds in question to finance necessary imports into Korea should be made known to any committees of the Congress which have occasion, in connection with legislative requests for Korean aid, to inquire into the resources of the Republic of Korea itself. However, in view of the urgency of the matter[1] and in view of the consistency of the recommended action with previous actions of the United States Government in similar circumstances, prior consultation with the Congress would not appear to be necessary.

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[1] The final draft of this letter, which had been forwarded to Mr. Webb by Mr. Merchant, was accompanied by copies of telegrams 235 and 238, September 7 and 8, from Seoul, in which Ambassador Muccio strongly urged immediate action on this question and reported on a proposal by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to send a special economic mission to the United States to obtain a settlement of the matter (895B.10/9–851).

Sincerely yours, **James E. Webb**

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 20041

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of United States–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 11, 1951—10:30 a. m.

U.S.–U.K. Min 2

Members

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)

Also present

U.S.	*U.K.*
Mr. Harriman	Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Gifford	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Jessup	Lt. Gen. Sir K. McLean [2]
	Mr. R. H. Scott [3]
	Mr. Gaitskell [4]
	Sir Leslie Rowan [5]

Alignment of US–UK in Far East

a) Korea

1. Mr. Acheson said the US side had been getting its ideas together regarding a course for UN action in Korea in case there is an armistice. The plan was to get on with political discussions keeping them confined to Korea and avoid discussing issues such as Formosa and China. The possibility of political agreement regarding Korea is not bright. We would not go back to where we were before hostilities began, and desire a united, free Korea. We recognize there is not much chance for agreement on this point, but we would not "sanctify" a division of the country at the 38th parallel, which line had been drawn solely for purposes of the Japanese surrender. Our policy called for a united Korea.

2. Mr. Morrison said he agreed that discussions should be kept to

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[1] This was the second of two meetings between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Morrison. No discussion of Korea was held during their first meeting, nor was there any such discussion during Mr. Acheson's one bilateral meeting with French Foreign Minister Schuman on September 12. A record of the brief discussion on Korea at the seventh and final tripartite meeting on September 14 may be found on p. 916. For complete documentation on these meetings, see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[2] Chief Staff Officer to the British Minister of Defense.

[3] Assistant Under Secretary, British Foreign Office.

[4] Hugh Gaitskell, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

[5] Economic Minister, British Embassy, Washington.

Korea, keeping in mind, however, the possibility of a comprehensive approach to settlement of problems in the area. He said the UK also desired a unified, democratic regime. In the back of his mind, however, were thoughts regarding UK public opinion on China, and also the point that Korea might not be ready for democracy immediately and if a democratic state were created and left to its own devices, it might easily be upset by a Fifth Column. This was a danger to be kept in mind. Regarding the nature of a cease fire conference and any armistice talks, he felt these should not be conducted in such a manner as to make it appear that it was the UN versus the Communist powers which were debating the issue. We should emphasize that the UN is a world organization—everyone is in it—and are working their problems out among themselves.

3. Mr. Acheson then read from a position paper setting forth a proposed US course of action in case of no armistice.[6] In addition to general consideration of the problem by the UN nations we believed we must accelerate military preparations. The free nations must get themselves in a state of readiness for general war. He did not wish to alarm anyone, but he believed there was a clearly increased likelihood of general hostilities. We have evidence of a considerable build-up in the Chinese air force, and at least two armored divisions have appeared in North Korea. The Western Allies should increase the tempo of their production and carry out their defense plans as quickly as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a paper which includes a number of recommendations.

> If the fighting falls off, the UN Commander in Chief should be directed to increase immediately the scale of military operations in order to retain the initiative in battle and prevent deterioration of morale.
>
> Restrictions on General Ridgway's movements should be removed in order to give him tactical leeway to make advances into North Korea to the waist of the North Korean Peninsula.
>
> Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese troops.
>
> Develop and equip additional Republic of Korea military units, increasing their responsibility for the defense of Korea. Mr. Acheson said forces of this type took a long time to develop. Two of the ROK divisions had turned out all right (the First and Capital Divisions), but there had been several disasters when ROK divisions had broken in battle allowing the enemy to come through and the UN Command had lost several months repairing the damage. The military policy now was not to place two ROK divisions side by side and to keep them on the Eastern side of the Peninsula where there was less chance of Communist pressure. Time is the important factor since

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[6] Reference is to document WFM T-10/1a, September 8, p. 889.

there were few effective Korean officers and non-commissioned officers, and it would take time to train them.

Remove restrictions against attacks in North Korea, especially against the Yalu River Dams and the power installations on the Korean bank. Mr. Morrison asked why we had originally embargoed action against these objectives. Mr. Acheson explained that we thought such action might be provocative to the USSR. However, the Communists had now removed most of the equipment which generated power for North Korea so that the entire output is going into Manchuria. In addition, one of the Dams serves as a main highway into North Korea. With regard to air attacks on Rashin, these would be approved on an individual case basis, and the emphasis in this connection was to keep UN aircraft clear of the Soviet border. Mr. Morrison said he was not familiar with Rashin and Mr. Acheson explained its location and proximity to Manchuria and Soviet territory. We had bombed it approximately three weeks ago, destroying the railroad marshalling yards and large quantities of war material. Mr. Morrison asked if there had been any Soviet reaction, and the Secretary replied that there had not been any evidence of it but that there may well have been concern.[7]

A complete economic blockade of China by the UN nations was also recommended.

4. In case of any large-scale air attacks against UN troops and installations in Korea, General Ridgway was to carry out his standing instruction of informing Washington, which would in turn carry out consultation with the UK and other participating nations to the extent permitted by the situation, after which Ridgway might be authorized to conduct pursuit and retaliation against Communist air bases. Mr. Morrison recalled the UK had agreed this point in the past in a communication with the Secretary.[8] Mr. Acheson said that as far as action in the UN is concerned we plan to give a history of the Kaesong discussions, including full detail on the alleged violation of the neutral zone, emphasizing that any breakdown in talks was not the fault of the UN, we believe the UN should reaffirm its decision to carry on the struggle against aggression and that members should take diplomatic action to bring political pressure to bear. Additional economic measures should be considered looking toward a complete

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[7] The following addendum sheet, dated September 17, was attached to the minutes:

"With regard to the reference to air attacks on Rashin mentioned in paragraph 3, page 2, the Department has been informed that the outstanding JCS directive did not require advance approval by Washington on an individual case basis. The JCS has established a set of conditions relating to visibility and so-forth which if met, authorize General Ridgway to conduct raids on Rashin when he considered such action militarily advisable.

"The British were informed by the Department of the appropriate modification of this point in the bipartite talks."

[8] See the note from the British Embassy, May 11, embodying the text of Mr. Morrison's message to Mr. Acheson, May 10, p. 427.

blockade of China and the US would seek to give effect to such a blockade either through the UN or bilaterally. The US would also seek to get increased military support and participation in the Korean operations.

6. **Mr. Morrison** said he agreed on a lot of points and had some questions about others. It was desirable to give the UK background and approach to the problem. The UK was anxious not to become involved in a mainland war with China. This was partly because of the general UK attitude toward China and partly because they must look at the world as a whole with all its potential for trouble elsewhere. One difficulty was that there were so many places where the Soviets might make trouble. The Middle East with its bad governments and restless peasant classes could be exploited quite easily by persons wishing to cause trouble. It would be the adoption of a policy of desperation by these people. They had no labor movements comparable to those in the US and UK to support their point of view and the potential for trouble always existed. He remarked, "If I were Stalin, I would have a go at it." The UK didn't want to become involved in a war with China. He agreed that if UN forces were heavily bombed, we would have to strike back, but the UK didn't want to do things needlessly. As diplomats, it was our business to avoid World War III. Communist China need not necessarily be a slavish Communist satellite. Mr. Bevin had believed that Chinese history, character and sheer numbers gave some basis for the assumption that they would draw a line between themselves and the Soviets. He had also believed that the USSR purposely made it difficult for China to be admitted to the UN in order to force China to turn to the Soviets for understanding and assistance. The UK didn't want to do anything to drive China to further cement its defensive union with the USSR. Another point was that if the UN became more heavily engaged in the Far East, the Soviets would likely start trouble elsewhere. These, he felt, were the basic UK points of view.

7. **Mr. Morrison** was not clear on whether the JCS was an entirely American military group; when this point was made clear to him, he said that his comments might be subject to those which General MacLean might wish to make. As for Korea, he said the British were satisfied to depend on Ridgway's discretion regarding tactical moves. He felt that it was necessary for a field commander to have such discretion, and he well understood the point regarding troop morale because London had experienced a similar problem when undergoing the terrific German bombings and a job to do was vital in maintaining morale.

8. With regard to training Japanese forces, **Mr. Morrison** said that

he had not heard of this before and the question was being raised sooner than he expected it might be. He wanted to get advice from his colleagues before he commented. There was some apprehension among certain people in the UK regarding German rearmament which he personally did not share because he felt to leave Germany out of the picture would result in the North Atlantic Treaty nations being lined up on one side against the Soviet Union and its Satellites on the other. However, he felt the idea of arming Japanese would raise some excitement in Britain. As far as training South Korean troops went he felt this was perfectly all right. He remarked that the question of bombing the Yalu Dam was "apparently under control", but that General McLean might wish to comment further. As far as a blockade by the UN was concerned, he was not sure it would be effective. He also felt it might cause China to rely even more heavily on the USSR. The Ridgway report, he agreed, must make clear that it is not the UN's fault that cease fire negotiations have been terminated. The UN should reaffirm its decision to resist aggression.

9. GENERAL McLEAN said that the British Chiefs' view was that they accepted the idea of UN tactical advances as far as the waist of Korea. They really didn't know enough about the situation and were satisfied to leave it up to Ridgway. They did feel, however, that the UN forces were in a good position at the present time and that if they went to the waist, it would add to their line of communication and internal security problems, at the same time shortening the Chinese lines which were vulnerable to air attack. Their consensus was that it was best for the UN to stay where it was. MR. ACHESON said that these same factors had been considered by the JCS and the general idea of maintaining our present position was considered sound. GENERAL McLEAN interjected that the British forces held the view that pursuit beyond the waist was considered a problem requiring governmental decision.

10. AMBASSADOR FRANKS asked if he might pose a question regarding Mr. Acheson's earlier statement that if fighting were resumed the general danger had markedly increased. He wondered what the background for this assumption was. If fighting was resumed, the Chinese would require additional men and equipment both on the ground and in the air. He supposed that it might be that the Chinese felt they could not withdraw. At the same time the USSR did not want to push the fighting further or give up larger amounts of material to the Chinese, but their commitment to the latter made them take a larger risk, and it is not clear where the fighting will stop.

11. MR. ACHESON said that is the underlying thought. In speculating on the situation it was possible to reach the conclusion that the Malik suggestion was based on an analysis by the Russians which

foresaw that the fighting would proceed on a larger scale which might easily spread and endanger the Soviet position. The Chinese may desire to press on in an attempt to gain a victory. This posed for the Russians the problem of providing equipment and building a strong China or of attempting to conclude hostilities and waiting until the general situation was more favorable to the Soviets. For some reason this idea was not working out. The Kaesong protests were continuing and apparently were designed to continue until someone loses patience and feels there is no use in attempting to come to terms with the Communists. Ridgway was being very careful in this connection. However, we had reports which indicated that considerably more equipment was arriving for the Chinese Communists, including the armored divisions and large numbers of aircraft. A new attack on the UN forces might be very serious. If large-scale fighting does resume, the world situation is markedly worse. In this connection he doubted that there was much value in worrying about Chinese reactions to such things as additional restrictions placed on them by the UN. He felt that these could not irritate them a great deal as compared with the larger situation.

12. Mr. Acheson said that to go back to the Japanese troop point, he desired to make it plain that there was no intent to use Japanese forces in Korea. What we were proposing was to expand the Japanese police reserve. They could easily be made a military body by increasing their training and armament. The purpose was to increase the defenses of Japan. Our Defense Department had been disturbed last autumn when Japan was denuded by transferring all available United States troops and supplies to Korea. A situation had existed where it would have been easy to take Japan and if that ever happened the position of our forces in Korea would be untenable. It was difficult for the US to meet the security requirements of Japan and also to send troops to Europe under NATO commitments.

13. Mr. Morrison said this explanation improved the situation greatly from his point of view. He understood the problem in Japan. He thought it was agreed between us that we must do everything we could not to "go over the line." It was not inconceivable that the Soviets might be forced in their own thinking to "preventive war." On the question of additional troops for Korea he felt that he must state now that this would not be easy for the UK. They were having trouble in Malaya and elsewhere and unless there was partial mobilization or the possibility of obtaining troops from Australia was looked into he could not foresee any availability. He wanted to consider this question with his colleagues in London.

14. On the question of a blockade, Mr. Morrison wondered if this

implied that UN naval units might actually stop Russian ships attempting to proceed to China.

15. Mr. Acheson said that we did not at present believe it was reasonable to have a naval inspection of vessels in the area but rather our thought was that UN member countries should agree to order ships under their registry not to go to China. Mr. Morrison said he appreciated having our many points with regard to the Far Eastern situation and would report fully to his colleagues in London.

[Here follows a discussion on East–West Trade.]

795.00/9–1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [Washington,] September 11, 1951.

Subject: Bombing of Yalu River Dams

Participants: Mr. R. H. Scott, Assistant Under Secretary, British Foreign Office
Lt. Gen. K. McLean, Chief Staff Officer to the British Minister of Defense.
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

During the coffee break of the morning session of the US–UK discussions this morning the Secretary and Mr. Morrison agreed that General McLean and Mr. Scott should discuss with me the background of the proposed removal of restriction on General Ridgway's air action against the Yalu River dams, with a view to the British getting off a telegram immediately to inform the Cabinet of this proposal.

I explained to the two British members that we were talking in terms only of the dams and of the power installations on the Korean side of the border. I said that this was a self-imposed limitation and had not been a matter of agreement with the British or anybody else. I also reminded them that we had in the past bombed the Korean end of the principal bridges across the Yalu, and referred to the Secretary's reminder to Mr. Morrison that one of the dams served as one of the principal highways across the river for military traffic. In response to their questions, I said that the original exemption from attack on these targets was in point of time before the massive Chinese intervention and arose, as I understood it, from a desire to avoid at that time needlessly provocative actions which might bring the Chinese in. In reply to a question, I said that the prohibition against invading the Manchurian air space would remain in effect. General McLean expressed some fear that on bombing missions against the dams the fighter cover might most naturally be tempted to follow attacking fighters across the border. I said that the very strength of our Air Force's emphasis on the fact that the prohibition against crossing the border had an adverse effect on the morale of the pilots, was testimony to the fact that we were scrupulously abiding by this injunction. In answer to a query, I said that we believed power was still going from these stations to Manchuria and Port Arthur.

From their closing remarks, I gathered that General McLean planned to get off in the afternoon a telegram to the British Chiefs of Staff and Scott would send a parallel message to the Foreign Office. From the attitude of both of them I inferred that they would put this up as a reasonable operation.

Mr. Scott subsequently confirmed to me that Mr. Morrison supported our position in his telegram to London on this matter.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 46 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET — TOKYO, 11 September 1951—9:21 p. m.
PRIORITY

C–50633. The Kaesong "neutral" zone was established to facilitate the armistice conf. Since 22 Aug the conf has been suspended by Communist decision. Meanwhile, the existence of the zone provides the scene for an ever-increasing nr of alleged incidents. The enemy seems to be using these alleged violations as a pretext for continuing the suspension of armistice talks. Each investigation by UNC liaison officers of alleged violations only educates the Communists further in how to make their fabricated presentations more technically accurate. In addition, the existence of the zone provides the enemy a mat mil advantage. There are indications that sizable Communist forces are using the neutral zone as a refuge. Operations by UNC Forces are hampered by the inviolability of the zone. The UNC has repeatedly stated its willingness to resume the conference. Despite this fact, the enemy continues to stall and to fabricate new allegations, under cover of the neutrality of the Kaesong zone which we respect.

There is no present need for a neutral zone around Kaesong. When and if discussions are resumed, new scty arrangements may or may not include a neutral zone. It may be that a guarantee of immunity from atk of participating pers will suffice.

My conclusion is that the neutrality of the Kaesong zone should now be terminated in order to remove one more basis for Communist stalling tactics, and to deprive the enemy of the distinct mil advantage he now enjoys.

Subject to your contrary instr, I therefore now propose to make another effort to break the curr impasse by addressing a statement to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai which will cover the following points:

a. Inform them that, eff 24 hours after the delivery of my msg in writing to the Communist liaison officers, providing they will come to receive it, or after my broadcast in the event of their refusal to receive it, the immunity from atk of the Kaesong area by my forces will terminate.

b. Base this action on the lack of any valid reason for continuing this immunity any longer.

c. Reiterate my willingness to dispatch my liaison officers to meet with theirs at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom to make arrangements for the resumption of negotiations whenever they, the Communist commanders, are ready to terminate the suspension of negotiations they declared on 23 Aug, and which they have continued to date.

d. Inform them of my willingness at that same time to provide their liaison officers and accompanying pers with immunity from atk by UNC Forces while this liaison party is at the conf site and enroute to and from it, providing they furnish me the nec adv notice.

e. Confine this statement solely to the termination of immunity from atk of the Kaesong area by my forces.

f. Lay down no conditions which can in any way be construed as an act on our part of either suspending or terminating the negotiations, or even of refusing to consider their possible resumption in the Kaesong area.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 47 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 11 September 1951—9 : 25 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-50634. This msg in 6 parts.

Part 1. At 100330I [1] September, the Liaison Officers at Munsan received from Communist Radio Station at Kaesong the following msg:

"At 1 : 35 AM September 10 an aircraft of your side made machine gunning over the vicinity of the conference site of the Kaesong Neutral Zone. We will inform you of the details of the above incident after the results of the investigation. By order of my Senior Delegate, I hereby first lodge a verbal protest with you."

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[1] Internal, i.e., Korean time.

Part 2. UNC Liaison Officers conducted investigation during daylight, 10 September in area of gunning approximately 1400 yards south of conference house. Summary of evidence follows:

a. Holes in houses indicating travel of two bullets generally northeast to southwest.
b. Several marks on stone walls of building.
c. Cal 50 bullets on ground near marks on buildings.
d. Testimony of several Koreans living in houses not conclusive but all heard aircraft.
e. One shell casing found about 2000 yards northeast of marked buildings.
f. No casualties, no damage other than as indicated above.

Part 3. FEAF reports that what appeared to be a bogie was detected by radar over Kaesong at 100141I. Continuing radar plot including a directed identification turn and subsequent transmission indicates plane was one from 3rd Bomb Group. The pilot reports having strafed lights at 100136I September in what he believed to be a different area but which in view of the radar plot, must have been Kaesong. Faulty navigation on pilot's part led to error.

Part 4. Admiral Joy is sending msg to Nam Il through the Liaison Officers at 120800 as follows:

"The UNC Air Commander has reported to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate that at about 0130, 10 September there was located by radar an aircraft in the Kaesong area. A continuing radar plot of the flight of the aircraft coupled with normal identification procedures revealed this aircraft to be one of the United Nations Command. Subsequent interrogation of the pilot disclosed that he had made a strafing attack at about 0135 on targets which through faulty navigation he had incorrectly identified.

"Based upon this information and the investigation conducted by the United Nations Command Liaison Officers today the fact that an aircraft of the United Nations Command strafed within the limits of the Kaesong Neutral Zone on 10 September is accepted.

"The United Nations Command regrets this violation of the agreed neutrality which resulted from the pilot's error in navigation. Appropriate disciplinary action is being initiated. It is noted that investigation conducted by the Liaison Officers established the fact that no damage resulted from the attack."

Part 5. It was decided to accept promptly full responsibility for the incident in order to lessen the advantage otherwise accruing to the Communists. The acknowledgement was made primarily on the basis of ground radar identification which strengthens the United Nations Command denials of guilt in the case of previously alleged violations. It was largely on the basis of radar reports, amplified by crew interrogations, that our participation in the former incidents was denied.

Part 6. I am releasing Parts 1 through 4 to the press at once.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 52 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 September 1951—11:28 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 81246. From JCS.

1. Your proposal in C 50633 would appear to negate purpose of prompt admission as suggested in part 5 of CX 50634. Termination or suspension of Kaesong neutrality immediately folg admission of violation would be used by Commies to support their charges that admitted violation was intentional and give color to past charges of UN violations in Kaesong area and of intention to break off negotiations. From international political standpoint, despite efforts on our part to avoid impression of either suspending or terminating negotiations, your proposal would inevitably be so construed.

2. JCS believe that msg of Adm Joy to Nam Il set forth in your CX 50634 expressing regret for accidental UN violation of Kaesong area on 10 Sep has put next move up to Commies. For time being you should await reaction to this admission. Your admission might serve Communists as face-saver and lead them to suggest resumption of talks.

3. If Communists do not make any efforts to renew negotiations within a week we will reconsider proposal in your C 50633.

795.00/9–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1951.

Subject: Various Far Eastern Problems

Participants: Mr. R. H. Scott, Assistant Under Secretary, British Foreign Office
Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Scott and Mr. Tomlinson called on me this morning and they spent more than an hour going over various Far Eastern problems in general terms.

At the outset, I said that there was one point made by the Secretary in his discussion of possible future courses of action in Korea with Mr. Morrison which the Secretary desired to have corrected. I asked him if he would undertake to appropriately amend the British record of conversations yesterday and personally inform Mr. Morrison on this point. Mr. Scott agreed to do so. The point, I said, related to the discussion on possible future bombing of Rashin, which I said would not require individual advance clearance by Washington providing that before ordering an air attack, General Ridgway determined it was militarily desirable and that it was possible to meet a rigid set of conditions established by our Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to visibility, and so forth.[1] Mr. Scott treated this as a point of minor consequence, though he did revert to the subject of possible bombing attacks on the Yalu River dams and North Korean power stations in terms of the increased risks that they foresaw of unintentional violations of the Manchurian air space. I minimized this possibility though admitting that occasionally it might happen. Incidentally, Mr. Scott volunteered that Mr. Morrison had strongly supported our position on the matter of bombing these dams in his telegram to London of last evening. I then asked if any of the points which Mr. Acheson raised appeared to give them any difficulty. Mr. Scott replied that he did not think so, though they had grave doubts as to the effectiveness of an embargo on all shipments to China achieved by shipping restrictions imposed by friendly nations since this would still leave the Russian and satellite traffic untouched. I agreed that there would be leakages but said there seemed to be good grounds for moving reasonably promptly on the question of bare boat charters by western nations to the Soviet Union and satellites, particularly in light of the increased number of such charters and the fact that in the aggregate they represented so large a part of the ocean-going tonnage available to the Soviet bloc. Mr. Scott made some polite noise but appeared neither to agree nor disagree with this line of thought.

I made the point that in the matter of removing restrictions on ground movements by General Ridgway we had no thought of moving at once to the Yalu, and I also minimized the possibility which Mr. Scott suggested that the Communists in Korea might allow the fighting to peter out even in the absence of an armistice.

On the chances of an armistice, Mr. Scott seemed more hopeful than is our general view. He believes that the pressure for an armistice comes from the Russians themselves, who do not find the continued heavy but indecisive fighting in Korea convenient, probably from the point of view of the strain placed on their relations with the Chinese which arises from their inability or unwillingness to meet the latter's demands for increased direct and indirect military assistance.

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[1] See footnote 7, p. 895.

We then discussed at some length policy toward China and Mr. Scott outlined at some length the basic British thesis. He asked where did I think our policies would and could come into conjunction. I told him that, speaking frankly, I believed our policies would become identical with the ultimate acceptance of our basic interpretation of the irrevocable hostility of Peiping to the West and the firmness of the connection between Peiping and Moscow. I said I thought that this change in British policy would come under the pressure of events just as I felt the Chinese entrance into the Korean war had confirmed our basic diagnosis and properly shaken the British confidence in their own. I agreed that by Chinese standards the present Peiping regime seemed to have a firm hold on China, with the usual reservations as to difficulties in the south, and I agreed that there was apparent today within China no political or military force which seriously threatened the hold of Peiping.

I then asked Mr. Scott what lay behind Mr. Morrison's thinking in connection with his statement to the Secretary that in any political discussion which would follow a successful armistice we should be careful not to have the Communist countries on one side of the table and the UN on the other. I said that I found it difficult to conceive of a realistic conference over the political future of Korea which did not have among those present the Chinese Communists and the Soviets, who were Korea's neighbors. I said I found it equally difficult to visualize their seat at the conference table any place except opposite the UN delegations and the ROKs since they were the ones who morally and directly had backed the North Korean aggression. Mr. Scott agreed with this estimate and said that he thought the point Mr. Morrison was trying to make was that it is the principle of universality in the UN which the British consider most important. The role of policing they consider less vital to the purpose of the UN since it can be exercised effectively only if there is unity among the great powers. He added, however, that he did not think there would be any difficulty in finding a practical formula for the political conference on Korea if such came into existence.

795.00/9–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1951.

Subject: British Reaction to UN Bombing of Yalu River Dams

Participants: Mr. R. H. Scott, Assistant Under Secretary, British Foreign Office
Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

During my conversation today with Messrs. Scott and Tomlinson, I inquired if the British had yet heard from London regarding a telegram they had sent earlier in the week on the subject of bombing the Yalu River dams. They replied they had received a lengthy telegraphic response, the net of which was that they concurred. I gathered, however, that there was considerable discussion in the telegram of the dangers they foresaw of anti-aircraft fire from the other bank of the Yalu and intensive attack from enemy fighters, creating an almost irresistible temptation for our own fighter pilots to cross into the Manchurian air space. Presumably we will have a more formal confirmation from the British Embassy.[1]

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[1] No communication was transmitted from the British Embassy until October 2 (see p. 982), but on September 15, Secretary Acheson, then in Ottawa for the North Atlantic Council meeting, sent the following message back to the Department of State:

"Dixon of UK del showed Jessup this afternoon extract from telegram which he described as giving us affirmative answer on bombing of Yalu River plants and dams which they had not been able give us in Washington. Tel indicates ministerial and chiefs of staff consultations resulted in agreement that on conditions envisaged in Secretary's statement (that is no armistice) and if there is large scale fighting Gen Ridgway should be given discretion if he considers it militarily desirable and important to take such action but UK attaches great importance to our respecting the frontier." (Telegram Actel 2; 795.00/9–1551)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 49 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 September 1951—3:45 p. m.

Z–36696. Formal reply to General Ridgway's Sept 6 letter. (Peiping Radio, English, 0700 12 Sep–RP).

Kim Il Sung, Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, today sent the following reply to Ridgway's letter of September 6th.

"General Ridgway:

"Your letter of September 6th persists in denying and refusing to deal with the series of provocative incidents which had taken place since August 22 in violation of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and it still persists in its malicious and slanderous allegations that these incidents either had no basis in fact or were purposely manufactured by our side.

"At the same time you bring up a proposal for the changing of the conference site thus trying to run [*turn?*] away from yourself inescapable responsibility for the violation of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and for obstructing the progress of the armistice negotiation.

"We consider your letter completely unsatisfactory and unacceptable.

"The fact that the Kaesong neutral zone is inside the area which is under our command is being used by you to try and cover up the truth about the series of provocative incidents created by your side in violation of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and also to try to put on our shoulder your grave responsibility for these incidents. We have to say that these efforts of your side are futile.

"Precisely on this question of the Kaesong zone neutrality our attitude has throughout been one of serious and responsible adherence to the agreement which was reached as a result of your proposal that we both agree to refrain from any hostile act within this zone during the entire period of our conference, whereas your side has never kept to it.

"Let us now in the sight of all fair-minded people in the world examine the facts in the past two months.

"Since the beginning of the Kaesong negotiation your side has twice declared the meeting suspended without any consultation. Once on the pretext that the press could not enter Kaesong and once on the occasion when our military patrol strayed into the area of the conference site.

"To prevent the negotiations from being obstructed, our side on both occasions promptly found a reasonable solution for your side and immediately agreed to the proposal to make Kaesong a neutral zone.

"What about your side? Firstly, ever since the establishment of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement on July 14, the Air Force of the United Nations Forces has never ceased flying along at low altitude over the Kaesong neutral zone. Later a more specific rule was arrived at on August 16 that no military aircraft was to be allowed over the Kaesong neutral zone, yet the United Nations Forces aircraft went on with their intrusions over the zone and hostile patrols and reconnoitering.

"According to the records in our possession between August 17 and August 30, the intrusions totalled 31 sorties and between September 1st and September 8th, 139 sorties. And though our side has made repeated protests your side has never ventured to give a straight reply on any of these constant hostile violations of the agreement.

"If the Air Force is not included among the armed forces which have to refrain from an hostile act within this zone, is there any neutral zone in the world worth talking about? If the Air Force is included then the hostile acts of the past two months in which United Nations Forces aircraft had intruded over the Kaesong neutral zone and carried out patrolling and reconnaissance are violations of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement.

"Quite apart from the irrefutable evidence of witnesses and material the logic of the hostile air activities of your side is in itself sufficient to show that the aircraft which twice dropped bombs in the vicinity of our delegations building headquarters in the Kaesong neutral zone on August 22 and September 1st and dropped a flare over the zone on August 29 beyond any doubt belong to the United Nations Forces.

"Moreover, these provocative actions are still developing. At 0135 on September 10th a military aircraft of your side again flew over the Kaesong neutral zone and strafed the conference site. This has been investigated by the liaison officers of both sides and the markings that have been made by the bullets are still there leaving no room for denial.

"We now again lodge a grave protest with you on these unending provocations.

"Clearly the armed units of the United Nations Forces having during the past two months committed premeditated acts of provocation and troops of the United Nations Forces twice on July 16 and August 25 penetrated into Pan Mun Jom and its facilities inside the Kaesong neutral zone and fired at our military patrolmen. On two occasions on August 19th and 30th the South Korean troops belonging to the United Nations Forces penetrated into the Kaesong neutral zone and attacked and murdered our military patrolmen.

"Our side not only has witnesses and material evidence with regard to these two incidents but has also captured members of the reconnaissance unit of the South Korean troops which took a direct part in them.

"All the above facts are enough to prove that although the proposal for a Kaesong zone neutrality agreement came from you, you are trying to make it binding on our side but not on yourself.

"Although your present letter once again takes the assurance that the troops of your side could not possibly have violated the Kaesong neutral zone agreement nevertheless in fact constant violation of the agreement has been perpetrated by your troops during the past two months and yet you have refused to deal with any of them.

"Is not this assurance merely a deception? Of course, we have the power to exercise control over territory for which we are responsible. But as both sides have agreed to make Kaesong a neutral zone during the period of negotiation and furthermore, as our side has accepted the obligations involved in the regulations for carrying out the agreement concerning the neutral zone we have the right to demand that your side, too, accept these obligations and refrain from violating the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement.

"Now all that you have been doing is to try to escape the responsibility for all these agreement violations by making denials and claiming that these incidents have no basis whatsoever in fact and that they have been all deliberately fabricated by our side.

"But the facts are crystal-clear. The evidence is incontrovertible. Attempts of denial on your part cannot possibly hold water. You have, therefore, resorted to the device of diverting attention by proposing the change in the conference site so as to escape the responsibility for dealing with the series of provocative violations of the agreement and in order to manufacture a pretext for breaking off the negotiation whenever you want to do so.

"We must point out that you will not succeed in these attempts. Even if we followed the logic of your slanders that all these provocative violations of the agreement were manufactured by our side and spurious, why is it that your side has not dared to demand an inquiry into all these incidents or to make suggestions on how the matter should be settled or even to conduct a reinvestigation into these incidents, but instead has left it to our side to make repeated demands for inquiry into and settlement of all these incidents?

"In your latest letter you declare that you can still effectively guarantee that your troops would not possibly violate the terms of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and since our side has in practice all along guaranteed the carrying out of the terms of this agreement, why do you want to propose a change in the conference site?

"These strikingly obvious contradictions are sufficient to prove that your proposal on changing the conference site is in fact directed at evading the responsibility for the agreement violations and at creating a pretext for breaking off the negotiation.

"Without the slightest doubt ever since the talks began and since the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement our side has been playing its part in the responsible manner to guarantee that Kaesong has every qualification as a negotiation site. This can be appraised by the whole record of the Kaesong negotiations regarding these questions.

"If it were not for the series of provacations recklessly created by your side in violation of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement, how could the Kaesong meetings fail to proceed?

"If only your side will conscientiously and responsibly deal with the series of provocative incidents and guarantee that the violations of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement will not recur, the Kaesong conference site is well able to serve the purpose of endeavoring to reach a fair and reasonable armistice agreement.

"If your side does not conscientiously and responsibly deal with these matters no matter what place you make the conference site there is no reason to believe that similar and even more serious provocations will not occur.

"Moreover since it is clear that your side will not abide by a neutrality agreement is there any reason to expect that your side will abide by an armistice agreement?

"Therefore, we now demand of you once again that you put an end at once to the incessant acts of violations of the agreement and deal with the numerous provocations against which our side has lodged protests. Only so can the negotiations be resumed on a normal and equal basis. Otherwise your side will have to bear the entire responsibility for the delay and obstruction in the progress of the negotiations and their consequences.

"We await your reply."

Signed Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army.

Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

357.AD/9–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1951—6 p. m.

208. Re proposed CINCUNC–ROK agreement. Loren[1] and McClurkin[2] reported to Dept from Tokyo and subsequently recommended to Amb "that there is need for financial and accounting agreement and that new draft without fon exchange control by CINCUNC

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[1] E. Allen Loren, Economic Adviser in the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser in Tokyo.

[2] Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

wld be satis agreement that nature. In addition if armistice negots fail, possibility created of necessary delay in transfer operating responsibility to UNKRA until after termination ECA aid agreement. In that case present draft[3] might be acceptable even with fon exchange control as basis negots with ROK for minimum interim aid agreement."

Subsequently CINCUNC determined postpone indefinitely negot agreement with ROK. DA now informs Dept CINCUNC desires proceed soonest this negot and insists upon inclusion fon exchange control. DA understands probable difficulty negotiating agreement particularly with provision re fon exchange but desires opportunity for CINCUNC endeavor secure this provision. Dept understands CINCUNC will probably request advice and assistance Emb in course negots.

Dept's present view is situation has changed since Jul. Delays in armistice talks are clearly extending period in which CINCUNC must retain major burden relief activities. Present state talks also more conducive to negots CINCUNC–ROK agreement than Jul situation. Given these circumstances we believe advisable agree to CINCUNC proceeding forthwith negotiate with ROK in consultation Emb on basis Jul 26 draft including requirement for CINCUNC concurrence in fon exchange allocations. In addition, we wld suggest substitution in last line Section I Art 5 of "stabilization" for "restoration" thus underlining CINCUNC responsibility for carrying out program of relief and support in such manner as to promote stabilization Korean economy. Only other change would be substitution "external" for "nonindigenous" in section I Art 2.[4]

Ur comments requested.

ACHESON

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[3] Reference is to a draft agreement, dated July 26, between CINCUNC and the Republic of Korea on relief and support of the civilian population of the Republic of Korea, not printed.

[4] The reference here is to services to be provided by CINCUNC.

795.00/9–1351

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am now in a position to comment more extensively on the State Department's redraft of the position paper (WFM T–10/1a) entitled "United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice", and also on the same paper that Mr. Matthews submitted with his letter of 10 September 1951.[1]

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[1] For background information on this paper, see the memorandum by Mr. Merchant, September 7, p. 886; for the text of WFM T–10/1a, see p. 889; regarding Mr. Matthews' letter, see footnote 1, *ibid.*

I am inclosing a memorandum of 12 September 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff combining their comments and suggested revisions of the position paper (WFM T-10/1a). I concur in these revisions. At the same time, the Department of Defense believes that United States policy on Korea in case of no armistice, as expressed in these two papers,[2] should receive additional study before a final position is adopted.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 September 1951.

Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T-10/1a), dated 6 September 1951,[3] Entitled "United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice."

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point of view, the following views on the Department of State draft position paper, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would express their concern over the procedure of the Department of State in regard to the subject position paper dealing largely with military matters. On the cover page of WFM T-10/1a it is stated that the document was revised to take into account comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that it now stands approved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the subject paper does not, in certain particulars, fully integrate their views. In addition, they question the accuracy of the statement regarding approval of the document inasmuch as they understand it does not now have the concurrence of the Department of Defense. On the other hand, they are informed that the subject matter of this document formed the basis for the position of the Secretary of State in discussions with His Majesty's Foreign Minister on 11 September 1951.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also find a misstatement of fact in subparagraph 2a(7) *Military Actions* with respect to air attacks on Rashin.

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[2] Although Mr. Lovett here refers to two papers, the reference in the preceding paragraph to the "same paper" is correct, since the texts of WFM T-10/1a, September 8, and the State Department re-draft mentioned in Merchant's memorandum of September 7 as being transmitted to Secretary Marshall are identical.

[3] See footnote 2 above; the September 6 paper was the one referred to in Mr. Merchant's memorandum of September 7 to Ambassador Jessup.

4. In subparagraph 2*a*(9) *Military Actions*, it is stated that the United States should re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against the China mainland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to a re-examination of the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops against the China mainland. Such action would be consistent with subparagraph 8 *f* of NSC 48/5, which was approved by the President on 17 May 1951. On the other hand, they adhere to the decision communicated to the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) on 9 January 1951, to the effect that in view of the improbability of Chinese Nationalist forces having a decisive effect on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere, to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa was not regarded favorably.

5. In subparagraph 3 *d Actions in the United Nations*, it is stated that the imposition of a naval blockade through action in the United Nations is probably impracticable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the imposition of a naval blockade by the United States in concert with the sixteen participating nations is a practicable military measure. It is believed that the statement in the subject position paper quoted above refers to the practicability of obtaining political support within the United Nations.[4]

6. In the light of the foregoing considerations and statements of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following changes in WFM T-10/1a:

a. Change the second sentence of subparagraph 2*a*(7) *Military Actions* to read:

> "Air attacks on Rashin should continue in accordance with existing instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;"

b. Change subparagraph 2*a*(8) *Military Actions* to read:

> "Take the necessary diplomatic measures for the imposition of a naval and economic blockade of Communist China;"

c. Change subparagraph 2*a*(9) *Military Actions* to read:

> "Re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops against the China mainland"; and

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[4] The three points raised in numbered paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 had already been discussed on September 12 by Mr. Merchant and Mr. Kenneth Young of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at which time Mr. Merchant had made clear that the conditions for bombing of Rashin had already been clarified with the British, the use of KMT troops had been set aside by Mr. Acheson as a topic not to be raised at the ministerial talks, and the naval blockade was being viewed with regard to its political feasibility not its military practicality (memorandum by Merchant to Matthews, September 12; 795.00/9-1251).

d. Change the second sentence of subparagraph 3 *d Actions in the United Nations* to read:

> "The imposition of a naval blockade through action in the United Nations is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable."

7. Subject to the acceptance of the changes recommended in paragraph 6, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, concur in WFM T–10/1a. They would stress, however, in the event no armistice is achieved, the military importance of:

a. Implementation of all of the measures which were recommended by them in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951, subject, however, to a re-examination now being undertaken in the light of existing conditions of the measure outlined in paragraph 1 *b* of the memorandum referred to; and

b. The requirement for acceleration of the present pace of military preparation by the United States and its allies.[5]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[5] No further revision of document WFM T–10/1a was made, presumably in view of the resolution of the points raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Messrs. Merchant and Young in their conversation as well as the conclusion of the Foreign Ministers meetings on September 14; see *infra*.

795.00/9–1451

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

I assume that you would wish to keep as brief as possible any discussion of Korea at the Tripartite discussions this afternoon and accordingly I give below a brief outline for possible use. It is a compression of what you said to Mr. Morrison.

(1) If we achieve an armistice, we envision promptly starting political discussions which would be confined to the search for political settlement of the Korean problem. Our political objective remains a unified Korea with maximum assurances against renewed invasion or

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[1] The memorandum was transmitted through the office of Ambassador Jessup. A manuscript note on the source text by Mr. Merchant indicated that it was used as a talking brief by Mr. Acheson at the tripartite meeting on September 14; see *infra*.

subversion. Only if we secured a satisfactory settlement would we be willing to consider discussing other Far Eastern problems. We have not crystalized our thinking on the exact form of the conference but in general we believe that the UN should be represented by a small delegation or commission and that the ROKS should participate. We also believe that it would probably be necessary and desirable to have the Soviets and the Chinese Communists participate since they are Korea's land neighbors.

(2) Unhappily, the prospect for an armistice is discouraging and hence we must consider courses of action to be followed in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations.

Such a breakdown, the responsibility for which would rest on the enemy, would probably have to be regarded as evidence of a willingness on the part of the Soviets to assume increased risks of an extension of hostilities. In light of the massive Communist build-up in Korea, we must expect a heavy offensive from the enemy.

We believe that General Ridgway should have complete freedom of maneuver on the ground, at least as far as the neck of Korea, and that he should be free of any restraints on bombing targets within North Korea, including the Yalu River dams. Prohibition against invasion of Russian or Manchurian air space would remain in force.

If, however, the enemy should launch a massive air offensive against our forces, General Ridgway would report immediately to Washington for instructions (enabling consultation) unless there were a breakdown in communications or some other emergency situation which required that he retaliate against the enemy air bases in order to protect his forces.

We should press on with the organization and training of ROK troops and continue the training of the Japanese police force.

Finally, in the UN field:

(*a*) General Ridgway should immediately make a full report;

(*b*) The UN should reaffirm its determination to resist the aggression;

(*c*) An effort would be necessary to secure additional contributions of troops; and

(*d*) The United States should press for additional economic measures against China, looking toward a complete economic blockade. The imposition of a naval blockade is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable. The US should seek agreement within the UN or unilaterally with as many nations as possible to prohibit their ships from calling at Chinese ports and to accept assistance from the UN in enforcing such prohibition.

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 20041

United States Delegation Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of United States–French–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 14, 1951—4 p. m.

Tripartite Min-7

Members

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

Also Present

U.S.	*U.K.*	*France*
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Payens
Mr. Merchant	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Alphand

[Here follows the first portion of the meeting dealing with the Middle East Command; for the full text of these minutes, see volume III, Part 1, page 1291. For documentation on the Middle East Command, see volume V, pages 1 ff.]

Far East

4. M. SCHUMAN said that he believed the Ministers would be interested in information from Mr. Acheson regarding Korea, the military situation in general, and any forecast which could be made regarding the possibility of an armistice. MR. ACHESON set forth the military situation as based on current reports from the JCS and proceeded to explain what steps the United States proposed to take in case an armistice was agreed in Korea. He next outlined the steps which we propose to take if no armistice was established. This entire discussion followed closely the exposition reported in Paragraphs 1–15 of the minutes of the second US–UK meeting on September 10, 1951.[2] M. SCHUMAN thanked Mr. Acheson and indicated there was no need for discussion. He said he assumed that any questions arising in the future would be discussed in the Consultative Committee of the United Nations. MR. MORRISON said that he would report to his colleagues and see how they reacted to the US proposals. He reiterated his doubt regarding the effectiveness of a blockade or "embargo" and pointed out that Hong Kong must trade with the mainland to live. He said he believed Communist China was not a servile satellite of the USSR and that he did not desire to take any steps which would drive her toward the Soviets.

[Here follows the remainder of the discussion dealing with Indochina. For documentation on Indochina, see volume VI, Part 1, pages 332 ff.]

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[1] This was the final tripartite session and the only one at which any substantive discussion on Korea was held.

[2] Reference is to the meeting of September 11; see p. 893.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 55 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters of the United Nations Command, Korea[1]

SECRET TOKYO, 17 September 1951—9:38 a.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-50998. Release fol msg to Gens Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, 1200I 17 Sep and deliver properly authenticated copy to Communist Liaison Officers as soon thereafter as practicable. Simultaneous release will be made in Tokyo.

"Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai:

"This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 12 Sep.

"Each of the allegations contained in your letter has been thoroughly investigated. These investigations established that the forces of the United Nations Command were not, I repeat not involved in any violation of the neutral zone except for the one incident occurring on 10 Sep. These thorough investigations, the results of which have been furnished to you previously, demonstrate the objective and responsible attitude of the UNC towards violations of the agreements concerning the neutral zone.

"In your msg you have inferred a desire that negotiations be resumed. I must remind you that negotiations have been suspended by your direction since 23 Aug. I again emphasize my concern in the achievement of a just and honorable military armistice. If you are now disposed to terminate the suspension of the armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 Aug, I am still prepared to order my Liaison Officers to a meeting at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom to discuss conditions that will be mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks. Signed Ridgway".

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[1] Repeated for information to Washington for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

795.00/9–1751

Memorandum for the Files by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1951.

Just before his departure for Ottawa,[1] the Secretary outlined to Mr. Matthews and Mr. Nitze certain ideas he had regarding a new approach by General Ridgway to the Communists regarding the resumption of negotiations. The attached draft message in this sense was approved by Mr. Matthews on the morning of September 15, whereupon Mr. Nitze and I went over to discuss it with General Bradley. General Bradley expressed himself as being in agreement with it and arranged to have copies distributed to the other members of the Joint Chiefs with a view to their considering it on September 17. General Bradley expressed the view that if this produced no tangible results we should at the end of about a week's time then take the step General Ridgway has recommended of withdrawing the immunity from attack which the Kaesong neutral zone now possesses.

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 906.

Meanwhile, General Ridgway has transmitted to the Communists his message of September 17, which to a considerable degree appears to compromise the utility of the attached draft.[2]

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

[Attachment]

Draft Message by Ridgway to Nam Il

SECRET

We have had a great deal of controversy on alleged violations of the neutral zone. We on our side have made every effort to prevent any violation of the neutral zone and to trace every bit of information which would shed light on whether forces under the UN Command have been responsible for any violation. In the one instance where we have found such information, I reported it promptly. The tone of the accusations from your side and the nature of the evidence advanced in relation to the charges made lead us to doubt whether you have a similar point of view.

The important thing, however, is to get on with the armistice negotiations. If you on your side will affirm your determination to guarantee the neutrality of the neutral zone, there is no reason why negotiations should not proceed. For my part, I will repeat my guarantees that we will take every measure to insure that no forces under control of the Unified Command violate our agreement with respect to the neutral zone. Everyone on our side is fully informed of my orders and understands my desire to proceed promptly with negotiations.

We have suggested that a new locus for negotiations be found, or that joint teams continuously inspect and report on any alleged violation. These suggestions have not been accepted. I now repeat them.

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[2] Telegram Tosec 14, September 18, to Mr. Acheson in Ottawa, not printed, informed him of the Department's view that General Ridgway's message of September 17 to the Communist commanders had undercut the utility of the attached draft message. General Ridgway's message had been sent before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could consider the draft message. (740.5/9-1851)

I propose that our representatives should meet, either to settle on new arrangements for further meetings or else to renew discussions of the issues involved in arriving at an armistice. I await your reply.

357.AD/9–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, September 17, 1951—5 p. m.

256. Ref Deptel 208, Sept 12. Concur Dept's view that under present circumstances with UNC operating agency of UN for indefinite period it desirable to proceed with negotiation CINCUNC–ROK agreement, including control by CINCUNC over ROK foreign exchange, with editorial changes suggested your msg. Further recommend that when legislation now before Congress is passed relieving ECA responsibility for counterpart funds and other residual functions under agreement on aid that responsibility these functions be transferred from Embassy to CINCUNC.

Successful conclusion of negotiations for payment of ROK of dollars recd from *won* sales to UN personnel prior opening discuscussions on CINCUNC–ROK agreement might create more favorable atmosphere for these discussions. If negotiators authorized to agree to wipe out ECA counterpart fund by application on ROK overdraft, as previously proposed by Embassy, believe this too might assist in expediting conclusion satisfactory CINCUNC–ROK agreement. Negotiators shld be prepared demonstrate that all possible steps being taken to increase flow of supplies for sale on Korean market since danger of runaway inflation now matter of utmost concern to responsible ROK officials.

MUCCIO

795.00/9–1851

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1951.

Confirming what I said the other day, I discussed the substance of the attached memorandum with Messrs. Matthews and Nitze. We are all three agreed that the launching of the major Communist offensive in Korea should be regarded and publicly described as the Communist answer to our efforts to resume the armistice negotiations, and hence constitutes the definitive breaking off of such talks by the Communists.

I think the Ambassadors understand this and I think further from my conversation with General Bradley last Saturday [1] that the JCS hold a similar view.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1951.

[Subject:] Possibility of Major Communist Offensive in Korea

There has been much speculation as to the reason for the Communist recalcitrance in the armistice discussions, their failure to resume the talks and their obvious build-up for what might well be a major offensive. One seemingly logical reason is that the Communists may attempt to drive the United Nations forces back to the 38th parallel, or even south of that line, and then indicate their readiness to resume discussions. If the talks were to resume under such conditions, when United Nations forces are clearly at a military disadvantage, the Communists would undoubtedly again take the position that the 38th parallel is the *de facto* and only logical demarcation line and that the arguments of the UN Command's representatives that an armistice must be based on a militarily defensible line are without foundation, since they had proved that no line can be really defensible. An attack which succeeded in driving us back to the parallel and a renewed Communist offer for a settlement at the 38th parallel might well create a demand by American and foreign public opinion to accept the Communist terms.

Present instructions to General Ridgway emphasize that, if the talks are to be broken off, the responsibility for such action must be made to rest with the Communists. In the event of a massive offensive designed to drive us to the 38th parallel or further south and a Communist refusal to accept another locality for the peace discussions, it would appear that the United Nations Command might better accept the responsibility for breaking off negotiations than to incur the risk outlined above. It is better that we terminate negotiations while in a relative position of strength, as we are now, and at the moment when it is clear that the Communists have launched a new, major offensive and when a continuance of the negotiations is obviously futile, rather than during a tactical withdrawal towards, or south of, the 38th parallel.

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[1] September 15; see the memorandum for the files by Merchant, dated September 17, p. 917.

If it is deemed advisable to terminate peace discussions under such conditions, General Ridgway should be directed to issue a statement pointing out that the Communists' repeated fraudulent charges of United Nations violations of the neutrality zone, their unwillingness to discuss a realistic military armistice, coupled with a simultaneous massive build-up, including the introduction of not only new Chinese Communist and North Korean forces but also Caucasian puppet troops, and the launching of an offensive, proves beyond doubt that they entered the discussions for no other purpose than to gain time in which to strengthen their forces for further aggression. The announcement should state that he is, therefore, breaking off armistice discussions.

In order to determine the necessity and advisability of adopting the suggested course of action and to determine whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff should now direct General Ridgway to break off the discussions at such time as it is determined that a major Communist offensive has been launched, it is recommended that the Department:

(1) Consult with the Department of Defense in order to determine whether UN forces are considered to have the capability of holding the present line in the face of an all-out attack;

(2) Determine whether a possible break-off of negotiations should now be discussed with the Ambassadors of the participating countries, and whether they should be notified in advance of any announcement;

(3) Determine whether, if a break-off in the armistice negotiations is effectuated, the courses of action which have been proposed in the event there is no armistice also come into effect;

(4) Review and develop a program of public information and psychological preparation for the break-off in the peace talks to place the blame clearly on the Communists and to justify our action.

With respect to paragraph 3 above, consideration should be given particularly to that portion of the proposed courses of action which provides for the lifting of restrictions against the bombing of the Yalu dams and the adjacent power installations. It must be remembered that, if these dams are bombed in order to effect their total destruction, our bombers will be exposed on many occasions to attack by the enemy, who will enjoy a privileged sanctuary inasmuch as the principle of "hot pursuit" comes into effect only in the event of a massive enemy *air* offensive. It is believed that such bombing, continued over a prolonged period of time, will inevitably lead to a demand by the Air Force and the American people that our pilots be allowed to pursue the enemy into Manchuria and China and destroy him wherever they find him. In this case, our guiding principle of localizing the conflict to the Korean peninsula will no longer be applicable.

795.00/9–1851: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 18, 1951—7 p. m.

263. Korean briefing mtg, Sep 18. Defense rep reported FEC estimate, based on numerous reports, 25,900 Caucasian troops in Korea, of which 15,400 probably Sov, including anti-aircraft personnel, security forces, engineers, signal and radar personnel, etc.; and 10,500 other occidentals including artillery, hospital personnel, ground-air troops and other services. No concrete evidence specific type, identity or location any unit. Enemy troop strength now estimated total 700,000 men for increase 61,000 since last week.

Merchant commented Ridgway msg to Commies Sep 17 indicating willingness have liaison officers discuss conditions for resumption armistice talks. No reply from Commies this msg, or previous Ridgway msg acknowledging accidental violation Kaesong area by UN pilot Sep 10. Merchant indicated news item just recd reports further Commie charge violation neutrality zone by 3 armed soldiers. Commies, according report, called for our liaison officers meet with them but no indication whether merely to receive formal complaint alleged violation or be given response previous msgs.[2]

Merchant referred to slackening of attacks and abuse by Commie radio and noted while may be entirely coincidental, in past there had been such slackening prior Commie offensive.

In reply Canadian question, Merchant indicated no agreement ever reached with Commies barring innocent, non-hostile passage by UN planes over Kaesong area, but he believes UN pilots are instructed maintain minimum altitude.

WEBB

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[1] Sent to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and to the posts in the other 16 countries contributing military support to the U.N. effort in Korea: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa.

[2] The Communist complaint over this incident was speedily disposed of when the U.N. Command conceded, following the joint investigation by the liaison officers on September 19, that four unarmed medical corps soldiers of an anti-epidemic unit from the Republic of Korea Army had inadvertently crossed into the neutral zone. The investigation was conducted in a relatively congenial atmosphere and the Communist side promptly agreed to return the men and their equipment. (Telegram HNC 308, September 19, from CINCUNC Advance, Korea, to CINCFE, Tokyo: Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 59; the text of the U.N. Command announcement on the incident is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1, 1951, p. 556.)

In commenting on this incident at the Ambassadors' briefing on September 21, Mr. Merchant observed that, speaking for himself, he found it interesting that the Communist side, given its record in manufacturing allegations, made no charge that the South Korean medical unit with its DDT bombs was a biological warfare team. (Memorandum of conversation by Heidemann; 750.00/9–2151)

795B.10/9–1951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 19, 1951—1 p. m.

222. Amb Yang today discussed with Merchant suspense acct question.[1] He was informed confidentially US has agreed in principle release that portion *won* advances arising from purchases *won* by individual members US forces through Jul 31. Amount involved approx $12,000,000. Details of transfer including nature of receipt still being worked out. Hope within week or ten days be able effect actual transfer funds at which time joint public statement may be issued.

Amb Yang asked us notify Emb in order everything possible be done avert dispatch mission to US to negotiate this matter. He believes unfavorable public reaction in US would result from such mission.

WEBB

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[1] The conversation actually took place on September 18, which was the drafting date of this telegram.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 63 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRIORITY TOKYO, 20 September 1951—9 : 45 a. m.

ZX–38349. Communists reply to Ridgway; proposes reopening of talks (Peiping radio, English, 0700, 20 Sep–RP).

Here is the full text of the reply from Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, to Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces.

"Commander-in-Chief M. B. Ridgway of the United Nations forces:

"Your reply dated September 17 has been received. Both your letter and the letter from Vice Admiral Joy, Chief Delegate of your side, to General Nam Il, Chief Delegate of our side, dated September 11, have admitted the fact that a United Nations forces aircraft strafed the Kaesong neutral zone on September 10th. However, your side still denied the various incidents which took place before September 10th when the United Nations forces violated the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement from the air and on the ground which made it impossible to proceed with the Kaesong negotiations. This kind of denial though can by no means alter or do away with all the witnesses and the material evidence which we possess concerning these incidents. And, therefore, the incidents which our side has drawn attention to and protested about must be dealt with in a responsible way.

"In view of the fact that your side has expressed regret concerning the latest incident in which the United Nations forces violated the Kaesong neutral zone and willingness to take a responsible attitude regarding violations of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and in order not to let the previously mentioned unsettled incidents continue to obstruct the progress of the negotiations of both sides, we therefore propose that the delegates of both sides should immediately resume the armistice negotiations at Kaesong without any need for further discussion on the conditions for the resumption of the armistice negotiation.

"As to dealing with the previously mentioned unsettled incidents and stipulating and guaranteeing strict agreement on the Kaesong zone neutrality, we propose that at the first meeting after the resumption of the Kaesong armistice negotiation appropriate machinery be set up by arrangement of both sides to carry out these tasks. Of course, all agreements reached through such appropriate machinery will be valid only after ratification by the delegations of both sides.

"If you agree we hope that you will immediately order the liaison officers of your side to consult with our liaison officers concerning the date and time for resuming the negotiations at Kaesong.

"Signed Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army. Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. Dated September 19, 1951."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 70 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 21 September 1951—1:40 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–82085. Reur C 69346 and JCS 99477.[2]

1. If present discussions on arrangements lead to a renewal of substantive talks on terms of armistice in Korea this may provide us with an opportunity to start negotiations off on a somewhat different line. Specifically, we believe that it would be advantageous for UNC delegation to put forth in writing proposal that a demilitarized zone not less than four kilometers in width should be established, with the median line specified by you on an accompanying map. JCS feel that this median line should be established definitely by you to avoid quibbling over what is the line of contact since this shifts daily.

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[1] This message was based on a draft prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State, on September 20 (Black Book, Tab 65).

[2] Dated August 21, p. 845. For JCS 99477, see footnote 2, p. 846.

2. After discussion with State we feel there is genuine negotiating and propaganda advantage in introduction at first substantive mtg of a new proposal rather than return to reiteration of our previous position, which would in all probability merely provoke a reiteration of Communist position. These considerations are based upon experience with Communist negotiators in other conferences. There is generally apt to be a period of fluidity folg a Communist initiative such as in this case Kim Il Sung's ltr to you suggesting resumption.

3. Furthermore, experience has shown that oral proposals or explanations are not apt to influence the govt or govts directing Communist negotiators and that proposals in writing are the only sure way of getting clearly to source of decision what we have in mind. If rejected by Communist delegation, text of your written proposal could be made public and would be convincing evidence of reasonableness of our position in these negotiations as contrasted with Communist intransigence and bad faith.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 66 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 21 September 1951—4:47 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-51315. This msg in 5 parts.

Part 1. Letter from Generals Kim and Peng dated 19 Sept was transmitted in my C-51219 [1] and ZX 38349.[2]

Part 2. I am transmitting the following reply via liaison officers at Pan Mun Jom at 220900 and releasing it to the press simultaneously:

"Your msg of 19 Sept, received 20 Sept 1951, has been noted.

"I flatly reject your suggestion therein that there are instances of alleged violations of the Kaesong Neutral Zone which remain unsettled. Each of the several cases wherein you reported an alleged violation of the zone and requested an investigation was investigated fully at the time. Where UN forces were responsible, that fact was reported. Where UN forces were not involved you were so advised. All cases were settled definitely, and, so far as I am concerned, are closed.

"Again, I emphatically reject the baseless charge repeated in your letter that alleged violations of the Kaesong Zone by UNC forces made it impossible to continue the negotiations. The responsibility for the inexcusable interruption in the armistice conference is completely yours.

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[1] Not printed; it merely stated that the official version of the letter from the Communist side was essentially the same as the English broadcast transmitted in telegram ZX-38349. (Black Book, Tab 64)

[2] Dated September 20, p. 923.

"In your msg you have arbitrarily dismissed the need to discuss conditions incident to the resumption of negotiations, in spite of the obvious fact that the armistice discussions have been interrupted for prolonged periods because of incidents or alleged incidents. I have therefore given instructions to my liaison officers to insure that this vital subject receives careful attention in any future discussions with your liaison officers in order to minimize the likelihood of further interruptions.

"Since you are now ready to terminate the suspension of armistice talks which you declared on 23 August, my liaison officers will be at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom at 1000 on 24 Sept to meet your liaison officers and to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks."

Part 3. As authorized by JCS 80658 of 6 Sept,[3] I intend to use the initial meeting of liaison officers to explore more fully the possibility of securing enemy agreement on a new site. At the proposed meeting the liaison officers will observe the following guidance:

1. Inform Communists that CINCUNC's instructions to UNC liaison officers are to seek agreement on the optimum conditions favoring progress towards an armistice.
2. Using the theme of CINCUNC's msg of 6 Sept (my CX-50292),[4] particularly the last sentence thereof, expound the desirability of a change of site, pointing out that a change of site would relieve a situation in which diametrically opposed views of the commanders has resulted in a virtual impasse.
3. If the Communists refuse to agree to or to discuss new site, the liaison officers will seek additional guidance from CINCUNC before proceeding further.
4. Make no commitment, and imply none, either to return to the Kaesong area, or to refuse to return to that area.

Part 4. If the Communists refuse to agree to or to discuss a new site, I shall then, in accordance with second para of your 80658 of 6 Sept, request your further consideration of the request I made in my 50115,[5] namely, that I be authorized to categorically refuse any further negotiations within the Kaesong area.

Part 5. There is not the slightest change in the physical situation of the Kaesong Neutral Zone, nor in the reliability of the Communists who control it. Moreover, access to the zone can be had only by passage through enemy controlled territory and the safety of the

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[3] This message was transmitted on September 5, p. 882.
[4] Dated September 6, p. 884.
[5] Dated September 3, p. 875.

UNC delegation is a matter of continuing urgent concern to me. In the interests of seeking to avoid further delay in progress toward an armistice I feel an effort to find an agreeable meeting place less conducive to incidents is the minimum action indicated.

795.00/9-2151

Memorandum for the Files by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 21, 1951.

Following a series of telephone calls between Admiral Davis and Mr. Nitze, in one of which the Admiral reported that the JCS had agreed to our request to send a stopper to General Ridgway regarding C51315, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Bohlen and I were called over to the JCS at 5:45 this afternoon.[1] At that meeting we considered the attached draft message which had been prepared by Admiral Davis. We concurred in it for the Department and it was unanimously approved by the JCS. General Bradley expressed the view that it should be approved by the President and undertook to secure such clearance.[2]

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

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[1] The text of the "stopper" sent to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 82092, September 21, read as follows: "Reur C-51315. Withhold reply to Communists contemplated therein pending further instructions after high level consideration here, which is now taking place." (Black Book, Tab 67)

[2] The text of the attached draft message was identical to that of telegram JCS 82147, *infra*. No record has been found indicating whether or not General Bradley sought or received Presidential approval for telegram JCS 82147.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 69 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 21 September 1951.[1]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 82147. From JCS.

1. If practicable, mtg of Liaison Ofcrs should be sooner than 1000, 24 Sep as proposed in your C 51315.

2. Also, second and third paras your reply to Communist msg of 19 Sep should be omitted and words "arbitrarily" and "obvious" should be omitted from first and third lines of fourth para.

3. Foregoing is intended to avoid public implication or impression

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[1] The source text indicated that this telegram was transmitted at 6:39 p. m. (EDT).

that there is any intransigence on our side regarding resumption of negotiations.

4. While agreeing with part 3 as to initial approach by Liaison Ofcrs, we are still unwilling, for reasons given in JCS 80658, to agree to categorical refusal to negotiate further in Kaesong area.

5. Therefore, your position as to change of site should not be so pressed as to make it impracticable for you to shift to alternative such as mutual inspection of Kaesong neutralization.

795B.11/9–2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, September 21, 1951—6 p. m.

276. Mytel 270, September 21; rptd CINCFE.[1] I consider Rhee's blast September 20 as confirmation his recent public quiescence was superficial and reflected no change in his basic adamant dislike any cease-fire settlement. How he may give expression to this fundamental attitude is always unpredictable.

I have suggested that Korean alternate to UN del be ordered to Munsan-Ni as precaution against any last minute sabotage or at least as good method promptly ascertaining how far Rhee is prepared to go toward undermining resumption armistice discussions. I do not consider any direct query on my part as to his intentions wld produce any reliable clarification.

While Rhee move not surprising, I had no warning it was to be made yesterday, altho Gen Van Fleet and I spent most of yesterday afternoon with Rhee. Subj of armistice was not brought up. President was all peaches and cream and unusually fawning.

As a matter incidental interest, Rhee made peculiar statement to press day before (published yesterday's *Korea Times*) in which he announced all statements issued his name should be considered as expressing his private views only "and in no way backed by authority vested in his office". He said he made many statements for purpose public enlightenment and people who criticized them as trivial were old-fashioned with Monarchist ideas. This has little bearing on present statement which was issued thru official OPI but is indicative Rhee's attitude he can somehow avoid official responsibility for many his pronouncements.

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[1] The text of telegram 270 read as follows: "Following text statement by President Rhee released September 20:

" 'Kaesong is below the 38th parallel. Before beginning cease-fire talks no Communist army was in city. Communists used cease-fire talks as pretext and sneaked in. They should not be allowed to occupy it.

" 'Furthermore everyone realizes Communists have used cease-fire talks in attempt humiliate [and] discredit in eyes of Communist world. If talks resumed, there should be some definite safeguard. My government favors resumption of talks under following minimum conditions:

" '(1) Chinese shall be withdrawn from Korean territory;

" '(2) North Korean Communists shall be disarmed;

" '(3) North Koreans shall be granted full and equal representation in National Assembly through election observed by UN;

" '(4) UN Command should set time limit, say of 10 days, within which time Communists must agree to these terms, or talks should be terminated.' " (795.00/9–2151)

Sent Dept 276, rptd CINCFE Tokyo, for General Ridgway.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 72 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, 22 September 1951—12 : 13 p. m.

FLASH

C–51347. Ref your JCS 82147.[1]

1. In my detailed analysis of the Communist msg of 19th Sep it appears obvious that the Communists desired to establish certain principles and facts and to induce a reply which could be made to appear as agreement thereto by the UNC. The Communist msg contained the fol explicit and implied statements:

a. The UNC is guilty of violations of the Kaesong Neutral Zone Agreement prior to 10 Sep in the air and on the ground.

b. The above violations (by the UNC) made it impossible to cont the progress of the Kaesong negotiations.

c. The UNC is at last willing to assume a responsible attitude toward violations of the Kaesong Zone which attitude it had not assumed heretofore.

d. The UNC is responsible for the delay in the armistice talks.

e. Incidents occurring prior to 10 Sep must be settled in a responsible manner through an organization to be established for that purpose. (This refers to alleged violations rejected by the UNC which we consider closed issues.)

2. The foregoing is the prelude to the phrase: "If you agree" which precedes the Communist proposal for a meeting of liaison officers, and has major significance. Careful study of the Communist msg convinced me that merely to agree to a meeting of liaison officers would involve the UNC in tacit agreement with all points of the entire msg.

3. The meeting of liaison officers to set the "hour and date" of resumption of meetings was to be contingent upon my agreement with the Communist requirement, *inter alia*, that an appropriate organiza-

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[1] Dated September 21, p. 927.

tion review the "unsettled" incidents. The Communist msg implies that past incidents must remain a live issue until the UNC accepts responsibility for them. This would thus be a continuing source of vicious propaganda against us. Since all alleged incidents occur within en-held territory, he has the continuing opportunity to manufacture evidence, human and material. I consider it absolutely essential that the question of cont indefinitely the inves of these past incidents be turned down in most emphatic terms. My msg made it clear that I was not agreeing to any such review. In effect, my msg represents a counter-proposal which rejects the principle of review of incidents which I consider closed.

4. I earnestly recommend your reconsideration of the directive in para 2 of your 82147. In my opinion the omission of the second and third paras of my proposed msg will completely abrogate the position we have established and will assist the Communists in their efforts to maneuver the UNC into the position desired by them.

5. With reference to para 1 of your 82147. The date of 24 Sep was proposed as the earliest date by which, in my opinion, the Communist liaison officers could be instructed by their delegation in view of the fact that my msg was in effect a counter-proposal rather than an acceptance of their terms.

6. With reference to para 5 of your 82147. My representatives have been carefully instructed in this regard and the way will be kept open for any nec shifts to alternative measures.

7. Rqst your comment earliest.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 71

Memorandum for the Files by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1951.

At 7:45 this morning Colonel Addleman, duty officer in Admiral Davis' office, called me to say that there was a "hot" message in from General Ridgway and that he was sending a copy over for me by special messenger. Our watch officer called me about an hour later to say that the message had been received from the Pentagon. I asked him to inform both Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bohlen immediately by telephone its gist, and said that I would be right down to pick up the message. A few minutes later he called to inform me that General Bradley's office had called to say that he would be in touch with me shortly. The message in question is C51347.[1]

I called Colonel Addleman to see if we were to meet with the JCS and he told me that it was hoped that the matter would be handled telegraphically and that he understood the draft reply concerning which General Bolte would call me shortly agreed to the re-insertion by General Ridgway of the two deleted paragraphs.

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[1] *Supra;* because of the time difference, this message had arrived in Washington early on September 22.

Meanwhile, I had consulted with Mr. Nitze and Mr. Wainhouse and we were agreed that Ridgway had a valid point in his desire to keep the record straight in light of the implications of the Communist note. Accordingly, we were agreed that it was not only acceptable but probably desirable to retain paragraphs 2 and 3 provided that the purple adjectives which gave it a necessarily truculent tone were deleted.

Soon after 10:00 General Bolte called and read me the text of the proposed reply which had been approved by the JCS. The message in substance accepted General Ridgway's point of view and authorized him to retain in his message the substance of paragraphs 2 and 3 provided they were stated in dispassionate language for the reasons given in paragraph 3 of the JCS message sent out last night. General Bolte said that this was a reproof which General Ridgway would understand and that the Chiefs were satisfied that he would moderate the tone acceptably.

I approved the message for the Department. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Wainhouse concurred.

General Bolte said that accordingly this message would be submitted to Secretary Lovett [2] for his approval.[3]

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

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[2] Robert A. Lovett had succeeded, as Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall who resigned on September 12.

[3] The message was sent to Tokyo in telegram JCS 82202, September 22, which read as follows:

"From JCS, Secy sends.

"Reur C 51347. This msg in two parts.

"Part I. JCS concur that your answer to Communists should not imply agreement to the various points expressed and implied in Communist msg of 19 Sep. Accordingly, you are authorized to incorporate essence of second and third paras of your initial proposed answer (C 51315) dispassionately stated for the reason given in para 3 JCS 82147.

"Part II. Your proposal to meet on 24 Sep or as soon thereafter as practicable is acceptable." (Black Book, Tab 73)

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 75: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 23 September 1951—8:02 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-51409. Ref your JCS 82202. I am transmitting the following revised reply to Kim and Peng via Liaison Officers at Pan Mun Jom at 231000I and releasing it to the press simultaneously:

"Your msg of 19 Sep, received 20 Sep 1951, has been noted.

"Your suggestion therein that there are instances of alleged violations of the Kaesong Neutral Zone which remain unsettled is rejected. Each of the several cases wherein you reported an alleged violation was fully investigated. Where UNC Forces were responsible, that fact was reported. Where UNC Forces were not involved you were so advised and the cases closed. I have so instructed my representatives. I likewise reject the charges repeated in your letter that alleged violations of the Neutral Zone by UNC Force made it impossible to continue the negotiations. The responsibility for the unnecessary interruption in the armistice conference is yours.

"In your message you have dismissed the need to discuss conditions incident to the resumption of negotiations, in spite of the fact that the armistice discussions have been interrupted for prolonged periods because of incidents or alleged incidents. I have therefore given instructions to my Liaison Officers to insure that this vital subject receives careful attention in any future discussions with your Liaison Officers in order to minimize the likelihood of further interruptions.

"Since you are now ready to terminate the suspension of armistice talks which you declared on 23 Aug, my Liaison Officers will be at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom at 1000 hours on 24 Sept to meet your Liaison Officers and to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of armistice talks."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 76 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRIORITY TOKYO, 24 September 1951—10:01 a. m.

ZX-39138. Kim and Peng answer Ridgway. (Peiping radio, English, 0700, 24 Sept–RP).

Here is the full text of the reply from Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai to General Ridgway:

"Commander-in-Chief M. B. Ridgway of the United Nations forces:

"Your reply dated September 23 has been received. Although your message still refuses to acknowledge the various air and ground violations of the Kaesong neutrality agreement which were committed by the United Nations forces before September 10th and which made it impossible for the Kaesong armistice negotiations to proceed pretending that all the incidents had been fully investigated by your side, yet from our side there was every reason and right to go on demanding that your side deal responsibly with these incidents because we possess adequate evidence concerning them and your side has time and again refused to make reinvestigations.

"We have already instructed our delegates to put forward our demands for the appropriate machinery which should be set up by mutual agreement after the resumption of the Kaesong talks in order to deal with these unsettled incidents.

"It is generally known that what directly made it impossible for the Kaesong negotiations to continue was the provocative incident of August 22 and the series of similar incidents that followed all of which were created by your side. Naturally, therefore, your side has to bear the responsibility for it. Only since your side expressed regret for the September 10th incident, that is the latest Kaesong neutrality violation by the United Nations forces, and willingness to deal responsibly with the Kaesong neutrality agreement violations, we considered that the armistice negotiations should be resumed at Kaesong immediately and these unsettled incidents should not be allowed to go on impeding the progress of the negotiations between both sides.

"Our side has always requested that a strict agreement on the neutrality of the Kaesong area be worked out to avoid the future violations and to reduce or even eliminate any possibility of the negotiations being suspended in the future. But the working out of such specific and strict stipulations as will be agreeable to both sides at the same time must be done not by the liaison officers who have never had the power to do this but by the delegates of both sides in discussions.

"In order that the armistice negotiations may not be affected we proposed that appropriate machinery to deal with such matters be set up by discussion of both sides at the first meeting of the resumed Kaesong armistice negotiations. We hold that this is the most reasonable method.

"Therefore, we have ordered the liaison officer of our side to meet the liaison officer of your side at 10 A.M. on September 24 to discuss the date and time for resuming the negotiations in Kaesong.

"Signed: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army.

"Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

"September 24, 1951." [1]

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[1] General Ridgway in his telegram C-51459, September 24, reported that the official text of the Communist reply had been received and did not differ materially from the above message.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 80 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, 24 September 1951—6:09 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-51500. Urmsg JCS 82085.[1]

1. Concur in desirability of introducing a new UNC proposal in writing after resumption of mil armistice discussions.

2. On renewal of substantive talks UNC delegation intends to submit a specific proposal in writing, accompanied by a map, showing

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[1] Dated September 21, p. 924.

demilitarized zone approx 20 kilometers wide generally north of battle line. Demilitarized zone will be essentially a more exact specification of the informal proposal presented in the sub-committee prior to the 23 Aug recess.

3. Should the Communists retreat from their previous arbitrary psn on 38th parallel, the UNC delegation will be prepared to modify UNC psn above and to make concessions towards a psn more favorable to Communists. During all discussions UNC delegation will emphasize its willingness to discuss modifications providing Communists are willing to abandon their adamant stand that the 38th parallel is the only acceptable demarcation line.

4. Believe it important that initial psn taken by UNC delegation should be such that Communists will not interpret it as a weakening of our psn. If psns more favorable to Communists were initially offered, Communists would conclude that long recess engineered by them resulted directly in considerable reward to their side. They would be encouraged to instigate similar delays in future in expectation of obtaining similar results.

5. In addition UNC present bargaining psn should be considerably improved as a result of the more advantageous mil psn UNC now enjoys due to recent mil action.

6. Ref your para 3. Demilitarized zones discussed thus far by the UNC delegation have been negotiating psns and have not approached the final UNC psn. The initial proposal to the Communists when negotiations resume is not one which we should prematurely publish to the world but is one from which we can bargain with the Communists. When the Communists indicate that they are willing to drop their firm stand on the 38th parallel and begin to talk in terms of mil realities, the UNC delegation can withdraw as nec to other psns. Our minimum psn should only be given in final and unalterable "take it or leave it" terms unless Communists first give up 38th parallel. Otherwise Communists will consider it simply as major concession in process of negotiations.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 79 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET — TOKYO, 24 September 1951—6:55 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-51508. Ref part 3, my C-51315.[1]

1. UNC liaison offs met with Communist liaison group at Pan Mun

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[1] Dated September 21, p. 925.

Jom at 1000 I hours this date and after some discussion agreed to proceed to Kaesong to talk rather than to establish facilities locally.

2. UNC liaison off presented memorandum to Col Chang, Communist liaison off, proposing change of site. Chang disowned authority to discuss other than time and date as to when the delegations would reconvene at Kaesong. Our representative pointed out that UNC liaison offs were authorized to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for resumption of negotiations including time and date, and informed the Communist liaison off that he would return to Kaesong at 1000 hours 25 Sep to receive the Communist answer on the proposal to change the site for future conferences.

895B.10/9-2551

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 25, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of Defense has noted the decision contained in your letter of 8 September 1951 to release to the Government of the Republic of Korea the funds now held in a suspense account in the Treasury Department which have been accumulated from sales of Korean currency to United States troops for their personal expenditures.

Because of the Department of Defense interest in the conditions of the release and the administration of the funds, since this matter could influence other financial and economic developments that might affect the discharging of the Department of Defense responsibility for short-term relief and rehabilitation and the conduct of military operations in Korea, we believe that it would be highly desirable that the conditions of the release and the manner of the administration of the funds should be worked out jointly by the staffs of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Treasury Department.

In this connection, although the Department of Defense wished to have this matter deferred until a later date, representatives of the Department of Defense will be available whenever the Department of State desires.

It should be pointed out that the proposed release of these funds differs from the general practice and experience of the United States in such matters, and is not altogether consistent with previous actions which have been taken in other allied or liberated countries. Previous settlements have not distinguished between the use of currencies by individual members of the U.S. armed forces and currencies used for official purposes. Therefore, it would appear to be desirable to inform appropriate Congressional authorities of the release of the Korean suspense account.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of Defense:
K. R. KREPS
Colonel, USAF, Deputy Director
Executive Office of the Secretary

Editorial Note

On September 25, the Secretaries of State and Defense submitted to the National Security Council a "Progress Report on the Implementation of United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia (NSC 48/5)." Excerpts from NSC 48/5, approved May 17, are printed on page 439. Part IV of the Progress Report dealt with Korea and consisted mainly of a review of developments over the preceding four month period, with particular emphasis on the course of the armistice negotiations. The report stated that both sides in Korea had taken advantage of the relative lull in hostilities to build up their forces and pointed to a considerable increment in Communist strength in troops, planes, and matériel, providing the capability for a large-scale, sustained offensive at any time. The United Nations Command, hampered by a lack of additional troop contributions, nevertheless occupied "the strongest possible defensive zone across Korea near the 38th parallel." (S/S Files: Lot 63D251, Box 4207)

For excerpts from the Progress Report, see page 2024. For the complete text, see volume VI, Part 1, page 80.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 82 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 25 September 1951—5:01 p. m.[1]

C-51545. In last 24 hours 2 developments in armistice discussions may be of great significance.

First, Communist liaison officers, Colonel Chang spokesman, in meeting with our liaison officers, Colonel Kinney spokesman, on 24 and again 25 Sep, have been adamant in refusing to discuss anything but time and date of next full delegation meeting in Kaesong, which they state must occur "immediately".

Second, Kinney reports they "appear extremely anxious to get the delegations together" and are acting "far more hurriedly than we have seen them act previously".

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[1] Due to the time difference between Washington and Tokyo, this message was received early on September 25.

At liaison meeting today which began at 1000I time, Chang put into the record his refusal to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for resumption of armistice talks. When Kinney proposed recess to permit liaison officers to obtain further guidance, Chang countered with proposed "meeting of delegations" at 261000I Sep. When Kinney replied that his instructions were "to discuss conditions for resumption of talks" Kinney reports that "Chang angrily recessed meeting unilaterally and stalked from the room", his precipitate departure affording our liaison officers no opportunity to arrange for next meeting.[2]

Evaluation is proceeding here. Determination of underlying reasons for such nervous, insistent and precipitate action on the part of the Communist liaison officers, quite at variance with their former conduct, might well offer us great advantages. One hypothesis, supported by some indications here, would be that his general military position in Korea is deteriorating by reason of our combined operations and that approaching winter will accelerate that deterioration. Another hypothesis could be that Peiping or Moscow, for reasons of their own, have ordered Kim and Peng to proceed with the discussions without further delay. Would appreciate soonest any evaluation State or Defense cares to make.

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[2] Later on September 25, General Ridgway reported in his telegram C-51563 that Colonel Kinney had addressed the following message to Colonel Chang:

"Despite your unilateral action in recessing the meeting today and your abrupt departure therefrom, I am prepared to meet with you tomorrow 26 September 1951 at 1000 to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for resumption of the armistice talks." (Black Book, Tab 85)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 84 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, 25 September 1951—8:11 p. m.

C–51575. Mymsg C–51545.

1. In my 3 official broadcasts to Kim and Peng of 6 Sept (my C–50292), 17 Sept (my CX 50998 to CINCUNC Adv, info to you), and 23 Sept (my C–51409), all made with your prior approval, I laid down 1 simple condition to a resumption of meetings, namely "to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks."

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra*.

2. At 25 Sept meeting of liaison officers, the Communists continued their refusal to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of armistice talks.

3. The Communists are thus adhering to their settled practice of dodging and evading UNC positions, sometimes adroitly, sometimes bluntly, always ceaselessly.

4. It seems clear that their purpose now is to force the UNC delegation to hold at least 1 more meeting at Kaesong. Once that occurs, all arguments, either for a new conference site, or for changed conditions at Kaesong, will lose force, and from a public opinion standpoint, will be difficult to maintain. It should be clear to both the US public and our allies that to date the unsuitable conditions at Kaesong have furnished the Communists with the means of suspending the conference talks, and a tremendously valuable propaganda platform. Continuation of those conditions would be indicative of a lack of both strength and wisdom. To go back to Kaesong either temporarily or permanently would be complete surrender to Communist aims and tactics.

5. In recent weeks I have received the unsolicited private opinions of several influential Japanese that the only way to handle the Communists is to continue to take the strong positions we have taken with them thus far. This point of view, from people who understand the Chinese and who are obviously interested in our success, lends support to the view that we should neither soften nor hasten our approach.

6. As previously stated, I shall have grave concern for the safety of our delegation while in, and enroute to and from Kaesong, if the talks are resumed there. I place no trust in Communist guarantees of safety, for if it should ever serve their purposes, they would not hesitate to stage an alleged partisan attack, disavowing all responsibility.

7. Furthermore, the ceaseless flow of protests and propaganda from the Communists about alleged UNC violations of the Kaesong area would keep the UNC always in the role of a defendant. This situation could be largely avoided in a new and properly selected site. There is no possible way now to make Kaesong a satisfactory site for further meetings of the delegations. Only complete abandonment of the old area will permit a fresh start. If done, I believe time will ultimately be saved. I further believe that, if the Communists intend to conclude an armistice, they will ultimately agree to our insistance on a new site.

8. It is my view that the UNC delegation should agree to a resumption of the armistice conferences only under conditions fully acceptable to us. It is my estimate that Communists now find themselves confronted with 2 significant factors: An unfavorable military situation and approaching winter. Time works to their disadvantage. An early

armistice is for the Communists a matter of urgency. For our part agreement on the Kaesong issue would constitute a deplorable abandonment of all we have so far achieved; would surrender the initiative; and subject us to further outrageous demands and the ridicule of US and world opinion.

9. *a.* My views expressed in my C–50115 [2] remain unaltered.

b. I therefore strongly recommend that I be authorized soonest to refuse categorically, at a time of my choosing, to send my delegation back to Kaesong and to then insist upon a new and satisfactory conference site within which security for both sides can be assured beyond any reasonable doubt.

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[2] Dated September 3, p. 875.

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1951—4 p. m.

Present:

General Bradley
General Collins
General Vandenberg
Admiral Fechteler
Admiral Davis
Admiral Lalor
Colonel Carns
General Bolte

Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Ferguson

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have been discussing the general principle of whether General Ridgway ever goes back to Kaesong or whether he will go back if he gets satisfactory conditions. We have also been discussing the idea of his putting forth his old proposal rather than a new one. Those are the things involved in his message.[2] There is a fourth point—with respect to an evaluation of the situation, and I don't know whether we have anyone who can give him an evaluation of the attitude of the Communists toward an armistice. We feel that General Ridgway should not be made to go back to Kaesong unless he is satisfied with the conditions. You felt before that you would hate to see the negotiations fall down just because we would not go back to Kaesong.

MR. BOHLEN: The liaison officers have already gone to Kaesong and I am not clear just what guarantees General Ridgway wants.

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[1] The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants.

[2] *Supra.*

General Vandenberg: His statement is that there are no guarantees that would work. Kaesong is a place where propaganda can continue to be made against us. He sees no way that guarantees can be enforced because of irregulars who could come in and raise hell.

General Bradley: In our message the other day we said that we recognized the inadvisability of Kaesong.[3]

Mr. Nitze: Has he made any suggestion as to an alternate site?

General Vandenberg: He suggested a Swedish (Danish ?) hospital ship once before.

Mr. Nitze: On that ship we would be in charge of communications.

General Collins: The ship is gone and won't be back for a month, so that is out.

Mr. Bohlen: I doubt if you would get them on any U.N. ship because they want their own communications.

General Collins: On the Imjin River you could put tents on both sides and each set up his own communications. The River is the front line. Possibly you could anchor a raft in the middle of the River or we could go to their side for discussion.

General Bradley referred to a General Ridgway message asking authority to insist on a new site. He then read our reply, which had gone out several days ago.[3]

General Bradley: One draft we had prepared here was to the effect that General Ridgway was authorized to inform the Communists that he would discuss conditions with the liaison officers.

Mr. Bohlen: Any site is going to have many of the same problems. Our thinking is along the line that the talks were broken off not so much because of the incidents but because the Communists have cooked up the incidents to embarrass the U.N. Command.

General Bradley: There has been no incident in which our people have been endangered, but General Ridgway now fears they will cook up something that will endanger our people. I agree with General Ridgway that with all that has gone on since August 23, they might try to harm our people.

Mr. Merchant: Won't their high rank be a protection?

General Bradley: If we were on opposite sides of the river we would be in range to wipe them out if they tried anything.

Mr. Bohlen: We think they have shown a desire to have a meeting because they have something they want to say to Admiral Joy. We thought the proposal for a battle line as the median line would be a good proposal and if they are willing to get off the 38th parallel point, we will know it promptly. A new proposal given in writing, which they can forward to their principals, will give you the best answer to the question. I understand the liaison officers have not found anything different in the neutral zone since the talks were broken off. Raising great difficulties about the site, I think, would affect almost every point.

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[3] See telegram JCS 82147, September 21, p. 927.

Mr. Nitze: The idea of isolating the questions into four points, as General Bradley did at the beginning of the meeting, is a good one. The question of the site and whether Admiral Joy goes to Kaesong is most difficult.

General Bradley: At least some of us here think that General Ridgway should come up with a new proposal on the line, but the site business has us worried.

Mr. Nitze: If you once go to Kaesong, it will be difficult to get it changed. If you once go, that is where the site is going to be.

General Collins: I wonder if the principals could meet on the River. If you could get the principals together, maybe you would get something. General Ridgway could suggest that pending clarification of the neutrality of the site the principals meet at Panmunjom.

Mr. Merchant: Is the bridge at the periphery of the neutral zone?

General Collins: Yes.

Mr. Bohlen: Would the bridge be in the line of flight of our aircraft?

General Collins: It could be avoided. It is much easier than avoiding a distance on either side of the road.

Mr. Nitze: I should think there would be less chance of air violation at a point so much nearer our line.

Mr. Rusk: My reactions are along the lines of General Collins. Should we have a discussion with General Ridgway about the conditions we would think satisfactory at any site? The main delegations could meet at the river and take up the question of arrangements.

General Bradley: I wonder if you will need any arrangement at the river.

Mr. Bohlen: You could do the two things simultaneously. You could have the liaison officers discuss the site and the principals could meet on substantive matters.

Mr. Nitze: It puts us in a much better propaganda position if we could suggest that the principals meet at Panmunjom.

General Collins: What might be done to get a more intimate idea of this matter is to set up a telecon with General Ridgway. We have been sending messages back and forth and no one quite understands the other.

General Vandenberg: We could have a telecon and after it ended get a directive and clear it.

General Collins: We can set up a telecon within an hour or two. If we ask for a telecon, General Ridgway will hold up everything. If we set one up for seven o'clock this evening, we would have time to get up draft questions and I think it would be profitable.[4] If we possibly can get the principals to meet, that would be the important thing.

Mr. Bohlen: That is what we are interested in. If they have a chance to get back on the 38th parallel in the discussion, we won't be able to put the thing in. Their reaction to our proposal will give us the best answer as to their intentions.

General Bradley: There is a great advantage in getting a proposal that narrows the issue and does not take territory away from the enemy. I think we should set up a telecon at seven o'clock.

General Vandenberg: Let us discuss our views here and then have only one or two from each side at the telecon.

General Bradley: Yes.

General Vandenberg: I think Bolte and Collins can do this if we discuss it here in advance.

General Collins: That is right, we can't make a decision until afterwards anyway.

General Bradley: We will set it up at seven.

Mr. Bohlen then circulated the State Department's proposed message to General Ridgway. (Attached)

General Bradley: With respect to the part of this draft that relates to Kaesong, I still have a question. I think the last part is a good idea.

General Vandenberg: Joe,[5] my view is that General Ridgway has good substantive reasons for objecting to Kaesong and we should respect them, but I agree with the rest of this State Department's message on the subject of new proposals.

Mr. Rusk: Is not our new front line a little better for us than it was a month ago?

General Collins: Yes.

Mr. Bohlen: I think any pull back must be reciprocal.

General Vandenberg: Yes, their face would be saved and we would have our own defenses.

Mr. Rusk: We recognized some months ago that a 20-mile zone was only a bargaining point.

Mr. Nitze: On the question of evaluation, which General Ridgway asked for, I have been in doubt what the real military situation was. Has the Communist position deteriorated? The number of MIGs has gone up, the truck citings [*sightings*] are high, and their casualties are up. These are all elements.

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[4] See *infra*.

[5] Reference is to General Collins.

General Bradley: It is a pretty hard one to evaluate. When you weigh everything, I don't know whether they are worse off, but they probably are because of what we can do in the air. They can't stay in any buildings and that will be important this winter.

Mr. Bohlen: On the second point, I think there is quite a lot in the idea that they think it is time to take a crack at a settlement. There is a good chance they want an armistice, and they know we are not going to take the 38th parallel.

General Vandenberg: I think the winter is worrying them. We don't look forward to it and we are 200% better off than they are.

Mr. Nitze: We heard one estimate that by April the Communists might be able to control the air over Korea.

General Vandenberg: By next spring we will be in better shape. I don't think they will be able to, although they might be temporarily.

Mr. Nitze: Our Intelligence people say they have been building up MIGs at the rate of 100 a month in Korea and a good number in Germany. Our production is only 31 a month.

General Vandenberg: Thirty-one? In July our production was eleven and it was about the same in August and September. We won't really get rolling until next fall.

General Bradley: Is there anything we can do with the armament to shoot more down?

General Vandenberg: What do you want from airplanes? We are shooting them down ten at a time and losing none of ours now.

General Bradley: Can't we get fifty?

Mr. Bohlen: What about the situation next April?

General Vandenberg: The production curve will begin to go up. They might get control temporarily but our strength will tend to go up. If they continue their buildup they will outnumber us by November.

General Bradley: Could we go back to the question of the telecon and help Joe by writing down some points.

General Collins: I am trying to block out an opening gambit.

General Collins then read a draft in which he stated that State Department and JCS felt that a meeting of the principal negotiators should be arranged as soon as possible. That the meeting of liaison officers was not likely to result in substantive decisions. He proposed that the principals meet at the bridge in Panmunjom and Admiral Joy could then make a proposal for a new line. He further stated that if the Communists counter with the 38th parallel we would know that further negotiations were impossible; if they were willing to discuss our proposal, then we could go ahead and discuss where the meetings could be held and under what conditions.

General Vandenberg: Should we try to get the Communists' views first?

Mr. Bohlen: I think we should make our proposal first and get the discussion on that. If they are not willing to talk about our approach, we would be before the world in a good position.

General Collins: Yes, if they won't talk about our proposal we could publish the proposal and stand before the world.

General Bradley: I was writing down some points:

1. Important principals meet as soon as possible.
2. It is better not to meet at Kaesong.
3. We share General Ridgway's fear for his negotiators unless he secures satisfactory conditions.
4. We might suggest the site used by the liaison officer.
5. Attach great importance to the initial substantive proposal in the first meeting, and we could use the State Department draft for this part of our message.
6. We could then use the rest of the State Department paper explaining why we attach such importance to this.

Mr. Nitze: The first thing we might want to get would be General Ridgway's ideas for an alternative site and arrangements.

General Collins: I think that would develop in the telecon.

General Bradley: There is a slight danger that we might end up in argument about the site. If Kaesong is out then we are in for a wrangle on the site because the other people won't have instructions on anything but Kaesong.

Mr. Nitze: The worry about the safety of the principal negotiators is not, I feel, a good public relations position, because we are losing a good many men every day in Korea.

General Bradley: That is a good point. If we have hundred of casualties because a few fellows with stripes don't want to go and talk it is not good public relations.

Admiral Fechteler: I would think the last thing the Commies would want to do would be to harm our negotiators.

Mr. Nitze: The renewal of incidents as a way of fuzzing up discussion on inspection or some other point worries me more than the safety of the negotiators.

Mr. Bohlen: If they start an incident thing again, you may be fairly sure that they are not too serious about negotiations.

The meeting then broke up and Generals Collins and Bolte and Messrs. Nitze, Bohlen and Merchant remained to draft telecon material.

[Attachment]

Draft Message for General Ridgway, Prepared in the Department of State

The Department of State suggests that a message be sent General Ridgway along following lines in reply to his C51500 and his C51575:

For reasons given in JCS 80658 and reaffirmed in JCS 82147 [6] we remain unwilling to risk definitive breakdown armistice talks by categorical refusal to negotiate further in Kaesong. Accordingly, authority requested in para 9b ur C51575 cannot be granted under present circumstances. It is desired that early meeting of full delegations be arranged in order to ascertain if in fact attitude of Communist liaison officers described in your C51545 falls within two hypotheses tentatively suggested by you and does in fact reflect anxiety on part Soviet or Chinese Communist governments, or both, to obtain armistice, provided their minimum terms, as yet undisclosed, can be secured. You should therefore through your liaison officers resume effort agree on time for such meeting in Kaesong.

On assumption that such arrangements can be promptly concluded, first order of business would be agreement on mutually acceptable arrangements for conduct of negotiations, including further exploration of possible change in site. It is suggested this might be handled through subcommittee in order to proceed promptly to substance.

It is believed here that great importance attaches to initial substantive position adopted by UNC delegation.

In determining initial position and any subsequent action, it is believed here that effect on following four points must be borne in mind:

(1) Our own negotiating position.
(2) Communist estimate of our position and intentions.
(3) World opinion from propaganda point of view and importance of maintaining U.S. domestic support.
(4) Attainment of our objective, which is to secure an armistice, provided our minimum terms can be secured.

It is believed here that to adopt as initial position submission specific proposal in writing described in para 2 your C51500 would constitute in effect reversion to original UNC negotiating position of last July and retrogression from position established in sub-delegation meeting August 22. Many advantages would accrue to picking up at point where talks broke down August 23.

As stated in JCS 82085,[7] Communist negotiating position may be fluid for brief period following reopening negotiations. All of foregoing argues for taking advantage of position apparently established in sub-delegation meeting August 22.

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[6] Dated September 2 and September 21, pp. 882 and 927, respectively.

[7] Dated September 21, p. 924.

Following statement regarding our disappointment that so much time has been lost, for reasons for which they must bear responsibility, UNC delegate should remind Communists that at last meeting of sub-delegations on August 22 Communists had stated that so long as we adhered to our previously stated position no progress could be made and that we had replied that so long as they adhered to unrealistic 38th parallel as line of demarcation no progress could be made. At that point in discussion of sub-delegations there arose question of line of contact and its relation to line of demarcation and demilitarized zone. Principle was agreed that relation existed and that adjustments could be made to the line of contact by advances and withdrawals by both sides in such a way as to fix a military demarcation line. At this point the talks were broken off. Restatement of this agreed principle appears proper point at which they should be resumed. Accordingly, following statement along lines foregoing, UNC delegate should submit a map reflecting proposal along lines described in para 1 of JCS 82085. For reasons given in JCS 82085 this map should be accompanied by brief written statement referring to principle agreed on August 22 and describing proposal.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 87

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 25 September 1951—7 p. m. (EDT)

Nr. DA TT-5193

Subject: Truce Negotiations.

Conferees:

Washington:

Gen J L Collins JCS
Gen C L Bolte CSA
Mr L Merchant State
Mr C E Bohlen State
Mr P H Nitze State
Lt Col J B Matthews G3

Tokyo:

Gen M B Ridgway CinC
Lt Gen D O Hickey CofS
VAdm C T Joy COMNAVFE
Maj Gen L C Craigie Dep CGFEAF
RAdm L[*A*]A Burke NAVFE
Brig Gen E F Hammond SigO
Capt (USN) H M Briggs ACOFS NAVFE
Col D T Galloway JSPOG
Col G W Hickman Jr JA
Col F W Moorman SGS
Brig Gen E K Wright G3

Washington
DA-1

Top Secret

To Gen Ridgway from Gen Collins:

Re your C 51575 and C 51500 State & JCS feel that every effort should be made to arrange a meeting of principal negotiators as soon as possible in order that the real intentions of the Communists may be revealed. We fear that present discussion, limited to Liaison Officers, is not likely to lead to any such indications or in fact to any further meeting of principals. We therefore suggest that you give consideration to proposing an extraordinary meeting of principal negotiators at a bridge over the Imjin River or other suitable place in vicinity of front lines.

It is believed here that great importance would attach to initial position adopted by UNC Delegation at such a meeting. We feel that it would be inadvisable to resume negotiations as to a demilitarized zone on old bargaining position as indicated in your C 51500. To do so would constitute in effect reversion to original UNC negotiating position of last July and retrogression from position established in subdelegation meeting August 22. Many advantages would accrue to picking up at point where talks broke down August 23. However in order to avoid prolonged discussions as to factors involved in establishing a demilitarized zone we feel that Adm. Joy should at once make a proposal in writing and on a map as indicated in Par 1, JCS 82085.[1] If the Communists do not arbitrarily reject our proposal but indicate they need time for consultation, the principals might then proceed to discuss site for next meeting.

(End DA-1).

Tokyo

FEC-1 TT 5193 26 Sep 51.

Confidential.

To JCS from CINCUNC.

1. The following message was delivered to UNC Liaison Officer by Communist Liaison Officer at Pan Mun Jom at 0700I this date:

"Colonel Kinney,

"Senior Liaison Officer,

"United Nations Command Delegation.

"Your message received at 6:30 P M September 25 is noted.

"Under instructions from our Senior Delegate, I proposed to your side, at the Liaison Officers' meeting on September 25, that the Armistice Conference be resumed at 10:00 AM September 26. The Delegation of our side is prepared to meet with the Delegation of your side in the Kaesong Conference Room at 10:00 AM September 26. I am waiting for an answer to this proposal from your side.

---

[1] Dated September 21, p. 924.

"As you are aware, my commanders have proposed to your Commander-in-Chief that Delegations of both sides should resume negotiations in Kaesong immediately without the need to discuss conditions for resuming the Armistice Negotiations. I am only authorized to consult with you about the date and time for resuming the Armistice Conference. Should your side be averse to resuming the Armistice Conference at 10 : 00 AM September 26, it is requested that you inform me to that effect specifically, and I shall be prepared to continue to consult with you at 9:00 AM September 26, about the date and time for resuming the Armistice Conference.

"Chang Chun San Senior Liaison Officer, Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers."

2. UNC Liaison Officer is replying to the above message as follows:

"I shall meet you at 1000 hours today in accordance with my message to you last night".

3. See my msg C-51563.[2]

(End FEC-1).

Tokyo.

FEC-3 TT 5193 26 Sept. 51.

Confidential

Ref para 2 FEC-1.

Upon receipt of notification that UNC Liaison Officers were coming to Kaesong at 1000 hours today Colonel Chang replied by radiotelephone as follows:

"Since you did not come at 0900 AM I am prepared to meet with you at 1000 AM today to discuss date and time for resumption of Armistice Negotiations by the Delegates of both sides at Kaesong".

(End FEC-3).

Washington

DA-2

Top Secret

From Gen Collins to Gen Ridgway.

Purpose of this telecon not to reach decisions reference resumption of negotiations but to exchange ideas that may serve as basis for later decisions and instructions. When you have had time to consider material in DA-1 we would like your views.

(End DA-2).

FEC-2 TT 5193 26 Sep 51.

Top Secret

Official.

1. Appreciate this opportunity for exchanging views which at this time is highly important.

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[2] See footnote 2, p. 937.

2. The subject of first priority is an acceptable arrangement for the meeting of the principal delegates. This must be accomplished before serious consideration of UNC position on item 2, Agenda, is pertinent.

3. I consider that the maximum concession that can be made toward effecting a meeting of the principal delegates is to propose a meeting of the delegates at some place between the battle lines (under no circumstances at Kaesong) for the specific and single purpose of discussing conditions mutually satisfactory for resumption of the Armistice talks.

4. Believe our 51500 failed to make clear that it was our intention in our first substantive meeting to present to Communists on a map a proposal which embodied those aspects most favorable to the Communists as presented in the sub-committee meeting of August 22nd.

5. This actually complies with a request made by Commies at subcommittee meeting at which they expressed confusion at the many alternative adjustments informally discussed by UNC sub-committee. It would in our opinion pick up discussion at point where talks broke down on 22 August.

6. To do otherwise would indicate to Communists that they gained great advantages by long recess they initiated.

7. Following seem to be determining factors in reaching decision on your proposal that at next succeeding meeting of the principals we furnish map depicting the demilitarized zone four kilometers in width with its median line as the present line of contact, and propose this as the solution.

First, to comply with your instructions that we must avoid agreement on any zone which endangers our retention of the Kansas line the four kilometer zone described above would be our absolute minimum position.

Second, since it would be the minimum position, it must be made clear to the Communists at or about the time this proposal is made, that it is a "take it or leave it" proposal. In other words, it will be an ultimatum on which we must be prepared to break.

(End FEC-2)

DA-3

Top Secret

Par 7 of FEC-2 indicates that you consider present front line with slight variations, the minimum position in advance of Kansas that will insure security of Kansas. This is contrary to impression we obtained from your C 69346 of 21 Aug. In JCS 82085 we left to your discretion the selection of the median line. We thought that even if you designated the present front you would still have several positions back of the present front, except along the Imjin River, which could provide adequate security for Kansas.

Will you please clarify this point?

(End DA-3)

Washington
DA-4
Top Secret

What site do you have in mind as alternative to Kaesong?

(End DA-4)

Washington
DA-5
Top Secret

What conditions do you propose to insure neutrality of site and avoid recurrence of trumped-up charges of violations?

(End DA-5)

Washington
DA-6
Top Secret

We feel that single issue of our refusal to return to Kaesong area would be disadvantageous to us as definitive breaking point of armistice negotiations. We cannot tell whether or not Communists would in fact break on this point but we do not believe we should continue to insist on change of site as precondition for meeting of principal delegates to point where risk seems great that the Communists will break.

We share your concern for safety of UNC delegation but we must consider problem of insuring that world and US opinion accept as fact that Communists bear full responsibility for the final break if it comes. Some risk to UNC delegation necessarily present unless site is within UN lines which Communists would be most unlikely to accept. Moreover break of 23 August came on Communist charge of incident they fabricated and not because of threat to UNC personnel. Fact that UNC liaison officers have just met in Kaesong without any apparent lack of security also would be element in problem of presenting to public a new break based on our fears of danger to negotiators.

Accordingly we emphasize importance of full delegations meeting promptly under minimum safety conditions acceptable to you in order to get into hands of Communists in writing modified position on line of demarcation as indicated in par 1, JCS 82085.

(End DA-6)

Washington
DA-7
Top Secret

One factor in our respective attitudes on negotiating tactics at this time is estimate of Communist attitude to armistice. We take it that you are satisfied that "an early armistice is for the Communists a matter of urgency." We here are still in doubt as to degree to which in fact Communists desire or feel need for armistice. Hence we think it important to ascertain their intentions by move on our part as suggested in DA-1.

(End DA-7)

Washington
DA-8
Top Secret

Because of transmission difficulties and your probable need for further time to consider points raised in DA-1 2-3-4-5-6 and 7 we are now terminating this telcon. You can cable your views in time for our consideration Wednesday Washington time.[3]

Again we wish to make clear that purpose of this telecon was to exchange ideas and not to reach definite decisions. We will furnish reply to your C 51575 after consultations with JCS, Sec Def & State tomorrow.

(End DA-8)

Tokyo
FEC-4 TT 5193 26 Sept 51.
Will comply with your instructions.
(End FEC-4).

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[3] September 26.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book. Tab 94 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRIORITY TOKYO, 26 September 1951—4:41 p. m.

ZX-39742. Fol rel to press simultaneously Tokyo and CINCUNC Adv 1700 local this date: The United Nations Command liaison officers met with the Communist liaison officers at Kaesong at 1000 hours today. The Communist liaison officers proposed a meeting of the delegates at 1000 hours 27 Sep, which proposal was answered by the United Nations Command liaison officers that their instructions were to meet with Communist liaison officers to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory prior to the resumption of conference discussions by the delegations.

The meeting of the liaison officers was recessed by mutual agreement at 1120 hours.

795.00/9–2651 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, 26 September 1951—7:41 p. m.[1]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–51655. Ref telecon DA TT 5193. This msg in 4 parts.

Part 1.

Conference site.

1. My feeling is that meeting place of delegations should be between the forward elements of both sides at a point not dominated by either side. Ref DA 4, I intend to propose as an alternate site to Kaesong a location along line of contact in vicinity Songhyon-Ni BT 9701. This meeting place would minimize the difficulties which both sides have experienced at Kaesong.

2. Ref DA 5, following conditions will be specified:

A. Definition of a circular conference area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered on a selected point near Songhyon-Ni BT 9701. No armed personnel to be permitted in conference area from 0800 to 1800.

B. Both sides to refrain from acts of armed force during period of negotiations:

(1) Within the conference area from 0800 to 1800 daily.

(2) Along selected routes of approach to the conference area from Kaesong and from Munsan-Ni daily from 0800 to 1800.

C. Free access for both delegations and their parties to the conference area and free movement within the conference area from 0800 to 1800.

D. Patrols from each side, manned and armed as mutually agreed, to patrol along the other boundary of the conference area from 0800 to 1800. Area of patrol responsibility to be established by mutual agreement.

Part 2.

(A) Demilitarized zone.

1. I consider it implicit in exchange of views with you to date

(*a*) That any armistice finally concluded must leave us in secure possession of the Kansas Line;

(*b*) That we must retain in advance of the Kansas Line a security zone of adequate depth; and

(*c*) That finally the present line of contact, if adopted as the median line of the 4 kilometer demilitarized zone, would provide this essential security zone and, except in the center of our present front, no more. It is my understanding that the foregoing statement, as our final minimum position, has your full support.

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[1] Due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this message was received early on September 26.

2. In the center of our present position we could withdraw somewhat to the south of the line of contact without essential encroachment of the minimum necessary security zone protecting the Kansas Line.

3. Such withdrawal, however, from this terrain, which was captured at considerable cost, would only be contemplated as part of an exchange by which the UNC would acquire control of a portion of the Yonan Peninsula. A withdrawal without compensation would represent a unilateral withdrawal on our part and hence an undue surrender to Communist pressure; and, not the least important, would abandon key terrain in the Chorwon Kumhwa area which controls the so-called "Iron Triangle".

4. For the foregoing reasons, the 4 kilometer demilitarized zone based on present line of contact as the median line should be accepted as our minimum position.

5. At initial meeting of delegations on substantive matters it is proposed to present to Communists in writing and on a map the zone which was discussed with the Communist Delegates in the subcommittee meetings. At these meetings the southern boundary of a 20 kilometer zone was roughly sketched on a map by Maj Gen Hodes as possibility for discussion. This line represented concession on our part with respect to the zone formally presented by our delegation on a map at the 13 Aug plenary session. The effect of this would be to take up discussion of zone in plenary session where it ended in last subcommittee meeting. The southern boundary of this zone, subject to minor modification is as follows: AMS L 552 scale 1:250,000. From left to right YB 6391, north to YC 6102, northeast to BM 355 at CT 1719 northeast to ferry site at CT 2223, northeast to CT 4333, east to CT 6040 east to CT 7440, southeast to BM 1073 at CT 7838, northeast to CT 9742, east to Mun Dung-Ni at DT 1142 northeast to Ousil at DT 2551, northeast to DT 3362 to coast at DT 4670.

(B) Salient factors for considerations.

1. It is my view that any concession made to the Communists upon resumption of substantive discussions will be equivalent to making the first of a series of blackmail payments. While it may be trite, it is nevertheless true that blackmail never ends with the first payment. Certainly it is true in Communist dealings.

2. As stated in DA 6 it is possible that Communists may break negotiations completely if UNC Delegation does not return to Kaesong, but it is a risk I consider we should take. We must not let

the Communists dictate all important moves. If they want an armistice, and there are strong indications that they do, they will agree to a new site. If they are indifferent about concluding an armistice, UNC Delegation will be forced to concede on most points of difference. The UNC tactical position is too strong for us to appease.

3. I still hold to my previously indicated view that, in the light of both the present tactical situation and the approach of winter, time is working for us and against the Communists. Yet, we cannot in my judgment afford to overlook the fact that time is traditionally less important to the Communists than to us.

4. It is distinctly possible, therefore, that the Communists may reason as follows: "If a 5 week layoff nets us an appreciable concession which we were unable to achieve in several weeks of negotiating, why should we not gain our next objective by staging another suspension as soon as negotiations again get sticky?"

Part 3.

1. Recommended course of action:

a. State to Communists through liaison officers that our delegation will be at BT 9701 (Songhyon-Ni) at 1000I at ["] earliest possible time." (*Note:* Query confirms that "time" refers to date.)

b. If Communists meet at Songhyon-Ni, the UNC Delegation will attempt to limit discussion to conditions for resumption of conference and substantive items of agenda and definitely refuse to discuss past incidents.

c. If Communists insist upon discussing past incidents, UNC Delegation will nevertheless read paper and present map giving position of demilitarized zone outlined in part 2 para 5.

d. If Communist Delegation refuses to meet at Songhyon-Ni, abrogate the Kaesong neutral zone (see my CX[*C*] 50633)[2] unless you have directed otherwise.

2. If these recommended courses of action are approved, I intend to send the following dispatch to the Communists: "Since you have not seen fit to give your liaison officers sufficient authority to permit satisfactory conditions to be arranged for the resumption of armistice talks, I submit the following proposal directly to you. I believe this proposal provides for arrangements that can be mutually satisfactory to both our sides.

"I propose that both delegations meet as early as possible at a point approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-Ni.

"It would, of course, be agreed by both sides that this meeting place would be kept free of armed troops and that both sides would abstain from any hostile acts or exercise of authority over members of the other side in their passage to this point or while they are there.

"I propose that upon resumption of delegation meetings at this point, both delegations be prepared to return to the discussion of item 2 of the agenda immediately following any discussion that may be needed to clarify physical and security arrangements at the meeting place.

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[2] Dated September 11, p. 900.

"If you concur, I will arrange to have our liaison officers meet to discuss immediate erection of the necessary physical facilities."

Part 4.

Conclusions.

1. Recommendation contained in para 9*b*, my C 51575,[3] represents my conviction reached after thorough and prolonged consideration with all my senior advisors and meticulous effort to carry out the spirit of your instructions.

2. I regard the issue of resumption of delegation meetings at Kaesong as the most fundamental of any so far faced. I regard retreat on this issue as surrender, which will enormously multiply our difficulties in all subsequent armistice discussions here.

3. I shall continue to do my utmost to execute faithfully your instructions, whatever be your decision on this issue of renewing delegation meetings in Kaesong. Unless, however, your decision should be to direct me to resume delegation meetings in Kaesong, I shall refrain from doing so.

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[3] Dated September 25, p. 937.

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 26 September 1951—10 a. m.

Present:

General Bradley	Mr. Nitze
General Bolte	Mr. Bohlen
Admiral Duncan	Mr. Rusk
General White	Mr. Merchant
Admiral Davis	Mr. Ferguson
Admiral Lalor	Mr. Stelle[4]
Admiral Ingersoll[2]	Mr. Nash[5]
General Joe Smith[3]	Mr. Gleason
Colonel Carns	

GENERAL BRADLEY: We just had a message from General Ridgway as the result of the telecon.[6]

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[1] The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants.

[2] Rear Adm. Stuart H. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).

[3] Maj. Gen. Joseph Smith, Commander, Military Air Transport Service.

[4] Charles C. Stelle, Deputy Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

[5] Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

[6] Reference is to telegram CX-51655, *supra*.

General Bolte then read General Ridgway's reply.

General Bradley: It is not quite clear to me just what line he would draw on the map first.

General Bolte: Two kilometers on each side of the battle line.

Mr. Nitze: I think he meant the line would be the southern boundary of the proposal made in August.

General Bradley: Let us get a map in and look at it. To Ridgway it apparently seems that if you retreat from the position you took at the last meeting it will show weakness. The Communists will think they can get more by holding out.

General White: I would like to suggest that we review the reasons why it is necessary we move the discussions out of Kaesong.

General Bolte: Your public opinion would go along with a change from Kaesong.

Mr. Bohlen: It is a question of time. If we had gone back to Kaesong right away, there would be no problem with public opinion. After all, the talks broke off because they objected to the dangers of the neutral zone. Those things become issues to the extent to which they are built up. Now that we have made the point, we have another situation. With the position made public by General Ridgway, you have the question of whether we can go back to Kaesong.

General Bradley: When we consented to Kaesong originally we thought it was in about the status of a point between the lines. I am inclined to think that the site is now an issue.

Mr. Nitze: Kaesong will be more vulnerable in the future, and if there is a break we are in a better position on a new proposal.

Mr. Bohlen: I would go along with that.

Admiral Duncan: The first proposal General Ridgway suggested did not specify a place, but this one does.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, and that is better.

General Bolte: He has gone along with the telecon, except that instead of the bridge he suggests another site nearby.

General Bradley: I think to propose a place where the liaison officers have already been meeting has advantages.

Mr. Nitze: Of course, too, General Ridgway is only suggesting neutrality and protection during daylight hours in his new suggestion.

Mr. Rusk: Is it possible to authorize him to go ahead with his proposal without making Kaesong a breaking point? We have a consultation problem with the other governments. I think we should be explicit about this.

Mr. Bohlen: He doesn't say anything about Kaesong in his proposal.

Mr. Rusk: Of course, we have to recognize that it is harder to go back to Kaesong after this proposal is made.

Mr. Nitze: I think we and the Ambassadors should recognize that we can't go back.

General Bradley: I think General Ridgway has a good point in that it isn't hard for them to come to the place he suggests. If they want an armistice, do you think this is too hard a pill for them to swallow? I leave that to you, but if it isn't too difficult I would go along with General Ridgway.

Mr. Bohlen: It isn't quite black and white with these fellows. They probably see it much as we do. It is not just a question of whether they do or do not want an armistice. It really isn't an either/or proposition. Our attitude affects them as theirs does us. This problem is not so important that it will end the talks, I think, but you can't quite tell. They did break from their position and offered to go back to Kaesong without getting satisfaction on their charges.

Admiral Davis: If we press the advantage and insist on a new site they might think we don't want an armistice. However, General Ridgway's proposal seems fair enough to stand up publicly.

Mr. Rusk: It would help us if in the proposal General Ridgway could say "or any other site of a similar kind."

Mr. Nitze: I am not sure I would not accept his proposal as it stands but be clear with General Ridgway that if the Commies do suggest another similar place we would take it.

General Bradley: That raises the question whether I or some of us ought to go out there so our thinking does not get too far apart. None of the chiefs have been over since General Ridgway took command.

Admiral Davis: I was wrong about that. Admiral Sherman was over with Paul Nitze in July.

General Bradley: Well, I think we ought to go. When you are so close to those sons-of-bitches, you have different views.

Mr. Nitze: I think it is a good idea.

Mr. Bohlen: There is one point—if you were there when things broke up, that would receive a good deal of public attention. If your visit coincided with the crisis there would be a difficult problem.

Mr. Rusk: But the other side would cause the break.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, but if they do cause the break, a different interpretation might be put on General Bradley's going out.

Admiral Duncan: The only practical thing bearing on that is that General Collins is taking off to Europe and General Bradley for Turkey at about the same time.

General Bradley: The Turkish trip might be put off for about ten days. In the meantime I could go to Japan for a few days. I'd have to go to Korea.

ADMIRAL DAVIS: I am inclined to disagree Chip. It is a little like saying you don't send a ship some place because it may mean something. This trip of Brad's would be natural and if there is a reason to go, why not go.

GENERAL BOLTE: General Ridgway needs an answer on the site thing right away. He doesn't have to have an answer on the line right away.

GENERAL BRADLEY: On the Turkish trip, they probably would be glad to see me, but not the British and the French. That is the trouble with trying to take the others along. If we could go first we could get the thing straightened out.

At this point General Bolte read the Ridgway proposed message to the Communists, at Mr. Bohlen's request.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Paul suggests that you add: "or any other similar place."

MR. NITZE: My point was that we should make it clear to General Ridgway that we would consider any other similar place but he doesn't need to say it in his message.

MR. RUSK: The issue with the Communists probably won't be on this particular village but on Kaesong. Perhaps we should just say some other equally satisfactory place.

MR. BOHLEN: I think you are better off specifying a place.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Admiral Duncan has a question about the opening of the message.

ADMIRAL DUNCAN: Would it be better to say "since your liaison officers have stated that they are not authorized"?

GENERAL BOLTE: Yes, I agree, that point should be changed.

GENERAL BRADLEY: What is your reaction?

MR. BOHLEN: I think, balancing everything, we should go along, with a change in the first sentence.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I think General Ridgway has got away from the point that you can kick these fellows but still be polite to them.

MR. BOHLEN: They have a technique of making you mad.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Even if he is madder than hell, he should still be polite.

MR. RUSK: We would like to show this message to the Secretary and probably the President before it is sent.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Yes, it would also have to be shown to the President. He has become very interested in Kaesong. I think General Ridgway has gotten a little sticky on the question of the line.

At this point a map was brought in showing the southern boundary of the 20-mile zone which General Ridgway wished to propose.

General Bradley: The Ridgway line takes in some territory beyond his present position.

Mr. Bohlen: Then he isn't even taking the line of contact as his southern boundary.

General Bradley: No, I think he will have a hard time with this line since in the east and west he wants more territory than he has. I think we want to leave it to you to say what the result of such a proposal would be.

Mr. Bohlen: When we suggested a 4-kilometer zone with the median line the line of the present contact, we thought there was still some give in our position.

Mr. Nitze: It seems to me that if his initial position was the line he suggested and the zone was 2 kilometers on either side it would not be too bad a line. But it looks unreasonable if our last position is the line he suggests and all of the zone is to be north of it.

General Bradley: I question the 20-kilometer zone and I also question the line, particularly in the west.

Mr. Bohlen: Leaving aside tactics, the main point is reciprocity. Under the latest Ridgway proposal, and all of the others we have made, it is the Commies who withdraw. Reciprocity means a lot to those people.

Mr. Nitze: If you use a 4-kilometer zone with the Ridgway line as a median line, it won't be bad. Isn't the issue whether our first proposal on the resumption of the talks should be closer to our ultimate position than his August proposal was. He is probably right that we should not go to our ultimate position now. But the old position seems bad. I would not be too worried if he proposed this line with an equal zone on each side.

At this point General Bradley read a revision of the proposed message to General Ridgway concerning the meeting place. Admirals Davis and Duncan then read further revisions.

Mr. Rusk: Should not we tell General Ridgway that Kaesong should not be the breaking point?

Mr. Bohlen: He should be told that if the Commies refuse his proposal he should not violate the neutral zone without further instructions.

Mr. Nitze: If he sends this message on, doesn't he have to know what he is going to say about item 2 on the agenda?

General Bradley: Bolte's draft covers the immediate point of the meeting place. We should tell him not to go ahead with other things until he receives instructions, and particularly not to remove the neutrality of the zone.

Mr. Bohlen: I think we ought to put a ticker in on the neutrality point.

General Bradley: We might add a sentence on that.

Mr. Rusk: I wonder if it isn't necessary to get a message to him on both points today. Bureaucratically, it would be a lot easier to do both of them together.

General Bradley: Maybe that is right. We recently told him that on the resumption of talks we thought he should propose a 4-kilometer zone with the median line roughly the line of contact.

General Bolte: I think he has adequate authority to put in a line.

Mr. Nitze: Yes, but the line he proposes to put in is that contained in his last proposal in August.

General Bradley: Yes, that is the point we have to decide.

Mr. Rusk: I think General Ridgway's idea is a disadvantageous proposal.

Mr. Bohlen: I like Paul's suggestion that we use his line as the median line, that would still give us some leeway.

General Bolte: He is resisting making concessions.

General Bradley: Yes, he is disagreeing with us.

Mr. Bohlen: They will come in with a concession and they will expect one from us.

General Bolte: I don't think they are going to get to the drawing of a line tomorrow or the next day.

General Bradley: General Ridgway has decided not to follow our views, so that is impossible in any case.

Mr. Bohlen: I feel this way about the negotiating position. We would prefer what we sent to General Ridgway a few days ago, but if the fellows conducting the negotiations disagree you have to be careful. You will ruin General Ridgway if he operates partially on his views and partially on ours. That is why I think that going out there is a good idea.

General Bradley: One disadvantage in going during the negotiations is that the Commies will say that we have come out with instructions and that they will wait.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, I think their reaction should come before. It may be that General Ridgway is right and these fellows will cave all along the line.

General Bradley: There is one out; if he would go back with some line and suggest a zone of 4 rather than 20 kilometers. But I still believe that on the left flank he has asked for something they cannot accept. That is a rice area.

Mr. Rusk: The South Koreans have raised a question about it for that reason.

General Bradley: Maybe Syngman Rhee has affected General Ridgway. If General Ridgway reduces his zone to 4 kilometers, that would be quite a concession.

Mr. Nitze: I prefer the idea of a median line. Maybe he could raise his line up 2 kilometers and make it a median line.

General Bradley: You think it should be a median line and not the southern boundary?

Mr. Nitze: Yes.

General Bradley: Your idea, Paul, is to suggest that maybe along the middle he would advance his line a little bit and then call it a median line?

Mr. Nitze: Yes.

Mr. Bohlen: This has the advantage of reciprocity, which I think is very important.

There was a further discussion of the revised message to General Ridgway on the site and conditions for resuming the meetings, and a telecon was agreed upon.[7]

Mr. Nitze: We had hoped that we might get to what we would do if negotiations broke down, and the hot pursuit question.

General Bradley: That is coming up in the NSC this afternoon.

Admiral Duncan: On the hot pursuit, I think we should get away from that phrase since what we propose means more than that and involves destruction of air fields and other things.

Mr. Nitze: If what one is discussing is the extension of air activities beyond the border, we thought that raised substantial questions, such questions as what is the probable reaction of the U.S.S.R., what would the outcome be, isn't the object still to get a settlement in Korea and how this effect is to be produced.

General Bradley: The whole thing goes back to what you are going to do if negotiations break down. We have proposed certain things. This air action is one of them. I think our people are going to demand some further action. Our thought was that we were trying to win it this way. If you can't, what else do you do? We can't throw in any more troops, we don't want to. We think you have to do something additional to a UN blockade.

Mr. Nitze: We have the additional problem with the sixteen countries that have troops there. We will have a difficult time persuading them to extend the air activities to Manchuria.

General Bradley: Then we can say we have to do something additional and ask them to send a minimum of four divisions.

Mr. Nitze: Is the air action something you want to do? If the Soviets increase their air aid to China, would that be in our interest?

General White: I don't think it would be. This question came up when we were up around the Yalu. They would come up and make passes at our bombers.

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[7] No evidence has been found to indicate that a teletype conference was held with General Ridgway prior to the dispatch of the message sent in telegram JCS 82438, *infra*.

General Bradley: If I were asked the question I would say that I doubt whether you gain anything now by hot pursuit. If you want to gain anything you would have to do more. It is a difficult job now. They have been increasing their MIGs about 100 a month.

Mr. Rusk: To put it bluntly, we have this problem with the 16 nations. They would probably go along if there was a military advantage to be gained and we were in a good military position to carry it out, but if we touch off something and can't carry it through we are in a tough position.

General Bradley: If you go in to hit the bases you would need additional air.

Mr. Nitze: Can you make that diversion without affecting our strategic positions around the world?

General White: This question of air activity in Manchuria isn't such a live issue now.

Mr. Nitze: If our position in the event of a breakdown isn't a very good one to radically change the position of the Commies, then there is greater pressure to try to get an armistice.

General Bradley: Yes, I think that is right.

General White: The power installations are on the river and there you would get into hot pursuit if you went after them.

Mr. Rusk: I think we might consider working out a plan for fighter protection for missions of that sort.

General White: That would be broad enough to meet the present situation, I think.

Mr. Nitze: Is there any specific explanation for production of F-86s in August?

General White: It is probably a shortage of engines. They are not in production yet. Also, we are giving quite a lot to the Canadians. It takes a long time to get the production curve to go up. As for air frames, they are or could be made in larger numbers.

General Bradley: You were talking about a drop, Paul. I think the production was about the same.

General White: I think we have been producing about twelve a month for the last few months.

There was a further brief discussion of the revised message to General Ridgway.

General Bradley: Will you and General Bolte draft something on the question of the armistice line for us to consider. We could talk about a median line rather than a southern boundary.

795.00/9-2651 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 26 September 1951—1:19 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS-82438. From JCS. Reur reply CX 51655 to telecon DA TT 5193.

1. Your part 1 is accepted; your recommendation part 3, paras 1*a* and 1*b* are approved; and your proposed dispatch to Communists to submit to them proposals to meet vicinity Songhyon-Ni is approved subj to modification opening phrases to read "since your liaison officers have stated they are not authorized to discuss or arrange satisfactory conditions for resumption of armistice talks". Although this course of action will make it still more difficult to return to Kaesong, if Communists insist on Kaesong you will not make this issue a final breaking point nor abrogate the neutrality of Kaesong without further reference to Washington.[2]

2. Action on your other recommended courses of action will be sent you soonest.

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[1] Mr. Merchant, in a memorandum for the files dated September 26, indicated that Mr. Acheson approved the text of this message before it was transmitted. No evidence has been found to indicate that President Truman's approval was sought. (795.00/9-2651)

[2] Mr. Merchant subsequently asked Messrs. Hickerson and Wainhouse about the need to brief the "seventeen ambassadors" concerning the authorization given to General Ridgway to offer an alternative location for the talks. Mr. Merchant informed them of Mr. Rusk's first reaction in favor of such a briefing, but both Hickerson and Wainhouse felt strongly that calling a special briefing session would only unduly excite the ambassadors. (Memorandum for the files by Merchant; 795.00/9-2651)

795.00/9-2651

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1951.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 [1]

Item 1. The briefing was held.[2]

Items 2 and 3.[3] These were merged for discussion and the President called first on General Bradley. General Bradley's view was that conditions in Korea had changed to such an extent that no action should be taken on the previous recommendation pending a thorough study by the senior staff.[4] On Mr. Lovett's suggestion this study was broadened to include not only the proposed action with respect to hot pursuit, but with respect to other matters such as economic blockade, etc.[5]

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[1] President Truman presided at this 103d meeting of the National Security Council (Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1951; S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 730).

[2] The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the situation in the Far East in the light of a briefing on the military situation in Korea given by Commander C. H. Mead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSC Action No. 560).

[3] The items referred to were discussions on United States Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia (NSC 48/5) and United States Courses of Action in Korea, particularly in light of Secretary Marshall's memorandum to Mr. Lay of September 4 dealing with "hot pursuit", p. 881.

Item 4. Other business was routine.

JAMES E. WEBB

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[4] A memorandum of September 24 from Mr. Merchant to Mr. Acheson, prepared as a briefing paper for this NSC meeting, had urged the wisdom of calling for a new study of the situation in Korea (NSC 48 series).

At the NSC meeting, the Council also noted the request of Gen. Bradley that consideration of "hot pursuit" be suspended until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had had a chance to consult with General Ridgway (NSC Action No. 562*a*).

[5] The directive to the NSC Senior Staff, embodied in NSC Action No. 562*b*, culminated in the NSC 118 series circulated in November and December 1951.

895B.10/9–2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1951—6 p. m.

238. Urmsg 283 Sep 22, 271 Sep 21.[1] Fol is *aide-mémoire* and receipt being submitted Sep 27 to Ambassador Yang, as draft for ROK consideration.

Aide-Mémoire:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's conversations with officers of the Dept of State with respect to the partial settlement by the US Govt with the ROK for Korean currency made available to US forces in Korea in accordance with the financial agreement between the US and the ROK dated July 28, 1950.

"The financial agreement of July 28, 1950 provides that settlement of any claims arising from provision and use of currency and credits under the agreement shall take place directly between the governments of the forces concerned and the Government of the ROK. Without prejudice to the settlement for other amounts of currency provided by the ROK under the terms of the financial agreement, the Govt of the US is prepared to pay at this time to the Govt of the ROK, upon execution of an appropriate receipt, the sum of $12,155,714 in settlement for W63,051,922,270 which have been utilized in Korea through July 31, 1951, for direct sale to US personnel. It is believed that the examination of supplementary records may show additional amounts of *won* so utilized during this period, and to that extent small increments to this payment may be anticipated.

"It is the understanding of the Govt of the US that the funds tendered will upon receipt by the ROK be subject to such arrangements with respect to the utilization of the foreign exchange balances of the Govt of the ROK, as are now or may hereafter be in force pursuant to agreements between the ROK and the US Govt, the UNC or other authorities concerned with Korean relief and rehabilitation."

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[1] Neither printed; both messages urged swift action by the U.S. Government on the matter of settlement of *won* advances by the Republic of Korea to U.N. forces (895B.10/9–2251, 9–2151).

Receipt:

The Govt of the ROK hereby acknowledges the receipt of $12,155,714 from the Govt of the USA in accordance with the terms of the *aide-mémoire* of (date) from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the ROK."

No objection to public statement by ROK within terms these docs. Urinfo Wash agencies consider important payment be made in terms set forth above.[2]

ACHESON

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[2] The draft *aide-mémoire* and draft receipt were presented to Ambassador Yang by Mr. McClurkin on September 27, and the Ambassador agreed to handle the details of the transfer of the funds personally (895B.10/9-2751).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 97 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED ROUTINE TOKYO, September 27, 1951—5:25 p. m.

CX-51709. Fol rel to press simultaneously Tokyo and CINCUNC Adv 1700 local this date: Fol msg received from Communist Lsn Offs at Pan Mun Jom at 0900 27 Sept: "Sept 27, 1951 Col Kinney, Senior Lsn Off, UNC delegation. Since your side has, for the third time, rejected the proposal of our side to resume armistice negotiations by refusing to come to Kaesong at 1000 AM Sept 27 to proceed with armistice negotiations, I am prepared to continue to consult with you at 1000 AM Sept 27 on the date and time of resumption of the Kaesong negotiations and only on the question of the date and time of resumption of armistice negotiations in Kaesong. Signed Chang Chun San, Col, Senior Lsn Off, delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers"

Editorial Note

The following message from the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, was dispatched for delivery to the Communist Liaison Officer at 12:30 p.m. on September 27:

"General Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai:

"Since your liaison officers have stated they are not authorized to discuss or arrange satisfactory conditions for resumption of armistice talks, I submit the following proposal directly to you. I believe this proposal provides for arrangements that can be mutually satisfactory to both sides.

"I propose that both delegations meet as early as possible at a place approximately midway between the battlelines in the vicinity of Songhyon-Ni.

"It would, of course, be agreed by both sides that this meeting place would be kept free of armed troops and that both sides would abstain from any hostile acts or exercise of authority over members of the other side in their passage to this point or while they are there.

"I propose that upon resumption of delegation meetings at this place, both delegations be prepared to return to the discussion of item two of the agenda immediately following any discussion that may be needed to clarify physical and security arrangements at the meeting place. If you concur, I will arrange to have our liaison officers meet to discuss immediate erection of the necessary physical facilities. M. B. Ridgway." (Black Book, Tab 98-A)

795.00/9-2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. Moodie, Counselor
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Mr. Pastrana, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Absent
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Absent
Thailand —Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
Mr. Botha, Second Secretary
United States—FE, Mr. Merchant
UNA, Mr. Hickerson
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
UNP, Mr. Henkin
R, Mr. Trueheart
EUR, Mr. Allen
NA, Mr. Johnson
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Lockhart
FE, Mr. Barbour
FE, Mr. Johnson
Army, Captain Hooks

Captain Hooks informed the Ambassadors that the heaviest fighting over the past three days occurred in the Hwachon and Chorwon areas and that the fierce fighting in the area of "Heartbreak Ridge" was continuing.[1] There were no significant changes in the locations of enemy troops and no change in the last Far Eastern Command estimate of the enemy's capability to launch an offensive. He stated that of the 2,953 sorties flown by United Nations aircraft during this period, 1,870 were combat sorties, and added that press accounts of air-to-air engagements were substantially correct. He also reported that the box score to date—62 MIG's shot down as against 6 F–86's lost—showed that the United Nations continues to maintain air superiority. Captain Hooks reported that of the 10,149 enemy vehicles sighted during the period, well over half were southbound, which led Mr. Hickerson to observe that the enemy could probably sustain a 46 division offensive for slightly longer than the 26 days as last estimated. In response to a question, Captain Hooks stated that no new information had been received concerning Soviet troops in Korea or the reported presence of "Caucasian puppet troops".

The Belgian representative observed that all reports indicated that since the negotiations started the enemy had accomplished a considerable build-up. He asked whether the United Nations forces had been able to strengthen their position to compensate for this enemy build-up. Captain Hooks replied that, unlike the enemy, the United Nations forces had not been able to obtain substantial numbers of additional troops but that their position is not less advantageous than it was at the start of the negotiations. Mr. Merchant pointed out that it was difficult to arrive at a balance in that the communists had relied on bringing in fresh manpower whereas the United Nations forces have strengthened their own positions by building installations, maintaining air superiority, superiority in weapons and aircraft and the like. On the whole, Mr. Merchant stated, we do not feel that the enemy's build-up has reached serious proportions as yet. Mr. Hickerson remarked that the United Nations forces have seriously disrupted the communist build-up and that the actions of both sides would have been the same even if there had been no negotiations.

The French representative, referring to a press report that United Nations bombers had recently been forced to jettison their bombs short of their target because of heavy enemy air activity, asked whether this increased enemy air activity might not be creating a new situation by preventing the United Nations from carrying out interdiction of enemy transportation and other tasks. This new situation, he continued, was quite apart from the question of taking retaliatory action against Manchurian bases in the event of a massive enemy air effort against United Nations ground forces and asked if there would be prior consultation with the Ambassadors. Mr. Hickerson assured him this problem had not yet become acute, but that if the enemy's air strength does become an urgent problem, new decisions would be called for. Mr. Merchant observed that the enemy's air strength had not yet reached highly dangerous proportions and that the enemy still confined its major operational effort to the extreme northwestern portion of Korea. The Netherlands representative remarked that he supposed that there would be prior consultation should the situation become serious.

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[1] See Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 86–97.

Mr. Hickerson then informed the Ambassadors that the communists had not yet answered General Ridgway's message of September 27 which proposed that the full delegations meet as early as possible at a point half way between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-ni in order to take up item 2 of the agenda. In response to a question why this site was suggested, Mr. Hickerson pointed out that it was actually in no-man's land and would be neutralized only during the actual armistice sessions. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the area would be kept free of armed forces, not being in enemy hands, and that the possibility of manufactured incidents would be considerably lessened.

Mr. Hickerson then stated that as he had remarked at the previous briefing the issue of a new site for the negotiations would not be pressed to a breaking point without prior consultation with the group. He added that General Ridgway believes strongly that grave disadvantages would accrue to the United Nations if Kaesong were the site for the resumed talks and considers it of utmost and fundamental importance that a new site be selected. He added that General Ridgway believes that the communists will agree to a new site and will not make the matter an issue leading to a break-off. Mr. Merchant pointed out that General Ridgway's proposal was not a refusal to meet at Kaesong but was a counter-offer proposing a better site in order to get the full delegations together under conditions equally fair to both sides. If the communists, he added, suggested some other site which would be satisfactory, General Ridgway would probably accept it.

Mr. Hickerson then stated that while General Bradley was taking no new instructions to Tokyo with him for General Ridgway he did expect to consult with General Ridgway and Admiral Joy to the fullest on both the current military situation and the armistice negotiations.[2] Mr. Hickerson added that Mr. Bohlen was going along at General Bradley's invitation.

Mr. Hickerson then informed the Ambassadors of the project which has been worked out to bring to the United States from the Korean battlefield two representative military men from each country contributing to the United Nations forces and two from each branch of the United States armed forces. This group will arrive in Washington on United Nations Day, October 24, will be presented to the President, and will, if the plan works out be awarded by President Entezam the new United Nations Korean medal. The group will then be divided into two groups to tour the United States and perhaps Canada to demonstrate the collective spirit of the United Nations and the contribution other countries are making in the Korean war. The tours will end in San Francisco on Thanksgiving Day, November 22.

It was agreed to hold the next briefing on October 2 at 3 P. M.[3]

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[2] See the minutes of the State–JCS meeting of September 26, p. 955.
[3] The record of the meeting of October 2 is not printed.

357.AD/9-1751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1951—4 p. m.

245. Urtel 256 Sep 17. When CINCUNC–ROK agreement in effect Dept prepared concur ur recommendation that when Mutual Security Act passed residual ECA responsibilities exercised by Emb be transferred to CINCUNC. Recommendation for Presidential action now being studied. Request you point out in discussions this matter in field that responsibilities under aid agreement re counterpart and Korean fon exchange have always been exercised by recommendations aid rep to Wash, and that such responsibilities will in future presumably involve consultation Wash agencies concerned with financial policies. Dept will continue desire Emb views financial and stabilization policies and desires that Emb continue participate actively after transfer responsibilities to CINCUNC in econ policies.

Re application accrued ECA counterpart to ROK overdraft, believe that it is more important to do this at appropriate time in connection stabilization effort than in relation negot aid agreement.

This tel State dist only.

WEBB

611.61/9–2151: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1951—9 p. m.

224. Embtel 491 Sep 21.[2] For ur info only since not yet cleared by Def or fully by Dept.

We agree you might take occasion before departure Moscow Oct 6 make oral request Vyshinsky call on Stalin. However you shld not request appt for this purpose until receipt Depts further instrs. In requesting see Stalin you shld explain you are leaving Oct 6 and expect attend UN GA sessions Paris; that it is possible you may not return Sov Union, though no final decision has been reached re successor and that pending final decision you remain as Amb and may possibly return Moscow for brief period; that it is over two years since you last saw Premier Stalin and you wld much appreciate opportunity see him again before you leave in Oct. If Vyshinsky inquires whether you have particular subject discuss with Stalin, in your discretion you may reply you have been authorized discuss certain matters with him.

If Vyshinsky immed dismisses possibility interview with Stalin same grounds as refusal Brit Amb,[3] you shld express your disappointment and say that in this contingency you authorized discuss with Vyshinsky matters in question and request this be brought personal attn PriMin.

If by chance you are accorded interview with Stalin, this fact will certainly become known or probably published by Sov press as customary in past. As we do not wish make public matter discussed, in response newspaper inquiries we wld desire link your visit exclusively your imminent departure USSR for lengthy period GA. If matter is discussed with Vyshinsky alone, there shld be no need any public statement.

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[1] Repeated for information to London as telegram 1743, to Paris as telegram 1882, and to Tokyo as telegram 509.

[2] The text of this telegram is printed in the Soviet compilation in volume IV. In it, Ambassador Kirk had asked Mr. Acheson about the advisability of a call on Foreign Minister Vyshinsky or Prime Minister Stalin before departing the Soviet Union for the General Assembly meeting in Paris. Concerning the subjects to be taken up, Mr. Kirk made no specific mention of Korea but concluded his telegram as follows:

"As to topics conversation my thinking would be to make two points: (1) Assurance in calm serious vein that we are not preparing to fight Soviets, elaborating as may seem proper but not apologetic; (2) express hope Mr. Stalin is being fully informed by his sources of hardening of temper of Western world (and US in particular) in face of continued Soviet aggressive and intransigent attitude towards everybody and everything outside Soviet orbit. (Exact phrasing and development above points should be carefully studied).

"Of course other topics as you may decide could be mentioned." (611.61/9–2151)

[3] In telegram 491, Mr. Kirk had said that when Sir David Kelly, with the approval of the Foreign Office, asked to say good-bye to Stalin before leaving Moscow on September 22, Vyshinsky told him that it would be quite impractical since Stalin was so far away from Moscow.

At this time, Stalin was reported to be in the Black Sea area; see telegram 232 to Moscow, October 1, p. 980.

Instrs on matter be discussed with Stalin or Vyshinsky follow in separate tel. We shall want inform Brit and Fr Govts in confidence nature your approach. When Moscow receives final instrs make approach London and Paris shld inform Morrison and Schuman our instrs to you. You may inform your Brit and Fr colleagues very gen terms results approach, leaving full details to be communicated personally by London and Paris to Morrison and Schuman.

WEBB

611.61/9-2151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1951—9 p. m.

225. For ur info only since not yet cleared by Def or fully in Dept.

We are inclined view at present juncture may be useful you discuss with Stalin or Vyshinsky specific issue Korean armistice talks. In context specific Korean issue two points suggested by you Embtel 491 Sep 21 wld very appropriately fit.[2]

If you succeed seeing Stalin you might begin by outlining your personal plans as already given Vyshinsky (Deptel 224) recall to him it has been over two years since you last had opportunity having talk with him and point out many things have occurred during this period not conducive betterment relations between our two countries or easing tensions internatl relations throughout world. You shld then go on say at present moment one outstanding issue, namely Korean armistice talks, which you authorized discuss which once settled cld do far more than any other single thing ease tensions and provide atmosphere in which further constructive steps might be taken toward solution other pressing internatl problems.

You shld continue and take line that developments between UN Command and North Korean and Chi Commie negotiators are incomprehensible US Govt; that NK and Chi Commie proposal for armistice line inconsistent with current mil situation and with statements which Gromyko made to you upon occasion your call on him June 27 to clarify initiative of Malik in suggesting armistice talks between parties involved in Korean war. You shld remind him it was Malik's speech which set off train of events leading Korean negotiations and that in your interview with Gromyko clarifying position Sov Govt Gromyko explained that Sov Govt envisaged mtg opposing commands to conclude mil armistice which wld include cease fire and which wld be limited strictly mil questions and wld not involve any polit or territorial matters (Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27).

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[1] Repeated for information to London as telegram 1744, to Paris as telegram 1883, and to Tokyo as telegram 510.

[2] See footnotes 2 and 3, *supra*.

UN Command surprised and disappointed discover that negotiators opposing command kept insisting upon armistice line not strictly mil in character, which introduced complicated polit factors and which did not correspond understanding on which UN Command had entered negots nor does it conform with existing mil situation. To take polit step in conversations between mil commander representing UN on one side and commanders who represent so-called Chi volunteers and armed forces NK regime which enjoys no internatl status is not acceptable; polit issues Korea must be dealt with by govts concerned on responsible basis.

You shld then go on say that refusal of NK and Chi Commie negotiators reach armistice settlement based on purely milit dispositions and upon reasonable line affording safety and security to armed forces both sides wld involve possible future dangers of which Sov Govt must be well aware. If gen offensive were launched again against UN armed forces, events ensuing therefrom cld easily get out of hand and have results not desired or within present policies parties involved, including Sov Govt. US Govt for its part by its declarations and by its actions has clearly shown that it does not desire widening conflict Far East. On contrary US sincerely desires see concluded armistice on basis which provides safety for armed forces both sides and security against resumption hostilities. Armistice line not based on these factors cannot be accepted. Surely Sov govt must be fully aware dangers involved present situation if an armistice not achieved. It can see that logic of events flowing from non-conclusion armistice agreement and resumption large scale fighting wld very possibly bring about those events which our desire and presumably desire Sov Govt avoid.

This juncture you shld pause and wait for comment or retort your statements. Line taken by Stalin or Vyshinsky will probably be defense Sov Govts position, of their constant striving for peace, of their non-involvement in Korean affair and they may also point out that Malik's speech specifically referred to 38th parallel and assert that Secy Acheson's statement before Congressional Comite in June indicated 38th parallel acceptable basis for concluding armistice.[3] Shld they cite statements by Malik and Secy, you shld point out again statements made by Gromyko to you June 27 and fact such armistice line involves polit and territorial questions utmost importance. You shld add that of all problems and causes tension in post war world Korean problem presents clearest issue. Invasion South Korea June 25, 1950 act naked aggression on part North Koreans—fact understood throughout world. Very fact North Korean army almost succeeded reaching Pusan early stages war demonstrates clearly upon whose responsibility aggression lay. However you have no desire now enter fruitless discussion concerning what has been done; what you wish impress upon him is seriousness present impasse in Korean armistice talks and serious eventualities which may ensue. Sov Govt must also be aware these dangers and it is hoped it will use its influence with North Korean and Chi Commie Govts to end realistic armistice agreement which wld afford safety for both sides can be achieved.

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 497.

You might then remark you assume Sov Govt receiving full and objective reports concerning developments outside Sov Union and attitude US and other states confronted by Sov policies which have proved uncompromising and not contributory solution mutual problems. Sov Govt does not need be told that other nations determined defend their own way life and independence. Measures now being taken by US and other govts increase their security are for defense and defense alone. You wish assure Sov Govt that US has no aggressive designs on USSR or anyone and we hope there may soon be restored nations of world sense confidence and security which shld be conducive settlement outstanding issues embittering internatl relations. Nothing cld contribute more to this at present time than successful outcome Korean armistice talks.

You shld add that without achievement armistice Korea there is little if any prospect for solution other problems besetting us throughout world; that armistice Korea wld do far more than any other single thing open up perspectives for useful discussion other measures which may be taken alleviate existing tensions and so long as hostilities continue Korea there remain ever present dangers unwanted broadening conflict. You shld conclude by stating it is earnest hope US Govt that armistice can be achieved and that Sov Govt will use its influence that end.

If you are pressed state what you mean concrete terms by "perspectives" you shld limit your reply to gen statement you are not prepared this time go into concrete details or mention specific matters but you may allude to issues raised Paris mtgs Deputies[4] and to other gen problems both inside and outside UN.[5]

WEBB

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[4] For related documentation, see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[5] The Department sent the following message in telegram 511, September 28, 9 p. m., to Tokyo:

"For Bohlen. Please show Deptels 509 and 510 addressed SCAP for USPolAd, Sept 28th, to Gen. Bradley. Desire ur views urgently." (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 101)

611.61/9-2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 29, 1951—3 p. m.

514. Topad for Bohlen. Preliminary soundings in Def this morning revealed doubts re timing proposed Kirk conversation in Moscow. Decision re timing will be strongly influenced by General Bradley's and ur views resulting from your discussions with Gen Ridgway.

There was also apprehension, although not unanimous, lest Soviets regard ref to possible future dangers in absence of armistice as threat or ultimatum. Suggest ur reply address itself to this problem too.

WEBB

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[1] Repeated for information to Moscow as telegram 229.

795B.5/9-3051 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, September 30, 1951 [—12:33 p. m.]

CX-51897. From CINCFE to JCS Washington, D.C. Info Department Army for Office of Secretary Defense (Personal for Mr. Frank Nash), State Department. This message in three parts.

Part 1. Subject is Hot Pursuit. Action on steps to be taken case of breakdown in negotiations in Korea was postponed at last Wednesday NSC meeting pending further study of desirability of instituting Hot Pursuit. Generals Ridgway and Weyland of opinion that this step is undesirable. Build-up of Communist fighter strength including available Soviet fighters makes the disregarding of the Yalu River as a boundary to fighter action meaningless.

Part 2. Subject contemplated action in case of all-out hostile air attack. For your further information, Ridgway contemplates that retaliatory air attacks would be limited at least initially to those air fields in the Antung area and possibly on the Shantung Peninsula if attacks were coming from there.

Part 3. Concur in the foregoing appreciations and recommend that we remove Hot Pursuit as one of the actions to be taken. Signed Bradley.

611.61/9-3051 : Telegram

The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT Tokyo, September 30, 1951—2 p. m.

658. Topad. From Bohlen: Re Deptel 514, September 29. Discussed timing of proposed Kirk conversation Moscow this morning with General Ridgway, his chief advisors and General Bradley. Unanimously agreed that such conversation wld be very desirable but shld be handled in such way as not to create impression we were making any plea or were eager because of weakness for armistice. It was felt therefore that while conversation in Moscow wld be very desirable it might be unwise for above reasons for Kirk to go to Black Sea area in order to have interview. Any statement by Kirk re armistice shld accurately reflect confidence felt here in local or military situation.

I recall proposed draft reference to obvious dangers inherent in renewed military activities was specifically drafted in such way as to avoid any implication or threat of ultimatum. This I regard as primarily matter of drafting so as to state an obvious truth rather than any threatening indication of our intentions.

Visit here has been most helpful. [Bohlen.]

Sebald

895B.131/10-151

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger)

RESTRICTED [Washington,] October 1, 1951.

Subject: Partial Payment to Republic of Korea of *Won* Advances for use of United States Forces.

Participants: Ambassador Yang
Mr. Hemmendinger—NA

Ambassador Yang informed me that he had received the following message from his Government:

"Accept suggested sum of $12,155,714 as initial and partial repayment of *won* loan with understanding conversion rates to be calculated according to rate prevailing at time and balance of loan will be paid in time to avert pending physical crisis. With this understanding check should be made out to Finance Minister Paik Too Chin and deposited in Bank of Korea."

Ambassador Yang indicated that he thought the word "physical" was a mistake for "financial".

I said I thought the question now in the light of this message was whether the Ambassador considered himself authorized to sign the receipt in the form which had been submitted. He said that he was prepared to sign the receipt, and that this communication could remain informal. He is going to New York today and will be prepared to come in on Wednesday[1] to complete the transaction. I told him I would consult and get in touch with his office.

I asked Ambassador Yang specifically whether he interpreted the "understanding" of his Government to be a part of a contract or a simple statement of the views of his Government. He said that he did not interpret it to be a part of a contract, but merely to be consistent with the idea which had been expressed by officers of the Department of State that further releases could be anticipated. (*Note:* There seems to be a misunderstanding here, in that the Department has mentioned only further releases of dollars in payment for *won* used by the United States forces for sale to troops, whereas the language of the message from the Republic of Korea would appear to refer to the whole of the *won* advances.)

Ambassador Yang also said that he understood the reference to conversion rates as meaning the military conversion rates prevailing at the time.

With respect to the instruction to have the check made out to the Finance Minister and deposited in the Bank of Korea, Ambassador Yang said he thought this would not involve sending the check to Korea, but would authorize deposit by him in the account of the Bank of Korea with the Chase National Bank.

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[1] October 3.

795.00/10–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1951.

Subject: Canadian Comments on Possible Course of Action in Korea in the Event that No Armistice is Reached.

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador.
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs.

Ambassador Wrong called on Mr. Rusk this afternoon at 4 o'clock by prior appointment. The Ambassador recalled that Mr. Merchant, in a recent discussion (Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation, September 13, 1951)[1] with representatives of the New Zealand and Australian Embassies and himself, had reviewed the thinking of the Department of State on a course of action which might be followed in Korea if there were a breakdown in armistice negotiations. Ambassador Wrong also referred to an exchange of views between the Secretary and Mr. Morrison along the same general lines and stated that he had received certain of the British reactions on policy in this regard.

The Ambassador stated that he had now received Ottawa's comments upon the considerations put forward by Mr. Merchant in his recent conversation and remarked that there would appear to be very little basic difference between Canadian views and the general thinking of the United States Government on this question. The Ambassador remarked that the military aspects of the problem had been reviewed by the Canadian General Staff and that its comments were more or less as follows: while seeing no objection to a series of tactical maneuvers and limited advances necessary to the protection of UN forces and the maintenance of local military initiative, the General Staff was not in favor of a strategic advance to the "neck" of Korea, since such an advance would not necessarily result in an overall strengthening of the UN defensive position in Korea, would lengthen UN supply lines and shorten those of the Communists and would bring UN forces within closer range of the Communist radius of air action. The General Staff also pointed out that the objective of destroying the enemy could be carried on as well along the present line as it could at the neck of Korea. The Ambassador pointed out, however, that the Canadian military authorities quite understood the necessity of maintaining freedom in local tactical operations. From the political standpoint, the Canadian Government believed it desirable that the UN nations contributing forces to Korea should be consulted before any general strategic advance to the neck of the peninsula were attempted, and that one of the factors to be considered might be the possibly adverse effect on Chinese Communist willingness to negotiate an armistice on that line as compared to the present situation. In summary, the Canadian Ambassador believed that the Canadian position was very close to that expressed by Mr. Morrison on this particular question.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that, as a practical military matter, a general advance to the neck of Korea would require extensive UN reinforcement in the light of the strong position now held by the Communists and that such re-inforcement for various reasons was at the present time deemed impractical. What the United States sought in effect was political freedom to conduct the necessary tactical operations to keep the enemy off balance, to inflict casualties and to protect the forefront of our highly defensible "Kansas" line. He explained that, for instance, it might be militarily desirable to make tactical thrusts at the enemy which would conceivably carry as far as the neck if Communist resistance were not particularly heavy and that it would be obviously inconsistent to permit engagement in heavy fighting on a tactical basis for a gradual advance to the neck accompanied by heavy losses, and on the other hand to refrain from a more general strategic advance to that point if resistance proved weak. In essence, therefore, what was required was freedom to conduct the current tactical operations within certain limits but without too confining a political restraint, and remarked that, as a matter of fact, a gradual advance in UN lines was currently taking place as a result of the present localized UN actions. He agreed that if the neck of the peninsula were reached, new political factors would arise which would make a review of the situation with other UN governments highly desirable.

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[1] Not printed; in the discussion under reference Mr. Merchant had gone over the possible courses of action in Korea along the same lines as the bipartite discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom then taking place (795.00/9-1351).

The Ambassador then stated that the Canadian Government was in entire accord with United States policy regarding a strengthening of ROK defense forces. The strengthening of Japanese defense forces was equally acceptable to Ottawa, once it was understood that such forces were not for use in Korea. With respect to the restrictions on the bombing of Rashin and the Yalu River dams, the Ambassador stated that Ottawa foresaw no difficulty over a continued bombing of Rashin if this did not involve any violation of Soviet territory, nor was there any particular objection to the bombing of the Yalu River dams which were now exporting power to Manchuria, again provided that Manchurian territory were not violated. In this connection, Mr. Rusk recalled that we had for some time been bombing the important bridges across the Yalu River while being extremely careful not to violate Chinese territory.

The Ambassador then noted that Mr. Merchant had raised the question of General Ridgway's current instructions concerning hot pursuit in case of an all-out Communist air offensive which would seriously jeopardize the safety of UN forces, and stated the Canadian understanding as to these instructions. Mr. Rusk reviewed the United States position on this point, indicating that General Ridgway had been instructed to engage in hot pursuit only in case of a Communist air offensive against UN forces which would seriously prejudice their security, accompanied by a breakdown in communications; in any other circumstances General Ridgway had been impressed with the necessity of referring the matter to Washington for decision before taking action, so that opportunity could be provided for all possible consultation with the other UN governments having forces in Korea. He emphasized that General Ridgway was under no illusion as to the importance of this procedure.

With respect to the proposed courses of action in the United Nations, Ambassador Wrong explained the Canadian view that if pressure were brought upon Members for further contributions to the UN military effort in Korea, this pressure should, in the first instance, be applied to those Members not now contributing military forces; only after that should presently contributing nations be asked for further contributions.

The Ambassador then remarked that there had evidently been some confusion in terms with reference to an intensified blockade of China, the main point being whether we contemplated a tight *naval* blockade or something more in the general nature of a tighter *economic* blockade. He added that his Government was opposed to a complete economic embargo of China, since a complete embargo might have the disadvantage of creating additional strains within the membership of the United Nations now supporting the UN action in Korea, without proportionately advantageous results upon control of Chinese Communist military potential; this, however, did not refer to an embargo on military supplies and strategic materials, which the Canadian Government continues to support.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that there were two possibilities, one to place the UN fleet in such a position as to interdict all trade with the China coast by force, an action which would necessarily carry with it implications of belligerency against China. The other was to intensify a self-imposed restriction upon the use in China trade of flag vessels of each UN nation, perhaps enforced by UN naval action against such national vessels as might violate the restrictions. This latter course would avoid any question of direct belligerency and would be perhaps 95 per cent as effective. The United States Government favored a tightening of economic controls upon trade with China along the lines of this second alternative, rather than a naval blockade.

The Ambassador then asked if any late news had been received concerning the Kaesong negotiations. Mr. Rusk replied that there had been little basic change in the situation and that the Communists had not yet replied to General Ridgway's suggestion for a change in the conference site. He indicated to the Ambassador that a new proposal from General Ridgway had been received and was under review;

namely, that if the Communists continued adamant in insisting on the Kaesong site to the point of breaking off further negotiations, he propose that a map indicating the present military line of contact and embodying a proposal for demilitarized zone be submitted to the Communists through the UN liaison officers and that a sub-delegation discussion on the conference site might be held in which the UN Command would be willing to consider any suggestion for a site which would lie mid-way between the present battle lines.[2] Mr. Rusk indicated that no decision had yet been reached in Washington on this proposal.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Rusk for the opportunity of presenting the foregoing views of his Government and reiterated his impression that these views and those of the United States were, in general, closely parallel on matters of substance.

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[2] See telegram C-51981, October 1, p. 981.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 104 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 1, 1951—6 p. m.

232. Deptels 224, 225, Sept 28. Proposed approach has not yet been cleared. We are repeating to you Tokyo's 658, Sept 30, containing Bohlen's report of Genl Ridgway's and Genl Bradley's views. We concur that it wld be undesirable for you travel to Black Sea area in order see Stalin. Therefore you shld not request see Stalin but shld make your approach directly to Vyshinski asking him convey your remarks to PriMin.

Our tentative thought on timing of approach is that you shld see Vyshinski on Fri Oct 5. Suggest you make appointment by Wed for Fri interview. If we are unable obtain final clearance for this approach you might merely use occasion your interview to take informal leave Vyshinski explaining your personal plan accordance second para Deptel 224.

If you receive authorization make this approach Vyshinski suggest you take up local Emb problems (Embtel 536, Sept 28) with Gromyko or Zorin.[2]

WEBB

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[1] Repeated for information to London as telegram 1761, to Paris as telegram 1909, and to Tokyo as telegram 517.

[2] Documentation on this topic is covered in the compilation on the Soviet Union in volume IV. Andrei Gromyko and Valerian Zorin were Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union. Telegram 536 is not printed.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 108 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 1 October 1951—7:01 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–51981. 1. In event exchanges with Communist commanders result in agreement on a site other than Kaesong, the UNC Delegation at the first substantive session will immediately propose as the basis for discussion a 4 kilometer demilitarized zone based on the following median line. From a point at BS 5081 along the north shore of the Han River to the mouth of the Yesong River, thence north following the course of the Yesong River to BT 7209 thence northeast to CT 1719 thence northeast to CT 2223 thence northeast to Chorwon CT 4334 northeast to Kumhwa CT 6538 northeast to CT 8341 east to CT 9841 northeast to DT 3559 northeast to coast at DT 4767. This line gives us some negotiation flexibility without jeopardizing line Kansas in event Communists accept above as basis for discussion. This proposal is based on line of contact as of 26 Sep. In event this line of contact undergoes any appreciable change prior to submitting this proposal to Communists the location of the demilitarized zone will be adjusted accordingly.

2. In the event the Communists continue their present intransigent stand relative to Kaesong, but there is no indication that a break is imminent, I plan to continue pressing for a new site without categorically foreclosing on Kaesong at that time.

3. In event the Communists continue their present intransigent stand on Kaesong and in addition it is estimated they are about to break on this issue, I intend to send the following message to the Communist commanders with a map describing the proposed zone as indicated below:

> "Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai:
>
> "Your letter to me, dated blank October 1951, acknowledges my letter to you of 27 Sep 1951, but rejects my proposal for meeting of our 2 delegations at Songhyon-Ni. I have already made clear to you my views regarding the unsuitability of Kaesong as a conference site; equality of entry and control has not been and cannot be assured there.
>
> "I rpt that the United Nations Command has been and still remains willing to effect an honorable military armistice. Therefore, I propose that the negotiations be resumed by a meeting of the sub-delegations to discuss agenda item 2, and that it be agreed in advance by both parties to accept the attached annotated map as the basis for discussion of agenda item 2.
>
> "You will note that this basis for discussion envisages a demilitarized

zone generally along the present line of contact. It requires compensating withdrawals in some places and mutual withdrawals in others in order to establish the demilitarized zone.

"If you concur in the above as the basis for discussion, I propose that the armistice negotiations be resumed at a place selected by you and acceptable to us midway between the present battle lines.

"The above proposals are submitted to you in an effort to secure an early resumption of negotiations. If you accept, my liaison officers will meet with yours to discuss the new location and to arrange for the facilities required for the resumption of conference talks."

4. Copies of my message to Kim and Peng, together with photographic copies of the map, will be issued to the press simultaneously with the release to the Communists in the event this msg is sent under conditions visualized in paragraph 3.

5. Accomplishment of above should make clear to world opinion that the UNC is prepared to establish a demilitarized zone based on the principle of mutual withdrawal from the present line of contact.

6. General Bradley and Mr Bohlen concur in courses of action recommended herein and your approval of them is requested.[1]

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[1] The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 82959, October 2, read as follows: "JCS approve courses of action outlined in your C 51981 subj to deletion of 'in advance' in last sentence of 2nd para of proposed msg to communist commanders." (Black Book, Tab 109)

795.00/10-251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1951.

Subject: British Comments on U.S. Policy Position if Korean Armistice Negotiations Fail.

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 11 o'clock this morning by prior appointment. He stated that the purpose of his visit was to convey to the Department certain reactions of the British Government concerning points raised by Secretary Acheson in the bipartite and tripartite talks on U.S. views towards policy in Korea in the event that armistice negotiations fail. Mr. Tomlinson pointed out that the attached memorandum [1] concerning the British position was only in the nature of an informal and tentative reply and was based on a telegram just received from the British Foreign Office.

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[1] Not printed.

After reading Mr. Tomlinson's memorandum, Mr. Rusk made the following comments: With regard to point 2 of the memorandum, Mr. Rusk explained that our view concerning an advance to the waist of Korea envisaged the tactical military necessity of allowing General Ridgway freedom of action within reasonable limits to attack and destroy the enemy and to protect the safety of his own forces. He pointed out that it was unlikely, under present conditions, that a general advance would be militarily feasible in the face of the strong position now occupied by the Communist forces and thus he did not foresee any immediate likelihood of a general offensive which would carry the UN forces to the waist. He stressed, however, that the U.S. Government would agree concerning the desirability of a general review of the situation with the interested UN member states in the event that UN forces reach that point, either through a series of gradual tactical advances or by a weakening of Communist resistance permitting a rapid general forward displacement of UN forces. Mr. Rusk commented on the apparent inconsistency envisaged in the occurrence of a disorganization or demoralization of Communist forces without the corresponding launching of a major UN offensive which could create this effect. He also pointed out the inconsistency of allowing a gradual tactical advance to the waist against heavy resistance, while at the same time opposing a general strategic advance to the same point, should Communist military weaknesses make this possible at small cost. At this point Mr. Tomlinson asked informally whether General Ridgway's plans involved an amphibious operation in North Korea as recently suggested by the Communist radio. Mr. Rusk replied that there was an understanding with our military authorities that if such an operation were to be undertaken there should be opportunity in advance for a review of such a plan by the State Department and consultation with the other interested UN governments. No such proposal had as yet been suggested by our military authorities, although Mr. Rusk could not say whether some such plan might not be under preliminary consideration. He then referred to the problem of drafting concrete directives to General Ridgway which would permit satisfactory military planning and, at the same time, would clearly define the political and other limitations involved in any general advance to the waist of Korea. Both Mr. Rusk and Mr. Tomlinson agreed, however, that there was very little basic divergency as between the British and American points of view on the question of a UN advance to the waist of Korea and that it was more a matter of interpretation and emphasis than of substance.

With regard to point 3 of the British memorandum, Mr. Rusk pointed out that the U.S. Government believed it desirable to strengthen the Japanese internal security forces without reference to any reduction or withdrawal of the U.S. garrison. He also requested Mr. Tomlinson to clarify the expression, used in the memorandum, "minimum rearming of Japanese internal security forces", suggesting that this could be interpreted as the rearming of a minimum number of Japanese forces or the rearming of Japanese forces at a minimum level of military equipment. Mr. Tomlinson was of the opinion that the former interpretation was the correct one. Mr. Rusk then remarked that any rearmament of Japanese forces, whether as police or otherwise, would undoubtedly "provoke" Russia in the sense of constituting an annoyance and of providing a propaganda factor; he, therefore, wondered whether the British Government might not mean "provoke" in the sense of increasing the probability of the USSR taking concrete retaliatory action. Mr. Tomlinson believed that the word "provocation" was used in the latter sense.

With regard to point 7, Mr. Tomlinson indicated that there evidently had been some confusion in the mind of the Foreign Office over the exact terms of General Ridgway's instructions and our interpretation of them. He explained that he had transmitted a further telegram to the Foreign Office in an effort to clarify this question, a copy which he showed to Mr. Rusk. The telegram made reference to three possibilities inherent in the situation as follows: (*a*) that there would at no time be retaliatory bombing or hot pursuit into Manchuria; (*b*) that no such bombing or hot pursuit would take place until there had been full consultation by General Ridgway with Washington and corresponding consultation with the other members of the United Nations contributing forces to Korea; and (*c*) that in the event of a massive air attack on UN forces, General Ridgway could proceed with a policy of hot pursuit and retaliatory bombing on his own initiative and without prior reference to Washington. Mr. Tomlinson further explained that the Secretary, in his discussions with Mr. Morrison, had referred to the question of a massive Communist air offensive which would place the United Nations forces in serious jeopardy and indicated that the British Government was unclear as to the interpretation of the word "jeopardy". Mr. Rusk explained that the position of the United States on this point was that no bombing of Manchurian bases or hot pursuit should be engaged in by the Unified Command if there were no massive Communist air attack which would require the most immediate and drastic counteraction to provide the necessary security to UN forces. If circumstances permitted opportunity for prior consultation with Washington and with the other members of the United Nations contributing to the Korean military action, General Ridgway should not engage in this counteraction until such consultation had been carried out. Mr. Rusk therefore could say that if any opportunity were provided by the military situation to carry out the action described in point (*b*) we would do so, but that in an extreme emergency General Ridgway was now authorized to operate in line with point (*c*). Mr. Rusk furthermore disagreed with the use of the term "retaliatory" bombing in the latter case, suggesting that the action would not be in the nature of retaliation, but as a counteraction based on extreme military necessity.

With regard to point 8, Mr. Rusk suggested the practical difficulty of determining clearly when the armistice talks had, in fact, been broken off, since the character of the current delaying tactics of the Communists made this a difficult determination.

Mr. Tomlinson requested Mr. Rusk's comments on the trip of General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen to the Far East, to which Mr. Rusk replied that the trip was for the purpose of achieving a closer mutual understanding on current problems and policy with General Ridgway's Command, pointing out that it had been several months since General Marshall had made his trip to Japan and that it was considered desirable at this stage to hold a further exchange of views. He explained that the course of the Kaesong negotiations would, among other things, be reviewed. Mr. Rusk suggested that we would receive a clearer picture of the general situation in Korea following the return of General Bradley.

As Mr. Rusk had another previous appointment at this time, he suggested to Mr. Tomlinson that the remainder of the memorandum be discussed at a later opportunity.[2]

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[2] No record of any further discussion on the British memorandum has been found in the Department of State files.

611.61/10–251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, October 2, 1951—5 p. m.

562. Deptels 232 and 233, October 1.[1] I agree with Bohlen's thought with which Generals Ridgway and Bradley concur that my conversation should be handled in such a way as not to create any impression that we are leading from weakness and that a display of over-eagerness to meet Stalin wherever he might be would be unwise, but still that Moscow conversation desirable. I believe that such impression of weakness could be avoided and at the same time greater weight given to the remarks I will be making to Vyshinsky if I make at least a *pro*

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[1] Telegram 232 is printed on p. 980; telegram 233 repeated to Moscow the text of telegram 658, September 30, from Tokyo, p. 975.

forma request to see Stalin if he here and in event likely reply that Stalin is out of town to make date see Vyshinsky Friday for discussion with him matters as proposed in second paragraph Deptel 224, September 28.

I would suggest that I call on Vyshinsky tomorrow October 3 (which will require request for conversation not later than tomorrow morning) for preliminary conversation. This will give Soviets a day to consider the proposal of my call on Stalin. If by Thursday evening we have not received any indication of Stalin's willingness receive me here in Moscow I will request interview with Vyshinsky at which time the major conversation may take place.

Meantime I propose see Gromyko discussing with him routine problems in course of farewell visit.[2]

Dept pass Tokyo, London, Paris; sent Dept 562, rptd info London 76, Paris 152, niact Tokyo 4 for Bohlen.

KIRK

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[2] The Department's reply, in telegram 239, October 2, 6 p. m., to Moscow, read as follows:

"We do not desire give greater weight to contemplated approach, if finally approved, than by your oral comments to FonMin (Embtel 562 Oct 2) and, therefore, prefer that you not request to see Stalin. We believe purpose your comments will be adequately served if during substantive conversation with Vyshinsky you specifically request your views be transmitted PriMin.

"Hope send you by Wed or early Thurs final decision re proposed conversation." (Black Book, Tab 106)

895B.10/10–251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, October 2, 1951—6 p. m.

303. Ref Deptel 238, Sept 26. Article in semi-official *Korea Times* of Oct 2 quotes US Secretary of State as promising refund "at the first opportunity of the billion *won* loan of the Korean Govt to the US army in Korea." Adds that this sum will be converted at rate of 5178 to dollar for total of $12,400,000. States "this will be advance refund of entire Korean Govt's loan to the UN army amounting to 321,678,580 thousand *won* or over 60 percent of total currency issued as of Sept 27". Also Secy Acheson said in the letter that the US navy and air force wld follow the example of the army in paying off their shares in the loan, which Korean Govt officials repeatedly pointed out is one of the greatest causes of the present inflated state of currency".

Quotes Yang as adding that other UN member states having fighting troops in Korea wld also follow suit. Entire article apparently continuation attempt make advance appear as loan and make Acheson appear as guaranteeing repayment of "loan". Above conversion rate obviously obtained by dividing *won* figure by dollar figure as quoted in Deptel 238.[1]

MUCCIO

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[1] Further comments on the Korean reaction to the financial agreement were contained in despatch 106, October 5, from Seoul, which read, in part, as follows:

"The US decision to effect a partial settlement of the ROK's *won* advances to the UN Forces was announced to the Korean public last week as an 'advance refund of the entire Korean Government's loan to the UN Army.' The Secretary was quoted in the semi-official *Korea Times* as having promised Ambassador Yang that the 'US Navy and Airforce would follow the example of the Army in paying off their shares in the loan.' Yang also allegedly reported to Pusan that the other UN members having troops in Korea would follow suit in paying off their 'shares.' It is strongly implied in the above article that the ROK has recently received a definite commitment on 'repayment' of the entire 261 billion *won* (over 60 percent of the currency in circulation) which officials here claim has been advanced to the UN Forces (See Embtel 303, October 2).

"ROK officials have continuously misrepresented, deliberately or otherwise, the nature of the *won* advances and it is certain that the Korean public has accepted the transaction as a separate loan, unrelated to other financial obligations outstanding between the ROK and the UN Forces, which the UN Forces (i.e., the US) are obligated to repay in equivalent dollars or goods. That this misconception is shared by the National Assembly is evident from debates on the subject during the past three or four months. The local press has labored under the same misapprehension and, in turn, has helped propagate it. An editorial in the *Minju Sinbo*, in discussing the recent agreement to make a partial settlement of the *won* advances said, 'We thank the United States for this action although such loans should naturally be repaid to Korea.'

"The fact that the Department has supported an immediate partial settlement of the advances to assist the ROK in combatting inflation has probably been interpreted in some quarters here as tacit admission that there is a loan obligation. The Embassy considers it unfortunate that the Korean public has been led to accept the Government's interpretation of the *won* transaction. Key officials, including the Minister of Finance, with whom the US Embassy has discussed the matter, know the facts but appear to have taken no action to set the record straight." (795.00/10-551)

611.61/10-351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 3, 1951—8 p. m.

249. ReDeptel 239 Oct 2,[2] you are now instructed discuss with Vyshinsky Korean armistice talks on fol basis. You should not indicate any undue sense of urgency which might be construed as an overeagerness or weakening on our part.

You might begin by outlining your personal plans to Vyshinsky and state that before you leave Moscow for extended period you wld like take advantage opportunity discuss certain matters now causing internatl tension and standing in way improved relations between our two countries.

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[1] A manuscript notation in the source text read: "OK H[arry] S. T[ruman]." This telegram was repeated to London as telegram 1810, to Paris as telegram 1967, and to Tokyo as telegram 538.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 986.

At present most explosive outstanding issue is Korea and armistice talks are most immed aspect that problem. Cessation fighting in Korea on mutually acceptable basis wld serve reduce tension and contribute to atmosphere in which further constructive steps might be taken toward solution other pressing internatl problems.

You shld continue that developments between UN Command and North Korean and Chi Commie negotiators are incomprehensible to US Govt; that NK and Chi Commie proposals re armistice line are inconsistent with current mil situation and with statements which Gromyko made to you upon occasion your call on him June 27 to clarify earlier statement by Malik. In that interview Gromyko explained that Sov Govt envisaged meeting opposing commands to conclude mil armistice which wld include cease fire and which wld be limited strictly mil questions and wld not involve any polit or territorial matters (Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27).

UN Command surprised and disappointed discover that opposing negotiators kept insisting upon armistice line not strictly mil in character which introduced complicated polit and territorial issues contrary to understanding on which UN Command had entered negots and which does not conform to mil requirements for satis armistice line. To take important polit steps in mil conversations between UN Commander on one side and commanders on other professing represent something called Chi "volunteers" and a NK regime which enjoys no internatl status cannot be accepted. US Govt authorized UN Commander participate in such mil talks with thought that this wld provide Sov Govt opportunity assist bringing about armistice. This does not mean that US Govt is prepared dispose important polit matters in talks with such irregular Commie mil personnel. Polit issues of a Korean settlement must be dealt with subsequent to armistice by UN and by Govts concerned on a responsible basis.

You shld then go on say that attitude Commie bloc toward restoration peace will be tested by whether NK and Chi Commie negotiators are prepared reach armistice settlement based on purely mil factors; upon reasonable line affording measure safety armed forces both sides and upon adequate arrangements for inspection of compliance with armistice terms and for satis disposition of prisoners of war. Sov Govt must surely recognize that, as simple statement fact, breakdown armistice talks and resumption full scale fighting[3] Korea wld add greatly explosive character situation and might stimulate course of events which wld be undesirable from point view both our Govts. US Govt for its part has clearly shown by its declarations and its actions that it desires end conflict Korea and prevent its spreading other areas, purposes which Sov Govt has publicly stated it shares.

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[3] Telegram 250, October 4, to Moscow, directed Ambassador Kirk to eliminate the phrase "and resumption full scale fighting" (611.61/10–451).

This juncture you shld pause and wait for comment or retort your statements. Line taken by Vyshinsky will probably be defense Sov Govts position, of their constant striving for peace, of their non-involvement in Korean affair and they may also point out that Malik's speech specifically referred to 38th parallel and assert that Secy Acheson's statement before Congressional Comite in June indicated 38th parallel acceptable basis for concluding armistice. Shld they cite statements by Malik and Secy, you shld point out again statements made by Gromyko to you June 27 and fact such armistice line involves polit and territorial questions utmost importance. You shld add that of all problems and causes tension in post war world Korean problem presents clearest immed issue. Invasion SK June 25, 1950 act naked aggression—fact understood throughout world. Very fact NK army almost succeeded reaching Pusan early stages war demonstrates clearly upon whose responsibility aggression lay. However you have no desire now enter fruitless discussion concerning what has been done; what you wish impress upon him is seriousness present impasse Korean armistice talks. It is hoped Sov Govt will act to end that NK and Chi Commie negotiators will conclude realistic armistice agreement which wld afford safety for both sides and which does not become involved with polit and territorial issues with which Govts and UN must deal.

You might then remark you assume Sov Govt receiving full and objective reports concerning developments outside Sov Union and attitude US and other states confronted by Sov policies which have proved uncompromising and not contributory solution mutual problems. Sov Govt does not need be told that other nations determined defend their own way life and independence. Measures now being taken by US and other govts increase their security are for defense and defense alone. You wish assure Sov Govt that US has no aggressive designs on USSR or anyone and we hope there may soon be restored nations of world sense confidence and security which should be conducive settlement outstanding issues embittering internatl relations. Nothing cld contribute more to this as an immed first step than successful outcome Korean armistice talks.

You shld add that without achievement armistice Korea there is little if any prospect for any real solution other problems besetting us throughout world; that armistice Korea might open up perspectives for useful discussion other measures which may be taken alleviate existing tensions. You shld conclude by stating it is earnest hope US

Govt that armistice can be achieved and that Sov Govt will act to that end.

If you are pressed state what you mean concrete terms by "perspectives" you shld limit your reply to gen statement that you are not prepared this time go into concrete details or mention specific matters but you may allude to issues raised Paris mtgs Deputies and to other gen problems both inside and outside UN.

Above shld be restricted to oral comments and you shld not leave *aide-mémoire* with Vyshinsky.

London and Paris shld now inform Morrison and Schuman.[4]

WEBB

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[4] The substance of this telegram was transmitted on October 4 to the French Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office (telegram 2021, October 4, from Paris; telegram 1678, October 5, from London; Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tabs 116 and 120).

795.00/10-451

Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1951.

Subject: Report on trip to Japan and Korea with General Bradley

The following report will deal only with the high points of particular interest in my trip with General Bradley to Tokyo and Korea and will not attempt in detailed fashion to cover everything we saw and did while in the Far East.*

During this trip we had three full days of conferences with General Ridgway, members of his staff, and Admiral Joy and General Craigie, the chief UN negotiators in the truce talks. These conversations covered every aspect of the military intelligence and political situation in Korea with, of course, particular reference to the present status of the truce talks. The trip also involved a two-day visit to Korea during which we visited the entire front, every corps headquarters, and met with every divisional and UN contingent commander, with extensive briefings on every aspect of the military situation in the Eighth Army headquarters at Seoul. I accompanied General Bradley to all of these military meetings and would like to make recognition of the complete frankness with which the U.S. military in Japan and Korea made available to me all the information at their disposal and permitted me to participate in all the briefings given General Bradley.

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*In this report I have not covered such specific subjects as General Ridgway's views on "hot pursuit" or inspection as one of the conditions of an armistice since these have been covered in direct messages from him following our conversations in Tokyo. [Footnote in the source text.]

I. *The Military Situation*

1. Even before our visit to the front in Korea it became apparent that the military situation of the UN forces in Korea was considerably more favorable than we had obtained from the daily briefings. Certainly I and, to a lesser extent, General Bradley had left Washington with the feeling that the enemy had benefited more than the UN forces from the lull caused by the truce negotiations and therefore there was real urgency in (*a*) obtaining an armistice on acceptable terms as soon as possible, or (*b*) finding out as quickly as possible whether the Communists definitely did or did not desire an armistice. Both in General Ridgway's headquarters and, more particularly, in the Eighth Army and along the front we found complete confidence in the military capabilities and position of the UN forces. From General Van Fleet down to each divisional commander complete confidence was expressed in the ability of the UN forces to throw back with heavy losses any all-out offensive that the Communists might launch against our present positions. While it was admitted that the Communists (particularly the Chinese) had in reserve sufficient troops and had built up sufficient logistic support during the armistice talks to mount and sustain a major offensive, there was confidence bordering on absolute certainty that any such offensive was doomed to bloody failure due to (1) the present defensive strength of the UN line, and (2) the measures which had been undertaken by the UN command during the same period in the matters of supply, fortifications, etc.

The morale and state of training of the UN forces appeared to be extremely high and General Bradley told me he had rarely seen combat forces in better shape from every point of view. Another encouraging factor was the evident success of the ROK training program. The officers responsible for this training were very emphatic in their statements that the ROK divisions were developing extremely satisfactorily into first-class fighting units. There is still a shortage of competent officers, but these intensive training programs are gradually overcoming this deficiency. On the front itself, the local UN commanders likewise rated the fighting ability of the ROK divisions in the line very high.

2. In general discussions in Korea, particularly with Ambassador Muccio, it appeared that there is considerable evidence concerning the very serious, if not desperate, situation in North Korea. Some refugees are still trickling over and almost without exception they are in an advanced state of malnutrition and bring reports of serious economic difficulties, food shortages and great lack, both in Army and civilian population, of adequate clothing for winter. The UN troops are already well supplied with essential winter clothing and will be

fully supplied by the time the cold weather sets in whereas in North Korea and in the enemy armies there is considerable information that they will have an extremely hard time when the cold weather begins.

3. The only dark spot which relates to the future is, of course, in the air situation and particularly the steady buildup of MIGs at the Manchurian bases along the Yalu River. Up to the present time this MIG buildup has not interfered in any appreciable fashion with the air bombardment of North Korea, particularly the interdiction program on lines of communication which since August 15th has been on a carefully planned consistent basis.

In regard to the air, concern is felt not in the possibility of a massive air attack on the front lines to take away command of the air over the battlefront, but rather in the increasing weight of MIGs which is being brought to bear on our fighter screen protecting the B–26s carrying out the interdiction bombing on rail and road communications. As the MIG buildup continues, a point might arrive when there would be sufficient MIGs to engage our fighter screen and still have adequate force to attack our bombers. Up to the present this has not occurred and the 5th Air Force is still able to keep the North Korean airfields unoperational for MIGs through daily bombing.

The chief request made of General Bradley by the U.S. military in Korea was for an increase in air strength—specifically, one additional wing of B–26s to intensify effectiveness of the interdiction program and additional F–86s to counter the MIG buildup.

To sum up, except for this one concern for the future in regard to buildup of MIG strength, the military situation in Korea is extremely favorable for the UN. There were numerous indications that the position of the enemy on the ground was deteriorating; although having ultimate capabilities of a large-scale offensive, his activities in the past three months had been entirely defensive.

II. *Truce Talks*

I believe that our visit out there was very helpful to General Ridgway and his negotiators. Their chief concern was that due to political pressures in Washington they might be forced to take positions which in their eyes would amount to a surrender to Communist pressure, particularly in the matter of returning to Kaesong. (The issue concerning site had already been fully joined before we got there and General Ridgway had already been authorized from Washington to suggest an alternate site to Kaesong. While I felt and still do that this was an artificial issue, nevertheless, having been raised, there could be no question of forcing General Ridgway to return to that site under present conditions. Therefore, in our discussions in Tokyo, since this was already a *fait accompli*, we did not argue the point.)

We were successful, without any great difficulty, in getting General Ridgway's full concurrence to the next substantive proposal in the event that negotiations were resumed or even for possible submission by letter in the event that no further meetings took place. This is, in essence, the proposal we made by cable to which General Ridgway had objected, namely, that rather than start the negotiations on the basis of the previous position concerning the demilitarized zone, we would put forth a new proposal suggesting as the median line roughly the present battle line with a 4 kilometer neutral zone on either side. As matters stand, this is the proposal which will be made immediately upon the resumption of negotiations.

We found that General Ridgway and his negotiators felt they had made steady concessions to the Communists on procedural matters and had thus possibly created an appearance of weakness which the military situation did not justify. General Bradley and I tried to convince General Ridgway that this was not the impression in the United States and world public opinion. He felt this very strongly and I do not believe we fully dissuaded him.

The chief concern we feel in regard to the negotiations is that the question of site may turn out to be so difficult to resolve, in view of the issue of prestige and face which it has raised on both sides, as to be the cause of another suspension of talks. Since our return, the JCS have been considering a proposal that Kaesong should in fact be physically turned into a point half-way between the existing battle lines which would then satisfy the chief requirement of General Ridgway, with which we are in agreement, that the meeting-place should be equally accessible to both sides and assure equality of rights. If this should be turned down, there remains the possibility of having our new substantive proposal transmitted direct from General Ridgway by letter to Kim Il Sung.

My general impression (with the one qualification re MIG buildup) is that the present military situation is more favorable to the UN than to the enemy and that it could continue through this winter with greater disadvantage to the enemy. There would therefore appear to be no great need to hurry the talks and, indeed, the military situation would justify stringing them out, even in endless debate as to site. A complete breakdown in General Bradley's view would lead to a strong demand from American public opinion for some major military development which the situation from the purely military point of view does not require and justify. It would therefore be my recommendation that we continue to attempt to achieve an armistice on acceptable terms; although there is no great urgency to do so quickly, we should, if possible, avoid a complete breakdown. The continued loss of American lives, although low in terms of military operations, nevertheless, is a very important factor for the early conclusion of an armistice.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 118 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 4 October 1951—2:47 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–52190. Request clearance of or comment on substantially the following statement contemplated for inclusion in an appropriate public statement at some early date:

"In their own selfish pursuit of power, the Chinese Communist leaders are either treasonably overriding the real interests of the Chinese people, or are monumentally stupid in their failure to perceive inevitable Russian encroachments, already far advanced in Sinkiang, Mongolia and above all in Manchuria, upon the territorial heritage of the Chinese people."

Purpose is to continue at every opportunity efforts at splitting Red China from Russia.[1]

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[1] Attached to the source text was a note by U. Alexis Johnson, dated October 4, indicating that he had informed Col. Charles H. Ott of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G–2) that the Department of State felt Ridgway's idea to be a poor one and that the considerations set forth in telegram JCS 95862, July 19, were still largely valid.

On October 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following message to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 83355:

"From JCS.

"In general, substance of statement proposed ur C 52190 appears to be in line with United States policy. However, issuance of such a broad, political statement by a mil cdr is, under present circumstances, deemed inappropriate. Therefore, JCS do not concur in issuance of statement." (Black Book, Tab 119)

611.61/10–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—4:36 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

253. FYI only as background and for use only in event Vyshinsky raises question present impasse in resumption Korean armistice talks.[2]

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[1] Repeated for information to London as telegram 1823, to Paris as telegram 1979, and to Tokyo as telegram 543.

[2] Ambassador Kirk had already informed the Department in his telegram 577, October 4, from Moscow that he had an appointment to see Vyshinsky at 2 p. m. Moscow time on October 5 (611.61/10–451).

Vyshinsky may well repeat Commie charges concerning Amer responsibility for non-resumption talks and take position US insincere in desiring conclude armistice because its insistence upon change site of talks from Kaesong to another area.

In reply you may affirm UN Command is sincerely desirous conclude armistice; that past experience with Kaesong site fully illustrates fact this place does not afford adequate protection guaranteeing security negots; that UN Command's insistence upon another site which will not be under control either side and to which both sides will have free access shld eliminate possibility incidents and ensure talks can be resumed with good prospect success. In proposing discussion change of site from Kaesong, UN Command's sole purpose has been obtain resumption talks in truly neutral area with equality of rights and access and to obviate possibility of charges and counter charges concerning incidents which have plagued talks to this date. In eyes UN Command there is no reason why agreement on another site truly neutral cannot be quickly agreed upon by both sides and talks resumed.

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Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 111 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 4 October 1951—4:41 p. m.

C–52201. Fol msg rec fr Gen Kim Il Sung and Gen Peng Teh Huai released to press simultaneously Tokyo and CINCUNC Adv at 1700 local this date: Fol is trans Chinese text of msg received by Col Murray from Col Chang at Pan Mun Jom at 1000 hours 4 Oct "3 Oct 51 General Ridgway, Commander in Chief UNC: Your letter of reply dtd 27 Sep has been received.

"In your letter you again proposed anew to change the conference site, which was previously proposed by you on 6 Sep and already rejected by us in our letter dtd 11 Sep. We consider it (your proposal) entirely void of reason.

"To have Kaesong as the conference site was agreed upon by your side. The neutralization of Kaesong area was established by mutual agreement, also following your proposal on 13 Jul. Since then, other than the accidental incident that occurred on 4 Aug and which was expeditiously and realistically settled by us and considered satisfactory by your side, you have not raised any complaint concerning the neutralized condition of the Kaesong neutral zone. Since 22 Aug, the disruption of the Armistice Conference was caused only by your violations of the Kaesong neutral zone, thus rendering it impossible for the conference to make progress. Because your side had admitted the incident of violation of the Kaesong neutral area by the UNC on 10 Sep and had expressed your desire to responsibly settle the matter, we immediately proposed to resume conference. The immediate problem, therefore, is to resume the Kaesong Armistice Conference at once and at the meeting to stipulate strict agreement regarding the neutralization of Kaesong area, thus guaranteeing against future recurrence of such incidents of agreement violations. Branch details should not grow out from the main stem; therefore, you should not propose the new problem of changing the conference site. Everybody will easily discover that you deliberately violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area even though this was proposed by yourself. By following your proposal in changing the conference site, how can it be guaranteed that you will not again proceed to violate when you desire to disrupt or break the negotiations, and would not the state of negotiations only become worse? Therefore, the unreasonable demand proposed by you, if it is not to create a threat, then it merely is to create new pretexts to continue to prolong the negotiations. Our sincere and responsible attitude toward the negotiations is known the world over. However, whether or not the negotiations could be immediately resumed and smoothly attain fruitful results, that could not be unilaterally decided by our side alone. It is very obvious that only if your attitude toward the negotiations is as sincere and responsible as ours, and not to have any thwarting branch issues, will the negotiations attain a reasonable conclusion which should have no difficulty whatsoever and which is the anxious hope of all the peoples of the combatant nations.

"Therefore, I once again propose that the delegations of both sides immediately resume the conference at Kaesong. At the first meeting following the resumption of the conference, an appropriate machinery should be established to stipulate the strict agreement concerning the neutralization of the Kaesong area, and to assure its execution in order to benefit the progress of the armistice negotiations. Subsequent to your agreement, our Liaison Officers will meet your Liaison Officers to discuss the matter concerning the resumption of the conference at Kaesong by both delegations. Signed Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander Korean Peoples Army; Peng Teh Huai, Commander Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 112 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army

CONFIDENTIAL FLASH TOKYO, 4 October 1951—5:29 p. m.

CX-52202. The following will be released to the press at 0419301 October:

"Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai.

"Your letter to me dated 3 October 1951, in answer to my letter to you dated 27 September 1951, has been received.

"I have already made clear to you my views regarding the unsuitability of Kaesong as a conference site. Events have proved that equality of movement and control has not been and cannot be assured there. Satisfactory conditions for resumption of the armistice talks can only be insured by moving the conference site to an area which is not under the exclusive control of either side.

"Since you reject my suggestion to meet at Songhyon-Ni, I propose that our delegations meet at a site selected by you and acceptable to me approximately midway between our respective front lines where the armistice discussions, be promptly resumed, under the conditions stated in my message to you of 27 September 1951. Signed M. B. Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 117 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 October 1951—7:20 p. m.

C–52227. Urmsg JCS 95354, 30 June. Subj is Armistice Negotiations in Korea. This message in 7 parts.

Part 1. Reference message requires that terms of Armistice agreement provide for free and unlimited access to whole of Korea by armistice commission and teams of observers who must be empowered to inspect to insure that terms of armistice are carried out.

Part 2. Reference message also requires that the armistice agreements must contain stipulations restricting troop reinforcement and supply build-up. It is my feeling that this is of major importance and an armistice agreement should not be concluded without these stipulations. With this as a basis, UNC insistence on inspection is reasonable and consistent. However, I believe a clarification is required regarding the degree of inspection which the UNC must insist upon.

Part 3. Studies prepared here for determination of UNC courses of action for future discussions with the Communists regarding inspection conclude that:

a. The JCS directive regarding free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and the right of inspection to insure armistice terms are being carried out, can be interpreted as requiring the UNC to seek agreement to "unlimited inspection."

b. In the strict definition of the term, "unlimited inspection" is neither necessary nor desirable from our point of view. In essence, what we want is sufficient freedom of access and right of inspection in areas outside the demilitarized zone to insure that there is no build-up of troops or supplies in such significant quantities as would, if continued, substantially impair the security of the United Nations

Forces, as that security existed when the armistice became effective. The foregoing would include, but not be limited to, observation teams at selected ground, sea and air ports of entry. The right of unlimited inspection of any unit, facility or relatively small area would not be vital to the security of the United Nations Command, nor would it be in our interest to accord the Communists such right with respect to our own forces. Such detailed inspection would multiply serious causes for friction and recrimination with no comparable gain. In the hands of Communist personnel, the right of "unlimited inspection" would be exploited to a wholly unacceptable degree in the intelligence field.

Part 4. Communist views on inspection principle, as brought out in discussions to date, are that good faith alone is sufficient security guarantee for both sides; however, they have indicated a willingess to accept inspection of the demilitarized zone regardless of its width.

Part 5. Communists have consistently resisted observation or inspection of their activities in territory under their direct control. They can be expected to prolong negotiations and may even be prepared to break them off if UNC insists upon unlimited inspection. Depending on the agreement reached on agenda item 2, the UNC may find it desirable to accept less than the ideal solution on inspection unless the UNC is authorized to break negotiations on this point. If this is not the case, it might be desirable to consider alternate positions on inspection.

Part 6. The UNC delegation will be aided throughout the negotiations if it is advised now of any likely change of your views. In my view, the minimum rights of inspection consistent with reasonably safeguarding the security of our forces would be about as follows:

Initial position.

a. Observation by joint observer teams at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the 2 delegations together with freedom of movements for the above teams over principle lines of communication throughout all of Korea.

b. Joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

c. Complete joint observation of demilitarized zone.

Final position. Identical with my initial position except for the omission of joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

Part 7. This matter has been discussed informally with General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen, who concur that this matter should be given immediate study. I recommend you review that part of reference directive pertaining to free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. Request your guidance.[1]

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[1] The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following reply in telegram JCS 83302, October 5:

"From JCS.

"Reur C 52227. JCS agree in principle that clarification of your instructions re inspection is in order; however, are undertaking review of same before making complete reply. Any additional views you may have on this matter would be appreciated." (Black Book, Tab 123)

General Ridgway responded on the following day, October 6, in telegram C–52373, saying that he appreciated the attention given to the problem but had no further recommendation at this time (Black Book, Tab 124).

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following message in telegram JCS 84817, October 23:

"From JCS. JCS agree that references in JCS 95354 to 'Free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea' might be interpreted as 'Unlimited inspection' and that in strict definition of term, unlimited inspection is neither necessary nor desirable from our point of view. Therefore, your initial position as expressed in Part 6 of C 52227 regarding minimum rights of inspection is approved. Modification of this position will require decision here based on situation as negotiations develop." (Black Book, Tab D) See also telegram Def–88059, November 26, p. 1184.

795.00/9–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants: *Defense:* General Omar Bradley, Chairman, JCS
Admiral William Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations
General Hull
General Joseph Smith, Dept. of the Air Force
State: Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor
Mr. Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Dep. Asst. Secretary, FE
Mr. John Ferguson, S/P
Mr. Charles Stelle, S/P

General Bradley read portions of a personal "eyes only" message[1] which he had just received from General Ridgway, in which he indicated that as we had up to now in effect conceded virtually all procedural issues to the other side he felt that it would be impossible for us to return to Kaesong. Therefore, in order that he could conduct his present negotiations over the site with confidence and with full assurances on this point, General Ridgway was asking General Bradley to obtain the assurances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would not at any time in the future be overruled and directed to return to Kaesong.

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[1] Not printed.

General Bradley indicated that he was of the belief that we should not be placed in the position of having definitively broken off negotiations solely on the question of Kaesong and suggested that the Army study the possibility of our proposing to the Communists that we move some of our forces up to the southern perimeter of the Kaesong neutralized area (to be withdrawn to their original positions upon the conclusion of the armistice talks). It was General Bradley's thought that this would be consistent with our proposal for a meeting place between the lines with equal access to both sides and might provide the basis for agreement if the Communists continue to be adamant in their insistence upon Kaesong. With the agreement of those present, General Bradley indicated that he would reply personally to General Ridgway's message assuring him that there was no disposition in the Government to change his present instructions with regard to the site of the talks or to order him to return to Kaesong, but at the same time indicating that we did not now deem it necessary or desirable to take the position that at no time and under no circumstances would we ever return to Kaesong. General Bradley also indicated that he intended to reaffirm to General Ridgway our thought on the importance of not being placed in the position of having broken off the talks solely on the issue of return to Kaesong and placing the emphasis upon our willingness to meet with the Communists at any suitable site thereby placing on them any onus of breaking on the issue of Kaesong.

General Bradley showed the group a map illustrating the 4-kilometer demilitarized zone proposal which General Ridgway has been authorized to make at a suitable occasion, the Kansas line, the present line of contact, and the objectives of the present limited offensive in the west central sector of the front.

There was some general discussion of the present military situation from which it appeared that the concensus was that the UN military position was very strong and therefore there was no immediate urgency for concluding the armistice talks.

The Joint Chiefs stated that they had received a message[2] from General Ridgway with respect to the necessity for inspection of Communist-held areas after armistice agreement, in which General Ridgway had indicated his belief that it was not essential that we have the right throughout all of North Korea. However, from the discussion it appeared that General Ridgway may consider that a minimum position on this point should include some manner of inspection of designated airfields and ports of entry into North Korea. The Joint Chiefs stated that, based on General Ridgway's recommendations, they were having a study of this subject immediately undertaken.

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[2] *Supra.*

There was some inconclusive discussion of the prisoners of war problem, including the problem of North Korean prisoners held by us whose homes were in South Korea, and the considerable number of Chinese prisoners who were said to be strongly opposed to being returned to Communist hands. A suggestion was made but not discussed that a solution might be release in the demilitarized zone of prisoners held by both sides so that the prisoners could opt which way they wanted to go.

Admiral Fechteler stated that he had just received figures indicating that from January through July, 1951, there have been some seven million tons of shipping (1,240 vessels) entered in Chinese Communist ports. He said these vessels were principally flying Panamanian and British flags. He indicated his belief that if this shipping were stopped by a naval blockade the Chinese could be persuaded quickly to conclude the armistice negotiations on terms acceptable to us. In response to questions, he indicated that he was thinking in terms of a genuine naval blockade of all Chinese ports except Port Arthur and Dairen to be enforced against all vessels, including those of the Soviet Union, and that sufficient naval strength to carry this out was available. The State Department representatives stated that this problem was principally one of UK attitudes, that no decisive action of this nature could be expected of the UK until after the general election and that the question had to be considered in relation to the Iranian problem.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 121 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, October 5, 1951—6 p. m.

586. Ref Embtel 577, October 4, repeated London 78, Paris 156, Tokyo 5.[1] I saw Vyshinsky today from 2 to 2:45. After preliminary remarks concerning my departure and travel plans I referred to my visit with Vyshinsky September 6 concerning Amer nationals in Chi (ref Deptel 227, September 28)[2] and expressed hope Sov Govt could soon notify US that request had been received favorably. Vyshinsky replied that unfortunately (he repeated the word) he not now able to give reply. I then made oral statement in accordance Deptel 249,

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 994.

[2] Not printed. For documentation on Americans imprisoned in China, see pp. 1474 ff.

October 3 adding suggested comment Deptel 253, October 4, in view line of discussion and Vyshinsky reaction.

Vyshinsky said that "note" would require careful study which would take time. I repeated that communication was not "note" but a verbal statement for Mr. Stalin's attention (he then asked for copy of statement and said that if I wanted immediate reply he could provide it.)

I reiterated that I was instructed by my govt to ask that my remarks be brought to attention Stalin. Vyshinsky more than once endeavored obtain a written copy of my remarks, at first indicating he could not accept responsibility for transmittal of statement to which US Govt attached great importance on the basis of his own notes. Finally toward end of conversation Vyshinsky assured me he would transmit content my remarks to Stalin. Verbal fencing regarding question of written copy of remarks occupied considerable portion of conversation.

Vyshinsky agreed undesirable enter discussion past events but said it necessary for him to "re-establish the truth" with regard to certain remarks in my statement not factually correct. For example remark concerning North Korean invasion—Sov Govt has shown that invasion was from South Korea, by South Koreans and interventionists. Further if Korean talks are at impasse responsibility rests with Amer side, with Ridgway. He said he could not understand why Amer command is protracting negots.

He continued that he could not understand why Kaesong not a suitable place for negots nor why US Govt addresses itself to Sov Govt but not North Korean Govt. Also how could question of armistice line be a political question since it is a question of negots for mil armistice. Proof of Sov Govt interest in matter is that it was initiator of proposal for armistice negots. There could be no doubt that Sov Govt would like to see negots completed satisfactorily. Sov Govt reciprocates in wish expressed by Amer Amb re US Govt desire for ceasefire. He noted that US has no aggressive intent against USSR and was pleased hear this statement, but many facts speak to contrary. If facts were same as words then all would be well.

I reiterated the sincerity of our statement to which Vyshinsky replied rather mockingly "all our statements are sincere". I stated that uncompromising attitude Sov Govt around world has not contributed to settlement our mutual problems. When Vyshinsky in usual fashion asked for example of Sov Govt's uncompromising attitude I replied that I not prepared cite chapter and verse, that history of Soviet Government's attitude in UN and elsewhere not such as to lead to reasonable solution world problems. He continued maintain he did not understand and referred to US–USSR commercial treaty and fact that it was not Sov Govt that had broken it.[2] He continued that it is well known that "trade affairs" are best basis for good relations. I cited as example uncompromising attitude negots in Paris last spring. When Vyshinsky asked who was responsible for ending negots I replied flatly that the USSR was. He said he felt two parties responsible, the US and UK (when interpreter reversed order Vyshinsky smilingly insisted on giving US priority). Vyshinsky referred to my remark re possibility breakdown armistice talks "might stimulate course events undesirable from point of view both our govts" as "possibly causing repercussions in relations our two govts" and continued, "How should we understand this—as a threat?" I replied quickly and emphatically, "certainly not" but should be understood rather as statement of fact. I said I was sure he well enough versed in history to know that limited wars have often spread. He said he understood that remarks should not be construed as threat and as regards spread of limited war, that depended on persons concerned.

I referred to an earlier remark and asked if it is correct that the USSR and the USA agreed that Korean war should not get out hand. He replied affirmatively and repeated that USSR had proposed armistice talks; it was not a US proposal. I replied that US had accepted proposal to which he said "Good, you must now go forward".

I said that we felt a point has been reached where if Soviet influence were put behind matter the Korean negots could be successfully concluded. He replied that we should come to an agreement with North Koreans, stating that Soviet Union is not a participant in negots. I called his attention to fact that USSR had diplomatic representation in North Korea and at Peking. His only response was that USSR has many connections, for example with US and that it cannot of course influence US Govt policy.

I concluded by repeating two points. First that Stalin should be particularly informed of my statement, which was specifically authorized by US Govt, that US intentions are not aggressive towards USSR. Second, that US Govt feels that if Sov Govt would assist with its good offices and good will Korean problem could be settled. He mentioned that USSR has always felt "good will" toward settlement Korean problem as soon as possible as was proved by Sov initiation proposal armistice negots. Finally I asked him to inform Stalin of my regret that I did not have opportunity to say farewell to him and expressed appreciation for everything done for me in this country.

Vyshinsky seemed be impressed with importance my statement and took copious notes. I think we can rest assured that content my remarks will receive attention of highest Soviet authorities.

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[2] Reference is to the announcement on June 23 by the United States of intent to terminate the commercial agreement of August 4, 1937; see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 16, 1951, p. 95. For information, see the editorial note under date of June 5 in the compilation on Eastern European Multilateral Relations in volume IV.

I twice endeavored draw him out on his possible attendance Paris UN without much success.

Although very businesslike re my statement, conversation was held in atmosphere of relative congeniality.

Dept pass London, Paris. Sent niact Dept 586, rptd info niact London 80, niact Paris 16.

KIRK

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 125 : Telegram

The Advance Headquarters of the United Nations Command, Korea, to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY KOREA, 7 October 1951—5:25 p. m.

HNC 340. Following is translation of Korean text of message received by Col Murray from Col Chang at Pan Mun Jom at 071500I Oct. 7 Oct 51.

To General Ridgway Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces. We received your letter of 4 Oct on 5 Oct. We have already twice sufficiently explained, in our letters of 11 Sep and 3 Oct, that there is no reason for changing the Kaesong conference site. Moreover, in this letter you failed to present any new reasons why Kaesong was not suitable as the conference site. Therefore, we can see that the demand regarding changing the conference site fundamentally cannot be formulated. However, in your letter you demanded for the third time that the site be moved to another place. If this sort of demand is not to continue to delay the negotiations, it is just to evade the responsibility of disposing of the continuous provocation actions in which your side violated the Kaesong Neutral Zone Agreement, by changing the target. However, as a matter of fact, the incidents in which your side violated the Kaesong Neutral Zone Agreement are entered in the records of history and can by no means be eliminated even though the conference site be changed. Moreover, the responsibility which your side should assume concerning such incidents cannot be evaded even if the conference site is changed.

As everyone knows, the immediate problems are: to resume the armistice negotiations immediately; to prevent the recurrence of the incidents in which your side violated the agreement in the past; and by the delegates of both sides meeting at the conference table and strictly regulating the agreement regarding the neutralization of the conference site zone and the agreement concerning the security of the conference site. Especially, both sides should assume the whole responsibility for the agreement. It will not be acceptable again for your side, making the excuse that you have no responsibility for this zone, to destroy it at will and deny it, restricting our side only, as you have in the past.

For this object, and in order to test once again whether your side has good faith towards the armistice negotiations we will again make an effort. We now propose to you as follows: Namely, we propose that the scope of the neutrality of the conference site be expanded to a rectangular zone to include Kaesong and Munsan, that the conference site be moved to Pan Mun Jom, and that both sides assume the responsibility of protecting the conference site. At the same time, we propose that the delegates of both sides resume the conference immediately at Pan Mun Jom, and at the first meeting after the resumption of the conference make regulations concerning expansion of the scope of the neutral zone and the principles concerning the security of the conference site; that by establishing appropriate machinery in which both sides participate, concrete and strict regulations be discussed; and that by guaranteeing their enforcement the smooth progress of the armistice negotiations be assured. After you agree to our proposal our liaison officers will immediately meet your liaison officers to discuss matters concerning the resumption of the conference by both delegations.

Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean Peoples Army, Peng Teh Huai Commander Chinese Peoples Volunteers, certified signed by both commanders. (S) Nam Il General Nam Il, Senior Delegate Korean Peoples Army, Chinese Peoples Volunteers Delegations.

795.00/10–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951.

Subject: Various Topics Concerning Korea

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 4:30 this afternoon by prior appointment. He opened the conversation by referring to an item appearing recently in the *New York Times* indicating that the Secretary had presented to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee certain background material on the question of the recognition of Communist China, including information on the British position at the time of their act of recognition in 1949. Mr. Tomlinson stated that he was raising this question solely on his own initiative and not on instructions from his Government. He wished, however, to be in a position to reply to any inquiries in this regard which the Embassy might receive from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Rusk replied that we had, in fact, orally reviewed the U.S. position in 1949 on recognition of Communist China in a recent confidential session of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee but that we had not left any documents with the subcommittee.[1] Mr. Rusk further explained that, in discussing the British attitude at that time toward recognition, we had presented the general background of the reasons for British action in this regard, which Mr. Rusk understood had subsequently been made public by the British Government itself. He, therefore, did not believe that any breach of confidence had resulted from this action and stated that if confidential matters in connection with this question were, in fact, to have been raised publicly the Department would, of course, have taken action to consult with the British Government. Mr. Tomlinson expressed his satisfaction with this explanation.

Mr. Tomlinson then referred to Ambassador Kirk's farewell visit to Mr. Vyshinsky and showed Mr. Rusk a communication from the British Foreign Office in which surprise was expressed that the Department had not seen fit to consult the British Government in advance as to the nature of Ambassador Kirk's proposed representations on Korea. Mr. Tomlinson then inquired as to the nature of the outcome of Ambassador Kirk's conversation with Mr. Vyshinsky.

Mr. Rusk replied by first explaining that we had not consulted the British in advance because the general nature of the position to be put forward did not represent any departure from a policy towards the Korean problem already firmly established and concurred in by both the British and United States governments and that, furthermore, the imminence of Ambassador Kirk's departure from Moscow and his farewell call at the Soviet Foreign Office had precluded any opportunity for discussion of the matter with the British Government beforehand. Mr. Rusk remarked that he gathered from the British Foreign Office communication that the American Embassy, had given it an accurate reflection of the character of Ambassador Kirk's representations and he assumed that the information concerning the outcome of the discussions would also be made available to it through our Embassy. Mr. Rusk then reviewed in detail for Mr. Tomlinson's benefit the nature of Ambassador Kirk's comments upon his conversation with Mr. Vyshinsky.

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[1] See *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 624 ff. See also the editorial note, p. 1810.

Mr. Tomlinson inquired as to our impression concerning the significance of Vyshinsky's replies to Ambassador Kirk and noted that Ambassador Kirk had stressed the desirability of having Mr. Vyshinsky call certain of the topics discussed to the personal attention of Prime Minister Stalin, a feature of the conversation of which Mr. Tomlinson believed his Foreign Office to be unaware. Mr. Rusk confirmed that Ambassador Kirk had been instructed to request Vyshinsky to convey certain of the points which he was raising to Stalin. He remarked that Mr. Vyshinsky's reaction to the points put forward by Ambassador Kirk appeared rather inconclusive and obscure.

Mr. Rusk then raised the question of whether our action in keeping the British closely informed on Ambassador Kirk's representations might not cause embarrassment to the Department from the other Commonwealth countries, not similarly informed, if this fact became known to them. Mr. Tomlinson did not feel that this was a likely possibility.

Mr. Rusk then commented briefly on the military situation in Korea and upon the latest information which had been received indicating that General Ridgway had accepted the Communists' latest proposal for a change of site to Panmunjom, pointing out, however, that we had not received the official text of this reply. He also remarked that there would not appear to be any direct connection between Communist willingness to compromise on the site for a renewal of the negotiations on the one hand, and Ambassador Kirk's representations to Vyshinsky on the other, although it was possible that some influence might later be exerted by the Soviets, as a result, upon substantive issues which might subsequently be raised in the negotiations. Mr. Rusk further explained that the discussions of General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen with General Ridgway had been for the purpose of establishing a better mutual understanding of the over-all picture with regard to the developments in Korea, with particular reference to the policy considerations surrounding the armistice negotiations.

Mr. Tomlinson remarked that from the press and other available sources one got the impression that the UN military position in Korea was not particularly favorable at this time. Mr. Rusk stated that this impression was not accurate, that our position was far stronger than was being reflected in the news and that we had perhaps made an error in stressing only enemy capabilities in the Ambassadors' briefings which gave an unbalanced picture of the situation and which he thought might be corrected. Mr. Rusk then informed Mr. Tomlinson that our military authorities were reviewing the problem of inspection as related to a cease-fire, with the thought that such inspection might be more practicably applied by employing a type of "bottle-neck" approach wherein inspection teams would concentrate on critical transportation and supply points such as harbors, important bridges, etc.

Mr. Tomlinson then raised the question of a proposed British appeal to Prime Minister Nehru to use his influence with the Chinese Communist regime in facilitating the entrance of International Red Cross representatives into North Korea for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of UN prisoners of war. Mr. Tomlinson stated that he had recently discussed this question with Mr. Alexis Johnson and that the British Foreign Office was interested in determining whether the United States would perceive any objection to such a course of action and, if no objection were perceived, whether we would desire to associate ourselves with such an approach. He explained that the approach was envisaged in two phases, first that Prime Minister Nehru would seek to obtain Chinese Communist assistance for the entry of International Red Cross officials into North Korea; second, failing an agreement to this, Nehru would then bespeak the cooperation of the Chinese Red Cross in the handling of packages and mail for UN prisoners of war.

Mr. Rusk replied that he had been informed of the British proposal and that, in general, the Department of State could see no objection to the British approach; furthermore, if the British considered that it would be of assistance for the United States Government to associate itself with this approach, we would be inclined to do so, but that we should not be inclined to do so unless the British Government felt a substantial benefit would ensue. Mr. Tomlinson added that the British approach would, of course, be on the basis of an effort to ameliorate the condition of all prisoners of war and not just those of Great Britain. He asked Mr. Rusk's opinion as to whether the other participating UN governments should be apprised of the British proposal. Mr. Rusk was of the opinion that at least for the present this would not be necessary or desirable.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 2 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 8 October 1951—6:35 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-52498. This msg in 2 parts. Ref CINCFE C 51981, 1 October 51.

Part 1. Translation of msg received from Kim and Peng has been forwarded to you by mymsgs HNC 340[1] and ZX 41988.[2]

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[1] Dated October 7, p. 1004.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the text as broadcast over Peking radio.

Part 2. I will release the fol msg to the press simultaneously at Tokyo and CINCUNC Adv at 2030 I 8 October and an authenticated copy will be delivered to the Communist Liaison Officers as soon as practicable thereafter:

"Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai:

"1. Your msg of 7 October 1951 has been received. I refer you to my previous msgs and again categorically state that the responsibility for the delay in the negotiations during the past several weeks is yours.

"2. In my msgs to you of 27 Sep and 4 October, I stated the fundamental condition which must exist in order to insure equality of control and equality of movement to, from and within the conference site. That condition is, I repeat, that the conference site be situated approximately midway between our respective front lines. Only so, can each side be expected to discharge its share of responsibility for the security of the approaches to the conference site and the security of the site itself.

"3. In regard to your proposed expansion of the neutral zone, it is my view that all that is now necessary is a small neutral zone around the new conference site, with Kaesong, Munsan and the roads to Pan Mun Jom from Kaesong and Munsan free from attack by both sides.

"4. In the belief that a site in the immediate vicinity of Pan Mun Jom will meet the fundamental condition of equality of movement and control that you will share my views regarding its neutrality I am instructing my Liaison Officers to meet with yours at 1000 hours on 10 October for the purpose of discussing matters concerning the resumption of negotiations by our respective delegations. Signed M B Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command."

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 3: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRIORITY TOKYO, 10 October 1951—8:49 a. m.

ZX-42399. Reds want immediate resumption of talks. (Peiping radio, English, 0700, 10 Oct, radio press)

General Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on October 9 addressed a reply to Ridgway's answer of October 8. The full text follows:

M. B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces:

We received your message of October 8 on the 9th. You again try in your message to shift the responsibility onto our side for dragging out the armistice negotiations. We consider this statement of yours as completely invalid.

In our previous messages to you we have very clearly given the facts and the reasons which showed that the responsibility for drawing out the armistice negotiations rests entirely with your side and which your side cannot in any way deny. Nor in this message of yours are you able to bring forward any new reasons. Thus, it is evident that solid facts cannot be discarded by your arbitrary statement and the responsibilities which devolve on your side cannot in any way be thrown off.

In the past your side used the agreement on the neutrality of the armistice conference site merely to restrict our side while your side deliberately violated it and then denied on the pretext that you had any responsibility regarding the area. We had, therefore, proposed that the scope of the armistice conference neutral zone be extended to a rectangular area including Kaesong and Munsan with both sides taking responsibility and that the conference site be removed to Panmunjom with both sides equally responsible for safeguarding its security.

Since your message agrees to the Panmunjom area as the conference site and expresses your willingness to carry out equal and responsible control by both sides the question of extending the neutral zone between Kaesong and Munsan may be resolved for settlement at the conference of the delegations of both sides.

Therefore, the two delegations should immediately resume their armistice negotiations in Panmunjom and as proposed in the previous message at their first meeting draw up the principles extending the scope of the neutral zone and safeguarding the security of the conference site and the setting up of appropriate machinery to solve the various conference questions concerned.

We have instructed our liaison officers to meet your liaison officers at 10 A. M. on October 10 to discuss the matter concerning the resumption of the conference by the delegations of both sides.

Signed: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

895B.10/10–1051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 10, 1951—5:22 p. m.

276. Dept today presented Yang with check for $12,155,714 who accepted the terms of payment as contained in *aide-mémoire* by sign-

ing receipt set forth in Deptel 238.[1] Dept issued fol press release which was agreed with Amb Yang:

> "The United States has paid to the Government of the ROK $12,155,714 in settlement for 63,051,922,270 *won*, Korean currency which has been made available by the ROK through Jul 31, 1951 for direct sale to US personnel, for their personal expenditures, it was announced today by the Depts of State, Defense and Treas.
>
> "The payment is without prejudice to settlement for other amounts of currency made available by the ROK under terms of the Financial Agreement of Jul 28, 1950.
>
> "The Financial Agreement provides that negots for settlement of any claims shall be deferred to a time or times mutually satis to the US and to the ROK. The payment to the Govt of the ROK at this time is intended to assist the Korean Govt in supplying essential commodities for the war-torn Korean economy, over and above the types of relief supplies being brought in by the UN Command."

Acheson

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[1] Dated September 26, p. 964.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 4 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL EMERGENCY Tokyo, 10 October 1951—7 : 31 p. m.

C–52616. Subj is summary of liaison officers meeting today. Party arrived Panmunjom at 1000. Met at check point by Communist liaison officers who were accompanied by press corps and other military personnel, all in winter uniforms. Communists had erected large conference tent in field across the road from check point (houses at BI 951033). Chang opened meeting proposing following agenda items: Facilities, selection of site, time and date of resumption of talks. Murray added item security arrangements. Chang presented proposals for "provisional arrangements" for resumption of conference which follow: "Memorandum to the liaison officers of the United Nations Command Delegation.

> "1. The date and time for the resumption of the conference of the delegations is to be discussed and determined by the liaison officers of both sides.
>
> "2. The specific site where the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vic of Panmunjom is to be discussed and decided on the spot by the liaison officers of both sides.
>
> "3. Provisional arrangements for the resumption of the conference of the delegations: A circular area with Panmunjom bridge as center and half a mile as radius, to be kept free from all armed personnel; the United Nations Command shall be responsible for the sector east

of Panmunjom Bridge (taking the Sanchon River crossed by Panmunjom bridge as the dividing line), and the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers shall be responsible for the sector west of Panmunjom bridge. Order in the conference site area, outside of the conference site itself, to be maintained by unarmed personnel of either side respectively. Order in the conference site to be maintained jointly by a small nbr of unarmed personnel of both sides.

"4. Tents and facilities for the site of the resumed conference of the delegations will be provided, and the conference room arranged, by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

Murray stated these generally acceptable, but that details of para 3 would be dependent upon exact locations selected for facilities and proposed that the meeting be adjourned to the bridge to view the terrain. Both parties followed by press walked from conf area to bridge (apprx ½ mile). Murray attempted to arouse interest in placing conference tent at center of zone proposed by Communists i.e. the center of the bridge with delegations using areas at end of bridge. Response largely negative.

Parties returned to tent and resumed. Murray expressed willingness to accept site preferred by Communists for conference tent, but only if center of circle defining zone was placed on the spot. Murray agreed to permit Communists to be responsible for conference tent but that UNC delegation would provide its own separate facilities. Murray then stated UNC also had proposals to make on matters pertaining to resumption of armistice negotiations and read the following: "Proposed agreement on matters pertaining to resumption of armistice negotiations in the vic of Panmunjom. The following agreement on matters pertaining to the resumption of armistice negotiations in the vic of Panmunjom is entered into by both delegations:

"1. As used herein, 'the Panmunjom Conference area' is defined as a circular area having a radius of about 1,000 yrds centered on the conference meeting place. No armed personnel except military police as agreed upon below are to be permitted in the conf area.

"2. The forces of both sides will refrain from acts of armed forces:

"*a*. Within the Panmunjom conf area.

"*b*. Along the Munsan-Ni Panmunjom-Kaesong road as indicated on attached map.

"*c*. Against the UNC delegation camp area at Munsan-Ni and against the city of Kaesong, as indicated on the attached map.

"3. Both delegations and their parties shall have free access and free movement to and within the Panmunjom conf area.

"4. Designated officers of both sides will be jointly responsible for the security and preservation of order within the conference area while the delegation party is present. Each side will provide a military police detachment of 2 off and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties. Military police will be armed with small arms only.

"5. It is recognized that each side is responsible for the protection of its delegation party from partisan activity enroute to and from the conf area and within its own lines.

"6. All previous security agreements, and agreements regarding the Kaesong conf area and neutral zone are rescinded and superseded by the foregoing security provisions.

"7. The physical facilities, and communication and administrative arrangements, with respect to the negotiations and the conference area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides.

"8. The composition of the delegation party of each side shall be as decided by the senior delegate of that delegation.

"9. The right to conduct complete and unrestricted investigation at the location of reported violations of the above agreements shall be accorded designated representatives from each side. Their reports will be submitted to their respective delegations."

This brought to the fore the fundamental difference in the interpretation of the phrase "matter concerning the resumption of negotiations by our respective delegations" as used by the Communist and UNC Commanders in their letters of 7 and 8 Oct and the resulting difference in the instructions held by their Liaison Officers. Chang sought to bring about agreement on those provisional arrangements necessary to bring the delegations together. Murray stated that the UNC proposal contained those matters which were related to the resumption of the negotiations and which must be determined prior to the meeting of the delegates. Communists cited Kim-Peng letter of 9 Oct as having a bearing on the terms of reference of this meeting. Murray stated letter only received this morning and he unfamiliar with contents. Murray stated he was present under instructions based upon exchange of letters ending with General Ridgway's letter of eighth. On the basis of these instructions he had presented CINCUNC proposal on conditions which must be agreed upon before negotiations could be resumed. Since other side unprepared to consider these matters he proposed a recess to permit each side study proposal and secure additional guidance. Chang agreed. After lengthy and repetitious discussion of scope of liaison meeting both sides arose. Chang, referring to copy of UNC proposed agreement and map which had been handed him by Col Murray during conference indicated that he would not accept them and said, "If you leave these here someone will pick them up." Murray replied that the proposals contained therein were already a matter of record and that the sheet handed him was merely confirmatory (true in the case of the agreement, but not the map). Chang still refused to accept the agreement or the map on the grounds that proposals contained therein exceeded scope of meeting. Discussion became animated. At this point there was a significant development. Without looking at Col Chang, Lt Col Tsai stepped forward from his seat at the table and with a conciliatory tone and manner stated, among other things, that there was no objection on their part to accepting the subj papers and then put them into his folder. As Chang stood silently by the table Lt Col Tsai courteously escorted Col Murray to the door of the tent.

With Communist approval all UNC equipment was removed from Kaesong to Munsan today with the exception of one tent which was erected at the east end of the Panmunjom Bridge.

For your information, Lt Col Tsai is Chinese; we attach some significance to his actions during todays meeting of the Liaison Officers.

Liaison meetings will resume at 111000I.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 5 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 11 October 1951—5 : 43 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-52688. Subject is summary of liaison officers meeting this morning. Met at 1000. Chang opened referring to large area of agreement and expressing hope of further progress. Murray replied: "On several occasions during yesterday's meeting Colonel Chang cited the letter from Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai dated 9 October as constituting a portion of the terms of reference for these liaison meetings. My superiors are now thoroughly familiar with the contents of that letter. My instructions have not been altered. Colonel Chang stated yesterday that it is the view of your side that the current objective of the liaison meetings is to create provisionally a favorable environment under which the delegates can be brought together. The United Nations Command agrees wholeheartedly in this objective in so far as it goes but it is not enough to bring the delegates together. The objective of the United Nations Command in these meetings is to create an environment under which the delegates can not only come together but can remain together in harmony and proceed immediately to the discussion of the substantive issues of the armistice negotiations without wasting time in procedural matters such as security arrangements. It is recognized by your side, as well as ours, that the transfer of the meeting place from Kaesong to Pan Mun Jom creates a requirement for modifications in the security agreements associated with the conference. It is our view that the progress of the negotiations can be expedited by arriving at these agreements in draft form through the liaison meetings. The proceedings of the plenary session of the delegations are necessarily formal. They do not lend themselves readily to the settlement of the details of agreements such as those pertaining to the arrangements for the meeting. The liaison meetings, on the other hand, constitute an informal medium of exchange where differences in detail can be quickly and easily resolved. Such matters have been handled in this way in the past. For these reasons it is the position of the United Nations Command that all matters pertaining to the resumption of the negotiations should be the subject of the draft agreement reached through the liaison meetings prior to the time that the delegates meet. The United Nations Command has submitted its proposed agreements to your side for its consideration. We propose that this be used for the basis of an agreement to be drawn up by the liaison officers for submission to the delegations. Thus at their first meeting the only work for the delegates in this regard would be the ratification of the agreements reached by us or the settlement of any differences in our respective points of view.

We are prepared to consider any proposals you may care to make on matter related to the resumption of the negotiations."

Meeting thereafter consisted largely of exploration of area agreement. Communists now prepared to accept in substance paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of United Nations Command proposal as expressed in C 52616. They will accept 2*a* and 2*b* with the deletion of Kaesong. They believe inclusion of Kaesong unnecessary. With regard to 2*c* they consider no agreement needed on Kaesong as it is covered by existing agreement. They will give a general assurance not to attack Munsan but will not as yet associate it with the specific area shown on map presented them yesterday since "this involves the question of the enlargement of the neutral zone which is to be covered in the first meeting of the delegations". No agreement on 5. Communist liaison officers continue to refuse to discuss paragraphs 6 and 9 on grounds they should be discussed by delegates.

Morning session was adjourned at 1200. Will resume at 1500. Afternoon may result in a draft agreement which will contain subjects on which agreement has been reached and United Nations Command version of matters in which agreement has not been reached. Anticipate limited agreement as indicated above on 2*b* and *c*, but anticipate difficulty in securing agreement on 5, 6 and 9 at this time.

Murray will contend the area of agreement is too limited and will continue to press for all United Nations Command proposals.[1]

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[1] The press release issued by the U.N. Command following the conclusion of the second meeting on October 11 indicated no substantial progress had been made in the discussions (telegram ZX-42964, October 12, from Tokyo: Black Book, Tab 7).

IO Files : Lot 71D440, Box 19247

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/367

UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST AGGRESSION IN KOREA (ALTERNATIVE I—IF THERE IS NO ARMISTICE)

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position of the United States as to possible action by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in regard to the United Nations action against aggression in Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question, and should seek to maintain the maximum United Nations support for the United Nations action in Korea and for the measures necessary to achieve United Nations objectives there.

2. If armistice negotiations are definitely terminated, the United States should be prepared, together with other key delegations, to sponsor a resolution which would

a. Take note of the report of the Commanding General on the failure of armistice discussions;
b. Express concern that the aggressors have refused to agree to an honorable armistice in accordance with United Nations principles and that they are insisting on continuing their aggression in Korea;
c. Call again on the aggressors to cease and desist from their aggression, and call upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea;
d. Reaffirm the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.
e. Urge upon all States and authorities the need to increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea; and in particular, urge all members to contribute additional forces to the Unified Command;
f. Note the report of the Additional Measures Committee in regard to the embargo established by the resolution of May 18;[2]
g. Note with satisfaction the favorable response of the large majority of States to its resolution of May 18 on additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea;

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[1] The Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly was held in Paris from November 6, 1951 to February 5, 1952. Korea was not formally taken up at the session until 1952. See telegram Gadel 60, November 4, to Paris, p. 1087.

[2] For related documentation, see pp. 1874 ff.

h. Note with concern that certain States have rejected the recommendations of that resolution, and in violation thereof and of previous resolutions have been giving assistance and encouragement to the aggressor in Korea;

i. Call upon these States to comply with the recommendations of the May 18 resolution, and call again upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving the aggressors any assistance or encouragement;

j. Request the Additional Measures Committee to continue to consider and report on this embargo;

k. Request the Additional Measures Committee to consider ways in which the measures recommended in the May 18 resolution could be strengthened and additional political and economic measures be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly;

l. Reaffirm that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and

m. Request the President of the General Assembly to make available his good offices to this end.

3. If negotiations are not definitely terminated and an ambiguous situation in regard to the possibility of an armistice continues to prevail, the Delegation should take up with other delegations the desirability of a resolution on the Korean action, which might incorporate appropriate provisions of those set forth in Recommendation 2 above.

COMMENT

If efforts to achieve an armistice have definitely failed, the United Nations will, of course, continue the action in Korea to meet the aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. The purpose of any action in the Sixth Session will be to take the parliamentary measures necessary to maintain and intensify the material and moral support of the members for the Korean action.

The character and tone of any resolutions adopted by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly will depend in large measure on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the intensity of renewed fighting. If negotiations are definitely terminated, if world opinion is satisfied that the United Nations Command had made honest efforts to reach agreement on an honorable armistice and that the Communists will not accept peace in Korea except on their terms, and the Communists have launched a major offensive, it should not be difficult to obtain general support for a strong resolution. The United States Delegation should request the delegations of a number of other countries with troops in Korea, to join in sponsoring a resolution along the lines set forth in the Recommendations. The provisions of the recommended resolution are generally self-explanatory. They are for the most part adaptations of previous resolutions, particularly the General Assembly resolutions of February 1 and May 18.

On the other hand, if negotiations are still continuing, or have merely faded out with the ever-present possibility of their renewal, and especially if the Communists seem to be willing to acquiesce in a virtual stalemate in the field, it will be very difficult to persuade many delegations to support sweeping condemnatory provisions and drastic measures.

There may be a disposition on the part of friendly delegations to postpone consideration of the Korean item until the situation in Korea becomes more clearly defined and either an armistice is achieved, or there is a definite termination of negotiations and resumption of full-scale hostilities. If it appears, however, that the ambiguous situation will drag on indefinitely, the United States Delegation should raise with other friendly delegations the desirability of a General Assembly resolution in the Sixth Session, which might include appropriate provisions from among those set forth in Recommendation 2 above.

Good Offices Committee

The final provisions of the proposed resolution would in effect replace the present Good Offices Committee. The Members of the United Nations will again wish to reaffirm their belief in the principle of peaceful settlement and will undoubtedly want a specific designation of someone to review efforts to get Communist agreement for stopping the fighting. The present Committee was created by the February 1 resolution which requested "the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices." For psychological reasons, it would be desirable to replace the Good Offices Committee which has a record of failure, and which was declared illegal and its communications not even acknowledged by the enemy. In any event, with a new President of the General Assembly, it would be desirable to have him designated to continue the efforts of the Good Offices Committee. Designating the President of the General Assembly is preferable to creating some new *ad hoc* body, since the President of the General Assembly is the one person whose legal status the Communists recognize and with whom they have made contact in the past.

Extending Hostilities to China

It is the position of the United States that if the Chinese Communists should initiate massive air attacks against United Nations forces, the United Nations forces are free to take necessary steps to meet these attacks, and to safeguard the security of United Nations forces, even if it involves disregarding the Manchurian frontier. These measures will, if circumstances permit, be discussed with our allies before they are instituted. In such circumstances, some of our allies might take the position that the Unified Command does not have the authority to carry the fighting outside of Korea. They may also argue, pointing to the six-power resolution of November 10 in the Security Council which was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and to the language in the General Assembly resolution of February 1 that it is United Nations policy to limit hostilities to Korea and that any deviation from this policy should be officially sanctioned by the United Nations before it is instituted.

The United States will not raise any question as to our authority to take these measures. If the issue arises, the United States Delegation should indicate that in the view of the United States, the Unified Command has the authority to take the steps necessary to achieve the mission of stopping aggression and restoring peace in the area. There is also an inherent and basic authority to take measures necessary to safeguard the security of the forces entrusted to the Unified Command. It should also be pointed out that discussion of the question in the United Nations can only subject the United States and its allies to propaganda attacks, and raise doubt and engender disagreement among Members of the United Nations, especially among these who do not have troops in Korea.

Additional Measures

If armistice talks break down, there will presumably be a report from the Additional Measures Committee on the operation of the selective embargo, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution of May 18. Such a report may merely indicate the extent of compliance and the probable effects of the embargo; it may, however, also recommend changes in the embargo. If there are to be changes in the embargo, it would seem preferable to make the Additional Measures Committee report the subject of a separate resolution. Any other measures which the Committee might recommend might also be included in that resolution.

If the Additional Measures Committee report is simply a factual presentation of the responses to the May 18 resolution and does not contain suggestions for changes in the embargo or for other additional measures, a provision to note the report could be included in the resolution suggested above. As indicated in the Recommendations, the General Assembly would also note with approval the extent of compliance with the May 18 resolution, express concern that some States have not complied, and again call on them to implement the recommendations of the May 18 resolution.

795.00/10-1251

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.
SD/A/C.1/368

UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN KOREA
(ALTERNATIVE II—IF AN ARMISTICE IS ACHIEVED)

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position of the United States as to the steps to be taken by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly after an armistice in Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question and should direct the efforts of the Assembly towards the achievement of a satisfactory political settlement of the Korean problem.

2. The United States should support a resolution which would reaffirm that it remains the purpose of the United Nations to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea. To that end, the resolution should appoint a United Nations delegation with broad terms of reference which would enter into discussions with interested parties designed to achieve agreement on a political settlement for Korea. The delegation would not be authorized to discuss problems other than Korea. Any agreement which it reaches would be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

3. In the first instance, we should prefer a small delegation consisting of the representatives of the United States and two other countries from among those which have participated in the fighting in Korea, e.g., Thailand and Australia. If informal discussions indicate that the United Kingdom and France strongly desire a place on the delegation, the delegation is authorized to agree to including them.

4. The resolution should call on UNCURK *a*) to advise the new United Nations Delegation as requested, and *b*) to continue to exercise its functions under the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 in such a manner as to support the efforts of the United Nations Delegation. Except in this regard, the composition and character of UNCURK would not be changed at this time but the future of UNCURK would be reviewed in the light of the report to be submitted by the United Nations Delegation on its efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea.

5. The proposed resolutions should also refer to past resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly on the United Nations action in Korea, note the approval of the armistice by the Security Council, express the Assembly's own satisfaction over the conclusion of the armistice and the successful accomplishment by United Nations forces of their mission in Korea. Friendly delegations may feel, however, that such provisions will antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of a political settlement, and the delegation is authorized to omit or reverse these provisions if consultations indicate strong opposition. In that event, we should reach an understanding with other delegations that a stronger General Assembly resolution leaving the record clear as to the character and purpose of the United Nations action in Korea would be introduced at a later date, if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down.

DISCUSSION

A. *Political Settlement for Korea.*

The Objective is Unification. An armistice in Korea will bring about a cessation of the fighting and make provisions against its resumption. It will constitute only the first step towards the achievement of a permanent peace in Korea and a political solution of the Korean problem by peaceful means.

The United Nations is committed to seeking the establishment in Korea of a unified, independent and democratic government. Such unification has also been the policy of the United States, and represents the desires of the Korean people. Every effort should be made, therefore, after an armistice, to bring about such unification under United Nations auspices, in accordance with United Nations principles, and under conditions which would provide maximum assurance against Communist aggression and subversion. At the same time it is the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided on an indefinite basis under an armistice agreement than to have a unification under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.

The Communists have also taken the position that the armistice is only the first step and a political settlement must follow. They have also championed the unification of Korea. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Communists would agree to a truly independent and democratic Korea to free elections under United Nations auspices, and a process of unification under the guidance of a United Nations commission. More likely they will seek a political settlement on terms which would permit them to gain control of all Korea. Failing that, as they have already indicated, they may seek an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of non-Korean troops. At the same time, the United States could not support any political settlement which gives up the goal of unification and accepts the division of the country as permanent. It would be better to have the armistice continue in effect as an armistice only. The United Nations troops would stay as long as was necessary in order to ensure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression. The United Nations would keep alive the principle of unification and continue its efforts through appropriate machinery to achieve it.

Whatever the prospects of success, the General Assembly should, after an armistice, reaffirm unification as the only acceptable solution for Korea and extend every effort to achieve a unified Korea on a United Nations basis. It is important also that the United States take the initiative in this regard and not allow the Communists the propaganda advantage of posing as the principal proponents of a unified Korea.

Participants in a Korean Conference. The United Kingdom has indicated its view that following an armistice, a political solution of the Korean problem should be sought at a Five-Power Conference (United States, United Kingdom, USSR, France, Communist China) or Seven-Power Conference (the same powers plus, presumably, India and Egypt), with some kind of "associate" participation by the Republic of Korea and the North Koreans. (After agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the United Kingdom has in mind that the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems). We have informed the United Kingdom that we do not accept this approach which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the Great Powers without any participation by the United Nations or by other countries vitally interested in the Pacific (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines) and only a secondary participation for the Koreans, the real parties in interest. We also indicated that we could not agree to any arrangement which might give the impression that we were treating Peiping as the Government of China. (With regard to a discussion of other Far Eastern questions, we informed the United Kingdom that neither the Five- nor the Seven-Power conference would be representative of the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese representation and Formosa, but that after a Korean settlement, we would be prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate forum which would include all the parties with interests in the questions to be discussed).

As the United Kingdom was informed, it is our position that the Korean problem should be solved by the parties in interest. Strictly, this would mean that the question should be discussed by representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Koreans; the United Nations should participate also in view of its continuing interest in the Korean problem and the role it must play both in achieving a settlement and in supervising its implementation. It is foreseeable, however, that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists might both claim a voice in the solution of the Korean problem basing their claim on their interests as neighbors and a long history of relations with Korea. Since, as a realistic matter, no agreement for a Korean settlement could be achieved without their consent or acquiescence, particularly with Chinese Communist and perhaps some Soviet troops remaining in Korea even after an armistice, the United States is prepared to agree to their participation in a conference to discuss a Korean settlement.

From statements made during the armistice negotiations, it would appear that a conference generally along these lines is the kind which the Communist would agree to. Most likely, the Chinese Communists would wish to participate, particularly since in the past, it has been indicated that they insist on a role in a political settlement for Korea. Whether the Soviet Union desires to participate is more questionable. They may prefer, as in other cases, to deal through a satellite so that while they are represented in fact they are not formally bound by the results of the conference. Nevertheless, they should be offered the opportunity to participate. It is contemplated that we would approach the Russians either at the United Nations or in Moscow to inform them of our proposed plan for a political conference and to ascertain their attitude on participation and on other aspects of the proposed resolution.

The United Nations Delegation. The proposed resolution would have the General Assembly appoint a delegation to represent the United Nations in discussions of a possible political settlement for Korea. The United Nations Delegation would have full freedom to discuss with anybody it wishes, arrange an appropriate conference, and attempt to reach an effective agreement.

The Delegation we envisage would consist of the United States, which has played a principal role in the recent history of Korea and in the United Nations action there, together with two other members of the United Nations from among those who have participated in the fighting in Korea, preferably from the Far East. Thailand and Australia appear to be logical choices, but the Delegation may agree to substitute others which are acceptable from the US point of view.

Every effort should be made to persuade other delegations, and particularly the French and the British to agree to such an arrangement. If they agree, we would, of course, keep them informed as to the progress of any moves or negotiations by the United Nations Delegation. The British and French, however, may insist that they participate, in view of their general Far Eastern interests and their role in the fighting in Korea. While we would seek a conference of the kind indicated including the concept of a United Nations Delegation, if the French and the British insist, we would have little choice but to agree to their participation in such a Delegation. In any event, it should be clear that the delegation represents the United Nations, that its purpose is to achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and that it is not to deal with questions other than Korea. The Delegation would report to the General Assembly and any agreement it might reach for a Korean settlement would be subject to General Assembly approval.

Relation to UNCURK. Since the United Nations Delegation would be performing in effect one of the principal tasks assigned to UNCURK, the resolution should set forth the relationship of the delegation to UNCURK. UNCURK would be called upon to advise the delegation as requested. UNCURK would also continue to carry out its other functions under the October 7 resolution so far as consistent with the activities of the United Nations Delegation and in such a manner as not to interfere with the Delegation.

If the United Nations Delegation succeeds in achieving agreement for a political settlement in Korea, that settlement will undoubtedly include reference to the kind of United Nations body which would be agreeable for implementing the settlement. The future of UNCURK would, therefore, have to be reviewed at that time in the light of the agreement reached. If the United Nations Delegation reports failure, the Assembly will nevertheless wish to keep alive its objective of achieving a unified Korea and will want appropriate machinery to that end. Whether it should be UNCURK, in its present form and with its present terms of reference, is a question which the Assembly will want to consider in the light of the report of the United Nations Delegation on the failure of the settlement talks and of the history and record of UNCURK to date. See Position Paper SD/A/C.1/369.

B. *Approval of the Armistice.*

It is expected that if an armistice is reached, a resolution will be introduced in the Security Council noting the armistice with approval. Some of our allies would like to see a resolution which does that and no more. The United States would wish the resolution, as a minimum, to refer to and reaffirm past resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the action and objectives in Korea, in order to avoid the impression that we were giving up the United Nations version of what has happened in Korea and were willing to rewrite or forget that history. The United States would also like a provision which would explicitly refer the problem of the political settlement of Korea to the General Assembly.

The action in the General Assembly would, of course, have to take account of any resolution which might be adopted in the Security Council. The proposed resolution should refer to the Security Council resolution and also indicate the Assembly's approval of the armistice. Particularly since some countries have already indicated a desire for a simple uncontroversial resolution in the Security Council in the hope of getting Soviet support for that resolution, the United States would like the subsequent action of the General Assembly to set the record straight on the whole Korean episode. We would not wish to leave the world confused and uncertain as to the real character and purpose of the action in Korea. It must remain clear that there was Communist aggression in Korea, that the United Nations action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that the United Nations has succeeded in this mission, and has not altered or abandoned its original objectives in Korea as a result of the conflict.

It may be anticipated that there will be objection to such provisions. It will be argued that such a resolution would antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of achieving a political settlement in Korea. If consultations reveal strong views to this effect, it may be necessary to omit or soften these provisions. In doing so, however, it should be made clear that we consider this only a postponement and that if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down, we will wish a stronger resolution along these lines.

In this regard, the delegation should warn other delegations against the dangers of assuming that the achievement of an armistice means a radical change in Soviet objectives. Such an attitude could have serious consequences going beyond the question of United Nations action in regard to Korea. The United States is always ready to welcome true Soviet cooperation in support of the United Nations Charter; we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We would have to have much more and stronger evidence of Soviet change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that the USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Communist imperialism and has started on the path of peaceful cooperation. The Soviet attitude to the armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on the international scene. Such an impression would lull us into a false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up the strength of the free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of the United Nations. Within the United Nations it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some delegations might feel would antagonize the Russians.

795.00/10-1251

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.
SD/A/C.1/369

THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA: REPORT OF UNCURK (ALTERNATIVE I—IF THERE IS NO ARMISTICE)

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position which the United States should take at the Sixth Session in regard to (*a*) the report of UNCURK; and (*b*) United Nations Machinery for continuing efforts to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and in particular, the future of UNCURK.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While the UNCURK report has not yet been circulated, it may be assumed that the report will be unobjectionable, and the United States Delegation will be able to vote to approve it.

2. The United States should support a resolution reaffirming the determination of the United Nations to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea. It should specifically reaffirm the objectives and principles of the resolution of October 7, 1950 and particularly the recommendations contained in Section I of that resolution.

3. The United States Delegation should seek the support of other delegations for provisions in the resolution which while expressing the appreciation of the services of UNCURK in the past year would determine that in the light of experience and new circumstances, United Nations political objectives in Korea could better be achieved by a single United Nations Political Representative to be designated by the General Assembly. The United States Delegation may also, if other delegations prefer such an arrangement, support the appointment of a commission to advise the Political Representative; the Advisory Commission would have headquarters in New York and consist of the same membership as UNCURK, possibly with the addition of the United States. UNCURK should continue to operate until the new Representative is prepared to take over its functions.

4. The United States Delegation should also seek the support of

other delegations for narrower terms of reference for the political representative of the United Nations in Korea so far as relations with UNKRA are concerned. The proposed Political Representative [with the advice and assistance of the Advisory Commission] should

(*a*) represent the United Nations in bringing about the achievement of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;
(*b*) assume all the functions exercised by UNCURK under the resolution of October 7; and
(*c*) with respect to relations with UNKRA,

1. determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which UNKRA shall operate at any time,
2. designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relations, after consultation with the Agent General, and advise him on the nature of such relations,
3. act in closest cooperation with the Agent General in regard to their respective areas of responsibility.

5. The position indicated in Recommendations 3 and 4 above is the preferred position of the United States. However, the delegation may agree to one of the following alternatives, in the order of preference.

(*a*) Replacing UNCURK with a UN Representative, as in recommendation 3, but maintaining for him the terms of reference which UNCURK now has under the October 7 and December 1 resolutions.
(*b*) Continuing UNCURK, but restricting its terms of reference in regard to its relations to UNKRA to those set forth in subparagraph (*c*) of recommendation 4.
(*c*) Continuing UNCURK and its terms of reference as at present.

DISCUSSION

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was created by the General Assembly in its resolution of October 7, 1950. Its chief purpose was to "represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of all Korea". It was to assume the functions previously exercised by the United Nations Commission for Korea (UNCOK) and also to exercise responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation to be subsequently determined by the Assembly. The responsibilities of UNCURK in this area were defined in the General Assembly resolution of December 1.

The October 7 resolution was adopted at a time when it seemed likely that United Nations forces would soon gain control of all Korea. Chinese Communist intervention and the history of military operations since that time make it appear highly unlikely that United Nations forces will succeed by force of arms in driving the Chinese Communists out of Korea. Nevertheless, the passage of time and intervening events do not necessitate any change in the terms of that resolution, and it applies as well in the present circumstances. The unsuccessful attempt to achieve an armistice in Korea also would not affect the objectives of the United Nations in regard to unification or the principles set forth in the October 7 resolution to govern efforts to achieve unification. As for years past, it continues to be the desire of the United Nations to bring about a unified Korea and to maintain machinery for that purpose.

UNCURK, however, has had a history of ineffectiveness and incompetence. In large measure, its failure of achievement was due to circumstances beyond its control since the change of military fortunes shortly after its creation made it seem unlikely that unification would be achieved and left the Commission with little to do. There has been a feeling, however, that even within these limitations UNCURK, as the political representative of the United Nations in Korea, could have achieved much more than it has. In any event, experience has shown the desirability of attempting to streamline the Commission. Further, with no immediate prospect of achieving unification, and with hostilities continuing and requiring the United Nations Command to maintain full control, it is not desirable to have in Korea a Commission of representatives of seven nations with alternates and staff.

The United States Delegation should, therefore, discuss with other delegations the desirability of substituting for the present UNCURK, a single United Nations political representative for Korea. If other delegations prefer the General Assembly could also create an advisory commission which would have its headquarters in New York but could go to Korea as appropriate. While the advisory Commission might be more effective if it were kept smaller, we might avoid delicate political questions, and would increase support for the proposed change, if the Advisory Commission consisted of the countries represented on UNCURK (Australia, Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey, Chile, Netherlands). If it can be achieved without complication or difficulty and without impelling other countries (e.g., United Kingdom, France) also to seek membership, the addition of the United States to such an advisory commission would be desirable.

The advisory commission, if established, would advise and assist the Political Representative in the exercise of his functions.

Relief and Rehabilitation

Under the resolution of December 1, 1950, UNCURK was expected to play an important role also in relation to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea. The Agent General and UNKRA established by that resolution were to carry out their responsibilities "in closest cooperation" with UNCURK. The Commission was to make such recommendations to UNKRA as it considered necessary for the effective discharge of its responsibilities in relation to unification; determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographic areas within which UNKRA was to operate; designate the authorities with which the Agent General was to establish relationships; take steps needed to support the Agent General in fulfilling his task; consider the reports of the Agent General and transmit comments upon them to ECOSOC and the General Assembly; call on the Agent General for information which UNCURK considered necessary for its work. The Assembly also authorized the Commission to consult with the Agent General in regard to the entire relief program and its adequacies and to make recommendations thereon to ECOSOC.

Experience to date has indicated the difficulties inherent in these arrangements. Partly because of the ineffectiveness of UNCURK, and partly because of personalities involved, the relationship between UNCURK and UNKRA contemplated by the General Assembly does not in fact prevail. The Agent General apparently resents the "subordination" of UNKRA to UNCURK, particularly the provisions subjecting his work and reports to the Commission's scrutiny. He has sought to assert his independence of UNCURK by refraining from informing UNCURK regarding his operations in Korea. The difficulties and potential friction will be aggravated, if as the United States will propose, the General Assembly replaces UNCURK by a single Political Representative.

The United States should, therefore propose that in relation to UNKRA, the new Political Representative, or even UNCURK, if it is retained, should play a lesser role. The Political Representative should have the authority to tell the Agent General what areas the latter is authorized to work in and what authorities he may deal with. These involve delicate political considerations on which the United Nations must speak with one voice and in which the Agent General follow the lead of the political body. Apart from these aspects, however, the General Assembly should merely, in general terms, enjoin on the Political Representative and the Agent General "the closest cooperation".

In the light of the negotiations leading up to the December 1 resolution, it may be expected that some delegations may object to granting the Agent General virtual independence of the United Nations Political Representative. The Australian Government in particular, whose representative [1] has been the mainstay of UNCURK and who may be a candidate for United Nations Commissioner, may insist that the relief program must be kept subordinate to the political program and that the machinery should reflect this subordination. It may cite difficulties which arose when UNRRA sought to act independently of political supervision and guidance in a number of countries. In meeting these objections, the United States Delegation may be able to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom; the United Kingdom might support our position particularly since the Deputy Agent General is Sir Arthur Rucker, a United Kingdom national.

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[1] James Plimsoll.

If the Delegation is unable to obtain general support for these changes in the relationship between the Political Representative of the United Nations and the Agent General, the Delegation may agree to leave the relationship theoretically unchanged. In that case, the resolution creating the new Political Representative could merely provide that he shall assume all the functions exercised by UNCURK under the resolution of October 7 and December 1. Presumably, the exact relationship between the new Representative and the Agent General would be settled in practice between them.

795.00/10-1251

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.
SD/A/C.1/370

THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA: REPORT OF UNCURK (ALTERNATIVE II—IF AN ARMISTICE IS ACHIEVED)

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position which the United States should take in regard to (*a*) the report of UNCURK, and (*b*) United Nations machinery for bringing about a free, independent and unified Korea, and, in particular, the future of UNCURK.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While the report has not yet been circulated, it may be assumed that the report will be unobjectionable, and the United States Delegation will be able to vote to approve it.

2. As to the future of UNCURK, the United States Delegation should be guided by Position Paper SD/A/C.1/368 on United Nations Action on Korea (Alternative II—If an Armistice is Achieved).

DISCUSSION

As indicated in the Position Paper referred to, the future of UNCURK would be reconsidered in the light of the report of the United Nations Delegation which would be appointed to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. If this report is submitted during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the United States Delegation to the Assembly will be instructed further as to steps which might be taken in the light of that report in regard to the future of UNCURK. In general, it may be expected that if the United Nations Delegation to be appointed by the General Assembly to seek a Korean settlement succeeds in achieving agreement for such a settlement, that agreement will very likely provide for an acceptable United Nations body for implementing the settlement and UNCURK would have to be replaced or modified in the light of that agreement. If the United Nations Delegation reports failure, the situation so far as the question of unification is concerned would in all probability not be basically different from what it was prior to June 25, 1950, and a body like UNCURK would presumably be continued. Of course, in view of the history and record of UNCURK we would undoubtedly consider replacing it by a new body, generally along the same lines as would pertain if no armistice is achieved. See Position Paper SD/A/C.1/369, The Problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of UNCURK (Alternative I).

The relation of UNCURK to the United Nations Delegation to be appointed by the General Assembly to seek a Korean settlement is also discussed in the position paper on United Nations action in Korea, Alternative II, referred to above.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 8 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 October 1951—7:59 p. m.

C-52800. Following for your info:

Part 1. Subject is summary of liaison meeting this morning. Met at 1000. Communists presented the following proposed agreement:

"Agreement on matters concerning resumption of conference by the delegations reached by liaison officers of both sides at the liaison meetings of October 10 and 11.

"1. Conference site.

"The specific site where the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is fixed at the conference site where the liaison officers of both sides met on October 11.

"2. Provisional arrangements for the first meeting of the delegations of both sides on resumption of the conference.

"*a.* No hostile act of any kind should be carried out by any armed force of both sides, including all regular and irregular elements and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area with the conference site as its center and 1000 yards as radius.

"*b.* Except the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side is permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side will provide a military police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present. The military police will only carry small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines. During periods when the delegation parties are not present, 1 officer and 5 men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area.

"*c.* Both delegations and their parties, the composition of which shall be decided by themselves respectively, shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference site area.

"*d.* The United Nations Command delegation has sought assurance from the delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers against attack on the road from Munsan to Pan Mun Jom and on the circular area centered on the United Nations Command delegation camp at Munsan and having a radius of 3000 yards. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers has agreed that, in order to facilitate travel by the United Nations Command delegation to Pan Mun Jom for resumption of the conference, and prior to agreement on extending the neutral zone to include Kaesong, Pan Mun Jom and Munsan, each side will refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the road from Munsan to Pan Mun Jom and against the Munsan area.

"3. Facilities and arrangements for the meeting place.

"Physical facilities and communication and administrative requirements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

"4. Date and time for resumption of conference.

"The date and time for resumption of the conference of the delegations will be determined by agreement between the liaison officers of both sides."

Morning session adjourned at 1130. Will resume at 1430.

Part 2. Murray will present following counterproposal this afternoon:

"Draft agreement establishing conditions for armistice conferences at Pan Mun Jom.

"1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is indicated in the attached map.

"2. The conference area is a circular area having a radius of 1000 yards centered on the conference site as shown on the attached map.

"3. No act of armed force will be carried out by the armed forces of either side against the conference area as defined above.

"4. Except for the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side is permitted in conference area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and preservation of order within the conference area. Each side will provide a military police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present. The military police will only carry small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines. During periods when the delegation parties are not present, 1 officer and 5 men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area.

"5. Both delegations and their parties, the composition of which shall be decided by themselves respectively, shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference area.

"6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

"7. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers agrees to refrain from acts of armed force against the United Nations Command delegation camp area enclosed in a circle having a radius of 3000 yards and against the road from that area to Pan Mun Jom as indicated on the attached map."

Part 3. I have instructed Murray to inform the Communists that if they will accept the above counterproposal with the following paragraph added, a definite commitment can be made as to the time the UNC delegation will meet with the Communist delegation at Pan Mun Jom:

"[8.] The United Nations Command delegation agrees to refrain from acts of armed force against the camp of the delegation of the

Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers contained within a circle having a radius of 3000 yards centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong and against the road from that area to Pan Mun Jom."

Part 4. Communists have shown evidences of anxiety to have delegations meet immediately. We feel that by having liaison officers present in firm manner the conditions necessary for resumption of delegation meetings, possibly further concessions can be gained. This will also facilitate consideration of substantive discussions on resumption of delegation meetings.

Part 5. Liaison meetings resumed 1430. Murray presented counter-proposal. Chang refused to "buy it" on grounds it included matters related to extension neutral zone which could be referred to delegates, particularly paragraph 8. Chang then sought to shift discussion to his proposal of morning session as basis for an agreement on those matters on which agreement could be reached reserving matters on which agreement could not be reached for decision by the delegates. Murray stated that he was prepared to discuss time and date of resumption of meetings only on basis of UNC counter-proposal, but that he had no objection to comparing the proposal and the counter-proposal. He then gave a point by point comparison between the two showing wherein UNC version was preferable. Chang finally and with obvious reluctance proposed recess during which each side would study the proposals of the other side. Meeting recessed 1600 to resume 1000 tomorrow. Estimate Communists proposal tomorrow's session will correspond in all essentials to our counter-proposal except for paragraph 8.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab B : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, 13 October 1951—10 : 17 a. m.

JCS–84081. From JCS. Reur C 67459 and JCS 96615, Jul 51.[1]

1. JCS are reexamining your armistice instructions with view to

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[1] Neither printed, but for a summary of the content of these messages, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 136–137. In July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised the question of voluntary repatriation for prisoners of war held by the U.N. Command, meaning that Chinese prisoners of Nationalist sympathy would be sent to Taiwan, and more generally, that no Chinese or North Korean prisoners would be forced to return to Communist held territory without their consent. General Ridgway felt that the idea had some merit, but pointed out that, while the Taiwan proposal complied with the letter of the Geneva Convention, the voluntary repatriation concept did not; he feared that its adoption might set a dangerous precedent for future wars and also provide a propaganda weapon for the Communist side during the present hostilities.

determination now of a United States policy which envisages, if such should become necessary to effect release of UN prisoners or prevent a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, an overall exchange of prisoners on a bulk basis.

2. In their reexamination of your armistice instructions JCS are including problem of obtaining release of certain specific civilian internees captured at time of invasion of South Korea. Such internees would be generally limited to staffs of British and French dipl missions in Seoul, the Apostolic Delegate, press correspondents, and other Americans and natls of UN mbrs.

3. In order to achieve insofar as possible humanitarian objectives, JCS are considering possibility that prior to the reaching of an armistice agreement, individuals who have rendered outstanding assistance to UN command or whose return to Communist control would result in death or enslavement might be paroled as provided in Geneva convention.

4. Your comments are requested on foregoing for incorporation in JCS study on these matters.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 9 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 13 October 1951—1:21 p. m.

C–52845. Further mymsg C–52809.[1] Ln party met Communist ln party at Pan Mun Jom at approx 122115I. Communists stated that UN planes had strafed Kaesong neutral zone at two pts, BT 941037 and approx BT 303075, at about 1735 hrs 12 Oct. Ln officers then moved to BT 941037, approx one km Northwest of Pan Mun Jom on Kaesong-Pan Mun Jom hwy. Witnesses stated three jet type acft with wing tip tanks, traveling from Northwest to Southeast, strafed the hwy at BT 941037. Party was shown many pts of impact of bullets on road and a few 50 cal armor piercing bullets. Furrows in ground and on hwy indicated bullets came from Northwest. A 12 year old boy sitting on side of road was killed, his two year old brother, whom witnesses state he was hiding, was shot in the left arm. Ln party interviewed 15 year old boy who was with other children and who stated that he ran under bridge when strafing began. Other persons interviewed and alleged to have witnessed the strafing were father of children, another older brother, and a North Korean soldier who was walking patrol on the hwy. Testimony indicated that two planes were in advance of the third and had fired first, thus alarming the witnesses. The third was the one whose bullets were alleged to have killed the child. Planes were reported as continuing Southeast after the strafing.

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[1] The text of this message, dated October 12, read as follows:

"1. At 1915 hours this date the following radio telephone message was received from Col Chang, Communists Liaison Officer. 'At 1735 hours this afternoon the Kaesong neutral zone was violated by one of your planes attacking. It is requested that your Liaison Officer meet me at Panmunjom immediately to investigate'.

"2. The following message was transmitted to the Communists by radio telephone at 1930 hours: 'A UNC Liaison Officer accompanied by investigating officers and interpreters will depart the UNC camp at 1945 hours and meet your Liaison Officers for the purpose of initiating an investigation'." (Black Book, Tab 8)

No investigation was made at BT 803075. Communists had no details on that incident except that they had received a report of strafing at that pt, but had not yet verified it. Since planes were reported to have been flying from Northwest to Southeast, they might well have been the same acft.

UN ln officers agreed to meet Communists at 130900I at Pan Mun Jom to continue investigations in daylight. Upon conclusions of investigation 12 Oct the Chinese Communist liaison officer, Col Tsai, stated that upon instructions from his senior delegate he was making a strong verbal protest and reserved the right to make further demands.

The preliminary views of Cols Darrow and Edwards, investigating officers, are that the incident appears to be bonafide. Information from Fifth AF is not suf to permit complete evaluation at this time.

Full investigation is in progress.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 10 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET Tokyo, 13 October 1951—3 : 41 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–52858. Fol is CINCUNC Adv HNC 347.

"As indicated in HNC 345,[1] at meeting of liaison offs this date Communist liaison offs referred to Kim-Peng letter of 9 Oct as constituting terms of ref for liaison meetings. They are willing to discuss prelim arrangements nec for resumption of conf by delegates. However, they gave indications that they are not authd to discuss other matters contained in our proposed agreement. I will instruct liaison offs to press for agreement on all pnts contained in UNC proposal for the next few days. If agreement cannot be reached on all pnts at liaison level I intend to have delegation meet with Communist delegation to arrive at agreements on remaining issues and to present new UNC proposal on item 2. UNC delegates, of course, will not meet with Communist delegates until our scty forces have occupied high ground east of Pan Mun Jom and liaison offs of both sides have agreed to the acceptance of the conf meeting place as the geometric center of the 'Pan Mun Jom Conf Site'. Sgd Joy".

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[1] Same as telegram C–52616, October 10, from Tokyo, p. 1011.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 11 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 13 October 1951—3:48 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–52854. CINCUNC Adv HNC 351 is quoted for your info. "I plan to introduce our new solution to item 2 of the agenda by use of the following paper:

"We are meeting to resume armistice discussions which were suspended by you on 23 Aug. The purpose of these meetings remains exactly the same as it was prior to that date. It is to achieve a just and reasonable mil armistice. With this in mind the UNC delegation believes that we should now discuss item 2 of the agenda. The UNC delegation has deliberated long and carefully on how best to secure a proper settlement of item 2. It is apparent from the meetings of the sub-delegations that the attempt to find common ground through a discussion of general principles and their illustrative applications has not met with success. What is needed is one solution which is generally satisfactory to both sides. The UNC delegation has prepared a solution to item 2 which provides the maximum benefits for your side consistent with the nature of the overall situation and with UNC requirements. This is not a general formulation of a position or an illustration of a position. It is a new, specific and concrete solution of item 2. If these discussions are not to continue indefinitely it is important that your side should fully realize that this solution has been made as favorable as possible to your side. This solution is, as it stands, most fair and reasonable. We ask for integral agreement to it subj to refinements mutually agreeable to both sides. In order that you may clearly understand our views, I hereby submit to you a map which portrays the UNC solution to item 2 of the agenda. With this solution the UNC delegation has done what it can to achieve agreement on item 2. We now await your response.

"In presenting the UNC proposal on item 2 it is not planned to propose also that it be made the sole basis of discussion. Under the present circumstances UNC firm insistence on the acceptance of its proposal seems preferable to permitting the discussion to become sidetracked into lengthy argument on the limits of discussion. Later if Communists show complete recalcitrance the UNC delegation can insist on its proposal being the sole basis of discussion and, if necessary support its insistence by an ultimatum. After resumption of substantive discussions, I will insist that Communists discuss the UNC solution to the demilitarized zone. Should Communists insist on 38th Parallel as line of demarcation or suggest demilitarized zone be area between 38th Parallel and line of contact we shall reject such suggestions. The basis of rejection will be that these proposals require UNC to withdraw unilaterally from the battle line and do not provide suitable defensible position for UNC. We shall permit discussion of refinements of the UNC proposal but will not accept major alterations. Sgd Joy"[1]

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[1] For subsequent revisions of this proposal, see telegram C–55931, October 27, from Tokyo, p. 1066.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 12 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 13 October 1951—4:11 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–52864. Urmsgs HNC 345 (C 52616), HNC 347 (C 52858), HNC 350 (C 52800) and HNC 351 (C 52854). This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. It is assumed here that there is no change in your intention expressed in HNC 347 to press, in first meeting of the delegates, for agreement upon issues remaining subsequent to liaison officers discussions (items 5, 6 and 9, your HNC 345). Full agreement on items 5, 6 and 9 as well as upon all points of UNC counter proposal of 12 Oct (HNC 350) are considered essential to successful continuation of the armistice negotiations and should be reached prior to discussion of substantive armistice agenda items. The acceptance of the neutral zone proposed by Peng and Kim, for which it is obvious the Communists will press, is considered out of the question.

Part 2. Ref last paragraph your HNC 347. As discussed with you when you were here, it is considered extremely desirable that UN security forces occupy the high ground east of Pan Mun Jom prior to a meeting of the delegations. The best method of informing the

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[1] Repeated for information to Washington for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Communists of our intentions in this regard appears to be an announcement by the UNC liaison officer to the Communist liaison officer of the anticipated forward displacement of security forces prior to their arriving at an agreement upon the exact time and date of the first delegations' meeting. Though Col Murray expressed optimism with regard to this point, we must be prepared for a possible strong reaction by the Communists, with the possibility of further lengthy delays in the renewal of conferences. Your views upon this subj are requested if there is any change in them since your departure from Tokyo.

Part 3. Urmsg HNC 351. Certain suggested changes will be forthcoming by radio.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 13 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joints Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 October 1951—4:16 p. m.

C-52946. Herewith for your info is HNC 359.

"1. Summary of liaison offs meeting which opened at 1000 today. Cordial atmosphere of former meetings replaced by frigid formality. Col Kinney opened saying investigation of alleged incident not yet completed but being pressed vigorously and turned discussion over to Col Murray who took up discussion of partisan question as related to agreement on resumption of negotiations, indicating UNC not responsible for partisans. Col Chang disagreed with this position. He then presented in writing only a new draft of a proposed agreement and proposed to discuss time and place of first meeting. Murray stated no purpose in discussing time and date until necessary agreements were reached and proposed a recess until 1100 to enable UNC liaison offs to study new Communist proposal. Chang counter-proposed a recess until tomorrow and reiterated protest on alleged violation. Meeting recessed 1030.

"2. New Communist proposal is identical in all respects to proposal presented morning of 12 Oct quoted in HNC 350 except:

"(*a*) Para 1 coincided with para 1 UNC counterproposal as given in HNC 350.

"(*b*) Para 2, inserts between first pd and A pd the following: (The following provisional arrangements, para *a*, *b* and *c* may also be the draft of the related part of the agreement of security arrangements to be discussed and stipulated by the delegations of both sides for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations).

"(*c*) Adds to end of para 2*a* (as shown on attached map).[1]

"3. Our liaison offs believe assumed cold attitude and delaying tactics of Chang indicate Communist's expectation that they can exploit any feeling of guilt that may exist on part of UNC with respect to alleged violation of neutral zone in order to obtain better terms."

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[1] Not printed here.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 14 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 October 1951—7:15 p. m.

CX-52961. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. The fol msg will be broadcast from Tokyo at 141900I and an authenticated copy delivered to the Communist liaison officers at the earliest practicable time thereafter:

"Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai. The United Nations Command Air Commander has reported to me the result of his investigation of the two aerial attacks in the Kaesong area at about 1730 on the afternoon of 12 October 1951. The rpt reveals beyond reasonable doubt that both these attacks were made by aircraft of the United Nations Command, in violation of standing instructions which specifically direct all units and pilots to avoid attack, or overflight of the Kaesong area.

"The United Nations Command therefore accepts responsibility for these two violations of the agreed neutrality still existing with regard to the Kaesong zone, and I shall take prompt and appropriate disciplinary action. Signed M B Ridgway, General, US Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command."

Part 2. The fol press release will be issued simultaneously in Tokyo and Munsan Ni at 101930I [*151930I*]:

"An investigation of the two air attacks within the area of the Kaesong neutral zone in Korea, about 1730 on the afternoon of 12 October 1951, indicates beyond reasonable doubt that both attacks were made by aircraft of the United Nations Command.

"This incident is doubly regrettable not only because it violated standing United Nations Command instructions and consequently an agreement to which the United Nations Command was a party, but even more so because it resulted in the death of one twelve year old boy and the wounding of his two year old brother. The conduct of military operations must often result in casualties to innocent noncombatants but I am sincerely saddened in this instance, since this occurred in a zone considered as a neutral area.

"I know that I speak for every member of the United Nations Command in expressing sympathy and heartfelt grief to the bereaved Korean family for their tragic loss.

"It has heretofore been, and will continue to be, a prime objective of the United Nations Command to avoid loss of life and destruction of property of the non-combatant population. To this end the United Nations Command will continue its efforts to prevent any recurrence of incidents which may bring suffering to blameless individuals. M. B. Ridgway, General, US Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command."

611.61/10–1551 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, October 15, 1951—5 p. m.

634. *Verbatim Text.* I was received by Vyshinsky at his request at 3 p. m. today for conversation lasting 45 minutes.

Vyshinsky read eight page statement in reply oral statement Ambassador Kirk October 5 and gave me copy at end interview.

Statement began with review of points made by Ambassador Kirk as understood by Vyshinsky and proceeded to comment on two main questions posed by Kirk (1) position in Korea and (2) Soviet American relations.

Re Korean situation: US interest to end its war in Korea against Korean people understandable, USSR interest in end war shown by its efforts in that direction; US responsible for delays in armistice talks; best way assure successful conclusion talks is instruct Ridgway not complicate matters with incidents or artificial difficulties such as relocation talks site; discussion armistice line military matter and must be included armistice talks. Soviet Union not participant negotiations but "all real efforts" toward successful conclusion negotiations "will meet in the present time as in the past with full and energetic support on the part of Soviet Union".

Re Soviet American relations: Re US emphasis on importance settlement Korean matter it goes without saying "in interest improvement international situation urgently necessary work out peaceful settlement Korean question", USSR has made many attempts discuss with USA many unresolved international problems of primary importance; on Soviet initiative Paris 1951 conference was convoked but USA UK and France refused discuss important questions proposed by USSR; if USA actually stands for improvement USSR–USA relations it has had many opportunities to confirm this with acts but it has not done so; Kirk's statement re non-aggressive aim US re USSR et cetera not first time such statement made including Truman message to Shvernik[1] but facts speak otherwise, witness abrogation commercial treaty,[2] that military measures of US are defensive in nature contradicted by fact of war against Korean people and creation aggressive Atlantic bloc directed against USSR et cetera; Soviet Government ask what sort of "undesirable consequences" or "unpleasantness" US Government has in mind in case Kaesong negotiations unsuccessful, if it is question of worsening Soviet American relations how can they be worse than after President Truman stated to entire world that agreements with Soviet Union are not worth paper on which they written.[3]

Statement concluded "in such circumstances can the statement of the wish to improve Soviet American relations be taken seriously? Would not it be truer to suppose that US Government actually is not striving for improvement of Soviet American relations and cooperation with Soviet Union but is interested only in conversations re cooperation and agreement. Nonetheless the Soviet Government following its peaceful policy and unceasingly striving for the establishment of cooperation with all countries prepared to cooperate with Soviet Union agrees to examine with the participation of US Government all important and unsettled questions and to discuss measures for improvement international relations including relations between USSR and USA".

In answer to direct question Vyshinsky stated Kirk message brought to attention of Stalin.

Full translation follows.

Dept pass London, Paris sent Dept 634, rptd info priority London 90, Paris 182.

CUMMING

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[1] The text of President Truman's letter of July 7 to Nikolai Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., transmitting the text of the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution reaffirming the friendship of the American people for all people including the people of the Soviet Union is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 16, 1951, p. 16. For related documentation, see the compilation on the Soviet Union in volume IV.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1003.

[3] Mr. Truman had made this observation in an address at the Constitution Day ceremonies at the Library of Congress on September 17; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 522.

611.61/10-1551 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, October 15, 1951—7 p. m.

639. Re Embtel 634, October 15. Following translation Vyshinsky statement to me today.

Verbatim Text. On October 5 I received at his request Amb of USA in USSR Mr. Kirk who stated he would like discuss question of improvement relation between our two countries. Amb stated in this connection he was authorized by Govt of USA to ask that statement which he was authorized to make on this question be brought to knowledge of Sov Govt and brought to personal attn of Generalissimus Stalin. Then Amb read extended statement of seven to eight pages.

To my surprise Amb replied to expression of my wish to receive text to [*of*] this statement that in accordance with his instructions he must make this statement only in oral form and not leave text.

1. Content of oral statement made by Mr. Kirk essentially consists of following:

(*a*) It is pointed out in statement read by Mr. Kirk that Korean question is sharpest and most dangerous international question at present time requiring immed solution. Amer Govt attaches tremendous significance to armistice discussion in Korea considering that favorable outcome of armistice discussions would permit settlement of other unresolved questions causing tension in international relations and would open up perspective for improvement of relations between USSR and USA. Amb stated that Govt of USA hopes for cooperation of Sov Govt toward positive completion of these discussions. Together with such reference to Sov Govt for cooperation Mr. Kirk however made rather strange allusions to some sort of possible "unpleasantnesses" between USSR and USA in case of unfavorable results of these discussions.

The Amb also stated that Amer command objects to discussion at Kaesong of question of determination of line of cease fire referring to fact that this question bears political character.

(*b*) In the statement attn is also given to question of Soviet Amer relations in connection with which attempt is made to shift responsibility for tension in internatl relations to democratic countries called by Amb "Communist bloc" as if they were not manifesting desire for settlement unresolved internatl questions. It is also indicated in statement that Sov Union occupies some sort of irreconcilable position in relation to many internatl problems and this, he said, is causing alarm in US and other countries.

Mr. Kirk gave assurance also that measures taken by Govt of US in military field have no aggressive aim with relation to Sov Union and other countries and are directed solely toward defense and that he makes the statement officially with full authority of his govt.

2. In his oral statement Mr. Kirk dwelt mainly on two questions—sitn in Kor and Sov Amer relations.

Sov Govt attaches important significance to these questions in connection with which it is necessary to state fol:

(*a*) Re the position in Kor. From Mr. Kirk's statement it is evident that Govt of USA concerned by sitn which has been created in Kor and course of discussions re termination of mil action. Such concern is fully understandable inasmuch as it is known to all that having unleashed war against Kor people Amer Govt found itself in sitn which caused it uncertainty about outcome of mil adventure which it began in Kor.

However, statements of Amb re aspiration of Govt of USA for successful conclusion for discussions at Kaesong incompatible with policy which Amer Govt is carrying forth in this question, systematically declining all proposals which are directed toward the actual peaceful settlement of Kor question and specifically proposals for immed termination of aggressive war in Kor for the withdrawal from Kor of all fon troops and settlement by peaceful means of whole Kor question.

In this connection it is necessary to direct attn of Govt of USA to efforts of Sov Union to achieve successful conclusion of negotiations at Kaesong and termination of war in Kor.

It was not Govt of USA nor United Nations org but specifically Sov Govt which took upon itself initiative for peaceful settlement of Kor conflict. Even in beginning of July 1950 the chairman of Council of Ministers of USSR I. V. Stalin came out for the speedy settlement of Kor conflict through the Security Council.

At the Fifth Session of the GA in 1950 the Sov Govt also introduced a proposal for immed peaceful settlement of Kor question and for withdrawal from Kor of fon troops. Finally in June 1951 representative of USSR at UN Y. A. Malik introduced proposal that as a first step on path to peaceful settlement of Kor question there be begun negots between belligerent parties for termination of mil action and for an armistice with reciprocal withdrawal of troops from 38th parallel.

As regards assertion of Amb that position taken by command of North Kor troops and Chi volunteers is somehow reason for delay in negots at Kaesong this assertion is completely unfounded. But it is known that command of Anglo Amer troops in Kor systematically created various obstacles to successful course of negots not stopping at creation of various kinds of incidents employed by Gen Ridgway to complicate negots.

Exactly such interference created by Amer commander is real reason for delay of Kaesong negots.

Best way to assure favorable outcome of armistice negots would be to instruct Gen Ridgway not to complicate negots with all kinds of incidents, not to create artificial interference by empty argument relative for example to relocation of negots from Kaesong to other sort of place.

As regards the remark of Amb relative to line at which armed forces of both sides will be located after termination of military activity, in opinion of Sov Govt this question is organically connected with question of termination of military action and consequently cannot be passed over in armistice negots.

Sov Govt does not consider it necessary to dwell on assertions contained in statement regarding aggression in South Kor inasmuch as already earlier the slanderous nature of such assertions has been incontrovertibly shown.

According to Amb's statement Govt of USA hopes for cooperation on part of Sov Govt toward a positive conclusion of negots at Kaesong. But it is known that Sov Union is not a party to these negots. On contrary Govt of USA is such party and consequently itself can take measures for successful conclusion of negots. It goes without saying that all kinds of actual efforts in this direction will meet at present time as they would have in past, full and energetic support on part of Sov Union.

(*b*) Regarding Sov Amer relations. The Amb stated that Govt of USA authorized him to request that attn of Sov Govt and personally of Generalissimus I. V. Stalin be drawn to necessity of improving relations between our countries, having remarked that in this matter as in matter of settlement of other unresolved internatl questions a great role belongs to satisfactory conclusion of armistice negots in Kor.

It goes without saying that in interests of improving internatl situation it is urgently necessary to attain peaceful settlement of Kor question. Sov Govt many times has attempted to negotiate with US on other important questions of Sov Amer relations as well as other unresolved internatl problems of first importance such as question of measures which would assure the creation of unified peaceful democratic independent Ger Govt and conclusion of peace treaty with Ger, of peaceful settlement with Jap, of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapon and establishment of strict internatl control, of termination of armaments race and reduction of armed forces, prohibition of war propaganda and of conclusion of peace pact.

On initiative of Sov Govt there was created in Paris in 1951 conf of Deputy Mins of For Affairs on Ger and other important internatl questions. Sov Govt proposed to include in agenda designed for session of Council of Mins of Fon Affairs a series of questions demanding urgent decision including such important questions as that of Atlantic Pact and Amer milit bases in Eur and in Near East. However, this proposal was declined by Govt of USA as well as Govts of Great Brit and France.

If Govt of USA actually stands for improvement of Sov Amer relations and for elimination of misunderstandings in a series of important internatl problems mentioned above, if it actually stands for peace then it has had no lack of opportunities to confirm by action its peace aspirations of which mention is made in statement of Govt of USA. It is known however that Govt of USA has not done this.

(*c*) According to Mr. Kirk's statement USA do not have any kind of aggressive intention with relation to Sov Union and other countries and aspires to improvement of relations between our countries. Govt of US is not making such statements for first time. In this connection it is appropriate to recall message of Pres of USA, Mr. Truman, and joint resolution of Senate and House of Reps of USA which were sent to Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR, N. Shvernik. In these documents there were also contained statements of such nature. However, this did not prevent Govt of USA from simultaneously abrogating commercial agreement of USA with Sov Union which had been in effect until present from 1937, from passing under pretext of alleged strategic considerations a law for prohibition of any kind of financial or economic so-called "aid" to countries who may export their goods to USSR and to countries friendly toward Sov Union, and from taking series of other measures directed toward termination of economic ties between USA and Sov Union.[1]

In the statement read by Mr. Kirk it is also said that the measures in the military field undertaken by Govt of USA have only defense in view and do not pursue any kind of aggressive aims in relation to USSR and other countries. This sort of statement however is in contradiction to actions of USA which show that Govt of USA is concerned not at all with maintenance of peace. This finds its expression not only in the conduct of war against the Korean people but also in creation of aggressive Atlantic bloc directed against USSR and other democratic countries, in remilitarization of Ger and Jap, in creation around Sov Union of innumerable Amer military bases, etc.

(*d*) Sov Govt cannot pass over Amb's observation regarding "undesirable consequences" and of possible "unpleasantnesses" between our countries in case negots at Kaesong do not give positive results. Is it permissible first of all to ask exactly what "undesirable consequences" or "unpleasantnesses" the Amer Govt has in mind? If it is a question of possibility of further worsening of Sov Amer relations then it is only barely possible to imagine that these relations can worsen even more after Pres Truman stated to the whole world that agreements with the Sov Union are not worth the paper on which they are written. In such circumstances is it possible to take seriously statements about a wish to improve Sov Amer relations? Wld it not be truer to suppose that Govt of USA actually does not aspire to improvement of Sov Amer relations and cooperation with Sov Union but is interested only in conversations about cooperation and agreements?

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[1] For related documentation, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

Nonetheless, the Sov Govt following its peaceful policy and constantly striving for establishment of cooperation with all countries who are prepared to cooperate with Sov Union, agrees to examine with the participation of the Govt of the USA all important and unsettled questions and to discuss measures for the improvement of internatl relations including relations between the Sov Union and the USA.

Dept pass London, Paris (its discretion).

CUMMING

611.61/10-1551 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, October 15, 1951—11 p. m.[1]

641. Re mytel 634, Oct 15. I have not informed Amer correspondents here of my visit to Vishinsky. I will however do so tomorrow unless otherwise instructed as they will learn of it through other channels. Statement wld be confined to mere fact of call without any reference to subject. This wld jibe with Amb Kirk's off-the-record statement to them that during his farewell call on Vishinsky he raised one matter that he cld not discuss in detail.

Brit and Fr colleagues know of visit, but bearing in mind Dept's initial instructions to Amb Kirk, I have told them only that visit was to receive Sov oral reply to Kirk's approach on Oct 5, general nature of which he had given them details having been given directly to Mr. Morrison and M. Schuman.

My recommendation is that unless Dept has other considerations in view or Sovs publish distorted version we make no reference publicly at this time to Kirk-Vishinsky interchange. This in some form has reached Stalin and silence our part may lure these people overreach themselves propagandawise. Pls inform Amb Kirk.

Dept pass London and Paris if desired.

CUMMING

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[1] Due to the time difference between Moscow and Washington, this message was received at 4: 52 p. m.

611.61/10-1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET   Washington, October 15, 1951—8:07 p. m.

272. Urtel 641, Oct 15. Concur ur proposal inform correspondents of visit Vishinsky confining yourself to mere fact of call without ref subj unless Sovs publish their version.

We think from tone reply Sov publication is likely and are preparing text Kirk's remarks for release that event. Will transmit text Emb.

If Sovs do not publish, our thinking coincides yours that purpose exchange accomplished by making US views known Stalin and that nothing to be gained by initiating publicity which will give currency false misleading charges contained reply.

No objection your informing Brit, French colleagues substance reply in confidence.[1]

Acheson

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[1] In the early morning of October 18 (EST) the Soviet radio broadcast an account of the Kirk–Vyshinsky conversation. A text of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of October 15 (reprinted from *Soviet News*, October 19, 1951) is published in (R.I.I.A.) *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, pp. 650–654, and corresponds closely to the text of the Soviet broadcast. Shortly after the Soviet broadcast, the Department of State issued a press release, dated October 17, setting forth the Kirk and Vyshinsky statements; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1951, pp. 687–691. The Soviet and American published accounts of the talks are essentially the same and follow the lines of telegram 249, October 3, and telegram 253, October 4, to Moscow, and telegram 639, October 15, from Moscow, pp. 987, 994, and 1042.

Mr. Bohlen, who gave a background briefing to newsmen in Washington at the time of the Department of State's issuance of the press release, was asked about the prominence given in Mr. Vyshinsky's statement to the terms "undesirable consequences" and "unpleasantnesses". He replied that Mr. Vyshinsky apparently was attempting to make this appear as a U.S. threat, although it was clear from Ambassador Kirk's statement that no such threat was made or intended. (Memoranda by Lincoln White (795.00/10-1851) and Robert Lambert (795.00/10-1851))

In its telegram 2107, October 19, to London the Department of State made the following comments:

". . . It is characteristic of Sovs to maintain secrecy in such instances where they are seriously concerned with obtaining results and . . . fact Sovs have published their reply and its obvious propaganda nature suggests they had other motives. . . . While language typically obscure, aside from repetition of familiar propaganda themes, Sov reply seems to confirm that their support for armistice talks has not altered." (611.61/10-1851)

795.00/10-1551 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET   Paris, October 15, 1951—9 p. m.

2195. FonOff today showed us telegram dated September 25 just recd from French ConGen Shanghai, substance of which follows:

While Sov hand obvious in move for cease-fire negots Korea, it is believed that Chinese Commies' own desires have played larger part. Chinese press Shanghai has ill-concealed desire for resumption negots and has even implied concern over breakdown. One of reasons for Chinese Commie attitude has been necessity deferring attack on Formosa and reports indicate considerable work all along coast opposite Formosa in ports and on air fields. As possible indication Chinese Commie expectation negots will be resumed and some agreement reached, econ efforts reported on upsurge Shanghai and Tientsin in anticipation.

Bonsal

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab A : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 16 October 1951—6 : 33 p. m.

C–53095. At present time there are in UNC custody about 41,000 South Koreans, currently classified as Prisoners of War, whose release has been rqstd by the ROK Govt on the basis that these persons were in fact involuntarily impressed into mil svc by Communist Forces. Also held as Prisoners of War in UNC custody are about 350 North Korean civilian refugees whose release has been recommended by 8th Army after thorough intelligence screening. Action is being taken to reclassify both the 41,000 South Koreans and the 350 North Koreans from a Prisoner of War status to that of "Civilian Internees". Following careful rescreening by ROK and UNC intelligence agencies the South Koreans who desire repatriation and who are acceptable to the ROK Govt will be released gradually on parole to local officials, and will remain in their custody for about 12 months. The first increment will be 1,200 persons. If they are absorbed successfully, further releases will take place at the rate of 1,000 persons per week. This plan will apply only to those South Koreans domiciled South of the Thirty Seventh Parallel. Release of 350 North Koreans will not take place until the South Korean release program is well under way.

Reclassification to status of "Civilian Internee" will relieve tension of South Koreans in custody who fear forced exchange in event of an Armistice, will relieve North Koreans in custody who fear forced repatriation, and will satisfy ROK Govt. Subsequent release will decrease current UNC problems in administering UN prisoner of war camp. Representatives of ICRC, Geneva, are fully aware of, and concur in, reclassification action. Special care will be taken to minimize publicity pending finality of Armistice negotiations.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 15 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 October 1951—6:34 p. m.

C–53096. "The following message in 3 parts.

"*Part I.* Following proposed agreement was presented by Communists at meeting beginning at 1000 this morning:

'Agreement between liaison officers on matters concerning resumption of conference by the delegations.

'1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is indicated on the attached map.

'2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 1000 yards centered on the conference site as shown on the attached map.

'3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed force of either side, including all regular and irregular elements and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.

'4. Except for the Military Police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side is permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side will provide a Military Police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present. The Military Police will only carry small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines. During periods when the delegation parties are not present, 1 officer and 5 men of the Military Police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area.

'5. Both delegations and their parties, the composition of which shall be decided by themselves respectively, shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference site area.

'6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

'7. The delegation of Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers agrees that all armed forces of both sides, including all regular and irregular elements and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area centered on the United Nations Command Delegation Camp at Munsan and having a radius of 5 miles, and against the area of a mile and a half to either side of the road from Munsan to Pan Mun Jom (as indicated on the attached map).

'8. The date and time for resumption of the conference of the delegations will be determined by agreement between the liaison officers of both sides.

'The 2 signatory parties agree that articles 1 A U [?] of the above agreement may also be the draft of the related part of the agreement of security arrangements to be discussed and stipulated by the delegations of both sides for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations.

'Col. A. J. Kinney, Senior Liaison Officer, United Nations Command Delegation.

'Col Chang Chun San, Senior Liaison Officer, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers'.

"*Part II.* Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 coincide with similar articles latest UNC proposal. Article 2 Communist proposal uses 'conference site area' for 'conference area' in UNC proposal. Communist Article 3 uses 'hostile acts of any kind' in place of UNC 'act of armed force' and enumerates components of armed forces. Communists Article 7 differs from UNC proposal as follows: (1) In making restriction applicable to both sides, (2) in enumerating components of armed forces, (3) in use 'hostile acts' in place of 'acts of armed force', and (4) in limits of area.

"The difference between the above proposed provisional agreement and the UNC proposed draft agreement is indicated by comparison of the entry which precedes the signature on the two papers and by the difference in their titles.

"*Part III.* Meeting resumes 1400I today. UNC will counter-propose an 8 article agreement, the acceptance of which along with the acceptance of 3 understandings, would permit resumption of the talks. The understandings are: 'The liaison officers of both sides mutually understand that:

'1. In Item 3 of the proposed agreement, the term "armed forces" includes all Army, Navy and Air Force regular and irregular but does not include persons not inspired by or subject to the control of either side. It is recognized that each side is responsible for protecting its delegation from the activities of such persons behind its own lines.

'2. Investigation of reported violations of agreements shall be conducted as has been the practice of the liaison officers in the past.

'3. All previous security agreement and agreements regarding the Kaesong Conference area and neutral zone are rescinded and superseded by the agreement governing conditions for the armistice conference at Pan Mun Jom when ratified by the delegations'.

"We will accept 'conference site area' in Article 2. We will propose the phrase 'hostile acts of armed force' in lieu of 'hostile acts' or 'acts of armed force' wherever it is used, making our agreement subject to the understanding that we cannot give any guarantees against aircraft overflying the areas involved under conditions beyond our control.

"As regards Article 7 where enemy is attempting to use Kaesong Zone phraseology, we will [shift?] responsibility to their side as indicated in Par 7 of UNC proposal and will insist on the 3000 yard radius in lieu of 5 mile radius on basis latter unnecessary and productive of incidents. Provisional nature of document can be eliminated by independent ratification by both delegations prior to the first plenary session."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 16 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 October 1951—6:38 p. m.

C–53100. Further to HNC 365.[1] At afternoon session which began at 1400 UNC liaison officers carried out program outlined in reference. Communist objected to article 8 largely on ground such matters should be considered for consideration by the delegations. However, they did permit themselves to be drawn into a substantive discussion of this item. This will enable us to engage them further in this discussion at tomorrows session. Prior to closing, Communists sought agreement on both liaison groups presenting their separate views jointly to the delegations. UNC liaison officers demurred, on grounds that both liaison groups were expressing views of their delegations, and to resdr [*refer?*] procedural matters to delegations would only place the question in a far less flexible forum. It is requested that in view of new Communist proposal for five mile radius areas, UNC liaison officers be authorized to counter propose three mile radius areas at their discretion but still not accepting Communists proposed corridor along roads. This is believed desirable as bargaining position, since any reduction of old Kaesong zone accomplishes our basic purpose. Understanding listed in my HNC 365 will be confirmed in writing at both liaison and delegation level. Resume 1000 tomorrow.[2]

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[1] Same as telegram C–53096 from Tokyo, *supra*.

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[2] General Ridgway sent the following message in telegram C-53108, October 16, from Tokyo:

"1. Further to my C 53100 liaison officers have been authorized to agree to Communist proposal to expand the areas free from attack around Kaesong and Munsan to a three mile radius in lieu of 3000 yard radius previously proposed.

"2. It is the unanimous opinion of the delegation and I concur that discussions at liaison officer level should continue for several days provided progress continues to be made." (Black Book, Tab 17)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 20 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 17 October 1951—8 : 42 p. m.

C-53192. CINCUNC Adv HNC 368.

"Summary of liaison meeting which began at 1000 today, Chang opened with statement Kaesong zone still in effect; therefore UNC Article 8 unnecessary. He continued with a defense of composite arrangement as proposed by them; that is, 5 mile zone at Munsan and corridor from Munsan-Pan Mun Jom and continuation Kaesong zone. Kinney in reply clarified our proposal, indicating the Kaesong and Munsan areas exempt from attack but not demilitarized. Pan Mun Jom exempt from attack, demilitarized to extent agreed upon and placed under control designated officers of both sides. No understandings to restrain overflight of Munsan and Kaesong area, but UNC aircraft would not overfly Pan Mun Jom except that no guarantee could be given under conditions beyond our control.

"Col Tsai took up defense of composite arrangement referred to above.

"Col Kinney passed over this discussion and sought to settle the question of definition of "armed forces". Chang and Tsai agreed in principle in order to force discussion back to their Articles 7 and 8, but details of the definition not agreed definitively. Except for this, only differences in views are nature of document, provisional or draft, Communist Article 7 versus UNC Articles 7, 8 and rescinding old agreements. These, of course, are major differences.

"This afternoon UNC liaison officers will present case against continuation of Kaesong zone and 5 mile radius restricted area. Estimate Communists will press for first meeting delegates and reference of undecided issues to them".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 21 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 17 October 1951—8:43 p. m.

C–53193. CINCUNC Adv HNC 369.

"Further to HNC 368.

"At afternoon session beginning at 1500, Col Kinney opened with inquiry on other side's version of Article 3. Col Chang and Col Tsai attempted to refute UNC statement of morning session, particularly the matter of overflight of aircraft. They insisted that overflight poses as much threat to the delegations as the entry into the zone of an infantry company. Chang then proposed his former wording with respect to 'armed forces' be used in para 3; that 'armed forces' alone be used thereafter in agreement and that an understanding on the matter be entered into by the liaison officers. He then presented the following statement of understandings:

"The liaison officers of both sides mutually understand that:

"1. The term armed forces of both sides in the agreement includes only the armed units and armed personnel under the control of or inspired by either side. Neither side will be responsible for an incident, if it is established definitely through joint investigation that the persons responsible for that incident are not inspired by or subject to the control of either side.

"2. Investigation of reported violations of agreements shall be conducted as has been the practice of the liaison officer in the past.

"3. Agreement reached between the liaison officers on matters concerning the resumption of armistice conference by the delegations may also be the draft of related part of the agreement of security arrangements to be stipulated by the delegations for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations. The draft, however, does not preclude additions and deletions by the delegations of both sides. All previous security agreements and agreements regarding the Kaesong conference site area and neutral zone are superseded by the agreement of security arrangements for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations when the latter agreement is stipulated by the delegations or both sides.

"UNC took this proposal under consideration. Col Kinney then attacked proposals of other side on zone. It is noteworthy that although only slight progress was made on differences in this item except as indicated above, other side at no time today withdrew behind front that this subject or any subject must be reserved for the delegations. Meetings continue tomorrow at 1000 18 Oct 51".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 22 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 18 October 1951—9 : 12 p. m.

CX–53280. Discussions between liaison officers continued today and some tentative agreement was reached as to those areas of discussion in which both sides are now in accord.

Kinney presented 3 mile radius proposal stating that though 3000 yard radius was ample, in order to facilitate progress, he was authorized to present 3 mile radius proposal. Communists agreed to study proposal. Meeting was recessed until 1000 tomorrow.

Some progress continues to be made with Communists gradually broadening base of topics they are willing to discuss.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 23 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 19 October 1951—9 : 59 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CINCUNC Adv HNC 372. "Summary of Liaison Officers Meeting Which Began at 1100 Today.

"Following a sharp blast Chang accepted 3 mile compromise and presented following proposed agreement and understandings:

"Agreement between liaison officers on matters concerning resumption of conference by the delegations.

"1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is indicated on the attached map.

"2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 1000 yards centered on the conference site as shown on the attached map.

"3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed force of either side, including all regular and irregular elements and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.

"4. Except for the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side is permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side will provide a military police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present. The military police will only carry small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines. During periods when the delegation parties are not present, 1 officer and 5 men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area.

"5. Both delegations and their parties, the composition of which shall be decided by themselves respectively, shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference site area.

"6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

"7. All armed forces of both sides, including all regular and irregular elements and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area having a radius of 3 miles centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong, against the camp area of the United Nations Command Delegation contained within a circle having a radius of 3 miles centered as indicated on the attached map, and against the area of 1 mile to either side of the Kaesong-Pan Mun Jom-Munsan Road (as indicated on the attached map).

"8. The date and time for completion of the conference of the delegations will be determined by agreement between the liaison officers of both sides.

"Col. A. J. Kinney, Senior Liaison Officer, United Nations Command Delegation.

"Col. Chang Chun San, Senior Liaison Officer, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

"Pan Mun Jom, Korea October, 1951.

"The liaison officers of both sides mutually understand that

"1. The term 'armed forces of both sides' in the agreement includes only the armed units and armed personnel under the control of or inspired by either side.

"2. Investigation of reported violations of agreements shall be conducted as has been the practice of the liaison officers in the past.

"3. Agreements reached between the liaison officers on matters concerning the resumption of the armistice conference by the delegations will be the draft of the related part of the agreement of overall arrangements to be stipulated by the delegations for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations.

"4. All previous security agreements and agreements regarding the Kaesong conference site area and neutral zone are superseded by the agreement of security arrangements for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations when the latter agreement is stipulated by the delegations of both sides."

"Differences now narrowed to two. First, Communists want exemption from attack 1 mile on each side of road to conference site as opposed to UNC position road only exempt. Second, Communists contend overflight is a hostile act and want us to agree not to overfly restricted areas. Estimate face saving offer from us will bring about agreement. Propose to state that we will not enter into agreement not to overfly, but we will restrict the flight of our aircraft over the restricted areas as much as practicable. The overflight of aircraft harms no one and in the absence of an agreement has no significance whatever. The existence of an agreement would leave the Communists no choice but to report a violation in the case of each entry of aircraft. Thus, the unnecessary agreement would serve as a potential source of embarrassment to the conference. With respect to the road, we propose to make a formal offer that exemption from attack be extended to an area within 200 meters on each side of the road. We will not call this a corridor, but merely a definition of the road area. Meeting will resume tomorrow at 1000I".

Authority granted Adm Joy to implement proposal contained in last paragraph.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 25 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 20 October 1951—9:27 p. m.

C-55463. CINCUNC Adv HNC 373.

"Summary of Liaison meeting which began 1000 today discussion continued on width of area along roads. Communists without any very clear basis continued to insist on 1 mile each side. UNC advanced principle that distance should be such as to prevent accidental injury to delegations on road as result of actions outside the restricted zone. In view of agreement of both sides not to atk delegations, distance greater than this would not increase safety of delegations but would only increase the possibility of incidents which might embarrass the conference. On basis of its principle, UNC formally proposed a zone extending 200 meters to each side of road. It is believed the Communists will offer compromise this afternoon which can be accepted.

"On question of overflight, UNC proposed fol statement as one of the understandings: 'In agreeing to refrain from hostile acts the UNC does not agree that the overflight of acft is a hostile act. The UNC agrees not to overfly the Pan Mun Jom conference site area, except under conditions beyond its control. The UNC gives a unilateral undertaking to limit, insofar as is practicable, the overflight of acft over the Kaesong area and the road therefrom to Pan Mun Jom.'

"Chang replied that overflight was a hostile act. With a remark that resolution of this difference might take a long time, he proposed a recess until 1500. Session closed 1145 to resume at 1500.

"Estimate afternoon session may bring agreement on area adjacent to roads, but there is possibility that more time may be needed to break down Communist stand on overflight." [1]

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[1] Telegram C-55464, October 20, from Tokyo gave the following brief report on the afternoon meeting of the liaison officers:

"CINCUNC Advance HNC 374.

" 'Further to HNC 373. At 1630 Chang accepted UNC proposal of exempting area 200 meters on each side of roads Kaesong-Pan Mun Jom and Munsan-Pan Mun Jom from hostile acts. One major difference remains, the question of overflight of Kaesong restricted area. Communists did not accept UNC proposal outlined in HNC 373. Afternoon session adjourned 1700 to resume 1000 Oct 21. Estimate 1 or 2 days will be required to resolve this difference to our satisfaction'." (Black Book, Tab 26)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 27 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 21 October 1951—7:07 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-55521. At todays meeting of liaison officers the UNC accepted the following Communist proposal in regard to aircraft:

> "Except under weather and technical conditions beyond control the military aircraft of both sides shall not fly over the conference site area at Panmunjom; the military aircraft of the UNC shall not fly over the Kaesong area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Panmunjom; the military aircraft of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers shall not fly over the Munsan area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Panmunjom."

Liaison officers will meet at 221000I to affix signature to the English, Korean and Chinese versions of the security agreement.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 28

Press Release Issued by the United Nations Command in Korea at Noon on October 22, 1951 [1]

Agreements were signed this morning by UNC and Communist Liaison Officers, establishing conditions under which the military Armistice Conference, halted by the Communists since 22 August can be resumed:

Ratification of the draft agreement by the delegates of both sides now remains before discussion gets under way again on item two of the agenda which deals with the establishment of a demarcation line.

"The UNC delegation has followed closely the negotiations by the Liaison Officers and have [*sic*] approved the steps taken to reach both the agreement and the mutual understandings."

"These mutual understandings, although not part of the basic agreement, and therefore not subject to ratification by the delegations themselves, are nevertheless viewed as being of equal force and equally binding."

"The date and time for resumption of the preliminary sessions is expected to be fixed shortly."

Agreements between Liaison Officers on matters concerning resumption of conference by the delegations are:

1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Panmunjom.
2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered on the conference site.
3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed forces of either side including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.
4. Except for the Military Police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side shall be permitted in the conference site area. Designated Officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and the preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side shall provide a military police detachment of two officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present in the conference site area. During the periods when the delegation parties are not present in the conference site area, one officer and five men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area. The military police shall carry only small arms, namely, pistols, rifles and carbines.
5. Both delegations and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each delegation party shall be as determined by the senior delegate thereof.

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[1] The source text is a copy of the press release which was distributed at the Ambassadors' briefing on October 23.

6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the Liaison Officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation each delegation will provide its own facilities.

7. All armed forces of both sides, including regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area having a radius of three miles centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong, against the camp area of the United Nations Command Delegation contained within a circle having a radius of three miles centered as indicated on the attached map,[2] and against the area of 200 meters to either side of the Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan road.

8. The date and time for the resumption of the conference of the delegations will be determined by agreement between Liaison Officers of both sides.

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[2] A map of the Armistice Conference Area as agreed upon on October 22 is printed in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 48–49.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 29 : Telegram

The Advance Headquarters of the United Nations Command, Korea, to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 24 October 1951—11:45 a. m.

HNC 385. 1. The following letter in Korean was delivered by Communist Liaison Officer to Lt Col Edwards, UNC at Pan Mun Jom at 1000 hours this date:

"23 Oct 51: To: Vice Admiral Joy, senior delegate, United Nations Comd Delegation.

"I have received your letter of 22 Oct and the attached four signed copies of the agreement (two English two Korean).[1]

"It has already been two months since the incident of 22 Aug which caused the suspension of delegates negotiations. So that, under the strict provisions of the new agreement and understandings such incidents as your side's continuously violating the agreement for two months will not arise again, and so as to prevent obstruction to the progress of the delegates negotiations, the senior delegate of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers delegation, acting with authority, has ratified 'The agreements between liaison officers of both sides on matters concerning resumption of conference by the delegations of both sides.' I have signed the four copies of this agreement of the liaison officers of both sides bearing your signature which you inclosed in your letter of 22 Oct. I here inclose two signed copies of the agreement (one each in Korean and English) and one copy in Chinese. I also formally agree to adhere to the five mutual understandings reached by the liaison officers of both sides.

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[1] At the time of delivery of Admiral Joy's letter (not printed), Colonel Kinney had informed Colonel Chang of the intention of the U.N. Command to occupy the high ground east of Panmunjom in order to eliminate the possibility of incidents from that quarter (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 50).

"You have already indicated in your letter of 22 Oct that you agree to adhere to these understandings. Since 19 Sep our commanders have repeatedly proposed that the conference of both delegations be resumed promptly.

"In order not to delay further the conference of both delegations I propose that the delegations of both sides resume the conference at 11 A M 25 Oct.

"(Signed) Nam Il General Nam Il Senior Delegate Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers Delegation"

2. Communists will be notified that UNC delegation will resume conference at 1100 hours 25 Oct.

VI. OCTOBER 25–NOVEMBER 27. RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AT PANMUNJOM; AGREEMENT ON A LINE OF DEMARCATION; THE PRISONER OF WAR QUESTION; PLANNING FOR THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY; CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE RETALIATORY STEPS BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION (GREATER SANCTIONS)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 31 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 October 1951—6:07 p. m.

C–55841. 1. Following report on first plenary session at Pan Mun Jom is submitted in 5 parts.

Part 1. Summary:

a. Convened at 1100. Nam Il opened introducing Gen Pien Chang-Wu, CPV and Maj Gen Chang Tu Hwan, KPA as delegates in lieu of Gen Teng Hua and Maj Gen Chang Pyung San. Admiral Joy presented credentials of Maj Gen Lee Heung Koon, ROKA in place of Maj Gen Paik Sun Yap.

b. Nam Il noted draft agreement prepared by liaison officers to govern the meeting had been ratified. He stated the agreement set forth in principle fairly complete arrangements. However, "to assure observance by both sides" Nam Il proposed the creation of a joint office of the liaison officers of both sides to determine details of security agreements in accord with the overall agreement; to inspect the application of the agreements; to conduct joint investigation of violations; and to settle by consultation administrative matters raised by either delegation. Admiral Joy accepted this proposal.

c. Admiral Joy referred to the purpose of the meeting and inquired if the other side had any proposal to make on agenda item number 2. Nam Il, after consulting with Chinese, proposed resumption of the sub-delegation meetings which were in progress when the negotiations were interrupted on 22 Aug in order to exchange views and make recommendations to the main delegations. After a short recess Admiral Joy accepted this proposal with the stipulation that either side could unilaterally call a meeting of the main delegations and named General Hodes and Admiral Burke to sub-delegation. Nam Il named Lee and Tsieh Feng and agreed that first sub-delegation meeting be held at 1400 today.

d. Main delegation session adjourned at 1200.

Part 2. Progress: Part 1 above.

Part 3. Attitudes: Formally correct and meticulous.

[Here follows Part 4, a transcript of the proceedings of the meeting.]

Part 5. Conclusions and recommendations: None.

795.00/10-2551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, October 25, 1951—7 p. m.

2029. Embtel 1968, October 22.[1] Following interview with Vyshinsky Oct 23, Brit Amb Moscow reported to FonOff that although Vyshinsky promised to consider possibility USSR again using good offices with North Koreans to urge continuance transmission letters between Brit POWs and their relatives in UK, his attitude unsatisfactory on question exerting influence re freeing Holt[2] and others his party. Vyshinsky implied again that it embarrassing to USSR to intervene. When Gascoigne pleaded length and abnormal character detention, Vyshinsky said there different interpretations of requirements international law re civilian internees. After Gascoigne noted Holt and at least one companion had diplomatic status, Vyshinsky merely insisted best way obtaining their freedom was to arrange cease-fire, for which USSR anxious. He also agreed with Gascoigne's assertion one major consideration in favor cease-fire is that this wld be important step in easing international tension. Gascoigne in his report seemed impressed by this, remarking that "on face of it, USSR seems anxious for cease-fire".

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[1] Not printed. It reported that the Foreign Office, influenced by the views of Messrs. Bohlen and Rusk as expressed to British Embassy officials in Washington and transmitted to London, had wired the new British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, to refrain from making representations on Korea during his call on Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (795.00/10-2251).

[2] Captain Vyvyan Holt, British Minister in the Republic of Korea, had been interned by the North Koreans following the outbreak of fighting in 1950. He was not released until 1953.

Dept pass Moscow; sent Dept 2029, rptd info Moscow 35.

GIFFORD

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 32 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 October 1951—8 : 19 p. m.

C–55852. HNC 591. "1. Sub-delegations met to consider agenda item 2 at 251400 Oct 51. The question of which side should first propose a demilitarized zone was discussed for about one hour with neither side submitting a proposal. UNC Representatives then requested a recess of 20 minutes at 1450 hours. The meeting reconvened at 1510 hours. After another attempt by Hodes and Burke to get the Communists to submit a proposal for the demilitarized zone, Hodes submitted in writing a proposal substantially the same as outlined in HNC 361 as modified by HNC 375.[2] This proposal was accompanied by a map substantially the same as submitted with memorandum of 20 Oct 51. The map handed the Communists showed only the northern and southern boundaries of the demilitarized zone. Our concept of the line of contact was not presented. The Communists requested a recess until 261100 Oct 51 to study the UN proposal. The Communists stated that they will express their opinions concerning the UN proposal at next meeting.

"2. Sub-delegation meeting was conducted in same manner as previous meetings except that Communists asked our agreement to add a Chinese interpreter to translate Korean into Chinese. Heretofore, Lee had translated Korean into Chinese for Hsieh Fang. This new development would be a desire on part of Chinese sub-delegate to insure that he gets from his own interpreter what is said in Korean.

"3. Meeting recessed at 1542 hours to reconvene 26 Oct 1100 hours. Time set at Communists request."

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[1] This telegram was signed : Joy.

[2] Telegram HNC 361, dated October 15, and the emendation contained in telegram HNC 375 were both sent from Admiral Joy in Korea to General Ridgway in Tokyo, but were not repeated to Washington. Upon request they were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ; see p. 1066 and footnote 5, p. 1067. (Memorandum attached to Tab 32 in Black Book.)

795.00/10-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

[Extract]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Foreign Government Representatives on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Absent
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Absent
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
Mr. van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines —Mr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —FE, Mr. Rusk
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Henkin
UNP, Miss Brown
UNA, Mr. Bloomfield
R, Mr. Furnas
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Barbour
Army, Captain Hooks

. . . .

Mr. Rusk pointed out that we had been giving considerable thought to the next point on the agenda dealing with inspection. We had felt that any cease-fire would be precarious unless there were sufficient provisions for inspection on both sides to insure the respective forces against sudden, surprise attacks. Previously, the idea of a full and free inspection had been prominent. Despite the fact that we were not keen on the idea of having mixed military observation teams behind our own lines, we had felt we probably would be obliged to accept such an arrangement in order to obtain access to North Korea. Our consideration of the inspection problem at this point inclined toward the view that unlimited inspection rights throughout Korea would not be required and that it might be possible to work out selective types of inspection at key points which would give the opposing commanders adequate insurance against any surprise onslaught. More extensive inspection than absolutely necessary might create more difficulties for us than benefits, both in reaching agreement and in providing a source of incidents. We hoped an inspection plan could be devised which would give reasonable assurances against the types of onslaught which would threaten the security of UN forces as a whole. Mr. Rusk stressed the secrecy of our thinking on this point.

Mr. Rusk thought that the prisoners of war question would be very troublesome. The difficulty inherent in this problem illustrated that even if considerable headway were made in the truce negotiations on the demarcation line and on inspection, there would not be any reason for great optimism.

. . . .

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 23 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 26 October 1951—6:55 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–55922. HNC 392. "Following is summary of sub-delegation meeting. Opened 1100. Lee stated UNC proposal was step forward but raised following objections:

(1) Proposed military demarcation line (he assumed center of zone presented) lies almost entirely north of the line of contact and within Communist positions;
(2) UNC would withdraw only on the east coast and slightly in area of Kumsong;
(3) Communists would withdraw 1500 square kilometers while UNC would withdraw only 600 square kilometers. Strong objection was voiced to proposed Communist withdrawal in Kaesong area.

Lee then presented Communist proposal on a map. Proposed line of demarcation is as follows:

Wolchon-Ni XC 8707—Tongo-Ri XC 9605—YC 2106—YC 3607—Chongdan YC 5806—Yonan BX 5198—BS 7699—Sangdo-Ri BS 8692—BT 9402—Chirung-Dong CT 0406 (where Communists claim their demarcation line crosses line of contact)—Korangpo-Ri CT 1106—Pokchu-San CT 6929—Sanyang-Ni CT 8329—Imdang-Ni DT 1728—Sohwari DT 3134—Kojin-Ni DT 5255.

UNC would withdraw to line of demarcation east of point where that line crosses line of contact. Communists would withdraw to line of demarcation west of same point. Where proposed line of demarcation crosses line of contact both sides would withdraw five kilometers.

Area evacuated would be demilitarized with each side responsible for civil administration in area evacuated by it.

Discussion of the relative merits followed during which it was apparent that there was basic disagreement as to the actual location of the line of contact. Hodes rejected Communist proposal and pointed out it would require UNC to withdraw relatively great distances along about 95 percent of the battle line and that Communist withdrawal on the west would not really be a withdrawal. Both Lee and Hsieh talked of 'concessions' offered by the Communists and suggested recess until tomorrow at 1100 hours in order to give us time to study their proposal. We suggested they meanwhile verify the actual line of contact and study our proposal further.

The sub-delegation procedure for 27 Oct is planned as follows: First, again strongly refute and reject Communist proposal outlining all reasons therefore; second, attempt to get agreement on line of contact; third, repeatedly suggest acceptance of our proposal of 25 Oct. (We are prepared to sit on this proposal as long as it is deemed advisable.)" [1]

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[1] The reply to this message was transmitted to General Ridgway on October 26 in telegram JCS 85254 and read as follows:

"From JCS.

"1. We concur in procedure outlined in last para your C 55922. Suggest particular care, however, to avoid prolonging argument to point of rigid commitment by Communists or you against acceptance of any compromise with respect to the two lines now proposed.

"2. Would also seem important that press treatment should not be such as to make it more difficult for us finally to settle on a compromise position." (Black Book, Tab 34)

This reply had been discussed and approved at the State-JCS meeting on the morning of October 26; the second paragraph was suggested by Mr. Rusk and drafted by Mr. Nitze (Lot 64D563, Box 728).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 35 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

SECRET TOKYO, 27 October 1951—3:45 a.m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-55931. HNC 361.[2] It has been our intention to submit the new UNC solution with a short paper. We hope to refer the solution to the sub-delegation without lengthy discussion by the main delegation of its merits or demerits. We would be prepared, of course, to follow up in the main delegation with detailed support and justification of the solution should such be necessary. The proposed paper, HNC 351,[3] has been revised to conform to both your C–52872[4] and the above. It is quoted below:

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[1] This telegram was signed: Joy.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1063.

[3] Text contained in telegram C-52854, October 13, from Tokyo, p. 1037.

"Presentation of UNC solution to item 2 of agenda we are meeting to resume armistice discussions which were suspended by you on 23 August. The purpose of these meetings remains exactly the same as it was prior to that date. It is to achieve a just and reasonable military armistice. With this in mind the UNC delegation believes that we should now discuss item 2 of the agenda. The UNC delegation has deliberated long and carefully on how best to secure a proper settlement of item 2. It is apparent from the meetings of the sub-delegations that the attempt to find common ground through a discussion of general principles and their illustrative application has not met with success. What is needed is one solution which is generally satisfactory to both sides. With this in mind we have drawn up a specific demilitarized zone which we submit on a map for your examination. It is completely equitable to both sides. We emphasize that this zone is submitted as a new and concrete solution to item 2. Your attention is drawn to the following points: The demilitarized zone is based on the line of ground contact and generally conforms to this line. It thus incorporates the first obvious requirement of a military armistice. Departures from this line of ground contact are introduced to assure suitable defensive positions in close proximity to the zone. The zone thus satisfies requirements for adequate troop security and stability. Your forces advance in the east and central sectors. UNC forces advance in the western sector. This conforms to the principle agreed to at the sub-delegation meeting of 22 August 1951. Finally, the zone is approximately 4 kilometers in width and thus provides an adequate buffer zone between the opposing forces without unduly multiplying administrative requirements for the zone. This is a most fair and reasonable solution to agenda item 2. We ask for integral agreement to it. If these discussions are not to continue indefinitely it is of the utmost importance that your side fully realize that this solution has been made as equitable as possible. We do not however exclude minor refinements mutually agreeable to both sides which closer examination may show to be administratively convenient. With this solution, the UNC has done what it can to achieve agreement on item 2. We shall now await your response."[5]

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[4] Not printed.

[5] Telegram C–55932, October 27, from Tokyo conveyed the text of telegram HNC 375 from Admiral Joy which proposed the following insert as the penultimate paragraph in the U.N. Command proposal:

"The solution to agenda item 2 that we proffer is based on the present position of the battle line. This line has undergone and may continue to undergo changes during our discussions. In discussing the establishment of a demilitarized zone it would be clearly inexpedient to take into consideration each day the changes that have occurred in the battle line since the preceding day's discussions, however, this armistice conference has already lasted four months. We very much hope for more rapid progress from now on. Should, however, the conference continue for some time, it is entirely possible that what is a just and reasonable battle line solution now will not be so at a later date. We sincerely hope that our work here will proceed with a speed that will make it unnecessary for either party to concern itself with such changes is [*in ?*] a solution to item 2 either at the time item 2 is under discussion or at a still later date."

Admiral Joy expressed the view that the U.N. Command statement might well expedite the actions of the Communist side in subsequent negotiations. (Black Book, Tab 36)

2. With regard to publicity we have not previously released publicly exactly what we present in the armistice meetings. We do not recommend departing from this practice at this time. However, we are preparing a separate press release which will play up in some detail the characteristics of the proposed zone and the fairness of our solution. We will furnish you a draft of the proposed press release by separate message.[6]

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[6] Not printed.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 37 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 27 October 1951—4:11 p. m.

CX-55993. Reur JCS 84081.[1]

Part 1. Our basic objective in any exchange of PW resulting fm armistice negotiations is to achieve the early release by the Communists of the max nr of UN and ROK PW. Secondarily and subj always to the basic objective, our object is to injure the cause of Communism with every means at our disposal.

From the mil point of view the exchange of PW should be accomplished on a one-for-one basis to insure no mil advantage accrues to either side. However, the value to the morale of the US and UN soldier in knowing he is considered all important and the view which the US public places on the early release of UN and ROK PW transcends the immediate mil aspects. We feel, therefore, we should agree to exchange in bulk, including all-for-all, if it is found nec in order to secure agreement on the early release of UN and ROK PW or in order to prevent a breakdown of armistice negotiations.

Fm a humanitarian point of view, we sympathize with the various proposals re non-return to Communist control of Chinese nationals, NK PW who do not desire repatriation and with other spec provisions such as obtaining early return of civ internees and disposing of refugees and displaced pers. We believe however, no action should be taken now or during the negotiations which may jeopardize our basic objective to gain the release of UN and ROK PW nor should the UNC delegation press the Communists to include in the armistice agreement any exceptions or spec provisions which jeopardize the achievement of our basic objective.

Part 2. Reur par 1.

The present UNC plan for exchange of PW is based on a concept of a one-for-one exchange. If this basis is accepted by the Communists and if the nr of bona-fide PW (represented by the total MIA of UNC including ROK) held by the Communists is not swelled by ROK refugees, NK civ, etc., the UNC, holding a vastly greater nr of PW than do the Communists, could hold out from the exchange those pers whose retention we deem advisable such as those Communist PW who have vol aided various UNC agencies, who are war crimes suspects or witnesses, who are intel prospects, or who do not desire repatriation or return to Communist control. Selection of those most desired would have to be made if a very large percentage elected not to be returned to Communist control. An accurate est of the total not desiring return would be difficult now, especially since there is no way of measuring what effect fear of reprisals against families of PW would affect indiv who elected non-return. Along this same line, you were informed in our radio C-53095 [2] of action now being taken to reclassify about 41,000 impressed South Koreans from PW status to that "civilian internee".

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[1] Dated October 13, p. 1034.

The refusal of Communist forces to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Con relative to reporting to ICRC, Geneva, the pris in their hands, constitutes a major obstacle to constructive planning, since UNC cannot know the nr of UN and ROK PW avail for exchange nor can UNC do other than guess what basis of exchange is most likely to prov the return of the max nr of UNC pers. The Communists, on the other hand, know through UNC reports to the ICRC the numbers and names of PW held by UNC.

From a mil standpoint, an all-for-all exchange will prov the Communists with a potential source of over 100,000 trained replacements who could be used against UNC in the event of resumption of hostilities. Balanced against this would be the return of an est max of 6,000 UN troops and about 28,000 ROK troops plus the possible return of some UN and ROK civilians.

Our present planned procedure re agenda item 4 is to attempt initially to force disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of all PW held by the Communists. This would assist us in bargaining more effectively. However we are convinced that, if the Communists desire to hold out certain UNC pers for a long-range indoctrination, or for any other reason, they will do so regardless of what basis of exchange is adopted, merely by deleting the names of such pers on lists furnished UNC.

In summary, it is believed auth for an all-for-all exchange should be auth if this appears nec to secure release of the max nr of UN and ROK PW, or is nec to prevent breakdown in truce negotiations. In add, it may be nec, in an all-for-all exchange, to release to the Communists the fol classes of pers:

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[2] Dated October 16, p. 1049.

a. Suspected war criminals and witnesses to war crimes.
b. Intel prospects.
c. Indiv who have voluntarily aided UNC.
d. Indiv not desiring to return to Communist control.

In an all-for-all exchange, the UNC can probably secure the return, not only of certain UN civ, but also some named ROK civ. If it is not nec to agree to an all-for-all exchange, then the UNC can retain as many from the above classes of pers as is possible under the agreed exchange conditions.

Part 3. Reur par 2.

Discussions and agreements on agenda item 4 will undoubtedly be based on prin of Geneva Con relative to the treatment of PW. Neither the 1929 or the 1949 Geneva Con describes civ internees as PW, by definition or implication. Interjecting question of release of civ internees into discussion of PW exchange would involve reaching agreement that such internees may properly be regarded as PW. International law in this regard is obscure. Communist resistance to discussion or agreement re civ internees can be expected on the grounds that the question is political rather than mil. Assuming, however, that the opposing delegation would consent to discuss the question of releasing civ internees, there is a danger that the scope of discussion could not be limited to categories listed in your radio. Pressure from ROK to include repatriation of civ captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces and from Communists to include return of NK refugees, could be anticipated. Many thousands of indiv are involved in these two groups. It is considered here that efforts should be directed toward effecting release on a basis of named indiv rather than categories. Rqst, therefore, that names of indiv in categories listed in your radio known or believed to be in enemy custody be furnished so that rqst for their release may be submitted at an opportune stage of negotiations. Considered aprop here for US Govt to ask ROK Govt to furnish UNC with restricted list of leading ROK civ believed to be in Communist hands for similar use by UNC delegation.

It is considered probable that with a spec all-for-all exchange or even with an agreed ratio of exchange, the UNC delegation may secure agreement on the release of some or all of these named civ without raising the larger question of exchange or return of all civ internees.

Part 4. Reur par 3.

Attainment of humanitarian objectives and of the long range objective to injure the cause of Communism should depend solely on the success of negotiations in reaching agreement for exchange of PW on a more favorable basis than all-for-all. It is the conviction here that premature release of PW through parole or any other medium would be regarded by the Communists as a breach of faith, prejudicing bargaining position of UNC delegation and jeopardizing recovery of PW in enemy custody. With ref to our radio C–53095, in light of present armistice negotiations this headquarters does not anticipate auth the parole of SK civ internees unless it is clearly indicated such action will not prejudice the success of the armistice agreements.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 38 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET Tokyo, 27 October 1951—7 : 57 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–56018. HNC 396. Morning and afternoon session today resulted no progress. We again gave reasons why their proposal unacceptable and why our proposal was. Long time devoted to discussion Kaesong area. Communists rejected our good reasons therefor.

We proposed discussion location line of contact. They refused for some time but finally agreed present their concept tomorrow at which time we present our line of contact. Am insisting discussions be based on line of contact.

Sub-delegation believes Communist proposal probably a bargaining one. They apparently hope for compromise some place between proposals and our adamant stand comes as rude shock to them. Their milking technique failing. Meet tomorrow 1100. Plan discuss line of contact and relationship to our proposal and review reasons for Kaesong.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 41 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 28 October 1951—7 : 31 p. m.

CX–56073. Acknowledge your msg nr 85254.[1] When Bradley and Bohlen were here, all were in agreement that when map with our proposed demilitarized zone was given to Communists, it would be, with only minor changes, our final offer. Understood this had your full approval. Accordingly, I plan little change in our proposed zone except to reflect further 8th Army advances. Request confirmation.

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[1] See footnote 1 to telegram C–55922, p. 1066.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 42 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET Tokyo, 28 October 1951—9 : 32 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

HNC 401 repeated for your info.

"Summary of sub-Delegation Conference which resumed at 1100 this morning. Started negotiations comparing versions of line of contact each side defending its own and rejecting the others. General trace of radically erroneous Communist version of line of contact presented today follows:

"BS 8784—BS 9594—BT 9604—CT 0808—CT 2022—CT 2524—CT 3137—CT 5639—CT 7042—CT 7247—CT 8547—DT 1237—DT 1740—DT 7045—DT 3753—DT 4067—DT 3970—DT 3875—DT 4575. Map being forwarded under separate cover.

"Discussed relative merits of respective proposals keeping discussions primarily on UNC proposal. Communists stated our proposal unfair because, based on their version of line of contact, UNC Forces advance 1025 square kilometers more than they withdrew. Tried unsuccessfully to get categorical answer from Communists that this was the only reason for their rejection.

"They would not commit themselves today but we believe they may eventually accept line of contact as military demarcation line. They connected 38th Parallel to their proposal today, but in connection eventual solution to Korean problems. Although they returned to their proposal periodically most discussion was conducted on the basis of our proposal. Perhaps some progress. Tomorrow will try get agreement on line of contact, restate arguments for Kaesong, and try get agreement to principle of demilitarized zone being along line of contact with adjustments to include Kaesong area under our control in exchange Kumsong and Kosong area. Resume tomorrow at 1100.[1] Signed Hodes."

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[1] No report is herein printed on the subdelegation meeting held on October 29.

795.00/10-2951

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1951.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1951

KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS

The President read the memorandum [1] with respect to Korea, considered it carefully, and then made the following comments:

First. That the major consideration with respect to a line is that this must be one that Ridgway is able to hold. He stated he had sent a message to General Ridgway to this effect this morning.[2]

Second. With respect to prisoners, that the plan to exchange all for all is, in his opinion, not an equitable basis. He does not wish to send back those prisoners who surrendered and have cooperated with us because he believes they will be immediately done away with. He points out that whereas we have lost only about 16,000 men now held by the Communists, we have about 145,000 of their prisoners.

I pointed out to the President that a situation might come about in which all other matters might be settled and a final settlement might rest on the exchange of prisoners; that the Communists had always insisted on getting back any persons who had gotten out from behind the Iron Curtain; and that we might have a real problem in determining what to do with any prisoners which were not exchanged, particularly in the very unlikely event that we could turn back only the same number of prisoners which we received. This discussion resulted in the President receding to the extent of saying that he certainly would not agree to any all for all settlement unless we received for it some major concession which could be obtained in no other way.[3]

JAMES E. WEBB

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [4]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1951.

KOREA

The basic situation in the cease-fire talks is as follows:

a. Each side has now presented a proposed cease-fire line. The Communist proposal is generally 8 to 12 miles south of the United Nations proposal, although the Communists are willing to concede the useless tips of the Onjin peninsula on the west. However, the two proposals are responsive to each other and there would seem to be no political reason why a line cannot be found by mutual adjustment.

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[1] Attached.

[2] The message referred to has not been identified.

[3] A carbon copy of this memorandum (in Black Book, Tab C) bears the following manuscript notation by U. Alexis Johnson: "We should consider how to educate Pres. a little on PW problem."

[4] The source text gives no indication of authorship.

b. The line is only the first of the four important elements in a cease-fire. The other three are: (1) supervision and inspection; (2) provision for no reinforcement; and (3) prisoners of war. An agreement on a line would not, in itself, quickly produce an armistice since the other subjects are very difficult.

c. It is probably true that neither side is willing to take an armistice at any cost. The greater likelihood is that each is willing to take an armistice on certain terms; the real problem is, therefore, whether the terms of the two sides can be brought into adjustment.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 44 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 30, 1951—1:21 p. m.

JCS-85537. From JCS.

1. Reur CX 56073.[1] We do not feel that your current offer should be regarded as "final" subject only to "minor changes" and this was not the understanding of the JCS when they approved your proposal nor that of Bradley and Bohlen, during Tokyo discussions.[2]

2. Our minimum position is maintenance of security of Line Kansas, to include an adequate OPLR. It is the understanding here that UNC concept of demilitarized zone as set forth in Para 1 your C 51981[3] provides negotiation flexibility without jeopardizing this minimum position. Thus certain adjustments, even in addition to those possible in the Chorwon-Kumwha area, would appear to be practicable. This would seem to be particularly true in view of recent UNC advances.

3. We recognize that it is difficult for Field Cdr to surrender hard-earned ground and do not consider that you should do so unless negotiations seem likely to fail on an issue which does not involve our minimum position.[4]

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[1] Dated October 28, p. 1071.

[2] Telegram JCS 85537 was based on a draft prepared in the Department of State and subsequently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following introductory sentence in the State Department draft, however, was not included in this message as it was transmitted: "Our view is that two lines proposed, the UNC and Communist, are now in the range of bargaining possibilities." (Black Book, Tab 43)

[3] Dated October 1, p. 981.

[4] The following three concluding sentences contained in the State Department draft were not included in this message as it was transmitted:

"Reference location on line, JCS and State agree that Ongjin peninsulas in

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 45 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 October 1951—8:43 p. m.

C-56250. HNC 409. "Sub-delegation reports as follows on today's meeting.

"Morning session opened at 1100 today. During this session considerable time was spent attempting to point out why UNC proposal is equitable and reasonable in contrast to meaningless Communist proposal. Communists referred to fighting in Yonan and Ongjin Peninsulas. UNC asked the location of the line of contact in this area in order to establish future trading position. Communists refused to indicate contact line but continued to maintain that there were battles in the area from which they would withdraw their troops. UNC delegates pointed out that situation in Ongjin and Yonan areas was identical to those in Wonsan, Chinampo and other areas in that there was no line of ground contact on those peninsulas. Discussion then shifted to islands. Communists maintained UNC withdrawal from islands should not be considered in settlement to be made along main battle position. Thereafter discussion was directed to meaningness of Communist line of demarcation in the west and consequent basic lack of soundness in their position.

"During afternoon session line of contact was discussed. Communists refused to agree that Kaesong merited special consideration on grounds that Communists had occupied area without combat as the result of security arrangements associated with armistice talks. Communists gave long speech of seen [?] adulation.

"Estimate made in yesterdays summary was overly optimistic. Communists insist their line of contact is correct. They would not modify it today, but did admit that it was based on information several days old.

"Communists continue to urge their original proposal without visible signs of weakening. Their presentations in support of it today were not good, but they are not yet exhausted. UNC delegates will continue tomorrow to pound home the superiority of the UNC proposal over that of the Communists. Signed Joy".

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west have little military interest and could not be defended. However, it would be both politically and economically desirable to return these areas to ROK administrative control if that could be done without unacceptable sacrifice of position further east. If some adjustment in line is necessary in central and eastern sectors to obtain agreement, Communist offer of western peninsulas could be accepted; this would improve public acceptability of such minor concessions in central and eastern sectors." (Black Book, Tab 43)

795.00/10-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 31, 1951—7 p. m.

2118. 1. Brit Military Intelligence has just completed study of recent aerial photographs of Yalu River Dam and has drawn conclusion that Dam is not being utilized as communications line between China and Korea, that the construction of the dam itself is such as to preclude passage of vehicular traffic; that there are no railways or serviceable roads on Manchurian approach to dam; and that the precipitate nature of the terrain is such that road construction wld be impractical. Railway bridge is shown to be some six miles down stream from dam. Study draws inference no useful military purpose wld be served in destroying dam by bombing.

2. Brit Joint Chiefs understood to be indignant over fact Morrison on own initiative and without reference to Joint Chiefs authorized Dept inform commander UN Forces, Korea in event resumption of full-scale Commie offensive bomb Yalu Dam without further reference to Brit Govt.

3. Substance para 1 above is shortly to be communicated to Dept thru Brit Emb.[1]

GIFFORD

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[1] See telegram 2564, November 17, to London, p. 1146.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 46 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 31 October 1951—12:59 p. m.

HNC 411. "Sub-delegation reports as follows on 31 Oct meeting: General Hsieh Fang did major part of talking in morning attempting to disprove our claims to Kaesong area. Not once did he or Lee mention Communist proposal. Indications were that the only objections to our proposal were 2: Our insistence on Kaesong area and the overall inequality in withdrawals and advances. UNC delegates presented all arguments as to why demilitarized zone should pass north of Kaesong including UNC withdrawal from other areas and islands, Communists occupation Kaesong by default and provision of appropriate defensive positions for Seoul area. A significant statement by Lee was 'especially we hope you will give up your demand for the Kaesong area. This will contribute to our progress and is the key point to the solution of our problem'. At afternoon session after short sparring period, Lee read a carefully prepared speech the first part of which vehemently criticized the UNC sub-delegation attitude and the UNC proposal. He stated that the UNC proposal was absolutely unacceptable and defended their original proposal. As the closing part of his statement he submitted a new proposal to the effect that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers from the adjusted line of contact. Copy of accompanying map is forwarded under separate cover. Median line of their proposed 4 kilometer zone, which is actually slightly south of line of contact, follows: BS 9484—BS 9690—BS 9696—BT 9502—CT 0006—CT 1112—CT 1516—CT 1923—CT 2527—CT 3236—CT 4140—CT 4942—CT 5642—CT 6539—CT 7039—CT 7641—CT 8739—CT 9641—DT 0042—DT 0642—DT 1243—DT 1844—DT 2346—DT 2949—DT 3553--DT 3956—DT 4360—DT 4963. Under Communist proposal the demilitarized zone is subject to changes in line of contact before signing of armistice. The statement referred to minor adjustments based on terrain. It is not yet clear whether these adjustments are incorporated in given line or whether they are open to discussion. Since Communist zone is based on their version of the line of contact, UNC tactics for tomorrow are:

(1) To get agreement on line of contact and,
(2) To determine by adjustments how close we can bring the Communist proposal to the UNC proposal.

At meeting of liaison officers during recess Chang turned over to Kinney the 11 year old child previously requested by UNC, claiming child was ROK espionage agent. Chang also announced southward movement of Communist troops to Sach-On River in vicinity Pan Mun Jom. Chang complained that UNC troops in vicinity of confererence site area were shooting at Communist troops near, but outside conference area. Kinney merely noted statements of Chang. Signed Joy."

795.00/11-151

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1951.
US/A/3366

UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST AGGRESSION IN KOREA—SUMMARY OF MAIN UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I. The United States should continue to play a leading role in the General Assembly consideration of the Korean question and should seek to maintain the maximum United Nations' support for the United Nations action in Korea and for the measures necessary to achieve United Nations objectives there.

II.—*If There Is No Armistice:*

A. The United States, with other key delegations, should sponsor a resolution which would:

1. Call upon the aggressors to cease and desist from their aggression and call upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea.
2. Reaffirm the United Nations determination to continue its action in Korea.
3. Urge all members to intensify assistance and contribute additional forces.
4. Note with concern that certain States have rejected recommendations of the Additional Measures Committee and of giving assistance to the aggressor.
5. Request the Additional Measures Committee to consider additional political and economic measures to meet aggression in Korea.
6. Reaffirm policy of United Nations to bring about cessation of hostilities and achievement of United Nations objectives by peaceful means.
7. Request the President of the General Assembly to make available his good offices to this end.

B. The United States should, with respect to the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, support a resolution which would:

1. Approve the report of UNCURK and specifically reaffirm the objectives and principles of the resolution of October 7, 1950.
2. Replace UNCURK with a single United Nations political representative with a Commission to advise him consisting of the same membership as UNCURK with functions similar to those of UNCURK.

III.—*If There Is An Armistice:*

A. The United States should support a resolution which would:

1. Reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea.
2. Appoint a United Nations delegation with broad terms of reference which would discuss with interested parties an agreement on a political settlement for Korea and for Korea only. The United Nations delegation might consist of representatives of the United States and two other countries with troops in Korea, e.g., Thailand and Australia. The settlement would be subject to approval by the General Assembly.
3. Request UNCURK to advise the United Nations delegation.
4. Refer to past resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly on United Nations action in Korea.
5. Note approval of the armistice by the Security Council and ex-

press Assembly's satisfaction over conclusion of armistice and successful accomplishment by United Nations forces of their mission in Korea.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 48 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 1 November 1951—6:11 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–56380. HNC 414. UNC delegates opened morning session with detailed refutation of Communist proposal of yesterday along lines indicated in HNC 413.[1] Communists feigned surprise at strong rejection to their proposal; attempted to get UNC delegation to take a recess until tomorrow for purpose of further study of their proposal. UNC delegates made it very clear that the proposal had been given thorough study and that no additional time for study was needed.

Afternoon session brought additional arguments on relative merits of 2 proposals.

While Communists reiterate that their proposal is final the delegation believes that the UNC demand for the Kaesong area is the crux of their objection to UNC proposal and that almost any compromise which does not require them to forfeit Kaesong would be acceptable. Sub-delegation believes we should continue to take advantage of the momentum gained during the past 7 days for the present at least. Meetings resume at 1100 hours tomorrow.

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[1] *Infra.*

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 47 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 1 November, 1951—8:03 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–56388. HNC 413. "UNC delegation expects to use substance of following statement in responding to Communist proposal today.

"Yesterday, when you described your proposal it seemed that we might be close to an agreement. You would have us believe that you have made generous concessions to our side and that therefore your proposal should be acceptable. A proposal is not made acceptable because it represents concessions from a position that was patently absurd in the first place. A proposal cannot be made acceptable by virtue of such changes. It is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of its contents if these are inequitable, no comparison with a previous proposal will make them equitable.

"Some of the inequities of your proposal undoubtedly arise from your conception of the battle line. I am not particularly concerned about these at the moment. When we have reached fundamental agreement, it will not be too difficult to settle these battle line differences.

"Examination of the proposal discloses, that your statement does not fit your proposal. You said that the 4-kilometer zone was centered on the line of contact. In fact, it is not near the line of contact in many places. In general, it is south of the line of contact.

"You said that you had made adjustments to the line of contact to obtain your demilitarized zone. You did make adjustments. You adjusted the Kosong, Kumsong and Kaesong areas of the demilitarized zone into our positions. This is not a satisfactory adjustment.

"Your proposal requires our forces to withdraw while your forces advance. This is not equitable.

"Your proposal does not take into consideration the many factors pertaining to the Kaesong area which are all very important in the determination of the demilitarized zone:

"This area is of vital concern to the defense of Seoul. This was one of the two main routes through which troops poured in June, 1950 when Seoul fell. Our side has no intention of leaving this Capital City with less natural defense than it had when it was originally attacked in 1950. The UNC mechanized forces were in Kaesong at the time an Armistice Conference at this site was agreed to. The UNC withdrew from this area for the specific purpose of turning it into a neutral zone. You moved your troops into the area and have attempted to treat this area as one which you gained by military action. Despite this, the UNC has in its own proposal offered territorial compensation to a degree more than equitable if you consider the manner in which you acquired this area in July, 1951.

"You stated that the areas from which both sides withdraw are approximately equal in size. The map which you gave to us shows that we withdraw 644 square kilometers while you only withdraw 85 square kilometers. The statements that you use in describing your demilitarized zone are, therefore, misleading and inaccurate.

"Since your solution is not an equitable nor fair solution to the problem, it is not acceptable.

"However, it is a great step forward.

"There are still many problems connected with agenda Item 2. There are some areas in our two proposed zones which are not far apart and it is likely that we could easily come to an agreement on those areas. There are other areas in your zone which are not satisfactory and which cannot be accepted.

"Before discussing the zone in detail, I should like to point out that your demilitarized zone in the Kaesong area is neither just nor objective. Your zone ignores the many factors pertaining to the arrangements of the Conference site, which has effected the line of contact. It is actually far south of the line of contact.

"You would have our forces withdraw unilaterally from the Kosong and Kumsong areas without corresponding withdrawals by your forces. You assert that the areas from which our side would withdraw are mainly in the jutting out parts of the battle line. In effect, you tell us that, in those places where our forces made large advances, they should now withdraw without corresponding adjustment.

"You have not taken into consideration other areas from which we withdraw. If our forces are to be withdrawn from the Islands off the coast of North Korea, that fact must be taken into consideration in determining the location of the demilitarized zone. If they are not to be withdrawn, the United Nations Command would not ask for any adjustments due to the Islands. What consideration we give to the Islands is, therefore, dependent upon whether or not the United Nations Command Forces are to withdraw from those coastal Islands.

"The Armistice Conference has affected the movement of troops in the Kaesong area. This factor must be taken into consideration in the allocation of the demilitarized zone. The effects of the security arrangements of the Kaesong area have had a significant effect on the location of the line of contact. It is not a factor which can be ignored.

"These are general objections to your proposal.

"Both sides reserve the right to amend the demilitarized zone if there are any significant changes in the line of contact. Both sides maintain that their zones are based on the line of contact. Both sides are willing to accept a zone 4 kilometers wide.

"The points that I have discussed are of fundamental importance. We are still a long distance from an agreed solution to Item 2 of the agenda. Your full and clear appreciation of this is our best hope of real progress."

795.00/11-251

Memorandum by H. O. H. Frelinghuysen and Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1951.

Subject: Item No. 3 of the Armistice Agenda

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

(1) General Ridgway's proposal, contained in CINCUNC's C52227 [1] remain our initial position in the negotiations on Item 3.

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[1] Dated October 4, p. 997.

(2) In the event that negotiations threaten to break down on this proposal this Government adopt as its *minimum* position on Item 3 "joint inspection of the demilitarized area."

(3) The following additional provisions be considered as desirable lesser alternatives, which are not essential but which could be used for bargaining purposes:

(*a*) Inspection teams located at strategic points within an area 100 miles each side of the demarcation line with necessary rail, air and sea access to their own area. This provision would avoid Communist opposition to inspection along the Sino-Soviet border and our opposition to inspection in the Pusan area.

(*b*) Reciprocal aerial and naval inspection of all of Korea.

(*c*) Failing agreement on (*a*) or (*b*) reference of the subject of inspection and supervisory machinery to a special armistice committee which might continue the discussion after the termination of hostilities for the purpose of arranging periodic inspections of vital areas.

(4) In the event that recommendation (2) is accepted as governmental policy, preparatory propaganda action be taken to obtain the full support of ROK, US and UN public opinion and at the same time to demonstrate to the Communists that our failure to insist on inspection in no way lessens our determination to resist any renewed aggression.

Discussion:

Item 3 on the Armistice Agenda provides for concrete arrangements for the realization of the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice". CINCUNC's message C52227, October 4, suggests modifications to JCS message 95354 of June 30 on the same subject.

According to CINCUNC's C52227 the purpose of inspection is to insure that "there is no buildup of troops or supplies in such significant quantities as would, if continued, substantially impair the security of the UN forces, as that security existed when the armistice became effective." Although the only real deterrent to a renewed attack in Korea is the strength of the free world and its determination to resist aggression, inspection is designed to serve as an additional deterrent to Communist aggression and to gather intelligence which could give UN forces sufficient time to prepare against an enemy attack.

Since the Communist mode of operation is basically opposed to the concept of inspection or supervision in the satellite areas and since Communist negotiators may adamantly oppose inspection in north Korea and thereby risk the break-down of the armistice talks, consideration should be given to the question whether and to what extent an inspection of north Korea can actually accomplish these purposes and what concomitant advantages we could derive from the inspection.

The presence of joint inspection teams in north Korea would be of some value in inhibiting preparations for renewed Communist aggression. The mere fact of their being in north Korea might deter the more flagrant violations of the cease-fire terms. Their report to the UN of Communist violations might rally the free world into taking defensive measures—short of military action—to meet the new threat. Such reports would also have a propaganda value in pointing up Communist bad faith and aggressive intentions.

Joint inspection teams would contribute to the acquisition of intelligence, thereby keeping the UN Command apprised of Communist capabilities and intentions. This factor might also have a deterring effect on Communist aggressive designs.

Inspection teams would provide an added sense of security to the Republic of Korea and might lessen somewhat the opposition of the Korean Government and people to a cease-fire in a divided Korea.

However, the accomplishment of the purposes for which inspection under Item 3 was designed will be severely limited by a number of serious weaknesses. Even in the event of a Communist buildup and reports of the inspection teams to the UN to that effect, it would be most difficult to earn UN support for taking the military initiative in renewing hostilities and smashing the buildup. By its very nature the UN would probably have to wait for an overt act of aggression before taking military countreaction. Failure of the UN to initiate punitive action might be interpreted as a sign of its weakness, would tend to vitiate the propaganda and psychological advantages derived from the inspection reports, and might encourage the Communists to commit further violations.

In the event of Communist bad faith it is doubtful that the presence of the inspection teams could assure against a Communist buildup. The Communists would probably neither permit teams of sufficient size nor grant them adequate freedom of movement and observation to prevent surreptitious evasion of the armistice terms. Moreover, the Communists could increase their military capabilities by building up storage areas, repairing airfields, and rebuilding their lines of communications under the guise of civilian rehabilitation.

UN members of inspection teams would be under constant administrative difficulties in north Korea, since Communists would make every effort to hamstring and embarrass them. In case the Communists wanted a particular area free from inspection they would undoubtedly find ways to prevent free access to the teams and thereby impede the acquisition of intelligence. The inability to define in advance the exact functions of the teams would make for additional difficulties. In event of Communist efforts to embarrass the teams the prestige of the UN might be adversely affected.

The presence of Communist inspectors in south Korea might impede our attempts to rebuild the ROK forces. In this case the USSR, Communist China and north Korea could utilize reports from their observers in south Korea to point up the "aggressive designs" of the ROK and pave the way for an attempted justification of what they would term a "defensive" buildup of Communist forces in north Korea. Communist inspectors would also derive a broad range of intelligence about our forces in the ROK, particularly if they were stationed in the Pusan area. There would be inevitable friction between Communist observers and the ROK Government, since the latter would probably make every effort to circumscribe the activities of the teams.

Unless the provisions for inspection can be so strengthened in the negotiations as to eliminate these weaknesses and unless definite punitive provisions are written into the agreement to assure its implementation, inspection would probably not adequately fulfill the purposes for which it is designed. From a political point of view, we should be wary of committing ourselves to a course of action whose implementation would be accompanied by innumerable embarrassing incidents; whose enforcement through a renewal of hostilities would be difficult to justify, would necessitate renewed fighting, thus increasing the threat of World War III, and be a source of friction with our allies; and whose non-enforcement would adversely affect the prestige of the UN. From the practical standpoint, the ultimate sanction against a renewal of the aggression is not the presence of inspection teams in north Korea but the clear likelihood that renewed fighting cannot and will not be limited in scope as the present hostilities have been.

It is therefore not believed that we should insist so rigidly on our initial bargaining position (C52227) as to risk the break-down of the armistice talks and a continuation of hostilities. A final governmental decision on this question must, of course, also rest on an assessment by the Department of Defense of the military value of inspection and its effect on the security of the United Nations forces.

It must be recognized that any subsequent modification of our position on Item 3 might result in an unfavorable reaction by American public opinion, segments of which may consider inspection necessary to the security of the UN forces and may charge appeasement, particularly if a renewed Communist attack threatens our military position. Every effort will therefore have to be made to publicize the reasons for our stand and to emphasize the adverse consequences of a break-down of the armistice talks—whether the result is a prolonged period of indecisive conflict or a widening of the area of hostilities.[2]

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[2] On November 5, U. Alexis Johnson forwarded this memorandum to Messrs. Matthews, Hickerson, Bohlen, and Nitze under cover of a brief memorandum which read in part as follows:

"I am circulating this memo for your concurrence or comments in the hope that we can arrive quickly at a Departmental position. I believe that we should consider carefully the method and timing of our presentation of this position to Defense."

The question of inspection was taken up at a State–JCS meeting on November 16; see p. 1141.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 49 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 2 November 1951—7:31 p. m.

C–56468. HNC 417. "Sub-delegation reports as follows: Morning session devoted to:

(1) Communist prepared statement upholding their proposal and denouncing our proposal as unfair, etc, with emphasis on Kaesong area.

(2) In order to clarify a remark of Lee's to the effect that their proposal was their maximum effort we asked, 'Is that an ultimatum?' Lee would not give a direct answer and developments indicated clearly that he did not in any way want to infer that he was issuing an ultimatum.

(3) Demonstration on our part by referring to the map to consider certain adjustments closely coinciding or coinciding exactly with their zone in the eastern three fourths of the battle line.

"The afternoon session began with a firm re-statement of our position with emphasis on its fairness and our requirement for the Kaesong area. Hsieh of course refuted again all arguments to our justification for this area. The Communists insist on avoiding all consideration at this time of islands as an additional bargaining point possibly with the intent of having us drop them at a later day as unimportant. Although no visible progress made today, this was only second day after their proposal and therefore too soon to expect any sign of Communist weakening."

320/11–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, November 3, 1951—3 p. m.

Delga 33. In considering Korean position papers GADel inquired concerning course action relating Korean item which wld be helpful in light current armistice discussions.[2] GADel particularly concerned question timing of initiation of discussion of item in comite I or as matter dipl consultation in advance of comite consideration. Suggestion was made for example that Ridgway be asked what effect initiation debate in GA would have—favorable or otherwise—in armistice discussions. GADel also interested nature considerations which shld be taken into account in relation activity in GA to these discussions. GADel requested that Dept be asked furnish specific guidance on subj presumably after consultation with Defense. Specifically shld GADel now seek delay consideration Korean item first comite and if so for how long or shld it commence immed consultations with other delegations with view to early comite consideration? Position paper 367, page 2, para 3 [3] touches generally on this question but does not provide specific guidance geared to current armistice negots.

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[1] Mr. Acheson was in Paris at this time as head of the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which was to begin on November 6.

ACHESON

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[2] The question of Korea was discussed at the Second Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, which was held on November 2 at the Hotel Astoria in Paris. After a fairly lengthy and inconclusive exchange of views, Mr. Acheson suggested that Washington be consulted on the question of the timing of taking up Korea in the General Assembly with a view to the effect that this would have on the negotiations at Panmunjom. (Minutes of the meeting in IO/UNP Files: Lot 60D268)

[3] Dated October 12; the reference is to paragraph 3 under "Recommendations," p. 1017.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 50: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 3 November 1951—8:45 p. m.

[C–56546.] HNC–420. "After day long debate over Kaesong issue principally, with UNC laying stress on concession we make in giving up islands north of demilitarized zone and in territorial waters, we took a new step. Carefully phrased as a matter for discussion purposes only, we asked what the Communists would think of projecting a 4 kilometer wide corridor from the UNC proposed zone (25 October) roughly south to include Kaesong so as to bring Kaesong into demilitarized zone. Communists reaction was strongly negative, with Hseih Fang answering question by stating his delegation would never accept a solution which left Kaesong either in UNC control or in demilitarized zone. Communists seemed very anxious to obtain agreement on the principle that the zone be based strictly on the line of contact. We agreed in general but emphasized appropriate adjustments were mandatory. Communists rejected this interpretation. Thus meeting ended with no agreement on any general or specific point."

320/11-351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 4, 1951—11:50 a. m.

Gadel 60. Repeated to: SCAP for USPolAd, Tokyo 730, info 00A. Dept believes undesirable consider Korean item, Delga 33,[1] in present state armistice negotiations. So long negotiations actively progressing and until fairly clear whether armistice will be achieved, tone GA debates would have to be ambiguous, and great danger debates might adversely affect progress negotiations.

GADel shld seek indefinite postponement entire Korean item, in manner and with understanding it might be taken up on very short notice. Suggest possibility putting item second or third Comm 1 agenda, and repeatedly putting it down a notch so long as postponement desirable. Alternative possibility to leave place Korean item undetermined, with Comite understanding it might be brought up any time. You will be further instructed as armistice talks proceed. In discussions other Dels, you shld indicate substance above, and general outlines our thinking various alternative position papers. When it becomes clearer how armistice talks will come out, you will be instructed to proceed detailed negotiation other Dels on lines appropriate position paper.

Dept recognizes uncertainty re Korean item might affect other items as well, and this shld be kept in mind in setting order of consideration other items. You should resist, however, possible tendency other Dels to do nothing or step over-cautiously on other questions from fear that doing anything Sov might not like might possible rock Korean armistice talks.

WEBB

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[1] Dated November 3, p. 1085.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 52 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 November 1951—9:39 p. m.

CX-56598. HNC-423. "The Communists again today, 4 Nov, stood firm against the inclusion of Kaesong in the UNC area or in the demilitarized zone. The principle upon which their proposal is based is a strict battle line solution with minor adjustments or even no adjustments. This principle has the appearance of being equitable in all respects and will no doubt have strong appeal to public opinion. The Communists may be relying on the pressure of public opinion to force UNC acceptance of their proposal before they are forced by the passage of time or by military pressure to recede from their position.

"The longer we insist upon the inclusion of Kaesong in the demilitarized zone the more damaging it would be to withdraw to a less desirable solution. It would result not only in greater loss of prestige, but it would encourage Communists to hold out on other points with the expectation of forcing the UNC to withdraw therefrom.

"We may now be faced with the necessity of waiting a long period for a Communist compromise as an alternative to our agreement to a battle line solution with minor modifications. Since we may be required by higher authority within a short period to abandon our objective of retaining Kaesong or placing it in the neutral zone, we recommend that we agree on 5 Nov to the principle of settlement on the battle line with appropriate (minor, if necessary) adjustments and that we proceed therefrom as indicated in the following statement.

"There are 2 proposals before the sub-delegations, one presented by the United Nations comd, the other by the other side. Both are based upon the line of ground contact with appropriate adjustments. However, they are based upon different and unilateral versions of that line as there is no agreed line. Both proposals recognize that inasmuch as the military demarcation line is based upon the line of contact provision must be made for altering the location of the demilitarized zone to give recognition to any changes in the line of contact resulting from military operations which may transpire between the present date and the signing of the armistice.

"The sub-delegations, therefore, have agreed to a principle according to which the location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone can be determined. That is, that they will be based upon the line of ground contact with appropriate adjustments. In view of the current lack of agreement on the line of ground contact we can go no further than this at the present time. In view of the probability of changes in the line of ground contact between the present and the signing of the armistice there is no need for determining the exact location of the demilitarized zone at this time, indeed, there is no advantage in attempting to refine our agreement further at the present time. All that is needed is to make such arrangements as will provide an agreed line of contact when such a line is required just before the overall agreement is finalized. The exact location of the line of contact is susceptible to objective determination. It can be located to the satisfaction of both sides by appropriate means such as the establishment of a commission made up of officers from both sides to visit points in the battle area where the location of the line of contact is in dispute. In view of these considerations and in order that progress towards solution of all the questions involved in bringing about the cessation of warfare in Korea may not be stalemated during the solution of a technical question the following formal proposal is hereby submitted:

"The sub-delegations agree:

"1. To accept the principle that the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone will be based upon the actual line of ground contact at the time of the signing of the armistice with appropriate adjustments.

"2. To establish a committee consisting of 2 officers from each side the function of which shall be to determine to the satisfaction of both sides the actual line of contact as of any specific future date and to be prepared to provide to the delegations such an agreed line at such time as it may be needed for the purpose of accurately determining the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone prior to finalization of armistice agreements.

"3. To report their agreements to the plenary session of the delegations with the recommendation that the latter proceed to the discussion of other items on the agenda leaving the finalization of the agreement on agenda item 2. Until such time as it is possible to settle it definitely in order to reach agreement in all questions related to an armistice in Korea at the earliest possible date. 'Under the UNC proposal the delegations will be enabled to proceed with the other questions related to the armistice while the bilateral committee undertakes its function of developing that which is a prerequisite to final agreement on agenda item 2; that is, an agreed contact line.'

["]Should the Communists fail to accept this proposal it may serve nevertheless to help to bring about a compromise on Kaesong. Should they accept it, the difference over Kaesong will be submerged for the present in the discussion of other problems. Meanwhile the passage of time, the approach of cold weather and continued military operations (at least air, Navy and arty), will exert their pressures. Thus, when the question of Kaesong comes up again we may be in a stronger position than we are at present to argue for its retention or demilitarization as an appropriate adjustment. Sgd Joy"

I have granted authority to Admiral Joy to proceed as outlined above.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 53 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 November 1951—9:40 p. m.

C–56601. HNC 424. "Sub-delegation reports as follows on meeting 4 Nov.

"1. (*a*) In morning session Communists advanced so-called new proposal requiring each side to withdraw 2 kilometers from military contact line, without any adjustments whatsoever. They argued that this was a new proposal, since it dropped their former claims to the Kosong and Kumsong salients. Hodes pointed out that this solution merely eliminated territory Communists previously asked for without compensation.

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[1] This telegram was signed: Joy.

"(*b*) Burke inquired whether the Communists had taken into account UNC withdrawal from the islands held in territorial waters of Korea. The Communists stated our withdrawal from islands was comparable to their elimination of patrol activities in UNC rear areas, and that they had considered our withdrawal from islands in their overall consideration of the demilitarized zone. When pressed for detailed compensation for UNC withdrawal from islands, the Communists asserted that the islands were unimportant and could not be measured in terms of kilograms and kilometers.

"(*c*) The Kaesong problem was rehashed, with UNC again stating that the Kaesong Area was under the control of neither side in early July. Fruitless discussion followed as to where UNC and Communist troops were located in early July. The Communists consistently held to the view that the designation of Kaesong either as in the demilitarized zone or under UNC control was unsatisfactory.

"2. A short afternoon session was confined to statements by both sides that they had nothing further to offer at the time."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 55 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 November 1951—9:46 p. m.

C–56667. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 425.

"Sub-delegates report on 5 Nov meeting which opened at 1100: Communist delegates opened with prepared statement on their proposal which they described as a strict settlement on the line of contact with appropriate adjustments, or in the event adjustments could not be agreed upon, a withdrawal of 2 kilometers from the line of contact by both sides without major adjustments. UNC delegates explored the proposal throughout the morning reaching the conclusion that Communists would agree that as a matter of principle adjustments in the line were desirable and that in general such adjustments would be equivalent, but that each case would have to be decided on its own merits. Recessed at 1300. Resumed at 1500. UNC delegates presented statement substantially as set forth in HNC 423[1] with the addition of an article establishing the agreed width of the demilitarized zone as 4 kilometers. Communists immediately set about exploring the meaning of 'appropriate adjustments' asking first, does this mean that you drop your demand on Kaesong, then trying by more diplomatic questions to get the same information. UNC delegates took the position that the question of what was or was not an appropriate adjustment could be determined only in relation to a specific line of contact; that is, the line on the date the agreement is finalized. Communists expressed a tentative conclusion that although both sides used the same words in describing the principle upon which agreement was sought, there was no actual agreement. At 1725 they took the proposal home for study. Sub delegation to meet at 1100 hrs 6 Nov. Joy."

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[1] Dated November 4, p. 1087.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 56 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 6 November 1951—5:37 p. m.

C-56713. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 426.

"Sub-delegation reports as follows on meeting this date: Communists presented long prepared statement rejecting our proposal of yesterday on basis agenda item 2 must be finally solved before going to other items.

"Communists now want determine present line of contact and make that line the final military line of demarcation of the demilitarized zone regardless of the time the military armistice is eventually signed or the actual location of the line of contact at that time. This concept is in complete disagreement with what they have previously said and with our own views.

"We pointed out that terms of armistice dependent on conditions at time of signing of armistice and that tentative agreement reached on each item might be modified if conditions on which tentative agreement was based changed significantly.

"No indications their future action.

"We will continue press for agreement on our proposal outlined in HNC 423.[1] We do not intend agree to permanently fixing demilitarized zone until armistice is signed.

"Meet tomorrow 1100. Signed Joy."

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[1] Dated November 4, p. 1087.

795.00/11-651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, November 6, 1951—6 p. m.

410. CINCFE for Ridgway by other means. Ref CINCFE CX-56598 sent Dept Army rptd info American Embassy Pusan.[1]

In light UNC proposal agree demarcation line on basis line of contact and probability ROK seize opportunity criticize arrangement excluding Kaesong ROK territory, I called on President Rhee November

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[1] Dated November 4, p. 1087.

5. I told him General Ridgway wanted me inform him difficulties involved, present phase negotiations. I recalled success General Ridgway has had holding out against withdrawal to 38th parallel on grounds demarcation line must be militarily defensible; pointed out Commies have now come far to meet us and appear ready agree on demarcation line if based on line of contact; UN has so far insisted major adjustments such line also required, but difficult adhere this position in face previous insistence on deciding issue on purely military grounds. World opinion could not be expected support continuing deadlock on this issue and fact was no proposal made more sense from mil point of view than line of contact.

Rhee appeared somewhat resigned to situation; he did not make scene but remarked that Kaesong of course meant great deal to Korean people and it wld be difficult having Commies south 38th parallel. He also repeated it was stupid believe Commies wld honor any settlement.

Rhee's relatively mild reaction does not necessarily mean he will not be difficult. I anticipate agitated reactions several quarters, with Rhee figuring in background. At an instance, Natl Assembly yesterday passed unanimous resolution addressed to ROK Govt, General's Ridgway, Van Fleet to effect "Korean people do not want to give up Yompack and Ongjin areas" and recommending they be "excluded from neutral zone", (*sic*).

Among points which ROK likely raise in future if line contact becomes armistice line is fact Ongjin and other ROK areas in west will be handed over to North Korean administration whereas North Korean areas on east coast south of demarcation line cannot, under existing UN resolutions, be turned over to ROK administration.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 57 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 6 November 1951—6:27 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–86291. From JCS.

1. Ur C 56546, CX 56598, C 56601, C 56667 and C 56713 considered.[1]

2. Line of action as described in CX 56598 considered sound.

3. In support of your contentions in CX 56598 re Kaesong JCS feel that line in this area proposed by Communists is one which we would rather accept than let negotiations break down or reach a stalemate. Consequently, if Communists flatly reject your latest approach and negotiation on this point appears fruitless, the quicker we accept a

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[1] Dated respectively, November 3, 4, 4, 5, and 6, pp. 1086, 1087, 1089, 1090, and 1091.

compromise the less it will appear as an important backdown both here and as far as Communist propaganda is concerned.

4. Throughout we have taken as basic principle that demarkation line should be generally along battle line. Communists now appear to have accepted this principle. We feel that in general this adequately meets our minimum position re demilitarized zone.

5. Judging from press reaction here it would be hard to make the people understand why negotiations broke down, if such should happen, over Kaesong in face of recent Communist concessions. This fact has been mentioned several times in last few days both on radio and in press.

6. If your latest proposal to postpone agreement on a line of mil demarkation and demilitarized zone is rejected completely by Chinese-NK delegation, and further negotiation along this approach appears fruitless, early agreement generally along proposed Chinese-NK line in Kaesong area is advisable.

7. However, JCS are concerned over latest Communist proposal as expressed in C 56713 since agreement to such a proposal would have practical effect of curtailing further UN ground advances beyond agreed line of contact. This would be militarily unacceptable unless agreement on all other agenda items also was reached shortly thereafter. Accordingly, although latest Communist proposal insofar as location of demilitarized zone is concerned meets our basic position and is thus acceptable, such acceptance must be qualified by a time limitation for completion of all agenda items, preferably a definite period in which major forward UN ground operations are not otherwise contemplated. It would be stipulated that in the event agreement is not reached on all agenda items within the definite period specified, location of the demilitarized zone is subject to revision. Your comments are requested ASAP.[2]

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[2] General Ridgway transmitted the following reply in his telegram C-56767, November 7, from Tokyo:

"Am forwarding your JCS 86291 to Adm Joy immediately. I plan to spend tomorrow night, 8 November, in Korea. Will discuss this msg with Adm Joy at that time and submit my views to you soonest thereafter." (Black Book, Tab 58)

795.00/11-751

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1951.

Subject: JCS Comments on Position Paper "Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice is Achieved"

For your advance information I am sending you a copy of suggested changes in the pessimist paper presented yesterday by Defense representatives in the Steering Group for US–UK talks. These changes were presented orally as having been decided by the JCS but not yet concurred in by the Department of Defense. We are informed that if the JCS proposals are approved by the Secretary of Defense they will presumably be transmitted formally to the NSC in response to the request for a review of the Korean problem. Consequently, we will probably have cognizance of the JCS comments only when presented to the NSC.[2]

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[1] Addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Counselor (Bohlen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson).

You will note that there are two problems which will require the most careful consideration. One is a direct proposal for the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China. The other that U.S. Air Forces unilaterally bomb Chinese air bases whenever enemy activities are on such a scale as to jeopardize the security of U.S. forces.

From conversations with Pentagon officers it is understood that the intent of the latter proposal is to take the decision to bomb Chinese bases without waiting for an attack if there is such a buildup in Chinese offensive air strength, viz., bombers, as to justify the conclusion that a Chinese air offensive in sufficient strength to jeopardize the security of our forces, particularly our air bases, is imminent. It is apparently the intent that the decision as to whether circumstances require such action would remain in Washington.

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, November 6, 1951.]

Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice Is Achieved[3]

PROBLEM

1. . . .

General Courses of Action

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[2] See NSC 118, November 9, p. 1106.

[3] The text of document NOV–3, October 25, to which these proposed changes were directed, differed from the text of document WFM T–10/1a, September 8 p. 889) only in Paragraph 2*a* (8), as indicated here, and in the second sentence of Paragraph 3*d*, which read in NOV–3, as follows: "The imposition of a naval blockade, through action in the United Nations, is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable." (Lot 59D95, Box 99) See the enclosure to the letter to Acheson from Lovett, p. 912.

NOV–3 was not used for the U.S.–U.K. talks in Paris in early November, since Korea was not taken up at these talks. The question of Korea did come up for brief and general discussion only at the tripartite meeting of U.S., U.K., and French Foreign Ministers on November 9 (Lot 59D95, Box 99).

2. *Military Actions.*

a. The United States should:

(1) . . .

(2) Direct [~~the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command~~] CINCUNC to increase [~~immediately~~] the scale of military operations in the Korean [~~campaign to the maximum~~] *area* consistent with the capabilities [~~and security~~] of the forces [~~now available or made~~] *available to him whenever in his judgment such operations will contribute materially toward the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in a disproportionate loss to the UN forces under his command;*

(3) Impose no restrictions on advances into North Korea [~~at least to the neck of the North Korean Peninsula~~];

(4) . . .

(5) . . .

(6) . . .

(7) Remove all restrictions against air attacks *in North Korea including restrictions against attacks* on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River[~~. Air attacks on Rashin should continue in accordance with existing instructions of the JCS and UN aircraft should continue to remain well clear of the USSR border~~];

(8) Take the necessary [~~UN and~~] diplomatic measures *for* [~~looking toward~~] the imposition of *a naval and* an economic blockade of Communist China [~~and re-examine the political feasibility of a naval blockade. (The exact wording of this paragraph is still being considered by the State and Defense Departments. The above wording is a State Department proposal.)~~];

(9) . . .

b. . . .

Add the following new paragraph under 2*a*:

"Employ U.S. Air Forces unilaterally and on short notice if the situation so requires to attack certain Chinese communist air bases whenever the scale of these activities is such as to seriously jeopardize the security of the U.S. forces in the Korean area."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 63 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY Moscow, November 7, 1951—11 p. m.

801. Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko received me at 6:30 p. m. today, for half hour conversation. He said he wished give me note from Soviet Govt to US Govt. I declined his offer let note be trans-

lated by McSweeney[1] accompanying me, whereupon, Gromyko translated note himself. Our informal translation, note follows:

Govt of USSR considers it necessary inform Govt of US of following.

According verified info received by Govt USSR on Nov 6, 1951, 10:10 a. m. Vladivostok time Amer two motored bomber of Neptune type violated state border of USSR in area of Cape Ostrovnaya.

Upon approach of two Soviet fighters with intention forcing Amer plane which had violated Soviet state frontier to land on Soviet airport, the Amer airplane opened fire on them. The Sov airplanes were forced open return fire, after which Amer airplane went off in direction of sea and disappeared.

Bringing this attention Govt USA, Soviet Govt states decisive protest against this new rude violation state frontier of USSR by Amer military plane and insists persons guilty of violation be brought strict responsibility and also expects Govt of USA will immediately take appropriate measures that in future Amer planes will not violate frontiers of USSR.

After Gromyko finished, I said I would, of course, regret any infringement Soviet territory by US aircraft, but I wished call his attention to fact that according my info all US aircraft in general area mentioned by him were under UN Command. Gromyko said it was certain plane was US and had US insignia. I repeated that Amer military aircraft under UN Command and asked whether Soviet Govt protesting against territorial infringement by Amer plane under UN Command. Gromyko's only reply was to repeat that plane involved was US.

I repeated my understanding that all Amer military aircraft in the area, including our aircraft in Japan and Korea, under UN Command. I questioned, therefore, whether any Soviet protest should not be sent to appropriate UN authorities. Gromyko reiterated that Soviet identification of airplane was US. I remarked that all ships, planes and soldiers operating under UN Command in Korea bear national insignia. Gromyko said that he had made no mention of Korea to which I remarked is not the Soviet border in the Vladivostok area near Korea? Gromyko reiterated that the question did not involve Korea.

I said I assumed that Soviet note was intended for info my Govt only; that I was not certain I should accept protest against action of plane operating under UN Command without further info as to all the facts. Gromyko said "essence of your info is not ground for not accepting a note. Any Govt might refuse to accept a note on grounds it had not sufficient info at the moment."

I repeated my previous statement that I understood all US aircraft under UN and if facts were correctly stated the matter should be referred to UN authorities as possible infringement of Soviet frontiers. I said that if Soviet fighters had actually engaged the plane, they should know direction of approach. Gromyko reiterated plane carried US insignia. He said, "it was a US plane".

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[1] John M. McSweeney, Counselor of Embassy in Moscow.

I referred to my earlier statement that it matter of common knowledge that US aircraft operating in that area under UN Command and under authority of UN and are not engaged in any offensive action against USSR. I repeated my explanation of regret that an Amer plane might have violated Soviet territory to which Gromyko replied "this is good to hear from you, but it would be even better if US authorities take all measures to assure no further action of this nature. This is not the first time". He added "as you know, such actions have occurred not only in east but in west beginning in 1950". I replied that re question of the 1950 incident (of course he referred to the Privateer shot down in the Baltic) it was well known that our governments differed in the facts, but I did not wish to raise that question tonight.

I said that I wished to clarify points made earlier: According to my info all US aircraft in that general area under UN Command; if any infringement of Soviet territory by US aircraft had taken place, it was matter properly for UN. I stated that since I had no facts myself regarding the alleged incident, I would accept his note for info my govt as Soviet statement of facts for the attention my govt. I said that I could not accept any responsibility for my govt or obligate my govt with regard to treatment of its note if note should turn out to be properly one for UN. Gromyko said, "I gave you the facts" and I replied I would accept note on basis stated by me with all reservations.

He made typical Soviet remark that "your relations with your govt are up to you." [2]

Dept pass London, Paris, Tokyo; sent Dept 801, rptd info London 130, Paris 260, Tokyo 6.

CUMMING

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[2] On the following day, November 8, the Department of Defense requested General Ridgway's headquarters to investigate the alleged violation as soon as possible, and, if substantiated, to determine whether it involved a U.N. plane on a U.N. mission or a U.S. plane on a U.S. mission (Telegram Def 86477 to Tokyo; Black Book, Tab 64).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 60 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, 8 November 1951—1:12 a. m.

CX-56810. 1. Sub-delegation reports that crux of today's [1] session came during late afternoon when Lee read from a statement formally proposing the fol. While Lee was reading, Communist representative outside conference tent handed typed copies to UN correspondents:

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[1] I.e., November 7.

"The sub-delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers formally proposes:

"(1) To decide upon the principle that the existing actual line of contact be made the military demarcation line, and that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers fm this line so as to est the demilitarized zone.

"(2) In accordance with the above-mentioned principle the subcommittee start imm to check the existing actual line of contact on the 250,000 to 1 map, so that the existing actual line of contact agreed by both sides may be fixed specifically as the mil demarcation line and that the 2 lines 2 kilometers away on both sides of this existing actual line of contact be made the Southern and Northern boundaries, marking the demilitarized zone. It also proposes that the fol understandings be reached:

"*a.* When fixing specifically the existing actual line of contact as the mil demarcation line to est the demilitarized zone, the side which proposes to make an adjustment should give up its proposal for adjustment if the other side is not agreeable.

"*b.* As soon as the sub-committee has in general determined the location of the mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone on the 250,000 to 1 map, it should submit to the plenary conference this specific proposal of the mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone agreed upon by both sides, and recommend that the plenary conference proceed imm to the discussion of the other items of the agenda, while leaving the work of specifically marking the location of the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the committee of staff officers to be formed by both sides.

"*c.* In view of the fact that it would be clearly inexpedient to alter the specific location of the mil demarcation line in accordance with the minor changes each day in the actual line of contact, if armistice negotiations proceed rapidly and no maj change occurs in the actual line of contact prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone preliminarily defined by both sides does not have to be revised. Otherwise, both sides reserve the right to propose, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, revisions of the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone corresponding to the changes in the actual line of contact."

2. *a.* It is realized that a literal reading of the above proposal asks only that the delegations decide upon the "principle" that the existing actual line of contact be made the mil demarcation line and, presumably, "the principle" that both sides (when final agreement is reached) will withdraw 2 kilometers fm this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone.

b. It is fur realized that the provision for veto by either side, if the text is taken literally, applies only to adjustments departing fm the present line of contact and that the later sentence "otherwise, both sides reserve the right to propose, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, revisions of the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone corresponding to the changes in the actual line of contact" provides for later revision of the mil line of demarcation to accord with the then existing line of contact.

3. Notwithstanding the above, it is felt that language difficulties and the known duplicity of the Communist introduce serious doubt as to the validity of the above literal interpretation. The proposal has, therefor, been rejected on the grounds that fixing the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone on the basis of the current line of contact with provision for changes subj to veto by either side would in effect constitute an imm cease fire on the basis of agreement on only one item of the agenda. Regardless of the time spent on other agenda items and of the changes which might occur in the line of contact as the result of mil operations between the fixing of the line and the signing of the armistice no changes could occur in the demarcation line since the consent of the other side would be necessary. Thus, the agreement to this proposal would provide an insurance policy under which the Communists would be insured against the effects of the UNC mil operations during the discussions of other items on the agenda.

4. Careful study of this proposal is now in process. I will report my final conclusions soonest.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 61 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET KOREA, 8 November 1951—6:50 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

HNC-429. Sub-delegation report for 8 November:

"UNC delegates opened refuting Communist proposal of 7 November principally on grounds indicated in CX 56810. In replying to these objections Communists expressed views on 'adjustments' which were inconsistent with the phraseology of their proposal. In an effort to develop a meeting of minds on the question of 'adjustments', UNC delegates invited the Communists to go to the map to develop a military demarcation line based on the existing line of contact. In the course of this, the UNC formally proposed a compromise on the Kaesong area with the demarcation line passing through the city. Lee opposed this with usual arguments. Hsieh seemed less positive. This discussion revealed that, in terms of area, Communists were offering only about 50 percent of equivalent value in exchange for adjustments in Kosong and Kumsong areas.

"Following Communist refusal of a compromise in Kaesong area, UNC reiterated its proposal of 5 November, stating that it is sufficient for the present to reach agreement on the principle that the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone will be based on the line of contact as of the date of finalizing the agreement. We recommended that no further time be wasted in trying to develop a pre-determined military demarcation line and demilitarized zone based on the existing line of contact as this step is entirely unnecessary.

"Sub-delegation feels that the Communists are anxious to get agreement on a tentative demilitarized zone even if it is understood that it will be revised to conform with any changes in the battle line. The Communist took the proposal home for study."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 62 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET KOREA, 8 November 1951—11 : 35 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

HNC-430. Re JCS 86291.[1]

1. Concur in your views in Paragraph 3 and 5, and providing further negotiations along line indicated in your Paragraph 6 appear fruitless, likewise concur.

2. *a.* Reference your Paragraph 4, new developments have occurred; please consult Paragraph 1*c* of my CX-56810[2] noting therein the Communist phrase "no major change occurs in the actual line of contact." In today's session, Thursday, 08 November, Hodes states Communists explained their concept of "major change" by stating that no major change had occurred in the battle lines since negotiations began at Kaesong last July.

b. On this basis it would be inaccurate to state that Communists have yet accepted the principle that the demarcation line should be generally along the battle line at the time armistice is signed.

3. I feel strongly the unwisdom of agreeing to the present line of contact as a permanent demarcation line subject to only minor adjust-

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[1] Dated November 6, p. 1092.
[2] Dated November 8, p. 1097.

ments thereafter, with the provision that agreement is reached on all other agenda items within a definite period of time. To a certain extent this would constitute a *de facto* cease fire for the period specified. The period itself would be difficult to fix and doubtless difficult to agree upon. Furthermore, assuming that we failed to reach agreement on all other agenda items by the expiration of the period agreed upon, the Communist would inevitably demand and we feel that we would inevitably be compelled to accept extensions of this period to our further great disadvantage.

4. *a.* In our advocacy of the line of contact on the effective date of the armistice as a basis for fixing the line of demarcation, we have perhaps failed to make clear to you what the sub-delegation has frequently made clear to the Communists with respect to the line in the vicinity of Kaesong. Actually the line in the vicinity of Kaesong has been viewed by us in quite a different light than the rest of the line and for the following reasons.

b. The possession of Kaesong is of importance politically and psychologically to the Communists since it is south of the 38th Parallel. It is the ancient capitol of Korea and since Communists actions have sought to make its retention a symbol of military victory. Kaesong is of political and military importance to the UNC because of the continued insistence of the ROK Government that the UNC secure its retention; because to a certain extent its possession by the UNC or its demilitarization would be viewed in Asia as damaging to Communists prestige and enhancing our own; and because its retention would afford greater depth tactically in the defense of Seoul from future agression from the north.

c. Further, at the time armistice negotiations began, Kaesong was in effect in no man's land. Just prior to that time the UNC had had ground forces up to battalion strength in Kaesong on more than one occasion. The UNC in an effort to facilitate the then forthcoming negotiations abstained from advancing its ground forces in strength into the Kaesong area, a move which at that time was well within its capability. Therefore, the UNC felt strongly that the line of contact in the Kaesong area should pass through the city where it was when that city was designated as a conference site.

d. For all of these reasons the UNC felt, in proposing the demilitarized zone outlined on the map presented the Communists on 25 October, that we were justified in considering that the Kaesong section of the line was in an entirely different status from that of the rest of the line proposed. We felt that we were entitled to assume that if Kaesong had not been neutralized in early July by mutual agreement the line of contact would now pass through that area. In other words we felt that the Kaesong section might well be agreed upon now. Subsequent adjustments in the remainder of the demilitarized zone would reflect changes occurring in the line of contact from now until the armistice is signed.

5. The preceding paragraph will, I hope, explain what might otherwise appear to be at variance with the logic of the position we have taken in support of the principle that the line of demarcation should be based on the line of contact existing at the time of signing the armistice.

6. My views at this moment may be summarized as follows:

a. Our sub-delegation has retained the initiative, having presented to the Communists on 5 and 8 November respectively 2 alternatives, acceptance of either of which would leave us on firm ground.

b. These 2 alternatives are:

(1). The course contained in my CX 56598 of 4 November.

(2). On 8 November a predetermined zone based on the present line of contact with adjustments in such a manner that UNC withdrawals from Kosong and Kumsong areas would be compensated for by an equal Communist withdrawal in the Kaesong area, with the city of Kaesong in the demilitarized zone. The predetermined demilitarized zone is, of course, subject to revision based on changes in the line of contact occurring prior to the signing of the armistice.

c. For the next day or two or until Communist action on these proposals is made known to us we retain the initiative and need not make any further proposals.

d. We must be prepared, however, to make known our decision with respect to Kaesong before our concession of this city damages our prestige and prejudices our position on other agenda items.

e. Feeling that public opinion in Asia accords far more importance to Communists retention of Kaesong than American and UN public opinion would accord to its loss, I am prepared to concede our Kaesong position at such time as I am satisfied there is no reasonable chance of our obtaining early Communist agreement to our possessing it or to its demilitarization. In doing this I would, of course, then stand inflexibly on the principle that the line of contact as of the effective date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.

f. Subject to your contrary instructions I shall follow the course outlined above making an intensive effort here to make our positions and the major supporting reasons for each, crystal clear to public opinion.

7. I would appreciate your comments soonest.

795.00/11-951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Foreign Government Representatives on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Dr. Pastrana, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Mr. Han, First Secretary
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States —UNA, Mr. Hickerson
UNP, Mr. Henkin
UNP, Miss Brown
UNA, Mr. Bloomfield
EUR, Mr. Allen
FE, Mr. Barbour
FE, Mr. Johnson
Army, Captain Hooks

Captain Hooks reviewed the enemy order of battle. The 12th Chinese Communist Army had been identified in the front lines; and the Far East Command believed it possible that this Army may be committed to relieve the 67th or 68th Chinese Communist Armies or the 2nd or 3rd North Korean Corps.

The Captain reported that heavy air operations had continued. Tuesday,[1] no enemy contact occurred. On Wednesday, 140 MIG's had been encountered. There had been no damage reported. On Thursday, 350 MIG's were seen, of which 113 were engaged. One MIG was destroyed and 4 damaged, while 1 F-86 was lost and 2 slightly damaged. 120 MIG's were encountered on Friday, of which 3 were destroyed and 3 damaged. During the period under report, UN air flew a total of 718 sorties, of which 401 were combat.

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[1] November 6.

Captain Hooks stated that a total of 1,721 enemy vehicles had been sighted during the past three days, of which 969 were southbound. An average of 91 vehicles per day had been destroyed by the UN.

On the ground, activity was limited to patrol action and occasional outpost clashes. There had been 18 enemy attacks in the Kumsong area on Wednesday and Thursday, all of which had been repulsed. The [First?] Cavalry Division artillery had fired on 15 enemy tanks 12 miles northwest of Yonchon, and one tank had been destroyed. The Thai battalion had repulsed several squad-strength attacks on Wednesday. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was reported in this area. In the 9th Corps area, probing attacks had been sucessfully repulsed. A tank patrol from the 6th ROK Division had destroyed 21 enemy bunkers. West of Kaejon, squad to battalion strength attacks had been repulsed. In the northeast, the Marines had successfully used a new tactic which the Communists previously employed. This was a series of night bugle calls which had drawn the enemy out and engaged it in a fire fight. South of Kosong, there had been patrol clashes.

Mr. McNichol inquired whether it would be correct to say that the enemy was taking the initiative in its probing attacks. The Captain replied in the affirmative and stated that this enemy action reflected sensitivity to our patrolling activities.

Mr. Hickerson gave the group the substance of the attached memorandum.[2] He pointed out that since these reports had been received, Mr. Vishinsky had made some proposals at Paris which appeared to be a step backward since they referred to a return to the 38th parallel.[3] Vishinsky had proposed that the Assembly should recognize it as essential: (1) that countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude a truce and withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel within a period of ten days; and (2) that all foreign troops and also all foreign volunteer forces should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months. We did not know at this point whether he was just making a speech or whether this was a significant statement; moreover, only the press account of the speech was available. Our Soviet experts were inclined to think that Vishinsky was simply making a speech and did not mean to retreat from the position now being taken by the Communists in the truce negotiations. However, there was a ticker comment to the effect that perhaps the stalling of the Communist delegation at last night's meeting meant the communists were awaiting instructions arising out of Vishinsky's remarks. Mr. Hickerson referred to the reported strategy conference with Admiral Joy and General Ridgway at Munsan, the purpose of which according to General Nuckols[4] was discussion of the latest Communist proposal. General Nuckols had pointed out that the effect of this proposal would mean a reduction of military pressure on the Communists.

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[2] Not printed; it outlined developments at the subdelegation meetings of November 7 and 8.

[3] Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal was made in a statement before the U.N. General Assembly on November 8; for the text, see U.N. document A/PV.336.

Mr. Hickerson summarized the negotiating situation, noting that there were two outstanding UN proposals: (1) a line to be defined now, which would put Kaesong in the demarcation zone, but subject to revision in the light of changes in the battle line; (2) a demarcation line based on the battle line, as of the time of signing of the agreement, to be established after agreement on the other matters on the agenda. Then there was the Communist proposal for agreement now on the line, with future changes only if both sides agreed. The present issue boiled down to the question whether there would be any pressure on the communists to agree on other items if their proposal should be accepted. In his view, it would be almost impossible to maintain troop morale if the actual line were fixed now and it was known that no matter what advances might be made, unless the enemy agreed to adjustments taking them into account, the gains would have to be surrendered.

Mr. Hickerson mentioned that thought had also been given to the possibility of setting a time limit for agreement on the other items and tie that to our proposal for a demilitarized zone. No decision had been taken on this matter; he warned the group that the idea should be held in strict confidence.

Mr. McNichol inquired as to the basic difference between the Communist proposal and our first proposal. Mr. Hickerson replied that under our proposal the demarcation line would have to be reconsidered in the light of changes in the line of contact; if there is no agreement on the revisions, there is no line, and no armistice. Under the Communist proposal, if there is no agreement on the changes, the present line would remain in effect. Mr. Johnson added that under the Communist proposal we would commit ourselves to a line in advance of agreement on other items on the agenda. Mr. Tomlinson (UK) believed the UN position would be confusing to public opinion because we had been struggling for the past several months to reach agreement on a line such as the Communists proposed. Mr. Johnson replied that the present discussion constituted an attempt to smoke out the Communists. It was obvious that a line such as the communists proposed could be marked out in the field only if the shooting stopped. In response to a question from the Canadian representative as to the possible wisdom of asking the Communists directly whether they intended a cessation of fighting in connection with their proposal, it was noted that such a cease-fire was obviously implicit in their proposal. The British representative thought that it would appear to the public that we had changed our position, and it should be pointed out that our stand now was in response to the change in the Communist position.

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[4] Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckols was press spokesman for the U.N. Command Delegation to the talks at Panmunjom.

Mr. McNichol pointed out that we had begun the truce negotiations with the idea that agreement should be reached on the entire agenda before the fighting stopped.

In response to several questions, Mr. Johnson observed that it would be extremely difficult under the Communist proposal to make any changes in the line based on future changes in the line of contact. The Communists, for example, did not consider that there had been any substantial changes in the line since June, although Captain Hooks remarked that the line had varied 10 to 15 miles, and though we had made certain important advances from the tactical and strategical standpoint. Mr. Johnson said that about ten enemy divisions had been used up during October and emphasized the importance to the UN of continuing to keep the enemy off balance.

Mr. Hickerson expressed the hope that the situation respecting the several proposals and the exact intent of the Communists would be clarified by the time of the next briefing meeting. The South African representative thought that public attention should be drawn to the fact that the new Communist proposal amounted to an immediate cease-fire.

S/S Files: NSC 118

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

T P SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1951.
NSC 118

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

References: A. NSC Action No. 562 [1]
B. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 5, 1951 [2]
C. Progress Report, dated September 25, 1951 by the Secretaries of State and Defense on NSC 48/5 [3]

At the request of the Acting Secretary of Defense, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council with reference to NSC Action No. 562–*a*, and is referred to the Senior NSC Staff for consideration in connection with NSC Action No. 562–*b*.

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[1] See footnotes 4 and 5, p. 964.
[2] See footnote 1 to Marshall's memorandum of September 4, p. 882.
[3] See the editorial note, p. 936.

In transmitting the enclosure, the Acting Secretary of Defense stated that he concurred with it and invited particular attention to paragraph 9 therein.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

TOP SECRET Washington, November 3, 1951.

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea.

1. With reference to your memorandum of 2 October 1951 and the enclosure thereto,[4] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reconsidered the recommendations set forth in their memorandum to you, dated 13 July 1951, on the above subject. As a result thereof, they have formulated the following views regarding the military actions proposed in their previous memorandum.

2. In the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider that it would be necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy. They recognize, however, that the scale of these operations must be accommodated to the means available to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and be in consonance with the situation then prevailing. Further, inasmuch as CINCUNC is in the best position to evaluate the chances of success, he must be accorded a wide latitude of discretion as to the timing, nature, and extent of these operations.

3. The build-up of Communist fighter strength in Manchuria would, in all probability, render pursuit by United States fighter aircraft across the Korean-Manchurian border a costly operation at this time without compensatory advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that the subject of pursuit by United States aircraft across the Korean-Manchurian border (loosely termed "hot pursuit") receive no further consideration as an immediate course of action in the event that the current armistice negotiations fail.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that the growing Communist air build-up in North China and Manchuria has reached a stage where serious consequences to United Nations forces in the Korean area might result from the employment of this enemy air potential. Inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the United States to maintain the security of its forces, it must be recognized that it may be necessary for the United States to employ its air forces unilaterally

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[4] Neither printed.

and on short notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now reaffirm the recommendations contained in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951, subject to the following changes:

a. Change subparagraph 1 *b* to read:

> "Direct CINCUNC to increase the scale of his military operations in the Korean area consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to him whenever, in his judgment, such operations will contribute materially toward the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to the United Nations forces under his command."

b. Delete from subparagraph 1 *c* the phrase "at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula";

c. Delete from subparagraph 1 *d* the word "Rashin" and the comma which follows (this change is necessitated by the governmental decision to bomb Rashin); and

d. Change subparagraph 1 *e* to read:

> "Employ United States air forces (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area."

6. Failure of the current armistice negotiations would indicate the desire of the enemy to prolong the hostilities in Korea, possibly for an indefinite period at approximately the same scale as heretofore. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the measures which they now recommend in that premise would, in all probability, be sufficient to maintain military pressure on the Communist forces in Korea but would not be adequate to achieve a conclusive military decision in the Korean struggle.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered other military courses of action for the attainment of a military decision which would allow achievement of a political settlement of the Korean problem satisfactory to the United States. They have concluded that any such military courses of action would require the employment of significant additional United States forces and means.

8. From the United States military point of view, the immobilization of United States ground, air, and naval forces in inconclusive operations in Korea over an indefinite period of time with the attendant attrition of manpower and matériel may become unacceptable. Moreover, it must be expected that, in the event armistice negotiations fail, United States public opinion may demand the adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a satisfactory military conclusion

of the Korean struggle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the implications involved in the intensification of military action in Korea on a greatly increased scale. In any event, decision on this matter would have to be preceded by a review of the United States position with respect to its objectives in Korea as well as to United States global strategy. Thereafter, determination would have to be made, among other things, as to:

a. The extent to which United States military resources should be committed to Korea to achieve United States objectives there; and

b. Whether the concept of Chinese "volunteers" will continue to be accepted and, if not, whether restrictions regarding the expansion of the area of hostilities into Manchuria and China will continue in effect.

In connection with subparagraph *b* above it is axiomatic that it would be necessary for this matter at least to be considered by those members of the United Nations actively participating in the Korean conflict.

9. In view of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the National Security Council now undertake a review of the United States position with respect to the Korean question to determine what objectives the United States should have for that area in the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail. United States courses of action in the political and military field for the accomplishment of such objectives can thereafter be determined.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 67 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 9 November 1951—5 : 53 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 86654. From JCS. JCS approve course of action outlined in para 6 ur HNC 430;[1] however, they reserve judgment for present on advisability of taking inflexible position indicated in last sentence of para 6 *e*. Accordingly, while you should continue to press for acceptance of this principle, this should not constitute a final UNC position.

We feel here that early agreement on principles governing selection of line of demarcation satisfying our major requirements has considerable importance. Possibility exists that having made substantial concessions on location of line, Commie resistance may considerably stiffen or even revert to 38th parallel position.

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[1] Dated November 8, p. 1100.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 69 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET ROUTINE TOKYO, 9 November 1951—6 : 13 p. m.

C–56957. For your info CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNC 433 is quoted.

"Reports of sub-delegates meeting of 9 Nov.

"1. Communists opened saying that inasmuch as agreement on adjustments could not be reached we should agree to a demarcation line based on the existing line of contact without adjustments. UNC stated as a general principle adjustments were desirable and it was so recognized by both sides and that demilitarized zone should be based on line of contact at time of armistice. It then asserted the superiority of the UNC proposal of 5 Nov over that of the Communists since it renders unnecessary and undesirable the step of determining a provisional demarcation zone based upon the existing line of contact which is subject to change prior to signature of the armistice. Communists attempted to refute this as a departure from the agenda and reasserted the superiority of a tentative settlement on the basis of the existing line of contact. UNC in closing reasserted the superiority of the 5 Nov proposal and recommended that it be studied further both by itself and in relation to Communist proposal of 7 Nov and UNC compromise proposal of 8 Nov.

"2. *Comment*: It was very clear today that the Communists want a demarcation line on the basis of the existing line of contact even though it is subject to revision on the date of signing. It is far from certain that they want it badly enough to agree to accept the UNC compromise proposal of 8 Nov in return therefore. Signed Joy. Signed Ridgway."

895B.00R/11–151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1951—7 : 34 p. m.

348. With further reference urtel 386 Nov 1 and desp 116 Oct 16[1] and with special reference to fon exchange provisions of Aid Agree-

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[1] Neither printed. In despatch 116, Ambassador Muccio had transmitted an exchange of letters with President Rhee dated October 1 and 9 (neither printed) wherein he rejected a proposal by Rhee that in view of the termination of the ECA Mission in Korea the clause in the 1948 aid agreement requiring ECA concurrence in the allocation of the Republic of Korea's foreign exchange was automatically cancelled. Mr. Muccio pointed out that the U.N. Command had taken over unspent ECA funds and provided ECA-type services; as long as this situation prevailed, the terms of the 1948 agreement remained in effect. (895B.00R/10–1651)

ment of Jul 10, 1948. Ur reply to Pres Rhee of Oct 9 wholeheartedly supported by Dept. In view continuing substantial econ relief aid and recent partial payment for *won* advances to UN forces, proposal dollar bond issue and ltr of Pres Rhee of Oct 1 requesting automatic cancellation of ECA agreement disappointing.[2] Wash agencies assumed that $12,155,714 ROK fon exchange resources wld be utilized by ROK to finance imports of essential consumer goods beyond those supplied by UNCACK in accordance with Dept press release of Oct 10[3] and consistent with antiinflationary program. ROK proposals if pressed further in Wash for making additional payments for personal use in future will receive little consideration unless an integrated program is developed rapidly.

Emb shld frankly convey these views to Pres Rhee and proper ROK mins and shld encourage immed initiation of import program involving use of ROK fon exchange for imports of essential consumer goods and scarce items which can be sold for revenue and sop up expanded currency in circulation. These discussions should be coordinated with CINCUNC, and UNKRA. Emb shld indicate to ROK that as long as US or UN continues to finance deficits in Korean economy it will be necessary for either appropriate US auth, CINCUNC or UNKRA to maintain supervisory control over allocation of fon exchange. Depts of Def and Army concur.

WEBB

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[2] In telegram 318, October 26, to Pusan (not printed), the Department had informed Ambassador Muccio of the inadvisability of a Korean proposal for a bond issue by the ROK Government using as collateral the $12,155,714 recently received as partial payment for *won* advances to the U.N. forces. Among other things, the Department felt, the proposed bond issue might result in undesirable speculation and possible flight of capital from Korea. (895B.00R/10-1551)

[3] See telegram 276, October 10, to Pusan, p. 1010.

795.00/11-1051

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 10, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of Defense has a number of comments and recommendations to make on the two alternative State Department draft position papers on Korea prepared for the guidance of the US Delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. These drafts, numbered SD/A/C.1/367 and 368, were attached with a letter of 19 October 1951 from the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to the Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs.[1] Accordingly, I am transmitting herewith, for your information and consideration, a memorandum of 7 November 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which I concur. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have inclosed a study of UN action against aggression in Korea, which I believe may be of assistance to the Department of State and to the US Delegation.

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[1] The letter of October 19 is not printed; the position papers may be found under date of October 12, pp. 1016 and 1020.

I wish to call your attention to paragraph 4 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which raises the point that an indefinite prolongation of armistice negotiations has not been given sufficient attention in the position paper. I strongly recommend that the position paper on Alternative I (No Armistice), especially paragraph 3 of the recommendation, be revised in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense recommends that the US Delegation be instructed, in its discussions of UN action against aggression in Korea, to present and seek concurrence in substantially stronger resolutions to cover both alternatives, each of which should include a statement expressing satisfaction at the task performed by the UN forces. It appears to me that the General Assembly has the definite responsibility of reiterating its support of General Ridgway and his Command in their efforts to achieve an armistice. I would also like to point out that the US should not bind itself categorically in the General Assembly to "maintain troops in Korea as long as necessary in order to insure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression." The sentence in Paragraph A of the Discussion in SD/A/C.1/368 containing this statement should be deleted.

The representatives of the Department of Defense in Paris will be available to assist in the revisions of these position papers.

Sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 7 November 1951.

Subject: United Nations Action Against Aggression in Korea

1. This memorandum is in reply to your memorandum dated 24 October 1951,[2] in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on two Department of State draft position papers, both on the above subject, intended for guidance for the United States delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, as alternative papers, one to be followed in the event there is no armistice; the other, in the event an armistice is achieved.

2. In the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, the

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[2] Not printed.

Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the tenor of the resolution to be sponsored by the United States should be such as to accentuate, to a greater extent than is now proposed, the changed situation which will then be confronting the United Nations. The necessity of applying more decisive measures than heretofore should therefore be emphasized.

3. In the event an armistice in Korea has been achieved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the proposed Recommendations of the United States position paper should include the following:

a. The proposed resolution to be sponsored by the United States delegation should negate the statement or implication that with the achievement of an armistice the mission of the United Nations forces in Korea has been accomplished;

b. The continuing necessity of maintaining substantial United Nations forces in Korea, at least until agreement has been obtained on a satisfactory political settlement, should be stressed without, however, making a rigid commitment to maintain forces indefinitely in Korea; and

c. The United States should take steps to prevent at this time the establishment of any conference for the discussion of other Far Eastern questions following the Korean settlement, if such discussions are to include matters pertaining to the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the position to be taken in the event that negotiations are indefinitely prolonged has not been given the consideration it warrants. In view of the past course of the armistice negotiations, it would appear that this situation might well be more likely during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly than the two courses given primary consideration in the Department of State position papers. Accordingly, this problem deserves immediate additional study. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that under these conditions certain nations may be reluctant to adopt any strong resolution or to take any other vigorous action. However, it is believed that as a very minimum the United States should adopt a resolution strongly backing the United Nations Commander in his efforts to achieve an armistice, strongly condemning the dilatory and delaying tactics of the Communist negotiators and the regimes they represent.

5. Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a study which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had prepared on the subject of this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Secretary

[Subenclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 7 November 1951.

STUDY ON UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST AGGRESSION IN KOREA

1. If the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, that failure will have occurred despite the best efforts of the United Nations Command. Such failure might indicate the desire of the enemy to prolong hostilities in Korea for an indefinite period at approximately the same scale as heretofore. Such failure would be indicative that the politico-military measures which the United Nations has applied thus far have not been effective in achieving its objectives in Korea and may not be adequate for this purpose in the future.

2. The Communist forces in Korea have the capability of increasing their scale of ground operations. They have built up their air potential to a point where United Nations superiority in the air in Korea is already being challenged and, if this potential were fully employed, it could jeopardize the security of United Nations forces. This could come about as a result of a massive air attack or of progressively heavier and sustained enemy air operations.

3. In the event the armistice negotiations fail, United States public opinion may demand adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a satisfactory military conclusion of the Korean struggle.

4. If the Communists cause the armistice negotiations to fail, such act must, in common prudence from a military point of view, be interpreted to signify the Communist intention to continue hostilities for an indefinite period on the present, or perhaps, on an expanded scale. The United Nations, therefore, should consider more decisive measures than have been applied heretofore in Korea. The intention to do so should be reflected in the proposed resolution. Mere adaption of previous resolutions could easily be interpreted by the member nations as indicative of a passive attitude and could thus fail to stimulate support for the more positive measures which the changed situation would properly demand.

5. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 31 August 1951,[3] the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views regarding the inclusion of nonbelligerent nations as members in any conference dealing with a political settlement in Korea, and at that time pointed out that neither Communist China nor the USSR is a belligerent in the Korean war. They further felt that the membership of such a confer-

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[3] *Ante*, p. 878.

ence should be limited to representatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations.

6. In the event an armistice in Korea is achieved, there will be a continuing necessity to retain sizable United Nations forces there at least until agreement has been reached on a satisfactory political settlement.

7. It is noted (page 1343 of Alternative II)[4] that the United Kingdom has in mind that, after agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems. A discussion of other Far Eastern questions immediately following a Korean settlement would be premature, particularly inasmuch as such a discussion would, among other matters, almost inevitably deal with the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 October 1951, presented their views as to the conditions which should obtain prior to the submission of the Formosa problem to an international conference.[5]

8. In view of all of the foregoing, the tenor of the resolution to be sponsored by the United States during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail should be such as to accentuate, to a greater extent than is now proposed, the changed situation which will then be confronting the United Nations. The necessity of applying more decisive measures than heretofore should, therefore, be emphasized. Specifically, the United States should seek to cause the United Nations, among other things, to take official cognizance of the following:

a. Failure of the armistice negotiations has occurred despite the best efforts of the United Nations Command, and this failure can be directly attributed to the unreasonable demands of the Communists;

b. Failure of the armistice negotiations reveals the Communist intention to prolong hostilities in Korea and to avoid settlement by peaceful means, except on their own terms;

c. In furtherance of this intention, the Communists have used the period of negotiation to effect a substantial build-up of men and matériel in their ground and air forces; and

d. In view of the Communist determination and increased capability for continuing their aggression in Korea, United Nations members should increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea, concurrently, undertaking the examination of additional measures to repel this aggression and to safeguard the security of the United Nations forces in the Korean area.

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[4] Reference is to the paragraph "Participants in a Korean Conference" in document SD/A/C.1/368, October 12, p. 1022.

[5] For text of the memorandum, see p. 1842.

9. In the event an armistice in Korea has been achieved, the proposed Recommendations of the United States position paper should include the following:

a. The membership of the conference dealing with the political settlement in Korea should be limited to representatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations;
b. The proposed resolution to be sponsored by the United States delegation should negate the statement or implication that with the achievement of an armistice the mission of the United Nations forces in Korea has been accomplished;
c. The continuing necessity of maintaining substantial United Nations forces in Korea, at least until agreement has been obtained on a satisfactory political settlement, should be stressed; and
d. The United States should take steps to prevent at this time the establishment of any conference for the discussion of other Far Eastern questions following the Korean settlement, if such discussions are to include matters pertaining to the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 70 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 10 November 1951—3:45 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–57014. DEPTAR msg Def 86477, DTG 082044Z Nov 51.[1] Plane referred to undoubtedly Patron 6 plane rept missing 6 Nov. This plane departed NAS Atsugi on routine daily shipping recon Japan Sea in connection UN opns in Korea. At 0646I plane made comm check with base radio with signal loud and clear. 0850I plane psn fixed by radar Hokkaido at lat 42 39 North long 138 12 East. Normal weather rept which should have been transmitted about 0945I not received. Dead-reckoning plot last known psn indicates that plane could have been in vic lat 42 00 North long 133 40 East at 1010I. Weather this area from pilot rept three hours later broken stratus base 2000 ft visibility ten miles. Nearest approach to USSR territory on track established for this mission forty miles and crew thoroughly briefed on effective order not to approach closer than twenty miles to USSR territory under any circumstances. Plane equipped with excellent radar which insures positive knowledge of psn and current instr require immediate radio rept in case of radar failure. Planes are prepared for inst transmission code group meaning "being atk by enemy acft" in such an emergency. No signals heard. Extensive search most probable areas entirely negative. From above it can only be concluded that (1) Intentional or unplanned approach to Russian Coast was not made (2) Plane was intercepted and atk without warning well outside of twenty miles Russian coastline.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 1097.

Regardless of insignia this was UN acft operating under UN control.[2]

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[2] In reply to the above message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram JCS 86791, November 12, instructed General Ridgway to include in normal fashion the loss of the plane in his next report to the United Nations covering the period November 1–15. This policy was concurred in by Mr. Acheson. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State decided that there would be no formal reply by the United States to the Soviet note. (Black Book, Tabs 71, 76, 86, and 88) General Ridgway's report (U.N. document S/2507), which was formally transmitted to the United Nations on January 31, 1952, merely stated that the plane was missing and presumed lost with no survivors; no mention was made of an attack. See also the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, p. 1163.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 72 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 11 November 1951—9 : 27 p. m.

C–57058. For your info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 435 is quoted.

"1. The sub-delegation reports the following during the 10 November meetings.

"*a.* Morning and part of the afternoon sessions devoted to debate on the subject of adjustments and merits of each side's previous proposals. Crux of today's session came in the late afternoon when Lee made the following proposal:

" 'The proposals our side made and the understandings our side proposed on November 7, should have long settled speedily the second item of the agenda without any dispute. But, very regrettably, your side still opposes the proposal of our side. The reasons you have raised in opposition indicate that, if your side is not intentionally distorting our proposal, your side certainly has not been able to understand our proposal. In order to render it impossible for our proposal to be distorted or misunderstood, we are willing to explain it again and to reformulate it.

" 'First, we propose that the actual line of contact be fixed as the military demarcation line without any adjustment, and that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers so as to establish the demilitarized zone. The reason why we have proposed not to make any adjustment to the actual line of contact is to prevent the second item of the agenda from being procrastinated without end by any unreasonable demand of so called adjustment. Ever since the resumption of the subcommittee meeting on Oct 25, your side has repeatedly made the unreasonable demand of so-called adjustment with regard to the Kaesong area of our side with the result that the second item of the agenda has yet not been settled. As late as Nov 8, your side made the unreasonable demand of fixing the military demarcation line close to Kaesong. Such unilateral and unreasonable demand as your side proposed on Nov 8 is absolutely unacceptable to our side. This only serves to prove further that the proposal of our side of fixing the military demarcation line in strict accordance with the actual line of contact is the only way of settling speedily the second item of the agenda.

" 'Second, we propose that the subcommittee determine the present actual line of contact, fix it as the military demarcation line and fix thereby the demilitarized zone. It is entirely necessary to do so not only because this clearly stipulated by the second item of the agenda but also because the military demarcation line so determined preliminarily must also be the basis of the final military demarcation line. At the same time, in order that the armistice negotiations may proceed rapidly, we propose further that the plenary conference proceed to the discussion of the third item of the agenda immediately after adopting our proposal, while the concrete work of checking the present actual line of contact, of fixing the present actual line of contact mutually agreed upon as the military demarcation line of delineating accordingly the demilitarized zone can be carried out concurrently by this subcommittee.

" 'Third, since your side appears to have much misgiving with the third item of the understandings we proposed on Nov 7 we would like to rewrite it as one of the items of our proposal in order to avoid any possible distortion. The military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone fixed on the basis of the present actual line of contact shall be revised finally according to the actual changes in the contact line immediately before the signing of the armistice agreement.

" 'It is our opinion that the military demarcation line once fixed preliminarily does not have to be revised according to every minor change in the actual line of contact and that upon mutual agreement revision need not be made. But since you insist that the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone must be revised according to all changes in the contact line prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, we shall not object.

" 'Therefore, the sub-delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers formally proposes that the subcommittee adopt the following proposal:

> " '(1) To decide upon the principle that the actual line of contact between both sides be made the military demarcation line, and that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone.
>
> " '(2) In accordance with the above-mentioned principle, the subcommittee check immediately the present actual line of contact so as to fix the present actual line of contact agreed upon by both sides as the military demarcation line, and to fix the two lines 2 kilometers away on both sides of this present actual line of contact as the southern and northern boundaries marking the demilitarized zone.
>
> " '(3) After the armistice agreement is fully agreed on and prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, the subcommittee shall make revisions to the above-mentioned military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, corresponding to the changes which

may have taken place in the actual line of contact between both sides.

" 'The sub-delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers proposes specifically that the subcommittee report to the plenary conference the above-mentioned 3 resolutions as soon as they are adopted, and recommend that the plenary conference proceed immediately to the discussion of the third item of the agenda, and leave the specific work of checking the actual line of contact, of fixing the present actual line of contact mutually agreed upon as the military demarcation line and of fixing accordingly the demilitarized zone to be carried out by this subcommittee concurrently.'

"*b*. This proposal is substantially the same as their proposal of 7 November in different garb.

"*c*. UNC sub-delegation counter-proposed the following:

" 'In order to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea the sub-delegations recommend the establishment of a military demarcation line located at the actual line of ground contact at the time of the signing of the armistice agreement, and the creation of a demilitarized zone four (4) kilometers in width by the withdrawal of each side for a distance of two (2) kilometers from the agreed military demarcation line; the military demarcation line and the boundaries of the demilitarized zone being subject to such minor local adjustments as may be mutually considered desirable.'

"*d*. UNC sub-delegation stated, immediately after making the above proposal, that the plenary session of the delegations could now proceed to the discussion of the other items on the agenda, leaving the determination of the specific location of the military demarcation line and the boundaries of the demilitarized zone until immediately prior to the signing of the armistice.

"*e*. Today's session closed without agreement.

"2. Meetings continue at 1100 hours 11 November. Signed Joy."

Editorial Note

On November 11, Admiral Joy issued a statement to the press the text of which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 24, 1951, page 1035. In support of the United Nations Command position, Admiral Joy asserted that the goals of the delegation were to establish a demilitarized zone reflecting the military situation on the day the armistice was signed; to provide adequate security for the United Nations forces, front and rear, during the suspension of hostilities; to insure against a military buildup beyond the level existing at the time of the armistice; and to arrive at quick and satisfactory arrangements on prisoners of war. The enemy, he said, wanted a finalized zone determined immediately primarily in order to secure relief from United Nations Command military pressure during a *de facto* cease-fire, meanwhile prolonging the negotiations without cost to himself.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 74 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 11 November 1951—8:05 p. m.

HNC 438. For your info CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNC 438.

"1. The sub-delegation reports the following on the 11 November meeting:

"*a.* Morning session opened with UNC representatives submitting proposal of 10 November in complete resolution form and pointing out that it was a concrete, specific, and complete solution to Item 2 of the agenda. We called for its acceptance today and a plenary session of the delegations tomorrow.

"*b.* Lee insisted at great length that UNC proposal did not constitute the required compliance with the agenda item.

"*c.* Hsieh characterized our proposal as a step forward but pointed out the main difference between the present UNC and Communist proposals, i.e., that theirs calls for agreement on a provisional demarcation line now while ours does not. He elaborated on the objection raised by Lee; contended that our proposal was not in accord with our previous proposals; and, referring to statements in the American press that Communists were seeking this method of relieving the military pressure on them, asserted that this worked both ways.

"*d.* At afternoon session Lee repeated usual statements that UNC proposal was not specific, not logical and did not fulfill requirements of Item 2 whereas Communist proposal did.

"2. Sub-delegations meet 12 November at 1100 hours. Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 77

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1951.

NOTES FOR DISCUSSION WITH JCS Nov. 12[1]

BACKGROUND

1. Opinion in US and elsewhere is confused as Commies have made major concession on demarcation line and remaining differences are too subtle for general understanding.

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[1] For the record of the State–JCS meeting, see *infra.*

2. Participating UN nations have thus far fully supported our position in negotiations and free world opinion has, in general, been behind us.

3. However, present situation has elements capable of exploitation by Commies to our disadvantage by reversion to 38th parallel or other such proposal which would be simple and readily understandable, and might appear reasonable in face of inability to reach agreement apparent details of present proposals. Vishinski speech may have presaged such a reversion in event no early agreement item 2. It may, of course, merely have been bluff to hurry us into an agreement less favorable to us.

4. Understanding of Department in [*is*] that, apart from Kaesong question, essential difference between present Commie and UNC proposals is that UNC proposals leave to later agreement adjustments in line of demarcation based upon present line of contact, while under Commie proposals line demarcation would be unchanged in absence subsequent agreement by both sides to adjustments.

5. Ridgway has now proposed and we have concurred in simply proposing reaching agreement now line demarcation will be line contact effective date armistice (presumably without adjustments unless agreed to by both sides.) Question whether Commies will accept as in view importance they have attached to Kaesong may suspect that UNC intention is to outflank or cut off Kaesong.

6. If this correct, appears only basis for agreement is agreeing line demarcation will be approximately present line of contact with only such subsequent adjustments as agreed upon by both sides.

7. We are therefore faced with the two alternatives of standing firm on our proposal and accepting the risk of a break-down or of accepting the Commie proposal. If we follow latter alternative, we should do so as soon as possible from standpoint public opinion and prestige and our position on other items on agenda.

8. If second alternative would in fact tend to establish conditions *de facto* cease-fire on ground, advantages or disadvantages to UNC must be fully explored.

(*a*) Advantages:
1. Continuation armistice talks.
2. Full support allies.
3. Some assurance of line considerably in advance of line Kansas in event of forced withdrawal of UNC forces as a result successful Commie attack.
4. Giving our ground forces respite while air and naval war (in which we have advantage) continues in full force.
5. Commies are, in effect, giving up ground force arm which is only arm they can presently use to bring effective pressure on us while we retain full use of air and navy arms.

(*b*) Disadvantages:
1. Guaranty of line to Commies who have been gradually forced to withdraw as result continued UN offensive and then possibly a lessening of pressure on Commies to agree to other agenda items.
2. Morale UN forces.
3. Propaganda advantage to Commies (bargaining victory).
4. Certain freedom of movement of Commie forces. Commies could weaken their own forces somewhat if they so desired.
5. US public opinion event Commie bad faith.

While disadvantages appear outweigh advantages these can be minimized by the placing of a time limit upon completion of other agenda items as suggested in paragraph 7 JCS 86291.[2] Ridgway objects to this on ground that we would inevitably be compelled to accept extensions of the period. This is not necessarily true and as it appears best alternative we should urge its reconsideration by Ridgway. Such a formula would be readily understood and accepted by public opinion and it would be difficult for the Communists to show that it is not reasonable.

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[2] Dated November 6, p. 1092.

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 12, 1951—11 a. m.

[Here follows a list of the 22 persons present. Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, McGhee, and Johnson were the principal Department of State representatives.

[The opening portion of the meeting dealt with a brief discussion on Yugoslavia.]

GENERAL BRADLEY: I thought we might start on Korea. The position the Commies want to stick on is agreement to a line now. We told Ridgway the other day to agree on the present line as a final line if we can get the rest of the points agreed to in a short time. I am damned if I understand why they refuse to put that forward on the basis of say ten days in which to settle the other points.

MR. MATTHEWS: We agree that the situation is getting dangerous.

GENERAL COLLINS: Why don't we send a directive to them out there to do it?

MR. MATTHEWS: That would be fine from our point of view.

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[1] The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants.

General Bradley: Why can't we accept the present line of battle as the line as long as we get the rest of the points settled in a short space of time. We are not going anywhere on the ground.

Mr. Johnson: We agree.

Admiral Fechteler: Let's tell him so.

General Bradley: I don't know why we were arguing about Kaesong. It didn't mean anything to us.

General Collins: Well, it was worth something in the form of security to Seoul.

General Bradley: It certainly was not worth taking a chance of a breakdown in the talks. It seems to me that someone ought to go over all the telegrams and tell General Ridgway, or give him a directive to accept a line and agree on it now if the rest of the points are settled in a reasonable length of time. If they are not, you will have to make adjustments in the line thereafter. The line the Commies are putting forward is better than the one we wanted in October in most respects.

Mr. Nitze: It is really a question of time. How long should we set the time period for in which the other points must be agreed? If it is a month and then there are minor adjustments in the line that we could both agree to, that would be all right, but we won't be committed to a line after the month is up. You would want an adequate period of time in which to work out the other points.

General Bradley: I don't think a month is too long. What do you think Joe?

General Collins: It is all right with me.

Admiral Fechteler: It's all right.

General Collins: I don't believe Ridgway ever did what we suggested.

Mr. Johnson: No, I don't think he did.

General Bradley: He said it would amount to a *de facto* cease fire.

Mr. Matthews: It would not stop air action.

Mr. Collins: He takes the point of view that if we agree to a line we would impose on ourselves a limitation of no attack, since we would not send our men out to get killed and then give up territory we had gained.

General Bradley: What would have happened on the green line we proposed? It was the same thing, wasn't it?

General Collins: Can't we have some one get on this right away with the State Department and get something cleared this afternoon?

General Bradley: Charlie (Bolte) you have the messages. Have you enough guidance? We all think this is as good for a period of time as the green line we proposed, or better.

General Collins: I think we should say the President directs him or desires to have it done.

General Bolte: I'll have a draft down here before you leave this meeting.

General Twining: If you agree on a line, your interdiction won't mean too much since little will be coming in toward the front.

General Collins: You will have artillery fire.

Mr. Nitze: Also, if you have a thirty-day period they wouldn't know that you weren't going to start the fighting again.

General Collins: The thing to do is to send a directive. The question is whether you need to use the President's name.

Admiral Lalor: We can clear it with the President by a despatch.

General Collins: O.K.

Mr. Matthews: We cleared the new date of January 3 for the Churchill meeting by that channel to the President.

General Collins: General Ridgway is a long way from home and carrying a great responsibility and I think we ought to say the President directs it.

Admiral Duncan: I think there ought to be a little more latitude than a directive from the President would give.

General Bradley: If you put the President in you really suggest that the President has stepped in and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree. He knows that every one of our directives is cleared with the President.

General Collins: I think we ought to be strong. We ought to accept some of the responsibility back here. That is what I am trying to do.

Admiral Fechteler: We can do that without dragging the President in.

General Collins: I agree.

General Bradley: Well, we will get that drafted.[2]

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

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[2] The message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway was drafted and sent to Key West, Fla., on the evening of November 12 for the consideration of President Truman who approved it without change (Black Book, Tabs 79 and 80); it was then sent to Tokyo in telegram JCS 86804, November 13, p. 1126.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 75: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 12 November 1951—9:01 p. m.

C-57142. HNC-442. For info CINCUNC HNC 442.

"Sub-delegation reports as follows on meeting at Pan Mun Jom on 12 November.

"1. Morning session:

"*a.* Communists continued to attack UNC proposal of 10 November on ground that it does not adhere to agenda approved by both delegations and allege UNC attitude forecasts later UNC abandonment of other agreements. Also accuse UNC of being inconsistent since earlier proposals include demilitarized zones defined on a map.

"*b.* UNC repeatedly pointed out that its current proposal fixed the line of demarcation and demilitarized zone completely; that all that remained was determination of final line of contact; that it carried out full intent of item 2; and that it differed from former UNC proposals in that it did not require correlation of adjustments other than administrative adjustments. UNC offered to delete, if objectionable, provision for administrative adjustments.

"*c.* Hsieh attacked motives behind our proposal and alleged UNC making cunning and vicious attempts to set up a situation so that we could break down conference in last steps of proceedings. This line of reasoning on his part is believed by sub-delegation to be significant in regard to his own intentions.

"2. Afternoon session:

"*a.* UNC outlined again at great length the absurdity of Communist proposal which calls for first the creation and later the abandonment of a provisional demarcation line and provisional demilitarized zone and compared in detail the 2 proposals of 10 November being considered. Communist rebuttal repeated arguments made during morning session and on previous day, and in addition accused the UNC of being afraid of the peace loving peoples of the world and of having a nature which loves the smell of gunpowder. Hsieh's attitude in afternoon was more conciliatory and advocated patience in dealing with armistice problem, but as usual distorted UNC statements in effort to make his points.

"*b.* The UNC sub-delegation feel from today's discussions that Communists hope that settlement of item 2 alone will accomplish in effect a *de facto* cease fire now. This impression created by Communist refusal to admit that the revision at the time of the signing of the armistice of their provisional line and zone would make their proposal similar to that of the UNC and also by their repeated insistence that their provisional line and zone were prerequisites to settlement of item 2, even though their proposal envisages changes occasioned by subsequent changes in the line of contact.

"3. The UNC sub-delegation believe it imperative, in view of the above and of attitude of Commie sub-delegation during past 2 days, that insistence on acceptance of our present proposal be continued. Further, the UNC sub-delegation believe it would be extremely dangerous to accept Commie proposal. It is believed there is no danger of their breaking off conference because they profit by delays.

"4. Sub-delegations meet again tomorrow at 1100.

"Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 81 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 13, 1951—12:30 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–86804. From JCS. JCS consider present line of contact acceptable as line of demarcation, and that combat expected during next month unlikely to materially alter its acceptability. JCS understand that latest offer on part of Communists indicates they are prepared to accept such a line.

JCS desire you press for early settlement item two of agenda negotiations on basis of present line of contact with understanding that agreement as to this line will remain valid only for definite period, during which remainder of agenda must be accomplished. JCS suggest this period be approximately one month. It should be made clear that, if at end of the stated period no settlement has been reached on all items of agenda, agreements with respect to location of median line of demilitarized zone are no longer valid and new although not necessarily different median line must be established.

If Communists raise difficulties about agreeing to location of actual line of contact, suggest you attempt to get agreement on basis of map, making such concessions as are not significant, or if this is impossible that you work out such methods of checking line as would be acceptable to you (such as marking and aerial photography) bearing in mind desirability of getting through with item two as promptly possible.

JCS do not consider that agreement as above on item two would imply a cease-fire. Ground action could still continue even though gains and losses would not be of significance to location of demarcation line if other items agreed within time period. Air and Naval action would, of course, be unaffected.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 91 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 November 1951—11:22 p. m.

HNC–446. For info CINCUNC (Adv) HNC 446.

"Sub-delegation reports as follows on 13 November meeting:

"*a.* Main argument Commies used against UNC proposal of 10 November was that it did not meet agenda item 2 requirements and proposal was therefore illegal. UNC sub-delegation refuted this argument, offered eliminate phrase 'minor local adjustments' but Commies not interested.

"*b*. Communists propounded questions designed to ascertain whether UNC would be willing to stop fighting on the present line of contact. When advised that location of any cease fire line would depend upon the location of the line of contact when armistice was signed Communists asked why our present proposal differed from our previous ones in not providing a present line and zone. It was again explained that our previous proposals were based upon adjusted lines which had to be specifically spelled out while the present proposal is based exclusively on the line of contact as it may exist on the date of the signing of the armistice and therefor requires no predetermination.

"*c*. A UNC query as to whether Communists expected a withdrawal and cease fire to follow immediately upon the reaching of agreement on item 2 alone was given equivocal answer which indicated no intent to require immediate withdrawal but avoided reference to cease fire. An indicated objection to our proposal was the fear that disputes on the location of the line of contact at time of signing of armistice would possibly result in UNC breaking off negotiations at that late date with the obvious implication that under their proposal unresolved disputes on proposed revisions would still leave the agreed provisional military demarcation line as the one to be used in the armistice agreement.

"*d*. Communists representative stated that they would not accept our proposal and that as long as we refused to state in what area the fighting would cease no armistice would be possible. Communists advanced the further objection to our proposal that under it we would be able to delay final agreement on the armistice until the line of contact was most favorable to us. Of course this argument also applicable to Communists proposal.

"*e*. Communists repeatedly demanded that United Nations Command state now, in solution to item 2, the line at which it desires the fighting to stop, insisting that this would have followed from any of our previous proposals. UNC sub-delegation repeatedly stated that fighting would stop when complete armistice was agreed to and on the line of contact at that time. Further stated that establishment demilitarized zone now on present line of contact would encourage delay in agreement on subsequent agenda items. The important point is achievement of complete armistice agreement earliest.

"*f*. Both Communist delegates appeared to lose their tempers, perhaps intentionally, as the meeting continued for 5 hours without a recess.

"*g*. The UNC sub-delegation has been unable to unearth the real reason for the Communists' refusal to accept our proposal. However, whatever it may be, it is of high importance to them since their stated objections, while completely illogical, are gaining in vehemence and vituperativeness.

"2. Sub-delegations meet again at 1100 hours 14 November.

"Joy."[1]

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[1] The following additional comment was transmitted from Admiral Joy in Korea to General Ridgway in Tokyo on November 14 and forwarded to Washington for the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Following is supplementary to HNC 446 dtd 13 Nov 51:

"1. Re para 1 *d*, Communists concern that UNC is attempting to set stage for reaching objective through mil action which cannot be reached through negotiations, is complete reversal of previous attitude. In discussing UNC proposals of 27 Jul, 25 Oct and 10 Nov Communists boastfully accused UNC of trying to gain objectives at conference table which they had been unable to gain militarily.

"2. Communists asserted that UNC must either give up present proposal or formally propose revision of agenda placing present item 2 in last place. UNC Subdelegation insists that agenda revision neither nec nor desired." (Black Book, Tab 92; Telegram HNC 448)

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 83: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, 13 November 1951—11:25 p. m.

C-57216. Ref JCS 86804.[1]

1. Rqst reconsideration of your directive to press for early settlement of agenda item 2 on basis of present line of contact with provision that agreement remains valid only under conditions of full settlement of all agenda items within a specified period of time. As a matter of deep conviction, I feel it is imperative that we continue our positive efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitarized zone based on the line of contact existing at the time of the signing of the armistice.

2. In every instance in which the UNC delegation has been permitted to stand pat on their requirements there has been eventual agreement by the Communists. I feel this is specially pertinent at this time and that continued patience and resistance will gain us this point of extreme importance.

3. During the 12 Nov session of the sub-delegations the UNC representatives offered to delete, if objectionable to the Communists, the provision for requiring minor local adjustments in the line of contact existing at the time of signing the armistice. This was done in order to eliminate not only the subj of minor adjustments but to ease the Communist sensitivity regarding Kaesong. The Communists evidenced no interest in this offer. All concerned here feel that Communist insistence on their proposal is based on a belief that once a line has been accepted the UNC will not be in a psn to engage in any ground activity which would necessitate the taking of casualties,

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[1] Dated November 13, p. 1126.

thereby granting the Communists the benefits of an effective ground cease fire even though there would be no signed armistice. This may be because they expect to delay indefinitely on subsequent agenda items or simply to increase their bargaining powers in the remainder of the negotiations because of lessening mil pressure on them.

4. The vital difference between the UNC and Communist proposals rests in the intent behind the Communist insistence on a demarcation line based on the present line of contact despite their pretended agreement that the present battle line has no legal relevance for the final settlement of Item 2. The fol excerpts from a statement made by Hodes at the sub-delegation meeting of 12 Nov stress the instability of the Communist position and give the basic reason for my belief that the Communists must eventually concede our psn:

a. "Why do you want to designate now the demarcation line and zone that will have no legal relevance at the time the armistice is signed and has no function prior to that time?

b. "We have proposed that the mil demarcation line be identical with the line of contact as it exists when the armistice is about to be signed. Since the location of this line cannot be known until that time there is no add step that can be taken now. At least none that is honestly motivated.

c. "Both parties have agreed that this demarcation line shall be the battle line as it exists at the end of the armistice talks. Since this line does not now exist it is manifestly impossible to be more concrete and specific than to specify everything needed to determine it at the approp time.

d. "Why do you want to create a provisional demarcation line now that has no function and which you agree will be discarded at the end of the armistice talks?"

5. I feel that premature acceptance of the present line of contact, under any conditions of adjustment, or requirements connected with completion of other agenda items, must inevitably delay the possibility of obtaining an acceptable and honorable armistice. I feel there is substantial probability that announcement to the Communists of the course you have directed will increase Communist intransigence and weaken our future psns on every substantive point. Having grown up with this developing situation, I have a strong inner conviction, admittedly based on the Korean as contrasted with the world situation, that more steel and less silk, more forthright American insistence on the unchallengeable logic of our psn, will yield the objectives for which we honorably contend. Conversely, I feel that the course you are directing will lead step by step to sacrifice of our basic principles and repudiation of the cause for which so many gallant men have laid down their lives. We stand at a crucial point. We have much to gain by

standing firm. We have everything to lose through concession. With all my conscience I urge we stand firm.

6. Since your directive does not require compliance at any specified date, I therefore respectfully rqst reconsideration of your directive in JCS 86804.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 85 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 November 1951—11 : 47 p. m.

C–57217. Reference CINCFE C 52227, 4 Oct 51, and JCS 84817, 24 [*23*] Oct 51.[1] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

a. Possible that initial discussions of agenda item 3 may occur very shortly. In view of experience to date it is vital that UNC be confident as to firm national policy in connection with several important items to be discussed. Principal among these items is that of observation and inspection.

b. Experience in dealing with agenda item 2 convinces me that lack of authorization to indicate or take an unyielding stand regarding a UNC proposal inevitably induces an aggressive attitude in the Communists. Actual UNC concessions, made without equivalent and simultaneous concessions by the Communists, result in an increased determination on the part of the enemy to press for further concessions. Moreover, lack of knowledge as to the ultimate national position on an agenda item produces uncertainty within the UNC delegation in its negotiatory processes. This further encourages the Communists to take adamant positions. These facts have been learned through experience.

Part 2. In JCS 84817 you approved my proposal as to the initial position to be taken with regard to observation and inspection, as stated in Part 6 of my C 52227. However, decision on my final proposed position was withheld since decision would be based on the situation "as negotiations develop." To introduce and argue vigorously for a basic principle, such as inspection of rear areas, only to be later required to give up that position, is detrimental to the over-all success of negotiations. The final position to be supported by national policy should be known to the UNC delegation prior to opening discussion on any agenda item.

Part 3. It is requested as a matter of urgency that I be given your decision reference approval of the final position pertaining to observation or inspection as discussed in Part 6 of my C 52227. If national policy will not back this final position it is requested that I be informed earliest as to the position in this regard which will be accepted as a final concession by the UNC.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 997, and footnote 1 to telegram C–52227, p. 999, respectively.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 98 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 14 November 1951—5 : 57 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–86969. From JCS.

1. JCS appreciate views expressed in ur C 57216 [1] and recognize that there are certain disadvantages involved in undertaking action directed in JCS 86804.[2] However, from the broader viewpoint, they feel these disadvantages are outweighed by the desirability of early agreement on agenda item 2.

2. Specifically, JCS feel:

a. That Communist proposal generally meets our basic position re demilitarized zone, namely, defense of Kansas line, and, in addition, provides protection for Wyoming line and the recently improved logistical support of X Corps. Hence agreement with it is no concession on our part.

b. That no major change in our favor in present line of contact likely in next month (reur CX 57143).[3]

c. That mil pressure on Communists neither will nor should be lessened.

d. That agreement on this agenda item, which apparently of prime importance to Communists, might well expedite agreement on other items rather than retard them, particularly if we maintain mil pressure.

3. JCS reaffirm the necessity for agreeing upon all proper arrangements for cessation of hostilities as contained in Armistice terms, before any form of cease fire is acceded to. (See subpara *g*, part II, JCS 95438, Jul 51).[4]

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[1] Dated November 13, p. 1128.

[2] Dated November 13, p. 1126.

[3] Not printed. In it, General Ridgway had transmitted a directive of November 12 to General Van Fleet to assume a posture of "active defense" in Korea. Along the outline of present positions, U.N. forces were to seize the terrain most suitable for defense, while limiting offensive actions to those involving commitment of no more than one division. At the same time, the Eighth Army was to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy as favorable opportunities arose. (See Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 176.)

[4] Dated July 2, p. 611.

4. Accordingly, JCS desire that you undertake action indicated in JCS 86804. They recognize that certain preparatory work may be necessary; however, they desire that this be done without undue delay.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 93 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 November 1951—8:05 p. m.

C–57272. For your info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 451 is quoted.

"1. Subdelegation report on meeting of 14 Nov 1951 fol:

"*a.* UNC opened the session by querying Communists as to how Commie proposal would prevent a breakoff of negotiations at the last minute, or prevent stalling in order to obtain a favorable line of contact, objections which they had raised to the UNC proposal. Communists stated that agreement on military demarcation line in the solution of this item of the agenda would constitute a '*de facto* cease fire;' that this was an 'unavoidable result' of agenda item 2. They still insisted that changes in the line of contact after agreement on the military demarcation line would be reflected in revisions to be made prior to the signing of the armistice although if one side tried to make changes in accordance with their legal right it would be an indication of bad faith and insincerity and prove that that side did not want an armistice.

"*b.* UNC repeatedly asked whether this *de facto* cease fire was expected to apply to Air and Navy as well as ground. Communists finally indicated, without specifically so stating, that they expected a complete cease fire on the ground, in the air and at sea as a demonstration of our good faith. Chinese representative delivered lengthy tirade in which he asserted that our former proposals necessarily included a *de facto* cease fire and that this was because we would have gotten all that we wanted by negotiations; that under our present proposal we intend to get by force of arms what we had been unable to win by negotiations. His statement was replete with accusations that UNC did not desire to end hostilities and with anger directed at UNC position, that in order to preclude stalling on other items UNC would not put itself in a position where it could not continue to conduct military operations up until such time as a complete armistice is agreed upon and signed.

"*c.* Communists said the *de facto* cease fire would have no binding legal repeat but that any military activities of either side after agreement on item 2 was reached would be an indication of the sincerity of that side's desire for an armistice; but that it was to meet UNC insistence on the right to continue hostilities that they had included the third paragraph in their proposal.

"*d.* UNC asserted that Communists proposal had apparently been purposely drawn so as to be open to the construction now being given it while not so stating on the surface; pointed out that it had required many questions over several days, the answers to all of which had been evasive prior to this morning to bring the Communists' intent out in the open; and stated that UNC wanted an armistice, but that it wanted a complete one, including all of the items on the agenda, and it did not want to set up a situation whereby those other items might never be solved.

"*e.* Communists representatives summarized their position substantially as follows: Their proposal contemplates a *de facto* cease fire by all arms; however, this is based on good faith only and is not legally binding; in order to allow scope for UNC 'military adventures', the third paragraph was added to their proposal; after agreement on item 2, the UNC may change the line of contact in accordance with its military ability; this is equally applicable to both sides; and clarification of proposal was given today only in order to refute our 'distorted press propaganda.'

"*f.* It is belief of subdelegation that Communists are pressing for a complete cease fire at the time agenda Item 2 only is agreed to. If they get such a cease fire they will proclaim bad faith if any hostile military operations of any kind are conducted thereafter regardless of delays or outcome on remainder of agenda items. Careful reading of the principle in the first paragraph of their proposal of 10 November permits such interpretation but only during today's discussions have these points been brought out in the open.

"2. Subdelegations meet again at 1100 on 15 November. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 96 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, 15 November 1951—9:15 a. m.

C-57297. In further support of my recommendation to you contained in my C 57216 of 13 November, the conclusions to be drawn from the facts which follow, in my opinion, immeasurably strengthen our conclusion here that Communist military forces in Korea are badly hurt as a result of UNC military operations and desire earliest possible suspension of hostilities.

First, press report that in Vishinsky's speech before UNGA his proposals included "cessation of hostilities in Korea within 10 days."[1]

Second, the report to me of the UNC Delegation on 14 November, based on the personal observation of the only two of our delegates presently meeting with the Communists, Major Gen Hodes and Rear Admiral Burke, to wit, "the Communist desire for an immediate *de facto* cease fire not only on the ground but in the air and on the sea became unmistakably clear today." The only fundamental divergence of views between the Communists and our representatives with respect to agenda item 2 is whether the cease fire portion of the hoped-for military armistice should be put into effect now or after agreement is reached on the other items of the agenda, including the essentials of safeguards to assure compliance and release of our prisoners in Communist hands.

Up to the hour of dispatch of this msg no information had been received here as to action on reference msg cited above.[2]

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 1104.

[2] Telegram C-57297 was sent prior to the receipt in Tokyo of telegram JCS 86969, November 14; General Ridgway's message transmitting the substance of the latter telegram to Admiral Joy is contained in telegram CX-57332, November 15, p. 1136.

795.00/11-1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BELGRADE, November 15, 1951—1 p. m.

643. Embtel 640, rptd Paris 108, London 117.[1] During conversation with Tito yesterday I referred to hot-and-cold Soviet tactics in Korean armistice negots and asked for his analysis. He said Soviets, in any negots arouse expectations as much as possible by conducting negots up to point where agreement seems imminent, then refuse to conclude and attempt to throw blame on opposition for failure. Tito regards this tactic as part of Soviet war of nerves, ultimate aim of which is to break opposition thru succession of shock treatments. Immediate aim is to keep world conditions as unsettled as possible. He admitted he was "familiar" with Soviet methods and said only answer was to refuse to yield an inch.

This Soviet tactic in international affairs recalls method used to break political prisoners, on whom alternation of hope and despair is practiced until prisoner cracks under strain.

Sent Dept 643, rptd info Paris 109, London 119.

ALLEN

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[1] Not printed; it reported briefly on the signing of the United States-Yugoslav Mutual Assistance Agreement (768.5 MAP/11-1451). For documentation on Yugoslavia, see volume IV.

320/11-1551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 15, 1951—5 : 13 p. m.

Gadel 151. Dept has revised recommendations 2, 3, and 4, position paper "UN Action in Korea, Alternative II—If Armistice Achieved", SD/A/C.1/368,[1] to read as fol:

"2. The United States shld support a res which wld reaffirm that it remains the purpose of the United Nations to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic govt in Korea. To that end, the res shld estab a new United Nations Comm. The terms of reference of the Comm shld be:

a. The Comm shld consider, and enter into discussions with govts and authorities as appropriate regarding a basis for bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means,

b. The Comm wld deal exclusively with a Korean polit settlement and wld have no authority to consider any other problem;

c. The Comm wld report to the Gen Assembly, as appropriate. If it shld succeed in getting agreement of the interested parties to a plan for the unification of Korea consistent with United Nations principles, it wld submit this agreement for the approval of the Gen Assembly.

"3. In discussions re the composition of the Comm, prior to passage of the res, the United States shld proceed on the basis that the Comm shld be a small body capable of carrying out the negotiating function which is its primary task. The US Del shld make it clear that in view of the role of the US in the Korean conflict it shld be a member of the Comm. In addition, it wld be desirable to have three small countries from among those which have participated in the fighting in Korea, e.g., Thailand, Australia and Turkey; and the Soviet Union, if it will serve. If the Soviet Union is not willing to serve, its seat on the Comm might nevertheless be kept open. If informal discussions indicate that the United Kingdom and France strongly desire a place on the Comm the del is authorized to agree to including them.

"4. The res shld express the appreciation of the Assembly to UNCURK for its services. UNCURK shld go out of existence when the new Comm informs it that it is ready to begin its functions under this Gen Assembly res. When the Assembly receives the report of the new Comm on the results of its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, the Assembly will review, in the light of that report, the need for long-term polit United Nations representation in Korea."

Corresponding changes in Discussion will be air pouched. Views

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[1] Dated October 12, p. 1020.

Defense Dept not yet recd.[2] In transmitting these changes at this time, no intention affect instrs contained Gadel 60.[3]

WEBB

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[2] The source text of telegram Gadel 151 indicates that the drafting date was November 8, which presumably accounts for the fact that no mention is made of the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in the letter from Mr. Lovett, dated November 10, p. 1111.

[3] Dated November 4, p. 1087.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 97 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

TOP SECRET Tokyo, 15 November 1951—5 : 29 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-57332. Desire you press for early settlement item 2 of agenda negotiations on basis present line of contact as "a provisional line of demarcation[")] with clear understanding that agreement as to this provisional line will remain valid only for definite period during which agreement must be reached on remainder of agenda. Period of 1 month is suggested. It will be made clear that, if at end of stated period settlement has not been reached on all items of agenda, agreements with respect to location of this provisional line of demarcation will no longer be valid, and a new, although not necessarily a different median line will have to be established.

If Communists raise difficulties about agreeing to location of actual line of contact, suggest you attempt to get agreement on basis of map, making such concessions as are not significant, or if this is impossible that you work out such methods of checking line as would be acceptable to you (such as marking and aerial photography), and as will not compel suspension of operations, other than as already provided in Kaesong area.

You will inform Communist delegation that above is with understanding that both sides will be unrestricted in their ground, naval and air operations until armistice agreement is accomplished in full. It is desirable that prefatory paragraph be [*to?*] actual agreement on agenda item number 2 be couched in terms such as "the Representatives of the United Nations Command, the NKPA and Chinese Peoples Volunteers do reaffirm their understanding that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice document and do agree that . . . et cetera." Further, it is desirable that the word "provisional" be used to modify the terms "demilitarized zone" and "median line" wherever appropriate.

Attempts to attain the objectives of previous 2 paragraphs must be guided by the desirability of getting through with item number 2 as promptly as possible.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 109 : Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, 15 November 1951—6 : 11 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 87119. For Ridgway from CSUSA sgd Collins. Colonel Hanley's statement reference atrocities has caused widespread repercussions not only in United States but abroad.[1] Reaction here has turned primarily to shock to families of men listed as missing in action and to possible connection between Hanley's statement and Armistice negotiations. Our understanding is that statement was cleared only through subordinates of Logistical Command without personal knowledge of you or Van Fleet.

Recommend the issuance of clarifying statement by you as soon as possible covering source and conditions of issuance of Hanleys statement, assurances as to best official estimates of dead, indicating whether or not figures in Hanley's statement are excessive, and clarification of non-inclusion of these deaths in our casualty reports. Disclaimer of any connection with Armistice negotiations would be most helpful.

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[1] On November 14, Col. James Hanley, Chief of the Judge Advocate Section of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, issued a statement in which he said that evidence showed that the Chinese Communists had killed 2,513 captured Americans in addition to 10 British, 40 Turkish, 5 Belgian, and 75 other soldiers since November 1, 1950. The North Koreans, he said, had killed 147 more. In addition, large, unknown numbers of Korean civilians had been killed without previous trials. Subsequently, Colonel Hanley added to the total of prisoners slain 3,610 Americans killed before November 1950. (See the *New York Times*, November 15 and 16, 1951.)

320/11–1151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET PRIORTY WASHINGTON, November 15, 1951—7 : 07 p. m.

Gadel 159. Re Delga 143, Nov. 11.[1]

Dept believes appropriate to reaffirm in gen terms UC need for additional troops Korea during Comite debate CMC Report.[8] While Dept continues in favor postponement consideration Kor item (Gadel 60)[9] during present state negots, this fact shld not be bar to emphasizing continued need additional forces Korea on appropriate occasions.

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[1] The text of this message from Paris read as follows:

"Views expressed by some reps on GADel in informal discussion with members of staff are that securing additional troops for Korea from other states is important and urgent from congressional and American public opinion standpoint, and that US is bearing too heavy and too disproportionate share of Korean ground forces burden. In opinion of these reps we ought to take every occasion in and out of Assembly to point this out and press hard for more troops even to point of shaming those who have not contributed or contributed too little.

"GADel staff explained in considerable detail the considerations underlying present troop situation, country-by-country, and past and current efforts in this regard. Mindful of Gadel 60 [footnote 3, below] particular point that was raised in discussion and on which GADel would like Dept guidance was whether on occasion of debate on CMC report in comite, we should take opportunity to stress need for more Korean troops from others." (320/11–1151)

Dept agrees that we shld continue press hard for more troops Korea. You will recall we have in past conducted and are presently carrying on negots with nbr Govts with view getting additional forces. Our efforts have not abated as result armistice negots. Our assumption has been and is that regardless outcome armistice negots Korea, there is real need for additional troops. If armistice talks break down, need for more troops will be self-evident. On other hand, if armistice negots successful and hostilities terminated, still be great need for troops because substantial ground forces must remain considerable time Kor in order maintain strong UN position, insure against possible renewal aggression. We believe firmly strong UN position Kor will contribute measurably in subsequent dipl efforts toward Kor settlement.

Comment in Comite by US Del might reaffirm publicly what we have stressed in extensive bilateral negots, i.e., that each state has stake in collective action against aggression, and it is matter of self-interest for each to make maximum contribution. It might further reemphasize our desire to broaden UN character of Kor operation and thereby make more equitable sharing of sacrifice.

Del will, of course, wish avoid sharp critical tone which might hamper Dept's continued bilateral efforts and provoke resentment which wld not only have adverse effect upon our efforts this regard but endanger support on CMC Report itself and other matters of importance, as well as offer ammunition Commie propaganda. We desire further to avoid giving any impression in GA that action against aggression in Korea is unilateral US effort as Soviet propaganda contends.

Dept believes wld be particularly advantageous for US Del to avail self informal opportunities with other dels to stress continued UC need for additional troops Korea.

Webb

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[8] For documentation on the Collective Measures Committee, see vol. I, pp. 616 ff.

[9] Dated November 4, p. 1087. On November 13, the General Assembly had placed on the agenda of its Sixth Session the item on the problem of the independence of Korea and the report of UNCURK and referred it to the First Committee which did not take it up until January 1952.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 99 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 November 1951—8:55 p. m.

C-57344. For information CINCUNC Adv 454.

1. "Report of sub-delegation meeting of 15 Nov.

"2. Lee opened asserting UNC proposal on 2 agenda item is contrary to spirit of agenda and contrary to previous proposals of UNC. He stated UNC sought to reverse agenda but this couldn't be done as it was result of agreement by both sides. Lee continued saying objective of UNC proposal was to delay an armistice even to the point of wrecking the conference and implied that its aim was to carry on the military adventure in order to maintain tension and enlarge the scope of the war. Turning to Communist proposal, he stated its objective was an early cessation of hostilities to pave the way for further agreements; that it put first things first. While UNC proposal violates spirit of agenda, Communist proposal does not and should, therefore, be adopted.

"3. UNC delegates replied each agenda item has 3 elements, where, how, and when. The UNC proposal on agenda item 2 fulfills all 3. It does not violate the letter or the spirit of the agreed agenda. UNC asserted Communists had yesterday disclosed the real but previously concealed meaning of their proposal. This attempt to conceal was not conducive to good faith but it was understandable in view of nature of the concealed matter, since it rendered Communist proposal even less acceptable. UNC asserted armistice is a body of agreements which when signed becomes basis for cessation of hostilities. Stated Communists were seeking cessation of hostilities on basis agreement on 2/5 of agenda. UNC asserted military action can cease only after armistice is signed, not on basis of partial agreement. This has been understood by both sides from the beginning. Said Communists now contradict the earlier statements of their senior delegate and themselves. They themselves recognize these contradictions by the phraseology of their proposal which admits continuance of operation is legal even though Communists say continued operations would be an expression of bad faith.

"4. UNC continued saying its position is that military action will cease on basis of an armistice agreement, not 2/5 of it. This has been clear to the world since the beginning of negotiations. Thus, there is no need for an otherwise useless demarcation line to assist Communists to expose this intent on the part of the UNC. The provisional demarcation line is unnecessary and irrelevant. UNC said we need not be ashamed of our progress, namely, an agreement that when an armistice is about to be signed the demarcation line will be drawn along the line of contact.

"5. UNC continued since the duration of these talks cannot be predicted, UNC cannot and will not cease military action until armistice agreement is reached. But it desires an early end. The quickest way for Communists to bring about peace and secure their own objectives with respect to location of a demarcation line is to cooperate fully in a joint venture to work through remaining items of agenda. The question is: Are Communists sincerely interested in completing the rest of the agenda quickly and fairly? If they are, they will find the UNC has no objective but to reach these highly desirable objectives as early as possible.

"6. Lee asserted UNC subjective interpretation of Communist proposal resulted in distortion. Yesterday's explanation could have been omitted since the proposal is self-explanatory. The proposal says that the demarcation line will be revised. There is no legal restriction on the UNC carrying out any military adventure until the armistice is signed. The UNC was seeking hidden motives in the proposal only to convince the people of the world to its own direction. The Communist proposal is so fair that this would fail.

"7. He continued, Communists have never mentioned that they are seeking a cease fire prior to signing of armistice, and the UNC should not assume it. According to the agenda the demarcation line must be settled during the discussion of item 2. The item requires the fixation of the line, but Communist proposal provides for its revision. Hsieh continued saying that the determination of the area in which both sides are willing to stop fighting must be a preliminary to the settlement of other items.

"UNC attacked inconsistencies between Communist expositions of their proposal made yesterday and those made today. Said these shifts gave impression Communists did not know what they intended. SCC [?] asserted today Communists say cease fire will not come into effect until armistice is signed. If Communists mean that, the line of contact at that time becomes the military demarcation line. Then the Communists agree with UNC proposal. Why then do they wish to establish a demarcation line now? It has no meaning nor function. What is the purpose of Commie proposal? If none, Communists should accept UNC proposal. If Communists mean something else, their proposal is not clear and today's explanation is inconsistent with its intent.

"Lee replied the agenda item includes the fixing of the demarcation line. He said both sides have come close as to where to fix the demarcation line. As to the when, Lee said it must be settled during the discussion of agenda item 2. Consequently, if neither side develops further military operations a *de facto* cease fire will result even if the agreement is not yet signed. However, he added, since UNC asks to go on fighting Communists proposal allows for revision of this line. UNC is seeking to reverse the 'natural order' of assembling an armistice agreement.

"UNC asked are we trying to settle item 2 as written or according to interpretations placed upon it by Communists? The item involves only where, the when, and the how, and the UNC proposal satisfied all 3. UNC asserted Communists have added to these a provisional demarcation line and zone not required by item 2.

"Today, for the first time during the current discussions, Communists delegates, particularly Hsieh, showed lack of aggressiveness and little enthusiasm.

"Adjourned 1430 to meet at 1100 16 Nov 51. Signed Joy".

795.00/11-1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1951.
NO DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Item Three, Korean Armistice Agenda

Participants: JCS: General Collins, Gen. Twining, Admiral Fechteler, Admiral Lalor.
State: G—Mr. Matthews
S/P—Mr. Nitze
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
FE—Mr. Johnson

A meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs at 11:45 a. m. today to discuss the inspection provisions of the UNC proposals under item 3 of the Korean armistice agenda. Various questions were asked by the State representatives concerning the JCS attitude on such problems as the increase in the Communist military capability by the rebuilding of airfields, railroads and roads; the degree of inspection of compliance with the armistice which the JCS considered essential; activities of Communist inspectors in South Korea, etc.

In general, the discussion was directed towards determining the views of the JCS concerning the absolute minimum of inspection considered militarily essential, the State representatives expressing the view that, as realized from the beginning of the discussions, inspection within Communist-held territory was the most difficult point in the armistice agreement in view of the great Communist sensitivity to outside observation of conditions in their territories. There was some discussion of the likelihood of enlarged hostilities, particularly against China, in the event that following an armistice agreement there was a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea and the relationship of this to observance of the armistice terms by the Communists. There was also discussion of the relationship of over-all U.S. and Communist military strength in the Far East to the question of renewal of hostilities in Korea in the event an armistice was concluded. It was the view of the Chiefs, as expressed by General Collins, that in the absence of a firm agreement at a political level concerning action which would be taken against China in the event of a major violation of the armistice conditions, particularly action by the UK concerning a blockade of China, it would be essential to insist upon the present instructions to Ridgway (that is, inspection teams at key points in North Korea) as a minimum U.S. position. It was agreed that State would explore the possibilities of such a political agreement and that Ridgway would be informed accordingly.

After the meeting, JCS telegram No. 87239 [1] was drafted by Admiral Lalor and Mr. Johnson, and subsequently cleared by Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Nitze for State.

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[1] *Infra.*

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 106 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, 16 November 1951—5 : 10 p. m.

JCS–87239. From JCS.

1. Reur C 57217,[1] JCS believe both Ground Obsr Teams and Aerial Obsn and Photo Rcn highly desirable. However, they do not believe that negotiations should be broken off on issue of Aerial Obsn and Photo Rcn. JCS have assumed that your phrase "Joint Aerial Observation" is intended to mean Joint UN and Communist occupancy of specially designated and marked airplanes.

2. JCS consider that determination of a final position on Item 3 would be premature at this time in view of fact that there may be alternatives to local inspections as guarantees against renewed Communist aggression in Korea. State is exploring possibility of an an-

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[1] Dated November 13, p. 1130.

nouncement by participating nations of an Allied agreement which would serve as a deterrent to renewed aggression in Korea. The agreement would assure punitive action against Communist China in event of a major violation of armistice terms.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 108 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 November 1951—9:55 p. m.

CX–57415. 1. In sub-delegation meeting of 16 Nov Communists spent day in attempting to prove illegality of UNC proposal and to obtain information on where UNC was willing to stop fighting. They evaded all attempts to get reasonable or clear answers to such questions as: What is purpose of provisional zone, do you expect a cease fire after agreement on item 2 alone, length of time provisional zone to be effective, would final line of contact become the final military demarcation line under their proposal.

2. At propitious time during meeting of 17 Nov or as soon thereafter as opportune sub-delegation will present position outlined in JCS 86804.[1]

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[1] Dated November 13, p. 1126.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 110 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, 16 November 1951—10:25 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–57416. Urmsg DA 87119.[1] Colonel Hanley's press release was made without my prior knowledge, or that of my HQ. General Van Fleet reports it was made without his prior knowledge. I have sent my public information officer and an officer from my judge advocate section, who is a specialist on this subject, to Korea to obtain full and precise factual data concerning this unfortunate statement.

Complete report, including a proposed press release, will follow upon receipt of these data. At least until major aspects of the situation have been cleared up, I contemplate no press release here without prior coordination with you.

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[1] Dated November 15, p. 1137.

I plan, if facts can be secured, to include in my complete report the following:

a. The total nbr of UN dead believed to have been the result of atrocities and for whom bodies were recovered.
b. Of this nbr the total nbr of identified dead.
c. Of the number in subpara *a* above, the total nbr of unidentified dead.
d. The total nbr of UN military personnel other than above, on whom evidence has been received indicating death occurred as a result of atrocities, but where neither the fact nor manner of death can yet be confirmed. In this latter case the source of the report and the evidence in each case will be forwarded as obtained.

Pending receipt from Eighth Army of the data permitting the submission of the foregoing, Eighth Army has reported the following with respect to US dead.

a. 365 US dead believed to have been the result of atrocities and for whom bodies have been recovered.
b. Of this number, 259 identified dead.
c. Of the nbr in subpara *a* above, 106 unidentified dead.
d. 3,545 US military personnel other that above, whom evidence has been received, indicating death occurred as a result of atrocities but where neither the fact or manner of death can yet be confirmed.

Of the US dead so reported, theatre records show that upon identification of body, report was made in each case to next of kin, in accordance with normal casualty reporting processes.

Pending receipt of my complete report, the following is suggested for release to the press, either here or in Washington or concurrently in both. Request your views. Proposed release follows: "The figures in Colonel Hanley's press release were compiled over a period of about one year. During this period it became apparent that the Communist propaganda claims to the effect that members of the UN forces, being taken prisoners by the Communists, were treated in strict accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, were false. It was, therefore, decided that at an appropriate time the total nbr of deaths resulting from atrocities, so far as aval evidence indicated atrocities, should be made public.

"It is deeply regretted that in the publication of these total figures it was not strongly emphasized that these totals included no new figures, but were simply the sum of previous figures which had already been reported through normal channels over the period of one year. Each member of the UN forces included in these totals, whose remains had been identified, had been reported as killed in action and his next of kin had been notified.

"The publication of this information, which has been in the process of compilation over the past 12 months had, of course, no connection whatever with the current armistice negotiations." [2]

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[2] General Collins, in telegram DA-87251, November 16, not printed, recommended that General Ridgway issue a press release at once and suggested a text. For the text released by Ridgway, see *infra*.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 111 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOKYO, 17 November 1951—1:21 p. m.

Z-10111. The following is being released to press in Tokyo at once.

"The statement made to the press on 14 Nov by Col James M Hanley of the Judge Advocate Section of the 8th Army Staff in Korea concerning atrocities perpetrated by the Communists upon United Nations prisoners of war in Communist hands was made under the following circumstances.

"For more than a year officers especially assigned to investigate atrocities have been at work gathering their evidence. More than a year ago it had become evident to all concerned here that Communists' statements concerning their strict adherence to the principles of the Geneva Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war in their custody were false. Throughout the compilation of this evidence, whenever it was finally determined that the death of a soldier had actually occurred and after his body has been identified, a report was made in each case to the next of kin, regardless of the manner in which death occurred, in accordance with the normal casualty reporting processes. It had been concluded some months ago, that at an appropriate time when the accumulated evidence warranted and when due coordination had been effected with proper authorities in Washington, this evidence should be made public. That this coordination was not properly effected at the time of this release is of utmost regret to this headquarters.

"All concerned share with me in deploring the anguish which this most regrettable incident has inflicted upon the relatives and friends of members of the United Nations Command still carried on our casualty lists as missing in action. Relatives and friends of these gallant men, who met their still undetermined fate in the performance of their duty to God and country, have had the heartfelt sympathy of every member of this command. We, their comrades, who shared and so knew personally the conditions under which they fought, would be the last ones on earth to wish to add to the grief of their families.

"Yet, notwithstanding this feeling of deep regret over what has occurred, it may perhaps be well to note with deep reverence that in his inscrutable way God chose to bring home to our people and to the conscience of the world the moral principles of the leaders of the forces against which we fight in Korea.

"The shocking impact of the brutality which was been revealed should have been no surprise to the American people. The basic facts had long been known. As far back as October 1950, a movie film showing the recovered bodies of some 26 of our soldiers were shown to a group of distinguished American citizens, the mayors of 200 of our cities. This film, which I personally selected, and with the approval of proper authority exhibited in Washington, showed the bodies of these soldiers, each shot in the head and with their hands still tied behind their back, as they had been at the moment of execution.

"It may well be that in no other way could all lingering doubts be dispelled from the minds of our people as to the methods which the leaders of Communism are willing to use, and actually do use, in their efforts to destroy free peoples and the principles for which they stand.

"The publication of the information in Colonel Hanley's statement had, of course, no connection whatever with the current armistice negotiations.

"M. B. Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command." [1]

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[1] On November 20, General Ridgway forwarded a further report to the Department of the Army in his telegram C-57640, which read in part as follows:

"Statement released Pusan by Col Hanley, Chief, War Crimes Section, Eighth Army, to press representatives at special press conference 14 Nov. Figures based on case records War Crimes Section gathered from eye witnesses, UN escapees, enemy POW, survivors, and various intelligence reports. War Crimes Section records maintained since 25 Jun 50 now contain 908 reports. Of these, 40 cases have been dropped as unwarranted; 868 cases are under active and continuing investigation. These cases contain reports which, if all are confirmed, would establish a total of 6,332 UN military personnel killed as a result of atrocities, of whom 6,202 are indicated as US military personnel. There are included in this total both unconfirmed estimates of number involved and cases where the weight of evidence is considered conclusive as to number of victims. Mere addition therefore does not achieve the accuracy implied. A tabulation of those cases involving known recovered dead, where evidence clearly indicates they were victims of atrocity killings, follows: US military identified 259, unidentified 106; BCO military identified 4, unidentified 1; Belgian military identified 4, unidentified 1; total identified 267, total unidentified 108. The total of 259 identified US victims consists of 243 US Army, 10 USMC, and 6 USAF." (Black Book, Tab 117)

795.00/10–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 17, 1951—1:54 p. m.

2564. Re Embtel 2118 Oct 31. Dept has informed Brit Emb rep here that our intelligence auths entirely agree with estimate Brit mil intel concerning potential use Yalu dam as communications line and that in discussions with Morrison this subject Sec had not been correctly briefed. However, we pointed out as also stated by Sec to Morrison, dam is very important source electric power for Port Arthur, Dairen industrial and military complex.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, summarized the substance of a conversation which he had held with Mr. Tomlinson of the British Embassy on the preceding day.

Webb

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 112 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 17 November 1951—5 : 25 p. m.

C-57466. HNC 459.

"Report of Sub-Delegation meeting for 17 Nov 51:

"*a.* Morning session and major portion of afternoon session were spent in further discussion of the relative merits and demerits of the UNC and Communist proposals of 10 Nov. The Communists having given no indication by 1430 that they would abandon their position during this session, the UNC delegates, in compliance with pertinent directives introduced the following new proposal:

"1. The representatives of the UNC and of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers:

"(1) Reaffirm their understanding that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement.

"(2) Agree that the present line of contact as jointly determined by the Sub Delegations will constitute a provisional military demarcation line, and that 2 lines, 2 kilometers from this provisional military demarcation line, will constitute the southern and northern boundaries of a provisional demilitarized zone.

"(3) Agree that the above provisional military demarcation line and the above provisional demilitarized zone based upon the present line of contact shall become effective in any armistice agreement signed within 30 days after this agreement is accepted by the 2 delegations in plenary session.

"(4) Agree that, if an armistice agreement is not signed by the end of the 30 day period, the then existing line of contact will be determined jointly by the Sub-Delegations and will constitute a new provisional military demarcation line which will be the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone to be effective under such conditions as will be at the time generally agreed to by the delegations of both sides.

"Communists gave preliminary response that proposal seemed to be in accordance with their principles, that if both sides exerted themselves the remaining questions might be resolved soon. However, since this depends on how sincerely we deal with each other, the time element is not a matter of great importance.

"*b*. Meeting adjourned 1525 to permit Communists to study proposal.

"*c*. Meetings continue 1100 hours 18 Nov. Signed Joy".[1]

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[1] The brief report on the subdelegation meeting of November 18, contained in telegram C-57511, November 18, from Tokyo, read as follows:

"Report of sub-delegation meeting 18 Nov:

"In a session which lasted only 1½ hours Communists asked questions to clarify their understandings of UNC proposal made 17 Nov. They requested recess at 1230 for purpose of studying proposal further. Reconvene at 1100 tomorrow." (Black Book, Tab 113)

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 114: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 19 November 1951—3:15 p. m.

C-57569. HNC-467. "Report of sub-delegation meeting 19 Nov:

"In a session which lasted only 1 hour and 15 minutes Communists sought further clarification on para 4 of UNC proposal, particularly the intent of the word 'conditions.' When satisfied they proposed a recess until 211100 Nov. UNC delegates made inquiry to check Communist understanding of para 1 that hostilities would continue and as to the provisional and tentative nature of the line and zone fixed in accordance with paras 2 and 3. Communist reply was 'We'll give you our overall reply to your proposal on 21 Nov'. Recessed 1215 at Communist request to adjourn. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 116: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 19 November 1951—5:58 p. m.
ROUTINE

DA-87452. From CSUSA signed Bolte[1] ref C 52227 and C 57217 and JCS 87239.[2]

1. In view of the possibility of Communist non-acceptance of any really eff insp and obsn mechanism and the resultant possibility of a

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[1] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.

[2] Dated respectively October 4, November 13, and November 16, pp. 997, 1130, and 1142.

breakdown of negotiations on this issue, and recognizing that it is not in the mil interests of the US to be tied up in Korea indefinitely, a most careful assessment of our psn in this regard is required. It would be helpful to the JCS if they had your more detailed views on this subject.

2. As you know, the main purpose of insp and obsn were: (A) To assure against a resumption of hostilities; and (B) to prov for the scty of UN forces. It now appears doubtful that any insp mechanism in itself will attain the former. The only real assurance we have against a resumption of hostilities is the maintenance of suf and aprop mil power in the Korean area (not necessarily within Korea) to serve as an eff deterrent to renewed hostilities. Associated with this is the possibility, as indicated in Para 2 of JCS 87239, of UN issuing an ultimatum to the eff that renewed hostilities will result in punitive action against Communist China itself. However, unless we have reasonable assurance that such punitive action, to include naval blockade and air attacks, would be undertaken and would be supported by other UN participants, we would be reluctant to base the scope of insp on anything other than the mil considerations of scty of UN forces in Korea.

3. The real concern is, of course, the scty of UN forces in Korea if the Communists accept or ignore the risks involved and renew hostilities. While insp and obsn will obviously contribute to this scty by prov more accurate intl, this advantage must be weighed against such factors as: (A) the possibility of a breakdown in negotiations and a renewal of hostilities on this issue; (B) the possibility of serious friction and incidents stemming from insp; and (C) the prov of better info to the Communists on our own activities, dispositions, etc.

4. In view of these factors your views on the fol are rqst:

A. The nr and, if possible, the location of key points and road or railroad nets in both north and south Korea of which obsn is desirable;

B. Would this obsn be better or more practicable by permanently locating obsr teams in these localities or by having roving teams inves on a spot-check basis?

C. What safeguards or prov are envisaged for preventing or solving any incidents or disagreements?

D. How do you propose to handle repts of violations of the armistice by either side?

E. How do you propose to check on rehab of railroads, roads, and airfields in north Korea? Your present armistice instr do not prov against such rehab. Would such rehab in itself increase unacceptably Communist mil capabilities?

5. Assuming flat rejection by the Communists of the psns indicated in Part 6 of your C 52227 can we acpt anything less from the view point

of scty of UN forces? Would the deterrent factor indicated in Para 2 above coupled with any, or a combination, of the fol be suf to prov reasonable scty:

A. Insp in demilitarized zone only.
B. Insp in a zone on the order of 20–30 miles centered on the demarcation line.
C. Periodic spot-checks of spec locales in Korea by the Mil Armistice Commission.
D. Joint aerial obsn.
E. Intensification and expansion of covert intel activities.

6. Rqst your views on the foregoing and on any other allied problems and considerations which might assist the JCS in determining a final psn on this subj.

795.00/11–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by David M. Key, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 19, 1951.

Subject: Korean Resolution and Allied Questions

Participants: Secretary of State
John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea
Dr. Mye-Mook Lee, Korean Minister to London
Mr. Taik Sang Chang, Vice Chairman Korean Assembly
Ambassador David Key[1]
Miss Ruth Bacon[2]

Mr. John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea, accompanied by Dr. Mye-Mook Lee and Mr. Taik Sang Chang called by appointment on the Secretary at 6:15 p.m. today.

After referring to a recent report received by the U.N. that the cease-fire negotiations were making good progress and remarking that an armistice might, therefore, not be far distant, Mr. Chang observed that the Korean people would be bitterly disappointed if, after all the sacrifices which they have made and the suffering which they have undergone, a political settlement is arrived at which would still leave Korea divided and which would expose South Korea to the same threats and dangers which have existed since 1945. He felt that any such settlement would be tantamount to a defeat and suggested that, since the Communists respected only force, it was essential that the U.N. forces advance further northwards, not so far as the Yalu perhaps, but at least considerably to the north of the present fighting front, some of which lies to the south of the 38th parallel and exposes Seoul to danger. Mr. Chang expressed the opinion that unless such a military advance were made, the U.N.'s negotiating position would be so weak as to hold out virtually no hope for the unification of Korea. In fact, he did not see how a satisfactory political settlement could be expected if an armistice were concluded on the basis of the present front in Korea.

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[1] Mr. Key was the American Ambassador to Burma.

[2] Miss Bacon, United Nations Adviser to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, was also an Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The Secretary assured Mr. Chang that the unification of Korea was an objective which the United States unreservedly supported, and we must continue to "keep plugging at it". While he did not underestimate the difficulties of overcoming communist objections, he hoped that through the U.N. and through realization of the growing military strength of the democratic states, the Communists would agree to Korean unification as part of a general political settlement. Whether and if so when the Communists were prepared to enter into a general settlement was a decision which rested largely in their hands. With respect to the present armistice negotiations and Mr. Chang's suggestion that the U.N. military forces seek to advance further up the peninsula, the Secretary pointed out that these were primarily military questions concerning which we must look to General Ridgway for advice and abide largely by his views. General Ridgway strongly favored an armistice based on the present front which he felt was the strongest and most advantageous position for the U.N. forces from a military viewpoint. General Ridgway, moreover, was opposed to any further advance northwards, since this would lengthen the U.N. supply lines, shorten the Communist supply lines and expose the U.N. forces to increasingly heavy air attacks. In these circumstances the Secretary felt it was inappropriate to discuss any further advance northwards.

Mr. Chang then asked whether there was any basis for rumors to the effect that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Korea if an armistice is concluded. The Secretary said that he had heard of no suggestions of this sort. The Secretary pointed out that if the Communists again resorted to aggression in Korea, after an armistice, there would ensue the gravest consequences.

In reply to a hope expressed by Mr. Chang that economic aid would be extended to Korea for the reconstruction of the country after an armistice is concluded, the Secretary assured him that we would strongly support any U.N. proposals to this end. Mr. Chang referred in this connection to reported friction between UNCURK and UNKRA. The Secretary stated that he was aware of these reports but he was confident that this problem would be straightened out during this session of the General Assembly. With reference to Mr. Chang's observation that the head of UNKRA had not been spending much time in Korea, the Secretary pointed out that up to now there had not been much for him to do there but that if an armistice were concluded and UNKRA became more active, he was certain that this situation would be corrected.

Mr. Chang next mentioned the serious problem of inflation caused by payments to U.N. forces and the unrestricted printing of currency. He referred to a "partial settlement" already made by the United States in this regard and to negotiations on economic questions currently in progress in Korea. The Secretary replied that Korean economic and financial problems would continue to receive U.S. consideration.

Mr. Chang raised the point whether by dealing with North Koreans in the armistice negotiations this would involve *de facto* recognition of the North Korean regime. The Secretary replied that it did not nor did the fact that we were at the same time negotiating with Chinese Communists involve *de facto* recognition of the latter.

Before leaving, Mr. Chang asked what resolution the U.S. Delegation proposed to submit to the General Assembly on the Korean question. The Secretary pointed out that the Korean item was at present the fourth item of business on the First Committee's agenda and accordingly, much would depend on whether or not there was an armistice when the item came up for consideration. In response to Mr. Chang's suggestion, the Secretary stated that the U.S. Delegation would be glad to keep in close touch with the Korean representatives as developments occurred. He suggested that Mr. Chang get in touch with Senator Austin and other members of the Delegation dealing with this matter.

There is attached a copy of an *aide-mémoire*, prepared by Mr. Chang, which was submitted to the Secretary's office prior to his visit.[3]

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[3] The *aide-mémoire*, not printed, outlined the Korean position on the points taken up by Prime Minister Chang as set forth in the memorandum of conversation.

795.00/11-2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

[Extract]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Foreign Government Representatives on Korea

Participants:
Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Dr. Pastrana, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia —Absent
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Mr. Han, First Secretary
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Absent
Philippines —Lt. Col. Salientes, Armed Forces Attaché
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Taswell, First Secretary
United States —UNA, Mr. Hickerson
UNA, Mr. Bloomfield
FE, Mr. Johnson
UNP, Mr. Popper
UNP, Mr. Henkin
UNP, Miss Brown
EUR, Mr. Allen
Army, Captain Pope

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Mr. Hickerson stated that he wished to raise one somewhat painful matter with the group. He referred to the story by James Reston which appeared in the *New York Times* November 17 and which gave in considerable detail and quite accurately the substance of the current UN proposal. He read to the group the two initial sentences of the story, including a reference to the fact that it had been learned that Assistant Secretary John D. Hickerson had informed the representatives of foreign governments the preceding afternoon of the proposal. He regretted the necessity for calling this matter to the attention of the group. He read a message which had been received from Admiral Joy (HNC 462, November 18) which indicated a strong possibility that information as to the details of our proposal had leaked before the proposal was made public. He called attention to the fact that Admiral Joy believed that the Communists were prepared for and expecting our latest proposal.[1] Mr. Hickerson expressed deep regret at being compelled to report these facts to the group.

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[1] In his message, Admiral Joy stated that "viewed in retrospect there appears to have been a perceptible stiffening of Communists' attitude about November 13. . . ." (Black Book, Tab 115) In the briefing on November 9 (p. 1103), Mr. Hickerson had mentioned the possibility of submitting to the Communist side a proposal for a demarcation line tied in with a time limit for acceptance of the other items. He referred to this possibility again at the briefing on November 13 (795.00/11-1351).

The matter was discussed briefly at the State–JCS meeting on November 21, following which Mr. U. Alexis Johnson wrote the following memorandum of conversation:

"At a meeting at 10:30 this morning, the JCS raised the question of the leak contained in Reston's *New York Times* article of November 17 on the proposed action in the truce talk negotiations in Korea, which apparently resulted from the information given representatives of the participating countries at the meeting with Mr. Hickerson on November 16.

"State representatives expressed their concern also over this leak and stated that the matter had been discussed with the representatives of participating nations at the meeting of November 20, with the implication that hereafter it would be impossible to discuss at these meetings plans for future actions. The State representatives concurred with the JCS in that hereafter the timing of any discussion of future actions in these meetings should be such as to eliminate the possibility of leaks to the enemy of information on contemplated actions." (795.00/11-2151)

795.00/11-2151

Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1951.

Subject: Discussion with UK Ambassador on "Greater Sanction" in Korea

The following suggestions are offered for your consideration in connection with your proposed discussion with the British Ambassador on the above subject:[1]

(1) Although the JCS indicated that they might be willing to dispense with inspection other than that of the demilitarized zone in the event we were able to reach a satisfactory agreement on retaliatory action to be taken against China in the event of renewal of the aggression against the ROK, I do not think that we should at this time present the question to the British in such a categorical manner, that is, I think that we should leave the door open for both obtaining inspection of some kind if it proves possible *and* a political agreement such as

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[1] See *infra*.

that mentioned above. The principal point of an agreement with the UK should be acceptance by the British of the necessity of military action against China in such circumstances. The actual decision to take such action would not be made by us except in the light of the over-all situation existing at the time, but we desire UK agreement that they would support our decisions on these points. While it would be desirable from our point of view to secure the advance support of the British for any action we might decide to take in the future, this is clearly impossible. Therefore, we should not seek to cover specifically in an agreement with the UK action beyond that presently foreseen as likely to be required. However, the British would realize, as we do, that direct military action against China might well lead to general hostilities involving the USSR.

(2) The essential elements of any such agreement should be:

(*a*) Complete economic blockade of China, including necessary measures to prevent vessels of participating countries from entering Chinese ports or carrying any goods destined for China to any transshipment points.

(*b*) Subject to further study of the legal and practical problems involved, agreement in principle on a UN naval blockade of China which would assist participating nations in enforcing measures which they have individually adopted, as well as prevent the entry into Chinese ports of vessels of non-participating countries.

(*c*) Other military action against China short of commitment to major land operations on the Chinese mainland, but including such operations as air bombardment of military targets and harassing amphibious raids, including assistance to Chinese Nationalist forces engaging in such raids.

(*d*) No consideration whatever to be given to the entry of the Peking regime into the UN or affiliated organizations.

(*e*) Withdrawal of recognition of the Peking regime.

(*f*) UK agreement should also be sought to maintain at least its present level of forces in Korea following an armistice until there has been a clarification of the situation that will then exist in Korea—that is, as long as it is considered necessary to maintain UN forces in Korea we would hope that there would be substantial participation by the UK and other contributing countries so that any reduction which might be possible in U.S. forces would operate so as to increase the proportion of other UN forces stationed in Korea.

(3) The objective of the foregoing would not be necessarily the infliction of a complete military defeat on the Peking regime but the creation of such military pressure as would cause the Peking regime to withdraw all Chinese forces from Korea and to cease all support of the North Korean regime so that, short of overt Soviet intervention, the result might be the accomplishment of a unified non-Communist Korea.

(4) We must recognize that the foregoing policy may gravely en-

danger the British position in Hong Kong and that the British will probably counter with a request for a commitment as to the assistance we will be prepared to give them in Hong Kong in the event they agree to cooperate with the foregoing policies. We are, of course, not now in a position to give them any commitment in this regard but should hear what they have to say then discuss the matter further with the JCS.

(5) In the event a satisfactory political agreement along the foregoing lines can be reached with the UK and other key countries, I would envisage a procedure somewhat as follows:

(*a*) A firm, strictly confidential understanding between the U.S. and the UK and certain other key nations, such as France, Australia and Canada concerning the measures that would be taken against China in the event an armistice agreement is reached and there is subsequently a renewal of the aggression against the ROK.

(*b*) A formal statement to the Communists by the UNC delegation or General Ridgway consistent with the above-mentioned agreement to be made at the time item 3 of the agenda is under discussion or possibly at the close of the armistice negotiations.

(*c*) Immediately following a successful conclusion of the armistice negotiations a public statement couched in general terms, consistent with the confidential understanding between the key countries, to be issued by all of the countries participating in the military action in Korea.

(*d*) Possibly, action in the UN, such as a Security Council or GA resolution, consistent with the foregoing statement by the participating countries. This step might be designed so as to force the Russians to choose between acceptance or rejection of a share of responsibility for guaranteeing observance of an armistice agreed to by the Chinese and North Korean Communists.

(6) All of the foregoing will require difficult and extensive negotiations, during which it will be of the utmost importance that the strictest secrecy be observed.

795.00/11–2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1951.

Subject: "Greater Sanction" and its relationship to Korea armistice negotiations.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Sir Oliver Franks called today at 3:30 at my request.

I stated that we were considering the situation that would exist following the conclusion of an armistice in Korea and what could in fact be done to prevent a renewal of the attack by the Communists, and the relationship of this problem to that of the degree of inspection and acts which would be prohibited under the armistice to be discussed under item 3 of the agenda. I stated that as we envisaged the situation, we did not see any reasonable possibility of obtaining a satisfactory political settlement in Korea following an armistice, even though we would of course strive to achieve such a settlement, and therefore it appeared to us that it would be essential to keep some UN forces in Korea for some time, the strength of such UN forces being related to the progress made in the present program for strengthening the ROK forces, which is proceeding in an encouraging manner. I said that in looking at this situation it seemed to us that if following agreement on an armistice the Communists launched an attack against UN forces in Korea it would create a situation considerably different than that at the time of the original attack and that this situation might in some ways be compared to that of the allied forces in Berlin, where the deterrent to attack is not the strength of the forces themselves but the realization by the other side that they could not reasonably expect to localize hostilities and that the attack in fact would not be attack upon Berlin but an attack upon the allied armed forces stationed there. I stated that if there was an attack by Chinese Communist forces upon UN forces in Korea it could not be expected that it would be possible to continue to confine the hostilities to Korea and permit China itself to remain immune to the consequences of such action. I stated that it was our present thinking that in such an event we would want to consider imposing a naval blockade upon China and carrying out air attacks, at least upon Chinese air bases; that we therefore desired to discuss with the British the action that would be taken under these circumstances, and in particular to consult with them over the three questions of, (1) naval blockade of China, (2) air action against China; and, (3) retention of Commonwealth forces in Korea following an armistice.

In reply to Sir Oliver's question, I stated that if an agreement on these points is reached with the UK, and subsequently other countries, we contemplated a public statement of some kind which would, of course, not necessarily detail the action upon which we had agreed but would make clear to the Chinese the serious consequences of any renewal of the attack. In reply to Sir Oliver's question concerning the length of time we contemplated such a commitment would be effective or that UN forces would be retained in Korea, I stated that we did not feel that our decision or a public statement in this regard should contain any particular time limitation, nor should they necessarily constitute an unlimited commitment into the future, regardless of circumstances elsewhere in the world.

Sir Oliver stated that he could, of course, give no official reaction or even personal indication of the view that the UK Government would adopt with respect to this matter. However, he felt that in many respects the UK might be more concerned over contemplated naval action and the effect such action would have on the relationship with the "friends" of the UK, such as India, than it would over air action against, for example, Chinese air bases, in which the reaction of the Soviets would be the principal factor. Sir Oliver recognized that an overt commitment of Soviet forces to action against UN forces in Korea represented an entirely different type of situation than that of Chinese attack and that the question being discussed involved only what he termed "regional" action. In reply to my specific question concerning the retention of Commonwealth forces in Korea, Sir Oliver stated that without being able to speak authoritatively on the subject, or expressing any opinion on the size of the forces to be retained, he felt the UK would recognize and accept the principle of retaining some Commonwealth forces in Korea. Mr. Nitze made it plain that while we hoped to reduce our forces in Korea, it was also hoped that the other UN forces would consist of a UK division and possibly an additional division of other participating nations so as to increase the proportion of UN forces other than those of the U.S.

Sir Oliver orally reviewed the discussion and promised urgently to seek the views of his government.

795.00/11-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, November 21, 1951—5 p. m.

2447. 1. On Nov 19 Bajpai read to UKHC, New Delhi, tel from Indian Chargé, Peiping, to fol effect:

> Gen impression Peiping is Chi Commies having driven back enemy to 38th parallel (crossing of which had impelled them to go to Korea), now genuinely desire cease-fire as is evidenced by maximum concessions along present battle lines rather than 38th parallel. It wld therefore be grave mistake for US miss this opportunity or interpret it as China's weakness. If cease-fire talks fail, China's attitude will only stiffen and there may not be another such favorable opportunity negotiate cease-fire on present terms. Chinese air strength rapidly growing and its preparations for winter warfare complete. China unlikely launch offensive, however, unless cease-fire talks completely fail. Judging from opinion in Peiping, both Western as well as Eastern, and from reports of people who have just returned from Korea, it

wld be mistake for US think it can drive back Chinese and gain more favorable terms.

2. Bajpai explained sole purpose GOI in passing above to UKHC was for info: GOI had no intention whatever mediate or get involved in current negots. For this reason GOI had instructed its Chargé not discuss with CPG. GOI did not intend itself make report available US but had no objection UK using info in discussions with US. Bajpai pointed out ref 38th parallel inaccurate. He said GOI feels there is now disposition on part CPG reach agmt on cease-fire but if attitude UN reps too rigid this may change.

Text by airmail Paris and New Delhi.

GIFFORD

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 119: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 21 November 1951—10:18 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–57723. HNC 469. "1. Following report of sub-delegation meeting of 21 Nov:

"*a.* Communist representatives opened by advising of agreement in principle to UNC proposal but objecting to form thereof. They then presented proposed 'changes' in the form of a new proposal which reads as follows:

"The sub-delegations of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Delegation of the UNC reach the following agreement on the 2nd item of the agenda, 'fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea:'

"(1) The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides be made the military demarcation line, and that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone.

"(2) In accordance with the above-mentioned principle, the sub-delegations check immediately the present line of contact, so as to fix the actual line of contact agreed upon by both sides as the military demarcation line, with the 2 lines 2 kilometers away on both sides of the military demarcation line constituting the southern and northern boundaries of the demilitarized zone.

"(3) In view of the fact that hostilities will be continued until the signing of the armistice agreement, if agreements are reached on all the items of the agenda within thirty (30) days after the 2 delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the above-mentioned military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone already fixed shall not be changed regardless of whatever changes that may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides; if agreements are not yet reached on all the items of the agenda by the time the 30 days transpire, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone already fixed shall be revised in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement.

"*b.* UNC representatives pointed out in detail the inconsistencies and ambiguities contained in the new Communist proposal, particularly with respect to para 1, most of which were the same as those ascribed to the 10 Nov proposal made by the Communists. Numerous questions intended to clarify the Communist proposal were asked but specific answers could not be obtained.

"*c.* UNC suggested recess to allow it to study further the Communist proposal with a view to rewriting it in clear and unambiguous form and submit revised proposal at tomorrow's meeting. Our proposed rewrite will be forwarded in separate message.

"2. Sub-delegation meeting will be resumed at 1100 hrs 22 Nov. Signed Hodes."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 120 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET   TOKYO, 21 November 1951—11:31 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-57724. [HNC 470.] 1. This supplements my C 57723 (HNC 469).[1] Folg is UNC subdelegation proposed revision of Communist proposal of 21 Nov which they intend to present tomorrow unless otherwise instructed:

"The subdelegations of the delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers and of the UNC delegation reach the folg agreement on the second item of the agenda, 'fixing a mil demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea':

"1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either para 2 or 3, as appropriate) will be made the mil demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw 2 kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the mil armistice.

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[1] *Supra.*

"2. In accordance with the above stated principle, the sub delegations will determine immediately the present line of contact so as to fix it as the mil demarcation line and as the median line of the demilitarized zone. If the mil armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the 2 delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and to [*the?*] specific location of the above mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone, the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.

"3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the mil armistice is not signed by the time 30 days expire, the mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone shall be revised so that the actual line of contact between both sides at the time of the signing of the armistice agreement shall become the mil demarcation line and the median line of the demilitarized zone."

2. I am considering directing a change in para 3 which will bring this para into conformance with subpara 4 of UNC proposal of 17 November, forwarded to you in C 57466, and changes in paras 2 and 3 to specify the method of determining the line of contact.[2]

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[2] The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following response in telegram JCS 87724, dated November 21:

"Reur CX 57724, JCS feel that only substantive point at issue is time of withdrawal from median line. This is adequately clarified in Para 1 of new UN proposal. JCS therefore concur in your proposed action." (Black Book, Tab 121)

In telegram CX-57725, November 22, General Ridgway suggested to Admiral Joy that Paragraph 3 be amended in the following fashion:

"With the exception of Paragraph 3, your proposal contained in HNC 470 (C-57724) is approved. It is desired that Paragraph 3 be presented substantially as follows:

" '3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice is not signed by the time 30 days expire, the then existing line of contact will be determined jointly by the subdelegations and will constitute a new provisional military demarcation line which will be the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone to be effective for such purposes and for such a period as will at that time be mutually agreed by the delegations of both sides.' " (Black Book, Tab 120)

320/11-2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, November 22, 1951—noon.

Delga 294. Gadel 159, Nov 15. Re Korean troops.

Study being given most effective procedures for stressing continuing need additional UN troops Korea. USDel greatly concerned this issue, desires afford all possible assistance and take positive action maximum extent feasible keeping in mind basic considerations Gadel 60, Nov 4.

For informal discussions this problem other dels to be effective, USDel needs latest info present status bilateral negots and offers already made, also indication from Dept on what other dels here it is desirable approach and forces sought in each case.

Position paper AMC does not cover question obtaining additional forces, including timing of pacing possible AMC action on additional troops with bilateral approaches.

For general recommendations offered: (1) As soon as info on present status bilateral negots recd, USDel shld stress informally in general terms with appropriate friendly dels need additional forces whenever opportunity offers and discuss problem in more specific terms with selected dels also informally; (2) USDel shld make strong reference need of additional forces Korea during debate CMC, statement to be so phrased as to maintain clear distinction between Korean case and future planning task CMC; (3) USDel shld proceed at earliest moment Dept regards appropriate discuss informally with chairman and selected members AMC question timing request AMC for additional UN forces.[1]

ACHESON

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[1] For the reply to this message, see telegram Gadel 350, December 5, to Paris, p. 1248.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 123: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 November 1951—9:25 p. m.

C–57788. HNC 474. "1. Folg report of sub-delegation meeting of 22 Nov: Hodes presented UNC re-draft of Communist proposal as stated in HNC 470 and revised by CX 57725.[1] Communists expressed general agreement on paras 1 and 2, however, disagreed with para 3, insisting that this paragraph remain as stated in last part of para 3 of Communist proposal. Reasons given were that:

"(*a*) Para 3 of UNC proposal was inconsistent with principle stated in para 1,

"(*b*) Delegations must clearly solve item 2 of armistice agenda while discussing item 2. Meeting recessed at 1155I by Communists to study further UNC proposal. Meeting resumed at 1500I. Communists presented revised para 3 as fols:

> '3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in the second article, the sub-delegation shall revise, after agreements are reached on all the items of the agenda,

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[1] See telegram CX–57724, November 21, p. 1160.

> the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, and constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice'.

"UNC then proposed recess until 1100I, 23 Nov in order to study Communist revision. Meeting adjourned at 1545I.

"2. As a result of my conversation with Gen Ridgway this date, the UNC sub-delegation on Nov 23 will accept the Communist version of para 3 with minor revisions indicated as fols:

> '3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in para 2 above, the sub-delegations shall revise the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice.'

"3. Staff officers of both sides meet separately at same time as sub-delegation 23 Nov to begin determination of actual line of contact 1 May. Signed Joy."

795.00/11-2751

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 23, 1951.[1]

Subject: U.S.S.R. Diplomatic Note Concerning Violation of U.S.S.R. Asiatic Border by U.S. Plane

1. On 8 November 1951 in your message Def 86477 [2] you requested the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to

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[1] A covering note, not printed, from Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster to the Secretary of State, dated November 27, indicated Mr. Foster's strong concurrence in the recommendations of this memorandum. The covering note, which formally transmitted the memorandum, stated that it had been informally handcarried to the Secretary of State on November 23.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1097.

submit a report in connection with the alleged violation of the U.S.S.R. border near Vladivostok by a U.S. aircraft.

2. The requested report was submitted by CINCUNC in his CX 57014 (DA IN 17741).[3]

3. The Secretary of the Navy reported the incident to you in serial 000443P35 on 10 November 1951,[4] with a recommendation that the information be forwarded to the Secretary of State for such action as may be necessary.

4. CINCUNC's report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 1–15 November contains a statement that a United Nations Command twin-engined Neptune patrol bomber is presumed to be lost after failing to return to its base on 6 November. The plane was on a weather reconnaissance flight over the northern Sea of Japan and an intensive search for survivors has had negative results.

5. From the facts known in connection with the missing plane, there can be no doubt that it is the same plane that the U.S.S.R. note admits was fired upon by two Soviet fighters.

6. It is considered appropriate to request the Department of State to release the facts of the incident to the press, and to make a strong diplomatic protest through the United Nations to the Soviet Union for firing on a U.N. plane and probable destruction while over international waters well clear of Soviet territory.

7. It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Secretary of State to make a strong diplomatic protest at this time to the Soviet Union through appropriate United Nations channels. It is considered that the following facts should be included in the protest:

a. A United Nations plane, a two-motored P2V bomber, failed to return from a weather reconnaissance over the Sea of Japan on 6 November 1951.

b. The route this plane was following did not approach closer than 40 miles to U.S.S.R. territory, and the plane crew had been thoroughly briefed not to approach closer than 20 miles to the U.S.S.R. territory under any circumstances.

c. The Soviet note of November 7, 1951, admits two Soviet fighter planes fired on a two-engine bomber at 10:10 Vladivostok time. From the last reported position of the reconnaissance plane at 0850 (−9 time zone) on 6 November, it is undoubtedly this plane that was fired upon by the Soviet fighters.

d. An intentional or unplanned approach to the Russian coast was not made, and the plane was intercepted and attacked without warning while over international waters, and furthermore, while well outside of twenty miles from the Russian coastline.

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[3] Dated November 10, p. 1116.

[4] Not printed.

8. It is also recommended that the Secretary of State be requested to release to the press the facts as reported above, including the statements that an intensive search for survivors proved fruitless.[5]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Secretary

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[5] On the following day, November 24, Ambassador Warren R. Austin communicated to the U.N. Secretary-General a note incorporating the information contained in paragraph 7 of this memorandum. Mr. Austin's note was released to the press on the same day; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 3, 1951, p. 909.

357.AD/11-2351

Memorandum by Robert E. Asher, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), to Mr. Thorp

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] November 23, 1951.

Subject: Korean Reconstruction

As far as I can see, the UN program for Korean reconstruction is on dead center. This is a personal opinion and I pass it on to you for information rather than action, since I doubt whether there are any useful moves that you ought to make at this juncture. However, I feel that the delay in getting an UNKRA program under way will mean attacks in the GA and ECOSOC both against Kingsley, an American citizen, as the UNKRA Agent-General, and against the U.S. Government. Both are vulnerable, but the major fault seems to be Kingsley's for not pushing harder to get his agency into operation.

1. There is no UNKRA Reconstruction Program under consideration at this time. Before Kingsley's arrival in Washington we had received an advance copy of the fifty-page mimeographed document, UNKRA/AG/1 of October 20,[1] that I mentioned at a recent E staff meeting. From the point of view of presentation, etc. it was a feeble effort, but it was better than no program. It assumed that the military authorities would be responsible for relief and rehabilitation until military security had been assured (Phase I). Even during this phase, however, UNKRA, by agreement with the Unified Command, would undertake longer-range projects to the maximum extent feasible. Various projects, especially in the field of housing, were outlined. The proposed program further assumed March 31, 1952 as the date on which UNKRA would take over full responsibility from the military authorities (Phase II).

2. The program drafted by UNKRA was withdrawn before being discussed. Kingsley made it clear to the Department as soon as he

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[1] Not printed.

arrived that he was not prepared to talk about economic questions, that he was not really familiar with the program, and that he was now thinking along more political lines. The impression given to people outside of the Department, however, appears to be that the program was withdrawn because there wasn't enough desire on the part of the State Department to press the Defense Department for its implementation.

3. The fact is that Kingsley isn't in any hurry for the program to begin. He already holds two jobs (he is still IRO Director) and may be negotiating for a third. If he goes to Korea, he wants to go as UN Political as well as Economic Representative, though it would be bad to consolidate the two functions and doubly bad to consolidate them in an American. In reality, Kingsley doesn't want to forsake his family and the comforts of civilization for the hardships of Korea, and has threatened to resign if pushed into going before he is ready. He brings no idealism or enthusiasm to the reconstruction job.

4. The Defense Department is much happier running the relief program itself. It has more money than UNKRA and more freedom without UNKRA around. It has built up its own relief machinery, included non-American civilians on the UNCACK teams, and broadened its World War II concept of "disease and unrest" supplies to include some industrial goods. The U.S. foots a larger proportion of the relief bill while the military are in charge than it will thereafter. The State Department, thanks in part to appropriation complications, and in part to excessive caution and concern with short-range difficulties, has been reluctant to exert pressure on either UNKRA or the Defense Department to hasten the transfer of relief and rehabilitation responsibility from U.S. Army to UN civilian hands.

5. The upshot is the supplementary UNKRA-Unified Command Agreement that now awaits only final concurrence from the Defense Department. It provides that Phase II, the takeover by UNKRA, will not begin until at least 180 days after the date on which a cease-fire agreement comes into effect. Planning for Phase II will be undertaken by Joint Committees to be established in the near future in Washington, Tokyo and Korea. In addition, during Phase I, UNKRA is authorized to undertake special projects additional to the relief and rehabilitation program of the military authorities; it may maintain certain UNKRA personnel in Korea; and it will employ and pay the salaries of some technical personnel to serve under military direction. Kingsley does not appear to have in mind, however, a coordinated set of supplemental projects but only two or three useful but unrelated projects designed in part to give the illusion of greater UNKRA activity than there will really be.

6. The U.S. pledged $162.5 million to UNKRA. Fifty million dollars has been appropriated, primarily for financing the takeover of

supplies in the pipeline at the time UNKRA assumes full relief responsibility. There is enabling legislation for a further $45 million, but no appropriation. No U.S. cash has yet been made available to UNKRA, and MSA is making it difficult for the U.S. to contribute anything now. The U.S. action has complicated the job of getting contributions from other free world nations. Meanwhile, UNKRA operates on the Canadian contribution of $7.2 million.

7. The Canadians are worried about the absence of a U.S. contribution and the dissipation of their contribution without tangible results in Korea. The Report to the GA of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is likewise critical of UNKRA.[2] The Koreans themselves are threatening to raise serious questions about the delay in getting UNKRA under way, though there is no proof that they would be better off if UNKRA began its operations earlier. UNKRA, however, is extremely important as a symbol of international concern for their reconstruction. The Korean needs are desperate and extend well beyond the military relief program.

8. Having failed to push harder for an earlier takeover by UNKRA, I suppose the least the Department can do now is to make sure that some real projects are initiated during the remainder of Phase I. I can plug away at this angle on behalf of E. There is no compelling reason why an arrangement cannot be worked out whereby, within an agreed import tonnage, UNKRA could obtain immediately a fair amount of autonomy for its project operations and technical assistance work. E can also keep pressing for a draft long-range reconstruction program to replace the October 20th version. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the odds are good that UNKRA's prestige will sink to a dangerous low before the period of so-called full responsibility is under way.[3]

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[2] See U.N. document A/1881, pp. 37–41.

[3] A manuscript note on the source text, presumably by Mr. Thorp, read: "What a mess." A second notation, initialed by Mr. Thorp and directed to Mr. Asher, stated: "I don't like this. Keep an eye out for any opportunity to straighten this out."

693.0024/11–2351

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 23 November 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to Mr. Lovett's letter of 14 August and your reply of 27 August 1951,[1] regarding policy on the repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war. In your reply you suggested a reexamination of the present instructions to General Ridgway on the exchange of prisoners of war, to include the related subject of the release of civilian internees.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 857. For information regarding Mr. Lovett's letter, see footnote 1, *ibid.*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this entire question. Their views, in which I concur, and a proposed new directive to General Ridgway on the subject are inclosed. I should appreciate an indication of your concurrence in order that the proposed directive may be submitted for the approval of the President at an early date. The exchange of prisoners of war is Item 4 on the agenda of the current armistice negotiations.

As part of any agreement for a general exchange of prisoners, some provision will have to be made for the disposition of prisoners of war who are accused of conventional war crimes. The UN forces now hold a substantial number of prisoners against whom documented cases have been prepared covering criminal acts committed prior to their capture. A majority of these cases involve acts committed against South Koreans. While the United Nations would be within its legal rights in withholding such persons from a general exchange of prisoners, such action would undoubtedly expose our own men who are prisoners of the Communists to the threat of reprisal based on trumped-up charges. On the other hand, to relinquish custody of war criminals without trial or punishment would constitute abandonment of a principle of international law to which the United States has heretofore given its support, and would undoubtedly arouse public resentment both in the United States and in other affected nations, particularly the Republic of Korea. Another group requiring special consideration is prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. The inclosed directive does not contain specific instructions to General Ridgway on these questions. Further study is now being given to the matter in the Department of Defense, and I should welcome an expression of your views.

With reference to paragraph 4 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, I should be glad to receive from you a list of civilian internees in Communist hands for use during the negotiations.

Sincerely yours, WILLIAM C. FOSTER

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 15 November 1951.

Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners

1. In accordance with their memorandum for you of 15 October 1951,[2] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated a proposed revision

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[2] Not printed.

of General Ridgway's armistice instructions concerning prisoners of war exchange. The views of General Ridgway were considered in the formulation of this revision to his directive.

2. There are presently in the custody of the United Nations Command about 41,000 South Koreans, currently classified as prisoners of war, whose release has been requested by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government on the basis that these persons were in fact involuntarily impressed into military service by the Communist forces. There is adequate moral and legal justification for such release. Also held as prisoners of war are approximately 350 North Korean civilian refugees. General Ridgway is taking action to reclassify both of these groups from a prisoner of war status to that of civilian internee. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, are fully aware of and concur in this reclassification action. Individuals of these two groups, who desire release and who are acceptable to the ROK Government, will be gradually paroled to local officials, remaining in their custody for about 12 months. General Ridgway does not intend to authorize the parole of these internees until the situation indicates clearly that such action will not prejudice the success of the armistice negotiations. The foregoing program is in consonance with the suggestion made to you by the Secretary of State in his memorandum [*letter*] of 27 August 1951.

3. With respect to the further suggestion by the Department of State that, prior to the reaching of an armistice agreement, individual prisoners of war in certain categories might be paroled as provided for in the Geneva Convention, it is the conviction of General Ridgway that such action would be regarded by the Communists as a breach of faith, prejudicing the negotiating position of the United Nations Delegation and jeopardizing the recovery of United Nations prisoners of war in enemy custody. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the desirability of achieving, where possible, humanitarian and psychological warfare objectives, but feel that this consideration must not be permitted to jeopardize the main purpose of the negotiation, which is to obtain the early release by the Communists of the maximum number of United Nations and ROK prisoners of war. In this connection, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command in his psychological warfare programs has scrupulously avoided the subject of non-repatriation and, further, has held forth no promise of asylum to Chinese Communist forces or North Korean military personnel which would involve radical departure from the provisions of the Geneva Convention governing the classification and disposition of prisoners of war. Further, it should be borne in mind that the Communists know through United Nations reports to the ICRC the indi-

vidual names and the total number of prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command, and it must be presumed that they will likewise become informed of any change of status affecting such prisoners.

4. You will note that the proposed directive to General Ridgway, enclosed herewith, instructs him to attempt to secure agreement on the release of certain specifically named United States civilian internees, if a favorable opportunity presents itself during the course of the negotiation, and if this can be accomplished without raising the larger issue of exchange or return of all civilian internees who number many thousands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that you request the Secretary of State to furnish for inclusion in this United States list the names of individuals which may additionally have become available. If corresponding lists of British and French civilian internees are available, as well as those for other nationals of United Nations members, these should likewise be furnished. Finally, the ROK Government should be asked to furnish General Ridgway a specific list of leading ROK civilians believed to be in Communist hands for similar use during the negotiation.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you submit the attached proposed revision of General Ridgway's directive to the President for approval. Upon receipt of Presidential approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will transmit the revision to General Ridgway.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
J. LAWTON COLLINS
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

[Subenclosure]

Draft Proposed Message by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

Reur CX 55993 [3] and JCS 95354, 30 Jun 51 [4] nofor‌n.

Personal for General Ridgway eyes only from JCS.

1. Subject is revision of JCS directive regarding armistice terms as they pertain to exchange of prisoners of war.

2. Subparagraph 5 *h* of JCS 95354 is rescinded and the following substituted in lieu thereof:

"*h*. Prisoners of war exchange on a one-for-one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation. Your present planned procedure to attempt to obtain the disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of prisoners of war held by the Communists should assist in this respect. However, if it appears necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, UN and ROK prisoners of war, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, you are authorized to agree to an all-for-all exchange.

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[3] Dated October 27, p. 1068.
[4] *Ante*, p. 598.

(1) Generally, prisoners of war should be exchanged as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

(2) In implementation of any agreed exchange, it is recognized that the Communist authorities may attempt to exchange ROK prisoners, withholding other personnel temporarily or indefinitely. It is suggested, therefore, you insist that the exchange of prisoners be carried out on the basis of group-for-group, composed of mixed CCF* and NKPA† for mixed US/UN and ROK groups.

(3) During your negotiations for the exchange of prisoners of war, it may become possible to secure agreement on the release of certain specifically named civilian internees without raising the larger issue of exchange or return of: (*a*) the civilian captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces, and (*b*) NK refugees. In pursuing this matter, however, you should not jeopardize the main purpose of the negotiation which is to achieve the early release by the Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.

(4) At least thirteen American civilians remained in the area of conflict after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. A list of these civilians believed to be in the hands of the NK authorities, based on currently available but not necessarily all-inclusive information, giving the name of the individual, date and place of birth, profession, and where last seen, is as follows:

[Here follows the list of 13 persons.]

(5) The Department of State will be requested to ask the ROK Government to furnish you with a specific list of leading ROK civilians believed to be in Communist hands for similar use by you in negotiation. Comparable lists of British and French civilian internees, as well as those for other nationals of United Nations members, will also be sought and furnished you."

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*Chinese Communist Forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

†North Korean People's Army. [Footnote in the source text.]

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 125 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 23 November 1951—7 : 53 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–57837. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 476.

"1. *a.* Agreement reached by sub-delegations on agenda item 2.

"*b.* Following is text of recommendation to be submitted to plenary session after location of line of demarcation is agreed upon by sub-delegations. The delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers and the delegation of the UNC reach the following agreement on the second item of the agenda, fixing a mil demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea:

'1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either para 2 or 3, as appropriate) will be made the mil demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw 2 kilometers fr the line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the mil armistice.

'2. If the mil armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone determined by the sub-delegations on the basis of the above-stated principle and in accordance with the present line of contact (as indicated in the attached map and explanatory notes), the mil demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.

'3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the mil armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in para 2 above, the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the mil armistice agreement the above mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides, so that the revised mil demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the mil armistice agreement and will constitute the mil demarcation line for the duration of the mil armistice.'

"2. Staff Officers of both sides now in conference to fix present line of contact. Sub-delegations will reconvene upon completion of Staff Officers work in order to approve location line of contact. This may possibly take place tomorrow, 24 Nov. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 130 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET KOREA, 24 November 1951—1:05 a. m.[1]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

GX-3100 TAC KCG. Fol replies to your DA 87452 of 20 [*19*] Nov 51[2] in 2 parts.

Part 1. General.

1. While I concur that it is contrary to our military interests to remain tied up indefinitely in Korea, acceptance of this concept hinges largely on the word "indefinitely".

2. *a.* As prev stated in several msgs to you and orally to visiting senior officials, including Generals Bradley and Collins, I view with great anxiety any course of action tending to create in Communist minds a belief that we shall promptly withdraw all or any substantial part of our military forces from Korea upon conclusion of an armistice. I consider withdrawal within 18 months would result in incalculable damage to our military position and national prestige in the Far East. It would constitute complete repudiation of repeated solemn assurances of support of the people of the ROK from the most authoritative US Governmental sources. The resulting abandonment of these people to the savage retaliation of a brutal Communist occupation would, it seems to me, be utterly repugnant to our concept of honor.

b. No promises, no assurances, no international agreements, nothing but the barrier of superior forces will guarantee against such occupation.

3. Moreover, a premature substantial reduction of our military forces would increase the risk of heavy casualties should an enemy major offensive follow.

4. It seems [conclusive therefore that] we face a decision to maintain approximately our present military strength in Korea for the next 12 months, reviewing this decision as a changing situation may justify.

5. If this is to be our decision then the security of our forces becomes the paramount consideration in Korea. In turn then, the extent to which we can, through inspection, obtain timely intelligence of dangerous enemy build-up south of the Manchurian and Soviet borders, will determine the losses we may sustain, if a major hostile effort, particularly one supported by air, should be launched.

6. In this general picture the potential of enemy air is a highly

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[1] The source text indicated that this message was signed by Ridgway and sent from Advance Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1148.

important factor. The enemy has seriously challenged our air effort south to the Chongchon River. He has compelled suspension of our daylight medium bombing effort north of that line. He has made, and continues to make, a major determined effort to advance jet air to operational bases well south of the Yalu. If and when the time should come that he could advance his air bases throughout Korea, and have his air strength just across Tsu Shima Straits on the south, and La Perouse Strait in the north, as is already the case, then the successful accomplishment of our present primary mission in the Far East—the defense of the Japanese Islands—would be gravely jeopardized in the event of war with the Soviets.

7. The "principle of inspection" is important for these reasons and for yet another. From the beginning of our national negotiations with the USSR in 1946, we insisted in the UN Atomic Energy Commission on the inclusion of essential safeguards in any agreement we might accept, based on "the principle of inspection".[3] So far as I know we have adhered faithfully to that position and still do. Abandonment of it in Korea would weaken our basic position. In fact it points, as do so many other factors, to the clear conclusion that there is no separate solution to the Korean problem. That problem can be solved only within a solution of the USSR problem, from which the Korean problem has derived.

8. "It is the opinion of the UNC Delegation, based on experience and Communist expressions in sub-delegation meetings to date, that the Communists can be expected to prolong negotiations and may even break them off if UNC insists on inspection and observation other than in demilitarized zone."

9. I, therefore, come to two general conclusions:

a. Insistence on "the principle of inspections" is a vital factor in our armistice negotiations, and

b. The US Government must, without delay, reach and advise me of its decision on this matter, in order that the UNC Delegation may be properly instructed and plan its course.

10. The recent directed action of the UNC Delegation in offering the Communists a proposal with the present line of contact fixed as the military demarcation line for 30 days is more advantageous to the Communists than their proposal of 10 Nov and has, in my opinion, and that of our delegates, substantially weakened our future bargaining potential. I must urge most serious consideration of our view here that the UNC Delegation be given a clear cut decision of how far it can go on agenda item 3 and still be assured of the support

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[3] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 712 ff.

of the US Government. It is particularly debilitating to our prestige and negotiating position to take firm positions, thereby creating widely publicized issues, only to withdraw from our position under pressure.

11. I cannot concur in your view that "the only vital real assurance we have against a resumption of hostilities is the maintenance of sufficient and appropriate military power in the Korean area (not necessarily within Korea) to serve as an effective deterrent to renewed hostilities". Communist conception of the time factor, the demonstrated difficulty from both logistic and public opinion angles of timely redeployment into Korea following a withdrawal, as well as the grave doubts of our capability for so doing in event Communist air potential should be used to prevent it—all argue against the soundness of this concept.

Part 2. Detailed reply.

12. In my opinion, we should hold firm on our minimum position even to the point where the enemy breaks off negotiations.

13. There can be no question that the presence of the Communist members of joint inspection teams behind our front lines will provide the Communists with more information than they otherwise might have. The amount of additional information they might so obtain, its timeliness, and its net worth to them, are debatable factors.

14. There is no question but that joint inspection teams will give rise to friction and recriminations. These are inevitable consequences of dealings with Communists on any question.

15. My answers to the questions propounded in your paras 4 and 5 follow: With the above as background, the following are answers to questions posed in para 4, urmsg DA 87452.

a. Permanent teams located at ports of entry (ground, air and naval) and at major military installations: 10 from each side. Teams based in the demilitarized zone to accomplish missions within that zone, special missions as directed by the commission, and to act as a reserve pool for emergency replacement of outlying teams: 10 from each side. Roving teams with the mission of visiting the smaller army, air and naval installations: 5 from each side. A total of 40 teams would require that each side furnish a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 120 field grade officers for this purpose. Location of key points: Koreyong; Chongjim; Ch'Osan; Hyesanjim; Manpojin; Sakchu; Sinuiju; Sinanju; Hungnam; Pyongyand; Wonsan; Sariwon; Inchon; Seoul; Yangyang; Shuncju; Taejon; Shonju; Andong; Taegu; Kwangju; Sunchon; and Pusan area.

b. Under optimum conditions it would be better to have both permanently located observer teams and roving teams, both operating under directives of the armistice commission.

c. Controversial matters or incidents observed by members of the observer teams would immediately be referred to the armistice commission.

d. Reports of violations of the armistice would be referred to the armistice commission. In the event the latter was unable to resolve the problem at hand, the commission in turn would refer the problem to the commanders of both sides who would then communicate in an effort to resolve the problem. Such problems or incidents would immediately be reported by CINCUNC to the JCS.

e. The rehabilitation of railroads is considered inevitable in view of the fact that their use is linked with the civil economy. Certain rehabilitation of airfields is inevitable because of the principle of reciprocity. Detection of redeployment of Communist air forces to fields in North Korea would be either by ground observer teams or joint aerial observations as outlined above.

16. *a.* I consider unacceptable, from the viewpoint of the security of UN forces, anything less than the "final position" stated in part 6 of my C 52227 of 4 Oct.

b. I recommend approval of this minimum position as a final US Government position on which the UNC Delegations is authorized to break if rejected by the Communists.

17. In view of the rapidity with which armistice negotiations might conceivably now move, information on the action taken on the foregoing recommendations is considered necessary here as a matter of urgency.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 135 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 24 November 1951—7:25 p. m.

C–57926. HNC 478. "Report of meeting of Staff Officers to determine line of contact, 24 November. Agreement was reached today on approximately 50% of the line of contact. In all cases where differences exist they are based upon enemy dispute of positions held by UN Forces. In part, the differences result from the enemy's lack of accurate and timely information. In others it appears that he may be attempting to retain particularly desirable positions. UNC Staff Officers meet Communists again at 1000 tomorrow. In the event full agreement is not reached by noon tomorrow UNC sub-delegation will call for meeting of the two sub-delegations in an attempt to resolve the differences then existing. Sgd Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 136 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 November 1951—9:15 p. m.

C-57984. HNC-482. "Staff officers made progress in getting agreed line of contact in today's sessions. However, at 1400 hrs 11 points of disagreement remained. Sub-delegations met at 1500 hrs in an effort to resolve the remaining differences. Only one was resolved. The 10 remaining points of disagreement concern positions which both sides claim. The UNC is absolutely certain that its information on these locations is correct and up-to-date almost hourly. The Communists were adamant that their information was current and correct; however, it is well known that it is neither. To agree with Communists in these areas would place the demarcation line behind positions UNC actually holds.

UNC sub-delegation offered to fly a joint team to each of the points in question but Commies refused. The Communist sub-delegation during today's meeting appeared to expect UNC to capitulate on all points. They became truculent and stubborn and made no effort to attempt to negotiate. Quick agreement on a reasonable line of contact is hampered by Commie intransigent attitude. Staff officers meet at 1000 hrs, 26 Nov, to again attempt to reconcile differences. Sgd Joy."

795.00/11-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Walter N. Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1951.

Summary JCS Meeting, November 26.[1]

Admiral Fechteler asked how the British felt about a naval blockade in the event of a renewed Communist attack. He was informed that the

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[1] This memorandum summarized the discussion held at a State-JCS meeting in the morning of November 26. The State Department draft memorandum on the substance of the discussion (not printed) does not list Mr. Treumann as a participant for the Department of State, which was represented by Messrs. Matthews, Bohlen, Hickerson, Bonbright, Johnson, and Ferguson, but presumably Mr. Treumann's memorandum was drawn up on the basis of notes taken by Mr. Johnson. Generals Vandenberg and Hull and Admiral Fechteler were the principal representatives for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of Generals Bradley and Collins who were in Rome attending the meeting of the NATO Council which took place from November 24 to 28, 1951. (S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728)

The purpose of the State-JCS meeting was to discuss a proposed message in reply to telegram GX-3100 TAC KCG, November 24, from General Ridgway, p. 1173.

British might find it more difficult to accept than air action, against Chinese bases. When asked about figures as to strategic material going into China, Admiral Fechteler stated he did not have any but that it was impossible to contemplate as much traffic as there is into Hong Kong and imagine that it is not going into Communist China.

In opening the discussion on the inspection question, Mr. Hickerson said that in a telegram of November 23[*24*] General Ridgway had stated that the Communists might prolong or break off the negotiations if we insisted on inspection in the non-demilitarized zone and then recommended that we should still insist on it. Mr. Hickerson stated that if that estimate is correct we attach greater importance to inspection than to getting an armistice. The security of troops is, of course, a function of the military and in case it was really essential we could not press for a relaxation. General Vandenberg said that from a military point of view we should not go below what General Ridgway suggested. General Hull said that General Ridgway's suggestion would provide military security, but whether we would stand or fall on it is a question. Of course, without some inspection there is no real security. Mr. Bohlen doubted the possibility of Communist acceptance of the type of inspection recommended by General Ridgway.

General Vandenberg recalled his talk with General Ridgway and said that the latter was convinced that the Communists were badly hurt. If that was the case, they would have to accept anything reasonable from our point of view. He raised the possibility that the Communists were scheming to renew the fight under more favorable conditions to them. Mr. Bohlen said that the Communist position on this issue was not a black and white proposition. Even if they were in bad shape, they would not agree to terms under which their hold on North Korea would become untenable. The Communists are faced by a balance of considerations just as we are.

General Vandenberg said that the alternative to an armistice was worse than an armistice. This fact must be weighed against the possibility of a renewed Communist attack after a big build-up. In the event of no inspection, we could not guard ourselves against a surprise attack. Our intelligence might be as ineffective as on June 25, 1950. Admiral Fechteler said we should support the man in the field. General Hull stated in the event of no inspection, General Ridgway ran a serious risk of being overrun by a surprise attack.

Mr. Johnson stated that the real deterrent to a renewed Communist attack was the overall U.S.-UN strength. When the possibility of an overwhelming surprise attack next spring was raised again, Mr. Bohlen asked how our forces could protect themselves against the enemy buildup in the event of no armistice. Both Generals Vandenberg and Hull stated that our forces were relatively safe in that event.

Mr. Bohlen said that General Ridgway recognized that his position tended to "freeze" us. We should not advance a final "take it or leave it" proposition. There is a vast area (of compromise) between a position on no inspection and General Ridgway's present position.

When asked whether he envisaged a North Korean or Chinese surprise attack, General Vandenberg thought that the Chinese would leave enough forces to dominate the entire area. Mr. Bohlen suggested that the Russians might not be pleased with Chinese interference in a Russian area. He thought that the Russians wanted an armistice because of their fear of general war. General Vandenberg suggested that the Communist air buildup indicated that the armistice was not started for the purpose of actually getting one.

Mr. Bohlen stated that nowhere along the periphery of the Soviet Union is there much protection and security for forces of the free world. Are we not asking for something in Korea that we do not have anywhere else? When mention was made of the atomic sanction in the event of a Soviet attack against Germany, Mr. Bohlen said that consideration was being given to the question of whether sanctions against China were enough. Mr. Matthews stated that if General Ridgway said that inspection was necessary for the security of his forces, it could not be argued. The matter should, however, be referred to the President.

Mr. Bohlen said that we could not tell General Ridgway that his proposition is our final position and subsequently—if the Communists reject it—pull away from it. What if the Communists meet us halfway and make a counter proposal? Is it necessary to say this is the final position?

Mr. Bohlen suggested that General Ridgway should tell the Communists what he wanted to inspect against. It would help us a lot if things came to a break and we would be able to say that we wanted to inspect in order to check on the armistice terms against a buildup.

The question was raised whether this meant that restrictions and inspection be discussed simultaneously. The suggestion was then made that the discussion of restrictions precede inspection. Changes in the wording of the message were discussed and incorporated.

Because of the delay involved in sending the message, the question was raised whether a message regarding our initial position should be sent. It was decided that General Ridgway had the initial position, and that pending the sending out of a message on inspection, an interim message be sent telling General Ridgway to start with the problem of limiting an arms buildup.[2]

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[2] The Joint Chiefs sent the following message to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 88055, transmitted at 6:39 p.m. on November 26:

"From JCS.

"1. Reur GX 3100 TAC KCG, JCS assume that prior to formal submission to Communists of proposal for inspection under item 3 of agenda you will have proposed the conditions outlined in paras 4e and 4f of your basic instructions governing armistice negotiations (JSC 95354, 30 Jun 51).

"2. Approval of your initial position as given in JCS 84817, 23 Oct 51, is reaffirmed. Guidance relative to a final position will be provided you at an early date." (Black Book, Tab 139) For General Ridgway's response, see footnote 2, p. 1188. For the text of telegram GX-3100, see p. 1173.

711.5622/11–2651

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1951.

Subject: Possible UN Action Re Bomber Shot Down By Soviet Union.

Should we pursue further in the United Nations our claim that Soviet Union pilots shot down a United States plane on a United Nations patrol mission over international waters far from the Soviet coast?

On balance, we are inclined to let the matter lie.

The only practical step open to us would be to have the matter put on the agenda of the Security Council. The only respectable resolution we could offer under this item, in view of the different versions of the plane incident which we and the Soviet Union have publicized, would be a resolution creating an impartial commission to investigate the facts. (We offered such a resolution on September 1, 1950, UN document S/1752 when it was charged that our pilots had bombed Chinese territory; the Soviet Union vetoed that resolution on September 12, 1950.)

The difficulty with this proposal is that even if it were adopted by the Security Council, we could not be confident of getting from an impartial body an affirmative finding for our version of the incident. Indeed, it is not out of the question that an impartial group might find in favor of the Soviet story. The only witnesses who might have supported our case were the members of the crew of the lost plane. The Soviet airmen involved, and probably hundreds of Soviet citizens, could be produced by the Soviet Union to testify that they "saw" the United States plane over Soviet territory and even that they "heard" it open fire. Apart from eye-witnesses, the only evidence we could offer would be our radar "plots" on the plane when last heard from, and the orders under which it was operating. It is not clear whether General Ridgway would want to disclose these to an impartial group. In any event, from the information available to the Department so far, the most we could prove would be that the plane was last known to be far from Soviet territory and that if the plane kept to its course it could not have come within 20 miles of Soviet territory. It does not appear that we could prove that the plane did not in fact lose its way and deviate from its course. That weakness in our case is obvious on the face of the report which we filed with the Security Council.

We could, of course, bring the case to the Security Council on the assumption that the Soviet Union would not agree to establishing an impartial commission and would veto it, thus giving us a propaganda victory. It is, however, a highly questionable and dangerous practice to introduce resolutions which we do not really want to see adopted merely in the hope that the Soviets will veto. Further, in the discussion in the Security Council, the factual weakness of our case and the futility of any investigation will become apparent. It will become quite clear that in fact we do not know what happened to the plane and where it was shot down, and the Soviets do. The other members of the Council and the United States may well assume that in fact our plane did lose its way and fly over Soviet territory, and would resent being asked to support us when they think we may be in the wrong.

We have also examined the possibility of asking the Secretary General to put in a claim against the Soviet Union on behalf of the United Nations and of the personnel of the plane, under the principle of the Bernadotte case, and the opinion of the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly resolution (365–IV) which reaffirmed the right of the United Nations to make such claims. Those claims would seem to apply only to agents of the United Nations injured or killed while on duty for the United Nations, and that the troops of a member nation in the United Nations action in Korea are not such agents of the United Nations as would authorize the United Nations to file a claim in a case like the present. Whether the United States Government could bring such a claim not merely in its own capacity but as the Unified Command is an interesting theoretical question, for which, of course, there is no precedent. We are asking L to look into these questions, although it would not appear desirable to pursue such steps at this time.[1]

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[1] Mr. Johnson responded to Mr. Hickerson in a memorandum of November 28 which read as follows:

"I recognize the force of the arguments contained in your memorandum of November 26 on the above subject for taking no further action on this matter. However, I am not yet convinced that we should not in some way publicly and clearly contrast the Soviet attitude on this question with our attitude at the time our fighters violated the Soviet frontier near Vladivostok. Were it not for the UN aspect of the question we would have clearly demanded the usual assurances and indemnification. I am not sure that we wish to leave the record standing that in the event one of our planes is unlawfully destroyed and the personnel killed while engaged in UN action, we will not make some effort to obtain redress.

"I suggest that UNA, EE and FE further discuss this matter." (711.5622/11-2851)

795.00/11-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1951.

Subject: Cease-fire Negotiations in Korea.

Participants: Mr. K. R. C. Pridham, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Pridham called on Mr. Johnson at 2 o'clock this afternoon by prior appointment. He explained that the British Foreign Office, on the basis of certain informal discussions in Tokyo by Mr. Boucher, a member of the British diplomatic mission, had inquired of the Embassy in Washington as to our present thinking on the question of inspection under Item 3 of the Panmunjom agenda. The Foreign Office believed, on the basis of this information, that General Ridgway was taking a firmer attitude towards inspection than that originally presented by Mr. Rusk in an earlier conversation with Mr. Tomlinson of the British Embassy. Mr. Pridham recalled that the impression received from Mr. Rusk on that occasion was to the effect that we might be willing to make substantial concessions on the matter of inspection and that Mr. Rusk had intimated that the general thinking of the United States then was that some limited form of "spot" inspection of potential military build-up areas in Korea would suffice; to the Foreign Office it now appeared, however, that General Ridgway has in mind a more elaborate form of inspection, including aerial observation. Mr. Pridham added that the Foreign Office now wonders whether our current approach to this problem represented a stiffening in our attitude on this point and whether instructions had been sent to General Ridgway concerning this matter.

Mr. Johnson replied that the matter is now under very active discussion between General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department and that instructions of a preliminary nature had been sent to General Ridgway. He explained that what is now contemplated is, first of all, the establishment of an agreement which would prevent a subsequent increase in the general military potential of either side in terms of men or matériel. Once this agreement has been reached, the United States considered it most essential, in the interests of the security of our forces and to prevent a sudden and overwhelming attack by the Communist forces, that an adequate system of inspection be set up to verify the carrying out of such an agreement. We envisage the establishment of a joint group or commission to supervise observance of the terms agreed upon under Item 3 of the agenda; a series of joint inspection teams on both sides of the line would be stationed at ports, rail junctions, airfields and other key points to report to the commission but which would not necessarily be required to travel about. This system of inspection might be supplemented by aerial observation and reconnaissance. Mr. Johnson also pointed out that we were giving thought to what course of action should be taken in the event of a substantial Communist violation of any armistice agreement.

Mr. Pridham wondered whether the importance which we attach to this question might not provide great difficulties with the Communists in reaching agreement on Item 3, resulting in further long drawn-out negotiations. Mr. Johnson stated that this might well be the case but that both General Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military point of view attach great importance to the necessity for an adequate inspection system.

Mr. Johnson pointed out that in his conversation of November 21 with the British Ambassador, Mr. Matthews had mentioned the relationship of the problems arising under Item 3 of the agenda to the subject of his discussion with the Ambassador. In reply, Mr. Pridham stated that they fully understood this and hoped to have a reply within the next 48 hours. He informed Mr. Johnson in strict confidence that the "departmental position" of the JCS and Foreign Office had been transmitted to Mr. Eden[1] and that this position was not favorable to the questions raised by Mr. Matthews in his discussion with the Ambassador, except upon the point of recognizing the principle of retaining some British Commonwealth forces in Korea following an armistice.

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[1] Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Johnson stated that as the news ticker this morning had reported final agreement with the Communists on Item 2[2] and that we therefore expect Item 3 to come up for discussion within the next day or two, the British views on the questions raised by Mr. Matthews with the British Ambassador should therefore be made available with minimum delay. Mr. Johnson again stressed the emphasis which our military authorities place upon adequate safeguards against a subsequent sudden Communist attack in Korea and also urged upon Mr. Pridham the delicacy of this question and the great damage which could be done should the Communists receive advance information concerning our position on Item 3.

Mr. Pridham asked whether he could give the Foreign Office, as a firm United States position, that which had been outlined by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson replied that since the matter was still under discussion within the United States Government Mr. Pridham would not be justified in sending such a message at this particular moment, to which Mr. Pridham agreed.[3]

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[2] See telegram C-58056, November 26, from Tokyo, p. 1186.

[3] In telegram Tosec 63, November 26, 8:25 p. m., to Rome (not printed), the Department forwarded to Mr. Acheson, who was attending the meeting of the NATO Council, a summary of Mr. Matthews' conversation with the British Ambassador on November 21 along with the information that London had referred to Mr. Eden an unfavorable recommendation on the "greater sanction" proposal and suggested he try to influence Mr. Eden's view on the matter (Black Book, Tab 141).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 141 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett), at Rome[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 26 November 1951—8:56 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

Def-88059. Noforn. Personal for Lovett from Foster. There are being repeated to you three messages: Ridgway's C 52227 of 4 October, GX 3100 of 23 [*24*] November, and DA 87452 to Ridgway from CSA dated 19 November for your information and background.

In an earlier message Ridgway's proposed initial position was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you, and the President.[2] It is necessary to give Ridgway Government's decision which could be the breaking point of negotiations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with Matthews, Bohlen, and others from the State Department have drafted instructions to Ridgway concerning final position he is authorized to take on Item 3 of the Agenda. I have approved the JCS answer which must, of course, be cleared by the President. In discussing this with Mr. Webb, he and I decided that you and Mr. Acheson should be informed of the proposed action. In order that the President be fully briefed on the matter prior to taking final action, it is planned to send General Hull, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with Mr. Matthews from the State Department to Key West on Wednesday, 28 November to present the matter to the President for his approval. Should you or Mr. Acheson desire to comment, please do so promptly.

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[1] Mr. Lovett was in Rome for the meeting of the NATO Council, November 24–28. A manuscript note on the source text read: "Copy to Secretary [Acheson] in Rome."

[2] Reference is to telegram JCS 84817, October 23, to Tokyo; see footnote 1 to Emmons' November 26 memorandum, p. 999.

The following message is to be presented to the President for his approval:

"Reur GX 3100 TAC KCG, dated 23 [*24*] November. This message in two parts.

Part 1.

"Your general comments in Part One of referenced message indicate that Paragraphs One and Two of DA 87452 fail to convey clearly to you the intent of the JCS. The JCS have never visualized immediate withdrawal of UN Forces from Korea upon conclusion of an Armistice, but instead have held that withdrawal is unrelated to a Military Armistice. The JCS further hold that under appropriate circumstances it may be in the military interests of the US to effect a phased withdrawal of our forces from Korea. However, our primary goal continues to be the attainment of an Armistice satisfactory to the United States.

"In seeking this Armistice the JCS do not desire to curtail planned action on your part which would insure the security of UN Forces. They share your concern in this regard and agree that detailed inspection, as you envisage it, would contribute to this security and is thus essential.

Part 2.

"In view of the foregoing and the desirability of achieving both ground and aerial observation as indicated in JCS 87239,[3] the JCS desire that you adopt the position outlined in Part Six, Paragraphs A, B, and C of your C 52227 as your initial position and as amplified by Paragraph One Five of your GX 3100 TAC KCG. It is assumed that prior to formal submission of proposal for inspections, you will have set forth, under Item Three of the Agenda the proposed agreements on buildup, introduction of new equipment etc, in accordance with your basic instructions in our 95354 of 30 June. The JCS are concerned over the possible inadequacy of ground observation teams to maintain surveillance of the airfields of North Korea numbering approximately 100. If you are satisfied that adequate surveillance can be performed from the ground so as to insure against possible surprise air attack originating from North Korean bases, you are also authorized to stand on the final position which you outline in Part Six of your C–52227. If further study of this final position indicates the essentiality of aerial observation, or negotiations with Communists as they develop indicate a modification of your security requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have to give consideration to possible change in the final position.

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[3] Dated November 16, p. 1142.

"If negotiations are broken off over this issue, the decision to cease discussion of an Armistice must be made by the Communists and not by the UNC."[4]

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[4] Telegram Telac 60, November 29, to Rome, informed Mr. Acheson that the proposed directive to General Ridgway was discussed with President Truman on November 28 by General Hull and Mr. Matthews, approved by the President with minor modification, and sent to General Ridgway on the same day (795.00/11–2951); see telegram JCS 88226, November 28, to Tokyo, p. 1193.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 137 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 26 November 1951—9 : 55 p. m.

C–58056. HNC–483. "1. At today's meeting UNC Staff Officers reached agreement with Communist counterparts on location of line of contact. Meeting terminated at 1930 hours.

"2. Sub-delegations meet tomorrow at 1000 hours to consider line of contact agreed to by Staff Officers. UNC sub-delegation hopes to secure prompt approval by both sides in order to submit matter to a plenary session of main delegations tentatively scheduled for 1100 hours tomorrow, 27 November.

"3. After approval of military demarcation line, UNC delegation intends to press for immediate consideration of Item 3. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 143 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 27 November 1951—10 : 11 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–58115. My C–58114.[1] After ratification of agenda Item 2, UNC asked that before delegations go on to discussion of agenda Item 3 they entertain a suggestion that would in due course facilitate the solution of agenda Item 4. The suggestion was that both sides exchange (1) names, nationality and identifying data of POW's, (2) the location of POW camps and (3) the number by nationality, of POW's in each camp.

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[1] Not printed. It reported on the acceptance by both delegations at the plenary meeting on November 27 of the demarcation line submitted by the subdelegations. It then listed the coordinates of the line of demarcation. A map illustrating the line is printed as Map IV in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*.

Nam Il noted this suggestion and went on to make a formal proposal of general principles for consideration under agenda Item 3. These were: 1) All armed forces of both sides, including regular and irregular units and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, shall cease all hostilities from the day of the signing of the armistice agreement. 2) All armed forces of both sides shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 3 days after the signing of the armistice agreement. 3) All armed forces of either side shall be withdrawn, within 5 days after the signing of the armistice agreement, from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of the other side, with the military demarcation line as the dividing line. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order. 4) All armed forces of both sides shall not enter the demilitarized zone and shall not carry out any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. 5) Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form an arimstice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the armistice agreement.

The UNC noted this proposal and made an opening statement on agenda Item 3 which recommended that the following be included in the concrete arrangements. 1) Details of Cease-fire, removal of troops from the demilitarized zone and civil administration of the demilitarized zone. 2) Measures which will reduce the possibility of resumption of hostilities. 3) The establishment of a supervisory organization to include joint observer teams. 4) The authority for the supervisory organization and its joint observer teams to observe in such parts of Korea as necessary.

At 1200 the conference recessed to resume at 1430.

Nam Il opened afternoon session with preliminary response to UNC proposal. He expressed general agreement with 1st principle. With respect to the 2nd he expressed fundamental stand of Communists that a 'thorough peaceful solution which alone can prevent resumption of hostilities required the convening of a conference at a higher level to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and similar matter.' He stated that this was the purpose of agenda Item 5; that the purpose of the present conference is to attain a military armistice and that it cannot solve such questions as these as expressed in the 2nd principle of the

UNC. In this connection, it was notable that in presenting their proposal the Communists ignored the question of joint inspection, and in commenting on the UNC proposal they again ignored the question of joint inspection.

With reference to UNC 3rd and 4th principles Nam Il said that they corresponded to Communists 5th principle. As to authority of armistice commission, he said, it should be limited to that necessary to supervise implementation of armistice terms. In closing, he said delegations should seek to reach agreement on subjects within scope of a military armistice.

UNC commented on Communist proposal saying it was inadequate as an expression of principles under the wording of agenda Item 3 and proposed a list of general principles to be adopted prior to referring the problem to a sub-committee for detailed solution. These were:

1. There shall be a cease fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.
2. There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.
3. There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.
4. The military armistice commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the armistice commission.
5. There shall be a withdrawal of forces of each side, air, ground and naval, regular and irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.
6. There shall be no armed forces in the demilitarized zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.
7. The military commanders shall administer their portion of the demilitarized zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

Nam Il stated that these 7 principles were only an elaboration of the UNC proposal of the morning session to which he had already made a preliminary response. He then proposed a recess until 1100 tomorrow to enable both sides to study the opinions expressed by the other side.[2]

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[2] General Ridgway transmitted the following message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his telegram CX–58313, November 30:

"Ref my C–58115. Urmsg JCS–88055.

"Urmsg forwarded to delegation. Afternoon plenary session was underway when urmsg recd at Munsan. Consider that UNC delegation properly presented our position. To counter Communist proposal and to maintain initiative, it was nec to present 7 principles as outlined C–58115.

"Para 2, JCS 88055 noted." (Black Book, Tab 167) For text of telegram JCS–88655, see footnote 2, p. 1180.

VII. NOVEMBER 28–DECEMBER 31. DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEM 3 DEALING WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPERVISORY ORGANIZATION FOR CARRYING OUT THE TERMS OF A CEASE-FIRE; CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUANCE OF A GREATER SANCTIONS STATEMENT; THE PROBLEM OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 99

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State (Barnes) [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 28, 1951.

Participants:

United States	*United Kingdom*
Secretary Acheson	Foreign Minister Eden
Secretary Lovett	Lord de Lisle and Dudley [4]
General Bradley	Marshal Sir John Slessor [5]
Secretary Pace	Sir Pierson Dixon [6]
Assistant Secretary Perkins	Sir William Elliot [7]
Mr. Frank Nash [2]	Mr. Shuckburgh [8]
Admiral Arthur Davis [3]	
Mr. Robert G. Barnes	
Mr. L. D. Battle	

The Secretary opened the discussion by stating that he wished to review with Mr. Eden and his colleagues an issue concerning Korea which had been broached to Sir Oliver Franks the other day in Washington by Mr. Matthews. We wished to give consideration in connection with the armistice negotiations to making a statement that any breach of the armistice would be a serious matter and would create a situation that would make it impossible to localize the conflict. Even with an armistice, it would be necessary to keep troops in Korea for some time, but we wished to minimize as much as possible the dangers of what might happen. We conceived of the statement as one which would create a situation similar to that prevailing in the case of Berlin, where the deterrent to aggression was not the troops on the ground but the consequences that would flow from any violation of the peace.

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[1] The conversation took place at the American Embassy. The memorandum was drafted on November 29.

[2] Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

[3] Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, U.S. Deputy Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.

[4] British Secretary of State for Air.

[5] Chief of the Air Staff (U.K.).

[6] Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

[7] Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington and British Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.

[8] Evelyn Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Acheson said this question tied into the problem of securing an agreement on inspection in the current armistice talks. We had come to the conclusion that it would be wise to reduce the amount of inspection which we would request in the current negotiations. This would increase the military risk to the UN Command in Korea. The proposed statement on the consequences which would flow from a violation of the armistice would help to minimize this military risk.

General Bradley said it might be helpful to point out that there were roughly five different types of inspection which we might demand: (1) full inspection behind the lines, (2) inspection of certain key points such as ports and rail heads, (3) inspection conducted only by air, (4) inspection of a limited area of perhaps 25 miles behind the armistice line, or (5) inspection of only the demilitarized zone. After an armistice was agreed, we had to face the problem that the enemy could build up its forces materially once freed from UN air interdiction and thereby create a very serious threat to the UN forces. At the present stage of the negotiations we faced the choice of demanding a strong inspection or of accepting a weaker inspection supported by a strong statement with reference to a violation of the armistice.

Mr. Lovett pointed out that our air activity in Korea had completely disrupted all rail communications in North Korea and served to prevent the North Korean forces from building better air fields closer to the front lines. With an armistice these two results would not be possible and the enemy would be able to build up materially its military strength. Sir John Slessor asked if there was any provision in the present armistice terms which denied each party the right to repair airfields and rail lines and was informed that there was not.

Mr. Eden said he was confused about the time sequence involved in the present negotiations and inquired as to whether it was true, as rumored, that an armistice had been achieved that afternoon. He was informed that this was not true. The agreement reached so far was only with respect to the present military line. The terms of the armistice, the principle of inspection and the exchange of prisoners were still to be discussed, and all items had to be agreed before there would be an armistice. In response to a question, General Bradley explained that the military line had been agreed for a period of 30 days, but that if an armistice was not secured within that time, the agreement on the line would lapse. Mr. Eden said he understood that and thought that the 30 day point was perfectly fair, as he had explained in the House of Commons.

Mr. Acheson said that we now had to admit that it would be impossible to secure an agreement with full inspection. We would try to get as much as possible, but if we were to reach agreement at all it would be necessary to accept something less than an adequate inspection system. This problem could be helped by a statement about the consequences of a violation. Mr. Lovett added that perhaps the concept of a full inspection was illusory after all, since the principal communist bases were located north of the Yalu. We had pretty good information on the present rate of the communist build-up, and it was apparent that an inspection up to the Yalu would still not eliminate all possibilities of danger. Therefore there was great value in considering the statement regardless of the degree of inspection secured.

Mr. Eden asked what General Ridgway's view was on this matter, and General Bradley said that Ridgway now realized he could not secure all that he would like to have. His major point, however, was a desire that he be given a firm instruction on the inspection point now. Ridgway hoped to avoid any possibility that his instructions might be modified in the middle of the negotiations with the attendant suggestion of weakness on our part. The real question was whether we could not assure General Ridgway of some other form of security, such as perhaps a blockade or other measures which might be taken against the communists.

Mr. Eden said that was a very big question and one he could hardly answer on the spot. Mr. Acheson said we did not expect him to answer it then but that we thought he would want to discuss it in full with our people before making his decision.

Lord de Lisle said this was presumably a situation which might go on for some time. Mr. Acheson agreed that there was no time limit on the military threat but that we felt the danger diminished with the passage of time. Mr. Lovett added that many military men now think there may never be an armistice but just a fading away of hostilities. General Bradley agreed with this, and added that in his opinion the North Koreans would never violate any armistice agreement which might be reached but would on the contrary be quite glad to get one.

Mr. Eden asked if we had in mind a public statement, and Mr. Lovett said that it would have to be. Mr. Acheson pointed out that, while we had never made a formal declaration on this point, he had said about the same thing in answering questions during the Congressional investigation into the dismissal of General MacArthur. As to the nature of the statement, Mr. Acheson said that what we had in mind was a US–UK statement, or possibly a US declaration supported by the UK. We did not contemplate making this statement through the UN.

Mr. Eden said he was sort of wondering about the inspection problem and how it had been handled in other cases. Mr. Pace cited instances in Austria and elsewhere where we had arranged for joint inspections. Mr. Eden said the inspection point was important and we should not give up on this idea. Mr. Acheson said we would not; we would in fact ask for it all first, but we had to realize that if we were to secure an armistice we would be forced to accept something less than the best.

Mr. Eden then inquired just what it was we wanted from him and how soon. He said we obviously had to give Ridgway guidance and he assumed it was pretty urgent. Mr. Acheson said that if the current reports were true, agenda item 2 had been concluded and Ridgway was now moving into item 3. After two or three days of general discussion, he would need to have his final negotiating position on the inspection point.

Mr. Eden said it was quite clear that Ridgway could not be left without any sanction. The question was how much he should be given. Mr. Eden said he was anxious to be clear on the whole proposition now and not have any misunderstanding later as to just what we had agreed. He said he was planning to return to London on Thursday,[9] would try to talk to the Prime Minister[10] on Friday and get off a wire that same day.

Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Eden should realize that if there was a violation of the truce, our country would be swept with great indignation and the people would want the administration to throw the book at the communists. He did not think America would be alone in its rage. General Bradley added that he hoped we would not be alone in the sanctions we might have to apply. Mr. Eden said he hoped so too, but he was thinking of his own public opinion and wanted to be quite clear as to what its was we wanted to do.

Mr. Eden said he thought we had to reach decisions on the following points and he thought it was desirable to settle all the points now:

1. The instructions to be sent to General Ridgway in connection with negotiations on the inspection.
2. The decision to make the public statement. In this connection he said he would like to have the US work out just what it was we wanted to say. Mr. Acheson said that he did not have any language but that what we had in mind was a public statement outlining the serious nature of an attack. It would be made without time limit, but it would be understood that it was not an unlimited future commitment regardless of other circumstances.
3. The form of further action which we might take. With reference to this point, he asked whether we would want to do more than

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[9] November 29.

[10] Winston S. Churchill.

bomb the communist airfields. Mr. Lovett stated that some form of blockade would be necessary. General Bradley pointed out that the number of ships going into China had almost doubled in the past year and that this traffic was a very real problem.

Sir John Slessor said he questioned those figures, particularly as they concerned Hongkong. Mr. Eden said he did not have any figures like that, but they would check them and let us know. He added that from a purely personal standpoint he felt that the bombing beyond the Yalu would be less difficult for his government than the blockade. General Bradley asked how far beyond the Yalu they had in mind, and Sir John Slessor said it would be a question of bombing in the most effective way. He thought it was a point which could be worked out among the military representatives. He felt that the really important point was the bombing immediately across the frontier. He said we had a very difficult task in not doing this now, but once it was done, it might prove unnecessary to bomb farther in. Once you eliminated the forward fields, you might not need to go after those that were 300 miles or so beyond the Yalu.

Mr. Eden said again that he would check into this question on Friday and get off a wire to both Rome and Washington.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 151 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 28 November 1951—4 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–88226. From JCS.

1. A. General comments in part 1 your GX 3100[1] indicate that paras 1 and 2 of DA 87452[2] fail to convey clearly to you the intent of JCS. JCS have never visualized immediate withdrawal of UN forces from Korea upon conclusion of an armistice, but instead have held that withdrawal is unrelated to a mil armistice. For your info but not for discussion at the armistice negotiations, JCS hold that under certain circumstances it may be in the mil interests of the United States to effect a phased withdrawal of our forces from Korea. However, our primary goal continues to be the attainment of an armistice satisfactory to United States.

B. In seeking this armistice JCS do not desire to curtail planned action on your part which would insure the security of UN forces.

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[1] Dated November 24, p. 1173.
[2] Dated November 19, p. 1148.

They share your concern in this regard and agree that detailed inspection, as you envisage it, would contribute to this security and is thus essential.

2. In view of foregoing and desirability of achieving both ground and aerial observation as indicated in JCS 87239, Nov 51,[3] JCS desire that you adopt the position outlined in part 6, paras *a*, *b*, and *c* of your C 52227, Oct 51,[4] as your initial position and as amplified by para 15 of your GX 3100. It is assumed that prior to formal submission of proposal for inspections, you will have set forth, under item 3 of agenda the proposed agreements on buildup, introduction of new equipment, etc; in accordance with your basic instructions in JCS 95354, Jun 51.[5] JCS are concerned over the possible inadequacy of ground observation teams to maintain surveillance of airfields of North Korea numbering approx 100. If you are satisfied that adequate surveillance can be performed from the ground so as to insure against possible surprise air attack orginating from NK bases, you are also authorized to stand on the final position which you outline in part 6 your C 52227. If further study of this final position indicates essentiality of aerial observation, or negotiations with Communists as they develop indicates a modification of your security requirements, JCS will have to give consideration to possible change in the final position.

3. If negotiations are broken off over this issue, the decision to cease discussion of an armistice must be made by Communists and not by UNC.

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[3] Dated November 16, p. 1142.
[4] Dated October 4, p. 997.
[5] Dated June 30, p. 598.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 145 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 28 November 1951—6:38 p. m.

C–58194. CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 490 for info.

"Report of Armistice Conference 28 Nov.

"1. Convened 1100. Nam Il opened with further comment on principles offered by UNC yesterday. He indicated Communist agreement with 1, 2, 6 and 7. He sought clarification of 5, the current wording of which is designed to retain during the period of the Armistice Coastal Islands off North Korea which are now under UNC control.

"2. With respect to the third UNC principle Nam Il contended that in order to achieve a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean question, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea. In this event, he said, there will be no question of supplies, equipment and facilities exceeding those existing at the time of the signing. It is because peace can be achieved only by withdrawal of foreign troops said Nam Il that his side wants a conference at a higher level. It is improper to seek a conclusion of such questions in the conference the objective of which is a military armistice. Therefore, he said, the UNC third principle exceeds the scope of the present conference and the fourth principle which requires free access for joint observation teams to all parts of Korea is entirely unnecessary. In summary Nam Il opposed the third principle on the grounds that it goes beyond the proper scope of a military armistice conference and the fourth principle on the grounds that it is unnecessary.

"3. UNC made a statement on the scope of a military armistice and stated that insofar as item 3 is concerned the 7 basic principles stated yesterday by the UNC clearly define the scope of the armistice which should be reached.

"4. UNC went on to offer an explanation of each of these 7 principles, closing statement with expression of view that these principles constitute a sound basis for the solution of agenda item 3.

"5. Nam Il replied that items 3 and 4 are beyond the scope of the present conference and that if these matters are discussed it should be under agenda item 5. The third and fourth principles, he said, are clearly connected with the withdrawal of foreign troops and if this last question cannot be solved neither can the other 2.

"6. UNC again defined an armistice as a cessation of hostilities under mutually agreed conditions and stated that a cessation of hostilities as a prelude to a settlement of the Korean problem was possible only under an armistice which would prevent either side building up a decisive military advantage for its duration. The UNC said it could not agree to an armistice which did not contain minimum safeguards to prevent the resumption of hostilities and provide for the security of forces. At suggestion of UNC session recessed at 1240 to resume at 1500.

"Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 147 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 28 November 1951—7:29 p. m.

CX-58197. Subj is selection of pers to serve on Mil Armistice Commission (MAC). This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. For JCS. Your JCS 95354, 30 Jun prescribes that Armistice agreement should not be in force until MAC is prepared to carry out its duties. Agenda item nbr 3 (concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and Armistice in Korea) includes among other items the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and Armistice. Consider desirable that at least a nucleus of the UN portion of the MAC be established immed to familiarize themselves with the problems presented in the entire agenda, prepare plans for the detailed organization of the UNC portion of the Commission and to prepare plans to implement the terms of the Armistice agreement. Further, in order to be prepared to effectuate the Armistice immed should an agreement be reached and in order to place the UNC in the most favorable position during the negotiations as well as in the initial stages of implementation such study and planning should be carried on by elements of MAC simultaneously with current negotiations conducted by the UNC Armistice Delegation and Staff.

Without commitment at this time as to the permanent composition of the MAC or the nationalities ultimately to be presented, I plan to form a working committee by the tentative appointment of the following segment of the UNC portion of the MAC:

Following in 3 columns;

Assignment	*Nbr & Nationality*	*Equivalent Rank*
Member MAC	1 US	Maj Gen
Member MAC	1 ROK	Brig Gen or Col
Member MAC	1 Brit	Brig Gen or Col
Secretariat	1 US	Colonel
Secretariat	1 Turk	Colonel
Observer teams	5 US	Col or Lt Col
Observer teams	2 ROK	Col or Lt Col
Observer teams	1 French	Col or Lt Col
Observer teams	1 Thai	Col or Lt Col
Observer teams	1 Greek	Col or Lt Col

Separate action is being taken within FEC to obtain nominations (Army, Navy, and Air Force) to fill US and ROK positions.

Request you obtain by 8 Dec 51 nominees fr appropriate governments to fill positions listed other than ROK and US. Upon receipt of nominees and final selection of group, will forward to you appropriate instructions as to time and place group will assemble. As a tentative planning date, it is anticipated group will assemble in Tokyo on 20 Dec 51.

Part 2. For AmEmbassy Korea. Rqst Ambassador obtain fr ROK by 3 Dec 51 nominees to fill ROK positions indicated in part 1. Upon receipt of names of selected individuals and final selection of group will forward appropriate instruction as to time and place group will assemble.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 148 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 28 November 1951—7 : 31 p. m.

CX-58195. 1. Reurad JCS 84081 and ourad CX 55993.[1] Early consideration of item 4 concerning exchange of prisoners of war appears possible. Our present planned procedure is:

a. To insist upon disclosure of names, numbers, and locations, by nationality, of all United Nations Command prisoners of war held by the Communists. While this would assist us in bargaining more effectively we are convinced that Communists can hold out certain United Nations Command personnel if they so desire merely by deleting names from rosters furnished us. However, such a list is necessary as a basis for subsequent discussions. If Communists insist, we are prepared to furnish rosters to them of all prisoners of war held in United Nations Command custody.

b. Initially we shall strive for exchange on a one-for-one basis. If Communists accept this proposal and if the number of bona-fide prisoners of war held by the Communists is not increased by Republic of Korea refugees and North Korean civilians, the United Nations Command, holding a vastly greater number of prisoners of war than do the Communists, could hold out from the exchange those persons whose retention seems desirable.

c. If one-for-one basis is not possible and if it appears necessary to arrive at an expanded ratio of exchange in order to insure the release of the maximum number of United Nations Command personnel or is necessary to prevent breakdown in truce negotiations, we are prepared to agree to any ratio up to and including an all-for-all exchange.

d. As a means of insuring accomplishment of our primary objective of prompt return of maximum number of United Nations Command prisoners of war, I feel it is essential to authorize the armistice delegation authority to agree, if necessary, to an all-for-all exchange, even though it would mean turning over to Communist control all prisoners of war, including the following categories:

(1) Suspected war criminals and witnesses to war crimes.

(2) Intelligence prospects.

(3) Individuals who have voluntarily aided United Nations Command.

(4) All Korean prisoners of war who resided prior to June 1950 South of the 38 parallel and who have not been cleared by Republic of Korea and reclassified as civilian internees.

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[1] Dated October 13 and 27, respectively, pp. 1034 and 1068.

(5) Individuals not desiring return to Communist control including:

(*a*) The majority of Chinese prisoners of war many of whom have submitted petitions claiming they are loyal ex-Nationalists impressed into Communist Forces.
(*b*) Some North Korean prisoners of war.
(*c*) Some South Korean prisoners of war of the group referred to in para 1 *d* (4) above.

2. Information is requested earliest as to policy decisions on each of above points or on any related policies which may affect decisions here.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 146 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 28 November 1951—10:30 p. m.

C–58207. CINCUNC Adv HNC 491 for info.

"Further to HNC 490:[1]

"1. Nam Il opened afternoon session with strong refutation of 3 and 4 principles proposed by UNC. He said the UNC seeks to delay solution of Korean problem through a prolonged armistice and that to attempt to substitute an armistice for a peaceful settlement is to disclose an unwillingness to settle the problem peacefully. He said there is a possibility of an armistice not primarily because there exists a balance of force but because of the wishes of the people of the world, including those of the US. Moreover, he said, there is a possibility of further solutions immediately after the armistice; however, setting up a permanent balance of force in Korea will not lead to a peaceful solution. The resumption of hostilities in Korea can be prevented not by a state of balance of war but by the elimination of war through the withdrawal of foreign troops and subsequent steps for peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. Therefore, he said, as soon as the armistice is realized, the governments concerned should negotiate the withdrawal of troops and discuss other ways and means for peaceful settlement of Korean problems and speedily put them into practice. This, he said is the only real guarantee against resumption of hostilities and the third principle of the UNC is groundless. He said if the UNC insists upon starting broad discussions now on preventing resumption of hostilities his side is in favor of doing so, but the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces within a definite period must come first. He said again that the concrete measures proposed by the

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[1] Dated November 28, p. 1194.

UNC were inappropriate and impracticable and that his side could not agree to the third principle and the 4 which follows from it.

"2. Balance of session was spent in defense by UNC delegation of its 3 principle and continuous refutation by Nam Il along the lines indicated above. Among significant statements are the following. 'We hold that all foreign troops should be withdrawn immediately. We are not attempting to increase our forces, but we oppose any attempt to avoid the withdrawal of troops and hamper final settlement of the Korean problem.' 'Your side seeks to discuss problems beyond the scope of a military armistice but related to the withdrawal of troops. By this means you seek to avoid the withdrawal of troops in the future.'

"3. 'The maintenance of an armistice through the maintenance of a balance of forces is not possible. It lies in the sincerity of both sides, the basic and permanent solution is the withdrawal of troops. We insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Your side under pretext of maintenance of balance of forces seeks to continue a state of war and evade solution of the Korean problem.'

"4. 'Principles 3 and 4, are beyond scope of 3 item of agenda. They are closely related to withdrawal of troops. Without solving the basic question of withdrawal these questions cannot be settled. Therefore, we completely oppose principles 3 and 4. We insist in carrying on discussion within scope of agenda.' Repeated several times in varying forms was the statement that principles 3 and 4 cannot be considered until the problem of foreign troops is settled. When pinned down Nam Il stated that 'withdrawal of foreign troops will settle principles 3 and 4.'

"5. In summary the Commie position is that withdrawal of foreign troops will make UNC principles 3 and 4 unnecessary and so far this is the strong stand of the Communists on agenda item 3. The delegations meet tomorrow 29 November at 1100 hours.

"Sgd Joy."

Editorial Note

On November 29, President Truman held a news conference at Key West, Florida. At the opening of the conference, he made a statement in response to erroneous press reports of an informal cease-fire in Korea resulting from an order to the Eighth United States Army to cease offensive activities. The President denied that such an order had been issued, and said that there could be no cease-fire since a cease-fire might later endanger the positions of United Nations forces if no genuine armistice were reached. He added that continued pressure by the United Nations constituted the strongest incentive for the enemy to agree to a just armistice. For the text of Mr. Truman's statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, page 637.

The mistaken press reports were based on an instruction from General Van Fleet to the Eighth Army, following agreement on the demarcation line on November 27, calling for reduced operations on the front in order to prevent unnecessary casualties and demonstrate willingness to reach agreement on a cease-fire with the enemy. The Eighth Army, however, was to prepare for offensive action if negotiations proved unduly prolonged. For details, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pages 177–178.

611.41/11-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [ROME,] November 29, 1951.

Participants: Secretary Acheson
Mr. Eden

[Here follows the first portion of the memorandum dealing with discussion of the "European Army"; for text, see volume III, Part 1, page 746.]

The second question was Korea. At this point Mr. Shuckburgh joined us, and the conversation was largely conducted by him through notes.

He wished to be clear that the public statement we had been discussing was one to be issued either by the United Kingdom and the United States jointly, or by us simultaneously or separately, rather than through the United Nations.

I confirmed that this was what we had said at our previous meeting.[1] I could not now see how the UN could possibly issue any statement, the Security Council being inhibited by the veto and the General Assembly by the impossibility of its procedures.

I thought that the main thing at the present time was to agree upon our policy. After that we could work out the method of the announcement. But for the present, I said, I could see no satisfactory avenue through the UN. However, our statements should be sufficiently vague so that they would not either include or alienate the UN.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Barnes, November 28, p. 1189.

We then went over the three points mentioned by Mr. Eden as the important ones on which to concentrate. I confirmed this, and said that we had already telegraphed these to the Department. Mr. Eden confirmed that they would have Cabinet discussion and would try to let us know before I left Rome, which I said would be either Sunday or Monday.[2]

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[2] December 2 or 3.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 162 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 29 November 1951—9:03 p. m.

C-58288. CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 493 for info.

"Report of armistice conference 29 November. Convened 1100.

"1. Nam Il opened with a statement along the following lines: UNC third and fourth principles are inappropriate, impracticable and absolutely not acceptable. A military armistice should lead to a peaceful settlement which would render resumption of hostilities impossible. Therefore, the question of withdrawal of foreign troops must be settled before any other matters concerning prevention of a resumption of hostilities are discussed. Its discussion should follow immediately upon the fixing of the military demarcation line. It was at the insistence of the UNC delegation that it was agreed to settle a simple military armistice first leaving the question of withdrawal of troops to another conference. However, the UNC delegation now insists on extensive discussions of measures to prevent resumption of hostilities under agenda item 3. We are in favor of doing so. How can the resumption of hostilities after the signing of the armistice be prevented? The UNC holds that both sides should maintain the forces. We agree to defer this to item 5. However, since UNC insists upon discussing broad question of preventing resumption of hostilities under the third item, we agree and insist upon starting with the discussion of the withdrawal of foreign troops. We still maintain that the 5 principles proposed by our side provide an adequate solution to agenda item 3.

"2. UNC delegation stated that deliberations should be limited to considerations within the powers of the respective commanders to implement; that security of forces during an armistice could not be left to political considerations beyond their purview. UNC stated it cannot consider any proposal which would omit from the agreement provisions for the security of its forces and the stability of the armistice during its duration. Specifically, it insisted upon provisions against increase in military capabilities and provision for observation of the adherence of both sides to such limitations during the period a military armistice is in effect.

"3. Nam Il replied in the following vein: 'To safeguard against the resumption of hostilities steps must be taken immediately to eliminate the state of war and not to maintain it. Discussion must begin immediately on the withdrawal of foreign troops. The UNC wants to discuss limitations upon the increase of military forces. We consider this is not enough. If the UNC agrees to discuss conditions to prevent the resumption of hostilities why does it not agree to discuss the decrease of the military forces by stages?'

"4. UNC replied that the delegations were to work out a military armistice, not write a peace treaty. It said that if an agreement on an armistice can be reached there will be a cessation of hostile acts, but that a peaceful settlement will require further negotiations in which the present delegations will not take part. UNC said that it was empowered to take only the first step in the process of going from war to peace, that is a military armistice. It said question of withdrawal of troops must be left to a later conference; that we could make recommendations to the governments concerned on this question but do no more. It asserted that discussion on this point should be held under agenda item 5.

"5. Nam Il replied as follows: 'The UNC says the withdrawal of troops is not within scope of third item. But it insists upon discussing extensive measures for preventing resumption of hostilities. Withdrawal is the essential condition to prevent resumption of hostilities. After withdrawal there will be no question on an increase of forces. If the UNC insists on broad discussions of measures for preventing hostilities under the third item of the agenda it cannot avoid the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops. If the UNC has the authority to discuss the question of a limitation upon the increase of foreign forces in Korea, how is it that it does not have the authority to discuss their withdrawal? Is not the UNCs statement that it is not empowered to discuss withdrawal simply a device for opposing the withdrawal of troops from Korea to facilitate the resumption of hostilities at a time of its own choosing?'

"6. When UNC proposed a recess for lunch Nam Il proposed recess until 1100 tomorrow. UNC concurred. Meeting recessed 1235. Signed Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 165 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 November 1951—3 : 33 p. m.

C-58341. Reference HNC 495.[1]

1. Your attention invited to para 3 of JCS 88226,[2] quoted herewith: "If negotiations are broken off over this issue, the decision to cease discussion of an armistice must be made by Communists and not by UNC." It is believed that your proposed statement as presently worded would place you in a position of having violated this directive.

2. In view of the above it is desired that your proposed statement be reworded as follows: "During the past 3 days, the UNC has stated its position on agenda item 3 and has explained it in full. Everything in our proposal is as fair for one side as for the other. Every specific principle which we have stipulated is designed to enhance the stability of the military armistice and to increase the prospects of an early peace in Korea. All of these principles are strictly military. None are political. We have stated 7 principles upon which the solution of item 3 of the agenda must be based. We have listened to your objections to these principles. We now reject these invalid objections categorically.

You oppose observation by jointly manned teams throughout Korea. You oppose the limitation of forces on both sides, limitations designed to assure that no increase in military capabilities occur on either side during the period of the armistice. You have attempted to force out of consideration joint observation of the manner in which armistice teams will be adhered to. You have sought to avoid limitations on military capabilities during the period of armistice. You have tried to submerge these fair and open arrangements by dragging into the discussion the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. You have done this, knowing full well that withdrawal of forces from Korea is a subject inappropriate to the Military Armistice Conference. Here is our answer.

First: We will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will introduce into Korea any reinforcing air, ground or naval units or personnel during the armistice. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the exchange of units or individual personnel on a man-for-man basis, or major items of equipment on a piece-for-piece basis.

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[1] A note on the source text read: "495 not identified". Presumably it was a message from Admiral Joy to General Ridgway, not repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dealing with a proposed statement on item 3 by the U.N. Command Delegation.

[2] Dated November 28, p. 1193.

Second: We will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will increase the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Armistice Commission, nor the vehicles, ships or aircraft used to transport such supplies.

Third: We will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that a Military Armistice Commission of mixed membership on an equal basis, designated by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and the Commander-in-Chief of the Communist forces, shall be established for the purpose of providing for supervision over the execution of an adherence to the terms of the armistice arrangements. This commission and its joint observation teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movement over principle lines of communication throughout all of Korea. The commission shall likewise have authority to establish joint aerial observation and photoreconnaissance over all of Korea and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.

Fourth: We will continue to insist that the question of withdrawal of troops from Korea, as an element of armistice agreement, is entirely beyond the purview of this Military Armistice Conference and subject to ultimate determination by the political authorities concerned.

We shall insist on the inclusion of the foregoing principles as essential of an acceptable armistice. With all the earnestness at my command I urge you to cease raising objections to these fair principles. We, and all who seek peace, await your considered answer with the deepest concern. I recommend we recess until such time as you designate, in order that you may have opportunity to fully study this statement."

End.[3]

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[3] The following reply was sent by Admiral Joy to General Ridgway in telegram HNC–500, November 30, 8:25 p.m.:

"Receipt of your C 58341 acknowledged. Since many of the points included in paragraph 2 of your message were covered in today's proceedings, the statement contained in subject message is being edited here to avoid undesirable repetition. However, the essence and clear intent of your direction will not be modified." (Black Book, Tab 166)

795.00/11-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, November 30, 1951—6 p. m.

2566. In tel dated Nov 27, Lamb, head Brit mission, Peiping, reported to FonOff that he had been informed about two weeks previously in strictest confidence that Chou En-lai, in a speech to Chinese artistic and cultural society with closest Communist Party affiliations, said CPG forced to negotiate cease-fire owing to adverse effects of war on natl economy. Chou quoted as saying Korean war had already cost Chinese more than Jap hostilities.

Original source above info was a Chinese present at meeting who told it to friend of Lamb. Informant commented Chou had recently regained original influence with CPG and had now replaced Liu Shaochi[1] as spokesman of official policy.

Lamb commented this report would strengthen belief CPG about ready for cease-fire. If so, they presumably also ready negotiate armistice, subject inevitable face-saving bargaining. They may try subsequently re-introduce 38th parallel as basis for dividing line, so as to give color to claim of having driven back UN to south thereof.

GIFFORD

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[1] Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China.

795.00/11-3051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 30, 1951—7 : 35 p. m.

411. Dept now considering question return civilian internees which will be raised in negots on Item 4. Suggestion has been made you might request ROK Govt for list leading ROK civilians believed commie hands in order possibly specifically requesting their return in these negots together with request for ret named UN civilians. Dept tends believe this course undesirable.

Necessity for insistence on return all UN civilian internees recognized, also difficulty if not impossibility insisting on return ROK civilian internees including Govt officials. Discussion in negots of ROK civilians wld probably be rejected by commies or at least result in demand for return North Korean refugees. Dept's preliminary thinking is that ROK civilian problem might be made subj for consideration by special post-armistice commission or be treated as subj for polit settlement and not armistice negots. In event latter course recommendation under Item 5 might include reference to need settling question large displaced segments Korean population. Ur personal views this entire problem, estimate ROK reaction urgently requested. Likewise desire ur recommendations best manner approaching ROK.

WEBB

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 168 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 November 1951—8:25 p. m.

C–58370. For info, CINCUNC Adv 498.

"Report of armistice conference 30 November. Convened 1100. UNC opened. It clarified the point that the concrete arrangements it seeks are for the duration of the armistice only and that the delegations have no competence to terminate the state of war. In reply to Nam Il's question of yesterday UNC said it had authority to discuss limitation on increase of forces in Korea because the governments concerned consider the limitation of forces is a necessary measure to prevent resumption of hostilities during armistice. However, said UNC, it will not make any commitment at this time concerning ultimate or staged withdrawal of foreign troops since governments concerned consider this question unrelated to a military armistice. UNC said further, the question is basically not one of authority it is a question of measures to be taken to insure an effective armistice. UNC said it will insist upon principles of limitation of forces and joint observation and that it would not agree to immediate withdrawal of UNC forces from Korea.

"Nam Il replied in the following vein. Withdrawal of troops and speedy settlement of Korean question can prevent hostilities after the armistice. His side is ready to discuss the question under agenda item 5. The 5 principles he proposed provide reasonable solution to 3rd item of agenda, whereas principle and concrete measures of UNC third and fourth points are unreasonable and impracticable. UNC insistence on them raises doubt as to its sincerity. Agreement on 5 principles is practicable and would permit plenary session to go on with agenda item 4 while details are worked out. What is the objective of the UNC in insisting upon so impractical a principle as your number 4? Under pretext of maintaining balance of forces UNC proposes to interfere in internal affairs of the other side. This is inconceivable in a military armistice. Minimum confidence in the sincerity of the other side which is necessary in an armistice renders such interference unnecessary and unwarranted. His side thought

UNC should have recognized such proposals as unreasonable and unattainable but it has, nevertheless, advanced them. The purpose is to prevent reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea under pretext of forbidding increase of military facilities for offensive purposes. Under pretext of striking military targets UNC destroyed the peaceful towns of Korea. Now under pretext of preventing increase of military facilities for offensive purposes UNC attempts to keep Korea forever a heap of ruins.

"On one hand UNC wants to refrain from introducing into Korea additional forces. On the other it seeks to introduce them under the name of replenishment and replacements if there is an armistice. What is the need for replenishments and replacements? How are these to be distinguished from an increase of military forces and equipment? On the one hand the UNC says this a military armistice without political consideration. On the other hand it maintains that the supervisory organ have free access to all parts of Korea. This is a brazen interference into internal affairs. This is unreasonable and unwarranted and our side cannot absolutely agree to such a provision.

"Nam Il reviewed the 5 Communist principles explaining their meaning. He then returned to the wording of the 5th UNC principle and rejected UNC stand that it retains coastal islands and waters now under its possession during the Armistice. UNC responded to Nam Il's comment on Communist 5 principles as follows. It agrees with 1 and 2. It agreed with 3 in part, but UNC must retain coastal islands now under its control during armistice. It agrees with principles 4 and 5. However, the 5 principles are not sufficiently broad to be a complete solution to agenda item 3 since they give no thought to question of functions and authority of armistice commission. UNC agrees that plenary session lay down general principles on item 3, but these must include functions and authority of commission. The heart of this is the principle of joint inspection.

"UNC continued amplifying its views on the third and fourth principles. In connection with the third principle the words of paragraphs 4*e* and *f* of JCS 95354 [1] were used. In connection with the 4th principle it explained joint observation as follows: There should be joint observation teams located at key points throughout Korea such as ports, airfields, and major communication centers. In addition, there should be joint aerial observation of Korea to provide photographic and visual checks on conditions related to the armistice. By the use of aerial observers we, the military armistice commission, can obtain immediate factual determination of many questions which may arise. Between the two methods of observation, air and ground, full coverage of all matters related to the armistice can be obtained.

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[1] Dated June 30, p. 598.

"At UNC suggestion of recess for lunch Nam Il stated that he had heard nothing new and that unless UNC had something new for afternoon session he proposed recess until 1100 tomorrow. Signed Joy"

320/12-151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1] *to the Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 1, 1951—7 p. m.

Delga 464. Subject Korea.

1. Gross and staff have been considering points for GA res on Korea if there is an armistice. We have considered Gadel 151 of November 15, but corresponding changes in discussion section position paper have not yet been recd and we are not entirely aware motivation Dept's changes embodied Gadel 151. In prospective discussions here we conclude fol considerations shld underlie proposals to be advanced:

(*a*) There shld be maximum UN participation future steps Korean settlement;
(*b*) Korean settlement involves difficult East West issue;
(*c*) Direct US participation in working out settlement is essential;
(*d*) Opportunity for USSR participation accordingly also shld be provided.

2. We question whether Comm of 5 or 7 members intended to enter into negots with govts and authorities in the field for the purpose of seeking a basis for a unified Korea wld provide an effective UN instrumentality for reaching this result. If such comm is to have hq in Korea, heavy expenses wld be involved and depending on quality of personnel of comm it is likely to add to rather than ease the already difficult political [garbled group.] If such negotiating comm is proposed, doubt concerning seriousness of US determination to move forward might result. Therefore we doubt advisability of creating negotiating comm with wide powers authorized to operate in the field.

3. As alternatives we see:

(*a*) UN rep of US nationality appointed by SYG not acting under US instructions but advised by comm composed of permanent UN reps sitting in NY and exercising advisory functions.

(*b*) UN comm composed as suggested by Gadel 151, but headquartered in NY and with terms of reference emphasizing "good offices" rather than active "negotiating" function. Comm wld be authorized to travel and to act through its chairman or through an agent or rep of its own choice. If Sov did not participate in work of comm, it cld operate through a permanent US chairman. If Sov did participate, the comm could decide how it wished to proceed in light of developing circumstances.

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[1] With the departure of Mr. Acheson from Paris, Ambassador Austin became head of the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

4. Alternative "*a*" has advantage of single negotiator of US nationality who wld be so selected as to be sympathetic to US policy. Advisory comm wld permit representation of some states actively participating in Korea and seat wld be open for USSR. UN rep wld be negotiating agent with emphasis on UN concern re Korea. It wld also provide flexibility so that USSR cld sit in comm or otherwise get into contact with UN rep at any time there is a break and any desire on part of USSR to settle Korean issue.

On the other hand, UN rep wld not technically be acting under US instructions, and there is problem of finding right man and causing his appointment by SYG. Although terms of ref of UN rep and advisory comm wld clearly limit their scope to [garbled group] Korean issue, this wld potentially give considerable power to uninstructed US citizen.

5. Alternative "*b*" affords flexibility in that comm cld operate in accordance with changing circumstances. Stressing the "good offices" concept discourages members of comm from free-wheeling attempts to negotiate.

Disadvantage this alternative is danger that comm having more than advisory powers tending to turn itself into executive pol authority. This disadvantage is even more serious in respect of comm having "negotiating" authority, as suggested in Gadel 151.

6. We do not now make recommendation for choice between alternatives *a* or *b* whose pro's and con's are set out above. We shld as soon as possible discuss these points as well as others relating to SC and GA res with our UK and Fr colleagues as well as others directly interested, including of course ROK. UK, Aust and ROK reps have already approached us on our views.

7. We also propose to suggest to them that all these procedural questions be canvassed with USSR if once there is an armistice.

This is on the theory that the over-all issue cannot be solved without some degree of Sov acquiescence. We are further considering whether it wld be the Brit, Fr or ourselves who shld raise these questions with USSR rep.

8. In connection with current armistice negots, we assume that discussions in Korea of the last agenda item, "recommendations to govts," wld not be so broad as to decide questions of the nature of future UN procedures.[3]

AUSTIN

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[3] See telegram Delga 465, *infra*.

320/12-151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 1, 1951—7 p. m.

Delga 465. Re Korea. In planning handling of Kor item in SC assuming there is an armistice, Gross and GADel staff have been considering SC procedures and draft resolution on the theory that SC consideration wld be a preliminary step to broad and general debate and action to fol in the GA. We are mindful of comments in position paper SD/A/C.1/368,[1] page 7, and also Dept's views as contained in Deptel 75 of Aug 14 [*4*] to USUN.

Prelim conversations which we expect to have with other SC members wld be first with US, Fr, Turkey, Netherlands and then perhaps Brazil. We are also considering thereafter, tentative conversations with USSR which wld cover general lines of SC resolution.

1. Alternative 1 is type of resolution suggested by Jebb and reported in USUN's 115, of July 10[*19*]:[2]

"The SC, having received the report from the UC dated (blank),

"Notes with approval the conclusion of an armistice in Kor and expresses its profound satisfaction that hostilities have been brought to an end on terms acceptable to the UN,

"Requests the GA to consider the measures which shld now be taken to bring about a final settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles and objectives of the UN."

This draft, although it wld present some difficulties for USSR in first and third paras, wld be hard for them to veto or to oppose with a counter-resolution.

2. Alternative 2 closely fols views contained in Deptel 75 of Aug 14 [*4*] to USUN and comments in position paper 368:

"The SC, recalling and reaffirming its resolution of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950, and

"Recalling that the said resolution of July 7, 1950, created a UC and requested the US to designate the commander of forces operating under it and requested the US as a consequence to provide the SC with reports on the course of action taken under the UC;

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[1] Dated October 12, p. 1020.

[2] Telegram 115, July 19, not printed; the thrust of Mr. Jebb's earlier resolution is set forth in Delga 615, December 11, from Paris, p. 1302. See also telegram 59, July 10, from New York, p. 644.

"Notes with approval the report of the UC dated (blank) and the terms of an armistice contained in it;

"Requests the SYG to transmit this resolution to the GA as material to its objective which is the establishment of a unified independent, Democratic Govt in Kor by peaceful means."

3. (*a*) Alternative 2 presents difficulties not only with USSR but also with friendly dels.

(*b*) If the resolution refers to and reaffirms past SC resolution and if it is generally and strongly supported, pol consequences wld be undesirable. On the other hand, we see no advantage of forcing a Sov veto, because we want to get quickly from the SC to the GA and a broad acceptance there. Also, no doubt is thrown on the validity of previous SC resolution by failing to cite and reaffirm them, because it is generally recognized in SC precedents that these resolutions continue in full force and effect until further affirmative action by the SC. In any event, new GA resolution on Korea.

(*c*) This draft might lead USSR to table short form of resolution simply approving armistice. They cld then veto our alternative and put us in position of having to support theirs.

(*d*) If USSR were to vote against recitals of previous SC resolution and there were seven affirmative votes, then we feel this negative vote wld be a veto and not a preliminary vote, so the resolution wld finally be put to the vote without them. Although as sponsors we might rely on SC rule 32 and insist resolution be voted as a whole, USSR might attempt tactics we used on 13 Sept 1949 of a procedural motion that the resolution be voted in parts. If USSR got seven votes for this, that wld be tantamount to suspension of rule 32. In any case, this wld probably lead to a long procedural wrangle.

4. In the light of the above considerations, we hope that pending info obtained from proposed tentative conversations Dept will suspend judgment on what form of SC resolution shld be selected.

5. Any form involves again placing Korean case on SC agenda and Council wld then have to dis-seize itself by a separate resolution which we could use whether or not there is a veto of the substantive resolution.[3]

AUSTIN

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[3] The Department of State transmitted the following response in telegram Gadel 323, December 2, to Paris:

"Re Korea. Pls refrain Delga 464 and 465 from any conversations with other dels subject matter these tels pending receipt further word from Dept." (320/12-151)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 4 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 1 December 1951—9:55 p. m.

C-58449. HNC-503. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 503. "Report of armistice conference 1 Dec 51. Convened 1100.

1. Nam Il asked for a reply to questions asked yesterday. UNC made a statement setting forth in full its views on rehabilitation and reconstruction in answer to Communist charges that it seeks to limit peaceful reconstruction.

2. Nam Il replied that he did not consider this a satisfactory answer to his question and requested a 15-minute recess. Upon returning he made a statement in the following vein. UNC third and fourth principles are unreasonable, its fifth principle not clear. The three are self contradictory and inconsistent with UNC stated positions. On the one hand the UNC proposes no introduction of reinforcements into Korea, on the other it asks for exchange on a man-for-man basis. To insure against resumption of hostilities foreign troops should be reduced positively during the armistice. There is no reason for continued introduction of troops. What reason can UNC have for seeking exchange of troops on man-for-man basis? Why does UNC want to introduce fresh units and personnel into Korea and what reasons does it have for replenishment and replacement? UNC has stated that an armistice should provide adequate safeguards for security of troops. Yet it demands limitation on reconstruction of military facilities during the armistice. Korean people have the right to reconstruct, rehabilitate and to reinforce defensive facilities destroyed by wanton bombing. Interference with this right cannot be tolerated. Does the UNC seek by this pretext to prevent the repair and reconstruction of defensive facilities? What cannot be labeled by UNC as military facilities for offensive purposes? UNC holds that armistice negotiations are strictly military and involve no political questions. Yet it insists that the supervisory organ have access to all of Korea, thus directly interfering in the internal affairs of the other side. The authority of this organ should be confined to that necessary for carrying out terms of armistice. Our side has no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of that part of Korea controlled by UNC. There is no need for access to all parts of Korea, to carry out the armistice. It would be a flagrant and unwarranted violation in internal affairs which has no justification in a strict military armistice. What is the purpose of the UNC in this respect? We have fixed a demarcation line and a military zone to separate the armed forces and provide

a definite demarcation line with which to cease all hostilities and make it difficult for them to be resumed. This was the basic condition for an armistice. Therefore, each side should withdraw its forces in rear of the demarcation line. This is the inevitable consequence of fixing the line. Yet UNC still attempts to retain armed forces on islands in our rear—an obvious violation of the spirit of the agreement on the demarcation line. What is the object of the UNC in this respect? Perhaps it wants to make the armistice unstable by retaining forces in our rear. Perhaps it is for some ulterior motive that UNC seeks limitation upon increase in armed force for stated purpose of stabilizing armistice. What object is the UNC pursuing?

3. UNC replied its objective is a just and reasonable armistice which will insure against resumption of hostilities pending final settlement of the Korean problem. UNC stated Nam Il's statement contained no new thoughts; most had been refuted previously, none would stand up under examination. UNC then made the following statement: 'In order that you may understand clearly our views concerning this military armistice, I shall make a very important statement. During the past 4 days, the UNC has stated its position on agenda item 3 and has explained it in full. Everything in our proposal is as fair to one side as to the other. Every specific principle which we have stipulated is designed to enhance the stability of the military armistice and to increase the prospects of any early peace in Korea. All of these principles are strictly military. None are political. We have stated 7 principles upon which the solution of item 3 of the agenda must be based. We have listened to your objections to these principles. We now reject these invalid objections categorically.

You oppose observation by jointly manned teams throughout Korea. You oppose the limitation of forces on both sides, limitations designed to assure that no increase in military capabilities occurs on either side during the period of the armistice. You have attempted to force out of consideration joint observation of the manner in which armistice terms will be adhered to. You have sought to avoid limitations on military capabilities during the period of armistice. You have tried to submerge these fair and open arrangements by dragging into discussion the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. You have done this, knowing full well that withdrawal of forces from Korea is a subject inappropriate to this military armistice conference. Here is our answer:

First, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will introduce into Korea any reinforcing military units or personnel during the armistice.

Second, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will increase the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective.

Third, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that a military armistice commission of mixed membership shall be established to provide supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice agreements.[1] This commission and its joint observation teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout Korea. The commission shall likewise have authority to establish joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance over all of Korea and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.

Fourth, we will continue to insist that the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is entirely beyond the purview of this military armistice conference and subject to ultimate determinations by the governments concerned.

We shall continue to insist on the inclusion of the foregoing principles in the armistice. With all the earnestness at my command I urge you to cease raising objections to these fair principles. We, and all who seek peace, await your considered answer with deepest concern.

Unless you have something new to offer, I suggest we recess until such time as you designate in order that you may carefully study my statement.'

4. Nam Il replied that he found nothing new in this statement and that he waited for a full response to his morning statement. He then proposed a recess until 1500 hours.

5. Meeting recessed at 1233 hours. Signed Joy". Report of afternoon session follows.

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[1] The word "agreements" was changed in a supplementary copy of this telegram to read "arrangements". (JCS Files)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 5 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, December 1, 1951—10:05 p. m.

C-58450. HNC-504. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 504.

"Further to my HNC 503. Conference reconvened at 1500.

"1.

"*a.* Nam Il made a statement along following lines. The rept objective of UNC stand on military facilities is to deprive one side forever of the right to defend itself while talking about the security forces of both sides. UNC wanton bombardment of peaceful towns has resulted in such serious consequences that Communist side must increase AA facilities including construction and improvement of airfields. This is security necessity—an inalienable right of the Korean people. No interference can be tolerated. UNC should understand this so that progress can be made in the conference.

"*b.* Nam Il went on to make a preliminary response to UNC closing statement of morning session as follows:

"The general principles and concrete measures suggested by the UNC are basically contradictory to each other. UNC asserts its principles are designed to enhance stability of armistice and increase prospects for peace. Why does it want to retain armed forces in the rear of the other side after demarcation line determined and thus place armistice in state of instability? UNC says its principles are military and non-political. Why does it insist upon free access to all Korea? This is a flagrant interference in internal affairs of Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and cannot be tolerated. To insure against resumption of hostilities foreign forces must be withdrawn and peaceful settlement speedily achieved. UNC has no ground for saying other side is against limiting forces. UNC insist neither side introduce reinforcing armed units and personnel. Why then does it contend that so-called necessary replacements be admitted if it is sincere towards a speedy settlement of the Korea question? Why replacements after fighting is stopped? Not only should foreign troops not be increased, they should be reduced; not allowed to enter Korea any longer. If UNC favors restrictions against lifting the level of material and equipment why should it seek replacements?

"*c.* The scope of authority of the armistice commission should coincide with the specific content of armistice terms. For instance, it should control the demilitarized zone. Yet UNC, disregarding whatever armistice terms may be agreed to by both sides, demands free access to all Korea to conduct inspections. Why? I request an answer and reserve the right to make further comment following detailed study of UNC proposal.

"2.

"*a.* UNC replied in following manner. With respect to inspection . . . free access by joint observation teams is necessary for an effective armistice. They will observe military matters only. Their function is in no sense political.

"*b.* With respect to replacements . . . . UNC does not 'ask permission' to exchange personnel on man for man basis. It merely informs the other side that it will from time to time remove certain units and individuals replacing them at its own discretion. This procedure will result in no increase in the level of forces in Korea. As guards are changed from time to time so it will change units and individuals. It has no intention of removing the guard.

"*c.* With respect to islands . . . during discussion of agenda item 2 other side refused to agree to reasonable adjustments in line of contact on grounds that it would not relinquish territory it held. It refused to make any adjustment elsewhere for withdrawal of UN Forces from the islands. It stated the islands were of little consequence. The main and incontestable argument used by the other side was that it physically occupied certain areas and would not give them up under any circumstances. The UNC agreed to the reasoning of the other side and to the principle that what it held it kept. Now the other side reverses itself. It wants the UNC forces to withdraw from territory under its control without adjustment elsewhere. The other side excluded islands from discussion under item 2. The UNC will hold these islands unless there is suitable adjustment elsewhere.

3. Nam Il replied that that he thought the 2 item was closed, the demarcation line and demilitarized zone established. Did the UNC want to reopen item 2?

"4. UNC replied that it had no desire to reopen item 2—that it had referred to the arguments used there merely to show why it was holding the islands.

"5. Nam Il replied that it was not right for either side to have forces in the rear of the other. UNC insistence in this point means it doesn't want an armistice. His side simply cannot agree to this. Its attitude is absolutely firm.

"6. UNC replied that the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone are on the mainland. They do not, nor were they intended to include islands. The other side excluded islands from item 2 and the UNC will hold them unless suitable adjustments are made elsewhere.

"7. Nam Il made a statement in general as follows: The true purpose of the exchange of troops on a man for man basis is to continue during the armistice the introduction of troops from abroad. The true purpose of limitation of airfield reconstruction is to prevent Korean people from strengthening defensive facilities which are necessary during an armistice. The true purpose of free access is to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The demand to retain coastal islands constitutes a direct threat to the security of the other side and renders the resumption of hostilities a possibility. Such proposals and demands are unacceptable.

The UNC has no reason to insist on such demands unless it wants to delay the negotiations. Both sides should agree in principle on the points in the two proposals which they have already accepted and jointly work out the details while the plenary session goes on to item 4.

"8. Nam Il then proposed a recess until 1100 tomorrow. The UNC suggested that the other side make a careful study of the last paragraph of its morning statement. Recessed 1612. Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 6 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 2 December 1951—9:01 p. m.

C-58512. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 505.

"Report of armistice conference 2 Dec. Convened 1100.

"1. UNC delegation opened in folg vein: Since other side states that it is groundless to say that it opposes the limitation of forces during the period of armistice it is assumed that it agrees to three UNC principles. Therefore UNC proposes acceptance of UNC principles 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 by both sides and continued effort to reach agreement on remaining principles.

"2. Nam Il replied that he agreed with principles 1, 2, 6 and 7 but with respect to the three principle, limitation is not enough; forces should be reduced and withdrawn from Korea. Nam Il went on as fols: There is nothing new in 'very important statement' made by UNC yesterday. UNC still insists in its unreasonable proposals. It proposes limitation of military facilities for its own offensive purposes. The true purpose of this is to prevent the Korean people reconstructing their defensive facilities. Yesterday's statement only confirmed this. The restriction is to be placed on the reconstruction of airfields. The Korean people can never forget the brutal bombing of peaceful towns. They have the right to reconstruct during the armistice their defensive facilities, including aflds. They will do so to secure their forces and prevent further wanton bombing. The UNC stresses the security of trps. How can it seek to prevent reconstruction of aflds? The Korean people will never tolerate the slightest interference with such reconstruction. The UNC seeks to retain coastal islands. All forces including those on the island should be withdrawn from beyond the demarcaction line. Retention of islands by UNC would render the armistice unstable. No sophistry on the part of the UNC lifts the obligation which is upon it to withdraw from the islands. As for UNC insistence upon replenishments and replacements, it is inconsistent with your proposal of limiting forces. If UNC really wants to reduce possibility of resumption of hostilities it cannot propose continue entry into Korea of foreign trps. It can only w/d trps. The true purpose of the inspection principle proposed by UNC is to interfere in the internal administration of the People's Republic. The authority of the armistice commission should be contingent upon and consistent with the content of the armistice terms. In any case it is inconceivable that during the armistice and while war is still unterminated, one belligerent should seek observation posts in the rear of the other side, freedom of mvmt over its lines of communications and aerial reconnaissance. This is inconceivable. Our side seeks no free access to territory under UNC control for purpose of inspection. Neither will it grant such a right to the UNC.

"3. UNC replies as fols: The other side objects to routine replacement and replenishment yet it asserts the right to unlimited reconstruction of aflds on grounds they are defensive. If there is no intention of building up forces during the armistice why are more aflds needed. The other side seeks to deny UNC right to maintain forces at existing levels, but at the same time wants to increase its own offensive potential by unlimited construction of aflds. UNC can only conclude that other side desires to use armistice to ready itself for resumption of hostilities at a time of its own choosing. If not, there is no reason for refusal to accept UNC three principle. Examination of objections to the four principle strengthens this conclusion. Objections to joint observation on grounds that it is an interference are unconvincing. The UNC welcomes such observation as an indication of its good faith and will accept no less from the other side. To clarify the meaning of 'free access' UNC will amplify its explanation. The joint teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers, as agreed by both sides, and freedom of mvmt over principal lines of communication. It also includes joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance. This is the meaning of 'free access.' It constitutes no interference in internal administration. The UNC has nothing to hide. What does the other side object to if it does not in fact intend to violate the armistice? The arguments used by the other side to refute UNC three and four principles only reinforces UNC conviction that these must be included in any armistice. UNC retention of the islands is in strict accord with the ltr of the agreement on agenda item 2. By mutual agreement the islands were deliberately excluded from consideration under agenda item 2. The UNC will retain the territory it now holds.

"Nam Il proposed recess until 1500 this date.

"*Comment:* UNC current position on islands is not necessarily its ultimate position. Possession of these islands will be a useful and strong bargaining point at a later stage in the discussions. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 7 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 2 December 1951—10:09 p. m.

C–58513. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 506.

"Further to HNC 505. Reconvened 1500.

"1. Nam Il opened in following vein: UNC during morning presented no new reasons for retaining islands. Since both sides have agreed to demarcation line why does UNC insist on retaining forces in rear of other side. The arguments used during discussion of the demarcation line are no longer pertinent. This is a test of whether UNC is willing to respect the agreed demarcation line. If the agreement has value the UNC has no ground for its demand. If armistice is to be stable what reason can UNC demand have? What is the purpose? How is it possible? It is inconceivable. The other side opposes this after agreement on the demarcation line. It is a violation of the agreement. So long as UNC insists on this the other side cannot take seriously the UNC proposal of restricting introduction of armed forces to enhance the stability of the armistice. If the UNC were to abide by the letter and spirit of the agreement on the demarcation line it would prove that the UNC proposal that both sides refrain from introducing into Korea armed forces and equipment is really designed to stabilize the armistice. As for the UNC proposals on restricting military facilities and free inspection, they are an interference in the internal administration of the other side and involve political questions. They exceed the scope of the negotiations and are unacceptable. In order that no more time be wasted it is hoped UNC will no longer insist on these proposals. UNC use of unorthodox arguments to persist in these demands implies UNC assumes itself the victor who required the other side to submit. This cannot be tolerated as both sides are on an equal footing. The delegation of the KPA and the CPV shall continue to oppose these proposals. With the greatest sincerity we and all who hope for an early agreement solicit your most serious consideration of this statement.

"2. UNC replied in general as follows: There is nothing to be gained by further discussion of the islands. UNC offered previously to participate in adjustments involving its withdrawal from the islands.

The other side refused. UNC accepted the refusal stating that it would retain the islands. The other side must now accept the consequences of that refusal. To sum up, both sides are agreed on principles 1, 2, 6 and 7. The UNC has made it clear that it considers principles 3 and 4 essential. Persistent refusal of the other side to accept them only confirms their essentiality. The UNC and people of the world have been warned by this refusal that the other side seeks in the armistice not a step towards peace but a period in which to build up its military potential. It wished to do this in secrecy, free of observation by the joint armistice commission. In spite of protestations about peace the UNC can give credence only to actions. Resistance to these principles indicates an intent to violate them. Thus, more than ever, the UNC must insist on their inclusion in the agreement which binds both sides. No progress can be made until the other side alters its views on these principles. The more the other side opposes them the more the UNC mistrusts their motives. The delegations are now separated by four points of difference:

"(1) Introduction of reinforcements and limitation of supplies, equipment and facilities

"(2) Joint observations at principal ports of entry and communication centers as mutually agreed, free movement over communication lines for joint observation teams; joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance

"(3) Unilateral insistence by the other side that UNC give up the islands which it will not do without suitable adjustment and

"(4) And unilateral intention of other side that it be free to increase military capabilities, especially airfields. These four points are the basic differences. By concentrating on them it might be possible to find a solution.

"3. Nam Il inquired if adjustments in connection with the islands was related to the military demarcation line.

"4. UNC said it had no desire to reopen agenda item 2; it would retain the islands.

"5. Nam Il again sought clarification and was informed that UNC did not refer to item nbr 2.

"6. Nam Il asked if the matter of construction of air fields within his position was not an internal affair.

"7. UNC replied as follows: Statement of the other side give strong evidence of its intent to use armistice to improve its military position that it should seek enabling provisions in the agreement is incredible. Its statement that it must, during the armistice, build up combat air capability, including airfield construction, is alien to its protestations of good faith. The other side openly expresses an intent to increase military capabilities. It uses the weak pretext of a requirement for increased AA facilities, but it alone would determine whether increased capability would be used offensively or defensively. The intended rehabilitation of airfields is an increase in military facilities which provides an increased capability. The rebuilt fields would be useful only if air elements were introduced into Korea. Since the other side subscribes to the principle of non-introduction of reinforcements there is no case of additional air facilities. Airfields are not an internal matter when they add to offensive capabilities. The UNC firmly opposes any development of military airfields.

"8. Nam Il said that nothing new had been said; all had been refuted and that the attitude of the UNC was delaying the conference. He inquired as to whether UNC had any suggestion for the settlement of the four outstanding differences.

"9. UNC said it was looking to him for a suggestion in this respect and proposed adjournment. Meeting adjourned 1628. Delegations meet 3 December at 1100. Signed Joy."

795.00/12–351

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 3, 1951.

TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN ROME [1]

Please arrange to convey communication in following terms as soon as possible to Acheson, if available, or failing him Lovett and Bradley.

2. I have discussed with my colleagues the suggestions made at our meeting in Rome on the evening of 28th November about the next steps in the Korean armistice talks. We are most grateful to Mr. Acheson and his colleagues for taking us into their confidence as they did, and we are most anxious to keep in very close touch on this matter.

3. We think that the United Nations negotiators should continue to press for the most effective possible supervision arrangements. They might try for joint inspection teams at key points or failing this for supervision teams led by neutrals (e.g. Scandinavians). We realise,

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[1] This telegram was transmitted as telegram 1099 to Rome on November 30 along with the message printed *infra*. Both messages were then passed on to Mr. Acheson who reported this to the Department in telegram 2444, December 1, from Rome, not printed (Black Book, Tab 2). The copies of the British messages here printed were conveyed under cover of a note dated December 3 from Mr. Tomlinson of the British Embassy in Washington to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson.

Following the NATO meetings in Rome, Mr. Acheson returned to the United States by sea, with Mr. Webb serving as Acting Secretary of State until mid-December.

however, that it may prove impossible to get any satisfactory arrangements and that, if the talks are not to be allowed to break down, Ridgway may have to proceed on the assumption that the Communists are acting in good faith. In the event, we agree that on conclusion of an armistice he should report back to the United Nations that it has not been possible to agree on what he considers adequate supervision arrangements, but that, in order to bring hostilities to an end, he has accepted arrangements, the effectiveness of which depend entirely on the *bona fides* of the other side.

4. We agree that in that event warning statements should be issued about the very serious consequences which would arise from a major breach of the Armistice arrangements by the communists. I do not consider that the warnings should be made only by the United States and United Kingdom, nor do I think that a collective statement by the United Nations would be practicable. It seems to me that the statements should be made by the United States, United Kingdom and as many as possible of the countries contributing forces. These warning statements should be in very general terms and, in our view, should if possible be identical. It would be unwise to be precise about the nature of the counter action which we should feel obliged to take, but we might, for example say that in the event of such a major breach, it might prove impossible to localise hostilities as hitherto. We should of course like to discuss the draft.

5. We agree that such a major breach of the armistice agreement would confront us with an entirely new situation, which might well necessitate more drastic measures on the part of the United Nations Forces, but we do not think we should at this stage commit ourselves as to what precise measures should be taken.

6. Our preliminary views on the two measures mentioned by the Americans are:

(a) Naval Blockade of China.

China is not dependent to any real extent upon seaborne imports for the maintenance of her present war effort in Korea, and in the short term this war effort could be maintained in the face of a sea blockade by a combination of the overland supplies from the U.S.S.R. and the production of China's own war industry. Admiralty do not feel that a sea blockade would produce effective results, except over years rather than months. They also feel that unless the Soviet ports were included, it would be futile. This last point has to my mind raised the gravest issue, as it would be a direct hostile act against the Soviet Union which is exactly what we are both so anxious to avoid. Therefore we are not at all convinced that a sea blockade would be a useful measure.

(b) Bombing North of the Yalu.

Neither are our staffs sure that decisive results would follow from the bombing of the Chinese airfields and bases and junctions across the Yalu. However we would much rather proceed in this way than by the sea blockade. It is here to be noted that munitions sent through Soviet ports might be intercepted in this way.

7. We would like the United States and United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to discuss these matters in detail between them, and our people over with you are fully briefed on the details.

8. We are sending you shortly a note on trade with China.[2] Our information is somewhat different from yours.

9. I know you will understand that we must inform Canada, Australia and New Zealand of these exchanges.

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[2] *Infra.*

795.00/12-351

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 3, 1951.

TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN ROME[1]

Confidential. Immediate. Addsd to Rome tel no 1102 of 30th Nov reptd for infmn to Washington. Yrtel 653 and mytel no 1099.[2]

Trade with China.

Bradley's statement ignores the situation as it exists today and in any case is very exaggerated. It is true that there was a considerable increase in trade with China immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War but all the figures available show that there has been a steady and substantial decline in trade during 1951.

2. Shipping.

No figures are available for shipping engaged in trade with China before February 1951. At the end of February there were 158 ships of all nationalities excluding Soviet Bloc engaged in China trade of which 64 were British and 56 Panamanian. At the end of November there were only 58 ships of which 26 were British and 17 Panamanian. In addition at the end of November there were 6 Polish ships engaged in this trade.

3. Trade.

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra.*

[2] Telegram 653 not here printed; telegram 1099 is printed *supra.*

UK exports to China by average monthly values in thousand pounds sterling were:—

1950	First Quarter		98
	Second	"	182
	Third	"	479
	Fourth	"	436
1951	First Quarter		430
	Second	"	250
	Third	"	120

Hong Kong exports to China by average monthly values in thousand pounds sterling were:

1950.	First Quarter		5622
	Second	"	4109
	Third	"	6754
	Fourth	"	10409
1951.	First Quarter		13748
	Second	"	10239
	Third	"	5675

The figure for the third quarter of 1951 shows very clearly the effect of the United Nations Embargo. These figures include exports by sea or rail to China.

Imports into Hong Kong from all sources during 1949 were at an average monthly rate of pounds sterling 14.3 million. During 1950 at pounds sterling 19.7 million and in September 1951 at pounds sterling 20.7 million. Much of this increase can be attributed to the general rise in world prices.

4. It is worth noting that the United Nations embargo on trade with China covers only strategic materials and leaves a large range of non-strategic commodities available for legitimate trade.

5. If General Bradley is still in Rome please convey above infmn to him and also, if possible, to Mr. Acheson. H. M. Embassy, Washington will also no doubt pass it to State Dept.

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 20-A

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 3 December 1951.

Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners.

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum dated 23 November 1951,[1] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered

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[1] Not printed.

the instructions which should be furnished General Ridgway regarding the disposition of those prisoners who are accused of conventional war crimes, or who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also considered the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) message CX 58195 (DA IN 3785) dated 28 November 1951 (copy enclosed)[2] on the general subject of repatriation of Chinese and Korean prisoners of war.

2. As stated in your letter of 23 November 1951 to the Secretary of State, the decision either to release or to withhold certain categories of prisoner personnel during a general exchange of prisoners will have undesirable consequences. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which appear later in this memorandum are made after weighing those consequences. There follow certain background data which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered in arriving at their recommendations:

a. The directive to General Ridgway on the broader aspects of the exchange of prisoners of war which was forwarded with the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you, dated 15 November 1951,[3] would authorize him to agree to an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war if this appeared necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, United Nations (UN) and Republic of Korea (ROK) prisoners of war, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of armistice negotiations;

b. The absence of a complete victory in Korea creates a condition which inhibits our freedom of action in adhering to the principles of international law with respect to war criminals;

c. Discussions in the armistice negotiations regarding the disposition of accused war criminals would, as a minimum, provide the Communists with a field of propaganda and could result in delaying the recovery of UN and ROK prisoners of war or even militate against the release by the Communists of a maximum number of these prisoners. Accordingly, such discussions should be minimized although the arrangements must insure that any exchange which is arranged on an all-for-all basis includes prisoners held by both sides who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes and those prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses;

d. In view of the Oriental attitude toward human life and of the enemy's known disregard for international conventions and humanitarian considerations, it can be expected that the Communists will react harshly in reprisal to any attempt by the United Nations forces to withhold for trial prisoners of war accused of any crime. Such a reaction would probably include the withholding of a similar or greater number of UN and ROK prisoners for trial and possibly summary execution, on trumped-up charges. Such procedures would be followed by the Communists for propaganda purposes and as face saving devices, if for no other reason; and

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1197.

[3] See the enclosure to the letter from Mr. Foster, November 23, p. 1168.

e. It is recognized that if war criminals are relinquished without trial or punishment, public resentment will undoubtedly be generated in the United States and other affected nations, including the Republic of Korea. On the other hand, it is believed that a greater number of the people of these countries would strenuously oppose a breakdown of armistice negotiations over this issue with the consequent exposure of UN and ROK prisoners of war to barbaric Communist reprisals which would inevitably follow United Nations trials.

3. In view of the great value for propaganda purposes, and again in view of the oriental attitude toward human life, it is conceivable that the Chinese might not agree to relinquish UN personnel whom they have charged with war crimes. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that in this eventuality the UN armistice negotiators propose that such prisoners held by both sides be delivered into the custody of the Armistice Commission.

4. On balance then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the best interests of the United States would be served if, in the event of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war in Korea, those prisoners of war accused of either conventional war crimes or post-capture offenses be relinquished by the United Nations forces, and be included in the exchange of prisoners as mutually agreed upon in the terms of the armistice. Accordingly, they recommend that this policy be approved and that there be no deviation from a final United States position of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners.

5. In connection with the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff would record their concern over the fate of those enemy prisoners of war who have voluntarily aided the United Nations Command. They have no concrete suggestion by which the exchanging of this group of prisoners can be avoided, but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring the return of a maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners in Communists hands, would also preserve the lives of those prisoners in United Nations forces hands who have rendered outstanding assistance to the United Nations Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with General Ridgway that the proposal by the Department of State for the parole of these groups by him is not an acceptable solution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their view that this consideration not be permitted to jeopardize the main purpose of the negotiation, which is to obtain the early release by the Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.

6. In response to the request for recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the instructions which should be furnished General Ridgway on the disposition of those prisoners who are accused of conventional war crimes or who have been convicted or are

awaiting trial for post-capture offenses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would state that this problem is of secondary importance to the matter of the release by the Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.

7. In light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

a. Approval as a matter of urgency of the draft message to CINCFE which was forwarded with their memorandum to you dated 15 November 1951, subject "Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners"; and

b. Approval of a reply to CINCFE's message CX 58195 along the following lines:

"Planned procedure in urad CX 58195 approved. Discussions in armistice negotiations regarding the disposition of war criminals should be minimized although the arrangements must insure that any exchange which is arranged on an all-for-all basis includes prisoners held by both sides who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes and those prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. In the event the Communists refuse to agree to arrangements for the above exchange you should propose that such prisoners held by both sides be delivered into the custody of the Armistice Commission. JCS have no concrete suggestions but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring the return of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners in Communist hands, would also preserve the lives of prisoners in UN hands who have rendered outstanding assistance to the UN Command.

"Recognizing that a completely acceptable solution of this problem is improbable and that we may be forced to return to the Communists certain personnel whose retention would be desirable, JCS assume that you are maintaining a complete record of individuals in the categories indicated in subparagraph 1 *d* of your CX–58195 for such use as may later be desirable."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 8: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 3 December 1951.[1]

C–58558. HNC–508. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 508.

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[1] The source text does not indicate the time of transmission.

"Report of Armistice Conference 3 December. Convened at 1100 hours.

"1. Nam Il opened in the following vein: The proposals on the limitation on the increase of military facilities and observation throughout Korea are political questions which constitute direct interference in the internal administration of the other side and cannot be tolerated. The matter of defensive facilities is an internal matter. UNC carries out inhuman bombing. It is effective because of inadequate AA facilities. Yet UNC refuses to withdraw its Air Force during the Armistice. How then can it interfere with sacred right of Korean people to defend themselves by arranging their defensive facilities? The UNC view that the Armistice Commission have access to all of Korea is an unwarranted interference in internal affairs which will not be tolerated. UNC proposal that both sides refrain from introducing into Korea reinforcements in men and material is inconsistent with its stand on replenishments and replacements. UNC insistence on the latter raises doubt as to its sincerity towards the former. UNC has no justification for its refusal to withdraw from islands north of the demarcation line as the dividing line. UNC has only the obligation to withdraw.

"2. UNC replied in following tenor: Statement made by Nam Il only indicates the other side wants not an armistice but a simple cease fire under protection of which it could increase its military capabilities. As military men the delegation of the other side should recognize that the UNC cannot enter into an armistice which does not involve undertakings by both sides to refrain from attempting to gain a military advantage during the suspension of fighting. As regards joint observation, it would not constitute interference in internal affairs. It would not be a means for intelligence information on such matters as design of weapons. It is necessary, however, that there be joint military observation of key points throughout Korea as mutually agreed to by the two sides. The UNC does not fear joint observation but welcomes it because it will not violate an armistice to which it is a signatory. Why does the other side fear it? What does it plan to hide?

"3. Nam Il reiterated that military facilities and the question of observation are internal questions.

"4. UNC repeated its firm stand in opposition to any increase of military facilities during the armistice and inquired if other side had any suggestion as to a method for resolving the differences which were pointed up yesterday by the UNC.

"5. Nam Il proposed a recess until 1500. Recessed 1200.

"Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 10 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 3 December 1951—9:50 p. m.

C–58579. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 509. Further to HNC 508. (C 58558).[1]

"1. Saying that the views of both sides had been fully exchanged during the last 7 days, Nam Il submitted two new principles to add to his original five principle proposal. These were: (6) in order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext. (7) In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of Para 6, both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean war to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result of inspection.

"2. Nam Il continued in the following vein: After 6 days debate no lengthy explanation of these principles is necessary, but the 7 principle proposal is an integral whole, its various paras being interrelated and inseparable. The new proposal incorporates the reasonable portions of the UNC proposal. It is proposed that the plenary session accept the 7 principle proposal as an overall agreement for the third item of the agenda.

"3. Nam Il then presented the 7 principle proposal in writing. The wording of the fifth principle varied from the original version as previously reported. It now read: (5) Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form an Armistice Commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in Paragraph 6 of this proposal.

"4. UNC delegation requested a 30 minute recess. On its return it stated that it had made a preliminary examination of the new proposal and desired to ask some questions to clarify its understanding of the proposal. A long list of questions was presented. The following are examples: Does Item 6 permit unlimited reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields? Does the term weapons include aircraft? Does Item 6 prevent replenishment of ammo used in training? Does Item 6 prevent rotation and replenishment of forces? Under principle 7 what nations do you have in mind? Is it your intention that both sides invite the same neutral nations or different neutral nations to inspect our respective sides? Could you provide a list of the nations whose representatives would be acceptable to you? Does principle 7 exclude observation of facilities other than ports of entry? Is the inspection proposed in 7 limited to the specific items listed in 6. Is aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance included in necessary inspection beyond the demilitarized zone?

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[1] *Supra.*

"5. Nam Il having indicated that the preparation of answers to these questions would take some time, the UNC made a statement as follows: As the UNC understands the position of the other side it proposes a compromise between positions held by the two sides. Due to the formal and relatively inflexible nature of the plenary sessions they are not the best medium for negotiatory processes of this nature. The UNC therefore, suggests reference of the question of acceptable principles to a subdelegation for resolution. The differences over agenda item 2 were resolved in this manner.

"6. Nam Il's first response was that the problem could be turned over to a subcommittee only after agreement in principle to the seven principles he had proposed. He revised this to say that he would give an answer after considering it and proposed a recess until 1100 tomorrow. Adjourned 1616.

"7. Delegations meet 4 Dec at 110[illegible] Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 20–B

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1951.

SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS OF WAR

CATEGORIES SINGLED OUT IN THE LETTER OF NOVEMBER 23 FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE[2]

1. Enemy prisoners of war against whom documented cases have been prepared covering criminal acts committed prior to their capture.

2*a*. Enemy prisoners who have been convicted of post-capture offenses.

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[1] The source text indicated that Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs was a codrafter of this document.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1167.

2*b*. Enemy prisoners who are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses.

Comments:

1. As of October 10, 1951, the UN Command had 302 suspects and 43 witnesses in custody. These 302 persons are accused of having committed conventional war crimes in violation of the "Rules of Warfare" (Fourth Hague Convention). Class A war crimes (Nuremburg type) are not involved.

2. According to the Geneva Convention: "Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offense."*

3. In view of our faithful adherence to the Geneva Conventions, the Communists know names and numbers of enemy prisoners in our custody. The UNC does not know how many UN-ROK prisoners are in enemy custody.

4. The UNC will attempt to secure a one-for-one prisoner of war exchange. In this event we would retain those prisoners whose continued retention would seem either desirable or warranted. This would include prisoners of the above categories. The following listing of factors for or against retention of these prisoners applies therefore only to the situation in which the UNC has been forced to accept the principle of an all-for-all exchange.

FACTORS FAVORING THE RETENTION OF PRISONERS OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES

1. We would continue to adhere to a principle of international law generally recognized within the comity of nations.

2. Continued adherence to this principle may act as a deterrent against offenders in the future. Conversely, its abandonment might encourage future offenses.

3. The punishment and continued retention of enemy war criminals, despite Communist threats to punish "UN war criminals" would show UN firmness in the face of enemy blackmail.

4. The continued retention of enemy war criminals would give us some protection against Communist bad faith regarding "UN-ROK war criminals". (In the event we return all enemy war criminals, the Communists might secretly retain some prisoners of war and after the completion of the POW exchange punish them for war crimes.)

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*Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 119. Articles 99 to 108 of the same Convention apply to judicial proceedings and are also relevant. By implication there is provision for the death penalty. [Footnote in the source text.]

FACTORS OPPOSING THE RETENTION OF PRISONERS OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES

1. Retention and punishment of these categories would endanger the lives of prisoners of war held by the enemy. The retention of enemy criminals would expose to enemy reprisal UN prisoners in numbers much larger than the 302 enemy suspects held by us. An analysis of enemy radio intercepts reveals that in recent propaganda broadcasts the Communists have attempted to build up a case against UN atrocities and "UN war criminals."

2. Although public opinion favors the punishment of Communist war criminals, it would react unfavorably to any action on our part which would in any way prejudice the lives of our prisoners of war. Safety of living prisoners would take precedence in the public mind over punishing the enemy prisoners for war crimes.

3. Unless we are prepared to make this question a breaking point of the negotiations, an adamant Communist position on the issue coupled with threats of reprisal to all our prisoners of war may eventually compel us to recede from our position. This would mean loss of prestige and UN weakness in the face of communist strength.

4. Under the particular circumstances of this armistice, a failure to exercise our right to punish war criminals does not constitute an abandonment of that right.

693.0024/11-2351

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 4, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of November 23, 1951 in regard to item 4 on the agenda of the current armistice negotiations, enclosing a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you of November 15 and a proposed message to General Ridgway on the same subject. The Department of State has given serious consideration to the questions you raised with respect to the disposition of prisoners of war who are accused of conventional war crimes and those prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses.

In policy decisions concerning the general question of the exchange of prisoners the overriding consideration is the welfare and return of all prisoners of war in enemy custody. Although it is recognized that this objective may be susceptible of accomplishment only upon the basis of an agreement providing for an all-for-all exchange of prisoners, the Department urges that, within the limits of this objective, efforts be made to avoid the forcible return to the Communists of persons whose lives would be endangered thereby. We are particularly conscious of our moral obligation to those who would be subject to reprisal for assistance and cooperation rendered the United Nations forces and Command.

The Department of State desires to give further consideration to all of the implications involved in returning to the Communists, in the event of an all-for-all exchange, prisoners against whom documented cases covering criminal acts committed prior to their capture have been prepared and I will shortly transmit to you the Department's views on this subject.

With regard to the proposed message to the Commander in Chief, Far East, on prisoners of war, there is attached a revised draft incorporating Department of State suggestions.[1] The change in paragraph 3*h* relates to the fact that in view of Communist disregard for the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, this Government has no exact knowledge of the number of prisoners of war which they hold. It is believed that prior to agreeing to an all-for-all exchange, General Ridgway should have definite assurances from the Communists that they will return all prisoners they now hold and that the number they agree to return conforms to his best estimate of prisoners of war held by the enemy.

The changes in paragraph 3 reflect the distinction which the Department believes may have to be made in dealing with the problems of the return of non-Korean civilian internees and the repatriation of Korean civilians. General Ridgway should make every possible effort to secure agreement on the release of certain specifically named civilian internees. The revised paragraph 4 contains a list, of all non-Korean civilians believed to have remained in the area of conflict after the outbreak of hostilities. It should be noted that this list includes 50 United Nations civilian internees, 4 Irish, and 1 Austrian. I will transmit additional details regarding these civilians as it becomes available.

Discussions on the larger issue of Korean civilians entail numerous political problems and should be avoided in the armistice discussions, at least for the present. The Department of State is currently considering the political aspects of the repatriation of Korean civilians including the advisability of securing a specific list of leading Republic of Korea civilians believed to be in Communist hands. Paragraph 5 has been modified accordingly.

Sincerely yours, [WEBB]

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[1] The revised draft is not here printed; the significant changes proposed by the Department of State are summarized in Mr. Webb's letter.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 13 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 December 1951—4:51 p. m.

C–58635. HNC–512. "Report of Armistice Conf, 4 Dec:

"1. Nam Il stated that he had studied UNC questions and proposal; that such concrete questions could best be discussed in subcommittee. He then stated that he did not oppose the UNC proposal of going over to a subcommittee of the delegations.

"2. The UNC stated that its suggestions did not imply acceptance of the Communist proposal, and that the function of the subcommittee was to resolve the differences between the delegations on Agenda Item Nbr 3 and to recommend to the delegations a mutually acceptable solution to that item. UNC continued, saying that concurrent discussion in subcommittee of Agenda Items 3 and 4 would contribute materially to the prog of the negotiations. UNC proposed appointment of another subcommittee to discuss Agenda Item 4.

"3. Nam Il replied that the proposal for discussion of Item 4 would be answered after due consideration and proposed that the subcommittee on Agenda Item 3 convene at 1400 today.

"4. At 1133 plenary sessions recessed for duration of subcommittee meetings, subject to resumption on call of either side. Sgd Joy"

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 12 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 December 1951—4:52 p.m.

C–58637. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 511.

"The following questions were asked by UNC yesterday immediately following introduction of few Communist proposal: (Questions on principle 6):

"1. Does your 6 preclude the return to Korea of individuals sent elsewhere for short periods of rest or temporary duty?

"2. Does your 6 preclude furnishing a replacement for a soldier evacuated because of illness, injury, or expiration of his term of service?

"3. Does your 6 prevent replacing, say, a company with a company of similar size and types?

"4. Do you intend by this to prohibit rotation and replenishment for UN forces?

"5. Does your 6 preclude the return to Korean ports of naval vessels sent elsewhere for periodic overhaul?

"6. It is assumed that your proposals are intended to apply during an armistice. Is this correct?

"7. You make no mention of military installations. Do you intend your proposal 6 to permit unlimited construction and rehabilitation of airfields?

"8. What do you mean by the term 'weapons'? Do you include airplanes under the category of 'weapons'?

"9. Is it intended to prevent replenishment of ammo used in training?

"10. Do you intend to prevent exchange of weapons of the same type?

"11. What is your definition of military forces? What forces do you include in your term military forces? (Questions on principle seven):

"1. Would the nations forming the supervisory organ to conduct the inspection have representatives on both your side and our side?

"2. How many nations do you have in mind on the supervisory organ, one nation or a group of nations?

"3. What nations do you have in mind?

"4. Is it your intention that both sides invite the same neutral nations or different neutral nations to inspect our respective sides?

"5. Is it your thought to station observation teams from neutral nations at the ports of entry, or to send them there from time to time at the discretion of the armistice commission?

"6. We would like to have a list of the nations whose representatives you would consider acceptable to you.

"7. Is your 7 principle intended to prevent observation of facilities other than ports of entry?

"8. Do you intend the inspection you propose in 7 to be limited solely to the specific items you list in principle 6?

"9. What body or group will make inspections of the demilitarized zone?

"10. In 'necessary inspection beyond the demilitarized zone' do you include aerial reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance? UNC intends to ask the following additional questions today: (Questions on principle 5):

"Principle 5 would hold the armistice commission responsible for 'the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in para 6 of this proposal'.

"(*a*) What is the exact meaning of the term 'scope supervision specified in para 6'? Does it mean supervision to insure only that neither side introduce into Korea during the armistice any military forces, weapons and ammo under any pretext?

"(*b*) Your principle 7 provides that the neutral nations supervisory organ will report its findings to the armistice commission. This we take to mean that the armistice commission would be responsible for supervising the enforcement of your 6 principle. If this is correct, do you intend that the military armistice commission have the authority to direct the neutral nations organ to make whatever inspections the military armistice commission consider necessary? In other words, will the military armistice commission determine what constitutes 'necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone'? (Questions on principle 6):

"1. Does your principle 6 preclude visits or inspections of a temporary nature from outside Korea by military personnel from those United Nations whose troops are part of the United Nations Command?

"2. Does your principle 6 preclude the flight to that part of Korea south of the demilitarized zone of those United Nations Command administrative and cargo aircraft regularly operating in Korea but based elsewhere? (Questions on principle 7):

"1. Would the neutral nations supervisory organ be under the auth of, and responsible to, the armistice commission if not, to whom would it be responsible?

"2. Since only representatives of neutral nations can conduct inspections beyond the demilitarized zone, and since their inspections would be limited to the items enumerated in your principle 6, how can the armistice commission obtain enough information to enable it to supervise the carrying out of other terms of the armistice?

"3. How do you propose to insure that the supervisory organ can be ready to function when the armistice is signed? If it is not ready, how will the necessary inspections be made in the interim?

"4. When are the neutral nations to be selected? By whom? Who will issue the requisite invitations to the selected neutral governments?

"5. How are the representatives of the neutral nations to be selected?

"6. When are the ports of entry to be mutually agreed upon—before or after the armistice is signed?

"7. Who determines what inspections are 'necessary'?

"8. Who determines the extent of inspections?

"9. Reference inspection beyond the demilitarized zone by representatives of neutral nations: Is it your intention that each side will select an equal number of representatives from neutral nations of its own choosing and that these representatives then form teams composed of equal membership on each side, to be stationed at such ports as Siniuju, Wonsan, Pusan or Inchon? In other words, at any of the ports just mentioned, for example, would there be a team composed of representatives designated by your side and by our side? Or do you intend that neutrals of your choosing only will inspect and report on matters north of the demilitarized zone?

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 14 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 December 1951—5:42 p. m.

C–58639. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 513.

"Report of sub-committee meeting 4 December. Convened 1400. The following answers to questions asked by UNC yesterday were given by Communists at opening of session:

"1. Rotation or replacements is impermissible in the entire duration of the armistice. Individuals rejoining their units can be permitted to return periodically to Korea within the scope to be prescribed by the armistice commission and subject to examination by the supervisory organ of neutral nations.

"2. By 'military forces' is meant all units and personnel regular and irregular of ground, naval and air forces.

"3. By 'weapons' is meant all the military equipment including aircraft.

"4. Neither side has the right to interfere with or to inspect the reconstruction of any facilities within Korea.

"5. Replenishments and exchange of any weapons and ammunition are impermissible.

"6. The supervisory organ composed of representatives of neutral nations shall send to the ports of entry at the rear agreed upon by both sides, the same kind of representatives for conduction the same kind of inspection. The scope of inspection is limited to that prescribed by para 6 of our proposal.

"7. It would be appropriate that the neutral nations be three to five in number and that they be invited by both sides.

"8. Whether the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be stationed at the ports of entry at the rear of both sides or proceed there regularly is to be decided by the supervisory organ itself and the method of inspection is to be decided in the same way.

"9. Regarding the list of neutral nations our side will submit our specific proposal after this measure is agreed to by both sides. Session continuing. Signed Joy".

795.00/12–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 4, 1951—7 : 56 p. m.

2790. Re Emb tel 2587 Dec 3.[1] In ur mtg with Eden Wed[2] request you express to him Dept's appreciation for his views transmitted to the Secretary which were made available to Dept by Brit Emb Wash.[3]

You may inform him that while some progress appears to have been made by armistice negotiators in gaining Communists acceptance of necessity for agreement by both sides not to increase level of forces or war matériel during period of armistice, and measures for each side to assure itself that other is complying with such agreement, it is by no means yet a certainty that Communists are willing to accept measures which will give essential assurances required for safety of United Nations forces. In this connection, it is of interest to note that thus far the Communists have been very outspoken with regard to their intent to engage in extensive airfield reconstruction within North Korea during the period of an armistice.

With respect to para 3 of Mr. Eden's message, it is intent of US to continue to press for adequate inspection arrangements. However, it must be recognized that no inspection system within Korea can be completely effective in safeguarding UN forces from Communist breach of faith. Consequently, whatever inspection system may eventually be agreed upon, we feel it important to make clear to other side what would, in fact, be probable consequences of any major violation of armistice agreement.

With respect to numbered para 4 of Mr. Eden's message, we agree that any statement to be made concerning consequences of major breach of armistice arrangements by Communists should not be made only by the United States and the United Kingdom and that a collective statement by the United Nations is not practicable. It is our preliminary view that most preferable course would be collective statement by all countries contributing armed forces. We are working on a draft statement which we hope shortly to discuss with UK. After general US–UK agreement on draft, we would consider desirability and timing of discussing statement, initially with certain other countries, and, if outcome of discussions warranted, eventually with all countries which have contributed forces.

With respect to para 5, while we agree it is difficult now to commit ourselves to exact action to be taken against China and that that decision can only finally be reached in the light of the circumstances then existing in the Far East and elsewhere in world, we do feel that there are certain minimum steps upon which we should now reach agreement in order to give substance and meaning to any statement we make. We conceive these minimum steps to be aerial bombardment of Chinese military bases (not necessarily limited to air bases across the Yalu) and naval blockade of Chinese coast. It is our view that nothing less than these measures could be considered as bringing any effective pressure upon China itself.

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[1] Not printed; it informed the Department that the Embassy in London had received from the Foreign Office the substance of the messages from Mr. Eden on the questions of greater sanctions and trade with mainland China (Black Book, Tab 11).

[2] December 5.

[3] Reference is to the first of the two British messages, transmitted to the Department on December 3, p. 1221.

We have just today received from the Brit Emb the UK views on trade with China [4] and will shortly wish further to discuss in greater detail the question of blockade as well as bombing of Chinese bases.

While we appreciate Brit desire to keep Commonwealth countries principally concerned informed, in view of considerable number of other countries also strongly concerned we suggest that further discussion of this subject for time being and until further consultation be limited to US–UK.

WEBB

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[4] Reference is to the second of the two British messages, December 3, p. 1223.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 17 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 4 December 1951—8:43 p. m.

C–58662. CINCUNC Adv HNC 514 for info.

"Further to HNC 513.[1] Entire session was devoted to Communists providing answers to questions posed by UNC. Key points not previously reported are as follows:

"(1) Communists will accept joint inspection behind their lines as long as inspectors are from neutral countries. They agree that the composition of the inspection teams will be mixed as between neutrals selected by us, and neutrals selected by them. All neutral nations must be agreed upon by both sides.

"(2) The authority and activity of the MAC shall be strictly limited to the demilitarized zone, since MAC is to be made up of belligerents. Belligerents cannot be permitted in rear areas.

"(3) Communists gave no hint as to what neutral countries they have in mind. They said they would give that information later after the principle was accepted.

"(4) Communists deferred answering whether the neutral inspecting organ was to be subject to the authority and direction of the MAC.

"(5) Communists stated that whether inspection was by air or ground methods was to be determined by the neutral inspecting organ.

"(6) Whether inspecting teams would be stationed at ports of entry or go to them from time to time was to be determined by the inspecting organ.

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[1] See telegram C–58639, December 4, from Tokyo, p. 1237.

"(7) All answers by Communists held to strict prohibition of replacement, replenishment, and rotation except in the case of personnel rejoining their units.

"(8) The scope of supervision contemplated in principle 6 is strictly limited to introduction of forces, weapons, and ammo into Korea. Airplanes are considered as weapons.

"(9) Places to be inspected would be determined in the armistice agreement.

"(10) Except for inspection by the MAC in the demilitarized zone and inspection of selected ports of entry by the neutral inspecting organ, all inspection is to be by each side within its own territory.

"(11) Communists deferred answers as to what they mean by 'coastal' as applied to islands and waters.

"It was apparent that the Communists sub-delegation had not been instructed completely as to the application of their own proposals, particularly relationship of neutral organ and MAC. Recessed 1600 to convene at 1300 tomorrow. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 18 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 December 1951—12:22 a. m.

C-58665. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 515.

"In order to carry out necessary work here on counterproposal to be made to Communists, the key question to which we need an answer from higher authority is whether the UNC will or will not accept inspecting teams composed of nationals from so-called neutral countries. It is also important to know what authority these teams should have and to whom they should be responsible. It should be realized that inspection by these neutral teams may be nothing more than a gesture with respect to the principle of inspection. Request guidance as a matter of urgency.

Sgd Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 21 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 December 1951—10:25 a. m.

CX 58694. This supersedes mymsg CX 58666.[1] This msg in three parts.

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[1] Transmitted earlier on December 5 (Black Book, Tab 19), not printed, its text was altered slightly by telegram CX-58694.

Part 1. Desired that sub-delegation take first opportunity to reintroduce the basic UNC principles by restatement as follows:

Article 1. All armed forces, ground, sea and air under the control of either side, shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the armistice agreement enters into effect.

Article 2. All armed forces under control of either side shall be withdrawn from and remain outside of the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement enters into effect, except such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically and mutually agreed to by both sides.

Article 3. There shall be established a military armistice commission of mixed membership on an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the UNC and the Commander in Chief of the Communist Forces, and responsible for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice agreement.

Article 4. *a.* The military armistice commission, and its joint observer teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movements for the above teams over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea.

b. The military armistice commission shall have the right of joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

c. The military armistice commission shall have the right of complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.

Article 5. Neither side shall increase the level of units, personnel, war equipment, facilities, or matériel existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective.

Article 6. Within 72 hours of the entering into effect of the armistice agreement, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control, ground, sea and air, from the territory controlled by the other side, that is to say, from behind the demilitarized zone.

Article 7. Each side will administer that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the median line and in accordance with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

Article 8. The armistice agreement shall enter into effect when the military armistice commission has been organized and is ready to begin the exercise of its functions.

Part 2. Suggest you also instruct sub-delegation as follows:

a. Insist upon clear-cut answers in unequivocal language to the questions listed in your HNC 511[2] as well as to the fol, which in some instances may be repetitious:

1. How are neutrals to be selected, and by whom?
2. How are neutral governments to be approached, and by whom?
3. Is agreement of both sides on each neutral to be confined to the neutral country itself or to be extended to each individual neutral representative?
4. Are the neutral inspection teams to be directly and exclusively responsible to the military armistice commission?
5. If not, from what sources will the neutral inspection teams derive their authority?
6. What are the specific terms of ref proposed for these neutral inspection teams?
7. Which are the neutral countries from which your selection would be made?
8. Within what period of time would you expect agreement could be reached on the foregoing?
9. If you should intend that the military armistice commission have no authority over the neutral inspection teams, leaving the determination to some outside authority as to whether these teams would inspect in the air, on the ground, or both, and whether these teams would be permanently located at agreed ports of entry or free to go there only when they chose, how could you expect any reasonable assurance that the terms of the armistice agreement were being faithfully executed?
10. Since you specifically would limit the scope of supervising contemplated in your principle 6 to the introduction of forces, weapons, and ammunition into Korea, do you not specifically intend to retain the right to build new airfields and to improve old ones with all their ancillary facilities as you see fit, and, if so, would not these fields then be ready for operational use upon the landing there of combat aircraft?

b. You are free to state categorically that the UNC rejects any prohibition against replacement and exchange of units and personnel on a man-for-man basis and of equipment on a piece-for-piece basis with the level existing at the time the armistice became effective.

c. You are free to state categorically that the UNC delegation considers any armistice agreement unacceptable that does not include safeguards in the form of observation which will insure against violation and evasion.

d. You are free to state categorically that unilateral reports of inspection of Communist controlled territory by Communist agencies will be unacceptable.

e. In seeking clarification of Communist positions on the foregoing and other points so far and hereafter raised, you should have in mind the necessity of reconciling two conflicting requirements: First, insistence upon sufficient time for proper analysis of Communist proposals that require a change in your basic directives, and for receipt of clear and satisfactory answers to our questions; and, second, avoidance of making ourselves subject to United States and world public criticism for obstructing or unduly delaying these negotiations.

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[2] See telegram C–58637 from Tokyo, December 4, p. 1234.

Part 3. The foregoing is not to be construed as an inflexible directive. Your comments are invited. However, with respect to the major points contained in the recent Communist proposals, you will avoid any positive commitment, or position which could be construed as commitment, without prior clearance here.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 29 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 December 1951—10: 52 a. m.

CX-58695. Desired that UNC initial position under agenda item 5 be phrased as follows:

"Each side agrees to recommend to its respective governmental authorities that they give consideration to the convening of a conference of the political representatives of both sides to discuss appropriate matters arising from but not resolved by the armistice agreement".

795.00/12-551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1951.[1]

Subject: Meeting with JCS on Korea

Participants: JCS: General Bradley
General Vandenberg
Admiral Fechteler
General Hull
General Cabell[2]
State: Mr. Matthews, G
Mr. Bohlen, C
Mr. Nitze, S/P
Mr. Ferguson, S/P
Mr. Bonbright, EUR
Mr. Johnson, FE

A meeting with the JCS was held this morning to discuss a directive to General Ridgway on the handling of the prisoner-of-war problem in the armistice negotiations. Discussion was held on the basis of JCS draft directive[3] and State suggestions for revisions therein contained in State's letter of December 4, 1951, to the Secretary of Defense, and JCS memo of December 3, 1951, to the Secretary of Defense.

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[1] Although dated December 5, the day on which this State–JCS meeting took place, the information contained at the end of the memorandum indicates that it must have been prepared, or added to, after that date. The source text shows no drafting date.

[2] Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Director of the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The discussions revolved principally around the questions of forced versus voluntary repatriation, one-for-one versus all-for-all exchange, and return of UN and ROK civilians held by the Communists.[4] It was decided that General Cabell and Mr. Johnson would prepare a revised draft directive on the basis of the previous State and JCS drafts and the discussion in the meeting.

There was also discussion of the Communist proposal for a neutral organ to supervise the armistice outside the demilitarized zone and the relationship to that organ of the Military Armistice Commission.

There ensued a long discussion of the "greater sanction" concept, the present stage of discussions of the subject with the UK, and the relationship of the "greater sanction" principle to the safeguards for the UN forces that would be required in any armistice agreement. It was the general conclusion that if the UK would join us in a "greater sanction" statement, the requirements for the safety of UN forces could be modified. However, as such agreement had not yet been achieved, it was premature to modify those requirements, but at the same time Ridgway should be instructed not to take "final" positions until a decision was reached on the statement. After some discussion of a draft directive to General Ridgway on the subject, it was agreed that General Hull and Mr. Johnson would prepare a new draft to be circulated during the day. This draft was subsequently approved and dispatched as JCS 88877, December 5, 1951,[5] and JCS 89114, December 7, 1951,[6] was transmitted to the President for his approval.

[*Note:* Draft directive on prisoners of war mentioned above, prepared by General Cabell and Mr. Johnson, was subsequently approved by State and Defense and dispatched to the President by JCS 89090, December 7.[7] Following the receipt of the President's comments on December 8, the first sentence of paragraph 1H was amended to meet the President's views; dispatched to General Ridgway as JCS 89172, December 10, 1951.][8]

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[3] See the subenclosure to the November 23 letter from Mr. Foster, p. 1170.

[4] The Department of State draft memorandum on the substance of discussions at this State–JCS meeting read as follows at the beginning of the discussion on the prisoners of war question:

"Mr. Matthews: The President has a strong personal interest in the prisoners of war problem. He does not believe that it would be equitable to exchange prisoners on an all-for-all basis. It is clear that if all of the prisoners in our hands are returned some of them will be promptly done away with by the Communist authorities.

"General Bradley: I have also been informed by the President that he wants any directive on POW's cleared with him. It looked to the President as though there had been some fuzzy thinking on this problem." (S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728)

[5] *Post*, p. 1247.

[6] *Post*, p. 1278.

[7] *Post*, p. 1276.

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[8] Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1296. Brackets in the source text.

320/12-551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 5, 1951—1 p. m.

Delga 511. Subject: Korea.

Heavy pressures from UK, Fr, Aust and Can to hold informal discussions concerning post-armistice moves Korea are building up as news from Korea gives rise to feeling armistice might soon be concluded.

Pearson (Canada) is leaving Paris for Ottawa Thurs a. m. and has requested Gross to meet 6 p. m. this evening Paris time.

In accordance with Gadel 327 [*323*], December 2,[1] we have rejected requests for conversations subject matter Delga 464 and 465.[2]

In view of Pearson's imminent departure and his repeated request for informal exchange of views, we have found it difficult without extreme embarrassment to refuse his request. In view of explicit instruction Gadel 327 [*323*], urgently request Dept to authorize by Niact message purely exploratory discussion with Pearson primary object of which would be to ascertain his views. We would, of course, make it completely clear that US position still under consideration.[3]

AUSTIN

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 1211.

[2] Both dated December 1, pp. 1208 and 1210.

[3] Telegram Gadel 343, December 5, to Paris, responded as follows:

"No objection, Delga 511. Dept's further comments Korea will fol. Since we are reviewing whole situation here with JCS, you shld carefully avoid any commitments re our position." (320/12-551)

711.5622/11-2851

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1951.

Subject: Possible Further Steps re Bomber Shot Down by Soviet Union.

We have again carefully explored, on the basis of Mr. Johnson's memorandum of November 28,[2] the possibilities of further action which would bring home to the Soviet Union and to other nations that they cannot with impunity unlawfully destroy our planes and kill our personnel who are engaged in UN action. In particular, we have examined the precedent in the Security Council following the incident in August 1950, when one of our planes had by mistake bombed Chinese territory. Our Representative in the Security Council at that time proposed that a commission consisting of representatives of India and Sweden proceed to the spot and investigate the incident, and stated that the US would pay compensation for any damages assessed by this Committee. The Soviet Union, however, vetoed the resolution.

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[1] The memorandum was also directed to Mr. Walworth Barbour of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 1182.

We have considered the possibility of offering a similar resolution in the present case. Careful study, however, has confirmed our original decision that this would not be a good idea. Such a commission would have to base its conclusions and its report on the evidence made available to it. The only witnesses for our version of the story—the pilot and crew of the plane in question—are presumably dead. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could produce the airmen involved and probably hundreds of Soviet citizens who could be made to testify that they "saw" the US plane over Soviet territory and that they "heard" it open fire. The only evidence we could offer would be the instructions under which the plane was operating and such information as we had as to its whereabouts when last heard from. Since it would be most difficult to persuade a commission that this is conclusive evidence that the plane did not in fact lose its course and reach Soviet territory, we could not be confident of getting a firm finding from the Committee in our favor, and indeed it is not out of the question that it might find in favor of the Soviet story.

In the circumstances, we recommend against raising the question in the UN. We might give further consideration, however, to the possibility of making a protest and demand for redress directly to the Soviet Union. This could perhaps be done consistently with the UN character of the mission on which the plane was engaged, by having the US Government emphasize that it is making the complaint both as the Unified Command and as the Government whose plane and whose nationals were involved. We have requested the Legal Adviser's Office to inform us whether there would be any legal objection to this procedure.[3]

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[3] See the memorandum by Mr. Hickerson, dated December 12, p. 1308.

795.00/12-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 5, 1951—4 p. m.

2607. Reference Deptel 2790, December 4.

In conversation with Eden this morning I handed him memorandum containing substance reftel which he read. He commented that the main difference seemed to be the matter of naval blockade which

Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff had discussed and still did not believe would be effective. He added he assumed that what went into the statement that would be issued would depend to some extent on the character of the armistice agreement with regard to inspection.

He noted that we would have further discussions on the question of blockade as well as bombing of Chinese bases and said that he would continue to give consideration to the matter.

GIFFORD

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 35 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 5 December 1951—6: 22 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS-88877. From JCS.

1. JCS are pleased with progress made to date on item 3 and consider that negotiations are now at such a crucial stage that particular care must be exercised to prevent any regression.

2. While agreement on this item may be possible, JCS consider that even full Communist acceptance of final position set forth in JCS 88226[1] will not insure security of UN forces in event of Communist breach of faith in observance of armistice. Accordingly, possibilities of action along lines indicated in para 2 of JCS 87239[2] are being pursued. Conversations with UK are continuing and matter was discussed at Rome by Sec Acheson, Sec Lovett and Gen Bradley with Mr. Eden and reptvs of British C of S.

3. Dependent upon development these conversations as well as continuing course of armistice negotiations, JCS may desire to reconsider final position on item 3. Consequently without further instructions from JCS you should continue to refrain from taking any irrevocable positions on points now at issue in negotiations on item 3 or in public statements thereon. However, you should not interpret this as precluding a continuation of your present effective efforts to expose difficulties in Communist proposals and obtain maximum possible degree of Communist agreement to our present final position.[3]

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[1] Dated November 28, p. 1193.

[2] Dated November 16, p. 1142.

[3] This message was repeated by General Ridgway to Admiral Joy with the following comment:

"1. Invite your attention to my C 57217 of 14 [*13*] Nov and JCS reply thereto in JCS 87239, 17 [*16*] Nov, as well as JCS 88877, [*5*] Dec, being repeated to you separately, for your guidance pending further instructions from here.

"2. Your difficulties are appreciated but it is vital that we continue to explore Communist proposals and indicate interest therein. Cannot accept Communist subdelegation charge that we are stalling in any way. We must have details of their proposals and intentions which, balanced against our own principles, will provide guidance towards final positions acceptable to us." (Black Book, Tab 30; telegram C-58790, December 6)

320/12-551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1951—6 : 30 p. m.

Gadel 350. Re Delga 294, Nov. 22. Dept sending latest info status bilateral negots via Airgram.[1] Eight copies tabulations of offers mil assistance Korea pouched GADel.[1]

In gen Dept's view that continuation bilateral approaches greatly preferable to full discussion this question in GA.

Re reco 1, Dept heartily agrees US shld stress informally in gen terms need additional troops Kor. Dept indicating to GADel in material being sent via Airgram details various bilateral negots and selected Dels which GADel shld approach informally.

Dept concurs in reco 2 urtel.

Re reco 3, we believe this not appropriate time discuss informally with Chairman and selected members AMC question possible request AMC for additional UN forces.

We believe prospect prompt and positive action by AMC not good. Reconvening for any purpose group designed solely to recommend additional measures against Chi and North Kor Commie aggression wld undoubtedly be opposed by friendly dels as likely disturb armistice negots, and might be considered as lack good faith US and lack true desire achieve armistice. Even if AMC reconvened there wld be reluctance recommend additional troops this time for same reasons. Also, since some members AMC not yet prepared commit themselves publicly further contributions this time, they wld be reluctant propose such recommendation. Possible failure in getting AMC make such reco wld give Commies propaganda ammunition and be interpreted some quarters as overt indication UN inability maintain strong position against possible renewal aggression, in event present armistice negots result in cease-fire. Furthermore, vote in GA on reco from AMC in nrs substantially less than 53 supporting action of June 25 and 27 Resolutions wld be damaging and be exploited by Commie propaganda as indication lack strong, united support for Kor effort.

We have not heretofore used AMC for mil recommendations, only economic. While this fact does not preclude its use, Dept believes undesirable set precedent which might put US under obligation secure prior AMC approval other mil steps in meeting aggression in Kor.

Advantage bilateral approaches is that constant pressure can be maintained on UN Members without opening Members free world to charge of lack of unity and unwillingness give full support to UN collective effort against aggression. Furthermore, special factors which obviously influence character negots can be given full consideration without giving comfort publicly to enemy. For example, ability increase in nr forces from NATO countries obviously affected by efforts being made by Eur countries to build mil estabs in fulfillment NATO commitments. By bringing question troops Kor in open GA forum, we wld be prodding nr NATO countries and others to announce publicly fact which we have known for some time; namely, needs for Kor must be balanced against needs for defense NATO and other strategic areas.

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[1] Not printed.

GADel shld bear in mind and make clear that in event armistice agreement includes prohibitions on increase level forces (item *c*, last part of Depcirtel 489, Nov 27),[2] such additional UN troops that may be sent Kor wld be employed relieve UN forces now in theatre and not raise overall level forces.

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[2] Not printed. The item referred to corresponds to paragraph 3 of the U.N. Command principles on agenda item 3 set forth in telegram C-58115, November 27, from Tokyo, p. 1186.

795.00/12-551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1951—7:17 p. m.

2807. Ref Deptel 2790[1] there is given below draft of type statement which US has in mind. Request you discuss with Eden and transmit to Dept any UK comments.

"We the nations participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the UN to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the UN, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the UN in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem, and our resolution that aggression committed again in Korea will bring upon any country whose forces are involved the full retribution without geographic limitation it will in justice have earned."

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[1] Dated December 4, p. 1238.

FYI last phrase final para foregoing refers to China as well as NK, it being considered that NK unaided could not carry out effective attack during immediate future following armistice.

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Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 24 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 December 1951—9 : 34 p. m.

C–58754. HNC–520. "Part 1 : Meeting of sub-delegations convened at 1300 this date. In answer to query, Lee replied his side would agree to invite representatives of those nations not directly participating in the fighting in Korea to form neutral inspecting organ. His side would accept members of United Nations such as Czechoslovakia or Poland, who were not fighting in Korea. In response to query, Lee replied Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark would be acceptable under the stated criteria. Lee said the Armistice Commission would not direct the neutral inspecting organ. The 2 would be parallel organs. The neutral organ would report the results of its inspections to the MAC. The MAC and the neutral organ are to be 2 independent agencies. No one can give instructions to the neutral organ, its directive is the armistice agreement itself. The neutral organ is a referee, operating in accord with the terms of the armistice. The MAC may request the neutral organ to make inspections outside Demilitarized Zone in case of specific needs. The major task of the MAC is to supervise the Demilitarized Zone. In addition the MAC will supervise exchange of POWs and will handle the reports made by the neutral inspecting organ. Individual representatives of neutral nations would be selected by the governments thereof. The neutral governments will determine whether their representatives are military or civilian, probably military. Agreement on neutral nations to be selected can be reached as soon as the principle is accepted, in 1 day, if UNC Delegation is agreeable. As soon as 3rd Agenda Item is completed, neutral nations will be invited during discussion of 4th Agenda Item. Personnel from neutral nations can be on hand at the time of the signing of the armistice. Communists refused to answer whether ports of entry include airports of entry. Communists evaded answer as to what distance they had in mind in using phrase 'Coastal waters and islands'. They stated definition of Territorial Waters under International Law was irrelevant. In excluding aircraft from entry to Korea during armistice, only combatant aircraft are meant. Neutral inspecting teams may be in place at ports of entry at the time of signing of the armistice.

"UNC Delegation proposed that a new set of principles to which both sides could agree be discussed and settled one by one. Communists insisted on package of all principles to be considered at once because of inter-relationship.

"Part 2: Tomorrow the Sub-Delegation will first seek answers to the questions on airports of entry and coastal waters. Second, we will read categoric positions contained in your CX 58694 [1] and state that Communist proposal is therefore not acceptable. Third, we will again seek to gain acceptance of the proposed procedure of taking up principles one by one. Fourth, when third step fails, we will present your principles contained in CX 58694 if the time seems opportune. We have no expectation that Communists will accept all the principles set forth in CX 58694.

"Meetings continue tomorrow at 1100. Signed Joy."

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[1] Dated December 5, p. 1240.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 22 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED PRIORITY TOKYO, 5 December 1951—9:35 p. m.

C-58755. HNC-518. For info CINCUNC Adv Msg HNC 518.

"The following written reply to United Nations Command questions was received from the Communists through the Liaison Officers prior to the meeting today.

"(1) The function of the Armistice Commission is to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in paragraph 6 of our proposal. If any armed forces of either side are found to have violated the armistice agreement by entering the Demilitarized Zone or carrying out any acts of armed force against the Demilitarized Zone, the Armistice Commission shall dispatch an inspection team composed of an equal number of personnel of both sides to the Demilitarized Zone to carry out inspection. The Armistice Commission has no right to operate behind the battle line of either side, beyond the Demilitarized Zone, because that would be an interference in the internal affairs of both sides, while the contents of the armistice terms are in general all limited to the Demilitarized Zone, regarding the deliberate bombardment, aerial bombing and coastal attack on the rear of one side by the other side, such as the case you posed in your question 17, we consider that if both sides are sincerely for an armistice, such incidents should not occur, and that, if they should occur, the supervisory organ of neutral nations must be requested to send there its inspection team to make an investigation and to report the result of the investigation to the Armistice Commission.

"(2) During the armistice, no military forces, weapons or ammo shall be introduced into Korea under any pretext, including, of course, military aircraft and naval vessels. The purpose of this is to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level. As to flight of Civil Transport aircraft and navigation of merchant vessels, they are not prohibited.

"(3) After agreement is reached on the third item of agenda, both sides can immediately work out through negotiations a list of neutral nations agreed upon by both sides, and proceed to invite them jointly, and after obtaining their consent, ask them to send an equal number of representatives respectively to be responsible for forming the supervisory organ, to be prepared, after the signing of the armistice agreement and in accordance with the scope specified in the armistice agreement, to dispatch teams, composed of equal numbers of members, to carry out inspection at the ports in the rear of both sides mutually agreed upon, and to be responsible to the Armistice Commission for reporting the result to the Armistice Commission. Signed Joy." [1]

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[1] A subsequent message sent from Admiral Joy to General Ridgway on December 5 as telegram HNC-519 was passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Following additional information on Communist position received from subcommittee, which is still in session:

" 'The MAC and the neutral organ are completely independent. Neither is subject to the direction of the other. The MAC may request the neutral organ to inspect outside the demilitarized zone. The directive of the neutral organ is the armistice agreement itself. Neutral teams may be in place at ports of entry at time of signing of armistice.' " (Black Book, Tab 23)

795.00/12-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, December 5, 1951—11 p. m.

532. As pointed out mytel 47 July 16 [1] and other reports from here appeals for action to secure release many thousands South Koreans in Commie hands have been publicly made several occasions since armistice talks started. In addition Emb has received several petitions from

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[1] Not printed.

various groups and individuals. Believe Koreans have been surprisingly restrained this issue as official attitude has been to quiet public protestations and counsel leaving problem in hands UNC negotiators who it was assumed wld raise issue at appropriate time. Chosen Democratic Party, consisting mainly refugees from north, have understandably been among most vocal group attempting keep issue in public eye. While influence this group shld not be overestimated, they are quite articulate and views given publicity in press.

At mtg Nov 4, four-point resolution regarding armistice talks renewed demand for return of kidnapped persons. (See Embtel 530, December 5).[2] Vice Pres Kim only yesterday sent me message from his sick bed stressing return of 20,000 kidnapped Koreans as most important issue in connection armistice, particularly as so many much needed leaders were among group.

In short it is my feeling failure broach question under Item Four, if subj UN and other foreign (mainly German missionary) civilian internees is raised, will evoke widespread comment and dissatisfaction in South Korean circles. Armistice unpopular as it is and seems unwise give Koreans excuse jeer at UN failure press for return missing persons.

I fully aware Commies unlikely agree return ROK civilians but horse trading tactics armistice talks have reached stage that best approach seems to be make initial demands far exceeding those for which ultimately willing to settle. Occurs to me matter might well be taken up under Item Four with expectation agreeing under pressure defer to Item Five. On other hand presentation lists poses real problem in view unreliability and incompleteness of available data. Also there will always be possibility some persons included who either did go north voluntarily or who later decided play Commie game.

Only existing lists I know of are (1) ROK OPI list 2,438 persons from Seoul area taken north, 976 killed by Commies in Seoul during 1950 occupation and 1202 missing from Seoul area, and (2) list 2527 persons kidnapped from ROK (preponderantly from Seoul), listed according their professions, prepared by association of families of kidnapped persons. Neither list is complete and they overlap. Figure generally given is 20,000 civilians taken north. I doubt if existing or subsequently revised lists shld be presented to Commie del although as mentioned I see no reason why demand shld not be made under Item Four of agenda for full accounting and return of survivors. Commies cld be asked for lists as will be done for PWs. Counterdemands re north Koreans in ROK cld be agreed to. In practice if lists such persons furnished they presumably wld include only persons in custody but not countless refugees who are here voluntarily.

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[2] **Not printed.**

Re matter approaching ROK, assume this necessary if additional lists required or if question not to be raised at all. However, if my suggestions accepted do not see need make any special approach to ROK this time other than possible to reassure key leaders subj to be raised under Item Four.

MUCCIO

795.00/12-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice

Participants: Ambassador Wrong, Canada
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Ward Allen—EUR

Ambassador Wrong had been requested by Foreign Minister Pearson from Paris to obtain clarification of US views on certain aspects of the proposed declaration to be issued in the event of an armistice and the courses of action to be followed in the event of a violation.[1] The UK have given Canada (as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) copies of Foreign Minister Eden's telegram to Churchill reporting on the Acheson-Eden meeting in Rome November 27, and Mr. Churchill's reply to Eden.[2] Based on these, Mr. Pearson raised the following points:

1. *Consultation:* He feels that Canada should have been consulted by the US directly before now and not be expected to obtain its information solely through the British. He feared that without direct consultations Canada "might be confronted with US-UK agreement and be asked to accept it unaltered or without sufficient time for consideration." Ambassador Wrong suggested it would therefore be tactful and desirable that the Department keep him informed. Mr. Pearson had suggested using the Washington liaison arrangements of those countries fighting in Korea for a general discussion of the future courses of action. However, Ambassador Wrong readily agreed with Mr. Hickerson's view that this was not the appropriate procedure, and in response to Ambassador Wrong's request Mr. Hickerson assured him that we

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[1] Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson had discussed the proposed declaration and other subjects related to Korea with Messrs. Gross and Ross of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in Paris on the previous day. (Telegram Delga 530, December 6, from Paris; 320/12-651)

[2] See the messages transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy under date of December 3, pp. 1221 and 1223.

would discuss the matter with Canada directly. Mr. Hickerson, however, indicated our concern that the UK had at this juncture brought in all four senior Commonwealth members since we did not yet want to consult widely and were worried about French reaction if they should discover that they had not been consulted as early as the UK and the Commonwealth.

2. *Inspection:* Mr. Pearson stated that he thought the US was adopting a very realistic attitude in permitting General Ridgway to accept less than completely satisfactory inspection provisions and he realized that the general US formula to meet a serious violation of the armistice is necessary. Nevertheless, he is worried that in the desire to obtain an armistice, insufficient attention is being paid to the possibility of precipitating a general war. Mr. Pearson stated it was not clear from his information whether the US intends that General Ridgway could take the indicated action in the event that there were merely a strong build-up in Manchuria, or whether he must wait until an actual attack. Mr. Hickerson stated, and the Ambassador agreed, that as the messages themselves made clear what the Secretary discussed with Mr. Eden was a serious violation of the armistice, i.e., a major attack on UN forces, and that General Bradley had confirmed this. However, Mr. Hickerson pointed out that if a serious build-up should be discovered and a large-scale attack appeared imminent, this would be a situation that would have to be considered and we might nevertheless want to take retaliatory steps.

Mr. Pearson felt that every effort should be made to get the Communists to accept inspection by bona fide neutrals and indicated either the Scandinavian states or India as acceptable. It was agreed that the recent Communist suggestions regarding the composition of a neutral commission had in part met this point and Mr. Hickerson stated that our preliminary thinking in Washington is in general not averse to utilization of such states for this purpose.

3. *Proposed Declaration:* Regarding the proposed declaration at the conclusion of the armistice, Mr. Pearson stated that he saw "disadvantages both in form and in substance." As to form he asked initially whether we contemplate a statement to be made only by the US, by the US and UK, or by the US and the Commonwealth. Mr. Hickerson replied that our present thinking is of a short general statement by the 16 nations with forces in Korea, but that this subject was under discussion with the JCS and since he had not been able to attend the meeting he was uncertain as to whether this thinking had undergone any change. He promised to advise Ambassador Wrong if anything new developed on this as a result of JCS consideration.

Mr. Pearson stated he was not convinced that the UN could not be more directly associated with the statement and is rather attracted to Mr. Eden's suggestion of having Ridgway report to the GA, which could then note armistice approval and state that any breach thereof would be seriously regarded by the UN and dealt with appropriately. It is in Mr. Pearson's view highly desirable to associate the UN with the political settlement, and a GA resolution regarding the armistice and consequence of a breach would be consistent with and a step toward this end. Mr. Hickerson stated we are still turning over in our minds the best way of associating the GA with the armistice, although we feel that issuance by the GA of the sort of statement we have in mind for the 16 nations is impractical. We are of course in full agreement that the UN must be closely associated with political settlement. We outlined to Ambassador Wrong our general thinking regarding action in the SC and GA following the armistice, looking toward a political settlement.

Moreover, Mr. Pearson is still not completely convinced that such a declaration is the best way of making known to the Communists the effect of a violation. Such a formal statement "might unduly provoke the already highly developed Chinese sensitivity." In groping around for an alternative method, Mr. Pearson suggests the possibility of having the substance of the statement made directly to the Chinese military representatives at Panmunjon by representatives of the Unified Command when the armistice is concluded. Such a statement would certainly leak in one way or another to the press of the world. Part of Mr. Pearson's concern is desire to avoid the necessity of Canada's making an individual statement. Mr. Hickerson responded that while we would look into this alternative suggestion, our initial reaction is that it would not be as effective, and Ambassador Wrong stated frankly he did not think so much of it either.

4. *Action to be taken in event of violation:* As to the specific measures which might be taken in the event of a major violation, Mr. Pearson agrees with the UK view regarding the lack of efficacy of a naval blockade. The military effect of a naval blockade would probably not be felt by Chinese Communists fighting forces for a period of weeks or perhaps months. Even bombing airfields beyond the Yalu is no certain method of bringing the Communists to terms, and Mr. Pearson is still worried as to whether such specific measures might not be the opening gun for an extension of the ground war to the Chinese mainland. In response, Mr. Hickerson felt it important that we should realize that if the Chinese Communists should launch a large scale attack in violation of the armistice we will be confronted with a completely new war and the lid must be off on any type of

military action which we would consider effective, short of ground operations against China. A naval blockade might be part of this, and as to bombing, it would certainly be more than bombing the airfields in Manchuria. It should include major communications and transportation centers, for example. Ambassador Wrong agreed that the security of the UN forces must be of paramount consideration and recognized the impracticability of determining in advance that in the event of an attack such specific limited measures as bombing of Manchurian airfields would be the only measures taken.

5. Returning to the problem of associating the UN with the armistice, Ambassador Wrong threw out the personal idea of considering the use of the POC in this connection, if only by way of stating in any declaration that we would ask the POC to observe in the event of any violation of the armistice. We replied that the idea might be worth some thought but had some doubts as to its desirability.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 31 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TOKYO, 6 December 1951—9 : 55 p. m.

C–58815. HNC–522. "Meeting of sub-delegations convened at 1100 this date. Lee declined to say whether the word 'ports' included airports, or what he meant by the word 'coastal'. UNC delegation stated categorically that airports would be among ports of entry. Lee indicated that all UNC Naval Forces must be withdrawn South of the demarcation line. UNC delegation stated categorically that 'coastal' would be interpreted by US as 'territorial' as defined in international law. UNC categorically rejected prohibition of rotation, replenishment, replacement within levels existing at the time the armistice is signed. UNC again proposed step-by-step, principle-by-principle procedure, designed to achieve agreement on at least the core of each principle. UNC attempted to gain agreement on the core of each principle by phrasing each one so as to eliminate disputed aspects. Communists merely reiterated their own position on each principle, making no effort to reach agreed wording. UNC then presented 8 principles contained in CX 58694.[1]

Lee commented that there was nothing new in UNC 8 principles, which still sought to interfere in internal affairs of his side. This could not be. Lee complained over lack of concrete comment by UNC on his 7 principles. He stated as long as there was no progress on Item 3, his senior delegate would not give an answer to question of sub-delegation for Item 4. If UNC showed sincerity toward Item 3, a sub-delegation on Item 4 could be established. Hsieh Feng asked for UNC comment on Communist proposal, saying he was willing to negotiate a solution. Said UNC was trying to use coercion. UNC induced his side to go into sub-committee by indicating interest in the Communist proposal. UNC is stalling wasting time. He would expect the UNC to give formal opinion on Communist proposal tomorrow. Recessed 1335. Continue tomorrow at 1100. Signed Joy."

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[1] Dated December 5, p. 1240.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 41 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 7 December 1951—9:54 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-58838. Am complying with JCS 88877 of 6[*5*] Dec. However I am concerned over first, our possible loss of initiative and second, likelihood that Communist charges of our "stalling" made in yesterday's sub-delegation session will find support in free world public opinion.

A scant three weeks remain of the 30 days within which, in accordance with our agreement on agenda item number 2, we hoped it possible to conclude armistice agreement. There is therefore an urgent immediate need for the UNC delegation to take and to announce to the Communists a positive stand on those particular points which the United States Government will not concede. By so doing we shall make it clear to the world that delays incident to further haggling on these points will be a direct Communist responsibility.

Foremost among the points I have in mind on which a position must be quickly taken and announced, is the Communist proposal for neutral inspection teams, without responsibility to the Military Armistice Commission. This appears to be a key issue and further progress in negotiations is dependent upon the delegation having a clear statement of United States Government position on this issue. Full details as we know them have already been furnished you.

If left to my decision, I would categorically reject this proposal for the basic reason that its acceptance would be failure to comply with your instructions which forbid the UNC delegation to deal with or to discuss political questions. Authorization for the constituting and functioning of neutral inspection teams would open the door wide to the injection of all manner of political matters entirely foreign to a purely military armistice.

If this point can be disposed of we shall at least learn where we stand.

Further, the foregoing suggested course of action offers some hope of Communist agreement to appointment of another sub-delegation for concurrent discussion of agenda item number 4, in which we are so vitally interested.

I would appreciate your views on the foregoing as a matter of urgency.

S/S Files: NSC 118/1

Memorandum by the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 7, 1951.

NSC 118/1

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

References: A. NSC 118[1]
B. NSC Action No. 562[2]
C. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," dated September 5, 1951[3]
D. Progress Report, dated September 25, 1951, by the Secretaries of State and Defense on NSC 48/5[4]

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 562–*b* in the light of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in NSC 118, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting. An NSC staff study will be circulated separately.[5]

Attention is invited to the alternative paragraphs 2–*b*–(6) proposed by the Departments of State and Defense.

It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[1] Dated November 9, p. 1106.

[2] See footnotes 4 and 5, p. 964.

[3] See footnote 1 to Marshall's memorandum of September 4, p. 882.

[4] See editorial note, p. 936.

[5] Not printed. The Staff Study was circulated on December 14 as an Annex to NSC 118/1; it differed substantively only in Paragraph 33 from the Annex to NSC 118/2, dated December 20, p. 1387.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, December 7, 1951.]

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

OBJECTIVES

1. The United States should continue to seek in Korea the following objectives, as set forth in paragraphs 6 *e* and *f* of NSC 48/5 subject to amendment of paragraphs 6 *e* and *f* as indicated below:

a. As an ultimate objective, continue to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. As a current objective, seek, through appropriate UN machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to United States security interests which would, as a minimum and without jeopardizing the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN:

(1) Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements.

(2) Establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and, in general, not south of the 38th parallel.

(3) Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.

(4) Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

b. Seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, or with Communist China.

c. Continue the military action until an armistice is agreed upon and continue economic and political sanctions against the aggressor until at least the minimum settlement is achieved.

d. In any event, continue to seek to develop strong barriers against communist subversion and military aggression in Korea, and to develop political and social conditions in Korea which would facilitate a united, independent and democratic Korea.

COURSES OF ACTION

2. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should pursue the following courses of action, in lieu of those set forth in paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5:

a. In the event that an armistice is achieved:

(1) Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Commission to undertake negotiations looking

toward an eventual political settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.

(2) Maintain all existing political and economic sanctions against Communst China and exert vigorous efforts to persuade our allies to do likewise, at least until a minimum settlement of the Korean conflict is achieved.

(3) Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea.

(4) Intensify, to the maximum practicable extent the organization, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK so as to facilitate the phased withdrawal of UN forces from Korea.

(5) Seek agreement among the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. In any event the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed. Efforts should be made to the end that the heads of other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.

(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms and declaring that future aggression in Korea in violation of the armistice agreement would be met by military action on the part of the UN.

b. In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail:

(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist.

(2) Increase the scale of military operations in the Korean area consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of the UN forces whenever, in his judgment, such operations will contribute materially to the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to UN forces under his command.

(3) Remove all restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea, including restrictions against attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River but excepting attacks against areas within approximately 12 miles of the borders of the USSR.

(4) Remove restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) of United States air forces to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President.

(See paragraph 2 *d* (1) for action in case of enemy mass air attack).

(5) Seek both within and without the UN the imposition on Communist China of additional political and economic pressures such as agreement by the maximum number of countries to the diplomatic isolation of Communist China.

*[(6) Seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to these nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China's aggressive military potential through these means may require employment of UN naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline.]

†[(6) Press the major maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose, immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports.]

(7) Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

(8) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:

(*a*) Aid to the maximum practicable extent anti-communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and
(*b*) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

c. In the event a decision is reached that the Communists are deliberately delaying armistice negotiations indefinitely and are increasing their offensive capabilities, increase pressures on the aggressor by stages and execute those courses of action specified in paragraph 2 *b* above, including political and economic pressures, through UN and diplomatic channels, to the extent feasible.

d. Whether or not an armistice in Korea is achieved:

(1) Continue in effect standing instructions to the Commander in Chief of UN forces in case the communists launch massive air attacks against UN forces in the Korean area.

(2) Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually responsibility for the defense of Korea.

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*Proposed by the Department of State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

†Proposed by the Department of Defense. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

(3) Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces.

(4) Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist to the maximum practicable extent the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

(5) If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

(6) Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from Communist control.

INR–NIE Files[1]

National Intelligence Estimate

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 7, 1951.

NIE–55

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA THROUGH MID–1952[2]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through mid-1952 in their relation to the Communist position in the Far East.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that the Communist objective, to extend Communist control over all Korea, remains unchanged.

2. The Communist forces are capable of continuing large-scale operations in Korea through mid-1952.

3. We believe that during the period of this estimate it will not be possible for Communist forces to drive the UN from Korea, unless major Soviet units are directly committed. We do not believe the USSR will be willing to commit such units because of the inherent risks of precipitating general war. However, unless the present un-

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[1] Files of National Intelligence Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 29 November 1951."

restricted Communist air build-up is checked or countered, we believe the growing power of the Chinese Communist forces, even without direct commitment of Soviet units, will enable them to deal severe damage to the UN forces and may make it impossible for the UN to conduct general offensive operations except at prohibitive cost.

4. Prolongation of the war in Korea at present levels would add to the economic and political difficulties of Communist China and North Korea, and would involve increased risk of extension of the war, but would be unlikely to have serious adverse effects on the USSR or on Sino-Soviet relations.

5. We believe that so long as the Korean war continues, the Chinese Communists are unlikely to engage in large-scale military operations against Indochina or Burma.

6. We believe that the Communists desire a suspension or termination of hostilities in Korea, but that their present position is not such as to oblige them to accept terms which they may regard as seriously disadvantageous. We believe the Communists will protract the military negotiations while there is a chance of obtaining concessions of actual or propaganda value. Thereafter, political negotiations will be prolonged in the confidence that while negotiations continue the UN will not renew or widen hostilities, and in the hope that popular pressures in the West will oblige the UN to conclude a settlement on terms more favorable to the Communists.

7. On the other hand, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Communists are protracting the armistice negotiations merely to gain time to build up the Chinese Communist air and ground forces preparatory to launching an all-out offensive against UN forces in Korea. A decision to launch such an offensive might be taken at any time during negotiations.

8. Finally, we believe that the Communists will not agree to any political settlement unless they are convinced that it provides opportunities ultimately to subvert the Republic of Korea.

DISCUSSION

I. DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Military Capabilities in Korea

Ground Forces Strength

1. Enemy ground forces in Korea are estimated at 610,000 personnel including 378,000 Chinese and 232,000 North Koreans. In addition, there are 258,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria plus three North Korean divisions.

2. There is evidence that the North Korean Army is now unable to replace its combat losses completely. One North Korean division

was deactivated in July 1951 and a Korean corps was recently relieved by a CC division—the first relief of this type since the hostilities began. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists have been able to replace their heavy losses.

3. Despite hardships, heavy casualties, and the growing proportion of only partially trained recruits, the effectiveness of Communist and North Korean troops has not been seriously affected by a decline in morale. Communist troops have surrendered in numbers only when unit control has broken down and resistance was hopeless. The high proportion of ex-Kuomintang troops among the Chinese Communist forces does not appear to be a significant factor affecting Communist reliability or morale.

4. The 7,500 battle-hardened guerrillas estimated presently to be in South Korea constitute a threat to public security and ROK rehabilitation in that area. The ROK has recently withdrawn two divisions from the battle lines for commitment to anti-guerrilla activities.

Ground Force Logistics

5. The logistic capabilities of the Communists in Korea have been limited by the UN interdiction of supply lines and the lack of flexibility of their supply system. Supplies have had to be accumulated over a long period to support their offensives. Moreover, Communist inability to provide adequate transport facilities to support front line units has prevented the Communists from maintaining the momentum of their offensives. Present stockpiles are sufficient in volume to support an offensive with forces now deployed for about thirty days. Although in past offensives the enemy could not move supplies from forward stockpiles to using units rapidly enough to maintain the momentum of an offensive for more than five to seven days, the Communists may now be overcoming this difficulty.

6. Although the Communists have brought in increasing amounts of transport equipment and have made a tremendous effort to repair and maintain lines of communication, UN air attacks have exacted a heavy toll on rail facilities, trucks, and bridges, and have greatly reduced operational efficiency of the Communist supply lines. Truck losses apparently have been replaced by deliveries from the USSR.

7. The food situation in North Korea is serious and the Communist forces in Korea must depend to a large extent upon Manchurian food supplies. The Manchurian harvest is believed to have been normal and to have provided an ample grain surplus to meet military requirements.

Air Force Strength

8. The Chinese Communist-North Korean Air Forces are estimated to have available approximately 1,450 combat aircraft of which at

least 800 are jet fighters. Of this total 1,075 aircraft (including 535 jet fighters) are estimated to be in Manchuria and the remainder are believed to be based in China proper, primarily around Peiping, Shanghai, and Canton. During recent months Communist air strength in the China-Manchuria-North Korean area has increased rapidly, with the greatest increase being in MIG-15 jet fighters.

9. The combat potential and effectiveness of the CCAF-NKAF have improved rapidly during the past six months and must now be considered formidable. By USAF standards the Communists are believed to be reaching a fairly high state of training. There have been numerous reports of intensive ground attack, navigational and paratrooper training. Actual UN experience has demonstrated that the Communists are capable of successful day and limited night interception, radar directed high altitude antiaircraft gunnery, and large formation tactics with jet fighters. The MIG-15 has been highly effective in the role of fighter versus bomber, the purpose for which it was designed. The performance pattern of the MIG-15 jet fighter units has been spotty, however, particularly in operations against UN fighters.

10. The full extent of Soviet Air Force participation is not known, but the use of Soviet technical advisors and the organizational pattern strongly indicate a dominating Soviet influence throughout the CCAF. It is probable that Soviet Air Force personnel are operating aircraft accredited to the CCAF.

Air Force Logistics

11. The Chinese Communist and North Korean Air Forces are wholly dependent upon the USSR for aircraft spare parts and associated equipment and largely dependent upon Soviet sources for POL. It is within the Soviet capability to augment greatly the Chinese Communist air strength at any time. These aircraft could come from the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces, from Europe, or from Soviet production which is estimated to include 500 MIG-15's per month. Within a relatively short period of time a large part of the estimated T/O and E strength of 5,500 aircraft in the Soviet Far East Air Force could be made available for operation in the Korean air war.

12. The intensive airfield repair and facilities build-up which has been accomplished throughout China and Manchuria during the past year has produced a system of airfields which would enable the CCAF-NKAF to employ all types of aircraft, including jet fighters in sustained operations and TU-4's in limited operations. The newly developed air facilities in Manchuria provide excellent air defense of Manchuria and support to the Communist forces fighting in Korea. In addition, they could be utilized as medium bomber bases for attacks

against important United States bases in South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. Maximum efforts to recondition and expand airfields in North Korea have continued. Three new airfields in northwest Korea may be ready for jet fighter operations by mid-December.

Naval Forces

13. The naval forces of the Chinese Communists and North Koreans are insignificant. The combat effectiveness of these forces is considered to be very low and their potential, barring the possible use of Soviet submarines, would continue to be distinctly limited for the period of this estimate. Mines laid by improvised mine layers present a continuing threat to UN Naval forces.

The USSR as a Source of Supply

14. The USSR must provide Communist forces in Korea with a large share of the replacements of munitions and other equipment for military use, including weapons, ammunition, tanks, trucks, artillery, petroleum, and aircraft, as well as trained personnel for instruction (tanks and artillery) and operation (antiaircraft guns and aircraft). Munitions and equipment can probably be supplied from Soviet stocks or current production without creating a strain on the USSR. Since a substantial part of these supplies must be sent to the Far East from western and central USSR, however, the Korean war has undoubtedly placed a heavy burden on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

15. The practical capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railroad is believed to be fully employed at the present time. It is unlikely that a significant increase in the flow of supplies to Korea could occur over the Trans-Siberian without cutting seriously into important Soviet military and civilian traffic.

16. There is some evidence that transloading points on the Siberian-Manchurian border are now handling cargo at close to capacity. Nonmilitary railroad traffic has, moreover, been embargoed from time to time in Manchuria, which indicates that a significant increase in transit traffic to Korea might cause serious difficulties for the Manchurian economy.

Over-all Current Military Capabilities

17. The enemy can attack at any time with forces presently in contact. These forces are composed of 29 infantry, 1 armored, and 4 artillery divisions with a personnel strength of 219,000, an estimated 80–120 tanks and approximately 500 artillery pieces. Also available in Korea are 43 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, 1 mechanized division, and 1 antitank division (391,000 personnel and 240–280 tanks). These forces could be committed within 2 to 10 days, but such a commitment would materially reduce Communist coastal defenses

in Korea. In addition to his offensive capabilities, the enemy can defend in place with forces presently available and can conduct limited guerrilla operations behind UN lines.

18. Although the CCAF has been employed in a predominantly protective role thus far, it nevertheless poses an increasing threat to the safety of the United Nations forces deployed in the Korean theater. The CCAF has increased over-all Communist defensive and offensive capabilities, and has gained air superiority as far south as Sinanju on the Chongchon River to the extent of making UN daylight medium bombing efforts in the area exceedingly costly and diverting UN air elements from interdiction missions. The CCAF could launch an intense air attack which might inflict serious damage upon United Nations ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of communication in Korea.

19. There are sufficient numbers of MIG–15 aircraft located in southern Manchuria to provide a strong fighter defense for this area. The fighter defense capabilities of China proper are considerably less and, should several areas of China be attacked simultaneously, the presently available forces would be spread too thinly for effective defense.

Trends in Military Capabilities

20. Through mid-1952 the Chinese Communists can maintain their present troop strength and combat potential in Korea. Assuming that the present ratio of UN Communist air effectiveness remains unchanged, the Chinese Communists could deploy and logistically support in Korea 9 to 12 additional divisions, including the equivalent of three armored divisions. It should be noted, however, that if the Communists decided to make a maximum effort in Korea, reduced the effectiveness of the UN interdiction, and sacrificed commitments elsewhere they might be able to increase troop strength in Korea to approximately 1,500,000 men. On the other hand, an increase in the effectiveness of the UN interdiction effort would make difficult even a moderate increase in Communist troop strength. It is unlikely that within the next few months the effectiveness of Communist units now in Korea could be substantially raised by the receipt of increased amounts of heavy equipment alone. Although the USSR has the capability to make available substantial quantities of heavy equipment to Communist troops in Korea, these troops would require considerable further training to use such equipment effectively.

21. The aircraft strength presently available to the Communist forces operating in Korea could be increased by mid-1952 to a level dependent only on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The continuing extensive build-up of aircraft, ostensibly operating as units of the

CCAF, has been to meet the specific requirements of the Korean operation. The over-all air defense capabilities of China will probably continue to increase.

22. In the event of an armistice, Communist ability to increase their military potential in North Korea would depend to some extent on the nature of the inspection provisions. Even should the armistice provide for inspection measures effectively preventing the augmentation of forces in Korea, however, Communist capabilities could be increased considerably by the repair and construction of roads, railroads, and other facilities under the guise of rehabilitation.

Military Capabilities in the Far East Elsewhere Than in Korea

23. The Chinese Communists have the capability of undertaking military operations elsewhere in the Far East in addition to the present large-scale operations in Korea. They could initiate large-scale operations as an alternative to the present military operations in Korea.

a. Taiwan. The Communists have been building up their air and coastal defense capabilities on the mainland opposite Taiwan. Thus far, the heavy Communist military commitment in Korea and the assignment of the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan straits probably have forced the Chinese Communists to postpone any attempt to invade the island.

b. Hong Kong. Regardless of the outcome of the cease-fire negotiations, the Chinese Communists will continue to have the capability of launching a successful attack on Hong Kong with few preparations and with little advance warning.

c. Southeast Asia. In Indochina, the Chinese Communists probably could support approximately 100,000 men for a series of limited offensives of short duration. Logistic preparations in South China are sufficiently advanced to support limited Chinese Communist air operations against Indochina. The Chinese Communists probably could make available approximately 50,000 men for sustained operations in Burma. However, so long as they are committed in Korea, the Chinese Communists probably would not be able to support logistically large-scale ground operations in Burma and Indochina concurrently.

d. Japan. The Chinese Communists do not have the capability to attack Japan without large-scale Soviet support.

The Internal Situation in Communist China

24. The mobilization of Communist China's limited economic resources for the prosecution of the Korean war has undoubtedly increased internal economic and political pressures and required Peiping to modify its economic and political programs. There is evidence that, at least in part as a consequence of hostilities in Korea, inflationary

pressures have increased, production of certain consumer goods has lagged, production objectives have been reduced, purges of "counter-revolutionaries" have been intensified, and popular support of the regime has decreased. In addition, some reports hint at policy disagreements within the Chinese Communist Party stemming from the Korean war.

25. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists thus far have apparently been able to support their military operations in Korea without suffering such serious consequences in China as a breakdown of rail transportation, an increase in anti-Communist guerrilla activity, outbreaks of large-scale civil disorders, or a shortage of manpower on the Korean front. It is believed that the Communists can continue the war through the coming winter without incurring any of these consequences.

26. Communist China is not likely to face serious problems supplying its forces in Korea during the next several months. To an increasing extent the USSR is providing Chinese as well as North Korean forces in Korea with heavy munitions and equipment, while Communist China continues to furnish most of the small arms, ammunition, food and clothing to its own troops. There is no evidence that the drain on the Chinese transportation system resulting from the transfer of trucks and rolling stock to Manchuria and Korea has as yet had a serious effect on the Chinese economy. However, continued increases in military transport requirements will necessitate further reductions in commercial freight movements in China and will place further pressure on the already-strained railroad maintenance facilities.

27. Although Communist China has enormous manpower resources, the inflexible labor requirements of Chinese agriculture limit the mobility of the Chinese labor force. Thus local labor shortages do exist and will probably be intensified by Peiping's conscription of manpower for military and para-military purposes. Furthermore, Communist China is faced with an urgent need for technicians for both the army and the expanding bureaucracy. This shortage of trained personnel has serious implications for the administrative capabilities of the regime.

28. The marked increase in the rate of public expenditure since the start of the Korean war has forced a drastic increase in taxes and a marked intensification of tax collection, especially in rural areas. A continuation of the Korean war with an inevitable additional increase in taxes will further diminish the rural support which was gained by Peiping during the initial period of land redistributon. Inflationary pressures have been built up as a result of the budgetary deficit and the continued diversion of production to military uses. Consequent price increases, while in no sense as sharp as those characterizing the

Nationalist postwar economy, have been significant, and prices will almost certainly continue to rise as the Korean war goes on.

29. The Korean war has undoubtedly obliged the Chinese Communists to rely increasingly on police and administrative controls rather than on popular support. Within the Communist party leadership itself, the Korean war may raise, if indeed it has not already done so, potentially divisive issues such as: (*a*) the protraction of the war at the continued sacrifice of domestic objectives; (*b*) increased Soviet intervention in internal Chinese affairs as a concomitant of Soviet aid; and (*c*) further intensification of internal controls at the expense of popular support.

The Internal Situation in North Korea

30. The North Korean regime is faced with much more serious internal economic and political problems than is Communist China, and a continuation of hostilities will almost certainly intensify these difficulties. The regime continues to control the North Korean police and army, however, and decreasing popular support poses no serious threat. The North Korean regime can be expected to continue to support Soviet policy regardless of the consequences within Korea since it is dedicated to the Kremlin's international objectives and is incapable of exercising a decisive influence on major Communist policy decisions with respect to the war. However, the maintenance of a viable and stable Satellite regime in North Korea may be an important objective of Soviet policy.

31. The food situation in North Korea may become critical for the civilian population by spring. Consumer goods other than food are virtually nonexistent. Transportation and communication facilities are apparently maintained only along essential lines of supply. Industrial establishments have been in large part destroyed. Manpower shortages have already interfered with rehabilitation and agricultural production. They may soon affect essential rear area services for the army and further cripple the civilian economy.

32. These difficulties, together with the social and psychological effects of prolonged devastation and inconclusive war, have accentuated antagonisms between the people and the regime of North Korea. The temporary occupation of large areas of North Korea by UN forces, the presence of large numbers of unpopular Chinese troops and the frustrated hopes of victory and unification have been additional factors forcing the regime to resort increasingly to harsh police controls.

33. There have been reports of serious friction between the leadership of Communist China and that of North Korea, including reports of friction with regard to the respective roles of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans in the conduct of the war. There is no

convincing evidence, however, that friction is sufficiently serious to threaten united Communist prosecution of the war or the conclusion of an armistice.

*Sino-Soviet Relations**

34. While the Chinese Communists probably entered the Korean war in full accord with the USSR, the heavy burden of the war and Peiping's dependence on the USSR for vital war supplies have undoubtedly created problems in the relations between the two governments. There is no evidence, however, that these problems are sufficiently serious or are likely to become so serious as to create major divergences in the policies of the two powers. While the Korean war has increased the military prestige of Communist China, the war has almost certainly strengthened the hold of Moscow on Peiping.

35. North Korea is important to the defense of Soviet and Chinese borders, and any serious threat to its integrity may, in the Communist view, be a threat also to the USSR and Communist China. South Korea is of strategic value to the Communists principally as an offensive base and, in anti-Communist hands, represents a military and psychological threat to the Communist position in North Korea.

II. CURRENT INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION

36. Current intelligence provides no conclusive indications of probable Communist courses of action with regard to either Korea or other areas in the Far East. Recent Communist propaganda and their concessions in the armistice negotiations both can be interpreted as indications of a Communist desire to obtain a cease-fire. Moreover, the pattern of Communist military activity in Manchuria and North Korea can be interpreted as an attempt to improve the Communist bargaining position in the armistice negotiations. On the other hand, the prolongation of these discussions can be interpreted as an indication of Communist efforts to create dissension among participating UN governments and undermine their resolution to remain in Korea. Furthermore, Communist efforts to develop air capabilities, maintain ground strength in Korea, and mobilize the total resources of China may indicate a Communist intent to resume large-scale offensive actions at a later date.

Indications of Communist Intentions From Communist Military Activities

37. Communist military activities in Korea, Manchuria, and China indicate that the Chinese are making preparations to continue military

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*A comprehensive analysis of Sino-Soviet relations, NIE-58, is currently in preparation. [Footnote in the source text. NIE-58 was not completed until September 1952.]

operations for an indefinite period of time. Current indications suggest that these operations in the immediate future will probably be characterized on the ground by limited objective attacks and determined resistance in depth to UN offensives and in the air by further efforts to extend Communist air superiority over much of Communist-held North Korea. On the other hand, the introduction of some armor and increasing amounts of artillery into North Korea, the continued efforts to achieve a logistic buildup, and the strenuous efforts to develop air capabilities could be interpreted as indications of a Communist plan to mount a major offensive.

38. The Communist air build-up, though primarily a Soviet effort, does not provide conclusive evidence as to future Soviet courses of action with respect to Korea. It could indicate any or all of the following: (*a*) a Soviet recognition that a major Communist air effort is necessary to bolster Chinese Communist morale and improve their military positions; (*b*) a Soviet intent to secure the defense of Manchuria in the event of an expansion of the war; (*c*) a Soviet attempt to improve the Communist bargaining position in the armistice negotiations; (*d*) a Soviet intent to challenge UN air superiority in Korea; and (*e*) a Soviet intent to build up Soviet air defenses throughout the Communist Far East and gain air combat experience.

39. Other activity in China proper indicates a Communist determination to continue full-scale military mobilization. Furthermore, the indications are that the Chinese Communists intend to continue supplying material and advisory assistance to the Viet Minh and the Burmese Communists. There are no positive indications of an early intent to send regular Chinese Communist troops into either area.

Indications From Communist Propaganda

40. Communist propaganda after the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea stressed determination to drive the UN forces from Korea and insisted that any settlement must include Chinese Communist acquisition of Taiwan and the admission of Communist China to the UN. Shortly before the Malik statement, propaganda emphasis shifted. The "Drive-the-invaders-into-the-sea" theme was replaced by the claim that driving the "invaders" back to the 38th Parallel represented a great victory. Previous political demands were no longer mentioned in the context of the immediate problem of a Korean settlement. Although Communist propaganda cannot be interpreted as a firm indication of Communist intentions with respect to Korea, propaganda analysis suggests, on balance, that the Communists desire a suspension or even a termination of hostilities. It also suggests that the Communists are desirous of obtaining a Korean political settlement based on

the pre-invasion situation in Korea and including the withdrawal of UN troops. Furthermore, Communist propaganda emphasis on "Asian unity" in the face of US "imperialist aggression" suggests that ultimate Communist objectives in Asia—including the withdrawal of US protection from Taiwan and admission of Communist China to the UN—have not changed.

Indications of Communist Intentions From Their Conduct of Armistice Negotiations

41. Communist actions during the armistice negotiations indicate a strong desire not to have the discussions terminated. The Communists have made a number of important concessions which, taken together, represent such a significant departure from their originally announced position as to indicate desire to secure a cease-fire. The negotiations to date do not provide indication, however, of Communist willingness to conclude an armistice on terms satisfactory to the UN.

Indications of Communist Intentions From Communist Policies Elsewhere in the Far East

42. In addition to the continued propaganda stress on the need for military preparedness, Peiping has placed increasing emphasis recently on domestic problems. Taken together with the ostensible Communist interest in a Korean armistice, this could indicate a Chinese Communist intent to reduce its Korean commitment in the near future in order to concentrate for an indefinite time on domestic programs. Communist policies elsewhere in the Far East give no clear indication of Communist intentions with regard to Korea but indicate that toward other neighboring countries the Communists intend to follow their present policy based on "Asian unity" and "national liberation."

III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

43. The Communist forces are capable of continuing large-scale operations in Korea through mid-1952. We believe that during the period of this estimate it will not be possible for Communist forces to drive the UN from Korea, unless major Soviet units are directly committed. We do not believe the USSR will be willing to commit such units because of the inherent risks of precipitating general war. However, unless the present unrestricted Communist air build-up is checked or countered, we believe the growing power of the Chinese Communist forces, even without direct commitment of Soviet units, will enable them to deal severe damage to the UN forces and may make it impossible for the UN to conduct general offensive operations except at prohibitive cost.

44. Unless the Soviets are prepared to provide the support necessary to achieve maximum Communist objectives in Korea, the Communists have two alternative courses of action: (*a*) to accept an indefinite prolongation and possible expansion of the war, or (*b*) to settle the conflict on the best terms possible.

45. Taking into account the various factors bearing on Communist policy in Korea, we believe that the Communists desire to stop the fighting in Korea in order to: (*a*) avoid a possible expansion of the war which might oblige the USSR either to introduce Soviet military forces on a large-scale or to accept the extension of non-Communist control as far as the Soviet and Manchurian borders of Korea; (*b*) prevent the further development of strains on the Communist regimes of China and North Korea which might ultimately threaten their stability; (*c*) permit Communist China to complete the modernization of its armed forces, to develop more effective administrative and police controls, and to develop a stronger industrial and economic base; (*d*) restore North Korea as a "model satellite" with the potential for the subversion of the Republic of Korea; (*e*) permit increased efforts to extend Communist influence and control to southeast Asia and the Far East generally. We are unable to determine what relation a Communist desire for a suspension or termination of hostilities in Korea would have to Soviet global policies.

46. We believe that the Communists desire a suspension or termination of hostilities in Korea, but that their present position is not such as to oblige them to accept terms which they may regard as seriously disadvantageous. We believe the Communists will protract the military negotiations while there is a chance of obtaining concessions of actual or propaganda value. Thereafter, political negotiations will be prolonged in the confidence that while negotiations continue the UN will not renew or widen hostilities, and in the hope that popular pressures in the West will oblige the UN to conclude a settlement on terms more favorable to the Communists.

47. On the other hand, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Communists are protracting the armistice negotiations merely to gain time to build up the Chinese Communist air and ground forces preparatory to launching an all-out offensive against UN forces in Korea. A decision to launch such an offensive might be taken at any time during negotiations.

48. Finally, we believe that the Communists will not agree to any political settlement unless they are convinced that it provides opportunities ultimately to subvert the Republic of Korea.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 36 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 7 December 1951—6:24 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–89090. From JCS. Req Presidential approval of folg proposed msg to CINCFE, approved by JCS, Sec Def and State:

Reur CX 55993 [2] and CX 58195 [3] and JCS 95354, 30 Jun 51.

Part I.

1. Subpara 5H, JCS 95354 is rescinded and folg substituted:

"H. POW exchange on a one-for-one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation.[4] Your present planned procedure to attempt to obtain the disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of POWs held by the Communists should assist in this respect. However, if it appears necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, UN and ROK POWs, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, you will be authorized to agree to an exchange or release on a basis such as that discussed in Part III below.

(1). Generally, POWs should be exchanged as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, reptvs of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

(2). In implementation of any agreed exchange, it is recognized that the Communist authorities may attempt to exchange ROK prisoners, withholding other pers temporarily or indefinitely. It is suggested, therefore, you insist that the exchange of prisoners be carried out on the basis of group-for-group, composed of mixed Chinese Communist forces (CCF) and North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) for mixed US/UN and ROK groups.

(3). During your negotiations for exchange of POWs, you should consider the release of certain specifically named civilian internees on generally the same basis as POWs without raising the larger issue of exchange or return of:

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[1] This telegram was addressed to the Naval Aide to President Truman aboard the presidential yacht *Williamsburg* on which the President was cruising at the time.

[2] Dated October 27, p. 1068.

[3] Dated November 28, p. 1197.

[4] A note attached to the source text, dated December 10 and initialed by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, read as follows:

"Note to be attached to JCS 89090 of December 7.

"In order to meet the views of the President, State concurrence today was given to JCS for amendment of paragraph 1 (H), Part II [*Part I*], foregoing message, so that the first sentence thereof will read as follows:

" 'POW exchange on a one by one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation *and negotiators should vigorously maintain that position as long as possible without precipitating a break in negotiations.*' "

(*a*). Civilian captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces, and

(*b*). NK refugees. At least 55 of these non-Korean civilians are believed to have remained in area of conflict after outbreak of hostilities in Korea. A list of these civilians believed to be in hands of NK authorities will be forwarded you in a separate msg.

(4). State Dept is considering the political aspects of repatriation of Korean civilians including advisability of securing a specific list of leading ROK civilians believed to be in Communist hands."

Part II.

2. Procedures in Subparas 1A and 1B of CX 58195 are approved.

Part III.

3. Re new Subpara 5H of JCS 95354 quoted in Part I above and Paras 1C and 1D of CX 58195, JCS think that if an acceptable agreement cannot be reached within terms of Paras 1A and 1B of CX 58195 Communist agreement might be sought to a procedure which respected desires of individual POWs with regard to their exchange. The only practical possibility appears to be an agreement which would provide that prior to their release, all POWs held by either side would be screened by teams composed of mbrs of each side; individual POWs expressing a desire not to be exchanged would be permitted to remain under jurisdiction of their captors. This procedure would be considered as fulfilling obligations of both sides under armistice agreement but would not involve any commitment on part of captor as to future disposition of such POWs.

4. Agreement would not be reached to adopt the procedure described in Para 3 above until Communists have submitted a list of names or numbers of UN and ROK POWs conforming satisfactorily to our best estimates of those they hold.

5. Your comments on Paras 3 and 4 above are requested. Considering an agreement on some such basis as a possibility, it is thought that all UNC proposals and discussion on Item 4 should be phrased in terms of "release of POWs" rather than of "return of POWs".

Part IV.

6. Final action on Paras 1C and 1D of CX 58195 is withheld pending your comments on Paras 3 and 4 Part III above. JCS have no further suggestions but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring return of maximum number of UN and ROK POWs in Communist hands, would also protect POWs in UN hands. Recognizing that attaining a completely acceptable solution of this

problem is problematical and that we may be forced to return to Communist certain personnel whose retention would be desirable, including criminals we should like to prosecute, JCS assume that you are maintaining a complete record of individuals in categories indicated in Subpara 1D of your CX 58195 for such use as may later be desirable.

Part V.

7. Discussions in armistice negotiations regarding disposition of war criminals should be minimized although any arrangements such as those described in Part III above, should explicitly provide that release by both sides should include even such POWs who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes or who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses.[5]

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[5] The President's response was transmitted by his Naval Aide from the *Williamsburg* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram 081731Z, December 8; it read as follows:

"Pres approves JCS 89090 with understanding that action indicated para 6 part IV will be referred to him for final decision. Pres holds strong view that negotiators should vigorously maintain position of one for one basis of exchange." (Black Book, Tab 37)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 38 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 7 December 1951—8:17 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–89114. From JCS. Req Presidential approval of folg proposed msg to CINCFE, approved by JCS, Sec Def and State:

1. Reur CX 58838,[2] JCS consider that there are 4 basic issues remaining to be resolved in order to obtain agreement on item 3:

A. No increase in present str levels and equipment stocks versus no introduction of personnel and equipment under any pretext.
B. Rehabilitation of facilities, particularly airfields.
C. Status of offshore islands.
D. Neutral observer teams versus Jt teams composed of belligerents and relationship of any such teams to MAC.

2. On above issues JCS hold folg views and you will be guided by them:

A. Rotation must be permitted; accordingly, your present position should be your final position.
B. As a final position you should withdraw objection to rehabilitation of facilities other than airfields. (If and when rehabilitation of airfields becomes last obstacle to an armistice, refer matter to Wash.)

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[1] This telegram was addressed to the Naval Aide to President Truman aboard the presidential yacht *Williamsburg* on which the President was cruising at the time.
[2] Dated December 7, p. 1258.

C. As a final position you should agree to withdraw from Korean Islands generally north of demarcation line extended.

D. As a final position you should agree to neutral observer teams composed of personnel of nations whose armed forces are not participating in Korean War, and mutually agreed to by both sides; however, these teams must be responsible to, and subject to direction and supervision of MAC.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 46 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 7 December 1951—9:35 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–58911. HNC 525. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 525.

"At sub-delegation meeting this date UNC led off with statement strongly denying Communist charge of stalling, pointing out Communist refusal to undertake simultaneous discussion of items 3 and 4. After stating UNC was interested in Communist proposal, and considered it a step forward, UNC then criticized Communist 7 point proposal, point by point. UNC indicated general agreement with Communist principles 1, 2 and 4, though not with exact wording. UNC rejected prohibition on replacement and replenishment and rejected requirement to abandón islands. The UNC line of attack on Communist principles 6 and 7 concentrated on the vague relationship of armistice commission and neutral organ, and the divided, uncertain authority and responsibility. UNC did not attack neutral organ concept as such. UNC insisted on limiting development of airfields. UNC emphasized there are considerable areas of agreement between the 2 sides. Communists reply again charged UNC was delaying conference. Lee stated his side complained UNC comments showed plain intent to 'interfere in internal affairs' of his side, condemned replacement and replenishment, insisted UNC must withdraw from islands, rejected any inspection of rear areas other than by neutrals. UNC reiterated refusal to consider any proposal designed to bring about withdrawal by attrition. UNC stated its interest in 'internal affairs' was limited to increases in military capabilities during armistice, which we opposed. Recessed 1300. In afternoon session, UNC stated it was still studying neutral nations concept and could not at this time accept or reject it. UNC criticized other features of Communist principle 7, insisted on single armistice commission rather than dual organs. UNC statement on neutral organ follows:

" 'You asked for comments on your proposed principle 7. First, as we have previously explained, we maintain that a single supervisory organ, rather than 2 such organs, should be responsible for supervising the execution of an adherence to all of the terms of the armistice agreement. We maintain this single supervisory organ should exercise direct authority over all observation activities, whether in the demilitarized zone or in the rear areas. Second, we believe observation should be conducted at communications centers as well as ports of entry. Your principle 7 limits observation to ports of entry. Third, your principle 7 limits the activities of observation teams to the scope of your principle 6. We have already told you clearly and finally that we will not accept the prohibition on rotation, replenishment and replacement implicit in your principle 6. Therefore, that part of your principle 7 which limits its application to your principle 6, is of course unacceptable.

" 'As to the question of representatives of neutral nations in the role of observers, that matter is under active and continuing study. There are features of this proposal which have definite merit. We are not ready yet to either accept or reject this concept. Certainly, however, the relationship of observer teams to the supervisory organ must be clear and direct.

" 'The organization supervising the armistice, whether a single organ or a dual agency such as you propose, must carry out administrative, judicial, and operational functions. By operational functions, I mean observation at selected points in Korea. Now were this organization only judicial in nature, it could function successfully under a charter—the armistice agreement—without need for any other directing head. Since the organization must carry out operational functions, such as observation, that part of the overall organ which executes the observation must be subject to direction from some responsible source. It is our belief that the supervisory organ of the armistice as a whole should have the authority and the responsibility to direct and control these observation activities. Your proposal does not provide such authority and responsibility to any supervising agency.'

"Agreement was reached on substance of UNC principles nbr 1 and nbr 2 of CX 58694.[1] Communists again failed to agree to enter subdelegation meetings on agenda item 4. Communists pressed vigorously for clear and unequivocal statement regarding neutral organ, insisting that progress of negotiations was halted until UNC gave some answer on this point. UNC replied answer would be given in due course. Communists indicated this was stalling, deadlocking conference, and insisted on knowing how long would be required for UNC to answer.

"It is considered imperative to the continued progress of negotiations that we receive guidance regarding the neutral nations concept as a matter of urgency.

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[1] Dated December 5, p. 1240.

"Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 40 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 8 December 1951—11:51 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–89118. From JCS.

1. Reur 080555Z,[2] position taken in msg proposed in JCS 89114 [3] with regard to rehabilitation was arrived at in consultation with State on folg considerations:

A. This is to be a final position on which we would be prepared to accept a breakdown of negotiations.

B. There is a strong feeling, particularly in the State Dept, that a mil armistice may be the only agreement we will have for a long time, and in fact we may not get a political settlement for some years. It would be impossible to deny for any appreciable time the right to rehabilitate those facilities upon which the economy of the country depends. Therefore, while on the short-term strictly military viewpoint denial of rehabilitation would be highly advantageous, particularly if hostilities were resumed, in the longer view we feel it would be impracticable to keep all of Korea in a state of devastation.

C. Further, any such prohibition would work both ways thereby preventing needed rehabilitation in South Korea. For example, weather, accidents, or guerrilla action might seriously affect our own communications and we must have the right to repair them. Also, we have in mind an extensive and vital program of rehabilitation in South Korea to which the United States has already committed itself in UN. In addition, the point at which any work undertaken would become prohibited rehabilitation warranting protest and resumption of hostilities would be most difficult to decide.

D. We consider some reservation regarding airfields necessary as their repair and extension would constitute a definite and observable threat. Hence, parenthetical statement in Para 2B of JCS 89114.

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[1] This telegram was addressed to the Naval Aide to President Truman aboard the presidential yacht *Williamsburg* on which the President was cruising at the time.

[2] This message, from President Truman aboard the *Williamsburg*, was dated December 8 and read as follows:

"Following from President to J.C.S. Refer J.C.S. 89114. Explain to me why we should allow rehabilitation of roads, railroads and other facilities except air fields. We have expended lives, tons of bombs and a large amount of equipment to bring these people to terms.

"They have been able to give us a bad time even in the cripp'ed condition of their communications and they have been able to operate effectively even without air fields." (Black Book, Tab 39)

[3] Dated December 7, p. 1278.

E. We feel that a stand against any rehabilitation whatsoever would constitute a definite breaking point with no armistice possible.

2. In view of above, we hope you will authorize transmission of the instructions contained in JCS 89114 to Gen Ridgway. State concurs.

795.00/12-851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, December 8, 1951—1 p. m.

2664. Deptel 2807, December 5,[1] and Embtel 2636, December 6.[2]

1. During informal conversation with Scott Foreign Office yesterday he told Embassy officer proposed draft warning statement had been sent to Joint Chiefs and Foreign Secretary for comment. Statement will probably be reviewed by Eden today and by Joint Chiefs on tenth, and thereafter Prime Minister will doubtless wish consider it. Therefore, unless unforeseen emergency makes quick reply imperative, UKG comments will probably not be available before twelfth.

2. Scott's personal and informal reaction is that text of statement on whole would be agreeable to UKG except for "sting in the tail" which threatens not only North Korea and China but also USSR and which tends to commit us in advance to a given course of action.

3. Scott's own suggestion for a final paragraph which might be acceptable his government would be about as follows: Settlement of the Korean problem. We reaffirm our intention to resist aggression. Should there be a renewal of aggression in Korea, it would accordingly be resisted and it might then prove impossible to localize hostilities as heretofore.

4. I have appointment with Eden morning of eleventh when he will have had time receive views Joint Chiefs.

GIFFORD

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1249.

[2] Not printed. It merely informed the Department that the draft statement contained in Department telegram 2807 had been given to the Foreign Office and that British comments would be forwarded as soon as received. (795.00/12-651)

320/12-151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 8, 1951—1:44 p. m.

Gadel 393. Re Korea, Delgas 464 and 465.[1] You are authorized hold tentative discussions on basis fol, indicating US positions still under consideration. We doubt desirability discuss with Sov, however, prior achievement armistice or at least final stages armistice negotiations.

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[1] Both dated December 1, pp. 1208 and 1210.

1. *SC Action.*

Dept recognizes there will be strong desire other Dels for SC res approving armistice along lines Alternative I, Delga 465. As indicated, Deptel 75, Aug 4 to USUN, and discussion position paper Korean item, Dept prepared go along on two step program with preliminary res by SC fol by GA res, but, for reasons given, we feel SC action shld preferably refer previous SC res Korea. If friendly Dels feel strongly, res wld be acceptable to Dept even if it did not go as far as Alternative II, Delga 465; Dept wld accept res generally along lines Alternative I but wld prefer addition preamble para referring previous SC res included. Possible draft such res might be

> "The Security Council
> "Recalling its resolutions of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950;
> "Having considered the report from the Unified Command dated ———;
> "Notes with approval the terms of the armistice contained in this report and expresses its profound satisfaction that hostilities in Korea have been brought to an end on a basis consistent with the principles of the United Nations and the resolutions of this Council;
> "Requests the General Assembly to consider the measures which should now be taken to bring about a final settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations."

Final Dept decision on SC res wld, of course, have to take into account views other Dels.

In preliminary discussion other Dels, you shld emphasize US acquiescence in SC action is concession view other Dels and is conditioned on commitment other Dels fol up with acceptable GA res.

2. *GA Action.*

Contents desirable GA res contained in position paper Korean item as amended Gadel 151.[2] In addition, GA might express appreciation UN forces, but Dept concerned that proposed res shld not give impression mission UN forces in Korea accomplished with armistice, in view probable continuing necessity maintaining substantial UN forces in Korea. At same time, res shld not commit forces remain indefinitely in Korea.

As indicated original position paper Korean item, Dept believes Korean problem shld be solved by parties in interest (including ROKs,

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[2] **Dated November 15, p. 1135.**

NKs, Chi Commies), with UN participation. UN shld be represented by small group, including US, from among nations participating in fighting in Korean action.

Changes in position paper transmitted Gadel 151 not intended alter basic concept position paper. Primary task body to be established by GA to represent UN in seeking Korean settlement, continues to be discussion and negotiation with all interested parties in effort achieve agreement on Korean settlement. Changes in paper intended only (*a*) to offer Sov place UN body rather than as Govt for UN to negotiate with, so as to avoid objection that Sov excluded from UN body, or, on other hand, that it given special role other than as UN memb; and (*b*) to make procedure more flexible so that UN body cld deal with all parties either simultaneously, as originally intended, or separately if that seems preferable. Comm cld have headquarters in NY and need only travel as appropriate to effectively carry out its terms ref.

Dept does not, therefore, consider function Comm one of "good offices" Delga 464; it wld represent affirmative UN interest and shld be able make proposals which wld command agreement countries whose consent or acquiescence essential to Korean settlement and wld assure subsequent approval by UN. For these reasons also, Dept does not consider desirable single "mediator" to seek settlement in Korea. Idea of individual expert to represent UN is question so fraught political difficulties appears unrealistic; proposal wld also be objectionable other Dels as excluding all other Govts from voice in exploration political settlement. Individual mediator wld not adequately represent UN interests and cld not deal with questions related to political settlement in which Govts have major interest, e.g., withdrawal of forces, supersession armistice agreement. Also, individual US national wld accentuate clash US–Sov interests Korea and make political settlement that much more difficult.

Re UNCURK, on further consideration Dept concluded it undesirable have UNCURK continue while new Comm functioning. In addition to objection proliferation Comms, creation new body without terminating UNCURK wld be considered major affront to latter. Dept contemplates that in light report new Comm, whether or not it achieves agreement for political settlement, Assembly will determine what political representation UN shld have in Korea thereafter.

Subject to recommendation 5 in position paper, draft res which Dept wld like to see wld run along fol lines:

> "The General Assembly
>
> "Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950 and the resolutions of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950, February 1, 1951 and May 18, 1951;
>
> "Noting the resolution of the Security Council of ;

"Notes with approval the armistice agreement set forth in the report of the Unified Command dated which confirms that the armed attack against the ROK has been repelled, that the fighting has come to a halt, and that a major step has been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

"Expresses the appreciation of the peoples of the world to the heroic forces of the members of the United Nations which have successfully fought and sacrificed on behalf of the principles of the Charter, and which continue to serve in Korea pending the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

"Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations continue to be the full restoration of peace and security in the area and the establishment of a unified, democratic and independent Government in Korea;

"Appoints a Commission, consisting of the representatives of ———, to ascertain the facts of the situation and enter into discussions with governments and authorities as appropriate regarding a basis for a political settlement in Korea and for the achievement of a unified, democratic and independent Korea by peaceful means, and to report to the General Assembly as appropriate;

"Expresses its appreciation to the Members of UNCURK for their services and requests UNCURK to continue its functions until the Commission created by this resolution informs it that it is ready to assume its responsibilities."

WEBB

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 42 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 8 December 1951—6:04 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–58967. 1. Pls refer my CX 58838 of 7 Dec 51.

2. Our delegation continues to be confronted with the necessity of maintaining a non-committal position with respect to the present key Communist proposal relating to so-called neutral inspection. Our delegation is finding maintenance of this position increasingly difficult.

3. *a.* In the light of this situation and of my C 66585 of 8 Jul 51 and JCS 96094 of 12 Jul 51 [1] in reply thereto, suggest you consider an armistice commission of three members, one representing each belligerent side and one a neutral nation, both the neutral nation and its selected representative to require the agreement of the belligerent commanders. The commission to have no responsibilities other

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[1] Neither printed.

than to the belligerent commanders. All matters before the commission to be decided by a veto-free majority vote. Observer teams, responsible solely to Armistice Commission, to be similarly constituted. The Armistice Commission and its subordinate inspection teams to have the functions of inspection and investigation in accordance with the terms of the armistice, with responsibility for reporting to the belligerent commanders violations they observe, together with such recommendations as may be voted.

b. The Armistice Commission and its subordinate observer teams to have cognizance over, adherence to, and compliance with all terms of the armistice, both within the demilitarized zone and in the rear areas.

4. Our delegation has submitted for my consideration still another proposal; namely, that the composition of the Armistice Commission, as well as that of its subordinate inspection teams, be entirely neutral, the membership acceptable to both sides, and that it be responsible to both commanders for inspections and observation within and without the demilitarized zone.

5. *a*. Within the [*With?*] respect to para 3 above, I consider the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

b. With respect to para 4 above, I think the contrary is true.

c. I make no formal recommendation with respect to either, the "principle of inspection" is so basic to our governmental position in worldwide negotiations with the USSR, and all aspects of this problem are so well understood in Wash, that in my opinion my recommendations in this specific case are unnecessary.

6. In planning our tactics it will be of the greatest assistance to have the guidance requested in my CX 58838 of 7 Dec, as well as your views on the foregoing proposals, soonest. It would likewise be very helpful, particularly if you anticipate your guidance may be somewhat delayed, to know the probable time during which we must maintain our current position on the issue of "neutral" inspection.[2]

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[2] The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in the following manner in telegram JCS 89119, transmitted on December 8:

"From JCS.

"1. Guidance requested in CX 58838 awaiting action at highest level, which is expected shortly.

"2. A. Re Para 3 of CX 58967, we concur with your views but consider that difficulty would be encountered in finding a neutral acceptable to both sides. Therefore, we think only practicable solution for mbrship of MAC would be belligerents designated on equal basis by opposing cdrs. Observer teams could be composed of neutrals, but would be responsible to, report to, and subject to the direction and supervision of MAC.

"B. We agree with your comments (5*b*) on Para 4 of CX 58967 insofar as it pertains to MAC, and we concur with your observation in Para 5*c* thereof.

"3. With respect to the organization and conduct of observer teams and MAC, you are reminded of the necessity to establish in the agreement safeguards against their inaction and resulting frustration by the exercise of a veto in MAC or in the teams themselves." (Black Book, Tab 43)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 47 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TOKYO, 8 December 1951—9:01 p. m.

C–58981. HNC–527. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 527.

"Sub-delegation meeting this date opened 1100 with both sides holding to and insisting upon their respective positions on principles. UNC attempted to get clarification of Communists meaning of 'coastal islands and waters'. Communists evaded. UNC strongly insisted on its right to retain islands, indicated firm intent to retain them unless appropriate adjustment was made. Communists sought to shift discussion to other principles. UN insisted on proceeding in order. Recessed 1300. Reconvened 1330. UNC pointed out wording of agreement on agenda Item 2 contained nothing requiring UNC to give up islands. Asked if Communists had a 'suitable adjustment' to offer in return for islands. Communists charged UNC delaying, stalling, refusing to show clear attitude on neutral organ question, and alleged UNC is wasting time in order to run out available time by delaying on side issues. After 3 and ½ hour discussion of islands, ending in stalemate, discussion moved to question of armistice commission. UNC took position against dual agencies supervising armistice. Communists pressed unremittingly for categoric answer to their proposal of neutral nations inspecting organ. UNC reiterated refusal to accept dual agencies in supervision of armistice.

"UNC recommended Communists give thorough overnight study to UNC 8 point proposal (CX 58694).[1] Lee finished with statement his side would absolutely never agree to interference with internal affairs of his territory. Lee gave no answer on agenda Item 4. Adjourned 1635. Tomorrow sub-delegation will continue effort to gain Communist agreement, with 8 principles of CX 58694. Meeting tomorrow 1100. Signed Joy".

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[1] Dated December 5, p. 1240.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 49 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 9 December 1951—6:37 p. m.

C–59024. HNC 529. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 529.

"Sub-delegation meeting convened 1100.

"1. Communists insisted steadily on 'clear expression of UNC attitude toward neutral inspecting organ'. UNC tried to draw discussion away from this point by discussing islands, replacements and replenishment, and other elements of UNC 8 principles, stating solution of these matters must precede determination of nature of observation teams. Lee returned to inspection question, insisting on neutral inspecting teams. He stated his side would never accept 'interference in internal affairs', meaning observation of rear areas by UNC observers. UNC restated its principles, stressing need for effective inspection, single armistice supervising authority. Recessed 1300.

"2. *a.* Reconvened 1400. In afternoon, Communists had no new points to make, merely reiterated positions on principles stressing 4 points: (1) Withdrawal by UNC from islands; (2) prohibiting introduction of forces into Korea from abroad; and reducing forces in Korea by stages; (3) no interference in internal affairs; (4) only neutral teams observe in rear areas at ports of entry. UNC pointed out there was nothing new in foregoing.

"*b.* Twice today Lee failed to answer UNC query regarding agenda item 4 sub-delegation.

"*c.* Recessed 1415, to continue at 1100 tomorrow. Delegation plans to continue to seek to gain Communist agreement to UNC 8 principles.

"Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 50 : Telegram

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate in Korea (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

SECRET PRIORITY KOREA, 9 December 1951—6:47 p. m.

HNC-530. Reur C-58985.[1]

1. The United Nations Command sub-delegation has daily asked the Communist sub-delegation for an answer to the United Nations Command proposal of 4 December for sub-delegation meetings on item 4. Answers have been evasive or inconclusive.

2. During today's morning session, the United Nations Command sub-delegation asked the Communists if they had an answer; they replied that they did not, that their senior delegate had the proposal under consideration. Again this afternoon, on being asked if they had

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[1] The text of this message, dated December 9, from General Ridgway to Admiral Joy read as follows:

"Suggest your full consideration of increased efforts to force Communists to initiation of concurrent discussions of details pertaining to agenda item number 4 and likewise to further exploitation of this issue public opinion wise." (Black Book, Tab 48) received an answer, the Communists repeated that their senior delegate had the matter under consideration. During the noon recess, General Turner[2] told the press that the Communists in spite of repeated inquiries from the United Nations Command sub-delegation had furnished no informative reply to our item 4 proposal and that it appeared they may be holding this matter as a threat or club over our heads.

3. As a further follow-up, I intend to have our sub-delegation deliver at the meeting tomorrow the following statement, a copy of which will be released simultaneously to the press: "At the plenary session held on 4 December 1951 the United Nations Command Delegation proposed that a separate sub-delegation be designated to discuss item 4. At that time it was pointed out that there was no relationship between items 3 and 4, that as a practical matter there was nothing to prevent their simultaneous discussion in separate sub-delegations, and that the order of items on the agenda could be preserved by referring the recommendations of the item 3 sub-delegation to the plenary session for ratification before referring to it those of the item 4 sub-delegation. You stated that you would answer the United Nations Command proposal 'in due time.' At the meetings of the item 3 sub-delegations which are now taking place, the United Nations Command sub-delegation has, each day, inquired concerning your decision on the UNC proposal on item 4. No indication of your acceptance of our proposal has been received, although 7 days have now elapsed since our proposal was made.

"This proposal was made by the UNC delegation for the sole purpose of expediting the negotiations and of speeding final agreement on an armistice. By holding meetings of a sub-delegation on item 4 concurrently with those which are now being held on item 3, many time-consuming details can be settled simultaneously on both agenda items. If you are in fact interested in an early armistice and in the humanitarian features of the consequent early settlement of prisoner of war matters, we can see no justification for any further delay in your acceptance of our proposal for concurrent discussions of items 3 and 4 on the sub-delegation level.

"The UNC sub-delegation to discuss item 4 of the agenda is prepared to meet with your sub-delegation at 1300 hours tomorrow, 11 December. Our liaison officer will be at Pan Mun Jom at 1030 hours tomorrow to receive your answer."

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[2] Maj. Gen. Howard McM. Turner was a member of the United Nations Command Delegation at Panmunjom.

Truman Library, Truman Papers, PSF–General File–Joint Chiefs of Staff

Memorandum for the President[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 10, 1951.

The following notes summarize the discussion at the meeting held in the Cabinet Room at 10:30 a.m., December 10, 1951, at which you presided, with the following in attendance:

James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army
Francis P. Whitehair, Acting Secretary of the Navy
Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, Military Aide to the President
Rear Adm. Robert Dennison, Naval Aide to the President
Brig. Gen. Robert Landry, Air Force Aide to the President
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by explaining that he had decided to come back from Key West because it was time for one of his regular meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he felt it would be better to have it in Washington with representatives of the State Department than to have it in Key West. He then asked General Bradley to give a briefing on the situation in Korea.

GENERAL BRADLEY reported that there has been a steady build-up in Communist air strength. In addition, they are working on three airfields in Northwest Korea which CIA estimates will be operational in mid-December unless they are knocked out. This Communist air build-up has made it necessary to stop daylight missions of B–29's. In addition, two new Chinese armies, plus 145,000 replacements, have recently moved into Korea from China. Ground action has consisted of Communist artillery fire averaging recently about 900 shells per day, and patrolling by U.S. units. There have been two recent Communist air missions against our front lines. Two South Korean divisions have been moved out of the front line and sent back to clean out the guerrillas. In summary, General Bradley said that the most significant developments have been a 209,000 build-up on the ground and a continuous air build-up by the Communists.

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[1] The source text gives no indication of authorship.

The President said that it was this developing situation which concerned him. He felt that the Communists, by their build-up and their negotiations, were trying to prevent us from being able to meet the situation that they, not in good faith, were developing. That was why he wanted this meeting.

General Bradley noted that the present estimate of Communist strength in Korea was 800,000.

The President said that he felt that our negotiators in Korea had been a little too conciliatory. He did not believe that it was necessary to give so much or take so much. He was worried about the State Department saying that it would take years to get a political settlement. If, by building up, the Communists are able to drive us out of Korea, our whole career in Korea will have been wasted. The question before us was how we meet this threat.

General Bradley said that he thought the following quotation from the latest CIA estimate expressed the situation most accurately:

> "We believe that the Communists desire a suspension or termination of hostilities in Korea, but that their present position is not such as to oblige them to accept terms which they may regard as seriously disadvantageous. We believe the Communists will protract the military negotiations while there is a chance of obtaining concessions of actual or propaganda value. Thereafter, political negotiations will be prolonged in the confidence that while negotiations continue the UN will not renew or widen hostilities, and in the hope that popular pressures in the West will oblige the UN to conclude a settlement on terms more favorable to the Communists."

The President stated that this presented a serious problem not only there but here at home. He feared that the increasing "home for Christmas" idea may make it impossible for us to meet the situation. He felt that our demands had not been strong enough. His impression was that they had been making the demands and we the concessions.

General Bradley expressed the view that the Communists had made very big concessions when they had given up on the line being at the 38th parallel and on Kaesong. He thought that neither side could give in on rehabilitation of things like houses and roads.

The President said that we should not give in on military installations such as airfields and railroad yards.

General Bradley said that we have reserved our position on airfields. We would not give in on that until we reached a final breaking point, and then we would try to limit the number the Communists could build so that we could knock them out quickly in the event of new hostilities. General Bradley thought that the choice facing us was to give in on some of these things or to go all out against China. He believed that a reasonably satisfactory armistice was preferable to all-out war with China.

The President said there was no argument on that, but on the other hand we should not compromise our position.

General Bradley agreed that there were some things that we would have to stand on, such as our rotation policy.

The President said that was necessary so that we could keep up the strength and morale of our forces.

General Bradley explained that the proposals which concerned the President were only efforts to give a final position to our negotiators. That was why they looked bad at this time. General Bradley felt that rehabilitation would be mutually advantageous even though it would be better for them. He pointed out that we have the problem of having to cut the roads daily by air attack. Also, we want to be able to do some rehabilitation ourselves, particularly if, for instance, there is a severe storm that wrecks South Korea. Besides, restrictions on rehabilitation can't be enforced anyway, since you can never be sure that they are not building new roads and houses. General Bradley felt that the biggest thing we could do to prevent a violation of an armistice would be to say that if the armistice is violated we will go all out against China.

The President agreed that that was another alternative.

Secretary Lovett shared the views of the JCS after originally having some concern about them. He said he was influenced in part by recent conversations with the British on two counts. First, what if we don't get an armistice? The British are in desperate straits and the French are practically bankrupt. We are generally inadequate in air strength throughout the world. In our conversations with the British we had put up General Bradley's idea of enlarging the geographical area if the armistice is violated, but had not specifically mentioned the blockade. The first British reaction was to draw back from the possibility of a blockade. We feel that this is one of the best things to do. The British therefore agreed to go back to London and discuss the matter with Churchill. Secretary Lovett said that he understood that the British had now tentatively indicated that they would favor a warning against a violation of an armistice.

Secretary Webb said that was true, but that the British wanted to weaken our proposed statement.

Secretary Lovett said that he felt that we did not have staunch support in the UN. The British and French were in bad shape, both financially and regarding manpower, so that their desire for an armistice is greater today than it has been. Secretary Lovett was also concerned about our ability to enlarge the conflict, which would have to be done largely with Air and Navy. The prospects are that we would have to accept considerable attrition in the air in view of the Communist build-up.

General Vandenberg said that the attrition would depend upon how you enlarged the air war.

Secretary Lovett explained that there would be large attrition if we made air attacks on Manchuria.

General Vandenberg agreed that that would be true. He said that he had gone along with the approach indicated by General Bradley because he thought that it was in line with our national policy. His own feeling was that we should get an armistice, get our troops out of Korea, and tell the Communists that if they violated the armistice we would do whatever is necessary. Actually we will have to enlarge the conflict whether there is a violation of an armistice or whether we fail to get an armistice. General Vandenberg thought that the American people would go along with an armistice that would allow us to get our troops out of Korea.

The President asked if General Vandenberg thought the American people would go along if it meant surrendering Korea. The President was concerned that the Communists would build up after an armistice and then come right down the peninsula to Pusan.

General Vandenberg thought that this would not happen if we made it clear that we would go all out against China if the armistice is violated. In that event he would not attack Manchuria, but China proper, hitting at their ports, mining their rivers, etc.

Secretary Pace thought that General Bradley's approach was a good one. Secretary Pace felt that we should indicate what we would do if there was a violation of an armistice. Then we might yield on fundamentally minor questions but hold on the major ones. He explained that in any case we would not withdraw immediately from Korea in view of our UN commitment there. In that connection he pointed out that General Collins has reported that the ROK officers training at Forts Benning and Sill have performed exceptionally well. Also, General Van Fleet is moving forward in improving ROK capacity there. Secretary Pace felt that the big issue was what we say if there is an armistice violation. If we can agree on that we can afford to yield on smaller questions.

Secretary Finletter thought that we should bear in mind that we have already achieved our objectives in Korea of repelling aggression and upholding the UN. He thought that we should henceforth not try to rub their noses, but should make concessions on minor points. The big question is what we should do if there is an armistice violation. First, he felt that we should not go it alone, but should act under the

UN. Second, he believed that we should take vigorous leadership in the UN to strengthen its position on the Korean question, despite the fact that many of the nations are in financial trouble and are generally fed up with the Korean war. Third, we should not make war on China alone. Fourth, we should try not to take actions that are so serious as to get the Russians involved.

ADMIRAL FECHTELER expressed his concern that making a threatening statement would not make much of an impression on China. Moreover, we might have trouble elsewhere and then not want to do what we had said we were going to do. In other words, he felt that any statement should not be interpreted as a threat or commit us to a line of action indefinitely into the future.

SECRETARY WHITEHAIR said that he was familiar with the slow-bleeding tactics which the Chinese are carrying out in the negotiations. He felt that we should try to get an armistice before the American people get fed up with these tactics.

GENERAL COLLINS said that he feels that he would like to get our troops out of Korea, but he also thought we should go as far as possible to get concessions from the Communists. He believed that although a UN statement may not influence China, it may give the Russians pause.

MR. MATTHEWS said that he agrees with the JCS proposal. He felt that it is important for us to get an armistice, but that neither side is willing to have one at any price. He thought that the best deterrent for an armistice would be the "larger sanction". He felt that the Chinese would pay attention to such a statement. He is hopeful that we will be able to get the UN nations having troops in Korea to go along with a stronger statement.

SECRETARY WEBB pointed out that we are trying to build a military shield against Russia. Moreover, we have many weak allies to build up. He said that his great concern was to keep countries from going Communist behind our lines, such as Japan and in Europe. He thought that the JCS proposal was about as good a formula as can be worked out for our immediate purposes. He thought that longer range settlement depended upon building strength out there in Asia.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was what he had wanted to find out. Looking at General Bradley, he said, "We'll have to go ahead with it, General."

THE PRESIDENT then asked about the situation in Europe.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that the Harriman group [2] feels that we will not quite reach our goals for '54 by that time, but that we can have approximately the number of divisions with some deficiencies in strength, equipment, and training. General Bradley said that it was discouraging to hear Mr. Schuman talk about a European defense force, but throw monkey wrenches into a German contribution. General Bradley was hopeful that the French may agree to go along during the course of the next year.

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[2] For documentation on the work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), composed of W. Averell Harriman, Jean Monnet, and Sir Edward Plowden, see vol. III, Part 1, pp. 616 ff. and 693 ff.

SECRETARY LOVETT pointed out that what both the French and the Russians are worried about is Germany. Germany is therefore the key. Our own forces there are first-class. Our allies, however, have a tendency to make broad commitments but are not taking the necessary steps to produce things which have developed as bottlenecks here, such as electronics and machine tools. In general, he felt that the sense of urgency from a military point of view is greater with us than with those who would be hit first, except for the British.

THE PRESIDENT said that there is one principal difficulty. This is that the situation here at home is somewhat similar to the French. During the coming election year it will be most difficult to keep up our defense program. He felt that it was a pity we have to look forward to 1952 for that reason, when what we should be doing is devoting all our attention to the world situation. That is why he is worried about Korea. We must not waste our position there or we may then find this country going isolationist.

GENERAL COLLINS said that if that was what was worrying the President, he felt that he could assure the President that the Communists would not get to Pusan next year. Even with an armistice we would make sure that that won't happen.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the TCC report would be of considerable assistance here because it focuses attention realistically on what can be done by the end of calendar 1952, which is the important first step. It also ultimately shows what can be done.

THE PRESIDENT said that this forthcoming budget is the biggest headache he has ever had. With reference to the civil activities in the budget, the President pointed out that, if we do not keep up morale in this country, we cannot maintain the free world, which is what we are after. We have never faced a situation such as we have now. It is a discouraging and dark picture, but we must make sure that there is no letdown.

GENERAL BRADLEY commented that if there is no armistice it will be a terrific blow to morale.

SECRETARY PACE pointed out that if we get an armistice we can make the capacity of Europe greater. He felt that we are now realistically assessing what can be done. European effort in the fiscal and economic fields is not there, but our own troops in Europe are fine. Also, our allies have made considerable progress on manpower. This is encouraging, particularly in view of the quality of our own forces in Europe.

Secretary Webb thought that it was very important to recognize that many members of Congress are travelling and will come home with impressions similar to Secretary Pace's. He thought that this would be very helpful. Secretary Acheson has pointed out that we have faced these same difficulties at every point in our efforts. We are now assessing where we can get strength soon, which is a valuable approach. Secretary Webb felt that we may get progress in the next few months because we are now looking at what can be done.

The President agreed that the situation is better than in 1946, but the political situation at home is what bothers him. He felt there was a danger that this country might again go isolationist.

Secretary Webb pointed out that we have another year of experience with military unification and building up the team at the State Department. He believed that this would result in better relationships with the new Congress.

The President warned that this might be optimistic, since many members of Congress next year would be saying, in effect, "Elect me and to hell with what happens to the country."

Editorial Note

On December 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to General Ridgway his instructions on the question of prisoners of war exchange, conveyed in telegram JCS 89172, the text of which corresponded exactly with that of telegram JCS 89090, December 7, page 1276, except that the first sentence of Part I, Paragraph 1, read as follows:

> "H. POW exchange on a one-for-one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation and negotiations [*negotiators*] should vigorously maintain the one-for-one position as long as possible without precipitating a break on this issue." (Black Book, Tab 51)

The list of civilian captives referred to in Part I, Subparagraph 1(3) (*b*), of telegram JCS 89090, was transmitted in telegram JCS 89189, also dated December 10, not printed. (Tab 51–A)

Also on December 10, the Joint Chiefs sent instructions concerning inspections under agenda item 3 in telegram JCS 89173, the text of which was identical with that of telegram JCS 89114, December 7, page 1278. (Tab 52)

795.00/12-851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—7:59 p. m.

2857. Reurtel 2664, Dec 8. Last part final par draft statement (Deptel 2807 Dec 5) is essential element. Scott's suggestion not sufficiently unequivocal as a threat of retaliation without geographic limitation to have strong deterrent effect we desire. In our view is essential that any statement make unmistakably clear new situation that wld exist if following armistice Commies renewed attack in Korea particularly as long as UN forces remain there. Believe our draft accomplishes this purpose while not committing us to any specific course of military action. As our draft based on premise Commie China is principal threat to renewal of attack and as Commie China has been only non-Korean country overtly engaged in aggression last para in draft is directed primarily at Commie China as well as NK.

It wld appear difficult for USSR allege final para our draft as applicable to it unless prepared to admit intent overtly attack UN forces in Korea.

Foregoing for ur background in any preliminary discussion with Eden if UK comments along lines indicated by Scott. FYI unanimous view in all quarters here that statement such as proposed by US would be major factor in deterring renewal Commie aggression in Korea.

WEBB

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 53 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 11 December 1951—8:13 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-59096. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 531

"Sub-Delegation meeting opened 1100[1] with Lee inquiring regard neutral organ proposal. UNC responded with statement (Par 3, HNC 530)[2] advocating immediate initiation of Sub-Delegation talks on item 4 of agenda. Lee replied he would transmit statement to his senior delegate,[3] then repeated his question regarding neutral organ, charging UNC delayed discussion of item 3 by failing to answer. UNC replied question of neutral organ is under active consideration, answer would be given in due time. UNC inquired if Communists had anything new to propose. Communists answered no. UNC recommended recess until following day. Lee upbraided UNC for failing to answer his question on neutral organ. Lee referred to free inspection of the rear areas, prohibition of increase of facilities and withdrawal from islands as unreasonable demands of UNC. Neutral nations representatives only may inspect rear areas, said Lee, asking UNC opinion on these points. UNC pointed out many unsettled points were not related to question of neutral organ, not dependent upon method of observation adopted. Recessed 1140. Meeting continue tomorrow 1100. Signed Joy."

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[1] Reference is to the meeting of December 10.

[2] Dated December 9, p. 1288.

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[3] Telegram HNC 534, December 11, conveyed the following message from Admiral Joy to General Ridgway:

"1. As a result of statement (HNC 530) transmitted at meeting 10 Dec, the Communists have been forced to agree to a meeting of sub-delegations on agenda item 4 at 1300I this date.

"2. Admiral Libby, Colonel Hickman with staff officers and assistants will represent UNC." (Black Book, Tab 56)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 55 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

TOP SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, 11 December 1951—9:02 a. m.

CX-59097. 1. Re JCS 89173,[1] repeated to you this morning, following are my amplifying instructions referred to therein.

2. Ref JCS paras 2*a* and *c*, I have nothing to add.

3. Reference JCS para 2*b*, prior to your desiring to announce final position therein described, give me sufficient time to refer matter to Wash for decision.

4. Ref JCS para 2*d*, guidance therein will be combined with guidance contained in paras 2 and 3 of JCS 89119 of 9 [*8*] Dec 51.[2] Accordingly, your instructions with respect to this point are as follows:

a. The Military Armistice Commission itself must be composed of belligerents designated on an equal basis by opposing commanders.

b. As a final position you should agree to neutral observer teams composed of personnel of nations whose armed forces are not participating in Korean war and which nations are mutually agreed to by both sides.

c. As a part of your final position you should insist that the observer teams shall be responsible to, report to, and be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission and to no other body.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1286.

d. Further, with respect to both the Military Armistice Commission and its subordinate observer teams you will insist that the terms of the agreement shall include safe-guards against the inaction and resulting frustration of the commission and its subordinate observer teams by the exercise of a veto.

5. Tactics to be used in complying with foregoing are at your discretion.

6. Suggest you continue to apply strongest possible pressure to secure agreement to initiate discussion of agenda item 4.[3]

7. Acknowledge receipt.

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[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

795.00/12-1151

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1951.

Subject: Disposition of Korean Civilians under Item 4.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the JCS despatch a message (draft attached) to General Ridgway setting forth the following as the UNC position for negotiating the return of Korean civilian internees.

a. At an appropriate point in discussion of the return of civilians under item 4, UNC negotiators should include a request for the return of ROK civilians by the Communists (estimated at 20,000 actually seized).

b. In the event this request results in excessive counter-claims and prolonged wrangling which threaten to break off the negotiations, UNC negotiators should defer discussion of the determination of the status of Koreans to item 5.

c. If discussions are deferred, the recommendation agreed upon by the negotiators under item 5 should include recognition of the fact that the question of disposition of displaced Korean civilians still remains to be settled.

Discussion:

Ambassador Muccio's telegram 532, December 5, replying to the Department's telegram 411 of November 30, recommends that in light of strong ROK feelings on the subject of return of Korean civilians now in Communist hands, he believes it is imperative for the UNC negotiators to raise this subject under item 4. This recommended course of action is not in accordance with that contained in the Secretary's letter to the Secretary of Defense of December 4 which recommended that discussions on Korean civilians should be avoided because of the many political implications.

If UNC negotiators seek the return of the 20,000 ROK civilians as recommended by Ambassador Muccio, the Communists will undoubtedly press for the return of all North Korean refugees including approximately 80,000 evacuated from Hamhung. A series of such claims and counter-claims could result in political wrangling which would endanger the success of the negotiations. Moreover, a request for 20,000, less than 5000 of whom are specifically named in the lists which the ROK has prepared, will not necessarily placate the ROK Government, which has demanded the return of hundreds of thousands of kidnapped civilians including about 800,000 residing in the area of Kaesong and the Ongjin peninsula. Ambassador Muccio indicates that there are some North Korean civilians who are still pro-Communist who could be exchanged for the ROK civilians.

On the other hand, failure to request the return of these kidnapped Koreans would constitute a discriminatory act which could be well utilized for Communist propaganda and would antagonize the ROK Government. Concern over the nature of a possible armistice has been noticeably increasing in Korea, and careful attention to the reasonable desires of the ROK will be necessary if political unrest—or even overt action—is to be avoided. However, the request for the return of these civilians should not be permitted to endanger the success of the negotiations, nor should political wrangling on this subject be permitted to delay the conclusion of an armistice.

In order to avoid either of the above eventualities, it is believed that although the UNC negotiations should request the return of the estimated 20,000 Korean civilians, they should, in the event of strong objection or excessive counter-claims, be prepared to give way on this point and refer it to discussions under item 5. Under the latter item UNC negotiators should seek agreement on a recommendation which, while noting the conclusion of an armistice and the cessation of hostilities, should recognize that certain problems, *including* the disposition of large numbers of Koreans displaced as a result of the hostilities, remain unsettled.

This course of action would indicate our good faith, would recognize the equality of Korean civilians with those of other nations, would deprive the Communists of the possible advantage of raising this question on their own initiative, and would probably help to placate the ROK Government.

Since the most recent message to General Ridgway on item 4 stated that this subject was under consideration by the Department of State, it is suggested that the next directive on this subject instruct General Ridgway along the lines of the recommendation discussed herein.

[Enclosure]

Department of State Draft Telegram by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1951.

From JCS re JCS 89172.[1]

Ref Part I paras (3) and (4)

1. At appropriate point in negotiating return civilian internees under item 4, you should include request for return those South Koreans seized by North Koreans and taken north parallel. Amb. Muccio reports that ROK estimates number at approximately 20,000.

2. In event such request results in excessive Commie counter-claims and political wrangling, you are authorized to defer further discussion to item 5. Under latter item, appropriate recommendation would include reference to fact that question determination status of large segments Korean population remains unsettled and necessitates early consideration.

3. Recommend you maintain close liaison with Amb. Muccio who will have difficult task reconciling ROK to UNC position this delicate question.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 62 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, 11 December 1951—5:45 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-59128. 1. Ref JCS 89119,[1] 89173[2] and my msg CX 58967.[3] In the event Communists refuse to agree to a military armistice commission composed of belligerents designated on an equal basis by opposing commanders and negotiations reach the breaking point on this issue, I recommend that I be authorized to propose an armistice commission composed of numerically equal representation from both sides and with a neutral chairman.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 1286.
[2] See the editorial note, p. 1296.
[3] Dated December 8, p. 1285.

2. I consider it important to point out that a military armistice commission composed of numerically equal numbers from each side will inevitably result in each side having a *de facto* veto. Whereas a military armistice commission composed of numerically equal representation of the two belligerent sides with a neutral chairman, together with a provision that prohibits the use of the veto, will permit the UNC to abide by the provisions of para 3 of JCS 89119.

3. Your views are requested.[4]

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[4] General Ridgway sent the following further message in telegram C-59130, December 11, from Tokyo:

"Urmsg JCS 89173.

"In connection with neutral observer teams some thought has been given here as to relative desirability from our point of view of certain theoretically neutral nations. Certain so called neutral countries are more subject to Soviet pressure than others, and some neutrals are opportunistic in their attitude toward the present world situation.

"Request guidance as the relative desirability of various acceptable countries. Further, if there is any choice among Communist dominated countries, your views would be appreciated." (Black Book, Tab 63)

795.00/12-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1951—6 p. m.

2687. Deptel 2807, Dec 5. I discussed Korea statement with Eden this morning. He said he had himself written something somewhat different and that whole matter had been considered by Chiefs of Staff late yesterday. He had not yet recd report of their deliberations but was expecting one momentarily and intended to see that subject was discussed at Cabinet mtg later this morning, even though it was not down on agenda.

Apropos of this high FonOff official has told us how much they appreciate our consultation and method of approach on this particular matter. It has made an excellent impression on Eden and others.

GIFFORD

320/12-1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 11, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 615. Re: Korea. Gross and Hyde called on Officer[1] (Australia) at his request. For some days he has expressed growing concern at need for consultation. Gross stated that absent instructions he cld hear Officer's views and perhaps offer only personal comments. There have been various Commonwealth consultations in Paris and Officer stated that the views he expressed cld be taken as fairly reflecting the Commonwealth point of view, at least that of the "Old Dominions".

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[1] Sir Keith Officer, Australian Ambassador in France, was head of the Australian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

1. Australia recognizes that the US has made the greatest contribution in Korea in manpower and treasure. Therefore it recognizes the key position US shld have in next steps. But Australia on basis of its size is next contributor of mil forces and it has just claim to participate in strategic decisions on future of Korea. He inquired how far US is committed to the idea of a unified independent and democratic Korea, because he feels that US troops and financial support must in a large measure guarantee it. He thought this might be largely a mil question and recognized that in the foreseeable future US will have troops in Japan and that their presence there has strategic value to US. But for UK and Australia it is without strategic benefit and a burden to have troops in Korea or Japan, if they were to be withdrawn from Korea. Yet continuing measures are necessary or we wld wake up to find Korea a Commie state. Gross commented that US public opinion cld not in his view understand or accept a decision to write off Korea. An armistice will involve the continuing use of troops in the area for a long period.

2. If there is an armistice, Officer stressed Commonwealth thinking that there shld be ratification of it by SC in anodyne res (precise phrase used by Jebb and reported in USUN's 115 of July 19)[2] simply noting the armistice and passing on the question to GA avoiding if possible Soviet veto. The res in the GA wld then note and reaffirm all the UN resolutions.

3. Officer expressed concern at reports of Dept thinking about creation of a comm to handle Korean polit questions. He thought the typical UN comm as an organ of the GA is undesirable in the extreme and that these questions of the future of Korea cannot effectively be discussed in the first comite and that those who are directly concerned, such as US, UK and Australia, must not have to discuss these problems in a forum with others who have made little if any contrib. On the other hand, the type of res that Australia favors wld be to recommend that the members concerned set up a conf which wld include US, UK, France, Australia, USSR and perhaps Thailand and Turkey. These states wld be asked to confer with other interested parties, meaning the Koreans and the Chi Commies, on ways and means of settlement.

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1210.

At this point Gross analyzed the various sorts of instrumentalities that cld be used, assuming there is an armistice:

(*a*) Gross and Officer agreed that the type of conf proposed by Indian-Asian-Arab group with India and Egypt to sit with the Chi Commies and big four is out of the question and not at all what Officer has in mind.

(*b*) Gross suggested another possibility wld be a UNO rep, but he wld be a very hard man to find. Officer felt this idea might have great merit if the type of man, such as Joseph Grew,[3] cld be found who wld undertake the task over a long period and work with patience and diplomatic skill. He agreed that such a man wld naturally be an American and that he must have a measure of idealism and much practical common sense. Preferably he shld act under instruction.

(*c*) Gross suggested also that there might be an advisory comm made up of permanent UN del members in NY with a permanent chairman or executive agent. Again Officer thought that this might be more practical than trying to find the right individual, altho he wld prefer such a group to be in Washington rather than NY because of the endless publicity that any activity at UN HQ entails. He concluded that the word "commission" and the concept of the ordinary UN comm was what particularly disturbed his govt and he thought that the arrangement suggested by Gross had a flexibility and the same sort of purpose which he had originally intended by the word "conf". It was agreed that personal opinions were being expressed, but that in general there was agreement on the sort of measures desirable.

4. Officer referred to the Secretary's discussion with Eden at Rome (further Delga 530)[4] and stated with seriousness his opinion that Australia is entitled to be consulted. He added that if the US were to make a statement on our views on a less rigid inspection system than originally contemplated in Korea, we shld not purport to speak for Australia unless an opportunity was given for full consultation in advance.[5]

5. At the Commonwealth mtgs on Korea, Pannikar[6] has come forward with the idea of a study group to be created by the GA and composed of three individual experts not reps of govts. Presumably he wld be one of the three. Without awaiting an armistice or awaiting the Korean case coming to the GA this group wld study the bases

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[3] Retired American diplomat and former Under Secretary of State.

[4] See footnote 1, p. 1254.

[5] Telegram Gadel 431, December 12, to Paris, instructed the U.S. Delegation to inform Officer that consultation with Australia was actively proceeding not only with respect to the greater sanctions statement but on other aspects of the armistice negotiations as well (320/12–1151).

[6] K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China, was a member of the Indian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

for a polit settlement, the degree of unification that is obtainable and methods of holding elections in North and South Korea. Officer added that presumably Pannikar wld go to Peiping and negotiate with the Commies on the basis of the findings of such a group. He added that the Commonwealth mtg had firmly but politely rejected this idea. He feels that Pannikar able but vain man and understands he will be in charge of the Korean item for India when Rau goes on the bench.[7] Gross expressed our complete and thorough distrust of Pannikar which wld extend to any proposals he might make.

It was understood that this was a personal exchange of views and that we had received no instructions from the Dept which wld authorize Gross to indicate its positions.[8]

AUSTIN

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[7] Sir Benegal Rau had been elected to the International Court of Justice beginning February 6, 1952. He was head of the Indian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

[8] On December 13, in telegram Delga 639, Ambassador Austin reported from Paris that Messrs. Gross and Hyde had conveyed to Mr. Jebb and M. Chauvel the Department's views as set forth in telegram Gadel 393, December 8, to Paris, (p. 1282). The discussion was tentative in tone, and Jebb and Chauvel received the Department's views sympathetically but wanted time to think about the United States suggestions. (320/12–1351)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 59 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

SECRET TOKYO, 11 December 1951—10:15 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX–59154. Re your HNC 541.[1] Believe our interests will be best served by initial insistence on obtaining information concerning our POW's.

Communists will find it exceedingly difficult to resist insistent pressure, couched in direct forceful language demanding immediate agreement to allow ICRC Representatives access to all their POW camps. Failure to do so, on whatever pretext offered, can only be interpreted throughout world as further conclusive proof of complete Communist callousness to individual human rights, and as positive proof, by their own direct admission, of deliberate refusal to honor their often repeated public announcements that they were abiding by the principles of the Geneva Conventions.

We should insist that they agree forthwith to receive ICRC Representatives and conduct them to their POW detention camps, as we have done, and as the world knows we have done. We should state these Representatives are present in Korea and ready to do their part at anytime. If they do not at once agree, I favor your excoriating them as lacking in every concept of honor of which those who through all ages have called themselves soldiers, are proud.

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[1] *Infra.* Telegram CX–59154 was sent following receipt in Tokyo of telegram HNC–541 but prior to the transmission of HNC–541 to Washington.

I would tell them this in the most blistering language we can command, in every session at every opportunity. They may yield. The lives, at least the health, of our men are at stake. I would force them to consent or publicly refuse.

We should refuse discussion of the issue they have raised between an exchange of all for all versus one for one or any other arrangement. Discussions of details of manner of exchange can follow immediately after Communists consent to our simple humane request.

Suggest you consult ICRC Representatives.

This message will be brought to the personal attention of Admiral Joy regardless of the hour of its receipt.[2]

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[2] The following message was sent by General Ridgway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram CX-59155, December 11, from Tokyo:

"1. If you concur with my views as stated in my CX 59154 to CINCUNC Adv of which you are info addressee, suggest you consider mobilizing immediately every available public information medium to bring increased pressure on Communist leaders. United Nations General Assembly now in session would seem to offer particularly good opportunity." (Black Book, Tab 60)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 61 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, December 11, 1951—10:53 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-59156. HNC-541. For info, CINCUNC (Adv) HNC 541.

"Report of sub-committee on agenda Item 4. Convened 1300. Communists early in session proposed one simple principle 'that both sides release all POWs held by them after signing of the Armistice.' UNC proposed 2 general principles:

"'(1) It is desirable to effect the early regulated exchange of prisoners of war on a fair and equitable basis and under suitable supervision.

"'(2) Suitable provision shall be made to insure humanitarian treatment, safety, and comfort of prisoners preceding and during exchange.'

"Thereafter UNC pressed for acceptance of following preliminary measures:

"'(1) Exchange now of POW data requested at Plenary session of 27 Nov; and

"'(2) Admission now of ICRC Representatives to POW camps. Communists made discussion of these and all other 'technical matters' contingent upon UNC acceptance of their aforestated simple principle. Communists further indicated disagreement with UNC first principle on grounds that there was no reason for retaining any POWs after the Armistice was signed. UNC finally proposed recess for stated purpose of enabling Communists to reconsider their refusal to exchange POW information now or to permit visits of ICRC Representatives. Session adjourned 1535 to reconvene at 1100 tomorrow.'

"*Comment:* Indications from first day are that discussion during subsequent sessions will focus primarily on the question of all-for-all versus 1-for-1, or any other arrangement. Sgd Joy."

795.00/12-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1951.

Subject: Meeting with JCS on Korea

Participants:	JCS:	General Bradley	State:	Mr. Matthews, G
		General Collins		Mr. Bohlen, C
		General Vandenberg		Mr. Bonbright, EUR
		Admiral Duncan		Mr. Johnson, FE
		General Bolte		
		Admiral Lalor		

There was a general discussion of the problem of membership and organization of the neutral inspection body and it was determined that there should be preliminary consultation with Switzerland, Sweden and Norway to ascertain whether they would be willing to serve on such a body. It appeared that from the standpoint of the JCS the extent and nature of inspection was not of major importance if agreement could be reached on a "greater sanction" statement. In general it was the conclusion of the meeting that under Agenda Item 3 the important question was whether agreement could be obtained for the "greater sanction" statement, and that Agenda Item 4 on prisoners of war assumed greater importance. It was agreed that General Bolte and Mr. Johnson would draft a message along these lines. The message drafted by General Bolte and Mr. Johnson, subsequently approved and dispatched to General Ridgway, is JCS 89473, December 12, 1951.[1]

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[1] *Post*, p. 1319.

There was also discussion of General Ridgway's CX 59155[2] and CX 59176,[3] a reply to which was drafted by Admiral Lalor and Mr. Johnson in light of the discussion at the meeting, subsequently approved and dispatched to General Ridgway as JCS 87474 [*89474*].[4]

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[2] See footnote 2, p. 1306.

[3] Dated December 12, 12:45 p. m., but received in Washington early on December 12 due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, p. 1311.

[4] Dated December 12, p. 1321.

711.5622/12-1251

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1951.

Subject: Bomber Shot Down by the Soviet Union.

We have discussed with the Legal Adviser's Office legal problems involved in further steps in regard to the bomber shot down by the Soviet Union.

1. The step which would raise least difficulties would be a direct diplomatic protest by the United States to the Soviet Government. We have hestitated to pursue this course because we have insisted that the plane in question was on a United Nations mission not on a national mission of the United States. (It was for that reason that this year, as once before, our representative in Moscow was reluctant to accept the Soviet note charging violation, and indicated that any protest should be made to the United Nations.) In fact, however, a United States Government protest in this case is entirely consistent with the fact that the plane in question was on a mission for the United Nations. Neither the plane nor the crew lost their national character by virtue of being assigned to the United Nations. Indeed, according to the Legal Adviser's Office, only the United States Government has authority to make a diplomatic claim for the loss of the plane and of the crew. It should be possible, therefore, in a note to the Soviet Government to make it clear that the claim is being made by the United States Government as the owner of the plane and as the Government whose nationals were lost with the plane, although the plane was engaged in a United Nations action. While the Legal Adviser's Office doubts that the fact that the United States as the Unified Command in Korea gives it the right to make diplomatic claims for damage to personnel or equipment engaged in the action,

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[1] The memorandum was also addressed to Mr. Walworth Barbour of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

it should be possible to mention the fact that the United States is the Unified Command in an appropriate context to underline the United Nations character of the flight in question.

2. The Legal Adviser's Office informs us also that while the United Nations cannot make a claim for the loss of the personnel and plane in question, it perhaps has the capacity to make a diplomatic protest to the USSR for damage to and interference with the United Nations action in Korea, and request an apology and assurances. The Legal Adviser's Office is also of the view that under a General Assembly resolution of December 1, 1949 (365–IV), the Secretary General might have the authority to make such a representation on behalf of the United Nations. It might be possible, therefore, to request the Secretary General to do so. We are not sure, however, it would be wise to involve the Secretary General in this incident in this way. He might not be willing to make such a representation, particularly in the light of the lack of conclusive evidence.

On balance, we recommend that the Department explore further and pursue the first alternative, i.e., a direct protest to the Soviet Government.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 80 : Telegram

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate in Korea (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE KOREA, 12 December 1951—12:45 p. m.

HNC 11–45. Following is text of press release being distributed to the press about 1230I this date.

Release.

"Following is the text of today's new UNC 7 principle proposal for resolving the existing differences on item nbr 3 of the Military Armistice Conference agenda.

"1. All armed forces, ground, sea, and air, under control of either side, shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the effective date of the Armistice.

"2. All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the effective date of the armistice. Except for such armed force of a police nature as may be specifically and mutually agreed to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone, nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any act of armed force against the demilitarized zone.

"3. Within five days after the effective date of the armistice, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control, ground, sea, and air, from the territory and territorial waters of the other side, including islands within the territorial waters of the other side. If the armed forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit (unless there is some valid and mutually agreed reason for delaying the withdrawal) the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

"4. *a.* Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission which shall be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to the whole armistice agreement. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with and assisted by, observer teams which shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission only. The observer teams shall be composed of personnel of nations whose armed forces are not participating in the Korean War, such nations to be mutually agreed to by both sides.

"*b.* Observation outside the demilitarized zone will be performed only by neutral observer teams. Observation within the demilitarized zone may be performed by neutral teams, by joint team selected by the Military Armistice Commission or by the Armistice Commission itself.

"*c.* Neutral observer teams shall be located at such land, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers as are mutually agreed to by both sides. These observer teams shall be permitted freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea and each side shall afford these teams full assistance in the execution of the duties assigned them by the Armistice Commission. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance and observation and photographic flights as are mutually agreed to by both sides will be performed by neutral teams.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities shall not be permitted.

"6. Each side shall administer in accordance with the terms of the armistice agreement that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

"7. The armistice shall not become effective until the Military Armistice Commission and its observer teams have been organized, are staffed, and are ready to begin the exercise of their assigned functions."

Release ends.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 70 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, 12 December 1951—12:45 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-59176. Re your 89172.[1]

1. I consider the securing of data on UNC and ROK prisoners of war held by the Communists to be an absolutely essential step to any further discussion on item 4. Before any reasonable agreements can be reached and in order to assure UNC the very minimum of safeguards for the return of UNC and ROK pers in en hands it is vital that we have names, by nationality, or at the least, numbers by nationality, with locations in either case.

2. The Communists, in the initial discussion of 11 Dec 51 on agenda item 4 termed the exchange of POW data as "technical matter" to be furnished contingent on UNC acceptance of their proposal that both sides release all POW held by them after signing of the armistice. Our agreement to this proposal would release all POW's we hold, without knowing that any of ours remain in Communist hands—an unthinkable bargain.

3. I propose to insist that, prior to further discussion on the details of exchange, the Communists furnish us with this data. I anticipate determined opposition to this proposal.

4. Accordingly, recommend that I be given authority soonest to issue an ultimatum to the Communists to the effect that we will not proceed with discussions of item 4 until lists of prisoners and their locations have been exchanged.

5. Additional comments on JCS 89172 will follow.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

694.95B1/12-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [Washington,] December 12, 1951.

Subject: Korean-Japanese Treaty Negotiations and Questions Relating to Armistice Talks.

Participants: Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Political Counselor, Korean Embassy
Mr. John M. Allison, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

The Korean Ambassador called on Mr. Allison at 3:00 this afternoon at the latter's request. Mr. Allison explained that he has been anxious to have an opportunity to exchange impressions with Dr. Yang following the Ambassador's return from his two month's visit to Korea and Japan.

Korean-Japanese Negotiations

The Ambassador then gave a lengthy résumé of his experience as chief Korean delegate in the negotiations with the Japanese Government on various outstanding problems between the two countries.[1] As background, the Ambassador stated that in conversations with the President and General MacArthur and, subsequently in Tokyo, with Senator Alexander Smith the importance had been urged upon him of Korea's obtaining a satisfactory settlement of differences with Japan prior to the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, in order that the future relations of the two countries could be placed on a sound and friendly basis. He said that in conversations with Mr. Yoshida, the Prime Minister had also expressed agreement with the desirability of reaching an understanding with a minimum of delay.

The Ambassador further explained that he had entered the negotiations in the spirit of friendliness and frankness in the hope that the Japanese would reciprocate and that a satisfactory treaty to both parties could be quickly concluded. He had, however, been quickly disillusioned as to the true Japanese attitude when it came to the actual day-to-day conduct of the negotiations. He pointed out that the Japanese Government evidently felt that, from its point of view, there was little to be gained through the negotiations and that the Koreans would be the principal beneficiaries. For this reason the Japanese working-level delegates continually stalled in coming to any agreements, stating at frequent intervals and on most issues that they were unprepared to put forward a position and even suggested delays in the discussion of some of the major issues to the Spring of 1952 when the Japanese Peace Treaty presumably will have come into effect. The Ambassador also referred to the fact that the Japanese delegation had initially suggested that the talks be conducted on a strictly bilateral basis without the presence or influence of a SCAP observer. The Ambassador, however, had succeeded in persuading his Japanese counterparts to accept the presence of such an observer.

The Ambassador stated that he had emphasized in the discussions the great importance both for Japan and Korea of healing old wounds through the working out of mutual problems and the negotiation of a fair and equitable treaty; he had endeavored in every way possible to influence the Japanese delegation to move ahead as fast as possible. He referred to the fact that he had also called to the attention of Japanese officials the importance of the negotiations with Korea as a symbol to other Asiatic nations, which were watching the Japanese attitude toward the negotiations with great interest, and that he had emphasized to the Japanese that the opinion of these nations in relation to future Japanese leadership in Asia would undoubtedly be influenced thereby.

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[1] These bilateral discussions had begun in October in Tokyo with the encouragement although not the direct participation of the United States Government, other than as an observer at the talks. Reports of the meetings were forwarded to the Department of State and may be found principally in decimal file 694.95B and related files. No agreements were reached prior to the end of 1951.

The Ambassador then went on to describe in some detail the course of the negotiations with respect to certain specific issues. In connection with the status of Korean residents in Japan, he pointed out that the Korean contention was that such residents should be given alien rights dating from August 8, 1945, whereas the Japanese insisted that this status should not be conferred until after the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

With regard to the question of fisheries, the Ambassador felt that the attitude of the Japanese delegates had been evasive; they had refused the Korean proposal that the MacArthur Line[2] continue in effect until a formal Korean-Japanese fisheries agreement had been reached. The Japanese had gone on to state that they were already engaged in negotiating fishing conventions with many other nations, which must take precedence, and that their fishery experts were so tied up in these negotiations that they did not now have time to discuss this question with Korea.

Dr. Yang indicated that after much persuasion the Japanese delegation had finally agreed to reopen, by the middle of February, further plenary discussions with Korean representatives on the major outstanding issues, and that in the interim a working-level group had been established in Japan to prepare fully for such discussions. The Ambassador explained that he had insisted that the Japanese should come fully prepared to undertake substantive discussions on all outstanding issues. To this effect an agenda had been agreed upon and he had obtained from the Japanese Government a written undertaking that every effort would be made to conclude a satisfactory understanding before the Japanese Peace Treaty came into force. Dr. Yang added that he had taken the precaution of making this undertaking public in Korea.

Dr. Yang noted that the Japanese Government had proposed to send Mr. Matsumoto to Korea to maintain liaison relative to the progress of work on the outstanding problems to be negotiated. He had urged upon the Japanese Government that, in view of the present unsympathetic state of Korean opinion, it would be better if Mr. Matsumoto [3] were to go to Korea in an informal capacity rather than as a high Japanese official on a goodwill tour, as had been suggested. The Ambassador was still hopeful that a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations could be achieved prior to the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

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[2] Line established on September 27, 1945 setting forth the boundaries within which unrestricted fishing operations could be undertaken by Japanese fishing vessels; see Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 4, pp. 1185–1186.

In response to a question from Mr. Allison, Dr. Yang stated that he would remain the chief Korean delegate to the conference and that he expected to return to Japan in February to participate in the discussions. The Korean Minister to Japan, Mr. Kim, would be his alternate. He felt that the influence of SCAP representatives had been beneficial in the achievement of the progress made thus far and stated, without undue modesty, that if he (Dr. Yang) personally had not participated in the conference, little or no progress would have been made. He also mentioned that the presence of Mr. Rusk in Tokyo had, he thought, had a helpful effect on Japanese willingness to continue negotiations in a more satisfactory atmosphere.

In the course of the conversation the Ambassador spoke favorably of the attitude of Prime Minister Yoshida and Mr. Iguchi [4] as having been helpful but added that this attitude was not reflected by the Japanese negotiators. . . . He also remarked that language difficulties had tended to impede progress and had led to delays and misunderstandings.

Armistice Negotiations

The Ambassador then referred to the great pre-occupation which the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea now were experiencing in relation to the course of the armistice negotiations. He spoke particularly of their great uneasiness over the possibility that the United States might withdraw its forces from Korea, leaving the Korean people exposed to further aggression and pointed out that this pre-occupation was particularly heightened by the absence of any firm guarantee of Korean security in the future.

Mr. Allison assured the Ambassador in emphatic terms that the United States Government and people were determined not to abandon Korea after hostilities had ceased and that the facts of our expenditure of lives, money and equipment in assisting the Koreans to repel Communist aggression spoke clearly and far louder than any mere paper guarantee could possibly do. He recalled Mr. Dulles' statement to the Korean National Assembly on June 19, 1950 when he had told the Koreans that as long as they would stand up and defend their freedom and democratic way of life they could count upon the United States, pointing out that the dramatic fulfillment of this promise had come only a week later, when the Communist invasion of south Korea began.

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[3] Shun-ichi Matsumoto, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Mr. Yoshida who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan.

[4] Sadao Iguchi, Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador conceded this but said that since the United States had now negotiated security treaties with New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines and Japan, but had not done so with Korea, considerable apprehension persisted in the minds of the Korean people that the United States was not committed to their future defense. Mr. Allison stressed that the lesson given to the world by the immediate and overwhelming response of the United Nations and the United States in coming to the aid of Korea after June 25, 1950 would, of itself, be a strong deterrent to further aggression. He suggested that strong public emphasis of this might be made as a warning for the future.

Mr. Allison explained, furthermore, that it was not the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Korea immediately after a cessation of hostilities but that any such withdrawal would probably be accomplished gradually and be timed to coincide with a strengthening of the military forces of the Republic. He emphasized that, while the United Nations Command was endeavoring to bring hostilities to an end and thus stop further bloodshed, some of the most difficult and complex problems for Korea still lay ahead; the United States Government would be deeply concerned in working out their solution. He hoped that the Ambassador would reassure his Government on this score.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Allison for these assurances and for the opportunity extended to him to discuss these various problems.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 71 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 December 1951—3:10 p. m.

CX-59188. This msg in 4 parts. Re JCS 89172 [1] and my CX 59176.[2]

Part 1. Re part 1 (3) and (4). Present developments indicate that the discussion of release of non-Korean civilians concurrent with negotiations for POW exchange is very inadvisable now because it could not be done without raising the highly controversial overall issues of civilian internees and refugees. The ROK Govt may be expected to protest any attempt to exclude ROK civilians if the release of non-Korean civilians was to be included in POW negotiations. Gen Lee of the UNC delegation has made strong representation of the views of his govt in this connection. He has requested that every effort be made to effect the release of more than 5,000 leading ROK civilians on the same basis as POWs and has indicated informally that, if this subject is not raised in the negotiations, he may be forced by his govt to withdraw from the UNC delegation. While I am fully appreciative of the desirability of securing the release of those non-Korean civilians already furnished by name in JCS 89189,[3] and of the 5,000 civilians whose release is desired by ROK, I firmly believe the question is predominantly political in nature and as such should properly be disposed of only if the entire problem of civilian repatriation is discussed. In any case, I intend not to raise this issue until I have secured a decision on the POW question.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

[2] Dated December 12, p. 1311.

Part 2. Re para 3 (3) and (4). It is highly improbable that the Communists would agree to any formula for exchange which involves individual expressions of opinion from prisoners in UNC custody because of the extremely adverse affect that large scale defection would have on world-wide Communist prestige and the high propaganda potential that would be available for exploitation by UNC once the exchange had been completed. Furthermore, in discussion of agenda item 3, the Communists strongly opposed the entry of members of the UNC to their rear areas and show no indications of altering their stand on this issue. However, in accordance with your recommendations we shall examine the feasibility of approaching the Communists with alternate proposals at an appropriate time provided that we have secured the POW data discussed in JCS 89172, and if we have failed to come to an agreement on a one-for-one exchange. Our alternate proposals will be generally along these lines:

a. Screening teams composed of military members of each side to be permitted entrance to POW camps for the purpose of determining the individuals by name, number and nationality who do not desire inclusion in an exchange.

b. Screening teams composed of neutral observers to accomplish "*a*" above.

c. Screening of POWs in the demilitarized zone by either military members of each side or by neutral observers before actual release and delivery to the military forces concerned. Obviously this will produce additional administrative and logistic problems and can be expected to slow the rate of exchange.

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

Part 3. I consider it advisable to point out that should some form of screening procedure be agreed to which would permit POWs to remain voluntarily under UNC jurisdiction, certain major problems would immediately confront us, including:

a. The disposition of those Chinese Communists not desiring return to Communist control, who were not offered safe asylum in Formosa.

b. Eventual disposition of those North Koreans not desiring return to Communist control and not considered acceptable to the ROK Govt for resettlement in South Korea.

c. The difficulty of identifying those persons electing non exchange who are deliberate intelligence and/or subversive plants working in direct sympathy with the Communist cause.

d. UNC would have a political and moral obligation to provide logistic support and security for an indefinite period to those persons who did not elect to be exchanged and were not offered opportunity for repatriation or resettlement by some nation or agency.

Part 4. I will follow my original planned procedure of seeking a one-for-one basis of exchange, of demanding that ICRC be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can, of expediting the exchange of prisoners generally, and of insisting on a group-for-group basis of exchange to insure return of the maximum number of UNC and ROK personnel. However, I am strongly of the opinion that the issue of one-for-one exchange will meet with strong Communist opposition and that I may find it necessary to request authority to agree as a final position to an all-for-all exchange to include the forced exchange of those POWs not desiring return to Communist control.

795.00/12-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, December 12, 1951—5 p. m.

2709. Ref immediately preceding telegram,[1] following is text of FonOff memo:

"His Majesty's Government have studied the United States State Dept's memorandum which was handed to Mr. Eden by Mr. Gifford on December 5 and the draft of a warning statement which was communicated to the Foreign Office later.[2]

2. His Majesty's Govt have agreed that if General Ridgway is unable to obtain any satisfactory supervision arrangements and is obliged, in order to conclude an armistice agreement, to rely entirely on the *bona fides* of the other side, it would be wise for the countries

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See telegram 2807 to London, December 5, p. 1249, and telegram 2664 from London, December 8, p. 1282.

who have contributed forces in support of the United Nations action in Korea to issue a joint statement giving warning of the grave consequences which might follow if a major breach of the armistice were to be committed. If, however, reasonably satisfactory supervision arrangements can be written into the armistice agreement, there would be no need for a warning statement; and, to improve the atmosphere in which discussions for the next stage (a political settlement in Korea) could be undertaken, it might be better that no warning statement should be issued. The final decision whether any warning statement should be issued should not be taken until the time of the signing of the armistice agreement.

3. It will be necessary for the United States Government and His Majesty's Govt to consider together what would be regarded as reasonably satisfactory supervision arrangements in an armistice agreement. It might indeed be argued that given the nature of the political tenets of our opponents and in view of the geography of Korea, no supervision arrangements could provide absolute safeguards against a surprise attack. This is not, however, the contingency which His Majesty's Govt had in mind in their reply of November 30 to Mr. Acheson's message. For adequate supervision the neutral teams would require freedom to travel and inspect throughout the whole of Korea and should not be limited to 'key-points of entry'. But, if agreement on this cannot be reached, His Majesty's Govt for their part would be prepared to agree to supervision by neutral teams at key-points, including existing and new air bases and communication centres. They hope that it will at least be possible to reach a satisfactory agreement on this basis, so that the important object of concluding the armistice agreement by December 27 may be achieved.

4. If, however, General Ridgway is unable to obtain even such limited supervision arrangements, a warning statement will have to be issued. The precise terms of the statement will depend both on the nature of the supervision arrangements themselves and on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the signing of the armistice. There is advantage in the two govts exchanging ideas now on the sort of statement which would be required in such circumstances; but the form and wording of the statement cannot be settled finally until the time of issue. His Majesty's Govt consider that the warning in the draft statement communicated to the Foreign Office is too positive and menacing. It states that aggression after the armistice will result in hostilities outside Korea; whereas in the views of His Majesty's Govt the warning should rather be in the form that it might not be possible to avoid the extension of hostilities. For this reason His Majesty's Govt propose that the last sentence of the State Dept draft should be revised to read as follows:

> 'We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm that if another act of aggression were to challenge again the principles of the United Nations we should again be united and prompt to resist. Should aggression be committed again in Korea the consequences would

be so grave that it might then prove impossible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.'

5. The State Dept's memorandum recommended that the two govts should reach agreement now on certain minimum steps which might be taken in the event of a major breach of the armistice, after a warning had been issued. His Majesty's Govt consider that there should be no commitment now to any precise course of action in hypothetical circumstances, and that decisions, which might lead to global war, should be taken only at the time and in the full knowledge of the circumstances. Subject to this, His Majesty's Govt will be willing to consider with the United States Govt possible plans for action in the event of fighting being resumed in Korea.

6. His Majesty's Govt hope that it will also be possible to discuss with the United States Govt as a matter of urgency plans for action in the event of an armistice being concluded and loyally observed. At the moment, the two govts have no agreed plan of action. We lay ourselves open to the risks of once again leaving the initiative for peace to the Soviet Govt and of proposals being put forward and discussed in the General Assembly before we are ready with our own. It would be particularly unfortunate if we on our side issued our 'warning statement' without making any constructive proposals for the next stage, while at the same time the Russians and the Chinese put forward apparently reasonable proposals for a Korean settlement.

7. The Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Govts have already been informed of the earlier exchanges of view between the United States Govt and His Majesty's Govt on this question and we understand that Mr. Casey, who is now in Washington, has had instructions to talk it over with Mr. Acheson. It would therefore place His Majesty's Govt in a very difficult position with the above Commonwealth Govts if they were to fail to continue to keep them informed of the progress of the discussions." [3]

GIFFORD

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[3] In explanation of the reference in this paragraph to the Commonwealth Governments having been informed of earlier United Kingdom–United States exchanges of views, Mr. Eden sent a personal message to Secretary Acheson (conveyed by Ambassador Gifford in telegram 2708, December 12, from London), in which he explained that although the process of consultation with the Commonwealth Governments could not be halted, he had taken steps to limit strictly the dissemination of the information. (795.00/12–1251)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 69 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET TOKYO, 12 December 1951—6:27 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 89473. From JCS.

1. Reur C 59130.[1]

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[1] See footnote 4, p. 1302.

a. It is considered that reptvs from folg countries acceptable to United States for nomination by UNC:

Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, subj of course to consent of nations concerned who are now being consulted on this matter.[2] You will be advised promptly of their acceptance.

b. We consider there is no choice among satellites. USSR not acceptable.

c. If agreement reached on non-combatant observer teams responsible to bilateral MAC, agreement should not necessarily provide that each side nominate same number countries but only that total number observers from each side be equal. We have in mind it may be difficult for only one or two of above mentioned countries to supply total required.

2. Reur CX 59128.

a. We agree that an alternative is necessary in event negotiations reach breaking point on issue of MAC composed equally of belligerents. We further agree to your proposal of a non-combatant chairman as one such alternative but before agreement is reached on nomination it should be approved here. However, we consider it very unlikely that agreement could be reached on such a chairman acceptable to both sides.

b. Reur para 2, we recognize that MAC whether composed of equal numbers from each side or with a non-combatant chairman will result in each side having *de facto* veto regardless of armistice terms. Our intent is that the terms of armistice agreement itself be so formulated that such substantive issues as scope of inspection (such as places outside the demilitarized zone where inspectors will be stationed) and the rights, duties, and priviliges of teams (such as freedom of movement of inspectors to and from specified points of inspection, internal procedure of teams in submitting reports, freedom of communication of individual mbrs of teams with MAC, responsibility for supply and facilities, etc.) be expressed in such clear and detailed terms as not to require major substantive decisions by MAC.

c. Even with the safeguards outlined above, the danger of ineffectiveness of such inspection as is agreed upon is always going to be present regardless of type agreement on MAC. It is our view that in the final analysis, deterrent to aggression must rest upon type of declaration referred to in JCS 87239.[3] If agreement cannot be reached to make such a declaration by all nations concerned, it is our present intention that it will be made unilaterally by our govt. Pending resolution here of that declaration, if you are approaching an impasse on item 3 we suggest you concentrate on item 4 which is vital in any case.

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[2] During the next few days, the Department of State contacted representatives of the three countries and received preliminary assurances in principle that the three governments would be willing to participate in the work of the neutral observer teams (795.00 file).

[3] Dated November 16, p. 1142.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 75 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 December 1951—6 : 29 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS-89474. From JCS.[1]

1. Reur CX 59155.[2] Concur in your view that public info media should be mobilized to apply pressure on Communist leaders to receive ICRC Reptvs. Steps are being taken here to make max use of appropriate media.

2. Reur CX 59176.[3] We concur in your insistence on provision by Communists of lists of prisoners and their locations prior to any substantive agreement on item 4. It is suggested that you instruct our delegation to make an early announcement to the effect that while we are willing to proceed with discussion of item 4, we will not enter into any substantive agreement on that item until provided with a list of prisoners and their location. We intend to adhere to this position under any circumstances. This position should not, however, be presented in form of an ultimatum which would imply a breakoff of negotiations by US if not immediately accepted by Communists.

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[1] Approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and by President Truman. (JCS Files)

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1306.

[3] Dated December 12, p. 1311.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 72 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 December 1951—10 : 31 p. m.

C-59220. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 549.

"Report of sub-Delegation meeting on item number 3.

"1. UNC opened with statement denying that Communist proposal of 3 December contained any concession to UNC views, then presented revised principles in accord with HNC 536 and your C 59121.[1]

"2. Hsieh commented as follows: UNC principles are ambiguous as to day the armistice comes into effect, in view of proviso that Armistice Commission must be ready to operate before armistice is effective; UNC attempting to delay putting armistice in effect by its ability to withhold formation of Armistice Commission and Staff; objected to phrase territorial waters as irrelevant; Demarcation Line must be basis of withdrawal from rear areas; held to view that observing organ should be in parallel with Armistice Commission, not subject to it; directing head of neutral organ shall be from within itself; rejected limitations on facilities and free access for observation personnel throughout Korea; UNC had partially conceded islands and only accepted neutral teams as part of supervisory organization.

"3. UNC responded that Hsieh's comments were all invalid and unacceptable. UNC suggested recess until other side could study UNC proposal thoroughly. Recessed 1245.

"4. In afternoon session, Hsieh repeated his objections to UNC retaining any islands north of Demarcation Line; to replenishment and replacement; to prohibition of Airfield rehabilitation and construction; to single armistice supervising authority; to observation of points other than ports of entry; to aerial observation and to freedom of movement for observation teams throughout Korea.

"5. UNC responded with stiff insistence on acceptance of UNC proposal. Recessed 1640.

"6. Tomorrow sub-Delegation will continue to press for acceptance of UNC proposed principles. Signed Joy"

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[1] Neither printed; the revised principles are contained in telegram HNC 11–45, December 12, p. 1309.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 73 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 December 1951—10:32 p. m.

C–59221. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 548.

"1. Report of morning meeting of sub-committee on item 4. Convened 1100. UNC opened inquiring if Communists are prepared to exchange POW data and to invite ICRC representatives to visit POW camps.

"2. Lee replied in following vein. At present the important question is not the exchange of data or the visit of POW camps by the Red Cross. It is the immediate release of POWs. We are ready to release them within one month after the signing of the armistice. The UNC should reply to the proposal regarding the release of all POWs.

"3. *a.* UNC replied in following vein. Communists failure to correctly state item 4 of the agenda may account for their assertion that their single principle would constitute a complete solution of item 4. Item 4 is correctly stated arrangements relating to prisoners of war. This refers to all necessary arrangements not merely to a basis for exchanging POWs. Two of these matters are exchange of data on POWs and visitation of POW camps by ICRC representatives.

"*b.* At plenary session 27 Nov UNC requested POW data be prepared for presentation at the proper time. The proper time was yesterday. When UNC delegation asked for information yesterday it was informed that Communists had prepared the data but that it would not exchange it at the present time. Do Communists still refuse to divulge this information? What is their purpose? On what grounds do they deny to POWs this elementary right under the Geneva Convention?

"*c.* This is not a new issue. UNC has scrupulously complied with provisions of Geneva Convention on reporting of POWs. Communists therefore know number, identity and nationality of POWs and locations of camps in which they are interned.

"*d.* On the other hand Communists have not complied with Convention. On 13 July 1950 Communists assured the Secretary General of the UN that they would abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention. On 15 August 1950 they reported names and locations of 50 POWs; on 12 Sept an additional 60. That was the sum total; 110 out of the many. No further information reported to Geneva. Thus UNC delegation has no accurate information on POW through normal channels. Why? What is the purpose in withholding this information? On what grounds is justified this action in violation of an international convention which Communists undertook to observe?

"*e.* Both sides can appraise problem of release and exchange of POWs only if up to date data on the subject is available. UNC is prepared to exchange data on POWs. Communists have prepared data. Why wait longer to exchange it? It is formally proposed that both sides exchange at once the basic data on POWs without which no intelligent discussion of agenda item 4 can be conducted.

"4. Lee replied as follows: The basic and central question in connection with item 4 is to reach an agreement on releasing all POWs held by both sides. Without a solution of this there can be little progress in discussion of other questions. We must first decide the basic question, then exchange the necessary data. Then, too, we can agree on releasing ill persons first and on an organization for supervising the exchange. But these questions can be solved only by solving the basic problem of releasing all POWs. UNC dodges showing its attitude toward this fair principle. As for Geneva Convention, it is observed; POWs are treated better than Convention requires. But UNC does not recognize that part of Geneva Convention which says once the acts of hostility cease, both sides must without delay release all POW. Why does UNC oppose this provision? Does UNC agree to Communist proposed principle or not? When UNC says fair and equitable exchange does it mean a one-for-one exchange? Does UNC mean it is unfair to release all POWs held by both sides? What does UNC mean when it refers to increasing the military advantage of one side by releasing all POWs.

"5. *a.* UNC replied. The two sides remain belligerents during the armistice. Communists themselves assert this in connection with agenda item 3 where they refuse to allow UNC personnel behind their lines on ground that they are belligerents. The people of the world will be gratified by Communists statement that they are observing the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs. But that Convention requires exchange of POW data through ICRC. Communists have refused to comply therewith. Why? On what grounds do Communists deny to POWs this elementary right under Geneva Convention? On what grounds is this action in violation of an international convention justified?

"*b.* The UNC agrees with the view of the other side that there is a natural order in the discussion of any subject. Respecting item 4, the exchange of data on POWs and the initiation of arrangements for visitation of POW camps by ICRC representatives are first steps. The first is a necessary preliminary to any intelligent discussion of item 4. The other is a fundamental right of all POWs under the international Bill of Rights for such persons, the Geneva Convention. It is a right too long withheld. Its early return is sanctioned by the humanitarian aspirations of all peoples everywhere. The preliminary matters of exchange of POW data and ICRC visitation must be settled prior to any discussion of details of manner of exchange. Discussion of such matters will logically follow agreement to simple requests of UNC.

"*c.* Communists state that they observe Geneva Convention in treatment of POWs. These are words. Their persistent refusal to admit ICRC representatives renders them incredible. Certainly the Communists are not observing Articles 79 and 88 of the Convention.

"*d.* If Communists are in fact observing the Convention why do they object to ICRC visitation? UNC considers that this matter and the matter of exchange of POW data must be settled prior to discussion of details of release and exchange. What is Communist answer to formal UNC proposal that both sides exchange POW data now and that Communists allow ICRC visitation?

"6. General Lee replied as follows: UNC misconstrues his statements. Communists do not refuse to exchange POW data. They are not only prepared with the data for the release of POWs but for the actual release of all POW within 30 days from the signing of the armistice. What is important; to exchange data or to release POWs? What is urgent; to dispatch Red Cross representatives or to release POW? Under pretext of continued state of war UNC seeks to prevent release of POWs who are anxious to go home. Neither side has the right to refuse release of POW after armistice is signed. If that is humanitarianism the peoples of the world will oppose it and the POWs will curse it. If humanitarianism is only to exchange data on POWs and to permit Red Cross visits to their camps Communists cannot agree with it. Communists do not want to retain POWs but to release them all. UNC misconstruction of Communist statements will serve no purpose. When did Communists oppose exchange of data?

"7. UNC replied. There is no misconstruction of statements. UNC has proposed two necessary preliminary steps, both of which will be supported by all fair minded people. The Communists have refused to agree to both, to the exchange of POW data and to ICRC visitation. Is this not correct?

"8. General Lee replied. UNC so called fair proposal is a proposal to retain POWs after an armistice. UNC must give a direct and clear answer as to its attitude on this principle.

"9. Recessed at 1312 hours to reconvene at 1500 hours.

"10. Report of afternoon session will follow. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 74 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 12 December 1951—10 : 33 p. m.

C–59222. CINCUNC Adv HNC 550.

"Further to HNC 548.[1] Sub-Committee reconvened 1500.

"1. Using forceful language UNC continued to press for exchange now of data on POWs and for Communist acceptance of ICRC visitation of POW camps. Communists evaded answering question on visitation and continued to make exchange of POW data contingent upon

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[1] *Supra.*

UNC acceptance of principle under which all POW would be released by both sides following signing of armistice. UNC several times stated that acceptance of visits and exchange of information must precede any discussion of such matters as basis of exchange. The crux of the day's proceedings came near the end of the session when the Communists using a prepared statement submitted a formal proposal. The proposal follows:

"(1) To decide upon the principle that both sides shall release all the prisoners of war now in custody of each side.

"(2) To agree that both sides shall release in groups and complete the repatriation of all the prisoners of war in their custody within the shortest period possible after the signing of the armistice agreement, and to decide upon the principle that those prisoners of war who are seriously wounded or sick shall have the priority of being released and repatriated in the first group.

"(3) To recommend that Pan Mun Jom, Kaesong, will be the place for the handing over and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides.

"(4) To recommend that both sides will designate an equal number of members to form a Prisoner-of-War Repatriation Committee under the armistice commission to be responsible for dealing with matters related to the handing over and receiving of prisoners of war in accordance with the above stated agreement.

"(5) Once the above items are mutually agreed and decided upon, the lists of names of all prisoners of war held presently by each side respectively will be exchanged.

"2. *Comment:* Program for tomorrow is to avoid discussions of Communist proposal as inappropriate at the present stage of the discussion and continue to press strongly and emphatically for visitation and exchange of data as preliminary steps which must precede any discussion of such matters as are contained in Communist proposal. Signed Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 78 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 December 1951—8:13 p. m.

HNC–553. "Sub-Delegations on Item 3 met at 1100. Hsieh delivered statement attempting to show 'Concessions' made by his side. His main theme was 'Interference with Internal affairs.' He related this to inspection 'Throughout Korea,' to aerial observation, and to prohibition on development of airfields. Hsieh argued against UNC retention of any islands outside of territorial waters and north of demarcation line. This, said Hsieh, constituted retaining forces in his rear. Hsieh accused UNC of delaying progress by not agreeing to his principles. UNC responded there was nothing new in Hsieh's remarks. Hsieh suggested two fundamental principles be accepted (1) No interference in internal affairs, (2) No threat to rear. UNC replied this was agreeable provided UNC interpretation of meaning of these phrases was accepted. UNC emphasized necessity to prohibit airfield development and to have thorough observation including aerial. UNC denied enemy right to islands, denied intent to interfere in legitimate internal affairs. Hsieh contended military facilities are internal affairs, opposed air observation and inspection of communication centers. UNC suggested Hsieh needed more time to study UNC proposal. Hsieh attacked right of UNC to rotation and replenishment. UNC explained rotation would not increase force levels. Hsieh suggested recess. Recessed 1535.

"Meetings continue tomorrow at 1100. Plan for tomorrow to continue to press for, and remain firm on, UNC proposal of 12 Dec. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 82 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 December 1951—10:05 p. m.

C–59310. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 554.

"Report of meeting of sub-committee on item nbr 4. Convened 1100.

"1.

"*a.* UNC opened in following vein: Communists yesterday proposed a list of principles to be considered as a basis for developing an agreement on item nbr 4. Proposal has been noted and response will be made at the appropriate time; that is, when a suitable atmosphere has been created for substantive discussion of item nbr 4 by agreement on two essential preliminary steps. First, the exchange on the POW data which must be the basis for discussion of release and exchange. Second, immediate visits to POW camps by ICRC representatives in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Until such time as these two basic simple and humane requirements have been met, discussion of the Communists proposal is inappropriate. The basis of exchange, place of exchange and similar details cannot be discussed until POW data upon which such discussion must be based is available to both sides. Both sides must resume discussion of things in proper order and reach agreement on exchange of data and ICRC visits.

"*b.* UNC will not discuss substantive matters on item nbr 4 until data necessary to an intelligent discussion is available. This data should have been available months ago. It is incredible that the other side states that it has the data but refuses to provide it. The people of the world will recognize that the responsibility for the failure of the conference to make progress lies solely in Communist obstinate refusal to disclose essential POW data. These people will ask themselves why the Communists ask the UNC to agree blindly to their demands as the price for handing over data which should have been provided regularly since 13 July 1950.

"*c.* Moreover, custom and usage which civilized society has come to regard as obligatory form the most important part of international law. Visits to PW camps by a neutral benevolent agency, particularly the ICRC are sanctioned by custom and usage. The Hague conventions gave formal expression to this practice of civilized nations. In World War I and II both belligerents exchanged information on POW's and permitted visits to POW camps by ICRC to interview POW, and distribute food, medicine and clothing. The right of ICRC visits was reaffirmed by the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. Although North Korea is not a signatory to either, Pak Hen Nen, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 13 July 1950 informed the Secretary General of the UN that NK would abide by the convention. Further evidence of Communist recognition of the status of the ICRC in POW matters is found in POW reports made to Geneva on 15 Aug and 12 Sep.

"*d.* Custom and usage and the aforementioned conventions establish certain basic requirements:

"(1) Visits to POW camps by ICRC personnel.
"(2) Interview of POW by ICRC.
"(3) Distribution to POW of food, medicine and clothing by ICRC.

"*e.* The UNC has agreed to observe the Geneva Convention and has complied therewith. North Korea has agreed to observe it but has failed completely to do so. The convention imposes a legal as well as a moral obligation. The UNC insists upon the visit to POW camps by ICRC delegates. Only when the Communists have complied with UNC requests for exchange of data and ICRC visits to POW camps can the discussion of release and exchange of POW make progress.

"2. General Lee replied as follows:

"*a.* The UNC did not answer the question asked yesterday. The UNC expressed no opinion on the Communists proposal of releasing all POW. So long as this question is unsettled why is POW data necessary? The central question is the release of POW. The conference is not to arrange visits to prison camps but to arrange the release of POW in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

"*b.* UNC verified that Communists were discussing 1949 convention.

"*c.* Lee continued: Prisoners should be released when hostilities are over, not retained as slaves. UNC boasts of humanitarianism but would retain POW. Those who represent the new epoch insist on their release.

"*d.* UNC destroyed peaceful towns of Korea; no one believes in its humanitarianism. UNC refuses to discuss basic principles. The responsibility for delaying the conference inevitably falls on the UNC. Does UNC delegation represent the military authorities or the Red Cross Society, what data is necessary for determining the principle of releasing all the POWs of both sides? Is the armistice impossible unless the Red Cross visits the POW camps? Why does the UNC refuse to discuss the basic principle of releasing POW?

"*e.* Col Tsai made a statement generally as follows. When the UNC objects to the Communist proposal it is not qualified to quote the Geneva Convention. This committee is supposed to negotiate arrangements relating to POW. What reasonable proposal has UNC put forth? It puts the cart before the horse. It avoids discussion of the real issues of agenda item 4. The UNC raises specific requirements not related to that item and states that it will not discuss the substantive question until these requirements are met. The sub-committee is constituted on an equal basis. Neither side can force the other. If the UNC does not intend to suspend the conference, it should cease unreasonable statements and use logic and reason. The UNC mentions item 4 occasionally. However it does not want to settle these things immediately. It wants to appear civilized and humanitarian. This pose is easily exposed. The Communist proposal to release all prisoners is a touchstone by which humanitarianism can be tested. The UNC would retain POW after the armistice. Where is its humanity, KGI refuses to discuss release of all POWs. Where is its concern? UNC humanitarianism, civilization and concern are false. Communist proposal is fair, equitable and clear. It seeks an early solution of agenda item 4. It is a stand born of genuine concern for POWs, of true humanitarianism. UNC has no reason to refuse to discuss this proposal.

"General Lee took it up as follows: UNC refuses to answer Communists questions or to respond to their proposal. Is that an attitude for settling item 4 or for delaying the conference? The UNC presented its 2 requests. Does it mean that the UNC cannot discuss item 4 unless the requests are accepted? Does it mean that UNC wants to suspend the conference now?

"3. UNC replied: Communists continually misquote item 4. It reads 'arrangements relating to POW'. The question of release and exchange is only one of these arrangements. The UNC does not intend or desire to suspend the conference. It does intend and desire to have it proceed in a logical, orderly fashion. It has proposed 2 simple and essential procedural steps as a preliminary to further discussions. These 2 simple logical and humane steps are supported by all peoples everywhere, but the Communists refuse to accept them.

"4. General Lee reiterated that the important question was release of all POW: That UNC refused to respond to the proposal. UNC insists unilaterally upon details unrelated to main question. If UNC does not abandon this attitude no progress can be made.

"5. Meeting recessed at 1355 to resume at 1500 hours. Sgd Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 83 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 13 December 1951—10:33 p. m.

C-59311. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 555.

"Further to HNC 554.[1] Reconvened 1500. UNC replied to Communist statements of morning session as follows:

"Communists are indulging in supposition about UNC intentions towards POW after the armistice. More progress will be made by sticking to facts. Communists asked why UNC insists on exchange of POW data now. The reasons are two.

"UNC needs the information first as basic data for use in discussion of item nbr 4. It is required secondly for humanitarian reasons. The POWs cannot be exchanged until the armistice is signed. In the meantime their rights should be observed and their families given assurances that they are alive and well. Furthermore UNC needs this data to appraise the effect of its agreement to any proposal. UNC cannot buy a pig in a poke. It must negotiate with eyes open. It will not be duped by Communist attempt to blackmail it into blind acceptance of communist proposal. Communists callously ignore fundamental obligation to transmit POW data. For what reason? Do Communists think UNC desire for an early armistice makes it an easy mark? UNC wants an armistice but not at price of everything for nothing. Do Communists think they can wait UNC out and force it to negotiate blindly? If so Communists are misguided. UNC refuses to negotiate blindly. As to the tool referred to by Col Tsai by which humanitarianism of UNC towards POW can be tested, this is simple sophistry. Record of UNC treatment of POW speaks for itself and will continue to do so. It is open for inspection. Agent of the people of the world in this matter is ICRC. Its delegates visit UNC POW camps to see that POWs are well treated. Communists continue to refuse similar visits. Communist tactics of trying to make UNC negotiate blindly are effective if their objective is to delay negotiations, but ineffective if it is to arrive at a solution to item nbr 4. Gen Lee made a long statement questioning the humanitarianism of the UNC for failing to agree to release all POWs after the armistice. He then reviewed the Communist proposal amplifying it by discussion. UNC replied as follows:

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[1] *Supra.*

"You say that your paragraph 5 is perfect? It is as a complete roadblock to any progress in these discussions. Your fifth proposal as it now stands effectively closes the door to any consideration whatsoever by our side on your other 4 proposals. You can open that door very easily. There are 2 locks on that door. You hold the key to both locks. The first lock is your refusal to give us the information on the prisoners of war you hold and to give it to us now. The other lock is your persistent refusal to permit representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit your prisoner of war camps. Meeting recessed 1643 to resume at 1100 tomorrow.

"*Comment:* UNC will pursue same program tomorrow. Sgd Joy."

795.00/12–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:18 p. m.

2931. Re Embtel 2709 Dec 12. Secy today discussed UK reply with Brit Amb along fol lines:

1. We feel that it will be possible to work out language of statement within framework of UK alternative suggestion for last para and will shortly furnish UK our suggestions in this regard. Our prin difficulty with UK suggestion is centered around word "might" in last sentence as we feel it important the Commies understand that in event of renewal of attack we wld not regard ourselves to be under any compulsions to confine the hostilities to Korea as heretofore.

2. We do not feel that situation with respect to inspection in Korea presents alternatives set forth in para 3 and 4 of the FonOff memo. The choice as we view it as a practical matter is not between alternatives of satis inspection arrangements and a statement. Even the best inspection arrangements we are likely to achieve in the armistice negots will still subj UN forces to grave danger of an attack in overwhelming force presented by the 800,000 odd Commie troops already in Korea plus whatever they build up in the way of additional ground and air strength in the Manchurian border area whose introduction into Korea will be facilitated by the rehabilitation of transportation and other facilities in North Korea. Therefore we consider that situa-

tion will require a statement along lines now under discussion regardless of extent of inspection upon which it will be possible to achieve agreement present armistice negots.

3. We concur it is not now possible reach agreement with UK on the precise course of action which will be taken if the aggression is renewed. This means that UK is not obligated at this time take any particular action and that US is not committed not to take any particular action. FYI it is particularly important that there be no commitment on the part of the US to obtain UK concurrence prior to taking action.

Request you discuss foregoing with Eden at earliest opportunity.

ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 85 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 December 1951—9:45 p. m.

C-59378. For info CINCUNC Adv Msg HNC 558.

"1. At afternoon session of meeting on agenda item nbr 3,[1] the Communists presented the following proposal:

"(1) All Armed Forces under the control of either side, including regular and irregular units and armed personnel of the Ground, Naval and Air Forces, shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the signing of the armistice agreement.

"(2) All Armed Forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the signing of the armistice agreement. Except for such Armed Forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed to by both sides, no Armed Forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone; nor shall the Armed Forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. Either side shall manage in accordance with the stipulation of the armistice agreement the administrative affairs of that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

"(3) All Armed Forces, Ground, Naval and Air, under the control of either side shall be withdrawn within 5 days after the signing of the armistice agreement from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of the other side. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

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[1] The report on the morning session is printed in telegram C-59379, *infra*.

"(4) In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment and ammunition after the signing of the armistice agreement. However, if either side needs to rotate its military personnel in Korea, it shall make request to and acquire the approval of the Military Armistice Commission. The number of such military personnel to be rotated shall not exceed 5,000 monthly. Any such rotation shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of neutral nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"(5) Either side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violation of the armistice agreement. This function of supervision and inspection shall be carried out in accordance with the following 2 provisions:

"*a.* Within the demilitarized zone, The Military Armistice Commission and the joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible;

"*b.* Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have occurred, the supervisory organ of representatives of neutral nations entrusted by The Military Armistice Commission shall be responsible.

"(6) Both sides agree to invite neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean War to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives respectively to form a supervisory organ; a Supervisory Commission. This supervisory organ, the Supervisory Commission, entrusted by The Military Armistice Commission, shall be responsible for dispatching inspection teams of neutral nations over mutually agreed lines of communications to carry out the function of supervising the stipulation of paragraph 4 at such ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and, when violations of the armistice agreement have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, to conduct necessary inspection at such places where violations have occurred, and shall report to The Military Armistice Commission on the result of supervision and inspection. Both sides shall accord these inspection teams of neutral nations full convenience in performing the above stated functions.

"2. UNC sub-delegation requested recess of 30 minutes to study Communist proposal. Further details on return of sub-delegation to base camp. Signed Joy"

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 86 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 14 December 1951—9:46 p. m.

C–59379. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 559.

"Sub-delegations on item nbr 3 met at 1100.

"Hsieh restated his case against prohibition of development of airfields, as an interference in 'internal affairs.' He attacked rotation and replenishment principles as an introduction of reinforcements. Hsieh complained UNC would not answer his questions. UNC pointed out questions he posed have been repeatedly answered. Hsieh pressed matter of replacement of weapons, denouncing it as an increase of strength. UNC responded that no increase was involved, since exchanges were to be made leaving net total the same. UNC explained replacement of equipment would be piece-for-piece, type-for-type. Hsieh stated UNC intended to prolong state of war, therefore UNC wished to increase forces in Korea.

"Recessed 1300.

"Reconvened 1430. Hsieh pointed out 17 days had passed in discussion of item nbr 3 and dwelt on 'concessions' made by his side. Stated UNC proposal of 12 Dec unacceptable. Hsieh then made proposal quoted in HNC–558.[1] UNC asked definition of 'coastal islands and waters.' Hsieh replied evasively. UNC asked if ports of entry included airports. Hsieh replied evasively. UNC asked wherein new Communist proposal differed from their former proposal in matters of principle. Hsieh pointed to inclusion of rotation in his new principle 4, and various minor changes in wording.

"UNC asked if all members of MAC had to agree to rotation, and how figure 5000 has been chosen. Hsieh replied 5000 was big enough. Hsieh evaded question of approval by MAC. UNC submitted a list of other questions in writing. UNC stated nothing in Communist proposal of today varied from their proposal of 3 Dec, suggested Hsieh study UNC proposal of 12 Dec further.

"Recessed 1630. Tomorrow plan to reject Communist proposal as no real effort to solve problem. Signed Joy"

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[1] *Supra.*

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 87 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 December 1951—1:17 a. m.

C-59383. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 560.

"Report of sub-committee meeting on item 4, 14 December.

"1. *a.* Lee opened inquiring as to UNC attitude on Communist 5 Point Proposal. UNC replied as follows: The UNC has taken note of this proposal. UNC considers it to be out of order. When a suitable atmosphere has been created for the conduct of substantive discussion of item 4 of the agenda it will then be the proper time for consideration of this proposal. What are the 2 essential steps which must be taken as a preliminary to further substantive discussion of this agenda item? First, the exchange of the prisoner of war data. Second, ICRC visits to your prisoner of war camps in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. Until such time as these 2 basic, simple and humane requirements have been met, we shall not have reached the point on our discussion of agenda item 4 where the introduction or substantive discussion of your proposal are appropriate. Only one thing is delaying the meeting and that is Communists obstinate and persistent refusal to take these simple preliminary steps.

"*b.* Communists have indicated they have the official data concerning prisoners of war which the UNC requires before it can intelligently discuss the problems involved in item 4. However, Communists have, so far, flatly refused to furnish this data to us unless UNC blindly accepts so-called 5 principles. What is reason for refusal to furnish this data now? Is it to use our requirement for such data to attempt to coerce us into agreeing to 5 principles? Is it because the list contains just a handful of names? What is the reason?

"*c.* Communists were put on notice in early July that the UNC delegation considered ICRC visits basic to the discussion of the prisoner of war problem. At that time the UNC delegation proposed, as the first agenda item, that the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to visit all POW camps. At Communist insistence, UNC agreed to combine that item with the overall prisoner of war problem, that is agenda item 4.

"*d.* The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on 15 July requested Communists to invite ICRC to visit POW camps. Thus, the relevance of this topic to the overall prisoner of war problem has been evident from the start of the armistice talks. The issue of ICRC visits is of long standing, is important and is germane to agenda item 4.

"*e.* Four days ago the UNC formally requested Communists to fulfill their moral and legal obligations under the Geneva Convention. Since that time UNC has sought unsuccessfully to get this agreement. The eyes of the whole world are on Pan Mun Jom. The relatives and loved ones of the prisoners of war await the answer to this question. Will Communists give tangible evidence that they are treating POW according to minimum standards set forth in convention by inviting ICRC to visit prison camps.

"*f.* The people of the world await the answer to this question. Will Communists live up to the convention they have voluntarily undertaken to observe or will they disregard this solemn undertaking?

"*g.* UNC awaits the answer which will clear the atmosphere and disperse the shadows of doubt and apprehension as to the well-being of the prisoners in Communist hands; doubt and apprehension engendered by Communists continued evasion. These are simple, direct questions for which simple, direct answers are sufficient.

"2. *a.* General Lee replied in the following vein: UNC expresses unwillingness to enter into any discussion of agenda item 4 unless we accept the so-called 2 simple humanitarianism demands. Negotiation requires a corresponding give and take. UNC cannot make these unreasonable unilateral demands. Consequently UNC stand that it cannot enter into any discussions unless its unreasonable proposals are accepted is unreasonable and in violation of the agenda spirit. To resolve our problems in accordance with the agenda item we should discuss the matter of releasing the POW after we agree upon this principle; we can proceed to further necessary measures to be resolved. Among such measures may be the problem of releasing the POW in order; namely release of the sick or seriously wounded, and such questions as to place, machinery and the exchange of lists of names. These matters should be taken up after we resolve the basic principle. Why is it that the UNC as a signatory of the Geneva Convention is not willing to adhere to Paragraph 118 of the convention which specifies that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay? How can you say that UNC has the right to refer Communists to the Geneva Convention when it does not comply with the first requirement of the Geneva Convention? UNC is legally obligated to adhere to the principles of the Geneva Convention. Communists are not signatories of the convention. Consequently they are not obligated legally to observe the Geneva Convention.

"*b.* However Communists respect and honor the most good spirit embodied in the convention. Those who are not a signatory of the convention contend that they will release all POW after the cessation of active hostilities and show their stand to the world. What are UNC reasons to retain POW after the actual hostilities cease and armistice is signed? Is that humanitarianism? All the POW are opposed to such a humanitarian treatment and throughout the world it would be symbolic of UNC so-called humanitarianism. UNC humanitarianism can be revealed in terms of atrocities and destruction of villages and towns. Would it not be wise to economize on the use of the word humanitarianism? Are Communists to believe that UNC is not willing to carry on this armistice if we do not accept its 2 proposals which are both unreasonable? In these negotiations no one party can force the other to accept his proposals. Both parties can only employ mutual presentation of their views and convince the other party of their logic. As soon as any presentation fails logically, the party is bound to reject it. By this way the negotiations progress.

"*c.* During the past four days discussions the UNC has been unable to refute any part of Communist proposal. If UNC cannot refute it, it must accept it.

"3. Meeting recessed at 1305 to resume at 1500. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 88 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 December 1951—1 : 18 a. m.

C-59384. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 561.

"Further to HNC 560.[1]

"1. Reconvened 1500 hours. UNC continued with refutation Lee's morning statement. Included were the following points:

"*a.* The Foreign Minister stated on 13 July 1950 that, 'The People's Army of the DPR of K strictly observes the principles of the Geneva Convention concerning the prisoners of war.'

"*b.* Use of the word 'strictly' in the statement of the Foreign Minister leaves no room for equivocation. Observance involves, among other things, notification to Geneva of all prisoners captured. Communists started to observe this specific principle, submitting 2 lists of prisoners, 1 list in August 1950 and 1 in September 1950. Then they stopped. Yesterday, in justification of failure to observe all the principles of the Geneva Convention, Lee state that the announcement by the Foreign Minister did not say that Communists would observe the Geneva Convention '*in toto.*' Today Lee states Communists are not legally obliged to observe it. Do we understand that they now publicly renounce the pledge of the Foreign Minister to observe strictly the principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war? If they do not observe convention *in toto*, which provisions do they observe and which not? To this end UNC asks 4 questions to which we would like answers tomorrow:

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[1] *Supra.*

"Question 1: Do you observe article 23 of the convention, which provides for the furnishing of information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps?

"Question 2: Do you observe articles 25 through 32, which provide for the physical welfare of prisoners of war?

"Question 3: Do you observe articles 122 and 123, which provide for the prompt reporting of the name and identification of every prisoner of war?

"Question 4: Do you observe article 125, which provides for the granting of all necessary facilities for visits to prisoners of war by relief societies and specifically recognizes the unique and special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this regard?

"*c*. Communists said this morning that neither delegation would make demands which the other party cannot accept. What have Communists done? They have said in effect, 'agree to 5 point proposal and they will turn over the list of the prisoners of war they propose to release.' If complete refusal to give UNC this data unless and until it blindly accepts Communist proposals is not an ultimatum, it is difficult to perceive the difference yet Communists label this stand 'fair and reasonable' and say that because UNC refuses to accept, it refuses to negotiate. For its part UNC has made 2 proposals, both of which are necessary steps to orderly discussion of agenda item 4. Communists call the 'unreasonable proposals.' Exactly what is unreasonable about insisting on getting POW data?

"2. General Lee replied as follows:

"*a*. We are now supposed to discuss matters contained in the agenda item 4. UNC should not have turned this meeting into a lecture room on international law. This meeting was not called for that purpose.

"*b*. UNC misquoted and distorted the statement made by Foreign Minister, Comrade Pak. I quote 'To Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary General, United Nations Organization: In response to your telegram date 12 July I have the honor of informing you that the Peoples Army of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea firmly adheres to the principles of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war. Signed, Foreign Minister Pak, 13 July 1950.' Let us make a study of this text. Where is found in this statement that we would abide by all the provisions of the Geneva Convention? All that is contained in this statement is that he was willing to abide by all the good spirits embodied in the Geneva Convention. This is the statement that he sent to the General Assembly of the UN and to the people of the world. Based on this statement Communists have treated POW well and will release all POW after cessation of hostilities. In fighting they have captured many prisoners. They respected their lives. They treated them well. They have released them during the fighting at the front line. They have made broadcasts of their welfare and well being. They have had them write personal letters and messages to their homes. They have expressed a desire to release all POW after the cessation of hostilities. Do these facts not show that they have abided by the best spirits embodied in the Geneva Convention? They have gone further than the provisions in the Geneva Convention in dealing with POW. This is a proper measure that they have taken based upon the established principle of internationalism which is far superior, in practice, to UNC so called humanitarianism. It is a measure only civilized men can carry out. UNC is requested not to misquote the statement of the Foreign Minister in the future.

"*c.* UNC states that it abides by the Geneva Convention. If so, will it fulfill the provisions of article 118 to release the POW after the armistice?

"3. UNC asked again for answer to question, 'in what way is our request for prisoner of war data unreasonable?'

"4. *a.* General Lee replied as follows: 'In relation to the lists of names of prisoners of war and the Red Cross visits to the POW camps, Communists are prepared to exchange the lists of all the names of all the prisoners of war. However, the principle of prompt release and repatriation of all prisoners of war must be determined first. If such a basic principle has not been determined where is the necessity of exchanging the lists of names of all POW? What is the more important and basic question of the 4th item of the agenda? What is more closely related to the interests of the POW, permitting their release, or ICRC visits to POW camps? Communists stand is that POW should be immediately released and repatriated after the armistice. UNC stand seems to be to retain part of the POW after the armistice. The POW and the peoples of the world will judge which sides stand is more reasonable, more humane and more in accordance with spirit of the Geneva Convention. As a signatory of the Convention the UNC is unwilling to observe the basic principle? The immediate release and repatriation of all POW after the cessation of all active hostilities. By what right does UNC quote its Geneva Convention? Communists propose that this conference quickly agree on the principle of releasing and repatriating all the prisoners of war after the armistice.

"*b.* Lee then made a plea for a less formal procedure, more direct discussion.

"5. In the course of subsequent discussion he gave a direct answer on the ICRC. 'As for the visits to the camps by the Red Cross people, that is out of the question because it is not specified and stipulated in agenda item 4'. While he indicated weakening on exchange of POW data he spoke of negotiatory procedure in connection with this item.

"6. *Comment:* Program for tomorrow remains unchanged, except that if Communist offer to exchange POW information now in return for our removing ICRC issue as a bar to substantive discussion, we shall accept. However will make it clear that ICRC issue will be raised later during subsequent substantive discussion. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 95 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 15 December 1951—4:29 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–89746. From JCS.

Reur CX 59188 and CX 59176.[2] This message in 3 parts.

Part I.

It is agreed that your final position may have to be that all POWs be released irrespective of outcome on release or exchange of civilians. However, we feel you should not assume this position now. Before agreeing to an exchange of POWs only, you should, at a time you consider appropriate, introduce question of exchange of civilians. Otherwise we lose whatever bargaining position we have because of large number of POWs we have in comparison to Communist holdings. We have moral obligation to make every effort to obtain release of civilians. In addition our government is under pressure from United States groups and other UN nations to include their civilians and ours in exchange arrangements along with POWs. For above reasons we are unable at this time to approve your proposal not to raise issue of exchange of any civilians until you have secured a final agreement of POWs.

Part II.

Therefore, procedure you outlined in CX 59188 and CX 59176 is approved as to major aspects as follows (lesser details are left to your discretion):

(1) Before reaching any substantive agreement on Item 4 you should continue to insist on provision by Communists of lists of prisoners and their locations.

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[1] In a memorandum dated December 15, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) described the background stages of this telegram as follows:

"On the morning of December 15, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Johnson discussed with the JCS a reply to General Ridgway's CX 51888 [*59188*] and CX 59176 on the basis of a draft prepared in State. Agreement was achieved on the message which was subsequently discussed with the Secretary. The Secretary, together with General Collins, obtained the President's approval and the message was transmitted to General Ridgway as JCS 89746, December 15." (Black Book, Tab 94–A)

[2] Both dated December 12, pp. 1315 and 1311, respectively.

(2) You should seek one-for-one basis of exchange of POWs, continuing, as long as you deem advisable, a demand that ICRC be permitted to visit all POW camps. Actual exchange should be by groups at POWs including in each group both UN and ROK POWs.

(3) If agreement cannot be reached on (2) above, basis of negotiations may be shifted to all-for-all exchange.

(4) Before moving to this position, you should, at an appropriate time, introduce question of exchange of civilians. In any discussion of civilian exchange you should be guided by following:

(A) Every effort should be made to exchange UN civilians and ROK Governmental personnel (list of UN civilians furnished you in JCS 89189.[3] State is consulting with Ambassador Muccio to develop a comparable ROK list).

(B) Similar effort, though of lesser priority, should be made to exchange all remaining internees and refugees.

(C) You should consult with Ambassador Muccio on all phases of exchange of ROK civilians.

(5) If it becomes clear to you that agreement cannot be reached on anything short of all-for-all exchange, you may then proceed to negotiate on all-for-all basis. In this case the provisions of Subpara (4) above will continue to apply.

(6) If, in your judgment, it is impossible to force an agreement which will include exchange of those civilians indicated in Subpara (4) (A) above, you will request authority from Washington before taking final position to secure release of POWs only.

(7) Any position requiring forced return of personnel held by UNC must have prior approval by Washington.

Part III.

Instructions are being formulated for recommendations to be made under agenda item 5 if arrangements for release of civilians cannot be accomplished as part of armistice terms. These will be furnished you shortly.

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

795.00/12–551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 15, 1951—7:11 p. m.

458. Reur 532 Dec. 5 Gen Ridgway is being instructed to introduce question return of UN and ROK civilians at appropriate time during discussion agenda item 4, using whatever bargaining position we have because of large nr POWs we hold in comparison with communist holdings. He has been supplied list of UN civilians (totals 54 prin-

cipally Am, Fr & Brit) presumably captured by Commies and informed that State is consulting with you to develop comparable ROK list. He is also being instructed to make a similar effort, though of lesser priority, to obtain return all remaining internees and refugees in Commie hands and to consult with you on all phases of exchange of ROK civilians. However, his instructions provide that he is not to pursue question of civilian exchange to breaking point in armistice negots.

In accordance with foregoing and after consultations with Ridgway you shld in your discretion consult with ROK Govt re preparation of list for transmission to Gen Ridgway of ROK Govt officials and other prominent persons thought still to be alive and in hands of Commies whose return is particularly desired by ROK Govt. Although Dept appreciates difficulty set forth penultimate para your 532 this course action, believed desirable ROK Govt understand every effort being made treat question ROK civilians on same basis UN civilians.

Acheson

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 91 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 15 December 1951—11:03 p. m.

C-59463. HNC-567. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 567.

"Report of Sub-Committee on agenda Item nbr 4, Dec 15. Convened 1100.

"Part I. *a.* UNC opened as follows:

"Two things occurred yesterday of far reaching significance. Their impact on the world would be so detrimental to the other side that they may wish to reconsider. Yesterday was a dark day in the progress of the negotiations, and in an even larger sense. The sanctity of the pledged word reached a new low and the humanitarian aspirations of the people of the world with respect to the well being of prisoners of war were dashed.

"*b.* On that day General Lee, by his interpretation of Foreign Ministers Pak's notification of adherence to the Geneva Convention, denounced the convention. On that day General Lee formally refused to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform its internationally recognized and traditional humanitarian services for the prisoners.

"*c.* The fact is that the persons entrusted with the administration of POWs have failed to comply with a pledge of adherence to the principles of an international convention given by NK Foreign Minister. By means of his interpretation General Lee attempts to nullify retroactively that pledge given 17 months ago. By means of his wholly unjustifiable interpretation General Lee, in effect, denounces his country's adherence to the Geneva Convention. This is a grim responsibility.

"*d.* Communists stated yesterday that visits of POW camps by ICRC was out of the question because it is not specified and stipulated in agenda Item nbr 4. This article specifies only the broad subj of 'arrangements relating to prisoners of war.' Under this Communists have already proposed 5 articles, none of which were stipulated in agenda Item. UNC does not question these articles nor will it seek to exclude them from discussion on such flimsy grounds.

"*e.* For its part, the UNC regards the services of ICRC, as specified in the Geneva Convention, an essential element of the arrangements relating to prisoners of war. On what logical basis can Communists oppose this?

"*f.* Communists have in connection with agenda Item nbr 3 proposed observation by neutrals. For many years ICRC has been accorded by International Convention a special status as a neutral benevolent society. It is the preeminent neutral. Now, Communists under Item nbr 4 discussions, refuse to permit ICRC entry to prison camps.

"*g.* Under 1 item of the agenda Communists propose entry of neutral observers, under another they oppose entry of neutral of unchallengeable integrity. This is the height of inconsistency.

"*h.* If it is true that Communists treat POWs more humanely than required under the Geneva Convention should they not, as does the UNC, welcome visits by ICRC? This would help you to convince US and world of compliance. On the other hand, continued refusal only feeds the suspicion that Communists assertions are not entirely factual.

"Part II. *a.* Gen Lee replied in general as follows:

"I have carefully noted your lengthy statement of today. The peoples of the world are well aware as to which issue is more important. Because Communists respect the basic principles of the Geneva convention, they treat POWs in the best traditional humanitarianism.

"*b.* Moreover, they hold that POWs in custody be released after the cessation of hostilities, that is, when the armistice is signed.

"*c.* To resolve issues involved in the agenda item Communists would like to take up first of all the question of immediate release of the prisoners of war. On this question they would like to hear comment.

"Part III. *a.* UNC replied: UNC regards its 2 preliminary steps as matters of such importance that it cannot go on without them.

"*b.* Communists have detailed data on POW held by UNC. This data was available during consideration of the whole broad problem. Communists may not realize the difficulties of attempting to come to decisions without that data. UNC thinks they do realize it all too well. They are attempting to put UNC in a position of negotiation in the dark. UNC has only 2 lists from you totalling 110 names in contrast to full data held by Commies. Therefore, UNC insists on exchange of POW data now.

"*c.* There is no valid argument to refuse to furnish data on POW. The time has come for Communists to recede from their position and provide the data now.

"*d.* UNC proposes a recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon. It hopes that the other side will be prepared after the recess to agree to exchange this prisoner of war data.

"4. Recessed 1312 to resume at 1500. Signed Joy." [1]

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[1] The afternoon session was summarized briefly in telegram C-59465, December 15, from General Ridgway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Further to HNC 567. Reconvened 1500.

"1. UNC continued to press for entry of ICRC delegates and exchange of POW data, particularly the latter. Communists continued to press for discussion of their 5 point proposal. No significant developments. Recessed at 1700 to reconvene at 1100 tomorrow.

"2. Program for 16 Dec is identical with today's except will stress POW data only and not bring up ICRC. Signed Joy." (Black Book, Tab 92)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 93 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 December 1951—11:04 p. m.

C-59464. HNC-568. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 568.

"Sub-Delegations on Item 3 convened 1100.

"1. Hsieh opened by illustrating with map what he meant by coastal waters and islands, which he described by extending the demarcation line roughly due east from the east coast and roughly southwest from the west coast. He indicated UNC should withdraw from all islands north of this extended line and waters around them to a distance roughly indicated as approximately 25 miles. Hsieh stated MAC would not control neutral supervisory organ, but would merely entrust this organ with certain functions. Hsieh stated both sides should accord neutral teams the convenience of traveling over lines of communication as agreed upon by both sides. Hsieh stated that rotation requests submitted to MAC must be supported by reasons and data, and must be approved by both sides of MAC. Hsieh stated number of personnel to be rotated must not exceed 5,000 per month. Hsieh stated that the old provincial administrative line should divide Han River

Estuary. Hsieh stated ports of entry meant ports agreed by both sides, dodging question of airports. Hsieh stated aerial observation by neutral teams is not necessary and is not permissible. Hsieh stated both sides should make joint efforts to see that the neutral organ can be formed and ready to operate immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

"2. UNC responded with a statement refuting Communist positions on islands, rotation and replacement, interference in internal affairs, airfields and inspection of the rear areas; and asserting firm UNC positions on these points.

"3. Hsieh accused UNC of refusing to negotiate. UNC denied. Hsieh stated UNC rotation program was needed by UNC to raise morale of its troops. Recessed 1240.

"4. Reconvened 1400. UNC delivered statement emphasizing its insistence on prohibiting increase in military capabilities during Armistice. (This will be dispatched verbatim in separate msg).[1] Hsieh complained of victor attitude taken by UNC saying UNC refused to negotiate. UNC stated it was always ready to give serious consideration to any proposal which provided for effective supervision of adherence to Armistice terms and for prohibition of increase of military capabilities during Armistice. Hsieh asked why 5,000 per month rotation was not enough. UNC stated categorically it would continue rotation and replenishment during Armistice and would accept no restrictions except those imposed by requirement not to increase level of forces. Hsieh denounced rotation as *de facto* increase in forces. Recessed 1600.

"5. Plan to continue tomorrow to press for UNC proposal of 12 December.

"Signed Joy."

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[1] *Infra.*

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 94 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 15 December 1951—11:06 p. m.

C–59466. HNC–570. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 570.

"Further to HNC 568.[1]

"1. Following is statement made in meeting of sub-delegates on Item nbr 3 this date which is considered of particular significance. You have made a number of statements attempting to show that principles advocated by the UNC are unfair, unreasonable and unwarranted. You condemn our insistence on prohibiting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields as being interference in your internal affairs. You object to our intention to rotate and replenish our forces in Korea. You complain that our retention of islands threatens your rear. You object to aerial surveillance as being more interference in your internal affairs. On the other hand, we defend these principles as insuring against an increase of military capabilities during the armistice and thereby a threat to the stability of the armistice. Now let's look at the situation as it is today. You are not threatening our rear in any way. You are not preventing us from rehabilitating airfields, you are not conducting aerial surveillance of our communication centers. You are not preventing unlimited rotation and replenishment of our forces. You do not interfere in the internal affairs of our side in any way. Under the conditions of combat, as they exist today, you do none of these things and we have no fear that you might. You do none of these things because you cannot—you lack the military capability to do them. But how do you find the situation today on your side? We do hold islands which you say threaten your rear. We do keep your airfields unuseabl[illegible] do conduct aerial surveillance throughout your rear. We do [illegible] the extent to which you can replenish your forces. We do interfere in your so-called internal affairs by disrupting your internal communications systems and by destroying communications centers in your rear. We do these things today because we have the military capability to do them. Until the armistice is signed we will keep on doing them. Now to preserve the existing situation as to military capabilities, to replace the effect of the UNC's military operations, we propose only that during armistice you shall not gain a military capability which you do not now possess. We go even further. We agree to apply the same restrictions to ourselves, even though you lack the military capability today to implement these restrictions by force of arms. But you complain this is unfair—you who are unable to impose any of these military restrictions upon our side by your own strength. You complain that it is unfair for us to insist on continuing restrictions through armistice terms which we are fully able to impose, and are imposing on you by military means during hostilities. In short, you seek to gain, through negotiations, what you could not win through fighting. You seek to avoid, through negotiations, what you could not avoid through fighting. In accepting the restrictions advocated by the UNC you merely accept a continuation of limits on your military capabilities which exist today as a result of UNC military operations. Your capabilities should continue to be limited by the terms of the armistice. You lose nothing. You gain much, for these same limits are applied to the UNC, even though you cannot today affect them by military means. It is clear, therefore, that our proposed principles are more than fair to you—they are wholly to your advantage as compared to the situation existing today.

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[1] *Supra.*

"2. On three occasions, subsequent to the above statement, UNC repeated the following:

"We are always ready to consider seriously any proposal which provides for effective supervision of and adherence to the terms of the armistice and for prohibition of increases in military capabilities during armistice. Signed Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 98 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 December 1951—8:55 p. m.

C–59529. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 576.

"Report of sub-delegation on agenda item 4. Convened 1100. UNC pressed during entire session for exchange now of POW data. Communists did not acquiesce and sought answer to question 'is UNC going to release all POW or not?' At close of session UNC placed its own POW lists on table and formally proposed exchange then and there saying if Communists not ready UNC would return with its lists at 1100 tomorrow. Meeting recessed at 1310 to reconvene at 1100 tomorrow.

"*Comment:* Since it clear that any effort to engage in substantive discussion will only open the door to discussion of release and exchange rather than other matters relating to exchange, program for tomorrow involves no change from present procedure. ICRC issue will be kept alive but in a subordinate position. Signed Joy".[1]

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[1] The report on the succeeding meeting, held on the following day, read as follows:

"Report of sub-delegation meeting on item 4 convened 1100. Discussion followed pattern set yesterday. Recessed 1300 after Communists indicated they had nothing new to present. Program for tomorrow no change. Signed Joy." (Telegram C–59560; Black Book, Tab 101)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 99 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 16 December 1951—8:57 p. m.

C–59530. HNC–577. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 577.

"1. Meeting on sub-delegates this date on item Nbr 3 opened with UNC focusing attention to fact delegations were in disagreement on

(1) islands, (2) development of airfields, (3) aerial observation, (4) a single supervising authority for the armistice, (5) replenishment and replacement, (6) making the effective date of the armistice co-incident with the readiness to operate of the inspecting organization.

"2. Hsieh replied defending his 14 Dec proposal. He atkd replacement and replenishment. Hsieh insisted relation of neutral organ to MAC be one of reporting only. He opposed restriction on military facilities, saying his side had shown consistent, firm attitude against this point from beginning of negotiations. Hsieh called on UNC not to harbor suspicions of motives of his side, saying his side desired thorough peace. Hsieh took position whether his side did or did not rehabilitate its military facilities was strictly the business of his side. Hsieh stated UNC could be sure its attempt to restrict his side thus was categorically and absolutely rejected. As to aerial observation, Hsieh said this was merely a method of observation, and was not needed in connection with observing ports of entry. Hsieh said question of effective date was technical; pointed out that at the time of the signing of armistice it could be determined whether neutral organ was ready to go. He said this point could be solved by agreement at the time of signing. As to islands, Hsieh said they deserved no more discussion. He said:

> "(1) Both sides are on equal footing in negotiations, no victor, no vanquished; and that armistice negotiations should be clearly separated from political conference later,
>
> "(2) Charged UNC sought to gain fruits-of-political conference while delaying convening political conference. This statement apparently refers to airfields.

"3. UNC charged Hsieh not trying to negotiate, simply insisting on his view. Hsieh said his views were fair and reasonable. UNC repeated charge. Hsieh said UNC had no reasons to oppose his principles (1) and (2) above. UNC stated Hsieh either did not want to negotiate or did not have authority to do so. Hsieh asked what UNC proposed as a solution. UNC stated it refused to negotiate between illogic and logic, unreasonableness and reasonableness. UNC denied opposition to peace conference. UNC asked if addition of words, 'this restriction means that there shall be no introduction of reinforcing military forces, equipment, and material' to UNC principle 5 would render it acceptable to Hsieh. Hsieh asked if this meant unlimited rotation and replenishment. UNC replied yes, within [garbled group] restriction. Hsieh replied rotation and replenishment meant increase in strength.

"4. UNC asked, on hypothetical basis, if UNC offered islands formerly controlled by North Korea what Communists had to offer in return. Hsieh replied UNC must withdraw from all islands in his rear. UNC charged Hsieh would not negotiate. Hsieh indicated his side might accept UNC principle 7, if UNC had no intent to deliberately delay effective date of armistice. Hsieh said his principles 5 and 6 were a compromise solution. He said there were two main points of disagreement.

"(1) Rotation and replenishment (which he opposed) and

"(2) Restriction on rehabilitation of facilities and aerial observation (which he said was totally inappropriate to an armistice conference.)

"Hsieh said it was UNC turn to make a move. UNC stated replacement and replenishment was not a UNC negotiation position but a firm intent, and that question of restrictions had been covered yesterday. Hsieh complained of UNC attitude.

"5. Recessed 1530. Tomorrow will continue to press for acceptance of UNC principles. Sgd Joy".

S/S Files: NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)[1] *to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: National Security Council Agenda for Meeting on Wednesday, December 19.

Item 2—NSC 118/1 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea".[2]

NSC 118/1 has been prepared in response to the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under date of November 3, 1951 (NSC 118)[3] which, in essence, stated that the achievement of a military decision in Korea would require significant additional U.S. forces and means and asked that U.S. objectives in Korea be re-examined in the light of this situation.

The decision taken in NSC 118/1 is to reject as an objective the unification of Korea by force and to continue to seek in Korea the objectives set forth in NSC 48/5,[4] namely, as an ultimate objective, to seek by political means the unification of Korea, and, as a current objective, to seek an acceptable settlement which would include, as a minimum, 1) a satisfactory armistice, 2) establishment of the authority of the ROK over all of Korea south of a determined defensible line, generally north of 38°, 3) development of ROK military power to deter or repel renewed aggression, and 4) withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.

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[1] Mr. Allison assumed this title on December 7, 1951 following the departure of Dean Rusk.

[2] Dated December 7, p. 1259.

[3] Dated November 9, p. 1106.

[4] For the sections of NSC 48/5, dated May 17, dealing with Korea, see p. 439

The paper then sets forth certain courses of action to be taken in various contingencies which may arise, including achievement of an armistice, clear failure of armistice negotiations, and protraction of armistice negotiations.

These courses of action follow in general those previously agreed upon by the State and Defense Departments.

They include the principle of "greater sanction", to be applied in case an armistice is achieved.

They include, in case armistice negotiations fail, a provision removing restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea. This is not intended to give new authority to General Ridgway since in actuality there are not now restrictions on advances or attacks placed upon him by the NSC. However, Defense desires it to be unmistakeably clear that restrictions which have, in fact, resulted from previous governmental level decisions, do not apply in case of a breakdown of armistice talks. This provision wipes the slate clean, removing all restrictions except those on attacks within 12 miles of the USSR borders. At the same time it is understood that any large-scale advances northward would be undertaken by General Ridgway only after consultation and approval from Washington. In this connection we are committed to consult the 16 participating nations prior to any major advance deep into North Korea.

The courses of action further include a provision that, in the case of failure of armistice negotiations, U.S. air forces may be employed (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) "to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President". As the Staff Study (Annex to NSC 118/1)[5] points out, the enemy air buildup has reached a stage where serious consequences to UN forces might result from an expansion of air attacks by the communists. Consequently, this paper recognizes that the Commander in Chief of UN forces, in case the scale of enemy air activity is such as to jeopardize the security of his troops, must be able to initiate attacks against Chinese Communist air bases before they are able to launch what might be a sudden massive air attack which could have disastrous effects on the UN forces. This increase in scale might develop over a period of time. In this case, and at such time as he determines, specific authority is to be sought from the President to employ U.S. air forces against Chinese bases. In case of a sudden massive attack by the communists, General Ridgway acts under standing instructions which permit him to take retaliatory action against Chinese airbases.

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[5] See footnote 5, p. 1259.

The one issue on which the State and Defense Departments have taken divergent positions is the question of a naval blockade. The Defense proposal is that we should:

> "Press the major maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose, immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports."

The Department has suggested the following language:

> "Seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to these nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China's aggressive military potential through these means may require employment of UN naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline."

You will note that the discrepancy between these two positions is more a matter of tactics than of substance. It is generally agreed within both State and Defense Departments that our western European allies, particularly the UK, would not accept, in the circumstances of a failure of armistice negotiations, the imposition of a naval blockade against Communist China.

We are fully aware of the general British attitude toward a naval blockade. They have doubts about the vulnerability of China to economic pressure, they desire to avoid hostile acts against Communist China, particularly because of Hong Kong, and they fear the dangers of military involvement with the USSR through a naval blockade.

The question is whether we can obtain our objective better through pressing first for a blockade and then falling back to an embargo, or whether we can more successfully achieve the same or better results by endeavoring to bring our allies along in a program of constantly increasing economic pressure which may eventuate in a naval blockade. We believe the latter is the course most likely to achieve the results we desire and that pressing for an immediate naval blockade would only result in rejection and therefore delays in obtaining agreement to the embargo which we believe is possible.

The British have already come a considerable distance in their application of economic controls against China. A recent report on shipping entering Chinese Communist ports shows a decrease in non-communist shipping from 608,000 tons in July to 456,000 tons in September. The ONI report in question (ONI Serial 74–C–51, 23 November 1951)[6] states that "a relatively small amount of this shipping carried strategic cargo to Communst China".

The efficacy of a naval blockade would depend to a large extent upon its enforcement against Soviet ports. Since it is generally accepted that such a blockade would not be enforced against Dairen or Port Arthur, its advantages would thereby be considerably lessened.

It is believed that, with the exception of the positions on a naval blockade, NSC 118/1 will find general acceptance in the Council. The Annex to NSC 118/1 contains a discussion of the various alternatives open to the United States in Korea, the arguments for and against these choices, a description of the various courses of action recommended and analyses of a minimum acceptable settlement and a political settlement.

It is recommended that you support the Department's proposed paragraph on the naval blockade (paragraph (6), page 6, marked*) and concur in the adoption of this Statement of Policy by the National Security Council and its submission to the President for approval. It is further recommended that you make clear your understanding that under paragraph 2 *b* (3) any proposals by General Ridgway for an extensive advance into North Korea from the present positions of the UN forces would be subject to a governmental level decision.

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[6] Not printed.

795.00/12–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 17, 1951—noon.

2753. Deptel 2931, December 14. I saw Eden last evening just before his departure for Paris and found he had not yet heard of Secretary's conversation with Franks. Strang[1] who was present said Foreign Office agreed with our view that a statement would be necessary no matter what armistice terms evolved. He was also optimistic re possibility working out mutually agreeable wording for last paragraph and will await Department's suggestions. Eden's only comment was that as memo quoted Embtel 2709, December 12, had been approved by Cabinet, any amendments would also need Cabinet action.

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[1] Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

GIFFORD

711.5622/12-1251

Memorandum by Walworth Barbour of the Office of Eastern European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Bomber Shot Down by the Soviet Union

With reference to the attached memorandum[2] concerning possible further steps in regard to the bomber shot down by the Soviet Union off the eastern coast of the USSR, I do not believe it desirable that we protest directly to the Soviet Government in this connection. No matter how you word it, the fact remains that a direct protest to the Soviets would, by its very procedural aspects themselves, derogate from our position that the matter is one for UN consideration and not a direct USSR-US affair. I am persuaded further to the desirability of maintaining this line since a direct protest to the USSR would not result in any satisfaction of any claims we might make for damages or otherwise. It would merely serve as another step on record at best. It would, however, also risk provoking a Soviet reaction magnifying the incident and consequently leading to further exchanges from which the US national interests could not hope to profit.

The American flyers were lost in performance of duty and, as such, are unfortunate casualties of the Korean war and, as much as we dislike it, there is little we can do to obtain redress from the circumstance that they were directly involved with Soviets in distinction to the indirect Soviet involvement which is causing general casualties in Korea. In the circumstances, I think it is probably more in accord with realities of the situation if we take no further action in this case. However, if anyone feels strongly that action is necessary, I wonder whether it would not be consistent with our position that this is a UN and Security Council matter for us to take advantage of the Soviet communication to the Secretary General for circulation to the other Security Council members and similarly circulate a reply thereto.[3] If desirable, we could further explore with other Security Council members whether they would be disposed to acknowledge the Soviet note in the same manner and, in referring to the UN command report to the Security Council, be disposed to support our position of condemning Soviet action. In either event no request for formal Security Council action involving any resolution would be envisaged.[4]

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[1] The memorandum was also addressed to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) and was routed through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright).

[2] Reference is to the memorandum by Mr. Hickerson, dated December 12, p. 1308.

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[3] Under date of December 4, the Soviet Representative on the Security Council (Malik) sent to the President of the Council a note containing the Soviet communication forwarded to the American Embassy on November 7 (see telegram 801 from Moscow, p. 1095) along with the observation that no United States response had been received in answer to the earlier Soviet note. The Soviet Representative wished to have the information circulated to the Security Council. (U.N. document S/2430, December 6, 1951)

[4] The U.S. Government did not respond either to the Soviet note of November 7 or to the communication of December 4 to the Security Council, and the matter was allowed to drop.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 100 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 17 December 1951—5:40 p. m.

C-59563. For your info CINCUNC Adv Msg HNC 581.

"Sub-delegates on item no 3 convened 1100 17 Dec. General Ferenbaugh seated vice [delegate?] Hodes relieved. Hsieh opened with restatement of (1) Rotation and replenishment and (2) Rehabilitation of facilities, as crucial points of dispute. UNC reiterated its position on these points. UNC asked for answer to its hypothetical question of yesterday regarding islands. Hsieh said islands was a minor question. Hsieh said rotation and replenishment was reinforcement, argued lengthily against it. Hsieh said restrictions on facilities and aerial observation were interference with internal affairs and his side unshakably opposed them. Hsieh said while his side had made concessions on rotation UNC had made no concessions on rehabilitating facilities. UNC returned to hypothetical question regarding islands. UNC stated rotation and replenishment is not subject to negotiation, is the firm intent of UNC. UNC asked if Hsieh suggested that in return for UNC conceding islands, his side would accept UNC principle 5. Hsieh said UNC withdrawal from islands was obligation of UNC, declined bargain, denouncing as unreasonable. Hsieh said his side absolutely would not tolerate any interference in internal affairs (airfield rehabilitation) and absolutely would not accept such restriction, such interference. UNC returned again to hypothetical question of islands, asking for clear answer. Hsieh said question already answered, returned to two points, rotation and replenishment, and rehabilitation of facilities. Hsieh said UNC insisted on rotation and replenishment, his side opposed prohibition of rehabilitation of facilities. UNC insisted on solution of island question. Hsieh insisted UNC was obligated to withdraw from islands. UNC denied this categorically. After recess for lunch, argument developed as to who needed more time to study proposals of other side. Hsieh reiterated he had answered question of islands. Recessed 1410. We continue tomorrow to press for UNC principles. Signed Joy."

S/S Files: NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1951.

Subject: NSC 118/1 "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea"

Further to my general memorandum with respect to the NSC agenda December 19,[1] I should like to suggest that in voicing your concurrence in NSC 118/1 [2] you make the following statements which will be made of record in the record of NSC action.[3]

1. Paragraph 2*b*, courses of action in the event the armistice negotiations clearly fail, subparagraphs (2) and (3), provide for increasing the scale of military operations consistent with the capabilities of our forces, and for removing any instructions against advances or air attacks excepting within twelve miles of the USSR border. While these are military instructions;

"It would be understood that the Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces, before engaging upon any major ground operations or advances in North Korea, would first consult with Washington".

2. In agreeing with paragraph 2*b*(4), which removes "restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires), of United States Air Forces to attack Chinese Communist air bases, etc., such employment, however, to be specifically

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[1] Mr. Bohlen's memorandum of December 17 is not printed (NSC 118 Series).

[2] Dated December 7, p. 1259.

[3] The quoted statements in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this memorandum reflected particularly the views of Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson who had consistently urged caution and the need for consultation prior to launching air attacks against Chinese bases (memoranda of December 17 and 18 from Hickerson to Bohlen and Acheson; NSC 118 Series).

authorized by the President", I would recommend the following statement by you in the record:

> "If time permits the State Department would have opportunity of informing our key allies of our intention and of the reasons therefor in such a way however as to safeguard completely the security of the information and the surprise of the operation".

If you agree, it would be desirable for you to hand Mr. Lay after the Council meeting the attached sheet[4] containing the above texts, so as to assure exact recording in the Council minutes.

I do not think that the changes in the present draft of 118/1 made today by the Senior Staff,[5] which you will find in your book, need give us any concern.

However, you should know that:

1. The Joint Secretaries are recommending to Mr. Lovett that the second sentence of Defense version of paragraph 2*b*(6), pertaining to naval blockade should provide that the U.S.: "failing to obtain their agreement (i.e. of the major powers to a blockade), impose a naval blockade on Communist China". The Secretaries would have this blockade include Dairen, Port Arthur, and Hong Kong.

If Mr. Lovett makes this recommendation, it would as Mr. Nash[6] said in Senior Staff, really sharpen the issue; and it should make the task easier for the adoption of our version of paragraph 2*b*(6).

2. The Joint Secretaries are also recommending to the Secretary of Defense that the withdrawal of U.S. troops be initiated, immediately there is an armistice, on the most rapid possible scale for redeployment and not be related either to the build-up of ROK forces or to the phasing of Chinese Communist withdrawals. The point of the Joint Secretaries is that, once there is an armistice, the Communists would be deterred from violating it not by presence of U.S. troops in force as much as by the implied "greater sanctions". The Joint Chiefs, according to Admiral Wooldridge, do not share this view.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will recommend, in addition to the changes agreed upon by Senior Staff, that, in the event armistice negotiations clearly fail (2*b*) the U.S. should "(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist, *and to attain the minimum settlement in Korea acceptable to the U.S.*"

The issue involved, in the context of the courses of action which follow (increasing scale of operations, removal of restrictions against advances, etc.), seems to be that the mobilization effort should be expanded in order to achieve an acceptable settlement by means of a clear-cut military decision.

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[4] Not printed.

[5] See Lay's memorandum, dated December 19, p. 1374.

[6] Frank C. Nash, Department of Defense representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

S/S Files: NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 11 December 1951,[2] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the draft statement of policy on the above subject in NSC 118/1 which was enclosed. In this connection, attention is invited to the fact that the Annex to NSC 118/1 [3] was not attached to your memorandum nor has it been subsequently received. In any event, the Annex should be brought into consonance with the comments which follow.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in those parts of the draft policy statement in NSC 118/1 having military implications, subject to the following:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that NSC 118/1 expands and changes certain portions of NSC 48/5. They believe that the intent of NSC 118/1 is to amend only subparagraphs 6 (*e*) and (*f*) and paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5. In order to make it clear that NSC 118/1 does not supersede or contravene in any manner any of the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of action set forth in NSC 48/5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a statement along the following lines be added at the end of the introductory sentences of paragraphs 1 and 2 of NSC 118/1:

> "These amendments are not to be construed as changing in any manner the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of action in NSC 48/5, including those pertaining to Communist China and Formosa which are set forth in paragraph 8 and subparagraph 11 (*c*) of the latter."

b. Change subparagraph 2 *a* (5) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner:

"(5) Seek agreement among all the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action, not necessarily limited in geographic scope, will be undertaken against them if aggression is renewed. If agreement cannot be reached to make such a declaration, at least by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, the United States should consider issuing a declaration unilaterally. ~~without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. In any event the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed. Efforts should be make to the end that the heads of other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.~~"

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[1] Circulated to the National Security Council on December 18 by Mr. Lay in connection with consideration of NSC 118/1 at the NSC meeting on December 19.
[2] Not printed.
[3] See footnote 5, p. 1259.

Reason: The paragraph as originally written contains an implied threat to the forces and territories of the USSR and further constitutes a too rigid commitment of future U.S. action under unknown circumstances.

c. Change subparagraph 2 *a* (6) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms. ~~and declaring that future aggression in Korea in violation of the armistice agreement would be met by military action on the part of the UN.~~

Reason: The portion of the resolution recommended above for deletion is illogical in that the United Nations would be calling upon itself as well as the Communists to observe the terms of the armistice agreement and would be threatening to punish itself by military action in the event of violation. Moreover, there is a real danger that, in the event of an armistice, incidents may be created by South Korea which would prove embarrassing to the United Nations. Further, provisions for deterring the Communists from renewed aggression are made in subparagraph 2 *a* (5), as amended in subparagraph *b*, above."

d. Change paragraph 2 *b* (1) to read as follows:

"(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist. and to support such additional military measures as might be required to attain the minimum settlement in Korea acceptable to the United States."

Reason: Additional mobilization effort may become necessary in order to attain a minimum settlement in Korea.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in alternative subparagraph 2 *b* (6) as proposed by the Department of Defense and would record their nonconcurrence in the alternative subparagraph 2 *b* (6) submitted by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that, in the event armistice negotiations fail, a request by the Department of State for some nations to participate in the imposition of an embargo would be a fainthearted initial action, not at all in keeping with the gravity of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proper course of action would be to apply pressure upon the major maritime powers to join in the imposition of a naval blockade on Communist China in order to bring about effective economic isolation of that nation from seaborne trade. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the United Kingdom now purports to have established suitable controls to deny the importation by Communist China of strategic materials through Hong Kong. The facts of the case are that these controls are largely ineffective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt that any course of action short of a blockade would provide an effective bar to the importation of even strategic materials into Communist China from the Hong Kong-Macao area, among others.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

795.00/12-1851

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/368/Rev. 1

UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN KOREA
(ALTERNATIVE II—IF AN ARMISTICE IS ACHIEVED)[1]

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position of the United States as to the steps to be taken by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly after an Armistice in Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question and should

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[1] **For the previous paper on this subject, dated October 12, see p. 1020.**

direct the efforts of the Assembly towards the achievement of a satisfactory political settlement of the Korean problem.

2. The United States should support a resolution which would reaffirm that it remains the purpose of the United Nations to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea. To that end, the resolution should establish a new United Nations commission. The terms of reference of the Commission should be:

A. The Commission should consider and enter into discussions with governments and authorities as appropriate regarding a basis for bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means;

B. The Commission would deal exclusively with a Korean political settlement and would have no authority to consider any other problem;

C. The Commission would report to the General Assembly, as appropriate. If it should succeed in getting agreement of the interested parties to a plan for the unification of Korea consistent with United Nations principles, it would submit this agreement for the approval of the General Assembly.

3. In discussions regarding the composition of the Commission, prior to passage of the resolution, the United States should proceed on the basis that the Commission should be a small body capable of carrying out the negotiating function which is its primary task. The United States delegation should make it clear that in view of the role of the United States in the Korean conflict it should be a member of the Commission. In addition, it would be desirable to have 3 small countries from among those which have participated in the fighting in Korea, e.g., Thailand, Australia, and Turkey, and the Soviet Union, if it will serve. If the Soviet Union is not willing to serve, this seat on the Commission might nevertheless be kept open. If informal discussions indicate that the United Kingdom and France strongly desire a place on the Commission the Delegation is authorized to agree to including them.

4. The resolution should express the appreciation of the Assembly to UNCURK for its services. UNCURK should go out of existence when the new commission informs it that it is ready to begin its functions under the General Assembly Resolution. When the Assembly receives the report of the new Commission on the results of its effort to bring about a peaceful settlement, the Assembly will review, in the light of the report, the need for long term political United Nations representation in Korea.

5. The proposed resolution should also refer to past resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly on the United Nations

action in Korea, note the approval of the armistice by the Security Council, express the Assembly's own satisfaction over the conclusion of the armistice and the successful accomplishment by United Nations forces of their mission in Korea. Friendly delegations may feel, however, that such provisions will antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of a political settlement, and the delegation is authorized to omit or reverse these provisions if consultations indicate strong opposition. In that event, we should reach an understanding with other delegations that a stronger General Assembly resolution leaving the record clear as to the character and purpose of the United Nations action in Korea would be introduced at a later date, if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down.

DISCUSSION

A. *Political Settlement for Korea.*

The Objective is Unification. An armistice in Korea will bring about a cessation of the fighting and make provisions against its resumption. It will constitute only the first step towards the achievement of a permanent peace in Korea and a political solution of the Korean problem by peaceful means.

The United Nations is committed to seeking the establishment in Korea of a unified, independent and democratic government. Such unification has also been the policy of the United States, and represents the desires of the Korean people. Every effort should be made, therefore, after an armistice, to bring about such unification under United Nations auspices, in accordance with United Nations principles, and under conditions which would provide maximum assurance against Communist aggression and subversion. At the same time it is the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided on an indefinite basis under an armistice agreement than to have a unification under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.

The Communists have also taken the position that the armistice is only the first step and a political settlement must follow. They have also championed the unification of Korea. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Communists would agree to a truly independent and democratic Korea, to free elections under United Nations auspices, and a process of unification under the guidance of a United Nations commission. More likely they will seek a political settlement on terms which would permit them to gain control of all Korea. Failing that, as they have already indicated, they may seek an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of non-Korean troops. At the same time, the United States could not support any political settlement which gives up the goal of unification and accepts the division of the country as permanent. It would be better to have the armistice continue in effect as an armistice only. The United Nations troops would stay as long as was necessary in order to ensure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression. The United Nations would keep alive the principle of unification and continue its efforts through appropriate machinery to achieve it.

Whatever the prospects of success, the General Assembly should, after an armistice, reaffirm unification as the only acceptable solution for Korea and extend every effort to achieve a unified Korea on a United Nations basis. It is important also that the United States take the initiative in this regard and not allow the Communists the propaganda advantage of posing as the principal proponents of a unified Korea.

Forum for Seeking a Political Settlement. The United Kingdom has indicated its view that following an armistice, a political solution of the Korean problem should be sought at a Five-Power Conference (United States, United Kingdom, USSR, France, Communist China) or Seven-Power Conference (the same powers plus, presumably, India and Egypt), with some kind of "associate" participation by the Republic of Korea and the North Koreans. (After agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the United Kingdom has in mind that the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems). We have informed the United Kingdom that we do not accept this approach which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the Great Powers without any participation by the United Nations or by other countries vitally interested in the Pacific (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines) and only a secondary participation for the Koreans, the real parties in interest. We also indicated that we could not agree to any arrangement which might give the impression that we were treating Peiping as the Government of China. (With regard to a discussion of other Far Eastern questions, we informed the United Kingdom that neither the Five—nor the Seven-Power conference would be representative of the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese representation and Formosa, but that after a Korean settlement, we would be prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate forum which would include all the parties with interests in the questions to be discussed).

As the United Kingdom was informed, it is our position that the Korean problem should be solved by the parties in interest. Strictly, this would mean that the question should be discussed by representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Koreans; the United Nations should participate also in view of its continuing interest in the Korean problem and the role it must play both in achieving a settlement and in supervising its implementation. It is foreseeable, however, that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists will claim a voice in the solution of the Korean problem. Since, as a realistic matter, no agreement for a Korean settlement could be achieved without their consent or acquiescence, particularly with Chinese Communist troops remaining in Korea even after an armistice, the United States is prepared to agree to their participation in discussions of a Korean settlement in an appropriate forum.

A New United Nations Commission. Under the proposed resolution the General Assembly would establish a new United Nations Commission on Korea, with headquarters in New York but free to travel as necessary. This Commission would be authorized to consider and enter into discussions with governments and authorities, as appropriate, for the purpose of achieving agreement on bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means. Its terms of reference would be limited to the Korean political settlement, and it would have no authority to consider any other problems. It would report to the General Assembly the results of its efforts, and, if it should succeed in obtaining agreement of the interested parties on a plan for the unification of Korea consistent with United Nations principles, it would submit this agreement to the Assembly for its approval.

The composition of the commission should reflect the facts that its primary task will be negotiation and that it will deal only with the Korean situation. In view of the important role of the United States in the Korean conflict its inclusion on the commission is mandatory. The other members of the commission could appropriately include three other members of the United Nations from among those who have participated in the fighting in Korea. Thailand and Australia, as Far Eastern countries, appear logical choices, and Turkey might be a suitable third member, representative of broader United Nations interest in the Korean problem. If any or all of these three states will not accept membership on the commission, the delegation may substitute other appropriate states from among those with forces fighting in Korea. In addition, the USSR should be invited to assume a place on the commission; in view of its own interest in the area and the importance of obtaining Communist concurrence (including Communist China) in any Korean settlement, if it refuses to accept membership, a seat for it might be kept open. Soviet membership would facilitate the work of the Commission in organizing and carrying on any discussions with both the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities.

Efforts should be made at the outset to persuade other delegations, particularly the French and British, to agree to the above arrangements concerning the membership of the commission. We should point out the desirability of avoiding the appearance that the great powers are imposing a solution on the Korean people. If the United Kingdom and France should be included on the commission, it would be difficult to avoid the question of Chinese representation and the consideration of other Far Eastern questions in the commission. The United States remains firmly opposed both to representation of the Chinese Communist regime in any United Nations body and to the discussion of other Far Eastern questions until after a Korean settlement. However, both France and the United Kingdom may insist upon membership for themselves on the commission; if informal discussions indicate their strong desire for such membership, the delegation is authorized to agree to their inclusion.

As indicated above, the Chinese Communists will undoubtedly insist upon a role in a political settlement for Korea. While we are prepared to agree to their participation in the discussions, any arrangement for actual membership on the commission would be obviously impossible. As one of its first tasks, the new United Nations Commission must work out detailed arrangements whereby other interested governments and authorities may participate in the discussions on a Korean settlement. In particular, means for consultation with representatives of the Republic of Korea, of the North Korean authorities, and of the Chinese Communists must be devised. An opportunity should also be provided for any other directly interested United Nations Members (such as the Philippines) to make their views available to the commission.

Relation to UNCURK. Since the new commission will provide overall machinery for seeking to achieve the United Nations objective of a free, unified and independent Korea, UNCURK should go out of existence as soon as the new commission is ready to undertake its functions under the General Assembly resolution. This resolution should accordingly provide for termination of UNCURK upon its notification that the new commission is ready to begin its work, and should also express the Assembly's appreciation to UNCURK for its services during the past year.

When the Assembly receives the new commission's report on the results of its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, the Assembly will review, in the light of that report, the need for long-term political United Nations representation in Korea. This point can appropriately be made in speeches by the United States and other friendly delegations during discussion of the Korean item in the Assembly.

B. *Approval of the Armistice.*

It is expected that if an armistice is reached, a resolution will be introduced in the Security Council noting the armistice with approval. Some of our allies would like to see a resolution which does that and no more. The United States would wish the resolution, as a minimum, to refer to and reaffirm past resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the action and objectives in Korea, in order to avoid the impression that we were giving up the United Nations version of what has happened in Korea and were willing to rewrite or forget that history. The United States would also like a provision which would explicitly refer the problem of the political settlement of Korea to the General Assembly.

The action in the General Assembly would, of course, have to take account of any resolution which might be adopted in the Security Council. The proposed resolution should refer to the Security Council resolution and also indicate the Assembly's approval of the armistice. Particularly since some countries have already indicated a desire for a simple uncontroversial resolution in the Security Council in the hope of getting Soviet support for that resolution, the United States would like the subsequent action of the General Assembly to set the record straight on the whole Korean episode. We would not wish to leave the world confused and uncertain as to the real character and purpose of the action in Korea. It must remain clear that there was Communist aggression in Korea, that the United Nations action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that the United Nations has succeeded in this mission, and has not altered or abandoned its original objectives in Korea as a result of the conflict.

It may be anticipated that there will be objection to such provisions. It will be argued that such a resolution would antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of achieving a political settlement in Korea. If consultations reveal strong views to this effect, it may be necessary to omit or soften these provisions. In doing so, however, it should be made clear that we consider this only a postponement and that if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down, we will wish a stronger resolution along these lines.

In this regard, the delegation should warn other delegations against the dangers of assuming that the achievement of an armistice means a radical change in Soviet objectives. Such an attitude could have serious consequences going beyond the question of United Nations action in regard to Korea. The United States is always ready to welcome true Soviet cooperation in support of the United Nations Charter; we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We would have to have much more and stronger evidence of Soviet change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that the USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Communist imperialism and has started on the path of peaceful cooperation. The Soviet attitude to the armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on the international scene. Such an impression would lull us into a false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up the strength of the free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of the United Nations. Within the United Nations it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some delegations might feel would antagonize the Russians.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 104 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH KOREA, 18 December 1951—4:02 p. m.

HNC–588. This message in 6 parts.

Part 1. Following a canvass of the opinions of the delegation and staff at Munsan yesterday and today, I submit herewith an analysis which includes:

1. The general situation.
2. Existing major points of disagreement.
3. The final position on each of these major points, which in my view the present and future interests of the U.S. require that we maintain, with the supporting reasons in each case. (Where a position is in conflict with JCS instructions, the facts are so stated.)
4. Conclusions.
5. Recommendations.

Part 2. The general situation.

1. *a.* There are several principle elements in the situation as of this date, all of which are indeterminate except one. The single exception is the time remaining of the thirty day period as it affects agenda item two. This period has 9 days to run.

b. The indeterminate principle elements are the effect of an extension of this period: The intentions of the Communists with respect to concluding an armistice; and the finality of the several positions which the Communists have taken on the respective existing major points of disagreement. Each of these is discussed in turn.

2. *a.* Extension of the thirty day period will have a positive and

harmful effect on the mental attitude of our forces in Korea, unless the period of extension is very short and conclusion of the armistice negotiations is clearly imminent. Furthermore, unless the condition obtains, it will have a like effect on public opinion in the United States.

b. While I state this purely as an opinion and while I am not in a position to gauge its force, I would think it conceivable that such public opinion might result in the U.S. Government adopting courses of action in Korea [in] conflict with its best interests, might incline it to accept a local temporary advantage, rather than an over-all far-reaching gain.

c. It could, it seems to me, be a case of taking the cash and letting the credit go, the "cash" being a temporary lull, a brief interruption in casualty reports; the "credit" being safeguards which would provide for maximum recovery of surviving POW's and maximum insurance against further casualties through minimum essential security measures for our forces in Korea today and in Japan tomorrow.

3. The intention of the Communists with respect to concluding an armistice is perhaps the most conjectural of all the variables in the present situation. Opinion has changed 180 degrees several times in the past few weeks, and today there is almost as much on one side as on the other. Whatever be the Communist intentions, it seems probable that we are most likely to develop them through a determination of the points on which we will not yield; through prompt announcement of those points in such unequivocal language as to make our purpose crystal clear; and through reiteration of these positions every day for the remainder of the thirty day period of grace.

4. The finality of the several Communist positions on existing major points of disagreement can likewise be determined in the same manner.

5. *a.* Item number 3 of the agenda now under active discussion is not making acceptable progress because of Communist intransigence.

b. Throughout this analysis, in fact throughout our entire negotiations, the policy directive you have assigned me has been kept clearly in mind, namely, the attainment as soon as possible of an armistice on terms acceptable to the United States.

c. Throughout this analysis, in fact throughout our entire negotiations, your directive, that, if negotiations are broken off the onus must rest on the Communists, has likewise been kept clearly in mind.

d. However, these two points above deserve comment.

(1) With respect to the first, it is axiomatic that the Communists have a like policy objective. Hence, with due respect to the second point, there must come a time at which our final positions must be stated, and if not accepted a time at which we must be prepared to

continue their reiteration indefinitely until either our patience, or that of the Communists is exhausted.

(2) With respect to both the first and the second, there is, I believe, a point at which the law of diminishing returns takes over. While again perhaps presumptuous in attempting to forecast the course of United States public opinion, I yet feel that a time must come when, if our final positions continue to be rejected, yet the Communists themselves do not break off negotiations, that the United Nations Command must do so. I do not, of course, suggest that the time has yet arrived. I do suggest that if the present course of these negotiations long continues, it will arrive and the decisions to meet it should be made in advance.

(3) Every time that the United Nations Command delegation abandons a position which it has strongly held, its future position and bargaining strength are proportionately reduced. Communist practices world-wide should by now be so thoroughly understood that no reasonable person can any longer be in doubt that the more they gain the more they take. The more that is yielded to them the more obdurate they become. Only through recognition and application of this well established fact can we hope to bring these negotiations to either a successful conclusion, or to a clear issue warranting their termination by the deliberate decision of the United Nations Command.

Part 3. Major points of existing disagreement.

Agenda Item Number 3

1. Armistice not to be effective until supervising organ is ready to function.

2. Neutral organ to be subject to direction and control of military armistice commission.

3. Ground (as distinguished from aerial) observation at ports of entry including ground, sea and air with freedom of movement for observer personnel.

4. Prohibition of rehabilitation and construction of airfields, and aerial observation thereof.

5. Rotation, replenishment and replacement.

Agenda Item Number 4

6. Basis for release and exchange of POW.

Part 4. Final positions on major points of disagreement which in my view the present and future interests of the U.S. require that we maintain.

Agenda Item Number 3

1. Insistence on prohibition of the construction or rehabilitation of airfields.

The most important part of this armistice is the restriction on the rehabilitation of airfields. Without such a restriction, the armistice contains no adequately effective provision for the security of our forces, or even for the stability of the armistice itself. The rehabilitation of airfields during the period of the armistice is inconsistent with the fundamental idea of an armistice. The balance of forces and conditions existing at the time of the armistice is put into effect could be radically altered thereby. The rehabilitation of enemy airfields is today the greatest potential threat to the security of our forces in Korea. Tomorrow it could be a similar menace to our forces in Japan.

2. Insistence on neutral aerial observation and photo reconnaissance. This provision is essential for determination of adherence to terms of armistice, particularly paragraph 1 above. Without aerial observation of the 97 airfields in North Korea, prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields would have little practicability, and none on new construction.

3. Insistence on the rotation and replenishment principle, unlimited except by the principle that there shall be no increase in the levels existing at the time the armistice becomes effective. To agree to limit rotation and replenishment to a level beneath that necessary to maintain the strength of our forces in Korea would constitute withdrawal by attrition. It would be an unmistakable indication of weakness of the Communists.

4. Insistence on including provisions in the armistice agreement which provide for mandatory action by the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral observer personnel in the execution of tasks assigned in the armistice agreement. Without provisions making mandatory the execution of tasks assigned the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral organ, the Communists can block any action by these organizations through refusing to agree. With such provisions included in the armistice agreement, it is not considered necessary to place the neutral organ under the direction and control of the Military Armistice Commission. (This position varies in wording but not in effect from present instruction of JCS 89173 paragraph 2D).[1]

5. Insistence on location of neutral observer teams at major ports of entry including ground, sea, and air as mutually agreed to by both sides, with freedom of movement over major lines of communication as required. It is essential that observation be conducted at a selected number of major ports of all types and freedom of movement be accorded teams to conduct these observations in order to determine whether the enemy is increasing his military capabilities by importation.

6. Basis for release and exchange of POWs. (Deduced from Communist statements in meetings to date).

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

a. We believe final position which offers best chance for maximum recovery of our military POWs is all-for-all exchange confined to military personnel only.

b. Although UNC has not as yet given any indication of its position on the basis for release and exchange of POWs, Communists have assumed that UNC will propose exchange on one-for-one basis. On this assumption they are attacking this position and building up a strong propaganda case against the one-for-one exchange. Article 118 Geneva Convention tends to support their all-for-all argument. In view of this, the UNC by formally proposing one-for-one exchange will be exposing itself to adverse propaganda. Such a risk would probably reap no productive results, because settlement on a one-for-one basis is likely not to be accepted by the Communists and because it seems likely the U.S. public would create an overwhelming demand on the government of a concession long before the UNC could outsit the Communists on this issue.

c. With respect to inclusion of civilians and forced repatriations.

(1) The only arrangement which gives any reasonable assurance of no forced repatriation is to omit any civilians and insist on a one-for-one exchange, without nationality considerations, until all POW held by Communists are recovered; thereafter release remainder of POW we hold but repatriate only volunteers. This conflicts with para II (6) JCS 89746 [2] and requires your prior authority.

(2) Any tenable position which includes selected civilians will almost certainly entail forced return of some personnel and thereby violate para II (7) JCS 89746.

(3) Therefore JCS decision is required as to which has priority—the return of selected civilians or adherence to principle of no forced return of POW.

d. The repatriation of civilians is a political question; to raise it is to violate the consistent stand of the UNC that the armistice is strictly a military matter.

e. We further believe that if we insist on principle of voluntary repatriation we may establish a dangerous precedent that may react to our disadvantage in later wars with Communist powers. Should they ever hold preponderance of POW, and then adhere to their adamant stand against any form of neutral visits to their POW camps, we will have no recourse, if they said none of our POWs wanted to be repatriated.

f. On assumption civilians have priority, there appears to be only one practicable way to proceed:

(1) Offer not to oppose all-for-all exchange of POW provided a specified number of selected civilians are included by Communists.

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[2] Dated December 15, p. 1340.

This may well lead to demand by Communists for return by UNC of all civilian internees and refugees in South Korea including South Korean civilian internees once reported to Geneva but since reclassified; that is, they may demand extension of all-for-all exchange principle to include refugees and internees.

(2) POWs shall be exchanged on a person-for-person basis until all POW of one side have been exchanged. The side which still holds POWs shall thereafter release from POW status all the remaining POWs held by it and repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all prisoners of war remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made.

g. The value of the second alternative as a club to secure acceptance of the first depends largely upon the adverse propaganda effect upon the Communists of having a large number of former Communists soldiers refuse to return to their homeland and of having the UNC provide them asylum. Unfortunately, the second alternative, which extends the institution of asylum to POWs is so appealing to humanitarian sentiment, that once it is announced and publicized, the demand by our people to stand or fall on this proposal may preclude ultimate abandonment of this position.

h. In view of the many interests involved, negotiations to accomplish return of civilians would be delicate. It is thought that the UNC should never formally propose alternative 6 *f* (1) above. The subdelegation would explore it with as little publicity as possible under the guise of discussing the Communist all-for-all proposal. We would state that the UNC holds many more prisoners, but that Communists want an all-for-all exchange. If the Communists will include in the exchange a specified number of civilians from lists to be provided, UNC will not oppose Communist proposal of all-for-all. Exchange of POW by UNC, and POW and listed civilians by the Communists, would be on a one-for-one basis, until prisoners and listed civilians held by the enemy are exhausted. Delivery of the remaining POW held by UNC would be contingent upon satisfactory compliance with the terms of the agreement by the Communists. The club would be exposed but not wielded.

Part 5. Conclusions.

Agenda Item 3

1. The question of whether the enemy will or will not agree to an armistice containing a prohibition on increasing military capabilities

(air facilities) during the period of armistice is perhaps the gravest question posed by the armistice negotiations, and in the unanimous opinion of the delegation is the key question on which the faith of the armistice hinges. If the enemy will not accept, or will long delay an armistice which contains a prohibition against airfields, the question arises why the enemy is so seriously concerned with airfields. The answer to that question may indicate the intentions of the enemy. The only way that crucial question can be decisively answered is—to press the enemy to a point of ultimate decision and choice—an armistice, or airfields. If his choice is the latter, then his intention to take over all of Korea (accepted in National Intelligence Estimate No 55)[3] include the determination to project his air power through-out the peninsula.

2. It is concluded that paragraph II (2), (6) and (7) of JCS 89746 prevent freedom of action of the UNC in presenting tenable initial or intermediate positions. The choice between permitting UNC POWs to volunteer for repatriation and attempting to secure the return of UN and ROK civilians, needs to be made because it is the opinion here that both cannot be achieved in the same UNC proposal.

Part 6. Recommendations.

1. That final positions outlined in part IV above be approved soonest without qualification and that the UNC delegation be authorized to announce them as such to the Communists and to the world at times of my choosing.

2. That current JCS instructions in conflict with above be rescinded. Signed Ridgway.

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[3] Dated December 7, p. 1263.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 105 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TOKYO, 18 December 1951—4 : 47 p. m.

C-59618. For info CINCUNC Adv 585.

"Meeting opened 1100 on item 3. Hsieh referred to UNC insistence on rotation and replacement, and to his side's objection to 'interference in internal affairs.' UNC repeated position of rotation and replacement and airfields from record of Dec 15. Hsieh stated the 2 questions above must be settled. UNC asked if Hsieh had anything new to propose. Hsieh replied no, insisted his side had made many concessions to UNC views, it was UNC's turn to make a move.

"Recessed 1145. Continue tomorrow 1100. Signed Joy".

795.00/12-1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1951—8:17 p. m.

2973. Reurtel 2709 Dec 12, we concur with UK suggestion for amendment last para draft statement with exception of last sentence which we suggest be revised to read as fols:

"Shld aggression be committed again in Korea the consequences wld be so grave that it wld, in all probability, not, be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

In our view foregoing revised language constitutes only plain statement of inescapable fact without objectionable tone of ultimatum. To say anything less wld in our opinion lack desired deterrent effect on Chi.

Brit Emb here being informed in foregoing sense but suggest you also discuss with Eden at earliest opportunity. Full text of draft statement amended accordance foregoing also being made available Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, with whom gen discussions this subject initiated Dec 17.[1]

ACHESON

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[1] Memoranda of the conversations with officials of the embassies mentioned may be found in files 795.00/12-1751 and 12-1851. The text of the revised final paragraph of the draft statement contained in telegram 2807, December 5 (p. 1249), to London now read as follows:

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm that if another act of aggression were to challenge again the principles of the United Nations we should again be united and prompt to resist. Should aggression be committed again in Korea the consequences would be so grave that it would, in all probability, not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

On December 19, the text of the revised draft along with background information thereon was sent to the American Embassies in France, The Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, and Belgium with instructions that the statement be taken up with the respective Foreign Ministries for receipt of their views. The Embassy in Brussels was to ask the Belgian Foreign Ministry to take the matter up with Luxembourg since Luxembourg's forces in Korea were part of the Belgian contingent and Luxembourg was not being approached directly. (Telegram 3589 to Paris, 813 to The Hague, 536 to Ankara, 2970 to Athens, and 901 to Brussels; 795.00/12-1951)

As a precedent for the statement, the Department cited the tripartite declaration made on September 19, 1950 when the United States, the United Kingdom, and France warned that any attack on West Germany or Berlin would be considered an attack on them. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 818 ff.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 107 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 18 December 1951—9:02 p. m.

C-59648. HNC 589.

"Report of sub-Delegation Agenda Item 4. Convened 1100. Lee opened with a short statement proposing to exchange POW data at 1500 today. Recessed 1120. Reconvened at 1500. POW data exchanged. UNC proposed a recess until both sides had studied data. UNC will give notification through Liaison Officer as to when it will be ready to resume. UNC said it hoped to be ready by 1000 day after tomorrow. Recessed 1520 to reconvene when both sides have completed study of data. Signed Joy."[1]

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[1] The lists presented by the Communist side showed a total of 11,559 prisoners composed of 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 U.N. personnel. During the early months of the fighting, in contrast, the Communists had claimed the capture of over 65,000 prisoners. At the time of exchange of information on prisoners of war, the Republic of Korea carried over 88,000 and the United States over 11,500 as missing in action. The Communist side listed 188,000 men missing, while the U.N. Command stated that it held 132,000 prisoners of war and another 37,000 recently reclassified as civilian internees. (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 141)

S/S Files: NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 19, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

References: A. NSC 118/1 and Annex to NSC 118/1[1]

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 18, 1951[2]

The Senior NSC Staff, having reviewed the statement of policy contained in NSC 118/1 in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and after further study by the interested departments and agencies, recommends the following revisions in NSC 118/1 to the National Security Council for consideration at its meeting on December 19:[3]

Page 2, subparagraph (4): Revise to read as follows:

(4) Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone.

Page 3, subparagraph (4), 5th line of the subparagraph: Place a period after "security of the ROK" and delete the remainder of the subparagraph.

Page 4, subparagraph (5), next to last line of the subparagraph: Delete "the heads of".

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[1] See NSC 118/1, dated December 7, p. 1259.

[2] Not printed.

[3] The paragraphs of NSC 118/1 under reference are: 1*a*(4), 2*a*(4, 5, and 6), and 2*b* (3).

Page 4, subparagraph (6), 4th line of the subparagraph: Place a period after "terms" and delete the remainder of the subparagraph.

Page 5, subparagraph (3): In the first line substitute "any" for "all"; in the second line after "against" insert "air".

The Senior NSC Staff also concurred in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 2 *a* of Reference B that NSC 118/1 is intended to amend only subparagraphs 6 *e* and *f* and paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5. It is suggested that a statement along the lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be incorporated in the "Note by the Executive Secretary" when a revised version of NSC 118/1 as amended is reproduced.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

S/S Files: NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1951.

NSC MEETING

NSC 118/1 was adopted with the following changes:

All the changes proposed by the Senior Staff in its memorandum of December 19, 1951.[1]

In regard to Paragraph 2 *a* (5) on page 4—first, it was agreed to be inserted in the minutes that this paragraph was a statement of policy and was not meant to prescribe the language of the warning. The words "in any event" in the second sentence were stricken out and the words "if agreement cannot be reached" inserted. At the end of the sentence, the words "or in the methods of warfare employed" were stricken out. In the last sentence, "the heads of" were stricken out.

In paragraph 2 *b* (1) on page 5, the proposed amendment by the JCS was not made. However, it was agreed that there should be a note in the minutes to the effect that the Council understood that the enlargement of the war contemplated in Paragraph b might call for increased military forces beyond those presently contemplated.

In Paragraph 2 *b*–2, 3 and 4, the two notes for the minutes which I proposed were adopted.[2] I forgot to give Mr. Lay copies of these notes.

The State-Defense disagreement about Article 6 was not resolved, but these two proposals were returned to the Senior Staff . . . for the purpose of making a further report as to whether the proposed embargo had any practical importance. Mr. Lovett's view was that this might be controlling.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] See the quoted paragraphs in the memorandum from Mr. Bohlen to Mr. Acheson, December 18, p. 1355.

In paragraph 1 *a* (3), the language was changed to read "provide for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea as circumstances permit". I believe this is correct although I may be wrong about the phrase "by stages". The change was made solely because all members thought that it meant exactly what the language of the paper meant. Mr. Lovett revealed the views of the Joint Secretaries which received no support—that is, it was the view that there could not be a precipitate withdrawal, but that as the circumstance developed decisions on withdrawal would have to be reached in a way which reconciled military needs and military security with the equally important objective of maintaining South Korean morale and resistance to subversion. It was clearly understood that no advance commitments could be made on this subject.

[Here follows discussion of topics not connected directly with NSC 118/1. For the text of NSC 118/2, December 20, as adopted and approved by President Truman, see page 1382.]

795.00/12–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, December 19, 1951—4 p. m.

584. Ref your C–59695, Dec 18.[1] Only existing lists civilians are (1) ROK OPI list prepared by Home Ministry listing 2438 persons from Seoul area taken north and additional 1202 missing from Seoul area and 976 identified as killed by enemy in Seoul during 1950 occupation and (2) list of 2527 persons kidnapped from ROK preponderantly from Seoul area. This latter list subdivided by provinces prepared by "Association of Families of Kidnapped Persons". Neither list is complete and they overlap. Total number of civilians taken north against their will is generally given as 20,000.

In addition the Home Ministry has been having lists prepared by provincial auths. I understand provinces of Kyonggido and Kyongsang Pukto have completed theirs. Presumably Gen Lee[2] referred yesterday to list (1) above when he said he had names of over 2,000 from Seoul area and second figure of some 8,000 he referred to was from provincial lists furnished him by Korean Auths.

(*b*) I consider lists (1) and (2) referred to above as reliable as possible. Provincial lists bound to be much more unreliable and incomplete. Furthermore all lists will possibly include persons who either did go north voluntarily, or who later decided play Commie game. Therefore lists (1) and (2) above should be given whatever priority practicable.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, Republic of Korea representative on the U.N. Command Delegation at Panmunjom.

Suggest CINCUNC Advance ascertain origin Gen Lee's lists. Assume they are (1) and (2) referred to above plus provincial lists thus far completed. I shall press Koreans complete other provincial lists earliest.

(*c*) I have no recommendations or comments to add to the gen exchange we had on this subj yesterday.

Rptd info Dept, CINCFE Tokyo Japan and CINCUNC Advance have for action by other means.

MUCCIO

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 112 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 19 December 1951—7 : 54 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–90083. From JCS.

Part I.

1. Analysis contained in your HNC 588 [2] most helpful. The firmness, patience and skill with which you and UNC Delegation are conducting these trying negots are appreciated and results thus far obtained viewed here as significant and gratifying.

2. View here is that there is small possibility that political discussions subsequent to an armistice will be successful in reaching any acceptable political settlement for Korea. Therefore likely that armistice will remain controlling agreement for a prolonged period. Consequently, its significance attains greater importance and its character must provide for greater degree of permanency than would otherwise be the case. Conditions of armistice must also be appropriate to Korean civilian economy and we cannot expect agreement on conditions whose enforcement would be impracticable over long period. In addition, it is of particular importance that the armistice agreement itself clearly provide that it will remain in effect until superseded by other arrangements.

3. While recognizing the possibility of renewed aggression in Korea

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[1] The substance of this message was apparently discussed at a State–JCS meeting on December 19. A handwritten set of notes of a meeting with the date "12/19/51" penciled in and drafts of several proposed messages to General Ridgway are filed with the Department of State records of the State–JCS meetings in Lot 64D563, Box 728.

[2] Dated December 18, p. 1366.

after an armistice, it appears more likely that Communist violations of armistice terms will be disturbances in nature of nuisance demonstrations, threats, equivocations and the like, samples of which we have encountered elsewhere in the world where living in juxtaposition to Communists rule. However, renewal of hostilities on our part would be most unlikely unless there were actual armed aggression by Communists or violations of armistice terms of such a character as to give clear indication of imminence of such aggression.

4. It is our view that safety of UN Forces and the major deterrent to renewal of aggression must in last analysis be dependent upon realization by Communists that a renewed aggression in Korea would result in a new war which would bring upon China the full retribution which United States and her Allies deem militarily desirable. Every effort is being made to obtain agreement of countries participating in the mil action in Korea to a declaration to this general effect to be issued immediately folg conclusion of an armistice. Preliminary discussions with UK show her support of this concept and we are hopeful that other Allies also will endorse it. It is still our intention to convey this warning unilaterally if necessary.

5. It is felt here that United States public opinion fully supports an acceptable mil armistice as the best of the alternatives which confront us in Korea. The public grows impatient only when it appears to them that we are quibbling over minor details. However, it is our belief that on issues which are manifestly of major importance, public opinion not only in United States but in other UN nations fighting in Korea stands staunchly behind our negotiators.

Part II.

6. Folg are positions you should firmly maintain in negots. We cannot state in advance that each one is absolutely final, as our judgment in this regard will be influenced by possible introduction by Communists of new variations which might be acceptable or by degree of support obtained from our major Allies for type declaration referred to in Para 4, Part I above. While complete disagreement on all these positions would be considered grounds for breaking off negotiations, United States Govt is unable now to state that failure to achieve agreement on only one or even several of final positions given below or elements thereof would, in last analysis, be considered in itself a breaking point.

A. Rehabilitation of Airfields. We agree that construction and rehabilitation of airfields will constitute an increased threat to security of UN Forces. However, we feel that as a long-range proposition complete prohibition on any rehabilitation will be impracticable to enforce. On other hand, there must be a prohibition against rehabilitation of those fields in Korea suitable for jet opns, against extension or enlargement of existing runways as well as against construction of new fields or runways. Not to exceed an agreed number of specified fields, which number is left to your discretion, may be rehabilitated and maintained subj to above restrictions.

B. Aerial Observation. Aerial obsvn would be desirable but not essential, particularly after ground obsvn teams are in place. Accordingly, insistence on aerial obsvn should not be a part of your final position, and failure to effect agreement to provide for aerial obsvn, even if ground observer teams are not in place, should not be a breaking point. In this connection, see Para 7 Part III.

C. Rotation of Personnel. Rotation of personnel and replenishment of supplies and equipment should be separated for purposes of negotiation. We concur in your insistence on provisions for rotation of personnel. Unless agreement can be reached on a limiting number which would satisfy your max requirements for rotation, there should be no limit on number rotated in any month. Under any arrangement there must be a provision that at no time must the over-all level of personnel be greater than that which existed at the time the armistice goes into effect.

D. Replenishment of Supplies and Equipment. It is desirable that there be no increase in supply levels over those at the time the armistice goes into effect, and you should seek agreement in principle on this point. However, since this would be extremely difficult to monitor, it is not too important except that there should be a definite prohibition against increase in combat aircraft. On this specific prohibition you should be adamant.

E. Non-Combatant Observer Teams and Mil Armistice Commission. Some countries which have been contacted on the matter of providing personnel for observer teams have indicated that they prefer designation "non-combatant" rather than "neutral". Your position on non-combatant obsvn teams and the MAC is approved. Regardless of composition of teams, no voting or other procedures should be accepted which would limit agreed freedom of movement or restrict the right of reporting by teams or individual members thereof. We concur that observer teams must be located at major ground, sea, and air ports of entry specified in armistice agreement with freedom of movement as required to perform their duties.

Part III.

7. Re Para 1 Part 3 HNC 588. Armistice should go into effect on an agreed date specified in armistice agreement. It should be keyed directly to having MAC and some observer teams in Korea but not necessarily in place. We recognize risk involved thereby, but feel effective date of armistice should not be delayed through inability to get teams in place. Suggest possibility of aerial obsvn by non-combatant teams on temp basis pending complete locating of ground teams.

8. For reasons stated in Para 6 Part II above, we consider that time has not arrived for you to initiate procedure of announcing and reiterating final positions as such as referred to in Paras 3 and 5 *d* (1) of Part 2 HNC 588 nor are we able to approve now recom in Para 1 Part 6 HNC 588 for authority to announce final positions.

9. As deadline approaches, if progress is still being made and depending upon status of negots, you are authorized to propose or agree to an extension for a period not to exceed 15 days.

Part IV.

10. We do not accord priority to civilians over POWs, but nevertheless, as suggested in Paras 6 *f* (1), 6 *f* (2), and 6 *h* of Part 4 HNC 588, you should not oppose all-for-all exchange of POW provided a specified number of selected civilians are included by Communists. Actual exchange of POW by UNC for POW and listed civilians by Communists, would be on a one-for-one basis, until prisoners and listed civilians held by enemy are exhausted. Release of remaining POW would be in accordance with principle of voluntary repatriation along gen lines outlined in Para 6 *f* (2) HNC 588.

11. On question of exchange of civilians you should be guided by folg:

A. Strong effort should be made to obtain release of UN civilians and ROK Governmental personnel (list of UN civilians furnished you in JCS 89189.[3] State is consulting with Amb Muccio to develop a comparable ROK list.)

B. Similar effort, though of lesser priority, should be made to obtain release of all remaining internees and refugees held by Communists.

C. You should consult with Amb Muccio on all phases of exchange of Korean civilians.

12. If not successful in obtaining Communist agreement to position in Para 10 above, you shld request authority from Wash before taking final position to secure release of POWs only.

13. Any position requiring forced return of personnel held by UNC must have prior approval by Wash.

Part V.

14. In discussion of Item 5 Armistice Agenda, you should adopt the folg statement as initial position:

"The Mil Cdrs have not considered questions concerning a political settlement in Korea, including unification of Korea under an independent, democratic govt and other questions arising from but not resolved by Armistice Agreement. The Mil Cdrs recommend to Govts and authorities concerned that early steps be taken to deal with these matters at a political level."

15. Inclusion of phrase "the unification of Korea under an independent, democratic govt" is desirable at least initially for reasons

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 1296.

of UN and Korean public opinion. If Communists oppose inclusion phrase they suffer propaganda reverse and you are authorized, at your discretion, to omit it from final recommendation.

16. While initially no mention should be made of withdrawal of troops, it is recognized that some reference to this matter may have to be made in final recommendation. If Communists insist inclusion subj, you are authorized to add words "such as withdrawal of non-Korean forces" to end of first sentence.

Part VI.

17. Any prior instructions in conflict with instructions in this msg are hereby rescinded.[4]

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[4] General Ridgway sent the following brief response in telegram C-59747, December 20, from Tokyo:

"Most grateful for prompt and positive guidance in your 90083. Recognize intensive efforts contributed by great numbers of individuals in State and Defense, most of them already heavily burdened. We wish you all happiness at Christmas time. Faithfully." (Black Book, Tab 118)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 116 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 19 December 1951—9:45 p. m.

C-59715. HNC 597. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 597.

"Item 3 sub-delegates met at 1100 this date. UNC delivered statement condemning Communists for offering no new proposal, for making no effort to solve disagreements, pointing out great military advantages which accrue to Communists during armistice, as result of cessation of opns of UNC air and naval forces. Hsieh responded with statement claiming concessions by his side, denying UNC concessions. Hsieh said UNC had no love for peace, rather, wailed because armistice is in sight. Unless UNC changed its attitude, progress in negotiation was impossible. After recess, UNC asked what set of principles which includes the basic thought of UNC principle five would be acceptable to Communists. Hsieh evaded. UNC asked if approval by the MAC of any rotation did not constitute a veto power over rotation. Hsieh said approval by MAC was necessary in order to insure no increase of force resulted. Hsieh said MAC would approve any reasonable rotation. Regarding airfields, Hsieh said UNC position was unacceptable. UNC asked if Hsieh meant that so long as UNC insisted on principle 5, there could be no armistice. Hsieh said 2 main points were in issue:

"(1) Rotation, replenishment and
"(2) Interference (airfields).

"Hsieh said, as a hypothesis, that if UNC gave up insistence in interference (prohibition on airfields) his side would give further consideration to question of rotation. UNC said its position on both points was firm. UNC reminded Hsieh that main cause of lost time in armistice negotiations was failure of his side to recognize a firm UNC position was for

"(1) Prohibition of increases of military capabilities during armistice, and;
"(2) Effective supervision and observation of armistice.

"Hsieh attacked UNC for refusing to withdraw forces from Korea. Hsieh charged UNC had been responsible for all lost time in conference, Hsieh rptd offer to exchange rotation for airfields. Airfields are clearly the key issue of the armistice. Recessed 1700. Continue tomorrow 1100. Sgd Joy."

S/S Files: NSC 118/2

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1951.
NSC 118/2

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

References:
A. NSC Action No. 595[2]
B. NSC 118/1 and Annex to NSC 118/1[3]
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 18[4] and December 19, 1951[5]
D. Memo for all holders of NSC 118/1 from Executive Secretary, dated December 12, 1951[6]
E. NIE-55[7] and SE-20[8]
F. NSC Action No. 562[9]
G. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," dated September 5, 1951
H. Progress Report, dated September 25, 1951 by the Secretaries of State and Defense on NSC 48/5

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[1] A separate note from Mr. Lay indicated to the National Security Council that on December 20 President Truman had approved NSC 118/2 and directed its implementation by all appropriate agencies and departments of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[2] At the 110th meeting of the National Security Council on December 19, the NSC had approved NSC 118/1, as amended and revised, in NSC Action No. 595.

[3] Dated December 7, p. 1259. Annex not printed.

[4] See footnote 1, p. 1357.

[5] *Ante*, p. 1374.

[6] Not printed; it merely transmitted a revised page of the original record copy of NSC 118/1.

[7] Dated December 7, p. 1263.

[8] Not printed.

[9] References F, G, and H are identified in footnotes 1, 2, and 3 to NSC 118, November 9, p. 1106.

At the 110th meeting, with the President presiding, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization adopted NSC 118/1, subject to the revisions recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the reference memorandum of December 19; to revision of subparagraph 1–*a*–(3) and the second sentence of subparagraph 2–*a*–(5); and to reference of the alternative versions of subparagraph 2–*b*–(6) to the Senior NSC Staff for review in the light of an analysis of the traffic in and out of Communist China and of the probable effectiveness of an embargo or blockade (NSC Action No. 595). The report, as amended, is enclosed. Also enclosed is the NSC Staff study contained in the Annex to NSC 118/1, revised in the light of the Council's action.

In connection with its action on this report the Council noted:

a. The following statements by the Secretary of State:

> Sub-paragraph 2–*a*–(5) should be understood to be a statement of policy and not to determine the language of the warning.
>
> With respect to sub-paragraphs 2–*b*–(2) and –(3), it would be understood that the Commander-in-Chief of UN forces, before engaging upon any major ground operations or advances in North Korea, would first consult with Washington.
>
> In connection with sub-paragraph 2–*b*–(4), if time permits the State Department would have opportunity of informing our key allies of our intention and of the reasons therefor in such a way, however, as to safeguard completely the security of the information and the surprise of the operation.

b. The statement by the Secretary of Defense that the Joint Secretaries wished to emphasize the importance of obtaining additional air support in Korea from other UN nations, particularly Canada, in view of the Communist air build-up.

c. The statement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that if we do have to broaden the scope of the war, this may require more forces than are currently contemplated.

The report, as amended, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 118/1, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

The enclosed statement of policy is not to be construed as changing in any manner the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of action in NSC 48/5, including those pertaining to Communist China and Formosa which are set forth in paragraph 8 and subparagraph 11(*c*) of the latter.[10]

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.

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[10] For the sections of NSC 48/5, dated May 17, dealing with Korea, see p. 439.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

OBJECTIVES

1. The United States should continue to seek in Korea the following objectives, as set forth in paragraphs 6 *e* and *f* of NSC 48/5 subject to amendment of paragraphs 6 *e* and *f* as indicated below:

a. As an ultimate objective, continue to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. As a current objective, seek, through appropriate UN machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to United States security interests which would, as a minimum and without jeopardizing the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN:

(1) Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements.
(2) Establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and, in general, not south of the 38th parallel.
(3) Provide for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea as circumstances permit.
(4) Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone.

b. Seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, or with Communist China.

c. Continue the military action until an armistice is agreed upon and continue economic and political sanctions against the aggressor until at least the minimum settlement is achieved.

d. In any event, continue to seek to develop strong barriers against communist subversion and military aggression in Korea, and to develop political and social conditions in Korea which would facilitate a united, independent and democratic Korea.

2. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should pursue the following courses of action, in lieu of those set forth in paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5:

a. In the event that an armistice is achieved:

(1) Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Commission to undertake negotiations looking toward an

eventual political settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.

(2) Maintain all existing political and economic sanctions against Communist China and exert vigorous efforts to persuade our allies to do likewise, at least until a minimum settlement of the Korean conflict is achieved.

(3) Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea.

(4) Intensify, to the maximum practicable extent the organization, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK.

(5) Seek agreement among the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. If agreement cannot be reached, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope. Efforts should be made to the end that other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.

(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms.

b. In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail:

(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist.

(2) Increase the scale of military operations in the Korean area consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of the UN forces whenever, in his judgment, such operations will contribute materially to the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to UN forces under his command.

(3) Remove any restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea, including restrictions against air attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River but excepting attacks against areas within approximately 12 miles of the borders of the USSR.

(4) Remove restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and

on short notice, if the situation so requires) of United States air forces to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President. (See paragraph 2 *d* (1) for action in case of enemy mass air attack).

(5) Seek both within and without UN the imposition on Communist China of additional political and economic pressures such as agreement by the maximum number of countries to the diplomatic isolation of Communist China.

*[(6) Seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to these nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China's aggressive military potential through these means may require employment of UN naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline.]

*[(6) Press the major maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose, immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports.]

(7) Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

(8) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:

(*a*) Aid to the maximum practicable extent anti-communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(*b*) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

c. In the event a decision is reached that the Communists are deliberately delaying armistice negotiations indefinitely and are increasing their offensive capabilities, increase pressures on the aggressor by stages and execute those courses of action specified in paragraph 2 *b*

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*These alternative paragraphs were referred back to the Senior NSC Staff for review in the light of an analysis of the traffic in and out of Communist China and of the probable effectiveness of an embargo or blockade (NSC Action No. 595-*a*(4)). [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

above, including political and economic pressures, through UN and diplomatic channels, to the extent feasible.

d. Whether or not an armistice in Korea is achieved:

(1) Continue in effect standing instructions to the Commander in Chief of UN forces in case the communists launch massive air attacks against UN forces in the Korean area.

(2) Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually responsibility for the defense of Korea.

(3) Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces.

(4) Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist to the maximum practicable extent the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

(5) If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

(6) Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from Communist control.

[Annex]

TOP SECRET DECEMBER 20, 1951.

NSC STAFF STUDY†

ON

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. The essential question to be determined is whether, in case the armistice negotiations fail to continue the policy of NSC 48/5, namely, to seek as an ultimate objective a unified and independent Korea by political means and as a limited objective a minimum settlement of the military conflict, or whether to seek a definitive military and political settlement to the Korean problem.

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†NIE-55, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through Mid-1952," (circulated separately by CIA on December 7, 1951); SE-20, "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea," (advance copy circulated separately by CIA on December 17, 1951). [Footnote in the source text. For NIE-55, see p. 1263; SE-20 is not printed.]

ANALYSIS

Nature of the Problem

2. The current efforts to achieve an armistice and a settlement, as defined below, could fail because of (a) Communist refusal to agree to minimum U.S. terms for a settlement; (b) Communist protraction or termination of negotiations; (c) the unwillingness of the American people to accept a stalemate; and (d) the potentially serious consequences of expanding hostilities resulting, for example, from the growing Communist air build-up in North Korea and Manchuria.

3. On the one hand there may develop certain pressures for the adoption of United States courses of action in conflict with the objectives in Korea set forth in NSC 48/5. From the U.S. military point of view, the immobilization of U.S. ground, air and naval forces in inconclusive operations in Korea during long and protracted negotiations over an indefinite period of time with the attendant attrition of manpower and matériel may become unacceptable. The increasing military power of Communist China threatens U.S. basic security interests in the Far East. It must be expected that, in the event armistice negotiations fail, U.S. public opinion may demand the adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a political and military decision of the Korean struggle.

4. On the other hand, the pressures on the United States to reach an early resolution of the Korean conflict through a cease-fire and an armistice are also becoming stronger. The desire to end casualties is strong. The deployment of U.S. military resources to Korea reduces the power that the United States might otherwise be able to exert in Western Europe and the Near East. Our allies, including the Commonwealth, are constantly pressing for an armistice, are reluctant to apply additional measures against Communist China, and cannot or are unwilling to contribute any more forces to Korea.

Considerations Bearing on the Choice of Objectives

5. The developing situation in Korea has reached a point where the United States must decide on the objectives and general direction which it now desires to pursue in Korea. The United States can choose among three broad objectives: (a) abandonment of the U.S. and UN commitment in Korea and complete withdrawal of UN forces; (b) achievement by a military decision of the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of Communist military forces from Korea; and (c) achievement of an acceptable settlement of the Korean conflict by military and other means and pursuance of unification only by political means.

Abandonment of Our Commitment in Korea:

6. Such a choice would irreparably damage the position of the United States in Asia and throughout the world, signify the surrender of the often-proclaimed UN objectives for Korea, and shatter the prestige of the UN. The result would be a major victory for Communism which would adversely affect the world-wide position of the United States. The security interests of the United States would be seriously jeopardized by this decision. It is unacceptable as a voluntary choice. Therefore, our objective can either be the unification of Korea through a military decision or through achievement of an acceptable settlement of the Korean conflict. The following are among the factors to be considered in determining that choice.

Unification of Korea by a Military Decision:

7. Achievement of this objective implies the defeat of enemy forces in Korea, the destruction or withdrawal from Korea of Chinese forces, the reduction of the will to fight of the Chinese Communist regime, and the establishment by force of a united Korea. The courses of action necessary to achieve these results would require the employment of significant additional UN forces and means primarily furnished by the United States. These additional resources would undoubtedly include substantial ground and air reinforcements, imposition of a naval blockade against Communist China and possibly the use of all available types of weapons. To pursue these courses of action to completion, during 1952, would require immediate decision so that necessary steps could be taken for the training, supply, and transportation to Korea of the added forces involved. After deployment of necessary forces and supplies, a decisive blow could probably be delivered within sixty days and thereafter UN forces could be materially reduced. Deferment of a decision to employ these courses of action for even a few months would delay the build-up to a date which would either require a winter campaign or defer decisive operations until the spring of 1953. The adoption of these courses of action would result in expanding the area of air and naval hostilities into Manchuria and parts of China, in which case the Korean action would develop into a *de facto* war against Communist China and might increase the possibility of general war. On the other hand, initial operations and the threat implied by increased UN resources might cause the Communists to seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to the United States.

8. In favor of a decision to pursue this objective are the following considerations. The strengthening of the present Stalinist regime in China, through its alliance with the USSR, is the greatest threat in the Far East to the security interests of the United States in Japan

and Southeast Asia. An increasing consolidation of the power of the present regime in China and extension of Soviet control over China's power potential would greatly facilitate eventual Soviet dominance in most of Asia. Consequently, it is in the U.S. national interest to adopt policies which are designed to reduce the power of the present regime in China, weaken or dissolve the Moscow-Peiping Axis, and cause the eventual destruction or reduction of Soviet power in Asia.

9. Owing to Communist China's growing and potential vulnerabilities, a *de facto* war with Communist China in Korea continues to provide a significant strategic opportunity, perhaps the last opportunity, for the United States to weaken and undermine the Soviet Union's principal ally, possibly without the costs of general war either with the USSR or with Communist China itself. The United States can exert its power in the Far East more effectively upon concentrations of Chinese air and ground forces in the area of north China, Manchuria, and Korea than upon Chinese forces in south and central China or in Burma or Indochina. It is conceivable that sufficient power applied against Communist forces in Korea could defeat their armies and seriously shake the Peiping regime, and might also succeed in weakening Commuinst China sufficiently so that for several years it would not be in a position to challenge or disrupt a definitive settlement of the Korean problem. The reduction of Communist China's growing military potential, if accomplished without major war, would greatly enhance U.S. objectives in Asia, and indirectly contribute to the security of the Atlantic community.

10. A decisive defeat of the Communists in Korea would seriously affect the future development of Communist forces now under the control of the Soviet Union. It is clear that the USSR desires, and is exerting substantial effort to create, a well-trained, well-armed and effective Chinese fighting force to strengthen the military capabilities of the Sino-Soviet partnership. Alarming progress has already been made in the build-up of a Communist air force in China, particularly strong in its jet fighter components.

11. Although hostilities in Korea have probably stimulated military use of manpower and Soviet military aid, losses in men and equipment may have hampered the construction of a modern military machine in China. An armistice would relieve the pressure and thus permit more rapid progress in military development, if the USSR continues to supply military aid. Application by the United States of greatly increased force against the Chinese in Korea would increase the difficulties of carrying out Sino-Soviet plans for the construction and expansion of this military machine.

12. In addition to the military effect on Communist China of a UN effort to unify Korea by force, the political and economic weaknesses

of the Peiping regime would be intensified. The strains already placed on the internal position of the regime by the losses in Korea would be multiplied and might eventuate in a deterioration of central control and serious dissatisfaction with the Kremlin ties.

13. Unification of Korea by a military decision would provide a stronger security outpost to protect Japan and the off-shore island chain, put an end to the aggression and permit the achievement of the long-standing political objectives of the United Nations in Korea. The defeat of the Communists in Korea would achieve the unification of Korea and satisfy the aspirations of the Koreans.

14. It is therefore clear that if the UN, without provoking general war, were able to impose a military decision upon the communists in Korea and thus make possible the unification of Korea as part of the free world, the resulting victory would, in addition to dealing a serious blow to the Chinese Communist regime, immeasurably enhance the prestige and position of the United States and the United Nations throughout the world.

15. However, against the advantages described above must be weighed the following disadvantages involved in a determination to achieve the unification of Korea by military means.

16. Consideration of the employment in Korea of the "significant additional United States forces and means" which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said is necessary to a military decision, must take into account the present security position of the United States, the world-wide military commitments of the United States and the forces and means available to meet these commitments.

17. The United States is faced with the continuing danger of global war, as well as local aggression, in a situation of inadequate military strength. Such forces as may be committed in Korea are not necessarily in the best position to meet these dangers. Attrition and matériel expenditure in Korea detract from our efforts elsewhere, and the requirements of UN forces in Korea have already served to reduce the possible flow of U.S. military assistance to other allied areas.

18. The continuing danger of general war, the difficulties in achieving military production targets, and the limited resources presently available for stepping up the military action in Korea suggest the problems and dangers of attempting to unify Korea by military means. It is estimated that were such a course decided upon, the necessary troop reinforcement might not be accomplished until well into 1952. Such reinforcements would of necessity be supplied largely by the United States, would delay the planned build-up of forces in Europe, deplete the Army general reserve, and result in an unsatisfactory deployment of U.S. military strength. The logistical problems

involved in maintaining and supplying these additional forces in Korea would present the most serious difficulties. Even if such a build-up were started at once and met with favorable results, it is questionable whether a decision could be reached and the ground forces involved be redeployed prior to mid-1953.

19. A determination by the United States to enlarge its objectives regarding Korea that would require a military decision necessarily raises the question of the UN character of the action in Korea. The United States would presumably attempt to persuade the nations participating in the Korean action to accept this new objective. It is unlikely that these nations would agree and the United States would then be forced to take unilateral action, thereby losing the support of its principal allies and transforming the Korean action from a United Nations effort to a United States effort.

20. Finally, while such objectives and a military decision might be achieved in Korea without provoking war with the Soviet Union, it is clear that the risks of general war with the USSR and with Communist China would be increased were we to decide to seek enlarged objectives and to apply the necessary military means to unify all Korea to the Yalu River and the territorial frontier. Such a course of action would appear to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists as a real threat to their security, and while it might lead to a direct confrontation of American and Soviet air and ground forces in Korea, it would more probably impel the Communists to seek an armistice before unification by force had been accomplished. And, assuming that, without Soviet intervention, we were able to secure a military decision in Korea with the additional forces required for such an operation, we might still face the problem of how to put an end to the Chinese Communist aggression on more than a temporary basis and permit the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea. Unless the state of siege against Communist China were really effective, we would be heavily committed indefinitely to hold a defense line along the Yalu River between Korea and Communist China. There is little reason to suppose the Communists would formally agree to any settlement on that line or eventually would not seek to disrupt or challenge it. In that unstable situation, not only would we be unable to reduce our forces in Korea; we would be permanently committed on the mainland of Asia for as long as the Communists wished to keep us there. Minor Communist military efforts could impose a heavy drain on our forces, since ROK troops would not be capable of defending the frontier alone. Strategically, our forces would remain seriously vulnerable in case of a Russian attack or all-out war. In summary, even a decisive military victory in Korea and its unification by force might

be a hollow victory in the short term, and a major strategic error in the long term. The risks of such an effort are clearly great, and might be out of proportion to the possible gains.

Achievement of an Acceptable Settlement and Continuation of Present Objectives:

21. In favor of seeking an acceptable settlement in Korea are the following considerations. Pursuit of such an objective would not require any large additional commitment of forces to Korea and might eventually permit the diversion of matériel to other theatres. UN casualties would stay relatively low and time would be gained to build up the ROK forces. The United Nations Command could remain in a relatively favorable defensive and logistic position, since it has the defensive strength at present to stop an offensive with extremely heavy and possibly crippling losses on Communist forces. On the political side, this objective affords perhaps the only opportunity of ending hostilities and settling the Korean problem by some kind of *modus vivendi* in Korea. Our allies, the United Nations, and world opinion fully support this objective.

22. Moreover, an armistice in Korea would help to reduce the heightening tension all over the world, and particularly in the Far East, which in turn might facilitate solutions of other outstanding issues in areas other than the Far East by setting an example of a negotiated settlement of a critical conflict of interests. Equally important, an armistice in Korea would bring temporary peace to an afflicted people, put and end to the battle casualties, and permit the orderly reconstruction of a large part of Korea.

23. This objective would not imply the imposition of maximum terms in Korea, such as the unification of Korea, and therefore would not risk provoking Soviet direct or increased indirect intervention, since the USSR is probably not prepared to accept the risk of general war to achieve its maximum objectives in Korea.

24. At the same time, achievement of this objective would permit the U.S. and its allies to hold strong positions in Korea in order to make good the already great sacrifice of the UN action against aggression in Korea, to guard against its renewal, and to provide protection for the security of Japan.

25. Concerning the disadvantages of this choice the following considerations are pertinent. An acceptable settlement admittedly will not produce the lasting and satisfactory solution of the Korean problem which the United States would desire, nor are the courses of action now underway or proposed likely to achieve the political settlement which is the ultimate objective of the United States. If the pursuit of these courses of action fails after a reasonable period to

produce even a satisfactory minimum settlement, the United States will have to reexamine the choices which will be presented. Expansion of hostilities into China may become unavoidable. In that event, a limited objective would become increasingly difficult to follow. As the delays in reaching any kind of settlement in Korea increase, American public opinion will come less and less to support an indefinite holding campaign in which the enemy retains the tactical initiative, and which could develop into a permanent stalemate for the United States. While a *de facto* cessation of hostilities or a minimum armistice would necessarily delay withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and therefore adversely affect our global military position, such a situation would permit the communists to disengage for operations in the critical area of Southeast Asia or against Formosa. Acceptance of this objective might eliminate a major opportunity to retard the formation of a modern military machine in Communist China.

26. An attempt to achieve this objective would also face serious risks because the growing Communist air build-up in North China and Manchuria may make the military courses of action in Korea difficult to carry out, and prejudice the achievement of an acceptable settlement. The implications of this build-up are considerable. Any necessary counter-action by the United Nations Command might have the effect of broadening the war in Korea to a war against Communist China, which would invalidate the policy of confining hostilities to Korea. The build-up already has reached a stage where serious consequences to UN forces in the Korean area might result from expanded employment of this enemy air potential. Inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the United States to maintain the security of its forces, it must be recognized that it may be necessary for the United States to employ its air forces unilaterally and on short notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area.

27. An enemy decision to employ Communist aircraft against UN forces in Korea at or beyond the battle line might begin by air attacks against UN air bases in Korea. This might take place either through a steadily increasing number of small-scale attacks on U.S. bases or by a sudden massive attack without adequate advance warning. The first might present a challenge to UN air forces, while the second could cause serious damage to UN planes and facilities. In case of massive attacks, the standing instructions to the Commander in Chief of UN forces should be carried out. Thus, the only way to protect UN forces in Korea from the effects of cumulative or massive enemy air strikes may be by ending the restrictions on air operations in Man-

churia and North China in order to retaliate directly against Communist air bases.

28. Therefore, the choice of this objective concerning Korea eventually may raise the issue of whether to leave the initiative to the Communists to bomb and attack our air bases—to try to end our air sanctuary; or whether to take anticipatory and preventive action to end their sanctuary by destroying Communist planes on the ground in Manchuria or North China before they actually attack our air bases. Success or failure in ending the respective air sanctuaries in Korea or in Manchuria may lie with the air force that strikes first. However, there are many strong reasons for the United States not to take that initiative unilaterally. Since the Communists appear to want a cessation of hostilities (NIE-55), it is probably a safe assumption that the enemy will continue to prefer to retain his own air sanctuary. Since anticipatory action might risk attacks on the crucial supply base of Pusan, direct Soviet air intervention, and the possibility of global war, it might lead to an even more untenable situation than would be the case of leaving the initiative to the enemy to break the UN sanctuary. It would certainly raise such difficult questions as obtaining support from our allies and committing additional air resources to Korea to implement such an action.

29. On balance, it is apparent that both the Soviet side and the free world find advantage in not trying at this time to reach their respective maximum objectives in Korea by force. In this situation, U.S. national interests would be better served if we continue to seek the objectives set forth in NSC 48/5 rather than expanded objectives. At the same time, it may become necessary to increase military and other pressures on the enemy to achieve our limited objectives. The risks and drawbacks of attempting to secure the unification of Korea by force and the defeat there of Communist armies, particularly the considerable uncertainties and costs of this objective, outweigh the disadvantages of continuing to seek an armistice, a minimum settlement of the Korean conflict, and the unification of Korea by political means.

Nature of an Acceptable Settlement in Korea

30. A settlement for Korea would include three distinct phases: first, a satisfactory armistice; second, an acceptable minimum settlement of the Korean conflict; and third, a political settlement establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea. Each of these phases is an objective in itself for the United States. Each has certain problems which are analyzed in the following paragraphs.

a. A Satisfactory Armistice: A satisfactory armistice agreement would provide for a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone based on a demarcation line, a system of inspection and observation, and an exchange of prisoners which would return all UN and ROK military prisoners. The degree and nature of inspection and observation would be subject to negotiation.

b. An Acceptable Minimum Settlement: Following an armistice, the principal objectives to be achieved would be the establishment of ROK authority over all of Korea south of the demilitarized zone, the development of sufficient ROK Military power to deter or repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone, and the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean military forces from Korea as circumstances permit. No settlement should be accepted which would hinder the strengthening of ROK military forces, retard the rehabilitation of the ROK, or jeopardize the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, Formosa, or the seating of Communist China in the UN. The problem of withdrawal of forces will undoubtedly be most difficult to solve. Since the United States will not be prepared to sacrifice the security of the ROK forces, it is likely that no agreement will be reached quickly. The Chinese forces will be likely to remain in Korea for a considerable length of time, and it will therefore be necessary for the UN forces to remain for a like period.

c. A Political Settlement: The ultimate objective for Korea, as declared repeatedly by the United States and as embodied in a series of resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, is the unity and independence of the country. The United States could not agree to any political settlement for Korea which did not fulfill this objective. Certainly the Korean people would never accept a political settlement which perpetuated the division of their country. The Communists will sacrifice their direct control over North Korea in favor of a political settlement only in the event they become convinced that their control of the whole country can be easily achieved through subversion. Consequently the likelihood of achieving a political settlement is remote and a divided Korea is to be expected for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the United States should take the initiative in negotiations looking toward a political settlement for Korea. It will be important to make clear to the world that the United States seeks through the United Nations an equitable political settlement for Korea and that responsibility for the frustration of this settlement, when it develops, will lie directly with the communists.

Courses of Action

31. The courses of action which the United States should pursue in order to achieve our objectives in Korea necessarily vary according to the contingencies which may arise, namely, achievement of an armistice, failure of armistice negotiations, and unacceptable protraction of the armistice negotiations.

32. It is recognized that the armistice is the first step in reaching a minimum settlement. The greatest danger in an armistice situation will be renewal of the aggression. Whatever system of inspection may be evolved, this cannot in itself be depended upon as a deterrent to the communists. A more powerful deterrent will be the knowledge

by Moscow and Peiping that the renewal of the aggression will bring prompt and certain retaliation, not only in Korea but upon China itself. Commitment on the part of the United States to take such retaliatory action involves grave risks including that of global war. However, once having accepted an armistice, it is unlikely that the communists would decide to invade the ROK until they had had a considerable period to build up the necessary forces. It appears more likely that the next communist move would come in another part of the world, where success might be more easily achieved. During this period of time the strength of the free world would continue to increase and we should be better prepared for the risk. The publicly expressed determination of the United States and our principal allies to retaliate against China in case of renewed aggression would serve notice on the communist world which they would regard with the greatest seriousness. It thus would become the "greater sanction", the strongest deterrent to aggression which we could devise, and therefore worth the risk.

33. The "greater sanction" would take the form of agreement among our principal allies to a public declaration that renewal of the aggression would be met by military action without geographic limitation. It would be desirable to obtain agreement to such a statement from as many as possible of the sixteen nations participating in the Korean action. If agreement cannot be reached, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope.[11]

34. In the second contingency, that of a failure of armistice negotiations, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, would step up the military action against the communists to the extent permitted by the forces available to him. These forces are presently sufficient only to maintain military pressure against the Communist front and are not adequate to achieve a conclusive military decision.

35. A clear failure of armistice negotiations could come about in several ways:

a. Announcement by the communists that they are terminating negotiations with no intention to resume them.

b. Renewal of large-scale hostilities by the communists, with or without announcement.

c. Decision by the United States and allies to break off negotiations.

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[11] The text of Paragraph 33 in the Annex to NSC 118/1 read as follows:

"33. The 'greater sanction' would take the form of agreement among our principal allies to a public declaration that renewal of the aggression would be met by immediate and full-scale UN military action. It would be desirable to obtain agreement to such a statement from as many as possible of the sixteen nations participating in the Korean action. In any event the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed."

36. A U.S. decision to break off negotiations would of course be taken only after the most careful consideration of the consequences. Such a decision would imply willingness to increase substantially the scale of military action and to extend the conflict. It would presumably be taken only after the exhaustion of UN efforts to obtain agreement to an armistice and would therefore occur after the situation of protracted negotiations had developed, and which is described below.

37. In the case of failure of armistice negotiations, the most vigorous efforts would be exerted to bring about a complete embargo on shipments and shipping to Communist China. It would probably be necessary, in addition, to impose a naval blockade in order to achieve an effective interdiction of Communist Chinese seaborne imports. Whether other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, would agree to a naval blockade, is of course open to question. Unless the blockade were applied to Dairen and Port Arthur, large loopholes would exist. It might also be necessary to stop Soviet ships proceeding to other ports, and their resistance and our possible retaliation pose risks which must be calculated. The effect of a blockade and possible communist reaction to it are estimated in a separate study (SE-20).

38. It would appear desirable to attempt to secure cooperation from our principal allies in imposing maximum controls designed to bring about complete economic isolation of Communist China. Whether this can be accomplished by a naval blockade or by coordinated action short of a blockade depends in large degree upon the willingness of the other nations to participate. The United States will need to use maximum influence to persuade other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to join in such action. It may be that we can succeed in getting agreement to increase controls and finally to impose a blockade. The strongest and most persistent diplomatic action will be required.

39. The third contingency is that of an indefinite protraction of negotiations. In this case our objective would be to bring the enemy to the point of agreement to a satisfactory armistice. Consequently, depending upon continuous estimates of enemy build-up and intentions, such courses of action should be taken as might be determined to be effective in the circumstances. The situation would not indicate the same degree of gravity as a clear failure of negotiations and consequently additional measures could be applied in stages.

40. If negotiations become indefinitely prolonged, the disadvantages of the deployment and maintenance of U.S. forces without a conclusive result in Korea will produce an increase of strains, dissatisfaction on

the part of our allies, and increasingly unfavorable reaction in the United States. Public pressure would certainly increase to the point where demands for a clear-cut victory might seriously divide the American people, hurt U.S. prestige throughout the world, and endanger the basic strategic position of the United States.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 119 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 20 December 1951—5:58 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS-90157. From JCS.

1. We note analysis in HNC 593[1] disclosing incompleteness of POW list furnished by Communists and assume this inaccuracy is being challenged. Intelligence here indicates that there have been UN and ROK POWs held in camps outside North Korea, and that there are UNC POWs alive not named in Communist list. Since the POW camps identified by Communists are only in North Korea, Communist list of POWs should be contested as incomplete and in particular failing to include UN and ROK POWs in camps outside Korea.

2. Our interpretation of data compiled up to this time which was based on info furnished entirely by you makes it appear that:

A. With respect to camps located in list provided by Communists sufficient evidence exists that:

(1) 40 percent to 50 percent of United States prisoners were sent to China and Manchuria in 1951; some other UN and ROK prisoners moved similarly in addition.

(2) Communists list only 11 out of at least 29 permanent camps in North Korea and none out of at least 18 permanent camps in China and Manchuria.

(3) UNC POWs are at least at folg locations in Korea not indicated in Communist list:

Chungganjin: (126 degrees 50 minutes–41 degrees 48 minutes) CB 2427;

Kanggye: (126 degrees 36 minutes–40 degrees 58 minutes) BA 9838;

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[1] The text of this message from Admiral Joy to General Ridgway, December 19, read as follows:

"For your info analysis of POW list of UNC pers in Communist hands discloses that only 44 of the 110 names reported to Geneva in Aug and Sep 1950 are included. Preliminary analysis indicates that same proportion applies to list of UNC pers who have been identified as broadcasting on Communist radio." (Black Book, Tab 111)

Sinuiju: (124 degrees 24 minutes–40 degrees 06 minutes) XE 1838.

(4) UNC prisoners of war were at least at folg locations in Manchuria and China not indicated on Communist list and at sufficiently recent dates that it is doubtful they were moved back to Korea:

Antung (M): (124 degrees 20 minutes–40 degrees 10 minutes) XE 1742;

Mukden (M): (123 degrees 30 minutes–41 degrees 45 minutes);

Peiping-Tientsin (C): (116 degrees 25 minutes–39 degrees 55 minutes).

B. With ref to completeness of list of POWs by name:

(1) Total list of names of United States POWs and ROK POWs is too small in comparison with percentage of missing-in-action of other nationalities. For instance, list contains 25 percent of United States MIA and 11.7 percent of ROK MIA as against 85 percent of British MIA, 64 percent of Turkish MIA, and 69 percent of Philippine MIA.

(2) Communist list names only 40 percent of those 110 United States prisoners reported by NK Govt to ICRC in Aug 50 to be held as prisoners.

(3) It is estimated that Communist list names only about 48 percent of United States mil personnel who are alive and in hands of Communists. This estimate is based on percentage of United States names presented on propaganda broadcasts and in published lists and photographs, which do not appear on Communist list; on letters received by next-of-kin in United States from POWs not on Communist list; and on identification, as prisoners, of United States individuals who are not on Communist list, through interrogation of both enemy POWs and recovered United States personnel.

3. It is desired that you check on intelligence available to you in order to verify statements contained in para 2 above. If your check fails to substantiate any of above statements, it is desired to resolve differences in an early teleconference.

4. It is emphasized that in attacking Communist POW data you should proceed cautiously so as to avoid creating an emotional atmosphere here or a situation from which neither side can withdraw. Furthermore, detailed data on this subj should not be released to press at this time. Also, it is essential that data used by you in disputing Communists' contentions must be that from credible sources.

5. There is a possibility that UNC POWs in China and Manchuria may be classified as "internees" by Chinese Govt. This would be consistent with position of Chinese Govt that it is not participating in the war.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 120 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 20 December 1951—8:51 p. m.

C–59772. HNC–603. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 603.

"1. Meeting on item number three opened 1100 this date. Hsieh claimed concession made by his side in allowing rotation of 5,000 monthly. Hsieh said approval of rotation by MAC would be mere formality. UNC said its position on rotation and replacement was firm: No limit, except that of no increase in force and material levels. UNC said great concession made to communists in cessation of UNC air and naval operations, which would lift a multitude of interferences in internal affairs, and asked only prohibition of airfields. UNC asked if Communists did not acknowledge minimum nature of interference contemplated in UNC principle five. Hsieh accused UNC of boasting of its military strength; said he was trying to settle two major issues, (1) rotation and replenishment (2) airfields. UNC asked if Hsieh was willing to negotiate today on the basis of the facts existing today. Hsieh called UNC foolish, deriding UNC concession in withdrawing air and naval power. In display of anger, Hsieh asked if UNC could now assure that a political conference would immediately follow armistice. UNC said it could not prophesy about political conference, only sought stable armistice. Hsieh said UNC did not desire peace. Hsieh laid heavy emphasis on matter of political conference immediately following armistice, saying UNC opposed this. Hsieh said UNC evaded question of higher level conference. Hsieh contended independent state (N.K.) had inviolate right to rehabilitate facilities. Hsieh said provided UNC gave up stand on airfields, rotation would be easily solved. Hsieh said question of when deadlock was broken depended on UNC, his side had made all possible effort to resolve deadlock. UNC said United Nations desired earliest possible solution of Korean problem. First step is effective, stable armistice. This objective best served by Communist agreement to UNC principle five. UNC invited Hsieh to present a set of principles acceptable to him which include the basic thought of UNC principle five. Hsieh asserted the two opposing forces were in balance. Hsieh said UNC opposed peace. Hsieh said only if UNC gave up unreasonable stand was there any hope for armistice.

"2. After recess, Hsieh said his December 14 proposal was reasonable; that the main issues were (1) rotation and replenishment and (2) airfields. Hsieh asked if UNC had given up unreasonable demand about interfering in internal affair. UNC said it had no intention of giving up prohibition on airfields. Hsieh again offered to exchange rotation for airfield. Hsieh said his side would never enter into an agreement which permitted interference in internal affairs (airfield prohibition.) UNC re-worded Communist principle four to render it acceptable to UNC. Hsieh said this was joke. Hsieh questioned good faith of UNC towards armistice. Hsieh again said he would exchange rotation for airfields. Repeated foregoing once more. Hsieh said next move was up to UNC. UNC asked if Hsieh was willing to let staff officers jointly draft a set of principles to submit to sub-delegates tomorrow. Hsieh said agreed provided staff officers used his 14 December proposal as basis of discussion. UNC said principle five was incorporated. Hsieh evaded, insisted that staff officers proceed with work, UNC agreed. Staff officers went into session at 1600, when sub-delegates recessed.

"3. Sub-delegates to meet at 1300I, 21 December. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 121 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

SECRET　　Tokyo, 21 December 1951—9:37 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-59779. Re HNC-605.[1]

1. You are authorized to deliver the letter to Gen Lee as outlined HNC 605.[2] Concurrently, suggest that you issue to the UN press a statement substantially as follows: "Wide discrepancies were stated to exist in the list of POWs furnished by the Communists last Wed, 18 Dec, in a stiff note delivered by the UNC today to Gen Lee, Communist delegate on the sub-committee for exchange of prisoners of war. The note stated in substance that after a careful analysis of the information and lists furnished the UNC by the Communists discrepancies [appeared?], which cannot be reconciled with data which the UNC has received from other sources. Much of the information on which the UNC bases its charges was released by the Communists themselves. On 18 Aug 50, for example, the Communists submitted list of 50 names as POWs to the ICRC at Geneva. 31 of these names do not appear on the 19 Dec roster furnished by the Communists. On 14 Sep 50, the Communists submitted similar list of 60 names to Geneva; 35 of those names are missing from the 19 Dec list. In the course of the

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The letter under reference was transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram CX-59780; it followed the lines of the press release set forth in telegram C-59779.

Communist so called "humanitarian broadcasts" in official releases of the Communists, and from other sources, over 1,000 names of UN personnel, named as POWs, are missing from the latest roster submitted by the Communists. The note to the Communists stated further: "Of the tens of thousands of soldiers of the ROK who are carried in official records as 'missing in action' you listed only 7142 as captured—a wholly unbelievable ratio under conditions of warfare in Korea." The UNC note ended with a blunt request for a "complete, proper, and satisfactory explanation as to the status of the UN personnel noted and the many thousands of ROK Army personnel UN reported by you as POWs".

2. You will note that the press release does not contain any of the names which will be forwarded to the Communists as inclosures to your basic letter or any reference to the fact that there were inclosures. It is considered inadvisable here to include in any press statement the names of prisoners of war who UNC feels to be in a questionable status.[3]

3. It is desired that you inform me ASAP of your planned procedure after delivery of the communication to Gen Lee.

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[3] General Ridgway suggested release to the press of the names of U.N. personnel not included in the Communists' lists of December 18, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to concur in his recommendation on the grounds that such a step might create an unfavorable emotional atmosphere in the United States and might tend to build up false hopes on the part of relatives and friends of the named individuals. (Telegram CX-59789, December 21, from Tokyo, and Telegram JCS 90304, December 21, to Tokyo; Black Book, Tabs 122 and 127)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 125 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 21 December 1951—11:01 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX-59781. Ref our msg C 58702 dtd 5 Dec 51.[1] The reclassification of 37500 South Koreans to civ internees has resulted in press speculation as to the exact status of these individuals, particularly in re to the present armistice negotiations. The lack of accurate public info has further caused apprehension on the part of certain gps within the ROK as to the status of these individuals and our intentions toward them. Subj to your contrary instructions, I intend to release the fol public statement at 220300Z: "The UNC has confirmed the fact that a careful screening of all POWs, completed early in Nov, has resulted in the reclassification of approx 37,500 individuals, all former civs residing south of the 38th Parallel who had been detained as POWs. The screening process and investigation of all individuals detained in UN POW camps disclosed the presence of many persons whose detention was attributable to various accidental circumstances attendant upon the confusion inseparable from hostilities and the consequent displacement of large masses of the civ population. These civs, originally processed as POWs, are now segregated in other camps separate and distinct from POWs. All are citizens of the ROK and will gradually be released to return to their homes fol a thorough rescreening now being carried out jointly by the ROK and the UNC to make certain that no individuals possibly dangerous to the security of UN Forces are included. The UNC has furnished the ICRC, Geneva, with complete info in re to this gp to include the names and identifying serial numbers of all the individuals concerned".[3]

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[1] Not printed.

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[3] The press release along the above lines was issued in Tokyo on December 22 (Telegram ZX-16940, December 22, from Tokyo; Black Book, Tab 131).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 124 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, 21 December 1951—1:25 p. m.

CX-59790. 1. The following msg to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai will be broadcast and released to the press here at 211400I Dec 51:

"Since the early stages of the Korean conflict, you and your governmental authorities have received several requests from the International Committee of the Red Cross requesting entry permit for their delegates to North Korea for the sole purpose of visiting prisoner of war camps to provide physical and moral assistance to United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners now in your custody. In addition, the UNC Armistice Delegation has made repeated proposals to your delegation for the same permission, pointing out that the United Nations Command has, from the very inception of the present hostilities, extended the privilege to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the prisoner of war camps which it maintains. Thus far, all such requests and proposals have been rejected.

"On behalf of the thousands of soldiers concerned, and speaking for each of the families of those persons you hold captive, I add my personal request that you reconsider this action. In no way can I see any justifiable reason for your refusing to grant permission to the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform the basic, humanitarian work for which they have been accepted without question by nations in previous wars.

"With no other considerations in mind than the welfare of these men and the distress of their families, I earnestly request that you secure immediate authorization for entrance of the duly accredited representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross who are now standing by, ready to provide you with their assistance. M. B. Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command."

2. Desire that you deliver written confirmation to Communist Liaison Officer today at earliest possible hour.

795.00/12-2151

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, Signed in Tokyo on December 21, 1951

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to interpret and make effective the existing agreement (hereinafter referred to as The Agreement) governing relations between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). The agreement is that proposed by the Unified Command (UC) as set forth in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to the Agent General, UNKRA, dated July 11, 1951, and accepted by the Agent General, UNKRA, by letter dated July 18, 1951, attached as Exhibits A and B respectively.[1]

2. Phase 2 of The Agreement shall commence (subject to such approval by any agent or agency of the United Nations not a party to this Memorandum as may be required at that time by any Resolution of the General Assembly) at the termination of the period of 180 days following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, as determined by the UC, unless it is determined by the UC, in consultation with the Agent General, that military operations do not permit the commencement of Phase 2 at that time, or unless an earlier transfer of responsibility is mutually agreed upon.

3. During Phase 1 of The Agreement:—

a. The UNC will have sole responsibility (except insofar as may be otherwise agreed under the terms of sub-paragraph 3*f* hereinafter) for the operation of all projects of relief and economic aid in Korea.

b. UNKRA liaison with the Government of the Republic of Korea will be conducted only at the Agent General, Deputy Agent General or Chief of Mission level.

c. UNKRA will maintain Planning Liaison Teams in Tokyo and

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[1] The letter of July 18 is not here printed; see the letter of July 11 from the Secretary of State to Mr. Kingsley, p. 656.

Korea. The primary duty of these Teams will be to prepare, and keep up-to-date, plans for UNKRA operations to begin at the commencement of Phase 2 of The Agreement. There will be made available to the Planning Liaison Teams full information with respect to plans for, and the operation of, the UNC programs for relief and economic aid in Korea. Also UNKRA will furnish UNC with complete information with respect to UNKRA plans for relief and economic aid in Korea.

d. Joint Committees which shall include representatives of the appropriate military authorities and of UNKRA will be maintained in Tokyo and Korea. Such Committees will discuss all matters of common interest related to Korea. The Joint Committee in Tokyo will be the joint forum of UNC and UNKRA for consideration of operational and procedural problems as they relate to mutual responsibilities for Civil Assistance operations in Korea and will prepare from time to time such common implementing directives as may be agreed upon for implementation in the field. The Joint Committee in Korea will be responsible for the exchange of information between UNKRA and UNC and for the preparation of plans for submission to higher authority.

e. As soon as there is a cessation of hostilities in Korea as determined by the UC, the Joint Committees in Tokyo and Korea will prepare plans for the assumption of responsibility by UNKRA at the commencement of Phrase 2 of The Agreement. These Plans shall include an examination of the kind and approximate amount of goods and services which UNKRA may desire to have made available to Korea for relief and economic assistance, at the commencement of Phase 2 of The Agreement, by any department or agency of the United States acting through the UC.

f. To such extent as may be mutually agreed, UNKRA will undertake, from time to time, relief and rehabilitation projects in Korea, additional to the UNC program. Proposals for such projects will be initiated through the Joint Committee in Tokyo; and arrangements for the operation of agreed projects will be determined by the Joint Committees in Korea or Tokyo as many be appropriate.

g. Except as may be otherwise agreed through the Joint Committee in Tokyo, the technical assistance and advice to be furnished to the Government of the Republic of Korea by UNKRA under the terms of The Agreement will be furnished through the UNC; and technical experts required for this work will accordingly be members of the staff of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK).

h. To such extent as may be mutually agreed, UNKRA will employ and pay civilian technical experts and other civilian staff for service with UNCACK; provided that for civilian staff now serving with UNCACK, this arrangement will come into effect on January 1, 1952, or, in the case of a staff member whose present contract expires on an earlier date, then on that earlier date. To the maximum extent practicable, the gradings of UNKRA personnel so assigned as members of the staff of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) will correspond to the existing gradings for similar employment now authorized for UNC personnel.

i. UNKRA personnel attached to and integrated into the staffs and units of the UNC will be under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command or a subordinate commander. The duties and rank or precedence of all personnel comprising this group will be prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Such personnel may be reassigned or transferred by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command or appropriate subordinate commander in the same manner as any other member of the United Nations Command and to all intents and purposes, including evaluation and reporting of satisfactory performance of assigned duties, such personnel shall be considered members of the United Nations Command and shall be responsible to the Chief of the Staff or commander of the unit to which attached.

j. UNKRA will cooperate in insuring military security by:

(1) Adopting and implementing the best practicable procedures and safeguards in consultation with appropriate military authorities to insure the loyalty of all its personnel.

(2) Observing the procedures and safeguards prescribed by the Unified Command.

k. UNKRA will maintain in Korea personnel, including administrative personnel, necessary for the implementation of this Memorandum and the UNC will continue to provide logistical support for these staffs.

4. Appropriate directives implementing The Agreement as interpreted by this Memorandum will be issued forthwith.

For the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command:

C. C. B. Warden
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Tokyo, Japan—21, December 1951.

For the Agent General, United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency:

Arthur N. Rucker
Deputy Agent General

Tokyo, Japan—21, December 1951.

795.00/12-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 21, 1951—2 p. m.

3721. Deptel 3589 Dec 19 rptd The Hague 813, Ankara 536, Athens 2970, Brussels 901.[1]

We have discussed reftel with Jessup[2] and agree with his suggestion for insertion of words "in Korea" after "action of aggression" in second sentence of final para of a draft proposed statement. This change consistent with remainder proposed statement and serves to limit geographical area of broadly defined commitment indicated in sentence as it now stands.

It wld be helpful to know whether UK Govt has been or is being approached re this matter in order to enable us to answer query which we anticipate Fr Govt will ask.[3]

Sent Dept 3721; rptd info The Hague 94, Ankara 89, Athens 80, Brussels 113.

BRUCE

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 1373.

[2] Philip C. Jessup was a Representative in the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

[3] The Department's reply, contained in telegram 3623, December 21, to Paris, expressed agreement on the change suggested by Jessup and also informed the Embassy of Eden's approval of the draft statement subject to Cabinet decision. Telegram 3623 was repeated to all the posts mentioned in telegram 3721. (795.00/12-2151)

795.00/12-2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Joint Statement on "Greater Sanction"

Participants: Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador
Mr. G. R. Laking, Counselor, Embassy of New Zealand
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, FE
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP

Sir Carl called at my request for a discussion of the *aide-mémoire* presented to the Department by the New Zealand Embassy on December 20 (copy attached).[1]

I went over the text of the *aide-mémoire* with Sir Carl, disposing of the principal points which it raised. With regard to the fear of the New Zealand Government that the joint statement might be provocative, I pointed out that the statement could not prevent the conclusion of an armistice because it would not be issued until after the armistice was signed. Moreover, I emphasized that we regarded the statement as a sober warning to the Chinese Communists so that there might be no misunderstanding of our attitude. We considered the statement a precautionary step which might well keep the Communists from blundering into general war.

With regard to the possible adverse reaction of the Asian countries, I remarked that we hoped and believed that Asiatic public opinion would understand the statement in the way which I had indicated. We would do everything we could to convince all nations that, as loyal United Nations Members, we would not violate an armistice to which we had agreed. If the Communists also accepted the armistice in good faith, our statement would never have to be invoked.

As for the risk of a major military involvement in China, I told Sir Carl that we appreciated that risk and had in mind taking only such measures as would be wise from a military standpoint and in the light of the particular circumstances at the time.

Regarding an endorsement of the statement by the United Nations, I told Sir Carl we were considering the possibility of including references to it in a General Assembly resolution.

I took pains to make clear to Sir Carl the great importance we attach to the issuance of the joint statement. I told him that our recent conversations at the Pentagon had demonstrated that the statement might well make the difference between the conclusion of an armistice and continuation of the fighting. With the statement we could if necessary compromise on such matters as the rehabilitation of airfields and the details of an inspection system; without it, we would have to insist on rigid terms which would probably be unacceptable to the Communists.

Sir Carl limited himself to taking note of our views for transmission to his government and did not himself make positive comments on the substance of the issues.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

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[1] Not printed. The *aide-mémoire* expressed the preliminary reaction of the New Zealand Government as one of grave doubt as to the need, or more particularly as to the desirability or effectiveness, of issuing a Greater Sanctions statement. (795.00/12-2051)

795.00/12-2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1951.

Subject: Korea: South African Comments on Proposed Statement of Sixteen Powers

Participants: Mr. Basil Jarvie, Chargé d'Affaires, South African Embassy
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Johnson—FE
Mr. Popper—UNA
Mr. Shullaw—BNA

The South African Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Basil Jarvie, called on me today to give the views of his Government on the proposed statement by the sixteen powers having forces in Korea. Mr. Jarvie said that South Africa was prepared to give its moral support to the proposed statement. He added that since Korea was so far removed from the area of South African interests his Government had been prepared from the beginning to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. Jarvie said the South African Government, without directly suggesting any changes in the language of the statement, had made several comments about the text. In the second paragraph of the statement the reference to the UN objectives of a unified, free and independent Korea appeared unrealistic and possibly provocative. He referred in this connection to the fact that if an armistice is achieved the line of division will be roughly comparable to the situation obtaining before hostilities. In the circumstances, to suggest the possibility of the expenditure of additional thousands of lives in the achievement of the UN objectives seemed undesirable.

I told Mr. Jarvie that it had certainly not been our intention in the statement to do other than restate the objectives which the UN had sought since 1946 and to affirm our intention to continue to pursue these objectives through peaceful means. Because of the repeated references made to this subject the omission of it in this statement would be sure to cause comment. I said we would have another look at the statement to make sure there was no ambiguity on this point.

Mr. Jarvie made the personal suggestion that the specific reference to a unified, free and independent Korea might be replaced by a more general reference. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the omission would be noted immediately by the South Koreans who would interpret it to mean that we had abandoned our principles and were abandoning them.

Mr. Jarvie then referred to the section of the statement relating to the rehabilitation of Korea and stated his Government had not, up to the present, made any contribution for this purpose. I told him the statement was general and did not constitute a commitment, but, of course, we hoped South Africa would decide to make a contribution.

Mr. Jarvie next mentioned the last paragraph of the statement, and said that his Government had always been of the opinion everything possible should be done to avoid an extension of hostilities, and they continued to be of this mind. In the event the armistice were broken, South Africa, he said, would have to review the question of maintaining a squadron in Korea. In any case, having regard to South Africa's commitments in the Middle East, it could not maintain a squadron indefinitely in Korea.

I told Mr. Jarvie that in our opinion any major breach of the armistice would be on such a scale as to make it impossible to avoid an extension of hostilities to China itself, and I wanted to make our views on this point entirely clear. Mr. Jarvie asked whether association in issuance of the statement would carry any obligation to return the South African squadron to Korea if it had been withdrawn in the period between the armistice and resumption of hostilities. I said that there was no commitment involved either to maintain existing forces in Korea or to add to them in the event of a breach of hostilities, but that the statement, if it meant anything, did carry a certain moral obligation to do what was required to resist a new aggression. Mr. Johnson added that obviously we did not mean to suggest that the countries concerned would act without regard to conditions elsewhere at the time of the attack.

I told Mr. Jarvie that in the event hostilities were resumed I hoped that the South African Government would, instead of considering withdrawing its squadron, decide to furnish several additional squadrons. Mr. Jarvie then said that the message from his Government did not state that it would definitely withdraw the South African squadron but only that in the event of a breach of the armistice it would have to consider the question of maintaining the squadron in Korea. He said that if an armistice is concluded there will have to be discussions, in any case, among the countries having forces in Korea about their maintenance. I told Mr. Jarvie that, while some forces might be withdrawn, we expected it would be necessary to maintain UN forces in Korea for several years.

Mr. Jarvie said that his Government believed it would be some time before elections could be held in Korea and that the reference in the statement to elections had no immediate connotation.[1] I expressed agreement with this view.

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[1] The draft statement made no mention of elections. See telegram 2807, December 5, to London and footnote 1, pp. 1249 and 1373.

Mr. Jarvie said the only other point he wished to make was that South Africa had not recognized South Korea. Association with the proposed statement would not, in the view of his Government, alter this situation. I expressed agreement.

I told Mr. Jarvie that since my last conversation with him we had learned Mr. Eden likes the statement and will seek a Government decision on it. In reply to Mr. Jarvie's question, I said he had suggested no changes in the language. I also told him that after talking with our Chiefs of Staff we were convinced the statement had taken on added importance. Without the deterrent to a resumption of hostilities supplied by the statement, our Chiefs of Staff would have to insist on prohibition of the repair or construction of airfields in North Korea and on adequate inspection. There was considerable doubt that in these circumstances an armistice could be agreed upon since on both of these points the Communists would be unlikely to meet our demands.

795.00/12-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, December 21, 1951—7 p. m.

2850. Embtel 2817, December 20.[1]

Cabinet yesterday approved alternate wording quoted Deptel 2973, Dec 18. Statement, of course, is subj discussion with other interested govts as to wording, timing and method of handling.

In this connection, Pearson, Canadian FonSec, has queried use of word "aggression", suggesting in its place "major breach of armistice" as less irritating and more restrictive in its comitment. Likely he will raise this point with US Govt in near future.

Ltr to above effect addressed to me being sent Eden for signature.[2]

GIFFORD

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[1] The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Eden told me last night that he was agreeable to alternative wording quoted Deptel 2973, December 18 but that official govt reaction wld have to await Cabinet consideration which he promised arrange as soon as possible." (795.00/12-2051)

[2] On December 22, the Department informed the Embassies in Paris, The Hague, Ankara, Athens, and Brussels of the approval of the British Cabinet subject to the mentioned conditions. The Department also indicated that the Greek Government had reported it would be happy to associate itself with the statement at the appropriate time. (Telegram 3641 to Paris, 832 to The Hague, 546 to Ankara, 3019 to Athens, and 917 to Brussels; 795.00/12-2251)

The Turkish Government expressed its agreement with the statement on December 24 (telegram 568, December 24, from Ankara; 795.00/12-2451).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 126 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET Tokyo, 22 December 1951—8:11 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–59840. CINCUNC Adv HNC 609.

"Subject: Staff Officers Meeting on Agenda Item Nbr Three, 21 Dec.

"1. Morning Session:

"*a.* Reviewed principles discussed previous afternoon. Full staff agreement reached on principle nbr 1 worded as follows:

"(1) All armed forces under the control of either side, including all units and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Full staff agreement reached on principle nbr 2 worded as follows:

"All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Except for such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone; nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. Each side shall manage in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice agreement the administrative affairs of that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

"*b.* Full staff agreement reached on principle nbr 3 reworded as follows:

"All armed forces: Ground, naval and air, under the control of either side shall be withdrawn, within five days after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, from the rear and coastal islands and waters of the other side meaning islands which were formerly controlled by the other side and any others specifically and mutually agreed to. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for delaying the withdrawal the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

"*c.* UN proposed acceptance of principle 5 as reworded. Communists objected stating their original wording sufficient. UN proposed insertion of 'ground, sea and airports' in order to clarify enemy term 'ports of entry.' Communists objected stated their wording 'ports of entry' was collective and included all types of ports. Stated specific ports could be decided on during discussions of details. Further questions by UN on 'ports of entry' clarification avoided by enemy who reiterated their term 'ports of entry' was all-inclusive. Communist claimed staff meeting should break deadlock on principle nbr 4 thus no reason to discuss principle nbr 5 which is of minor importance. UN continued discussion of reworded principle nbr 5, proposed substitution of 'non-combatant' instead of 'neutral'. Communists agreed to consider change. UN proposed to continue staff meeting and recess sub-delegation meeting until 22 Dec. Communists agreed.

"2. Afternoon Session:

"*a.* UN explained necessity for prohibition of airfield rehabilitation, Communists stated they did not intend to rehabilitate all airfields, that it was a question of internal affairs and objected to its inclusion in a military armistice. UN asked why rehabilitation necessary. UN stated it involved sovereign rights. Reiterated that it was question of interfering in internal affairs of a sovereign state. Communists offered revised principle nbr 4 as follows:

"In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment, and ammunition during the armistice. Such rotation as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the military armistice commission so that the supervisory and inspection organization of neutral nations may be entrusted to conduct supervision and inspection in the ports of entry in the rear, agreed upon by both sides.

"*b.* Communists stated that unless UN give up insistence on interference in internal affairs Commies would return to original wording. UN explained that this did not solve major problem of insuring an effective armistice. Enemy claimed big concession made, would not discuss airfield rehabilitation further. UN listed our concessions. Communists stated airfield rehabilitation, air reconnaissance and photography, inspection at communications centers, involved internal affairs of a sovereign state; said such demands must be given up. Claimed staff meeting was making no progress. UN stated staff meeting has made considerable progress and recommended continuation at 1000 22 Dec. Suggested sub-delegation recess until 1400 22 Dec; Communists agreed.

"*c.* Communists reiterated they could absolutely not accept interference in their internal affairs, namely rehabilitation of air fields." Signed Joy".

795.00/12-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1951.

Subject: Sixteen-Nation Statement on Korea

Participants: Mr. David W. McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. McNichol called on me this morning and gave to me orally the substance of a message on the above subject which the Embassy had just received from Canberra, as follows:

"On the basis that a statement is to be issued, it could accept a statement of the nature of our draft".

Their concurrence with the statement is based on the following understanding:

(*a*) "Further discussions to be held on the nature of the action to be taken in the event of a fresh aggression in Korea. Pending agreement on such action, the Australian Government in joining in it is not hereby committed to any particular form of military or economic action, that is, bombing in China and the blockade".

(*b*) "Statement does not constitute a commitment on the part of Australia to provide any definite form of assistance."

The message also raised the question of the unlimited nature of the statement in terms of time, as well as whether in the event of renewed aggression by North Korea only, with no overt assistance from China, the Republic of Korea would consider that the statement constituted a commitment on the part of the participating countries to initiate hostilities against China.

In reply, I informed Mr. McNichol that in our view the statement did not constitute a commitment to take action against China without any regard for the circumstances which might exist elsewhere at the time, but that it did constitute a commitment to take whatever action was considered militarily desirable in the circumstances then existing, that is, we were saying to China that if the armistice is broken and that if aggression is again committed in Korea we would mete out retribution to China whenever and however possible; we agreed that discussions on the nature of the action to be taken would, of course, have to take place but that we did not feel it either necessary or desirable to reach agreement on this prior to the issuance of the statement since any commitments in this regard would have to be conditional upon the military situation existing elsewhere at the time. Therefore, it did not seem to me that the conditions under which Australia was concurring with the statement were unreasonable or out of line with our thinking on the subject.

With respect to the question of the time limit, I stated that it seemed to us impossible to incorporate in the statement any limitations expressed either in terms of time or events and therefore this had been left indefinite. Mr. McNichol agreed that it did not seem practicable to introduce any such limitation, although we both recognized that no government could effectively bind itself in a matter of this kind for all future time.

With respect to the question of North Korean aggression without overt assistance from China, I stated, and Mr. McNichol agreed, that this appeared to be very unlikely as the balance of military strength in the foreseeable future would be strongly on the side of the Republic of Korea as against an unassisted North Korea.

Mr. McNichol stated that the Australian Government suggested alternative wording for the second sentence of the last paragraph of the draft statement so that it would read as follows:

> "We affirm our resolution in the interests of world peace to stand united and prompt to meet any further act of aggression in contravention of the principles of the United Nations".

He stated that their formulation of this sentence was based on the premise that the word "resist" in the present draft implied commitment to take military action in opposition to aggression wherever it may occur, and as in certain areas and certain circumstances such military action might not be practicable, it was felt that the words "to meet" would be preferable. I told Mr. McNichol that we appreciated the suggestion and would certainly give it full consideration. However, this sentence in the present draft, which had been suggested by the UK, did not appear to us to constitute a commitment to take military action but simply meant that we would "resist" aggression by whatever means possible, and in any event, the sentence taken in context could well be interpreted as applying only to Korea.

In reply to his inquiries, I told Mr. McNichol that we were greatly disturbed over the recent apparent leaks to the press of our thinking on this subject; that we were taking all possible measures to assure against any further leaks and in the meanwhile categorically denying to the press any knowledge of the subject.

In reply to his inquiry, I told him that we were encouraged by the progress of the negotiations on the statement and hopeful that they could be completed shortly, possibly next week, and that the negotiations at Panmunjon would thereby be materially assisted.

From our conversation it appeared that Mr. McNichol had been discussing the statement with Jarvie of the South African Embassy and that he (Mr. McNichol) assumed that the South African reply to us constituted concurrence with the statement.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 132 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 December 1951—8:17 p. m.

C-59939. Urmsg JCS 90157.[1] Msg in 5 paragraphs.

1. Regarding par 2A (1), insufficient information available here to substantiate such a high percentage of US POWs in China and Manchuria. Nevertheless consider that there are some US POWs in China and Manchuria, however the information available here at this time precludes a reasonable estimate as to actual numbers.

2. Re your paragraph 2A (2) it is noted that 11 POW Camps as submitted by Communists to UN Delegates have been accurately reported by intelligence sources, except for the Chon-Ma Camp for which we have up until now only 1 report. Analysis of our intelligence reports indicates that there are probably other camps. Our reports usually indicate areas which probably include several individual camps. On this basis it is estimated that there are more likely 30–35 camps in NK. This further indicates Communists lists of camps is far from complete. The total number of POWs in the camps which we feel exist and which have not been reported by the Communists is unknown.

3. Re your para 2A (3) and (4) concur except possibly Mukden and Antung; it is believed that sufficient time was available for enemy to have moved POWs into Korea.

4. Re your para 2B (1) and para 3 in connection with the discrepancy between the number of POWs as reported by the Communists and our missing in action figures, serious consideration should be given to the high death rate among the POWs in the camps reported by our sources. These could well have been purposely omitted from the Communist list.

5. Re your para 3 and para 2B, discrepancies you have quoted have been noted and detailed analysis being made to determine the exact differences between the list of POWs submitted by the Communists and the names appearing in other media such as photos, broadcasts and press reports previously published. Anticipate complete reply in 48 hours. In view of the above and other details to be forwarded, it is believed that a telecon will serve no useful purpose at this time.

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[1] Dated December 20, p. 1399.

795B.11/12-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, December 22, 1951—9 p. m.

604. CINCUNC Tokyo Japan (Personal for Gen Ridgway) has for action by other means. Dept for info. Ref C 59861 December 22.[1]

I appreciate your passing on Ailing Sihn's remarks re Rhee's attitude and activities in connection armistice negots.

I hope you have been seeing tels we been sending Washington and rpting CINCUNC, covering Rhee's public statements on armistice negots and Emb's reactions thereto. Since day agrmt was reached agenda item 2, Rhee and his govt resumed campaign of last summer against every conceivable phase of armistice. There has never been doubt that Rhee has sparked this campaign including frequent—almost daily—demonstrations which taking place Pusan and elsewhere in Korea. All polit and articulate elements in ROK go along with Rhee this issue.

Re his motives Rhee cannot count on support of majority in Natl Assembly for many of his programs and the legislature is increasingly independent. He undoubtedly worried over situation particularly because Assembly elects ROK president and presidential election scheduled next May. Thus he thinks his stand on armistice helps him politically. This is important but not only motive his attitude.

Since Rhee secretly instructed his cabinet November 29 push this campaign, I have been watching reaction most carefully. Campaign has not caught public imagination. Most of people war weary and ready for armistice. This does not prevent him from continuing efforts whip up emotions. I feel this largely "for the record" and partly last gasp effort effect progress negots. I do not believe at pay-off he will be able do other than go along, albeit with reluctance.

MUCCIO

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[1] Not printed.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 128 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 December 1951—9:45 p. m.

C-59940. For info. CINCUNC Adv HNC 616.

"Report of meeting of sub-delegation on item 4 this date. Convened 1100. UNC opened requesting information as to when it might expect Communist reply to UNC letter on discrepancies in POW data. Lee replied that paragraphs 1 and 2 were under study and that a reply would be given following study. Paragraph 3, he said, was untenable; one cannot ask from the other side a figure based upon the numbers missing in action. Lee criticized POW data provided by UNC on grounds that it was in English and that it omitted rank, serial numbers and organizations. He stated that whereas the figures from Geneva up to June 1951 amounted to 150,476 pers, the list provided by UNC was short by 44,259 names of which 34,786 are from the regular army. He requested a satisfactory explanation. In closing he said that now that the data was exchanged there would be no pretext not to discuss the principal ques, the release of all POWs as soon as the armistice is signed.

“UNC introduced a concrete proposal for release and exchange immediately of all seriously sick or wounded POW under articles 109 and 110 of Geneva Convention. UNC followed this with a statement referring to Gen Ridgways letter to Kim and Peng on the ICRC[1] and explaining why these visits were considered an essential part of the process of release and exchange of POWs. Lee said he would take UNC proposal on exchange now of sick and wounded under study and that his commanders were considering Gen Ridgway's letter. He reiterated the faults of the UNC POW data, particularly the missing third of the Geneva total. He then insisted that UNC had no further excuse for not discussing the central problem, the release of all POWs.

“UNC replied that it would seek clarification of the Communist proposal dur afternoon session. Recessed 1320 to reconvene at 1500. Sgd Joy.”

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[1] See telegram CX-59790, December 21, from Tokyo, p. 1404.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 134 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 December 1951—9:46 p. m.

C-59941. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 614.

“Sub-delegations on item nbr 3 met at 1400. UNC stated that through staff officers at this morning's meeting it had made a proposal designed to solve main issue (airfields), now it was Communists turn to make a move. Hsieh said crucial question was that of his principle four (airfields), saying UNC proposal in staff meeting was no concession. Hsieh said question of airfields should not even be discussed. He said his stand on this point was an unshakeable one. UNC said realities must be faced, as in the case of the solution of agenda item nbr 2; asked that Hsieh accept UNC proposal made by staff officers for revision of principle four. Hsieh said two forces were in balance; his side would not accept interference in internal affairs. UNC said military realities must govern solution; that the idea of preserving rough balance now existing was precisely why UNC insisted on prohibiting military airfields rehabilitation. Hsieh said UNC must give up interference in internal affairs. UNC said armistice would remove almost all of present interference in internal affairs, leaving only restrictions on airfields. Hsieh said UNC failed to see advantages gained by UNC as result of armistice. UNC said it was Hsieh's turn to make a move. UNC said no progress possible until Hsieh gave up demand to increase his military capabilities during armistice. Hsieh said UNC sought to deceive world. Hsieh asked if UNC meant that unless he accepted UNC revised principle on airfields, nothing further could be done. UNC said it was willing to listen to any new proposal. Hsieh said sole issue was interference in internal affairs and that there would be no progress as long as UNC insisted on this. Hsieh charged UNC was stalling. UNC recommended Hsieh study concession made in our proposal of today. Recessed 1500. Continue tomorrow at 1100. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 129 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 22 December 1951—9:47 p. m.

C–59942. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 615.

"There follows summary of Staff Officers meeting on item nbr 3 today.

"1. Morning session.

"(*a*) Communists stated interference in their internal affairs can not be accepted. Claimed big concession made on principle of rotation even though such rotation would increase UN Military capabilities.

"Communists presented reworded version of their principle number 5.

"(*b*) As follows: "Outside the demilitarized zone at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides and in the places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred, representatives of neutral nations shall be entrusted to execute the supervision and inspection."

"UNC pointed out that since Communists agree that freedom of movement of non-combatant nations inspection teams on the ground is not interference in internal affairs, aerial reconnaissance and photographic flight by these same teams cannot be called interference in internal affairs. Explained that rotation would not increase UN military capabilities, but enemy's rehabilitation of airfield definitely would increase his military capabilities. UNC presented revised principle nbr 4 reworded as follows:

"In order to ensure the stability of military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall under take not to increase the numerical quantities of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Korea after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective. Any rotation of personnel shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides. The rehabilitation of a limited nbr of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways: No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed."

"UNC stated that the above concession was offered even though such rehabilitation increases greatly Communist military capabilities.

"Communists contended rotation would increase UN military capabilities. Claimed aerial observation and air field rehabilitation a question of interference in internal affairs. Declined to discuss UN revision of principle nbr 4 as it included rehabilitation of air fields. Communist rejected UN revision of principle nbr 4; stated no progress possible unless UN gives up interference in internal affairs. Communists stated that since no further progress was possible, Staff Officer meetings should be terminated, sub-delegations reconvened. UNC stated if that was Communist view, UNC agreed to reconvene delegations, adjourned 1130. Sigd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 130 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 December 1951—12:16 a. m.

C-59943. HNC-618.

"Further to HNC 616.[1] Reconvened 1500. Lee opened, asking for a response to his side's proposals to release all POW after armistice signed or an explanation of the disappearance of 44,000 POWs. UNC replied as follows: Current list includes 132,474 broken down by nationality as follows: NK 95,531, Chinese 20,700, ROK 16,243. The last named were domiciled on 25 June 1950 south of 38 parallel.

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[1] See telegram C-59940, December 22, from Tokyo, p. 1418.

They were for the most part apprehended by UNC forces under suspicious or hostile circumstances. Some were guerrillas, some fighting with NK army; some were taken into custody as a security measure, others through the confusion of war. Last spring UNC held much larger group of these nationals of the ROK. Screening was initiated to separate those who had voluntarily identified themselves with the enemy from those who were innocent of connection therewith or who had been impressed. In cases where these persons were found to be improperly detained as POW they were reclassified and dropped from POW lists. A report was forwarded to Geneva. The classification of some 37,000 has been corrected. 16,000 remain who while technically POWs are qualified to retain their status as citizens of the ROK. They are entitled upon release to repatriations within ROK. The UNC has no intention of delivering them to the other side. The only POWs subject to discussion under agenda item 4 are those who are bona fide residents of NK or China prior to 25 June 1950. Lee attempted to refute this statement largely on the grounds that it was not a question of where these persons lived but of what side they were fighting for. He came back to the release all prisoners now theme. UNC started exploration of Communist principle of all-for-all exchange asking Lee to justify his proposal that UNC exchange during the armistice 120,000 men in good condition for 11,000 in unknown condition, thus negotiating the enemy an advantage of 12 divisions. Reference was made to double military advantage obtained by reducing Communists POW list by impressment of former ROK soldiers into NK Army. Lee evaded the question of justifying the all-for-all exchange and repeated former arguments. Col Tsai took up the refrain and made a long statement criticizing UNC's evading discussion of principle and disappearance of 44,259 POWs including 34,786 of the NK Regular Army. To say that South Koreans were conscripted is to lie. There are large numbers of South Koreans in KPA to fight for a just cause. It is not a question of their origin. These reasons are unacceptable.

UNC replied if it is a lie that South Koreans were impressed it is a lie which they told the UNC upon their return. As to correction of classifications, it is a *fait accompli.* It was reported to Geneva. If the Communists are not satisfied with that the UNC invites them to send representatives to the Pusan area where they will be afforded an opportunity to interview all these people. If any of them wish to go to NK UNC will so permit them at the proper time. Recessed 1730 to resume 1100 tomorrow.

Comment: UNC by implications today revealed its first position. This will be confirmed tomorrow through further exploration of all-for-all principle in light of no military advantage. Intend proceed thereafter in accordance our HNC 611,[2] initially pressing for return of impressed ROK soldiers. Sgd Joy".

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[2] See telegram C-59944, *infra*.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 135 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 December 1951—8:56 a. m.

C-59944. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 611.

"Listed below are positions which might be taken during negotiations on agenda item 4. Sub-delegation is prepared to adopt slight variations should circumstances require. Except for the initial position they are not necessarily listed in the order to be followed during discussion.

"In fact, it is the intention of the delegation to avoid introducing any of these positions as formal proposals. We hope to accomplish this by developing the successive positions through discussion, using our initial bargaining position and the Communist 'all for all exchange' as the extreme poles.

"Position one (initial bargaining position)—one for one exchange of prisoners of war until Communist held prisoners of war are all returned. UNC retains remaining Communist POWs, leaving their disposition to later political settlement. A recommendation in this matter could be included in agenda item 5.

"Position two—same as position one except former ROKA impressed soldiers restored to POW status by Communist and exchanged for UNC held POWs on one for one basis.

"Position three (optimum)—same as position two except United Nations and ROK civilians added by Communist and exchanged for United Nations Command held POW on one for one basis.

"Position four—same as position three except that upon completion of the exchange of civilians we return to Communist all their POWs who elect to be repatriated. Election to be supervised by a neutral body. (As in position one, POWs remaining who do not desire repatriation will be subject to later political settlement. A recommendation to this effect could be included in item 5 of agenda.)

"Position five—all United Nations Command held POWs for all Communist held POWs, ROKA personnel, and civilians. This requires JCS approval since it involves forced repatriation.

"Position six—one for one exchange of POW until Communist held

POWs are all returned. Then repatriation of all UNC held POWs desiring such repatriation, with remaining POWs being released and given asylum. This requires JCS approval since no civilians included.

"Position seven—all for all exchange of United Nations Command held POWs for Communist held POWs. This requires JCS approval. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 138 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

TOP SECRET TOKYO, 23 December 1951—10:49 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-59946. Ref your HNC 611.[1] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. We have carefully analyzed your proposed positions which might be taken during negotiations on agenda item 4 and submit the following general comments.

a. Negotiating for the return of ROKA personnel impressed in NKPA Forces. While the ROK Govt has indicated a desire to secure release from Communist Army of all Koreans of ROK origin who were forcibly recruited into NKPA, and while the loss of this group to the North Korean Govt may substantially decrease the troop strength available to them, certain overriding disadvantages make it appear inadvisable to include this group in any position to be used for negotiations. These are:

(1) Extremely unlikely Communists would ever admit they forcibly impressed South Koreans. It is even possible that they could prove many enlisted voluntarily.

(2) Provides effective propaganda springboard for the Communists to claim South Koreans were volunteers and to play up wholesale defection of South Koreans from the ROK Army.

(3) No way of knowing who or how many of this group Communists could produce. A strong possibility exists that they would include any South Koreans, military or civilian, to counterbalance preponderance in numbers of POWs held by UNC.

(4) Provides basis for claim ROK was trying to get back pro-Communist South Koreans for mass execution.

(5) Questionable whether JCS intended that this group should be included in any exchange.

b. Effects of one-for-one exchange as it relates to indefinite retention of POWs in captivity. In previous discussions of one-for-one exchange, you have indicated your reluctance to open with this as an initial position because of the propaganda value to the Communists of stressing the captivity theme. However, one-for-one appears to be a feasible approach provided it is not maintained to the point where the UNC will be accused of holding up negotiations for the purpose of retaining the excess POWs in UNC hands. Its advantages are:

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[1] See telegram C-59944, *supra*.

(1) Retains maximum bargaining power for further negotiations, and as a corollary makes each successive position appear to be a concession.

(2) If the Communists renounce one-for-one and play on the captivity theme, it provides us with an immediate opportunity to introduce question of civilian internees who are also in captivity. While there may be advantages in including in item 5 the question of eventual disposition of retained POWs after a one-for-one exchange has been completed, and while such action might expedite bringing item 4 to a conclusion, it appears that such an important item would again open the whole question in item 5 and might block the final conclusion of a successful armistice. Further, there is strong evidence to indicate that the return of volunteers to Communists' control is properly a military rather than a political matter. The disposition of non-volunteers remaining after an exchange has been completed is a political matter.

c. Principle of parole. It is noted in your positions 4 thru 7 no reference is made to the parole principle applicable to POWs included in any exchange. While admittedly its enforcement would be difficult or impossible, it does appear to have propaganda and negotiating value which make worthwhile its retention in our proposals, particularly since it is immediately related to the principle of level of forces in item 3.

Part 2.

1. Forwarded for your consideration is a proposed series of successive positions which appear to have desirable characteristics which follow generally the announced JCS policies, and in the main follow your basic ideas. It is realized that no particular sequence can be selected arbitrarily now and that continual readjustment may be required to tailor the positions to fit the pattern of negotiations.

a. Position 1: Introduction of exchange on *a one-for-one basis* to include POWs initially and names civilian internees subsequently; this position to be maint only so long as it appears to have negotiating value and does not put the UNC in the unfavorable light of appearing purposely to delay negotiations so as to retain a mass of POWs in its custody for further bargaining. Will not require JCS approval.

b. Position 2: *All-for-all basis for exchange* provided that:

(1) First enemy POWs are exchanged on a one-for-one basis for UNC and ROK POWs.

(2) Additional enemy POWs are exchanged on a one-for-one basis for named civilian internees in Communist custody.

(3) The side which still holds POWs shall thereafter release from

POW status all the remaining POWs held by it and shall repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made.

(4) Voluntary exchange in para 1 *b* (1) above is considered feasible because of large numbers of NKPA POWs in UNC custody who can be expected to volunteer, and provide a safe margin for the exchange of the total number of UNC POWs and civilian internees. Will not require JCS approval.

c. Position 3: *All-for-all exchange to include only POWs (no civilian internees) with no forced return.* Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis until one side has exchanged all of the POWs held by it and shall repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposite force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made. This requires JCS approval.

d. Position 4: *All-for-all exchange to include POWs and civilian internees with forced exchange.* Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis until one side has returned all the prisoners and civilian internees it holds. The POWs remaining after this exchange has been completed will be delivered by the detaining power to the opposing force with no choice of return offered POWs prior to their return. This requires JCS approval.

e. Position 5: *All-for-all exchange to include only POWs with forced return.* Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis of POWs only until one side has returned all the POWs it holds. The POWs remaining after the exchange has been completed will be delivered by the detaining power to the opposing force with no choice of return offered POWs prior to return. This requires JCS approval.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 140 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 December 1951—11:35 p. m.

C–59976. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 624.

"Sub-delegates on item 3 met at 1100.

"United Nations led off with proposed revisions of 3 remaining disputed principles as follows:

"(4) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holdings by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to increase the numerical quantities of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Korea after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Any rotation of personnel shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

"(5) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for supervising the execution of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following three provisions:

"*a.* Within the demilitarized zone, the military armistice commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"*b.* Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry (including airports) in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be responsible. A request from the senior member of either side represented on the military armistice commission for an investigation will be referred to the supervisory organ which must see that the inspection is conducted.

"*c.* Any member of the supervisory organ is authorized to communicate directly with any member of the military armistice commission.

"(6) Each side agrees to invite non-combatant nations in the Korean war, to send representatives to form a supervisory organ. The supervisory organ shall, when requested by the senior member of either side represented on the military armistice commission, dispatch inspection teams of non-combatant nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone. The supervisory organ shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission. Both sides shall accord the inspection teams of non-combatant nations full convenience of the main lines of communication and transportation in performing the above stated functions. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams."

"Hsieh asked what were the UNC concessions in revised principles. UNC said its proposal was clear. Hsieh repeated threadbare complaints about interference in internal affairs, saying he would absolutely not accept limitation on airfields. Hsieh also attacked aerial observation. Hsieh said if UNC did not drop the above two points, discussions could make no progress. UNC invited Hsieh to make an alternate proposal designed to break deadlock. Hsieh again repeated objections to interferences in internal affairs. Hsieh said if UNC would cancel last passages in principles 4 and 6, all other questions could be settled. UNC again asked for counter-proposal. Hsieh attacked restrictions on airfields, and said again so long as UNC insisted on such restrictions no progress could be made. UNC said progress depended on Hsieh facing facts as they exist today. After recess, Hsieh said question was whether UNC would give up concluding passages in principles 4 and 6. Hsieh said he saw no reason for inclusion of sub-paragraph *c* in UNC revised principle 5, or for last sentence of sub-paragraph *b* in same principle. UNC said these designed to avoid deadlocks in military armistice commission. Hsieh asked if UNC would remove the two points at issue (airfields and aerial observation). UNC said it was for stable armistice; that Hsieh delayed progress by opposing a stable armistice. UNC said Hsieh should accept fact that the UNC would keep on insisting on a safeguard against development of an air threat on other side during armistice. Recessed 1600. Continue tomorrow 1100, with intention to hold firm for UNC proposal of today. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 141 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 23 December 1951—11:49 p. m.

C-59977. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC-625.

"Report of Sub-Committee meeting on Item Nbr 4, convened 1100. UNC devoted the entire morning to getting Communists on the record with a definite answer to UNC proposal to exchange now the seriously sick and injured in accordance with Articles 109 and 110 Geneva Convention. This was not accomplished. All that could be established was that they would not agree now to our request. In long and evasive responses to UNC questions on this subj Communists raised following points:

"1. Communist Five Point proposal provides for early exchange of sick and wounded. Aim of the UNC in raising this question now is to delay rather than expedite the exchange of POWs.

"2. UNC seeks to retain POWs after cessation of hostilities.

"3. Where are the 44,259 missing persons? UNC admitted yesterday it has detained 37,000.

"4. UNCs statement that we do not know when the armistice negotations will be concluded is an expression of its policy toward the armistice.

"5. Does UNC agree to release all POWs held by both sides after signing of armistice agreement?

"6. UNC says 16,000 persons in its POW camps which it will not release. This is untenable.

"7. Regarding sick and wounded, UNC said yesterday that some might decline to return. What does that mean? (UNC invited attention to Para 3, Article 109 Geneva Convention).

"8. UNC is afraid to discuss principles because that would disclose its objectives to the world.

"UNC refuted all the above points.

"A list of UNC held POWs was handed the Communists in which Korean names were written in Korean characters and Chinese in Chinese characters. Recessed 1315 to reconvene at 1500."

795.00/12-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Greater Sanctions in Korea

Participants: Ambassador Hume Wrong of Canada
Mr. Peter Campbell, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Henkin, UNP

Ambassador Wrong called today to present his government's reaction to the proposed sixteen-power statement on Korea, and left with me the attached memorandum. He noted that his government agreed to join in the proposed statement and was generally satisfied with the text which had been prepared. The Canadian Government preferred the British version of the final paragraph, but since the United Kingdom was prepared to accept the compromise draft which the Department had offered, the Canadian Government would also acquiesce.

Ambassador Wrong explained his government's suggestion for a change in the last two sentences. They thought that the reference to the renewal of an aggression was perhaps provocative and that it might be deemed to imply that a new finding of aggression might have to be made by the Security Council or the General Assembly. That sentence also left some doubt as to whether the statement was limited to a new attack in Korea, and contained no limitation as to the time for which this statement was to be effective. His government therefore suggested a reference to a "breach of the armistice" which would make it clear that we were speaking of renewal of hostilities in Korea during the life of the armistice.

I indicated to Ambassador Wrong that there was no difference between us and the Canadian Government as to what was intended, and that the drafting problem which concerned his government had troubled us also. We had been reluctant to use the phrase "breach of the armistice" because it might seem too broad, since it would seem to apply also in the case of a lesser violation of the armistice than a renewal of hostilities. Even the phrase "a major breach of the armistice" would not be entirely satisfactory. Perhaps we might substitute the phrase "renewal of the armed attack." In any event I told Ambassador Wrong that we would take the Canadian suggestion into account and try to work out a satisfactory formulation.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

[Attachment]

The Canadian Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

1. If an armistice is concluded in Korea, the Government of Canada is prepared to concur in the publication of a warning declaration by the governments with combat forces in Korea, provided that a change is made in the last two sentences of the draft submitted to the Canadian Embassy by the Department of State on December 18th and that the Department of State is in agreement with the understandings set forth below.

2. On the text of the declaration, the Canadian Government considers that the warning in the last paragraph should be restricted to Korea and should refer to a serious breach of the armistice rather than to an act of aggression. The purpose of the declaration is to seek to ensure the faithful observance of the armistice by the Communists until a political settlement can be achieved. Furthermore, the use of a term "another act of aggression" instead of "breach of the armistice" might be interpreted to mean that the Security Council or General Assembly would have to find that a new act of aggression had taken place before action was possible. The adoption of the following language in these sentences would meet this point:

"We affirm that if there is a breach of the armistice which challenges again the principles of the United Nations we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea".

3. The Canadian Government would prefer that the warning of the consequences in the final sentence of the declaration should be in less specific language such as: "The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that it might then prove impossible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea". It is, however, prepared to accept the stronger language suggested by the Department of State if the other governments concerned consider that this would be acceptable.

4. It is the understanding of the Canadian Government that participation in the declaration does not commit the parties to any particular form of sanctions if a major breach of the armistice takes place.

5. It would be preferable for the declaration to be made by the United Nations rather than by the sixteen governments with forces in Korea, but the serious difficulties in the way of embodying a satisfactory declaration in a resolution of the United Nations are recognized. The Canadian Government, however, is firmly of the opinion that the declaration should, if possible, be endorsed in some way by United Nations' action, or at the very least brought formally to the attention of the United Nations.

6. An early expression of the views of the Department of State on these suggestions would be welcomed.[1]

WASHINGTON, December 24th, 1951.

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[1] On December 26, Mr. Johnson met with George Ignatieff, Counselor of the Canadian Embassy, to discuss again the proposed statement. On the question of a United Nations role in the promulgation of the statement, Mr. Johnson's memorandum of their conversation read as follows:

"With respect to Mr. Ignatieff's question concerning the desirability of having the declaration made by the UN rather than the sixteen governments, I stated that we thought this was entirely impractical. However, we agreed that if possible it would probably be desirable to have the UN take note of the statement, with approval after it had been issued. I said that, as he knew, we contemplated that UN action would be required following the conclusion of an armistice and that that action might well incorporate the statement by reference in some way, and that we would certainly consult with Canada and the other concerned countries with regard to this matter as quickly as appropriate." (795.00/12-2651)

795.00/12-2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 24, 1951—noon.

2857. Embtel 2850, December 21.

Following is text of letter, dated December 21, addressed to me by Eden:

"We have now given consideration to the revised draft of the warning statement on Korea, amended as suggested by the US Govt. The passage quoted in para four of the memorandum enclosed in my letter of the twelfth December (Embtel 2709, December 12) wld, as we understand it, now run as follows:

> 'We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm that if another act of aggression were to challenge again the principles of the UN we shld again be united and prompt to resist. Shld aggression be committed again in Korea, the consequences wld be so grave it wld, in all probability, not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea'.

I feel bound to add that I wld have preferred to retain unaltered the wording suggested in the memorandum enclosed in my letter of the twelfth December, but in view of the effort made by the US Govt to meet our point of view, my colleagues and I felt justified in accepting the amendment which you proposed.

Our agreement with the draft statement as now amended must, of course, remain subject to consultations in a wider circle, including the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Govts, to whom the US Govt have now given copies of the amended statement. I think, for instance, that there is much force in a suggestion which has been made to the effect that the warning shld relate not to 'another act of aggression' but to 'a major breach of the armistice', and I think this point cld appropriately be reconsidered in the course of consultation among the powers mentioned above.

We also attach great importance to having the UN associated with the proposed statement in an appropriate way, and I suggest that this also shld be for discussion among the above-mentioned govts".

GIFFORD

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 142: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 24 December 1951—12:43 p. m.

C-60004. HNC-630. For your info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 630. "Further to my HNC 625.[1]

"Reconvened 1500. Lee opened in the following vein: Now that the POW lists are published the people of the world are anxious for an armistice to get the POWs back. The proposal includes early release of sick and injured. UNC replied: Do Communists mean all the POWs they have or all they report. Have they reported all POW camps. Are no UN prisoners sequestered outside Korea. Where are the missing soldiers of the ROKA. Lee replied: Perhaps UNC retains POW outside Korea, but KPA never does it. The data submitted covers all POWs 'held by our side at present.' UNC says ROKA has 88,000 MIA, UNC cannot ask for POWs on this basis. Communists have 188,572 MIA, but don't ask for that many POWs. It is Communist policy to educate POWs and release them directly at front. This explains why Communists now hold so few. It does not happen in war that one side takes a prisoner for each taken by the other side. Thus, they should not be released as chattel, one for one, birthplace is not a criterion in determining status of POWs, but rather in what army did they serve. Nationality is not the basis for release. 'In the list no civilian is mentioned, but we are ready to release the civilians.' Accordingly, UNC cannot oppose release of 16,243 persons of SK origin because they are from NKPA. UNC implied that because there is a difference in number of POWs held UNC will release part and retain part. This is intolerable. UNC implied that some POWs do not want to be repatriated because of certain political beliefs. We are not discussing political beliefs, but to what army did the POW belong. UNC presented question of increase of military capabilities. That argument is untenable. Firstly, all POWs should be released regardless of race, nationality or rank. Secondly, NKPA opposes releasing some and retaining others because of difference in figures. Release at front must be considered. Thirdly, NKPA opposes retention of retaining some prisoners on grounds of so-called political beliefs. Fourth NKPA opposes UNC stand of retaining 16,000 of POWs on grounds they are SK. Fifthly, NKPA opposes retention of POWs on grounds of no increase in mil forces. UNC inquired if it understood correctly that all POW camps had been reported and that no POWs had been transported out of Korea. General Lee answered: 'That is all the prison camps we have and accordingly we have none anywhere else.' UNC again inquired: 'You said you have not transported any POWs outside Korea, is that correct.' General Lee: 'None of the prisoners is being held abroad, outside the country.' UNC: 'You made some reference to release of civilians, reporters and those of other occupations. Will you explain further what you mean by that.' General Lee: 'That is no more than telling you about our policy toward releasing the POW. For instance, civilians, we are going to release civilians who are not actually prisoners after the signing of the armistice and it is, of course, a fact that there are among them also newspaper reporters.' (At this point Colonel Tsai spoke to General Lee with urgency.) Lee continued: 'That is, at the armistice negotiations, this a question which is not related to the question of releasing the prisoners of war. It is not a question within the scope of the discussions.' UNC asked how many civilians were involved. General Lee: 'That is a question not within the scope of this meeting. That is something which can be made clear after the armistice. Accordingly we hope with that explanation to go over to discussion of the main issue.' UNC replied: 'We are puzzled as to why you brought the question up when you do not consider it part of the main issue.' UNC went on in following vein. The difficulty in determining the nbr of POWs the Communists hold arises from conflicting reports. Communist GHQ releases say one thing radio something else, and delegates another thing. The Communist GHQ officially announced that from 25 June to 25 Dec 50, Communists capt 38,500 POW, from 26 Dec to 25 Mar, 26,863. In the first half of the war 65,363 POW. On the basis of official figures for first 9 months alone Communists have failed to account for well over 50,000 POW. These are not MIA figures, but official Communists governmental figures. Where are the missing. Communists say they do not have as many POWs as UNC because they release them at the front, thus implying that they may have released in the neighborhood of 100,000. The fact is they have released 177. UNC still wants to know what happened to 10 of thousands of POWs the Communists officially claimed to have taken. Lee replied in following vein: UNC underestimates number of prisoners released at front. UNC seeks an excuse. Majority POWs were released in front. Some died in air raids. Some of illness. Some deserted. There is also a big difference between figure UNC announced and made propaganda of the number it reported. UNC replied: UNC is not looking for an excuse, but for 10 of thousands of POW who must still be in Communist hands since you have given no explanation of their whereabouts. UNC is trying to find the men which will make the Communist proposal of all-for-all exchange honest, no matter how ridiculous it may be from a military standpoint even accepting what it understood from General Lee's remarks, that official government figures used for broadcast purposes are not accurate, UNC still seeks information on the missing men. UNC will pursue this question tomorrow. General Lee denied inferring that the announcements of his government were in any way unreliable and attacked unreliable UNC figures on shortage of 44,259 persons. Recessed at 1740 hours to resume at 1100 tomorrow. *Comment:* Many indications as to positions Communists may be expected to take in subsequent discussion were elicited during this session. These portions are reported fully able. [?] It is requested that the information given in this dispatch not be released until such time as the Communist positions are more fully developed. Signed Joy."

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[1] See telegram C-59977, December 23, from Tokyo, p. 1428.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 149 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 24 December 1951—5:04 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS–90388. Personal for General Ridgway. Reur C–59942 and C–59976 [1] in which UNC proposal for principle nr four contains phrase "so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level."

As indicated in part V JCS 90083 [2] considered here important that any recommendation under item 5 of agenda should be in general terms, that is, a recommendation to "governments and authorities concerned that early steps be taken to deal with these matters at a political level" and that there should be no commitment in Armistice agreement as to who shall participate in subsequent political discussions and in what capacity or to the form or forum of any such discussions. For your background current thinking here on this subject is set forth in detail in State telegram 393 to United States General Assembly Delegation in Paris [3] repeated to USPolAd Tokyo today.

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[1] Dated December 22 and 23, respectively, pp. 1420 and 1426.
[2] Dated December 19, p. 1377.
[3] Dated December 8, p. 1282.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 144 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 24 December 1951—10:54 p. m.

C–60057. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 634.

"This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. The following is an initial translation of a reply to your msg of 21 Dec to Kim and Peng delivered to the Agenda Item Nbr 4 subdelegation at noon today:

To: Ridgway: Supreme Commander, UNC.

'Your ltr dtd Dec 21 has been received. We believe that the most important task at the present for the welfare of the prisoners of war and their families is to make it possible for all the prisoners of war interned in the prison camps on both sides to return to their homes as promptly as possible and enjoy a reunion with their families from whom they have been long separated and resume their peaceful lives, after the agreement is signed and comes into effect. Several important problems in the present negotiations are approaching resolution. However, the armistice discussions have not reached agreement only because your side maintains in vain its unreasonable demands by striking at side branches (issues) and thus delays the negotiations, so the prisoners of war held by each side cannot be released and the sustained agony and anxiety of the thousands upon thousands of families of prisoners of war continues.

'Based on our spirit and policy of giving good treatment to prisoners of war including all matters such as food, clothing, shelter or recreation, our side is giving the prisoners of war treatment which is in complete accordance with humanitarianism. The sick and wounded of the prisoners of war are all receiving effective medical care with the medical fac medical personnel prepared for them. Our humanitarian care and concern are amply reflected in the detailed and clear list of prisoners of war submitted by our side. Therefore we deem it unnecessary for the ICRC to visit the prisoners of war camps.

'However, in order to facilitate the escorting of the prisoners of war of both sides we propose that immediately after the armistice agreement is signed and put into effect, joint visiting group be formed of representatives of the Red Cross of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Red Cross of the Chinese People's Republic and the International Committee Red Cross, and that, dividing into teams, they go to the prisoner of war camps of both sides and make on the spot visits, and that they assist in the escort work at the place(s) of receipt and delivering of the prisoners of war of both sides. If you agree, we rqst you deliver this proposal to the International Committee Red Cross.

'Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army:
'Peng Teh-Huai, Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers:
24 Dec 51.'

Part 2. Delivered also was a sealed ltr from Maj Gen Dean addressed apparently in Dean's handwriting to Mrs Dean, 2518 Eton St, Berkeley, Calif.

Part 3. It is understood Communists also suggested delivery via sub-delegation of Xmas ltrs similar to Dean's from UNC POW provided UNC would likewise deliver msgs from Communist POW.

Details will follow upon return of sub-delegation and further verification. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 145 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 24 December 1951—11:20 p. m.

241420Z. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 637.

"Sub-delegates on item number 3 met at 1100. Hsieh led off with statement that only one question remained in disagreement: Interference in internal affairs. Hsieh said UNC proposal of 23 December contained no concessions on this point. Hsieh submitted proposal as follows: (4) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the military armistice commission so that the supervisory organ of neutral nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides. (5) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

"*a.* Within the demilitarized zone, the military armistice commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"*b.* Outside the demilitarized zone, at the port of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of neutral nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ of neutral nations by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be responsible for carrying out the inspection immediately.

"(6) Both sides agree to invite neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean war, to send upon their consent an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ entrusted by the military armistice commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in para (4) and para (5) *b* of this agreement. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for carrying out these functions, the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall immediately dispatch inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission. In performing their above stated functions, the inspection teams of neutral nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides.

"UNC pointed out new Communist proposal contained no new points of substance, no concessions whatever. UNC asked if Hsieh's proposal was submitted seriously or as a joke. Hsieh said restrictions on airfields and aerial observation were firmly opposed by his side. Hsieh said his side felt it more thorough to use wording "no introduction" rather than "no increase" in respect to weapons and other matériel. UNC delivered lengthy statement condemning Hsieh's so-called concessions and emphasizing equity of UNC proposals. Hsieh claimed he had made huge concession on rotation in removing specific limit of 5,000 from his proposal. Hsieh said his side favored peace, UNC favored war. Hsieh said public opinion of world would judge who made concessions. UNC said Hsieh's so-called new proposal unacceptable. After recess, Hsieh said he had nothing new to offer, desired UNC comments on his proposal of today. UNC said Hsieh's proposal deserved no more comment than already had been given, and asked if Hsieh considered he had made sincere effort to solve differences. Hsieh defended his proposal as best he could, laying stress on point that words "ports of entry" included all types of ports. Hsieh again attacked airfield restriction and aerial observation. Hsieh said whether UNC wished to have an armistice depended entirely on UNC next step. UNC made statement pointing out that loss of some sovereignty was inevitable in armistice, the only important question being whether restrictions were equally applied on both sides. All nations today forfeit a part of their sovereignty. Hsieh said preceding arguments were absurd, deserved no comment. UNC said Hsieh needed more time to study UNC statements. Hsieh said no need for him to give UNC statements further consideration.

"Recessed 1545. Continue 1100 tomorrow. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 147 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 December 1951—3 : 06 a. m.

C–60059. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 638.

"Report of meeting of sub-delegations on item 4, this date:[1]

"UNC opened as follows: In his final statement yesterday Gen Lee repudiated his earlier implication that the official pronouncements of his government for broadcasting were not reliable. He asserted the official announcements were strictly accurate. Thus he confirms the accuracy of the figures concerning the numbers of prisoners of war. This means the Communists have failed to account for at least 50,000 prisoners-of-war on the basis of official figures for the first nine months of the war.

"Yesterday Communists said that their total of missing in action was 188,000. UNC holds at least 116,000, which is some 62 percent. On the other side of the ledger, the ROKA has total of 88,000 persons officially reported as missing in action. Communists report holding only 7,142 of these men, less than nine percent. The US has 11,500 men missing in action. Communists have only 3,198. That is only 28 percent.

"These percentage relationships are revealing. Nine percent of the Republic of Korea Army missing in action and 28 percent of the US soldiers MIA are in Communists POW lists against some 62 percent of Communist MIA in UNC custody. If it were assumed that Communists captured 62 percent of UNC MIA it would amount to about 62,000. In the face of the 65,363 officially reported by Communist GHQ for the first nine months of hostilities; or the 62,000 which is a reasonable estimate based on expected percentages, Communists now list only 11,559 for the entire period of hostilities. UNC is convinced that there is no such actual discrepancy; that Communists are holding thousands of prisoners of war for whom they have failed to account. UNC requests accounting for a minimum of some 50,000 prisoners of war missing from Communist list.

"Gen Lee made following points in reply:

"*a.* It is unscientific and unreasonable to expect a POW figure corresponding to the MIA figure.

"*b.* This neglects the conditions of war, the large scale movement on the front since a year ago Sept.

"*c.* There is also the traditional policy of releasing POW's on the front.

"*d.* Many POWs escaped.

"*e.* Many POWs were released to go home.

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[1] Reference is to the meeting held on December 24.

"*f*. This policy of releasing POWs, not detaining them, was right not wrong. These people have gone back home and are enjoying a comfortable life.

"*g*. Don't ask us for the POWs but congratulate them on their life at home.

"*h*. Where are the 44,259 persons?

"*i*. During hostilities and with propaganda about the atom bomb and kidnapped hundreds of thousands of civilians [*sic*]. They live a miserable, humiliating life in the ROK. After the armistice proper arrangements must be made for them.

"UNC replied as follows: A reason you give for the extremely small list of POW is that many, many prisoners were released at the front. As a matter of fact, exactly 177 prisoners of war were released at the front. As to escape, surely Communists don't contend they mislaid some 50,000 POWs in this manner!

"It is a safe estimate that escaped will not exceed 100 at the most. With respect to the contention that the use of MIA figures as a basis of calculation is unscientific and untenable, admittedly the percentage ratio is not definitive but it is indicative. With respect to the condition of combat mentioned in Gen Lee's statement, there were large scale movements on the front after Sept 50. In general, and overall since then, Communist forces have been retiring and defending. It is characteristic of retrograde movement that the MIA figure is relatively high. It is high because some soldiers, who are KIA, are listed as MIA since no one has knowledge that they were KIA and the rearward movement prevents recovery of the bodies. Thus the MIA figure of the retiring force tends to be inflated, whereas the MIA figure of the pursuing force, which is able to find all its MIA is low. Thus, under the overall combat conditions since Sep 50, Communist MIA figure is inflated while UNC is low. Yet UNC holds a minimum of 62 percent of those Communists carried as MIA, while Communists admit to holding only nine percent of the ROKA MIA and only 28 percent of the US MIA. Using the most favorable figure, UNC maintains that there are upwards of 50,000 POWs admittedly taken by Communists for whom the Communists have given no accounting. Let the eyes of the world observe an accounting for these people.

"Lee replied as follows: UNC is trying to prove that it holds many POWs, whereas Communists hold a small number. The figure published by Communist GHQ is correct. UNC has forgotten the fact that in the figure it published and in the lists it submitted, many other persons are included. It forgets the fact that should the figure of the kidnapped be included, it would be an astonishing figure. UNC says people released at front amount to only 177. This is to underestimate the fact that so many POW were released. If Communists had, like UNC, detained all the persons captured, it might have the 50,000 mentioned. They were allowed to go back home. These measures are perfectly right. This is a scheme to justify UNC's retaining part of the POW. UNC is trying to retain thousands of POWs because peoples of the world know how our people are being massacred on account of their political beliefs.

"UNC replied as follows: We are seeking a simple factual accounting for people we believe you hold and have not reported. Communists say they released them at the front. But they released only 177. They say they let them go back home. But they are UN and ROK nationals and they are not at home. Where are they?

"Recessed at 1315 to resume at 1500. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 148 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 December 1951—3:57 a. m.

C–60060. For info CINCUNC Adv Msg HNC 642.

"Further to HNC 638.[1]

"Special feature of day. At close of morning session, Communists delivered ans to CINCUNC's letter ref ICRC, forwarded by HNC 634.[2] They also presented letter from Gen Dean to his wife and requested delivery (HNC 635).[3] They suggested that item 4 sub-delegation be medium for transmitting mail from POWs at camps of both sides and pointed out as preamble that UN POWs would undoubtedly be writing home on big UN holiday. UNC sub-committees agreed to the mail-forwarding proposal.

"Sub-delegation reconvened 1500 hrs. UNC opened as follows: UNC will suggest where many of the more than 50,000 unaccounted for might be found. Communists captured many thousands of ROKA soldiers. Where are they now? Some who succeeded in getting back to UNC lines have told of having been forced to fight against their own army until they managed to escape. Thousands of others are still serving in Communist army. Communists say they are volunteers. UNC is by no means sure that this is so, in the light of what those returned soldiers have reported. In any case, these captured soldiers are, and always have been, in the status of POWs. They should never have been used for work directly connected with mil operations, and Communists should have shielded them from the effects of mil action. Obviously, these two rights, the right of all POWs not to participate in work contributing directly to the conduct of the war, and the right to be protected against mil operations precluded the use of POW to fight against their own army. The Communists have flagrantly impressed POWs, and have further violated their right as individuals by striking their names from the POW lists. By this action Commies would deny POWs the right to be repatriated dur an armistice. Having used POW illegally dur war, they would continue to use them illegally dur an armistice. Quite apart from the effects of this practice upon the individuals immediately concerned is its effect upon the basis of exchange of the POW. It constitutes a transparent and fraudulent attempt to get something for nothing. Having deliberately presented incomplete lists from which many thousands of names are missing the Communists come to the armistice conference and demand an all-for-all exchange of POW. When they include in the lists all the POW they actually hold, then their proposal of an all-for-all exchange, while unsound from a mil pt of view in a mil armistice would at least be honest.

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[1] See telegram C–60059, *supra*.

[2] See telegram C–60057, December 24, p. 1435.

[3] Not printed.

"UNC therefore suggests that as a part of the accounting the Communists add to the POW lists all former ROKA soldiers now serving in North Korean Army. That might account for a substantial part of the missing 50,000. UNC is still waiting for accounting on these upwards of 50,000 missing POWs.

"Gen Lee replied as follows: History shows no cases where the same nbr of POWs were taken by each side and the same nbr of POWs were released by each side. Such a thing never happened in the past and will never happen in the future. UNC insistence on wanting to know where POWs were released is no more than an insistence to avoid solving the question. UNC says Communists should have about twenty times as many POWs as they actually have. The fact is that a large nbr of POWs who were released may be in UNC Army or may be living at home. Many after they returned home joined the guerrillas and fought for the people in UNC rear. By interviewing the roving generals on Formosa the fact can be understood better. By releasing many POWs Communists could destroy the anti-popular reactionary army. Experience indicates that it is successful. UNC considers the release of the POWs to be the increase of mil forces of the other side, but Communists are not afraid of such thing and recognize a big political effect in it. To release all the POWs directly at the front dur the hostilities is possible only for an army which fights for the people. UNC say that Communists rob the POWs of their rights by making them join the army. That is not what Communists are doing but precisely what the other side is doing. It uses POWs as spies, but many are captured. They can be seen in custody. After the experience of the past and in accordance with their consistent policy, the Communists consider the release of POWs a must and they will do it in the future. This is not a consistent policy but a large nbr of POWs have been released.

"On Nov 24, 1950 in the name of the Supreme Command and as well as the name of the Chief of the Political Bureau of the People's Army, Communists gave orders to continue to release the POWs. On July 30, 1950 in the name of the Supreme Commander, the order was issued to release the POWs. This is said to be helpful in clarifying Communist policy on POWs. Maybe it is hard to understand that the release of POWs is a must at the front. Only an army which was brought up among the people and which fights for the people can carry out the policy. Now what about a clear explanation of the 44,000 persons question.

"UNC replied. We are still trying to find out what happened to the thousands and thousands of POWs that have apparently vanished from the face of the earth. UNC will not stop until it has a satisfactory explanation of upwards of 50,000 POWs. As to the nbr of POWs released at the front who might be in UNC Army or at home, some are in the army; a grand total of 177. None are at home. Communists say it is policy to educate POWs and release them en masse at the front. They must educate them in a hell of hurry if they turn them loose without getting their names. 177 have come back to UNC lines and unannounced thousands have vanished. The bal of the session was spent in clarifying UNC POW data with particular ref to a Communist figure of 44,259, the origin of which has not yet been clarified but which does include the approximately 38,000 former ROK nationals who have been reclassified. Recessed 1723 to resume 1100 tomorrow. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 151 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 December 1951—5:55 p. m.

C-60099. HNC-645. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 645.

"Sub-delegates on item 3 met at 1100. UNC delivered statement explaining how UNC vizualized enemy utilizing an increased air capability based on rehabilitated airfields, and immunity from aerial observation. UNC stated it would not change its views on these points. Hsieh said UNC did not want peace, that UNC slandered his side. Hsieh said his position is no threat to UNC. UNC said if Hsieh had no intent to employ air capabilities why did he object to UNC proposal. Hsieh said his December 24 proposal was sufficient for a stable armistice. Hsieh said he had no authority to accept unreasonable demands of UNC. UNC asked if this meant December 23 proposal of UNC. Hsieh said he did not need to answer. UNC asked if Hsieh had anything new to offer. Hsieh replied no. Hsieh said it was up to UNC to take next step. UNC said it stood firm on its position. UNC asked if Hsieh did not intend to develop an air capability during armistice, why did he oppose UNC principles. Hsieh evaded. UNC proposed recess. Recessed 1210. Continue tomorrow 1100. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 152 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 December 1951—10:20 p. m.

251320Z. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 648.

"Report of meeting sub committee on item 4. Convened 1100.

"Lee opened with a rambling statement which included the following points:

"*a.* The source of the figure, 44,000 which is the number missing for the UNC POW list will be given soon.

"*b.* Release all POW as soon as the armistice is signed.

"*c.* UNC cannot continue to detain 16,000 POW's under pretext their birth place is in South Korea, nor on the basis of their political beliefs. Neither can UNC retain them on basis of humanitarianism nor adherence to Geneva convention.

"*d.* The 30 days expire very soon so a speedy agreement is necessary. UNC should agree to Communist principle.

"UNC replied in the following vein:

"While UNC is anxious to reach an agreement, Communists wasted 8 days denying the UNC information necessary to make a start on the problem, information which should have been provided during hostilities. The information now furnished is far from complete. The problem is still to find what is meant by "all" in the Communist proposal. UNC is not satisfied that all POWs held by Communists are listed. With reference to the 16,000, both Lee and Tsai have advanced the thesis that the place of a person's birth is of no importance in determining his status. With this UNC concurs. Lee said Tsai also said that a person's race or color are of no importance in determining his status. With this UNC concurs. But they say that the question of status is a question of whether the individual belonged to the People's Army or the Army of the Republic of Korea? This, of course, is nonsense with respect to the nationals of the ROK now held by UNC. The only criterion for determining the status of these persons is whether they were or were not residents of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. If they were, they are of no concern whatsoever to the Communists. They are nationals of the ROK. They will not be included in any exchange of POWs.

"Communists may for safety have taken some UNC POW outside of North Korea. Information to this effect comes from several sources.

POWs from the Communist forces have indicated that they have seen or heard of fairly large numbers of UNC POWs in China. Perhaps they are back in Korea; if not they should be reported as being interned in China. Can Communists furnish a supplementary list of POWs who have just returned from China or who have been interned in China?

"In summarizing, UNC has furnished full information of POWs. Through Geneva Communists have been given full POW information, even of the nationals of the ROK who might at any time have been identified with Communist forces. Thus, Communists can assess the whole problem of release and exchange of prisoners of war. UNC is still lacking vital information on upwards of 50,000 men who have been in Communist hands as POWs. UNC asks for a factual accounting for these people.

"General Lee replied as follows:

"About the 16,000 POWs. In this conference no political questions should be discussed. Accordingly, it is not possible to discuss the nationalities or birthplaces. The key to the solution of the issue is "which army one belongs to." Political and administrative questions should not be discussed. To do so will only make the conference more complicated. The question of the 16,000 POWs is very clear. Again today UNC talked about the ratio of the missing prisoners of war. It is not possible to capture equal numbers of prisoners of war on each side. A full explanation has been given as to why the figure of the POW detained by Communists is smaller. It is because they release many POW at the front. This is policy. As to the question of having POWs in China for their security, I will now give you a clear explanation. During the hostilities we never transported any prisoners of war abroad and we have no prisoners of war abroad."

"Recessed 1222 to reconvene at 1330. Sgd Joy".

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 153 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 25 December 1951—10:55 p. m.

C–60109. HNC–649. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 649.

"Further to HNC 648.[1] Reconvened 1330.

"UNC opened in following vein: Communist oppose UNC stand on the 16,000 ROK Nationals saying that we must not discuss political questions. From that they reasoned that the UNC should hand over this grp of ROK Nationals without further argument. A clear distinction must be made between a political question and a legal question. UNC position with respect to these 16,000 Nationalists is based on the Law of Nations and the fact that these people are citizens of ROK. As such they have certain rights. Neither the rights nor the responsibilities can be abrogated by the accident of war. Communists say that nationality and birthplace have no bearing, that the only criterion is 'which Army did a man belong to?' That did not go far enough. One criterion is 'which Army did a man belong to first'. Suppose an NK soldier was captured by UNC and he volunteered to fight on UNC side. Suppose further NK recaptured that man. Would NK under any circumstances hand him over as a POW? Or suppose a known citizen of the DPRK was found in the course of a battle in the ROK. Would Communists under any circumstances turn him over to UNC as a POW? With respect to POW data. It is true the UNC POW list was deficient in certain details which are being corrected. But it did give an account of every POW the UNC ever held. It is also true that Communists list contained the name, serial number, unit designation and rank of prisoners of war; 11,559 of them. There is only one small omission: The names of upwards of 50,000 POW who according to official Communist Government reports have been in Communist hands.

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[1] See telegram 251320Z, *supra*.

These prisoners of war were Communists responsibility under the laws of war. Who are they? Where are they? What has happened to them? If we can find these 50,000 men the Communist proposal regarding the release and exchange of POWs would begin to be honest. Without them it is a dishonest and fraudulent proposal. As to names and serial numbers of these 50,000, obviously they would appear on the list of the MIA after delegation of POW reported. There is an easier approach to finding a reasonable portion of these names. Give the UNC a list of the ROKA soldiers impressed into the DPRK Army. Before denying having impressed ROKA personnel listen to a few facts as reported by former ROKA soldiers who escaped to UNC lines. Incidentally this conflicts with the statement made this morning that no prisoners of war ever went abroad. Perhaps Communists get around that discrepancy by your assertion that these are 'liberated privates.' To UNC they still remain POWs. In September and October of 1950 Communists moved the bulk of the captured ROKA personnel into Manchuria. After indoctrination these POW were assigned to the VI, VII and VIII Corps KPA. Some divisions in the corps contained as high as 30% former ROKA soldiers. These were compelled to fight against their own forces during 1951. From Dec 1950 through Aug 1951 captured ROKA personnel were assigned to the II, III, and IV Corps of the KPA. For the most part, these former ROKA replacements were processed first through POW camps and then assigned to various KPA Corps Replacement Regiments. The number of replacements processed through these regiments depended on the number of ROKA soldiers captured during the various offensives and the need for replacements in depleted KPA combat units. Two of the regiments were the 398 unit of the III Korean People's Army Corps and the 792 unit of the V KPA Corps. The str of these regiments varied between 1,200 and 3,000, depending on the number of ROKA personnel captured. Captured ROKA pers recd from 2 weeks to 3 months tng and indoctrination, prior to asgmt to a front line unit. These personnel were never assigned to any one combat unit in large numbers, to facilitate strict surveillance and prevent desertion. Though this procedure of impressing captured ROKA personnel may be labelled 'voluntary induction' or as 're-education and release,' it is nothing more or less than forced induction-impressment. It is a violation of the rights of the individuals so impressed. UNC therefore asks that they be restored to POW status and that their names be added to the POW lists. This will account for a considerable block of the 50,000 persons for whom we are looking. Gen Lee replied as follows: The nationality of these people is a complicated question. The name of our republic is the DPRK. When it was born, it was as a result of an election which showed the will of the entire people of Korea, including the South Koreans. Therefore, such complications or political questions should not be discussed. About the inaccurate claim of 50,000 persons—most POWs were released. Don't worry about their safety. They must have gone home long ago. No small number of them must be fighting in your rear for liberation of South Korea. UNC summarized its arguments on the missing '50,000' and stated that when it had received an honest forthright explanation it could discuss Communist proposal intelligently. Recessed 1545 hours. Signed Joy."

795.00/12-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1951.

Subject: Sixteen-Nation Statement on Korea—Indian Participation

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. R. H. Belcher, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UN Affairs
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called today at our request to discuss the UK's proposal that India be consulted with respect to the proposed sixteen-nation statement on Korea.[1] Mr. Hickerson informed him that following discussion with the Secretary, it was our view that it would be unwise and undesirable to approach India with regard to this matter and urged that the UK Government not pursue the matter further. Mr. Hickerson stated that our view was based upon the grounds that: (1) India had carefully disassociated itself from the sixteen nations participating in the military action in Korea, India having been invited to the briefing sessions in Washington of this group and subsequently having failed to appear even though on one or two special occasions we had gone out of our way to inform India of the meetings and invited it to be present; (2) if India were consulted it would raise the question of equality of treatment of other nations, such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which also have medical units in Korea; and, (3) the United States continues to attach the highest possible importance to the statement and since we are convinced that India would not subscribe thereto, to consult with it at this time could only result in possibly jeopardizing the issuance of the statement.

Mr. Belcher stated that in the UK view there had been a marked progress in recent months in Indian attitudes towards Communist China and that they therefore did not entirely share our pessimism with regard to the possibility of India's subscribing to such a statement and, in any event, felt that failure to consult India on a matter of such great Asian importance would result in reversing the present favorable trend of Indian attitudes. They therefore felt that even though consultation with India might not result in obtaining Indian adherence to the statement the effects on India of such consultation would nevertheless be favorable, and conversely the failure to do so seriously adverse.

We suggested the possibility of informing India of the statement at the time of its issuance with the careful explanation of its exact meaning as a method of overcoming any such possible adverse effects.

Mr. Tomlinson and Mr. Belcher promised promptly to report our views to their Government.

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[1] Mr. Tomlinson had made this suggestion, at the instance of the Foreign Office, to John K. Emmerson, Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs on December 23 (memorandum of conversation by Emmerson; 795.00/12-2351).

895B.131/12-2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, December 26, 1951—4 p. m.

608. CINCFE Tokyo Japan, CGEUSAK, CGUNCACK have for info by other means. Ref Embtel 475, Nov 23.[1]

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[1] Not printed.

At time reftel, Emb expected CINCUNC–ROK aid agreement wld be concluded promptly, and dollar-*won* exchange rate wld now be under examination as part over-all study Korea's needs in relation to available aid.

Present sitn aid agrmt not yet concluded due ROK insistence their fon exch be exempted from concurrence and use by CINCUNK. Since Nov Embtel, price index all commodities, Pusan area, has risen 10.7 pct to year's high of 3240. Daily wages paid by private contractors to skilled labor up 17.2 pct to *won* 16,000; unskilled daily wages unchanged at *won* 7,000; wages paid by UN Forces unchanged. Retail price 20 liters cleaned rice up 16 pct to *won* 36,000. Spurt in price rice believed due temp delay distr new crop stocks Pusan area. Price elsewhere lower. For instance, Seoul Dec 7, 20 liters was *won* 30,000. Free market rice US dlr still *won* 10,000 to US dol 1. (Source: Bank of Korea).

Financial statistics:

(Source: note issue—Bank of Korea. UN Forces *won* drawings—UN funding officer) (in billions of *won*).

(Four columns item; Oct 31; Nov 30; percentage increase).

Note issue; 495; 520; 5 pct.

UN Forces *won* drawings 350; 390 . . .;[2] 11 pct.

. . . This figure does not reflect recent partial settlement of this acct by payment of $12,155,174 by US Govt to ROK which amts to 63 billion *won*.

ROK presently asking concurrence UNCACK for use $7 million their fon exch to import grains (barley and/or rye) to relieve averred small shortage local crop and as future means controlling grain prices.

During Nov, after distr and distr expenses, there was net loss to ROK of 134 million *won* from proceeds of sales of UNCACK aid supplies. Net loss figure may not reflect actual sitn during Nov since ROK records do not attribute expenses and possibly receipts in all instances to month in which expense took place but to later month when accumulated in or out payments may have been made. This figure also does not reflect proceeds to govt from ECA aid. (Source: ROK Office of Supply).

Emb has consistently advocated sale by aid auths of greater percentage aid goods to contract money supply and have constantly reminded ROK stress should be placed on quickly increasing importation such goods. This Con at ROK,[?] in addition to $7 million planned grain purchase, has plans, after clearance UNCACK extend [*spend?*] during balance this ROK FY ending March 31, 1952, $14 million more their fon exch. Possibly unlikely this magnitude of ROK imports can be arranged in limited time indicated. Altho *won* seems slipping again, feel Koreans making real effort correct trend. Believe UNCACK's accelerating program of imports of aid goods for sale, together with ROK supplementary import program now getting under way, should have substantial impact upon price level.

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[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

Rec rate for Jan remains unchanged *won* 6,000 to US dol 1.[3]

MUCCIO

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[3] The Department responded as follows in telegram 496, December 29, to Pusan:

"Urtel 594, Dec 20 [not printed] and 608, Dec 26.

"Understand recommendation made to EUSAK is that releases be made on current basis to encourage ROK expenditure for anti-inflationary objects without necessarily tying to conclusion aid agreement. Dept agrees but US Govt action will be influenced by CINCUNC position.

"Difficult here to evaluate extent to which food imports shld be increased. Integrated CRIK-ROK import program shld be developed designed to have maximum stabilization effect.

"Emb authorized concur in use ROK for exchange including $12 million released from suspense acct for imports which Emb and UNC consider serve relief and stabilization objectives." (895B.131/12-2651)

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 154 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 26 December 1951—4:14 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-60154. Urmsg JCS 90388.[1] Following msg dispatched to CINCUNC Adv Korea 251129Z:[2] "Ref HNC 615[3] and HNC 624.[4]

"UNC proposed principle 4 includes phrase: 'So as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level.' For your guidance, JCS 90083,[5] Part V, indicated, and JCS consider it important that any recommendation under agenda Item 5 be in general terms; that is, a recommendation to "governments and authorities concerned that early steps be taken to deal with these matters at a political level" and that there be no commitment in The Armistice Agreement as to who shall participate in subsequent political discussions, and in what capacity, or to the form or forum of any such discussions.

"In order to comply with the foregoing guidance you are directed to amend UNC proposed principle 4 to read: 'In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level, both sides, etc.'."

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[1] Dated December 24, p. 1435.

[2] I.e., 8:29 p. m.

[3] See telegram C-59942, December 22, p. 1420.

[4] See telegram C-59976, December 23, p. 1426.

[5] Dated December 19, p. 1377.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 155 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (*Ridgway*) *to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 26 December 1951—6:26 p. m.

C–60180. HNC–612. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 612.

"Reference CINCFE msg C 59788.[1]

"1. Subject is UNC Delegation plan of action in event an extension of time for negotiations beyond 27 December is required.

"2. Because of the proposed agreement on Item 2 (Enclosure 1, transcript of proceedings, 28th session, 27 Nov 1951), we feel it undesirable for the UNC to raise the question of extension of the 30 day period. We intend to continue along present planned lines in conducting negotiations. Should the Communists introduce the question we will, of course, reluctantly agree to an extension of not to exceed 15 days.

"3. The UNC Delegation believes the only alternative to the course of action indicated in Para 2, is to adopt a 'take it or leave it' position, which, of course, it is unable to do at this time.

"Signed Joy."[2]

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[1] Not printed.

[2] In a reply, also dated December 26, General Ridgway expressed his concurrence with the above stated plan of action (telegram C–60023; Black Book, Tab 156).

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 157 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (*Ridgway*) *to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 26 December 1951—6:33 p. m.

C–60183. HNC 655. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 655.

"Sub-delegates on item nbr 3 convened at 1100. UNC asked if Hsieh now had authority to negotiate points in dispute. Hsieh said question was whether UNC continued to insist on interfering in internal affairs, saying his December 24 proposal was sufficient for armistice. UNC stated it had before, and once again, rejected Hsieh's proposal of December 24. Hsieh said UNC did not make efforts to reach an armistice. UNC made statement criticizing Hsieh for refusing to negotiate, invited Hsieh to give more study to UNC proposal of December 23. Hsieh derided concession of UNC in respect to civil airfields. Hsieh returned to question of replenishment, objecting to it. Hsieh said provisions in his December 24 proposal met all security requirements of UNC. Hsieh said UNC sought to prolong war, de-requirements of UNC. Hsieh said UNC sought to prolong war, delayed progress, opposed peace, would not remove stumbling blocks (airfields, aerial observation). UNC said Hsieh's statement included nothing new, nothing which had not previously been refuted. UNC said Hsieh dodged the problem; asked why he wished to increase his offensive air capability; whether he had any serious proposal to make looking to solution of differences. Hsieh said first question was slander, distortion, no reply needed. Hsieh said second question was answered by UNC giving up demands on airfields, aerial observation. UNC said it awaited new proposal from Hsieh. Hsieh said up to UNC to break deadlock. Recessed 1200. Continue tomorrow 1100. The Communists have not brought up the subject of the expiration of the deadline. It is possible they may wish to sit it out. UNC delegation plans proceed accordance HNC 612[1] and will not raise question unless brought up by Communists.

"Signed Joy."

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[1] See telegram C–60180, December 26, *supra*.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 158 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 26 December 1951—6:37 p. m.

C–60182. HNC 656. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 656.

"Report sub-Delegates on Item 4. Met 1100. UNC pressed for an accounting on upwards of 50,000 men who were once in Communist hands as POWs, and who are not on POW list. Asserted that until the missing personnel was accounted for the Communist proposal of all-for-all exchange is fraudulent and dishonest. It is a proposal to release all POWs except 50,000, to exchange 130,000 for 12,000, while sequestering the 50,000.

"General Lee was ill and left the conference on two occasions. Tsai attempted to refute UNC charges using counter charges and arguments which have all been out-lined in previous reports. In view of Lee's illness UNC suggested a recess until afternoon or tomorrow if the other side preferred. Tsai proposed 1100 tomorrow. Near end of session a letter was received at the conference by the Communists and delivered to UNC along with voluminous enclosures. This will be forwarded as soon as it can be translated.[1] Recessed 1310 to reconvene 1100 tomorrow. Signed Joy".

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[1] See telegram C–60193, December 27, from Tokyo, p. 1453.

795.00/12-2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 26, 1951—7 : 18 p. m.

3050. Reurtel 2857 Dec 24. In order meet point penultimate para Eden's letter and other helpful suggestions which have been received from Canad, Austral, NZ and SoAfr Govts, final para draft statement has been revised read as fols:

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the UN, we shld again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice wld be so grave that, in all probability, it wld not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea".

Foregoing draft meets all points of view which have been expressed by other Govts. It is believed revisions accomplish purposes of (1) making statement clearly applicable only to Korea; (2) making clear effective period of statement is duration of armistice; and, (3) by substitution of "renewal of armed attack" for "another act of aggression", eliminating any implication that action contemplated in the statement require prior new finding of aggression by UN.

Request you immed communicate foregoing rev to Eden and seek UK agreement thereto.

FYI rev has also been communicated Govts South Africa, NZ, Austrl and Canada, as well as to Govts Neth, Belg (including Lux), France, Turk and Greece. Govts Turk and Greece had previously agreed preceding draft.

You may inform Eden USGovt continues attach greatest importance early agreement on this statement. You may also inform Eden after agreement on statement achieved US will discuss with concerned Govts methods whereby UN cld be associated with statement after its issuance.

ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 159 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 27 December 1951—8 : 15 a. m.

C-60193. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 657.

"Further to HNC 656 and CINCFE C 60182.[1] The following letter was received at Pan Mun Jom at 1300 today: 26 December 1951, Rear Admiral Libby, Senior Delegate, Agenda Item 4 sub-delegation, UN Delegation.

"1. It was impossible for our side to make a final investigation of the prisoner of war list which your side handed to us December 18, 1951 since the list does not contain information necessary for identification, such as rank and unit of the individual prisoners. Therefore, our side retains the right to raise problems other than those listed below.

"*a.* The number of names actually listed in the roster which your side handed to us December 18, 1951 is 1,456 less than the number which your side said. You stated that the 1,456 prisoners were certainly held in prisoners camps on your side. We urge you to give us a list of these 1,456 prisoners as promptly as possible.

"*b.* Our reinvestigation of the prisoners of war list which your side handed to us through the International Committee of the Red Cross revealed that the list your side gave us December 18, 1951 was short of 44,205 names. A detailed list is an enclosure number 1.[2] Where are these, and what is the fate of each of them? This is one very serious question. We request sufficient and satisfactory explanation.

"2. In your letter dated December 21, 1951 you estimated the size of the South Korean prisoners now held by our side based on the number of missing in action of the South Korean Army which was announced by Syngman Rhee's Government. Such an argument is completely untenable. In no war is there any determined correlation between the numbers of missing in action and prisoners of war. Neither side of the belligerents is justified in requesting the other for a certain number of prisoners based on the number of missing in action. Our side firmly rejects consideration of such an untenable problem raised by your side.

"3. Your side asked us in the letter dated December 21, 1951 and also in the supplementary list of December 22 about the whereabouts of a part of the prisoners who are not of Korean nationality. Our investigations revealed that 726 of the prisoners of war were either killed by air attacks and artillery fire during escort from the front to the camps or escaped or were already released by our side, or died of diseases. A detailed list is an enclosure nbr. 2.[2] Continuous investigation on the remaining 332 is underway. In order to facilitate our investigation, you are urged to give us, as soon as possible, the source of the names of the individual prisoners. /S/ Lee Sang Jo /T/ Lee,

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[1] Dated December 26, p. 1452.

[2] Not printed.

Sang Jo, Senior Delegate, Agenda Item 4 sub-delegation, delegation of the Korean People's Army, and Chinese Peoples Volunteers."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 160 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 27 December 1951—7 : 56 p. m.

C–60265. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 667.

"Sub delegations on item 3 met at 1100. Hsieh led off with statement charging UNC delayed progress. Hsieh reviewed arguments of past 30 days. UNC stated it still awaited a serious proposal. UNC asked why Hsieh was unwilling to agree to limitation of airfields, in view of his assertions that his side did not intend to threaten UNC with increased air capability. Hsieh said he had already answered question. UNC recommended recess until tomorrow. Hsieh said if UNC needed more time, that was up to UNC. UNC pressed inquiry as to why Hsieh refused to agree in writing with what he asserted verbally in conference. Hsieh evaded UNC, suggested recess for lunch. Hsieh accused UNC of delaying.

After recess, UNC again asked why Hsieh was unwilling to put in writing his assertion that his side did not intend to increase its mil air capabilities dur armistice. Hsieh said his principle four answered the ques, pointing out prohibition against introduction of combat aircraft into Korea. UNC said this did not answer ques. UNC asked if Hsieh considered mil airfields were part of mil capabilities. Hsieh evaded. UNC said if Hsieh refused to discuss the prime dispute, recess until tomorrow was in order. Recessed 1355. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 162 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, 27 December 1951—10 : 55 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C–6027.[1] For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 668.

"1. Sub-committee on item nbr 4 convened 1100, December 27. Lee opened with a long statement which included the following points:

"(1) Since 11 December Communists have been proposing release of all POW's.

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[1] The last number in the group was garbled in transmission.

"(2) For 16 days UNC had evaded discussing this principle.

"(3) Consequently, UNC is responsible for lack of agreement on agenda item nbr 4 within 30 days after agreement on item nbr 2.

"(4) UNC refused to discuss 11 December principle, first under pretext of no military advantage, and then that exchange of data and ICRC visits were prerequisites to discussion.

"(5) Although the data was not necessary to the discussion of the principle Communists, to break the deadlock, exchange data on 18 December.

"(6) Communist data was complete and detailed, whereas UNC data consisted only of names spelled in English.

"(7) Communists did not refuse to discuss the principle on grounds of incomplete data.

"(8) However, UNC develops further pretexts to avoid the principle, thus preventing progress on item nbr 4.

"(9) On pretext that UNC MIA exceeds POW held by Communists, UNC refuses to release and repatriate all POW's.

"(10) There is no established relationship between MIA and POW's held by the other side.

"(11) Communists policy of release at front results in a smaller POW list.

"(12) UNC claims released POW have not returned home. This only proves that those who have been forced into the war will not 'go to the drag again' once they have obtained liberty.

"(13) UNC submitted 1000 names for further information. In large part this has been provided. Further investigation is being made.

"(14) UNC should explain discrepancy of 1456 between recap and names submitted on its list.

"(15) ICRC shows 44,205 POW who cannot be found on 18 December data.

"(16) Personnel should be released on basis of Army they belong to, not on the basis of residence.

"(17) It is intolerable that UNC openly says it will retain 37,000 of the 18 December list.

"(18) In order to speed the release of all POW's the original proposal is resubmitted.

"*b.* UNC replied as follows: As to delay on item nbr 4, Communists refused for two weeks to form a sub-committee on this item. Thereafter, they delay 8 days in providing the data necessary to discuss the item. With respect to the reply on the 1000 names, Communists report 726 killed, died, escaped or released. UNC requests:

"(1) The names of the POW's who were allegedly killed; the date on which each POW was killed, where he was killed and where he is buried.

"(2) The date on which POW allegedly escaped; the place of internment from which he escaped.

"(3) The date and place where each POW was released.

"(4) The names of POW who allegedly died of disease; the date, and place, and place of burial.

"As a general comment on Communist principle just reintroduced, it proposes not the release of all POW's, as claimed, but the release of all

POW's less approximately 50,000 who remain unaccounted for. Until the accounting is made the proposal is not a suitable basis for discussion of exchange of POW's. UNC is now forced to digress from agenda item nbr 4 due to a statement in General Lee's official communication of 26 December.[2] UNC has no desire to turn conference into a political forum. After making point, UNC proposes to drop the matter as irrelevant to agenda item nbr 4 discussion, provided Communists will do likewise.

"In Communist letter dated 26 December they made a reference to 'Syngman Rhee's Government.' By this it is assumed they meant the Government of the ROK. UNC then called Communists to account for slurring reference to Government of South Korea.

"UNC then asked if CPV, as distinct from KPA, held or had transported any POW's into China.

"*c.* General Lee responded with a statement which included the following: Concerning the origin of the so-called 'Syngman Rhee' Government, the Korean people themselves know which is the true regime for the people and which is the regime which oppresses the people. As for its recognition, that government was born by the instigation of a certain state through the voting machine of that state. In these negotiations who is the other party and under what flags are the negotiations being carried on? Neither the KPA nor the CPV have any POW abroad.

"*d.* UNC then again called Communists to account for their discourtesy.

"11. Reconvened 1500. Throughout the afternoon session the UNC pressed for an accounting for the '50,000 men' who were at one time prisoners of the Communists, in conjunction with the thesis that, in the absence of such an accounting, the Communist proposal of an all-for-all exchange is not an honest effort to reach a solution to agenda item nbr 4. Sig Joy."

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[2] See telegram C-60193, December 27, from Tokyo, p. 1453.

795.00/12-2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 28, 1951—4:59 p. m.
PRIORITY

3702. Request Emb do all possible expedite reply Deptels 3589 [1] and 3664 [2] re statement on Korea. Favorable replies thus far recd from

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 1373.

[2] Not printed. It conveyed to Paris the text of the revised final paragraph of the U.S. draft statement, as contained in telegram 3050, December 26, to London, p. 1453.

UK, Australia, Canada, Greece and Turkey.[3] Progress armistice negots requires decision re statement soonest and USGovt continues attach highest importance to agreement on its issuance.[4]

ACHESON

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[3] On December 28, George Laking, Counselor of the New Zealand Embassy, left with U. Alexis Johnson an *aide-mémoire* setting forth his Government's acceptance of the text of the revised American statement with the understanding that further consultations would take place on measures to be employed if the armistice were broken. New Zealand felt that under no circumstances would the use of the atomic bomb be warranted and also expressed doubt about the wisdom and value of a blockade of the China coast. (795.00/12–2851)

On December 29, the Department informed the Embassy in Capetown of the acceptance by the South African Government of the text of the revised American statement (telegram 32 to Capetown, December 29; 795.00/12–2951).

[4] On December 28, the Department instructed the Embassy in the Netherlands to expedite a reply concerning acceptance of the revised American statement (795.00/12–2951). On the same day, the Embassy in Bangkok was asked to obtain the views of the Thai Prime Minister on the statement (telegram 1332, December 28, to Bangkok; 795.00/12–2851).

795.00/12–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 28, 1951—8 p. m.

3850. Deptels 3589 Dec 19 and 3664 Dec 26.[1]

Bonsal[2] was called this afternoon to FonOff by La Tournelle[3] and handed fol draft of proposed statement on Kor sitn representing views of French Govt:

> We, the nations participating in the Kor action, support the decision of the Commander in Chief of the UN Command to conclude an armistice agrmt. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agrmt will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.
>
> We declare again our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Kor, our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Kor prob and our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN.
>
> We affirm that any other act of aggression challenging again the principles of the UN wld find us again united and prompt to resist.

La Tournelle stated that this draft had received approval of PriMin,[4] FonMin[5] and Min of Assoc States.[6] He described changes from our draft (we had furnished him with modified final para) as fols:

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[1] See footnotes 1 and 2, *supra*.

[2] Philip W. Bonsal, Counselor of the American Embassy in Paris.

[3] Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, Director-General of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[4] René Pleven.

[5] Robert Schuman.

[6] Jean Letourneau.

1. French Govt believes that statement of this nature which refers to armistice agrmt shld not contain ref to ultimate polit settlement which UN envisages. La Tournelle implied that ultimate goal of "a united, independent and democratic Kor seemed perhaps today less realistic than when it was first enunciated by the UN and he referred in this connection to a recent Lippman art. French advocate omission of our entire second para.

2. French Govt believes that our final para and particularly final sentence thereof re probable impossibility of confining hostilities within frontiers of Kor in event of renewed aggression involves threat which wld run risk of seriously troubling atmosphere of subsequent negotiations. In reply to Bonsal's question, La Tournelle also made it clear that French desired to be able to interpret their proposed wording re "any other act of aggression" to include aggression against Indochina. La Tournelle stated that Pleven had wished to include specific mention of Indochina in statement, but had been dissuaded by FonOff.

Bonsal stated that he wld convey French draft to Dept, but that he believed that Dept wld consider that French proposal failed to meet our objective of permitting flexibility in armistice negotiations re inspection, etc, on basis that clear, precise post-armistice agrmt declaration by UN nations directly concerned in resisting aggression in Kor wld be deterrent to renewed aggression in that it wld leave potential aggressors no possible grounds for misunderstanding of consequences of such renewed aggression.

On specific points, Bonsal advanced fol preliminary comments:

1. Regardless of attainability of UN polit objective of a united, independent and democratic Kor, fact remained that this was related UN objective, that failure to mention it might be interpreted as abandonment, and wld be highly undesirable at start of polit discussions.

2. Failure to mention consequences of renewed aggression in shape of possible extention of hostilities beyond frontiers of Kor wld lead enemy to belief that renewed aggression might enjoy same impunities as that which has already taken place. Whole point of statement from our point of view was to clear this point definitively.

3. Speaking entirely personally and stressing absence of instructions from Dept, Bonsal said that French view that "any other act of aggression" might include aggression against Indochina wld seem to stop French and other UN nations concerned from considering present or even increased degree of Chi assistance to Viet Minh as act of aggression in UN sense and might therefore limit French freedom of action in dealing with this prob, increasing gravity of which has been stressed by Fr spokesmen recently. In reply, La Tournelle gave it, as his personal view, that French did not desire such liberty of action in dealing with present sitn in Indochina and that their interpretation of "any other act of aggression" wld involve so far as

Indochina is concerned qualitative rather than quantitative changes in present sitn. We are about to hear further from French on this subj in response to inquiry made in accordance with Deptel 3613 Dec 20.[7]

We are not repeating this message to other recipients reftels on assumption that Dept is keeping Embs in all capitals concerned informed of developments. We are, however, repeating to London.

Sent Department 3850, repeated info London 1024.

Bruce

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[7] For text, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 563.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 163 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 28 December 1951—9:07 p. m.

C–60350. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 673.

"Sub-delegates on item nbr 4 convened 1100, December 28. UNC continued to press for accounting for the missing POW's. The only development of possible significance was one sentence in a long statement from General Lee: 'About all the personnel of the prisoners of war whom we have captured in the past we are now putting the data in order and checking the data.' In view of this the UNC decided to postpone raising the question of the exchange of civilians under the release and exchange of POW's. Recessed at 1345 to reconvene at 1100 tomorrow. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 165 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY Tokyo, 28 December 1951—9:08 p. m.

C–60351. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 674.

"Sub-delegation on item nbr 3 met at 1100 this date. UNC opened meeting by asking for answers to questions posed yesterday. Hsieh evaded questions, stated interference in internal affairs and aerial reconnaissance by anybody will not be tolerated; further stated replenishment is absolutely impermissable. UNC asked why Communist feared aerial observation by non-combatant nations. Hsieh evaded questions.

"UNC pointed out Communist insincerity by insistence on building up military capabilities during the armistice. Cited UNC efforts to expedite negotiations. Hsieh claimed UNC insistence on simultaneous discussion of item nbr 3 and nbr 4 was only to further delay negotiations. Hsieh claimed they have been fighting in defense of peace and will firmly carry out their struggle until peace is achieved.

"UNC pressed again in afternoon session for answers, Communists again dodged and evaded questions claiming UNC assuming role of victor, trying to force them to discuss questions of internal affairs. Claimed UNC delaying negotiations. UNC stated since Communists practicing tactics of evasion no progress could be made, and since they had nothing new to offer UNC suggested recess until 1100 tomorrow.

"New UNC proposal not presented due to inopportune atmosphere. Intend to continue to press for answers to UNC questions and present new proposal if propitious at next meeting scheduled for 1100 tomorrow. Sgd Joy".

795.00/12-2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 29, 1951—noon.

2902. Following is text of Eden's letter dated December 28, in reply to my letter to him based on Deptel 3050, December 26:

"I have considered your letter of the 27th December, and write to inform you that I agree with the revised wording of the final para of the draft warning statement on Korea.

"You will remember that in the last para of my letter of the 21 December (Embtel 2857, December 24) I said that we attach great importance to having the UN associated with the proposed statement in an appropriate way. I now understand that, once agreement has been reached among the govts concerned on the text of the statement, the procedure for its issue will also be a subject of inter-governmental consideration".

GIFFORD

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 169 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 29 December 1951—4:03 p. m.

CX-60374. Re your JCS-90083.[1]

Part 1. Since receipt of ref msg I have fully explored several possible positions with relation to Item 4 for use in the present armistice negotiations bearing in mind the adoption of a plan that would be in consonance with your announced policies, retain for US maximum bargaining power and secure the whole-hearted support of the free world.

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[1] Dated December 19, p. 1377.

Part 2. During the negotiations these past several weeks and after careful analysis of Communist reactions we have obtained sufficient information to develop what I consider to be a sound, practical position. Accordingly, I have approved for use in negotiations the following proposal for presentation by the armistice delegation to the Communists when it appears desirable:

All-for-all exchange of prisoners of war and civilians with no forced repatriation.

a. Exchange of prisoners of war to be conducted on a 1-for-1 basis until 1 side has exchanged all the prisoners of war held by it who desire repatriation.

b. The side which thereafter holds prisoners of war after completion of para "*a*" above, shall repatriate all remaining POWs who express a desire to be repatriated in a 1-for-1 exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side and for civilians who on 25 Jun 50 were bona fide residents of the territory under that side's control and who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under the control of the other side and who elect to be repatriated. Prisoners of war repatriated after the 1-for-1 exchange in para "*a*" above, has been completed will be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him.

c. All prisoners of war in the custody of either side who did not elect repatriation under paras "*a*" or "*b*" above, will be released from POW status.

d. After action indicated in paras "*a*", "*b*" and "*c*" above is completed, all remaining civilians who, on 25 Jun 50, were bona fide residents of the ROK and DPRK respectively, and who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under the control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so elect.

e. In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made without duress, delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all prisoners of war at the points of exchange and all civilians of either side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory under the control of the other side.

f. If agreement is secured on the overall civilian internee-refugee question in the proposal stated above, lists of selected UN and ROK civilians will be introduced into the negotiations at the earliest opportunity.

795.00/12-2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951—8:01 p. m.

3756. For Ambassador. Urtel 3850 Dec 28. We are seriously concerned over Fr failure appreciate basic purpose our statement as evidenced by proposed revision handed Bonsal. We wld judge from account Bonsal's conversation with La Tournelle that Fr have also seized upon statement as opportunity secure commitment from states participating in Kor mil operation to cover possible future action in Indochina. While Fr are aware we continue to regard defense of Indochina matter greatest urgency to US (cite tripartite mil conversations) we cannot agree it is practicable deal with Indochina problem in projected statement on Kor. We cannot modify projected statement so as completely rob it of its intended signif merely in order broaden its application to Indochina.

We see no point to Fr objection second para our statement. Quite aside from disastrous effect on ROK, with which UN and US must work in future, omission ref to ultimate pol settlement for Kor wld generally be regarded as retreat from established UN objectives. It wld be interpreted as acknowledgment that to this extent at least aggression in Kor was successful. This we are not prepared do.

We are equally unable accept alterations suggested in final para our statement, altho we have no objection revision first sentence thereof as it appears in Fr draft. However, we do not perceive any substantive difference between two versions first sentence. As was well stated by Bonsal, we regard our formulation as strongest practicable deterrent renewal commie aggression in Kor and vital component in ability terminate hostilities on basis only type armis agreement attainable.

You are requested see Pleven soonest (or Schuman if Pleven unavailable) explaining to him reasons Fr redraft unacceptable to us and urging approval our draft. We suggest point be made that we are now close to agreement among all other participating states on text our statement. For Fr now to persist in proposing fundamental revision wld gravely complicate course armis negots. If as a result armis talks shld fail, and Kor hostilities be continued, effect on US interest in Indochina and on gen US mil and econ assistance Indochina and elsewhere cld not but be adverse. In our view it is in long-range interest Fr as well as ourselves immed to reach agreement to issue proposed statement soon as armis signed so that free world posture of vigorous retaliation to renewal attack in Kor may be made perfectly clear to all, and implications thereof for other areas subject commie aggression can be drawn by commies.

ACHESON

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 166 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 29 December 1951—10:18 p. m.

C–60404. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 679.

"1. Sub-delegation on item nbr 4 pressed all day for data on POW's as yet unaccounted for. Near close of session Lee indicated that the Communists would, in exchange for additional data from UNC to constitute a full report on all POW's held throughout the war, provide similar data. He stated it would not mean that there would be any increase in the number of prisoners now held which has been accurately reported. He indicated further that the new data would be incomplete because of the absence of records and due to their destruction in the war. No other significant developments.

"2. Sub-delegations on item nbr 4 scheduled to meet at 1100 hours 30 Dec.

"*Comment:* Tomorrow UNC will attempt to get agreement to restoration of former ROKA soldiers to POW status as an end in itself and as a means of getting a clearer statement from the Communists on individual self-determination in connection with the incorporation of these former POW's into the NKPA. Success in the former is not anticipated but the latter will support a position which the UNC intends to advance later. If appropriate the question of exchange of UN civilians under POW exchange will be raised and, depending on Communist reaction, possibly the question of ROK civilians. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 167 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 29 December 1951—11:46 p. m.

C–60409. HNC–678. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 678.

"Sub-delegation on agenda item no 3 met at 1100 hours this date.

"1. Morning session UNC asked for answers to questions of past 2 days. Hsieh claimed answers given many times. UNC stated Communists refuse to make any effort to solve differences while UNC has agreed to rehabilitation of limited number of airfields for civil air operations. Thus any pretext of interference in internal affairs eliminated. Claimed Communists intend increase military air capabilities preventing stable and effective armistice. Accused Communists of hiding this intent under false term 'interference in internal affairs;'

claimed Communists attempting to deceive people of world. Hsieh refuted UN remarks, made long statement accusing UN of attempting to gain control of all of Korea through aerial observation during armistice. UNC pointed out that proposal applies equally to both sides, asked enemy to adopt sincere attitude thus enable both sides to reach agreement on existing issues. Hsieh said Communists would accept no unreasonable demands and would continue to defend their sovereign rights. Asked UN to accept their fair and reasonable proposal of December 24. UNC asked for any serious effort which would solve existing differences. Communists stated they had made all efforts, next step up to UN. UN asked if enemy intended to build up air capabilities during armistice. Hsieh avoided question.

"2. Afternoon session:

"*a.* UNC asserted Communists evade and ignore issues remaining and refuse to answer questions. Stated many details left to be worked out after principles agreed to, including agreement on non-combatant nations, supervisory organ and observer teams; functions, rights and support of MAC and supervisory organ; agreement on ports of entry; islands to be controlled by each side; and agreement on ways and means of recovery of war dead. UNC submitted new proposal revising principles 4, 5, and 6 as follows:

"4. In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the military armistice commission so that the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in rear agreed upon by both sides.

"The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

"5. Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following 2 provisions:

"*a.* Within the demilitarized zone, the military armistice commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"*b.* Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ non-combatant nations by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall carry out the inspection.

"6. Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean War, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the military armistice commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in para (4) and para (5) *b* of this agreement. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for carrying out these functions the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall dispatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission. In performing their above-stated functions, the inspection team of non-combatant nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides.

"UNC claimed great concession made already on airfields. Reiterated previous concessions on islands; single directing authority, non-combatant inspection teams, rehabilitation of limited number of airfields for civil air operations. UNC proposed giving up safeguard of aerial observation only if Communists willing to agree to 3 principles submitted without substantive change. Communists requested 15 minute recess to study new proposal.

"*b.* Hsieh asked 3 questions:

"(1) UNC interpretation of 'reinforcing.' Would exchange of weapons on piece-for-piece basis still be permitted?

"(2) Was it intentional UNC did not take out last passage of principle 4, which refers to rehabilitation of airfields?

"(3) Would number of neutral nations to be invited be odd or even?"

"*c.* UNC answers were as follows:

"(1) Answer has been given in previous sessions.

"(2) Yes.

"(3) That is a detail; we are now talking about principles.

"*d.* Hsieh agreed 3 revised principles a step forward but a main stumbling block is still UNC desire to interfere in their internal affairs. Hsieh suggested recess until 1100 30 December for more complete study of UNC proposal. UNC now at presently authorized final position and will adopt firm stand on this position beginning tomorrow. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 171 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 December 1951—12:03 p. m.

C-60436. Urmsg JCS 90157 [1] and CINCFE msg C 59939, 22 Dec 51.[2] Msg in 2 paragraphs.

1. Ref my para 2, estimate of 30–35 PW camps in NK is based on our evaluation of info contained in PW article FEC IntSum 3341, 2 Nov 51.[3] This total includes 11 camps listed by Communists. Based on additional info published in PW article FEC IntSum 3393, 24 Dec 51, 10 new locations in NK are accepted, however, only the four following camps are believed to be permanent type: Pyonapong (YE 1006), Popyong (BU 4337), Chungwa (YD 4015), and Tongan-Myon (YD 1386). The remainder believed to be transient camps or collecting points. In the total of 18 PW locations in China and Manchuria, we estimate 12 as permanent type. Additional info contained in FEC IntSum 3393 indicates 2 new locations in Manchuria, 1 of which is permanent type, and 3 new inclosures in China, all believed non-permanent type.

2. Ref my par 5, being air-mailed to you this date is a roster of UN personnel believed to be in en hands and not included on communist list dtd 18 Dec. This roster includes following categories: NK official report to international committee Red Cross; Communist radio and press releases; PW letters to next of kin; captured en documents and photographs; interrogation of released UN POW; interrogation of en PWs. Recapitulation of this roster reveals that a total of 1,111 US personnel (Army, Navy and AF) and 18 UK personnel believed to be in en hands are not included on communist list. Included in the total are 45 persons reported deceased, all US personnel. This is a continuing study and additional info will be forwarded as devel-

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[1] Dated December 20, p. 1399.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1417.

[3] Neither this document nor any of the documents subsequently referred to in this message is printed.

oped. Also being air-mailed is a roster of 46 names included in the Communist list of 18 Dec as being PWs whose status, according to our records, is inconsistent with that classification.

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 172 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 December 1951—4:37 p. m.

C–60453. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 683.

"Rpt for morning session 30 Dec 51 sub-committee on agenda item nbr 3.

"UN amplified answers to questions Hsieh asked previous afternoon. Stated "no reenforcing" was a limiting term, permits normal resupply and replacement but no increase, does not include replacement of articles damaged during period of hostilities. UNC explained that nbr of non-combatant nations invited is immaterial but that nbr of individuals invited by ea side on supervisory organization and observation teams will be the same. Hsieh asked, regarding principle 4, what is meant by 'action at a political level'. UNC explained that wording was more expressive than Communist wording of proposal and does not change meaning of sentence. Communist commented on UNC revised proposal. Stated UNC had expressed agreement to holding of a political conference of a higher level during discussions on agenda item nbr 2. Asked that wording of first sentence of principle 4 not be changed if UNC new version had no intention of changing meaning. Hsieh accused UNC of intent to continue to introduce all types of weapons while Communists insist on no introduction of any weapons. Stated Communists "principle of no introduction[''] necessary for effective armistice. Hsieh claimed there should be no increase of mil forces in Korea and no replenishment. Insisted that last para of UNC principle 4, regarding aflds, was stumbling block, and a demand that absolutely cannot be accepted. Explained measure Commies had taken to dispel UNC fear of growing Communist air power. First: Enemy agreement on no introduction of combat acft. Second: Provision for inspection of violations by neutral teams in rear. Hsieh claimed Communists sincere, desired stable and effective armistice. Admitted that UNC proposal is a step forward but stated that differences still exist. Asked for UNC opinion for reaching settlement on these differences. UNC suggested that Communists study UNC proposal and amplifying statements, claimed enemy had offered nothing toward solution of remaining differences. Hsieh stated he had pointed out differences. Agreed that no difference exists on fourth principle if UNC agrees to adopt Commie wording of 24 Dec. Insisted that Communist stand on interference in internal affairs is unshakeable. Advised UNC to reconsider if solution is to be reached on remaining issues. UNC stated that its proposal very clear and next effort up to Communists. UNC suggested recess until 1100 31 Dec unless they had anything to offer. Hsieh stated that differences still exist in fourth principle and that two para of principle is absolutely unacceptable. Communists agreed to recess until 1100, 31 Dec. Sgd Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 174 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 30 December 1951—9:21 p. m.

C-60472. CINCUNC Adv HNC 684 for info.

"Sub-delegates on item nbr 4 convened at 1100 Dec 30.

1. During morning session UNC concentrated remarks on subject of former ROKA soldiers who became POW's and subsequently were incorporated in KPA. Lee committed himself further on the principle of individual self determination but gave no indications that the Communists could be persuaded to restore this class of personnel to POW status.

2. In afternoon session UNC raised the question of foreign civilians interned by the Communists and requested that they be exchanged with the POW's. Lee replied that they would be released after the armistice was signed, but asserted that the matter was beyond the scope of the armistice talks. UNC accepted this assurance that this personnel would be released and stated that this should be stipulated in the armistice agreement. Lee did not directly oppose this, although he did not give his assent. UNC went on to say that it intended to bring up the problem of other civilians, a problem to which Lee had adverted on several occasions during the talks. Lee attempted to extricate himself from any responsibility for having introduced this subject, saying that his remarks had been directed to the fate of the many thousand NK refugees now in ROK. He did not express himself fully on the discussion of civilians under agenda item nbr 4. UNC closed saying it saw no reason why civilians should not be permitted to return to their homes during the armistice.

3. Sub-delegation on agenda item nbr 4 reconvenes at 1100I, Dec 31.

Comment: After further discussion of the civilian problem tomorrow UNC will formally propose its recently approved position on the basis for the release and exchange of POW's if time is judged ripe. Since the position embodies the principle of individual self determination regarding repatriation which we feel will be repugnant to the Communists, the proposal will not be introduced at this time unless the Communists have agreed in principle that the repatriation of civilians be permitted under the armistice agreement. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 175 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 31 December 1951—5 : 55 p. m.

310855Z. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 688.

"Report of sub-delegation meeting on item 3. Convened 1100 hours, 31 Dec 51. UNC explained that rewording of first sentence of principle sets forth true objective--peaceful settlement—while previous wording only indicated conference would be held. UNC fur explained meaning of 'no reinforcing' as no increase in numerical quantities, only replacement of weapons and articles which become unserviceable during armistice. Stated piece for piece basis for exchange is unshakeable stand. Communists listed existing disagreements (1) holding of political conference (2) replenishment (3) interference in internal affairs. Asserted that UNC wording was hollow and aimed at dodging issue of political conference. Maintained that the method as well as the objective should be included in principle. Hsieh stated that UNC interpretation of replenishment only indicated intent to increase military weapons and equip. Asserted that UNC attempts to maintain 'state of war' in Korea to facilitate carrying out war policy throughout world. Hsieh reiterated previous stand that UNC interference in internal affairs main stumbling block and that Communist position of 'no interference' is firm. UNC charged Communists with insincerity towards effective armistice. Asserted that en intent is to develop mil air capability during armistice. Charged that Communist insistence on unlimited airfields rehabilitation and construction must be given up if progress is to be made. Col Chang asserted that UNC had admitted that restriction on airfields is interference in internal affairs. Reiterated stand that no combat aircraft be introduced into Korea. Stated Communists may or may not rehabilitate aflds; asserted that this subj is a matter of sovereign rights. Chang said that if either side began to develop aflds on a large scale the other side would imm know of this fact through inspection teams. Maintained that Communists are more concerned over their sovereign rights than airfields. Chang stated no concession could be made which involved the surrender of sovereign rights. Charged UNC with placing obstructions in way of progress.

Claimed that subj of aflds had nothing to do with present conference for a military armistice.

Hsieh charged UNC with delaying negotiations by refusal to remove main stumbling block which is UNCs unreasonable demands to restrict airfields. UNC asked if Communists had anything new to offer.

Communists suggested recess until Jan 1, 1952. UNC agreed. Signed Joy."

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 176 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, December 31, 1951—6:31 p. m.

310931Z. Your Dec 29 msg[2] requesting I ask ROK Govt official list ROK civilians in Commie hands just recd. OPI Chief who coordinates this matter for ROK reiterates info already conveyed to you mymsgs Dec 24 and 28.[3] Basic lists in General Lee's possession. Additions mentioned mymsg Dec 28 being sent Lee by Defense Minister. ROK Govt does not have a separate selected list. No govt official willing to accept responsibility of preparing such a restricted list. No upstanding prominent govt officials or civic leaders went or taken north. I understand reluctance to list 27 national assemblymen separately for example due to understanding that some which ones no one definitely knows threw their lot in with the Commies. All Koreans consider the revised list totalling 2,585 prepared by family association as the key list. I suggest that this be so considered.

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[1] Repeated for information to General Ridgway in Tokyo and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
[2] Not printed.
[3] Neither printed, but see telegram 584, December 19, from Pusan, p. 1376.

795.00/12-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 31, 1951—7 p. m.

3910. Re Deptel 3756, Dec 29. After series of conversations which I had today with Pleven, Schuman, Parodi[1] and other FonOff officials, we have obtained agreement of Fr Govt to text of our proposed statement regarding Korea, with exception of final sentence of our revised final para. Fr proposal for this sentence is as follows: "The situation thus created wld involve grave risks of an extension of hostilities".

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[1] Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Fr have agreed to this translation of their proposed text which reads as follows: "La situation ainsi cree comporterait des graves risques d'une extension du conflit". Fr do not care whether we translate "conflit" by conflict or hostilities.

Fr feel very strongly that our proposed wording for this final para is too much in language of ultimatum for public release at time of armistice. They suggest, however, that they wld be agreeable if simultaneously with public release it be made quite clear by us as negotiating party to Russians and also to Chinese Communists if occasion presents itself as regards latter that consequences of renewed aggression wld be extremely grave and wld in all probability involve impossibility of confining hostilities within frontiers of Korea. They think gravity might be added if it were done through our Embassy in Moscow, and they wld be prepared to support it. However, it shld be a statement to which we wld not give publicity.

Fr have abandoned their position regarding (*a*) omission of UN political objective; (*b*) wording which might be considered applicable to Indo-China and (*c*) have suggested wording for consequences of "renewal of armed attack" which is substantively equivalent to our original language. We believe this is best deal obtainable with French.

For Dept's info Schuman will be spending next two days in Metz and will be unavailable discuss this matter.

Sent Dept 3910. Rptd info London 1045.

BRUCE

Lot 55D128 : Black Book, Tab 177 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, 31 December 1951—9:31 p. m.

C–60530. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 691.

"Sub-delegation item 4 met 1100. An early remark by Gen Lee which appeared to be a repudiation of his previous agreement to provide data on all POWs held at any time touched off a discussion which occupied most of the day. At its conclusion, it was not entirely clear as to whether or not he would provide the required data. Following this sequence Lee charged UNC with evading the discussion of his proposal to release all POW in the custody of both sides following the signing of the armistice. UNC replied that it had been discussing the principle for days on the basis of the data which had been exchanged; that on this basis the proposal was dishonest and inequitable. It asserted that it was exploring all avenues in an effort to find a means of making the proposal more acceptable. Lee disregarded several opportunities which were offered him to discuss the question of civilians in response to the trial balloon sent up yesterday by the UNC. Recessed 1630 to resume 1100 tomorrow.

"*Comment:* Pointed lack of response to UNC trial balloon on civilians led sub-delegates to conclusion that further advance in this direction today would be premature. The subject will be raised again tomorrow. If Communists indicate agreement in principle that civilians be permitted to return to their former homes under the armistice, UNC proposal on release and exchange will be introduced. Signed Joy."

Index for Parts 1 and 2
Appears at end of
Part 2.

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